Introduction - Academic Computing and Networking Services

Campus Infrastructure Committee
Report to ITEC Advisory Committee (IAC)
on a CSU Network Operations Policy
July, 2011
Committee Members
Scott Baily, chair
Academic Computing and Network Services (ACNS)
Ty Boyack
Natural Resources Ecology Laboratory
Jim Cox
College of Natural Sciences
Michael Dennis
Business and Financial Services
Robin McGee
Warner College of Natural Resources
Jon Peterson
Research Services
Mark Ritschard
College of Engineering
Jon Schroth
College of Business
Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................1
Input from Campus .............................................................................................................................................3
Scope and Draft Policy .......................................................................................................................................4
Appendix A: Background and Concerns from ACNS NOC ...................................................................6
Appendix B: NOC Responses to Specific Concerns Expressed by the Units ................................12
Appendix C: Campus Concerns Regarding Central Management of Network Switches.........16
Appendix D: College need for Write Access to Network Switches .....................................19
Appendix E: CIC Report on Campus Network Infrastructure ............................................24
Network Operations Policy
DRAFT – July 20, 2011
The campus network is essential to the conduct of CSU’s education, research and
outreach tripartite mission. The data network must be "hardened" in order to
ensure the capacity, availability, and throughput required to accommodate user
needs, in particular, to prepare for the upcoming transition from a legacy telephone
system to a unified communications system as an application relying upon the data
network. Furthermore, the ACNS Network Operations Center (NOC) reports that
they are unable to meet these goals in the present operational environment,
especially given their university role in sustaining an environment capable of
supporting Voice over IP (VoIP) and an ever-growing list of environmental and
access control systems, and life and safety devices. Finally, this activity is consistent
with a directive from the Provost to become more efficient, and is an integral part to
implementing CSU’s IT Consolidation Activity #7.
The Vice President for Information Technology, as chair of the ITEC Advisory
Council (IAC), charