2014
The implications of the Ukrainian Crisis in
the International System and the choices of
the parties involved
Dr. Constantinos Filis
Dimopoulos Dimosthenis,
Karagiannopoulos Petros-Damianos
Institute of International Relations
Panteion University
16/7/2014
The implications of the Ukrainian Crisis in the International System and the
choices of the parties involved
2014
Copyright© 2014
Institute of International Relations
Centre for Russia, Eurasia & South Eastern Europe
Hill 3-5,
Athens, P.C. 105 58
Phone Number: 210 33.12.325/7
Fax: 210 33.13.575
Email: ceregreece@gmail.com
Site: www.idis.gr and www.ceregreece.org
Academic Supervisor:
Dr. Constantinos Filis
Authors:
Dr. Constantinos Filis
Dimopoulos Dimosthenis
Karagiannopoulos Petros-Damianos
Research Team:
Chytiri Spyridoula
Dimopoulos Dimosthenis
Karagiannopoulos Petros-Damianos
Xylia Sofia
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Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................... 3
Key words: .............................................................................................. 3
Introduction ............................................................................................. 4
Ukraine’s Orientation Choices................................................................ 10
European Union orientation ............................................................... 10
Eurasian Union orientation ................................................................. 12
The neutrality option .......................................................................... 14
The Chronicle of the Crisis ..................................................................... 16
Major external actors and their tools that can influence the crisis ........ 25
The United States of America ............................................................. 25
European Union .................................................................................. 28
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ..................................................... 32
Russian Federation ............................................................................. 33
Resolving the crisis: Kiev’s options and choices ..................................... 37
Closing Remarks ..................................................................................... 42
References ............................................................................................. 44
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The implications of the Ukrainian Crisis in the International System and the
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Abstract
The present research attempts to summarize the political events that resulted in the
outbreak of the almost 7 month-long Ukrainian crisis and the events of the crisis itself
until the current date. Additionally, it examines the three orientation choices of
Ukraine: the Western, the Eurasian and the neutral; the tools of the major regional and
global actors involved in the crisis and eventually attempts to analyze necessary steps
for the end of the conflict.
Key words: Ukraine, Russia, EU, USA, NATO, Putin, Ukrainian crisis.
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Introduction
First of all, it is of absolute necessity to examine the most important components of
the complicated Russo-Ukrainian relationship over the years and the geopolitical and
strategic factors which emerged by it. This effort, though described in a brief manner,
will be able to explain the reasons why the today’s Ukrainian crisis has not been
averted and will confirm the arguments of the following analysis, concerning the
strategies of the two opposing sides throughout the crisis and every possible outcome
this crisis might have.
The first factor we must focus is the high importance of Ukraine for Russia and
vice versa. To begin with we should mention geographically and strategically
important Crimean peninsula. The peninsula is of the highest value concerning the
control of the Black Sea, militarily and economically, whilst its control is crucial for
the natural gas and energy policy of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
Crimea has been throughout history a field of bilateral and multilateral conflict.
The port of Sevastopol, founded at 1783 by Catherine the Great, has been all since the
naval base of the Russian “Black Sea Fleet”. Regarding the Russian history, the
presence of this fleet has been particularly important, offering moments of glory for
the Russian army in Crimean War (1853-1856) and 2nd World War (1939-1945).
Crimea had been a part of Russia since 1954, when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev
transferred Crimea to Ukraine, as an act of friendship between the two soviet states.
[1]
The problematic relationship between the two countries during USSR era cannot
be ignored. Despite all Stalin’s actions, during the so called “decade of terror”,
denying the very existence of Ukraine and eliminating anyone who opposed, the
borderlines became even more severe.
The referendum of the 1st December 1991 concerning Ukraine’s independence,
conducted by Boris Yeltsin, was in fact the Soviet Union’s headstone. This way, the
former Russian leader, founded the brand new Russian regime, relieved once and for
all from any imperial ideation, as he then thought. It was the time when Russia and
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Ukraine should plainly transform into peaceful, western type, democracies. It was not
though a long before problems started reoccurring.
Economically viewed, right after the USSR dissolution, the winner states of the
Cold War, especially USA, offered their financial aid at most of the Eastern European
countries with combined state and private capitals and foreign direct investments.
Most notable examples have been the three Baltic States – Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia. The economical and thus political stability occurred by those investments,
was not something that also happened neither in Ukraine, nor in Russia. Both
countries large size – especially Russia’s – could not allow their transforming
economies to by based on donations, while their acute socialistic – state-centered
economic and political past was keeping repelling most of the foreign investors, due
to high risk. This western economic policy during the first years after the USSR
dissolution in fact secluded the two countries, letting them preserve their high
economic interdependence they had established during the soviet era. This
interdependence, mostly preserved until now, made us clear that one side is weak
without the other. Both sides seem to have fully understood this complex relationship,
although Russia is the one that proved more diligent to the needs this egoistically
realistic view of international relations demands. [2]
One more very important factor is the issue of people’s identity; factor that we too
consider of utmost importance. Nowadays the reference to a highly divided Ukrainian
society has become a cliché. While some external viewer could spot many similarities
in both Ukrainians and Russians, we should take a glimpse view of the many existing
contradicting borderlines.
About 17% percent of the Ukrainian people, before the crisis had occurred, were
formally Russian nationals, part because of the Russia’s policy of providing
citizenship to many Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine, along with financial aid,
counting up to a lot million dollars. [3] This Russian policy of the last 20 years was
the attempt of blocking or at least stalling the nation-building process in Ukraine and
proved to be an extremely useful leverage during the ongoing crisis, especially in the
Crimean case. Furthermore, in Ukraine there are at least 6 Christian doctrines, each
one supporting in general an opposing side in Ukrainian political life, leading
Ukraine’s social structure to further fragmentation. [4]
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Cultural differences between Russians and Ukrainian can be rooted far back in
history; excluding the Kievan Rus, Russians owned their fully independent state at
least by 1480, while the first independent Ukrainian state happens only during the 20th
century – no way the period of the limited autonomy of the Cossacks could be
regarded as a period of Ukrainian independence. Also, while Ukraine’s territory was
divided and conquered by many different states, the same period Russia was
extending their dominion all the way from Baltic Sea to the North Sea and the Pacific
Ocean. As a result national identities differed since then: Russians became and
independent nation, while Ukrainians were trying to survive; Russians were rebelling,
while Ukrainians were trying to implement accommodation strategies to some of their
overlords. Even when they were allies, Russians had been always having the upper
hand and when they were at war, Russians had been usually victorious.
This complex relationship and common historical origins could only lead the two
people into two possible results; either in forming a closer collaboration-cooperation
or in forming a conflictual relationship, providing the option of climaxing a crisis far
an easier option than in other cases. Nationalistic readings in both countries had
always been blaming either the imperialistic Russian policy or foreign propaganda
that turns our brothers against us. Although not entirely unrealistic points of view,
they lack objectivity and have been proved that they alone sometimes become an
obstacle in improvement of bilateral relations.
Although many scholars and the most politicians were unable to predict the
climaxing of the today’s Ukrainian crisis, mostly based on the fact that the first years
of the USSR dissolution found both countries under great economic and political
instability and later because of many idealistic and liberal theories that seem to have
had a great impact in western political thought the years after the Cold War, the
possibility of a Russo-Ukrainian conflict that could even lead to war between two
countries was described by John J. Mearsheimer back in 1994.
Because of the impending implementation of the Ukrainian nuclear disarmament
deal at the time, the known scholar thought that in order to preserve peace in Eastern
Europe, or at least prevent a future Russian intervention in Ukraine, their nuclear
weaponry should have not been dissoluted, according to the nuclear deterrence
theorem, especially since the Ukrainian conventional military capability could never
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become able to oppose as a significant deterrent factor towards a by all means
superior Russia. [5]
Despite internal Ukrainian factors and Russo-Ukrainian complexities that were
constantly creating security dilemmas especially as far as concerning the Ukrainian
side – Ukrainian politicians were never willing to abandon the hardly won
independence of their country –, we should also focus on the western powers policy
towards Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries in general.
After the end of the Cold War, western powers were now called to fulfill the power
gap created in Eastern Europe. Although the EU’s and USA’s decision to set in their
sphere of influence many of the Eastern European countries was the most realistic
decision, apparently western allies were not able to comprehend the size of Russia’s
growth the past few years of V. Putin’s administration and their ability and
willingness to react decisively against what the Russians think as attack on their vital
national interests and security problem.
The EU’s policy concerning the former Warsaw Pact countries until today can be
described as three interrelated stages. Although, those stages were surely not a
progressive process or a carefully designed long-term plan on the Union’s behalf, it
was more of a separated problem solving process, concerning specific subject matters
coming up every time.
The first stage of the EU’s policy covers the time period directly after the USSR
dissolution. At this very moment EU formed their future policy based on a technically
formed borderline separating the countries that were only members of the Warsaw
Pact and those countries that declared independence secluding from USSR.
Respecting the first group of states the policy formed would be an approaching, aiding
and integrating one while for the second group integration would not be the aim but
only economic and political cooperation.
The second stage began at 1994. The newly formed power balance in Europe was
covered with a “cooperative” rhetoric towards Russia. Europe’s raising energy
dependence from Russia should be combined with stability in bilateral relationships.
As a result two new policies were formally founded: “The Partnership and Co-
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operation Agreement” (1994) and “Joint Strategy” (1999), aiming to reinforce
coordinated EU’s policy towards Russia.
Although, from 2000 to date, begins the thirds stage, somewhat contradictory
towards the previous ones. The EU member-states went highly controversial; they
separated into two groups, the “older” and the “younger” member-states. The second
group, driven from their past experiences that caused hostility against Russia and
being influenced in a higher level than other EU’s member-states from the USA, were
highly concerned about more regulatory matters, such as human rights and
democratization, while “older” member-states policy kept being about forming
stronger economic and commercial relations with Russia.
The outcome of this internal EU’s conflict – mostly known as the phenomenon of
“Two Europes” – although it was real, it was in fact controversial for European values
and a setback for European federalism. In the meantime, as a result of the Ukrainian
“Orange Revolution” (2004), Ukraine’s main strategic target from now on would be
integration with EU, even if newly elected President Yushchenko was not willing or
able to exclude Russo-Ukrainian relationships as a factor that determines decisively
Ukraine’s future.
The situation in Europe since 2000 and the 2002 and 2003 decisions were the
reasons of initiating the new “European Neighboring Policy”. This policy’s main
purpose was, from now on, to approach every Eastern European country offering
bilateral political and economic reformer agreements, without being in first place
offered a full membership. Such an agreement has been the ”Ukrainian Action Plan”,
signed at 2005 and planned to be in force since WTO acceptance of Ukraine as a
member-state at 2008. The plan was aiming for a future implementation of a free
trade zone between EU and Ukraine, a strengthening process of democratic
institutions and further reforms.
Furthermore, the Russian military intervention in Georgia at 2008 and the RussoUkrainian natural gas crisis in 2009 provoked EU into upgrading their neighboring
policy; the new agreement was to be called “Eastern Partnership” and had been
specifically formed in order to stand against Russian aggressiveness. Its aim was the
political approach with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and
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conditionally Belarus. First steps towards that approach would be the establishment of
a visa-free regime and economic aid up to 600 million Euros. [6]
Additionally, another very important international actor implicated in Eastern
Europe’s balance of power is NATO. At the end of the Cold War NATO faced their
famous “identity” problem, since bipolarism was over and its main target – the USSR
containment – was successful. NATO found new meaning in their very existence by
expanding the alliance to the East. New members of the alliance were now becoming
ex-Warsaw Pact states, in contrast to what the first post-Soviet Russian leadership
believed that would happen. [7]
All those factors mentioned above, combined with the Russian pressuring policy
towards Ukraine in times of crisis and its, in fact, aggressive policy while Russia’s
strength was recovering, have caused today’s circumstances. Ukrainian security fears
combined with EU and NATO policies have caused a high level threat sense also in
Russia. Reaction against EU’s policies, especially “Eastern Partnership” was
immense; Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov immediately condemned the
action-plan by mentioning to every CIS state that this kind of agreements with EU
would be from now on contradictory to their obligations, asking them to choose
between EU and Russia.
NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe was also perceived from Russia as an
immediate threat to its security. The inclusion in the alliance of every former Warsaw
Pact country and even some ex-USSR countries, like the Baltic states was something
Russia could not tolerate any longer, especially if this expansion was to be continued
aiming Ukraine and Georgia. Thus the risky choice of Crimean annexation on behalf
of Russia is not something that should surprise anyone; Russia felt that was running
out of options.
Losing Ukraine was never an option for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Not
only because of any security threat or because of the social and economic interrelation
but also because of the fact that Russia’s Eurasia Union would be an exclusively
Asian project, lowering subsequently any power projection the Union might have in
due time towards Europe. [8]
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Ukraine’s Orientation Choices
A country’s decision about political orientation can be considered at four levels:
Political economics, norms and institutions, values and political identity and the
ontological level. [9] Having taken into consideration all those factors leading to a
potential decision we are first of all going to write down what every Ukraine’s
possible orientation choice is offering to Ukraine and its people.
European Union orientation
Except than a response to Russian aggressive policy the past few years, EU’s
choice to approach Ukraine was also a decision made out of a long-term action plan
for the country. Ukraine’s economy might had been at best weak before the crisis –
even worse after the events of the previous months – although Europe firmly believed
and keeps believing that after a long-term period of reforms and probably financial
aid from international institutions, like IMF, Ukraine’s potential should get revealed.
The country will inevitably acquire completely new horizons in future, in all fields, if
only become attached into the EU’s sphere of influence, argue European officials and
pro-European Ukrainians.
Among all of the post-Soviet countries, with the exception of the Baltic countries,
Ukraine seemed the most promising candidate for a speedy integration into the
European community of nations. Instead, a transition proved a long and bumpy road.
The transition to a western type economy had been slow and the covert
criminalization of economy was the sad outcome of the first years after independence.
The oligarchic regime that has run the country since mid-nineties has ruined the
country’s economy, crippled its social structure and tarnished its international
reputation. Additionally, Ukraine has been asking for EU membership since 1995, but
for years the European Union was too occupied with incorporating the 10 Central and
East European countries, which was completed in 2004 and 2007, respectively. All
these factors, combined with any geopolitical implications and Russian interventions
mentioned above hampered for years Ukraine’s European perspective. [10]
Nevertheless and as a result of the past few months’ rapid events, on 21 March
2014, European Union Heads of State and Government and Ukrainian Prime Minister
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H.E. Mr. Arseny Yatsenyuk signed the political provisions of the “EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement”. At the same time and in order not to wait for the entry into
force of the Association Agreement’s provisions it was also signed a “Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area”. This way was decided to start the unilateral
reduction or elimination of the EU’s customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine.
[11]
The Association Agreement is the first agreement based on political association
between the EU and any of the Eastern Partnership counties. The key parts of the
agreement focus on support to core reforms, economic recovery and growth, and
governance and sector cooperation in areas such as energy, transport an environment
protection, industrial cooperation, social development and protection, equal rights,
consumer protection, education, youth and cultural cooperation. It also emphasis on
values and principles: democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, good governance, a market economy and sustainable
development. [11] [12]
For the Ukrainian elite, in its vast majority, the only rational choice is the
European one, even when we are referring to the opulent businessmen of Eastern parts
of the country which recently declared their will of following the Crimean example of
joining the Russian Federation. Their “European choice” is an attempt to preserve
power in its hands inside the country. Many might call this choice an illusion, based
only on their fear of increasing antagonism with Russian oligarchs and the hope of a
more caring Europe, which will protect them against malicious attacks from Russia.
Although what must be made clear is that in every way, every final choice Ukraine
shall make, local elite’s exploitation of Ukrainian people and corruptive tactics always
jeopardizing the economic and political future of Ukraine are close to an end. As far
as it concerns EU, the proposed reforms are to be done on the Ukrainian behalf might
be difficult for the Ukrainian people and cause a high increase of poverty levels,
though if any implementation of those reforms takes place, local elite would not be
able to influence any government’s decision making process the way it did before.
Even if it is difficult for the Ukrainian elite to give up its dirty political tricks, in the
end, it will happen. The implementation of changes and reforms will surely take place
sooner or later, because of the country’s horrendous economic situation and the EU is
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the only international actor that could provide Ukraine with the necessary enforcing
measures of such an implementation.
As we can understand, at the very moment, EU provides Ukraine the possibility of
an associated membership. Although, the question to be made is whether Europe is
willing to transform this membership into a full membership one day, when all
necessary reforms take place and produce results. [9]
Furthermore, even if the EU road is followed – and EU remains true to their policy
– this is not going to deliver Ukraine from Russian pressure. As it will be explained
with details later, Russian pressure tactics above Ukraine is not something that can be
easily overcame neither by Ukraine itself, nor by any western allies the country might
have at the moment. That is for the same reasons a Russian deterrence was not
possible until now, even during the successful attempt of Crimean annexation.
In addition, if Ukraine finally follows the route of integration into the EU, it will
fall, beyond any doubt, into the category of the poor periphery, since there is a very
long way far from reaching any of the Copenhagen criteria. Thus, it is questionable
whether such a choice would be wise, since Europe high standards of reforms
combined with a continued self-comparison with other European people’s standard of
living, could cause further unrest in Ukrainian already divided society. Other
problems that may arise are the strengthening of the already significant migration of
Ukrainians to the EU, jeopardizing the very future of the country taking into
consideration the significant low birth-rates and an intensification of the process of
deindustrialization. [13] Furthermore, economists affiliated with the Eurasian
Development Bank present analytical scenarios and make negative assumptions about
the possibility of Ukraine’s worsening the terms of trade in the post-Soviet area and
reductions of Ukrainian exports. [14]
Eurasian Union orientation
Russia unwilling to “lose” Ukraine to European Union, for all the reasons
mentioned above, launched a series of substantial trade sanctions against Ukraine in
July and August 2013. What Russia wants is Ukraine to reject the European bid and
join its Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan.
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In June 2009, Russian Prime Minister Putin surprised everybody by stating that
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan would enter the WTO as a customs union. These
three countries agreed to unify their customs tariff s. In 2010, the Customs Union
came into existence, with the implementation of a common customs tariff and joint
Customs Code. In January 2012, border controls were abolished. A joint secretariat,
the Eurasian Economic Commission, was set up in Moscow with a staff of more than
1,000 people. The Eurasian Development Bank in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and an
arbitration court in Minsk were also established. [15]
The final step of the transformation of the customs union into a transnational
constitution was made when in 29.05.2014 was sealed the Eurasian Union's creation
by 1.1.2015 by the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in Kazakhstan's
capital, Astana. This timing is related to the current Ukraine crisis; Russian President
made it clear that Ukraine would not participate in the Eurasian Economic Union,
because of its signing of the Association Agreement. [16]
Although the signing of the agreement on the Ukrainian side has not completely
close the door to any future friendly Russo-Ukrainian relations, Putin’s choice to rush
on the creation of the Eurasian Union is puts additional pressure to Ukrainian
government. Russia is trying to capitalize any possibility of aggravated social unrest
because of the country’s economic instability; by showing Ukrainians that there is
another way that this crisis could be resolved: by abandoning the European
perspective in order to enter the Eurasian Union.
Except than the fact that Russia offers relief from the greatest part of current
Ukraine’s economic pressure Russia themselves are putting, ending their trade
sanctions against Ukraine, the only clear option that provides to Ukrainian people is
the end of the armed conflict pro-Russians have started in eastern provinces. Even if
Ukraine cancels every agreement recently signed with the EU, Russia is not going to
let Crimea go.
Although it will take time in order Ukrainian people to forget Russia’s annexation
of Crimea, there is a high possibility than many of them could set their differences
aside for a while, and since Ukraine’s economic situation is continuously aggravating
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and the only international actor could immensely relieve the Ukrainian economic
burden is Russia.
The possibility of a Russian orientation choice for Ukraine might not seem viable
for the time being. Although nobody could refuse that if the internal situation keeps
worsening, Ukraine’s policy could make a mid-term major swift towards this
direction.
It does not look to be in Moscow’s interest the major political and
constitutional reforms in Ukraine, like the ones EU is proposing, although if Ukraine
applies to be a member of the Eurasian Union in lieu of the EU, Moscow would
surely seek the reduction of corruption in order the future viability of the country’s to
be preserved.
The neutrality option
While someone carefully considers EU’s policy about Ukraine and the current
situation in the country, could easily understand that if EU’s political agenda was in
fact selfless would prefer a neutral Ukraine, in order to de-climax the crisis and let
Russia relieve the pressure, by making Moscow feel less threatened by the West. In
contrary if the EU keeps pursuing solutions being interested firstly about their own
benefits, by absorbing Ukraine into the western system – EU and NATO – would
probably cause Russia to at least persist on the Ukrainian economy’s complete
destruction, as it would be more thoroughly explained later.
Then follows the question whether Ukraine has got a middle option; the option of
neutrality. Such an option could copy Finland’s example during the Cold War, when
both Russia and the West agreed to keep Finland out of the fight. The word
“Finlandisation” in this context refers to the agreement in the late 1940s between the
US, the UK and the USSR to keep Finland out of the Cold War, which was gathering
in intensity at the time.
Rather than absorb Finland back into Mother Russia or convert it into a client,
communist state as in Poland, Stalin agreed to accept Finland’s neutrality status. This
status quo lasted for forty years. Finland could neither tilt to the Soviet Union nor to
the Western powers. [17]
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The Finland status not only abated the possibility of an armed conflict in Europe or
but also helped the internal policy makers to construct a very well-functioning market
and an exemplary democratic regime. It is not clear if the majority of Ukrainian
people has taken this thought under consideration, but probably would be a very
tempting offer, because it could not even put an end to the current circle of violence
but could upgrade every economic and commercial capability of the country in short
notice. Despite all these, only Western allies and Russia together could make a final
decision towards this approach, in contrary with the two previously described options.
“Finlandisation” does not mean that the EU appeases Moscow. But they need to
realize that taking harsh actions against Russia could only make sense if its members
carry a collective big stick of European warfare capabilities, along with active
development of a more coherent energy policy that reduces massive overdependence
of Germany and its Eastern European neighbors on Russian sources, or even have
NATO provide them with a large military power projection.
On the other hand, Russia itself seems to need as well, a “Finland option” for
Ukraine. Despite having to reduce the potential capabilities of the newborn Eurasian
Union, it is probable that Ukrainian national self-assertion is already fortifying many
ex-Soviet countries of central Asia, notably Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to stiffen
resistance to Moscow’s continuing effort to absorb them totally inside its sphere of
influence, depriving them of sovereignty. [18]
A “good will” shown from Russia could resolve many future crises before they are
even born. The Western powers, however, need to comprehend that threatening
Russia’s security is not a viable option and could only lead in more similar future
crises, especially when both EU and NATO have lost a great deal of credibility of
deterrence.
Taking into consideration the fact that all three directly implicated sides, Europe,
Ukraine and Russia into today’s crisis all share part of the blame for creating the
current conflict it is, though, of their interest to defuse tensions and seek a way out
before it threatens the well-being of all involved.
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The Chronicle of the Crisis
In the present chapter we will attempt to assess the latest developments that have
led to the fomentation of the current grave situation in Ukraine, starting by November
21 and the decree of the Ukrainian Government of suspending the procedures for
signing the European Association Agreement [19].
On November 21st Ukrainian Prime Minister Nicola Azarov on a published decree
ordered for the “halt of the process of preparing the association agreement between
Ukraine and the European Union", a decision which was encouraged by the harsh
conditions posed by the IMF for its financial aid package to Ukraine. [20]
Following the governmental decree, protests erupted in the Ukrainian capital the
very same night. The demonstrations were peaceful and in support of a pro-western
Ukraine and were calling the government to sign the treaty and strengthen Ukraine’s
relations with the EU.
After the Vilnius Summit on November 29, where Ukraine opted to not sign the
Association Agreement, the demonstration wave grew and more people went to the
streets all over Ukraine, mainly in Kiev and Lviv, to express their anger and
frustration towards their government. [21] The next day the police dispersed the
protestors violently, which provoked outrage in several other regions of the country.
[22]
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Sources: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Ukraine's Central Election Commission
As demonstrations continued Viktor Yanukovych attended the planned sixth
Russian-Ukrainian interstate commission on 17 December in Moscow, which resulted
in the signing of the Ukrainian–Russian action plan by President Yanukovych and
President Putin, which consisted of major financial assistance from Russia, a
significant decrease in gas prices and commitments for closer economic cooperation
between Ukraine and Russia. [23]
The situation continued to deteriorate despite the efforts made by President
Yanukovych to deescalate the situation by proposing an extensive cabinet reshuffling
in order to include key opposition leaders. The rallies kept increasing in duration and
volume demanding the resignation of President Yanukovych and early elections.
On February 21st an evanescent peace deal was reached between President
Yanukovych and the opposition leaders, following a week of bloodshed and violence,
however the same day, as the President left Kiev for a trip to the Eastern Ukraine
regions, demonstrators overran governmental buildings in Kiev and the next day the
parliament voted to remove from office President Yanukovych and release Yulia
Tymoshenko from prison. [24]
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After the impeachment of President Yanukovych, an action which he called illegal
and a coup d’état, who fled the country, the Parliament appointed an interim
government and announced that the country will hold Presidential elections on May
25. Meanwhile, regional authorities in eastern provinces stated their concerns and
disapproval of the new developments. Regional authorities in Crimea threatened to
secede from Ukraine. [25]
On February 27 heavily armed pro-Russian militias seized Crimea’s Regional
Government and Parliament buildings, hours later Crimean Parliament voted in favor
of holding a referendum on the region’s status on May 25, the same day of the
Ukrainian Presidential elections. The next day similar militias started capturing
infrastructure and key buildings, including airports in Sevastopol and Simferopol.
Kiev and Western Governments claimed that the gunmen were Russian soldiers and
secret agents in disguise; however Russia adamantly denied the allegations. [26]
By Wednesday 5th of March, pro-Russian forces had complete control of the
Crimean peninsula and any military bases of the Ukrainian Army that were not
overran, were blockaded.
Later on, Crimea’s regional government announced it
would hold a referendum on whether it should officially join Russia on 16 March.
Crimea’s Deputy Prime-Minister said the referendum was being held purely to ratify
the decision of the Crimean parliament to join the Russian Federation, and the
parliament had appealed to Russia for assistance. [27]
The USA and the EU imposed targeted sanctions against Russian officials and
individuals responsible for the Crimean occupation, the Russian Government
responded in kind as well. [27]
On March 11, Parliamentarians in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
Ukrainian city of Sevastopol adopted declarations on the territories' independence.
[28]
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Sources: Tim Ripley, defense analyst; IHS Jane's; Nirav Nikunj Patel, WorldPop Project
The following days Russia started military exercises along its borders with
Ukraine, mobilizing numerous mechanized and armor divisions, special and air forces
that lasted for several days. [29] In response, the US deployed several F-16s in Poland
as a gesture to reaffirm its commitment and to show support for NATO's eastern
members after Russia's intervention in Ukraine.
On March 16, the Crimean Referendum took place and resulted in an
overwhelming vote in favor of joining the Russian Federation with over 95%. [30] On
March 17, the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea officially asked to
join the Russian Federation. [31] The day after, on March 18, Russian President
Vladimir Putin and the Crimean leaders signed a bill under which the Crimean
Peninsula was incorporated in the Russian Federation. Western countries and Kiev
called the treaty invalid and the Crimean referendum unconstitutional, [32] however
quickly the Crimean issues was mulled since other regions in Eastern Ukraine began
demanding their independence and pro-Russian rallies starting taking place in several
cities, such as Kharkiv, Odessa, Luhansk, Donetsk etc. At the moment Crimea de
facto belongs to the Russian Federation, even if a part of the international community
does not recognize the annexation.
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Following the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation several pro-Russian
and pro-Putin demonstrations took place in numerous cities in Southeastern Ukraine
and Russia.
Meanwhile, Russian Armed Forces were holding several reoccurring military war
games along its western borders, which resulted in an amassing of over 30,000 troops;
armor, artillery and air assets. [33]
On March 24, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense ordered its remaining forces in
Crimea to withdraw. The same day it was also announced that about 50% of the
Ukrainian Armed Forces in the peninsula had defected to Russia. [34] [35]
During the first weeks of April, Russia decides to end the gas discount agreement
and threatens to cut off gas supply if Ukraine fails to pay its gas bills. On April 6,
several governmental building in the cities of Kharkiv, Luhansk and Donetsk were
captured by pro-Russian activists, demanding the declaration of independence from
Ukraine for each region and the authorization of a referendum to decide the future of
the regions. Turmoil also took place in the city of Odessa. [36] On April 7, the
People's Republic of Donetsk proclaimed its independence and announced a
referendum to be held on May 11 on the question of becoming part of the Russian
Federation. [37] The following day the Ukrainian Government announces that the
Ukrainian forces will conduct antiterrorist operations in eastern Ukraine in order to
regain control of the government buildings in the region. Indeed, Ukrainian forces
manage to regain control of the city of Kharkiv [38], however they declare unable to
regain control in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas, where the pro-Russian separatists
manage to defeat the governmental forces and expand their control on other cities
including the major city of Slovyansk. [39] [40]
On April 17, in a conference held in Geneva in order to defuse the crisis and
arrange a truce; the USA, Russia, EU and Ukraine reached an agreement to deescalate the crisis and pave the road for an inclusive process of political reform in
Ukraine. [41] However the agreement was ephemeral, as clashes between pro-Russian
and pro-Ukrainian forces continued. [42] Fierce clashes between separatists and
governmental forces continued throughout April.
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On May 11, Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence after referendums were
held, which legitimacy was questioned by Kiev and the West despite the claimed
overwhelming majority of the votes in favor of secession. [43] Throughout the rest of
May, clashes intensify in the regions of Slovyansk, Donetsk and Luhansk with
hundreds of people dead. On May 25, Petro Poroshenko the “Chocolate King” wins
the Presidential elections with about 56%, however most polling stations in eastern
Ukraine were closed. [43]
Sources: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; Tim Ripley, defense analyst
After the elections and the victory of Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian authorities
intensified their efforts to regain control of the regions of Donetsk and Slovyansk,
while for the time being the pro-Russian forces seem to be retaining control, while
having managed to force Ukrainian border security forces, near Luhansk to abandon
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their control centers, thusly opening an unhindered corridor of supply with Russia.
[44] [45]
During the first days of June, pro-Russian rebel forces started a systematic
offensive targeting major border control stations near the Eastern Ukraine-Russian
borders, managing to capture the Border Guard Headquarters, establishing thusly an
unhindered supply corridor from Russia. [46] [47]
On June 7, Petro Poroshenko is sworn in as Ukraine’s fifth President. During his
inaugural address the new President called the pro-Russian separatists to lay down
arms and end the fighting, promising amnesty and showing a strong desire for
national reconciliation and normalization in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.
[48] Despite the president’s statements, the clashes intensified around the rebel
stronghold of Slovyansk and Luhansk and the airport of Kramatorsk, while the
Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov ordered the immediate deployment of
police forces from all Ukraine to the Eastern Ukraine in order to assist the military
units operating in the area and restore order and stability. [49] [50] [51]
The pro-Russian separatists shot down a Ukrainian military transport plane,
leaving 49 dead on June 14. The downing of the military transport plane resulted in
violent protests outside Russia’s Embassy in Kiev, with embassy vehicles and
premises being attacked. [52]
On June 16, Russia announced that it has halted deliveries of natural gas to
Ukraine, after days of unsuccessful negotiations for the settlement of the Ukrainian
gas debt and a discounted price between the two countries. [53] On the same day,
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko proposed a ceasefire in the Eastern Ukraine,
which was eventually put in effect on June 20 in the form of a week-long unilateral
ceasefire on behalf of Kiev, calling the rebels to lay down arms and surrender. [54]
[55] [56] The following day Russian President Vladimir Putin gave his support to the
peace plan tabled by the President of Ukraine and the ceasefire, calling Kiev to start
productive dialogue with the separatists without preconditions in order to put an end
to the crisis. The Russian President underlined that the ceasefire should not be used as
an ultimatum. [57]
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During the first day of peace talks in Donetsk, pro-Russian rebels agreed to honor
the ceasefire, however that positive development was evanescent as the following day
clashes re-erupted as separatist forces shot down a military transport helicopter. [58]
[59]
On June 24, President Putin asked from the upper house of Parliament to rescind
the Authorization of Use of Force in Ukraine adopted on the 1st of March 2014. [60]
On July 1, President Poroshenko announced the end of the week-long fragile
ceasefire, reportedly violated numerous times by both sides. Simultaneously, the
Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) resumed its offensive on rebel positions,
employing air, artillery and infantry assets. It is believed, that Poroshenko’s decision
was influenced by numerous protests that took place in Kiev demanding the end of the
ceasefire. Moscow expressed its disappointment in the Ukrainian President’s decision,
stating that Poroshenko has taken on responsibility for the political and military crisis
in Ukraine. [61]
Subsequently on July 3, Valery Heletey was appointed as the new Defense
Minister of Ukraine. The newly appointed Defense Minister promised that the
Ukrainian Army will parade victorious in Sevastopol. [62] Following the appointment
of Colonel-General Heletey as Ukraine’s new Defense Minister, the Ukrainian AntiTerrorist Operation (ATO) achieved major success against the separatist forces,
recapturing the major rebel stronghold city of Slovyansk and several smaller cities,
towns and villages. [63] [64] Reportedly, the ATO has managed to capture roughly
half of the rebel territory. Currently, pro-Russian separatist forces have retreated to
their major stronghold areas – Donetsk and Luhansk – and are digging in in order to
repel the imminent attacks from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Despite their retreat the
pro-Russians accomplished another deadly hit against the ATO forces, killing an
estimated number of 30 soldiers and injuring another 93, when rockets blasted a
Ukrainian Army barracks. [65] [66]
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Source: Ukrainian Council of National Security and Defense
Between 11 and 13 of July, reportedly the Ukrainian Army started artillery and air
strikes against the rebel strongholds of Donetsk and Luhansk, while rebels claim that
they have downed a number of Ukrainian air assets. Meanwhile, Russia claims that
Ukrainian Armed forces have repeatedly violated its territory, as artillery shells have
landed in Russian residential areas near the borders and border guard stations, while a
Ukrainian warplane violated its airspace. [67] [68] [69] [70] [71]
It appears that the Ukrainian crisis is entering a new round as it remains to be seen
whether impulsiveness and recklessness will triumph over forbearance and logic. [72]
[73] [74]
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Major external actors and their tools that can influence
the crisis
The United States of America
It could be argued that so far the US President Barack Obama and his
administration did not have to deal with a major crisis, so far during his 5½ years in
the White House. However, it appears that during the last six months, major or
potentially major crises are knocking on his doorstep. Those are the Ukrainian crisis
and the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. Until now, The US Government has
resorted to imposing sanctions, with a questionable level of success and impact on
Russia and providing minimalistic assistance the Ukrainian Government via limited
financial aid, symbolic gestures, verbal support and quite limited military assistance,
mainly meals-ready-to-eat (MREs), uniforms and communication equipment; at the
time when the Ukrainian Army desperately needed small arms and intelligence
support. [75]
However, this unwillingness on behalf of the US to get significantly involved in
the Ukrainian crisis has been apparent from the very beginning of the crisis, firstly by
letting the EU and Germany to manage the situation and subsequently, even when the
United States assumed a more active role, it was made adamantly clear that the US
were not going to commit in preventing Russia from exerting its influence over
Ukraine.
It appears that after the bellicosity of the George W. Bush years, the Obama
Administration is extremely reluctant to risk confrontation or even flex its muscles,
whether it is dealing with N. Korea, Assad’s Syria, China, the ISIL, Iran or Russia.
Certainly, the United States of America is capable of power projection around the
globe; however it is clear that America lacks the will to do so.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the tools available to the US Government
and the actions it can take, the possible results of those actions and finally consider if
they are worth implementing or not.
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As stated before, the US has imposed mild economic sanctions on selective
Russian individuals, alongside the EU, however their results remain in doubt. Hence
wider and bolder sanctions targeting vital sectors of the Russian economy such as the
energy and defense sectors could be a viable option to really hurt Russia and its
economy. Evidently, such sanctions could harm the unstable Russian economy and
possibly force Putin to change his stance. The United States’ bilateral trade with
Russia is relatively small for the world’s largest economy; however such sanctions
could inflict significant collateral damage on the shaky European economy, which is
heavily interconnected with Russia’s.
Furthermore, the US could face retaliation measures from Russia in the form of
similar sanctions, like the already announced retaliation measures against the US
space and satellite programs and the future of the international Space Station beyond
2020. [76] Additionally, Russia could become less cooperating in other significant
issues, irrelevant from the Ukrainian crisis, like North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq
or the containment of China. [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82]
Another option for the United States would be to increase its military assistance to
Ukraine by providing intelligence, training, small arms, munitions and perhaps even
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more sophisticated weapon systems to the Ukrainian Army. Such measures taken by
the US would definitely tip the balance of power in favor of the Ukrainian Army in its
struggle against the pro-Russian separatists. Such change from the US Government
would definitely infuriate Moscow and probably would prompt them to increase its
support for the rebels resulting in a more violent and deadlier conflict between the two
factions. Moreover, such decision to provide additional non-lethal and lethal
assistance to Ukraine could create precedence for similar type of assistance towards
opposition fighters in Syria. Therefore, the provision of lethal military assistance is
considered highly impossible, but additional non-lethal aid could still impact the
balance of power in Ukraine by decreasing the war costs for the Ukrainian Armed
Forces, if we take under consideration the extremely worrisome financial situation of
the country’s economy. [83]
Another potential course of action for the US would be to increase its military
presence in the area, by transferring air, naval and land assets in neighboring NATO
member states. Such a move would reiterate its commitment to its allies and provide a
stronger deterrent against potential Moscow aggressiveness. Moscow would not
appreciate such a move by the US and probably would try to further destabilize the
region by commencing once more long military exercises along its borders with
Ukraine and further mobilize and transfer military assets to the region.
The US could put pressure on its NATO allies to finally decide to live up to their
commitments and increase their defense spending, making them more capable to
withstand and deter Moscow on their own. It is no secret that the US primacy, after
the end of the Cold War, allowed its allies to become freeloaders in international
security, relying on the military prowess of the US to act as the global policeman and
cover for their inadequacies. [84]
The US could opt to provide more financial aid to the troubled Ukrainian
Government, a course of action that could greatly benefit Kiev and potentially soften
the imminent austerity measures the IMF bailout is going to impose on Ukrainian
citizens. Most likely, such assistance will not provoke Moscow a lot.
Another option for the Obama Administration would be to actively pursue the
international isolation of the Russian Federation. It must be stated that the US did
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tried to accomplish that after the annexation of Crimea; however it can be argued that
the US failed to do so. In the Un General Assembly vote condemning the Annexation
of Crimea only half of the UN Member States voted in favor of the Draft Resolution,
while 82 countries abstained or were absent from the session, among them Brazil,
China, Egypt, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates. [85]
Even close US allies such as Israel have opted to maintain a neutral stance during the
crisis, while other countries have refused to impose sanction on Russia, as they do not
wish to imperil their normalized relations with Russia. [86] [87]
Another option for the United States is to influence the newly elected Ukrainian
President to put an end to the conflict and start genuine all-inclusive national
reconciliation in order to achieve a long-lasting peace, stability and security in
Ukraine. If Kiev continues this deadly conflict with its own citizens, the situation gets
more and more destabilized and irreparable. It is essential to outline that US vital
national interests were never at stake in Ukraine and the longer and deeper the US
gets involved in this crisis, the more difficult it will become for itself to disengage
when necessary.
As Stephen M. Walt argues it is necessary for the United States to relearn power
politics, a creed that it once excelled at. Strength and geography have always been
essential elements in the international system and in world politics, even if the US has
long forgotten it. [84]
European Union
It is essential to outline that the European Union and its actions so far, definitively
have helped to create and escalate the current crisis. Some argue that despite EU’s
honesty that Ukraine cannot be swimming in two different ponds at them same time –
both the European Union and the Eurasian Customs Union- it may have done a major
geopolitical mistake by trying to distance Ukraine from the exclusive Russian sphere
of influence. [88]
It is also of great importance to understand that the European Union with its
normative, administrative and technocratic approach to foreign policy makes it a
different kind of global actor. If that distinguishing fact makes the European Foreign
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Policy better than those with strategic and energetic foreign policies remains dubious.
[89] [90]
Europeans might truly believe that Ukraine has a European future if Ukraine does
want one and if Ukraine is ready to do all those reforms and sacrifices necessary for it
to adjust to the European social, economic, institutional and political standards.
However, European Union still has not offered Ukraine an explicit membership
perspective, as its eastern Member-States, like Poland, want a friendly neighboring
Ukraine, but western Member-States, like Spain and Portugal, believe that Ukraine is
too far away from their own interests. [89]
Alongside with the United States of America, the European Union has decided to
impose unilateral sanctions against Russia, rather hesitantly one may add. Imposing
tougher sanctions in cooperation with the US on the key sectors of the Russian
economy could indeed deal a major blow to Moscow’s fragile economy.
The
European and Russia economies are deeply interconnected, therefore any harsh
sanctions on Russia would also deal a massive blow to the shaky European Union,
which is desperately trying to escape from the slumber of fiscal austerity.
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Given the great dependence of the European Union to Russian oil and natural gas,
one would certainly advise the European Union and its members to start immediately
efforts in order to diversify its energy suppliers. That could be done by pursuing the
exploitation of newly found oil and gas deposits in the eastern Mediterranean and by
seeking new suppliers that would be interested in acquiring a share of the vast
European Energy Market. Such new potential suppliers could be some of its
Mediterranean neighbors or possibly oil and natural gas rich African neighbors like
Nigeria. [91] If a diversification is achieved – although that might be in the medium
and long-term- European Union’s flexibility to negotiate with Russia in a vast number
of issues can be greatly increased. Even the decision and the commencement of its
systematic pursuit can yield positive results for Europe.
Another step the European Union can take in order to increase its assertiveness, not
only in the Ukrainian crisis but in the long-term as well, is to seriously consider
adopting a serious Common Defense Strategy, which can include even the creation of
a European Armed Force. It can easily be argued that the Union does not need an
Armed Force given its rather normative foreign policy and due to the existence of
NATO, however it is important to underline at this point that not all the Members of
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the EU are members of NATO, and in an ever-changing global landscape NATO has
taken and might take duties that might defer from the ones of the Union. As we have
seen in the past NATO has taken action in regions far away from Europe and the
potential rise of China might force it to get involved in areas far away from what
someone may call an extended neighborhood of Europe. Such course of action might
appear very provocative to Russia and raise suspicions and similar counteractions, but
it seems a necessary step forward if the European Union wishes to become a true
global actor in the new-old days of great power security competition that are coming
back. [84]
As long as the European Union remains closely attached to its style of being a
normative power its most pragmatic and efficient way of helping Ukraine is through
financial assistance, as the Ukrainian economy is practically collapsed. Additionally,
Europe can cooperate with the new Ukrainian Authorities in institution building, anticorruption efforts, economic and political reforms; areas that Kiev will need to tend to
if it genuinely wants to become truly independent, self-sustaining and in the long-term
a member of the European family. However, providing sufficient amounts of financial
aid to Ukraine could create a rift between austerity stricken countries of the European
South and might prove to be a great burden for the fragile European economy.
Similarly as the US did, attempting the international isolation of Russia could be
an option for the European Union as well. However, the economic interdependence
and the strategic importance of maintaining close relations with Moscow make this
course of action highly impossible, while its success would be at the very least
dubious as it has been stated previously.
It is certain that the European Union is not going to benefit from a prolonged and
continuously escalated crisis in Ukraine. The Eurozone crisis is not over yet and if
Europe wants to finally overcome it, it will need a stable, normalized and peaceful
environment, where it can build mutually prosperous relations with its existing
partners and find new ones. Therefore, it is essential for the European Union to seek
ways to de-escalate the crisis in Ukraine and pursue a solution that will involve and
satisfy all parties, as this is the only way to achieve lasting peace and stability.
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The European Union is one of the few actors in the crisis that can persuade the new
Ukrainian Government to pursue such goals and start an inclusive dialogue, through
which national reconciliation and stability can be achieved.
One positive development so far for the European Union remains the fact that
European Leaders have formulated a specific Foreign Policy towards an international
development. Hopefully, the Ukrainian crisis will help Europe’s Leaders to realize
that the European Union’s strength originates from its cooperation, unity and
solidarity.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
One could validly argue that the Ukrainian crisis is a product of the continuous
expansion of NATO, which following the dissolution of the USSR absorbed a great
number of former Warsaw Pact Member-States and slowly, but steadily started to
move its borders closer and closer towards Russia. Since the mid-1990s, when NATO
started its march eastwards Russia opposed its plans, but there was little it could do as
it was hampered by economic and political crises. However, today’s Russia is
stronger than it what it used to be in the 90’s, that was evident by their reaction in
2008 and by its actions in the Ukrainian crisis, if it was not apparent already by its
enhanced economic, military and political influence around the globe.
One of the key problems NATO has faced so far in the Ukrainian crisis, which led
it to be nothing more than an observer, is the reality that Ukraine is not a member of
NATO and has no legitimate reason to get involved, since there have been no direct
threats towards the security of its member-states.
Secondly, NATO being a military alliance does not have the appropriate tools to
deal with the covert and indirect aggression, which is the tactics Russia has used so
far; this is the reason why NATO and the West have been taken by surprise several
times during the crisis. [92]
So far NATO’s responses to the Ukrainian crisis has been to suspend almost all
cooperation with Moscow, decide the provision of military assistance to Ukraine by
providing training to the Ukrainian forces, hold a number of NATO exercises and
Joint exercises between NATO and Ukraine and the strategic redeployment of a
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handful of airplanes and warships at the eastern member-states. NATO has already
decided to increase presence in Europe with two main initiatives, the European
Reassurance Initiative and the Readiness Action Plan. These two initiatives are not
aiming to deter Russia, after all no one believes that Russia is interested in attacking
any member of the alliance, but rather to reassure nervous allies in Eastern Europe
and the Baltics. [93]
The most important things that NATO should do are: firstly to make sure that the
alliance is strengthened so it can hold together politically and convey the message it
cannot be picked apart; and secondly that it refrains from any further expansion
eastwards as such a move would definitely provoke Moscow and would cause
unpredictable reactions, that may as well destabilize not only Europe but seriously
impact global politics.
Russian Federation
So far the Russian Federation has been the leading actor in the Ukrainian crisis.
President Vladimir Putin has been calling the shots, while the EU and the US are
merely trying to react.
Before the tools at Russia’s disposal are discussed, it is imperative to understand
the reasoning behind Russia’s actions so far, as well as its objectives. European
Union’s attempts to lure Ukraine away from Russia’s sphere of influence was
perceived and is a direct threat to Russia’s core national interests, as Russia sees itself
as the unique dominant force in the post-soviet space. If Ukraine was to align from the
west and distance itself from Russia, firstly shattered any hopes for a successful and
viable Eurasian Union and secondly highly increased the danger of having NATO at
Russian borders in the mid-term future.
What Westerners failed to grasp was that President Putin considers Ukraine so
important to Russia, that he would be willing to wage overt war for its sake, if he had
to. Putin has been willing to pay a substantial price, because Russia’s vital interests
were at stake. Neither the European Union nor the US have any vital interests at stake
in Ukraine, which is the reason they have repeatedly stated that they are not going to
wage war against Russia for Ukraine’s sake. [8] A nation should never vehemently
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"vocally" oppose actions by another country when they are unwilling and or unable to
influence the outcome of a regional dispute.
President Putin believes that the Maidan and the ousting of former Ukrainian
President Yanukovych was a western plot, which aimed to weaken Moscow and
deprive a close partner from it. The danger of losing Ukraine, such an integral partner
for Russia, created certain objectives that had to be achieved and specific messaged
had to be communicated to the West and the rest of the international community.
Russia’s objectives so far have been the following: firstly to put an end to the
NATO and EU expansionism, particularly in the post-Soviet space by making it clear
that Russia will firmly oppose such plans; secondly Russia had to solidify the control
over its naval base in Sevastopol, which preserves its ability to project power in the
Mediterranean and beyond; and thirdly Russia had to remind Ukraine’s Leaders –
current and future – that Russia has several ways to seriously disrupt their country and
it is in their interest to remain Moscow’s good books. [8]
Russia has seemingly managed to achieve its goals, with a small cost and has tried
to de-escalate the crisis, by accepting the results of the Ukrainian Presidential
elections and by slowly and discreetly distancing himself from the separatists and
decreasing his assistance towards them. [8] Russia most likely will not attempt to
further escalate the crisis, unless it is seriously provoked or its gains become
endangered.
The message Russia needed to communicate to the world has been that it has
recovered from the post-Soviet meltdown, that it is seeking to play a more prominent
role in the new multipolar international system and that it had no longer to accept
whatever indignities anyone might decide to impose on it.
Russia is aware that Ukrainian economy is already collapsed, therefore has been
and is willing to use several economic measures in its efforts to coerce the Ukrainian
Government and influence the outcome of the crisis. Such economic measures are the
exports of natural gas to Ukraine, as well as the other bilateral trade relations, which
can be severed or severely disrupted, if Moscow wants to, as Russia is its biggest
trading partner. [94]
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Taking under consideration the imminent austerity measures and reforms that
Ukraine will have to adopt in order to receive its IMF bailout loan; one would expect
that the undisrupted continuation and further improvement of bilateral trade with
Russia is essential for the viability of the economic recovery of the country.
If Ukraine and Russia do not reach an agreement over the gas debt and prices and
the Russian natural gas does not start to flow towards Ukraine soon, the social and
economic consequences could be severe. Moscow realizes that austerity measures,
which most likely will include lower salaries and pensions, cuts in healthcare and
social security and increase gas prices, can turn public opinion very quickly against
Kiev, especially if the economy continues to deteriorate. A deteriorating Ukrainian
economy can not only alienate the people with its current government but also with its
current western patrons, who will have brought the IMF and its measures to their
country. So Moscow understands that unconventional warfare in the form of measures
targeting the Ukrainian economy can coerce and disrupt the current government and,
in the long term, possibly overthrow it as well.
Russia has conducted in great extent and effect a series of unconventional warfare
tactics. That has been the case in Crimea and currently in Eastern Ukraine. Russia
used pro-Russians, alongside Special Forces, mercenaries and secret agents in order to
achieve a swift and covert capture of Crimea, while at the moment uses similar tactics
with the aim of destabilizing Eastern Ukraine, by providing guidance, training,
supplies and other types of assistance to pro-Russian separatists. [95] [92]
A dismembered Ukraine is not something that the Kremlin wants. Moscow has a
genuine interest to have a weakened but stable Ukraine, if not docile to Moscow at
least cooperative. That is another reason Russia is not interested in annexing Eastern
Ukraine as it did with Crimea. Russia wants a decentralized Ukrainian Government
preoccupied with its internal rifts, so it can retain its control and influence over the
country.
The above makes overt actions, like a direct military intervention in Ukraine by
Russia rather impossible. However, the stakes at risk for Russia are great and if it is
left with no other option or it is seriously provoked to the stated that it feels ridiculed
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in front of the international community, a direct military intervention in Ukraine
would be considered as an option.
Russia has taken all the measures necessary to reassure both Kiev and the West of
its willingness to do so, as it has held a great number of surprise military drills along
its borders with Eastern Ukraine and the amassment of large number of troops and
other military assets along the borders for prolonged periods of time.
While the US has unsuccessfully attempted to isolate Russia, Moscow has been
carefully building before and during the crisis stronger ties with several countries.
President Putin recently has improved diplomatic and economic ties with countries
like Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Egypt, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, China
and currently is on a tour to Latin America. [78] [82] [87] [80] [96] [97] [98] [86] [99]
[100]
Nevertheless, Russia - despite its current advantageous position and the ample of
tools at its disposal- has nothing to benefit from if the situation in Ukraine escalates
further and ends up destabilizing the whole region.
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Resolving the crisis: Kiev’s options and choices
Ukraine has been the country affected the most by the ongoing crisis. What is quite
obvious since the crisis is going on inside its territory and already has lost control
over Crimea – most likely forever- and despite recent success in the Anti-Terrorist
Operation in Eastern Ukraine, the region is very unstable. The Ukrainian economy is
at a very weak state and the divisions among the populace are growing stronger. [101]
However, there is still hope for Ukraine and that hope and prospect for a swift
resolution of the crisis lies with the election of the new Ukrainian President Petro
Poroshenko.
Poroshenko, although one of the richest businessmen in Ukraine, has a long career
in Ukrainian Politics as he used to be Foreign Minister during the Presidency of
Viktor Yushchenko and later on he was named Minister of Trade and Economic
Development by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.
Poroshenko manage to win with a wide difference in the first round of the
Ukrainian Presidential elections and that gives him legitimacy and political leverage
to pursue a swift end of the crisis. Moscow’s recognition of his victory empowers
Poroshenko to work with Moscow in resolving the crisis. Despite, the economic war
that Russia raged against Ukraine in its efforts to dissuade Kiev from signing the
Association agreement with Brussels, that created tensions between the Ukrainian
oligarch and Russia in 2013, it appears that Poroshenko’s relations with Moscow are
not damaged beyond repair. [102]
Additionally, while Poroshenko has always been a supporter of a more Western
Ukraine and supported the Maidan movement, maintained his distance from the
political leaders of the Maidan and the crimes that are allegedly attributed by
Moscow, pro-Russians and others. Therefore, one could argue that he has little if none
responsibility for what occurred before his appointment, that he has no blood on his
hands. Although his ongoing offensive, alongside with the use of heavy weapons
against the separatists inside civilian areas in Eastern Ukraine, may soon change this
perception.
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Consequently, Poroshenko might be the man that can shape Ukraine’s future by
resolving the crisis by capitalizing on his merits. A successful businessman, a
moderate politician, with good relations with the West, the ability to accommodate
Russia’s concerns and compromise, and so far is relieved from the mistakes of his
predecessors, while having a recent and wide election victory that can provide him
with all the necessary legitimacy to take responsible decisions.
Unfortunately, it is not all well for Poroshenko. He might not share yet
responsibility for the actions and mistakes of his predecessors, but he is now called to
work with the realities and problems of the Ukraine, which he has inherited.
As stated before Ukraine’s economy is collapsing and any prolongation, let alone
escalation of the crisis, will definitely worsen the situation. Ukraine’s economy
instead of flourishing after the collapse of the Soviet Union, like the economy of other
former Soviet Republics did, has been decreasing steadily, marred by corruption and
energy inefficiency. [101] Russia has always been Ukraine’s biggest trade partner and
the prolonged disruption of relations between the two countries is taking its toll of
Ukraine’s economy. Indebted Ukraine, which is additionally in huge annual budget
deficit, has asked for a bailout from the International Monetary Fund.
IMF loans come alongside with the need for stringent reforms and fiscal austerity.
Kiev will have to cut governmental spending by eliminating gas subsidies, which will
lead in the increase of gas prices for consumers, by making decisive cuts to civil
service salaries, pensions and healthcare. Hryvnia, Ukraine’s national currency is
already plummeting and will most likely continue to do so as a result of the austerity
measures. Such austerity policies have a very negative effect on the living conditions
of a population and bear the possibility to alienate the populace not only with its
government, which will be carrying out these cutbacks and reforms, but also with the
pro-western sentiment and the Maidan movement that has led the country away from
Russia and its less cruelly conditioned financial aid.
Ukraine’s economy has remained a Soviet style economy and the reforms
necessary for its transition to a more western-like economy will also be rather difficult
at least at the early stages.
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2014
The new Government will have to attract Foreign Direct Investments in order to
create a sustainable and prosperous economy. However, the longer the country
remains in crisis; it is unlikely for any foreign investors to take the huge risk to invest
in Ukraine. Moreover, the majority of Ukraine’s heavy industry, including the mining,
mineral and industrial sectors, is located in the unstable, embattled Eastern Ukraine. It
is evident that resolving the crisis permanently is of paramount importance for Kiev,
if it yearns for economic stability and growth.
As if economic uncertainty was not enough of a problem for the newly elect
President, Ukraine is a deeply socially troubled country. The fissures among the
Ukrainian population are perhaps the biggest cause of the crisis. Ukraine is split in
half between West and East, pro-westerners and pro-Russians, those who believe the
country they inhabit should have closer relations and belong to Europe and those who
favor closer relations with Russia. This is not solely an issue of orientation, but it also
has language and nationality extensions, as is the case in many former Soviet
Republics. North and West Ukraine speaks in majority Ukrainian and consider
themselves Ukrainians, while South and East Ukraine speaks mostly Russian as their
mother language and are or consider themselves as Russians.
Sources: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Ukraine's Central Election Commission
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The implications of the Ukrainian Crisis in the International System and the
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2014
The Ukrainian society is deeply divided and as the crisis continues the enmity
between the two sides becomes more and more sizeable and reconciliation becomes
more and more farfetched. Pro-Ukrainians consider their opponents as traitors, rebels
and separatists, while pro-Russians consider the others traitors, usurpers and Nazis.
For the past several weeks, Kiev has begun an Anti-Terrorist Operation in eastern
Ukraine utilizing everything at its disposal, including air strikes, artillery, tanks and
infantry. During the attacks against the rebel-held areas, the Ukrainian military has
targeted its own civilian areas and has possibly damaged beyond repair the its image
and legitimacy for those living in these areas. This has probably resulted in bringing
local population and others around the country that have been neutral until now closer
to the rebels.
It is beyond questioning that the continuation of this internal conflict can alienate
the two factions completely and result in the eruption of a full blown civil war with
destructive results that will exceed any imagination.
President Poroshenko and his country stand at a crossroads. On the one hand, the
public demands that the Government adopts a firmer stance against the rebels and
continue its military operations with the sole goal of annihilating the separatists. On
the other hand, forbearance, prudence and logic dictate that President Poroshenko
pursues with all his power to end this strife, find a solution that will be a compromise
that will bridge the gaps, facilitate national reconciliation and guarantee the Ukraine’s
stability.
If Poroshenko chooses to continue this confrontation, Ukraine will be called to pay
a great price, which is certain; the results are not. Ukraine’s army is fairly weak and
its current operation burdens the exiguous Ukrainian economy and systematically
worsens its capabilities due to the increasing amount of losses in men and assets. Each
day this conflict continues several lives are lost and the damage done to the country’s
infrastructure and unity is unfathomable. The continuation of the conflict, alongside
with a possible deterioration of the situation on the ground for the pro-Russians might
draw Moscow’s ire, and provoke it to more overt actions. Such development would be
nothing short of catastrophic for Kiev.
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The implications of the Ukrainian Crisis in the International System and the
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2014
Alternatively, if Poroshenko opted for the path of dedicating all his resources in
resolving the crisis, by having an all-inclusive dialogue that would ensure that a viable
comprise, that would reassure all parties involved of their interests, then Ukraine
could find the much sought peace and stability it needs.
Before the beginning of the crisis, Ukraine had three orientation choices: the
European one, the Russian one and the Neutral one. As the situation remains thusly, it
is highly improbable that neither the European nor the Russian choices are viable.
Russia has shown that it will not tolerate an eastward expansion of the EU or NATO
and while showing that Moscow has managed to alienate a large portion of Ukraine’s
population, for the time being.
Neutrality is an option that will not please everyone, but it will create the necessary
stable environment, in which Ukraine can heal its wounds and move ahead. A
Ukraine outside of NATO and the EU is one of Russia’s primary goals and will most
likely be happy to cement that, while Ukraine will become more flexible with its
relations with Russia and the West.
Ukraine’s best option at the moment is to decide to remain neutral, normalize and
pursue closer ties with both Russia and the EU, making sure it uses this unfortunate
adventure as driving force for change, Change that will make it stronger as a nation.
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The implications of the Ukrainian Crisis in the International System and the
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2014
Closing Remarks
For almost seven months now, Ukraine has spiraled to a state of chaos, instability,
uncertainty and violence, being a prey to the geopolitical power plays between Russia
and the West.
The European Union overplayed its hand by supporting the Maidan protests and
the ousting of President Yanukovych, bringing to power a pro-European regime of
questionable legitimacy. Russia perceived that as a brazen violation of its sphere of
influence and a profound attack to its core national interests and requited with
adroitness and ruthlessness. Moscow within a few months has managed to consolidate
its control over the Crimean Peninsula, which bears paramount strategic importance
for its naval power projection in the Mediterranean and the world; and succeeded in
sowing chaos and destabilizing the Eastern Ukraine. Astoundingly, Russia managed
all that without having to use direct military force, thusly making it exceedingly
difficult for Europe and NATO to respond timely and effectively.
Subsequently, the United States of America, the European Union and NATO can
actually do little, unless they are willing to withstand greater collateral damage or
even risk a direct confrontation with Moscow.
One can contemplate that Russia has achieved its majors objectives in this crisis –
thwarting EU’s and NATO’s expansion eastwards for the foreseeable future, securing
the naval base of Sevastopol and reminding to Ukraine that one does not simply defy
Moscow- and is looking to de-escalate and resolve the crisis and return to the status
quo ante, with probably a few concessions.
Newly elected President Petro Poroshenko must ponder upon the very real
problems his country is facing in the economic and national unity sectors and make a
brave decision. He must either yield to the public demands and continue a destructive
and uncertain conflict against the pro-Russian separatists in the East or heed to
prudence and reason and pursue to resolve the crisis, bringing all parties on the
negotiation table, so that a comprise can be reached.
Day by day, the situation worsens and it is possible that if the crisis is not resolved
by the end of summer, it will be rather difficult for either side to make a step back and
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The implications of the Ukrainian Crisis in the International System and the
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2014
negotiate for a solution. Prolonging the conflict forces both sides to invest more and
more to the goal of total victory, leaving them very little to nothing to lose at the end.
As the economic crisis is not over yet, the European Union, Russia and the US
should not be interested in expending themselves in superfluous crises, but they
should rather utilize their resources and assets to more pressing and perilous
developments around the globe.
Alas, not all international actors habituate themselves in acting rationally or have
the courage to take a deep breath and make concessions and occasionally immure
themselves to courses of action that can only lead to a dead-end. Likewise, in the
Ukrainian crisis there is still time for all parties involved to make the right choices
and prevent Ukraine from becoming a black spot on Europe’s map. What they will
decide? Only time can tell…
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2014
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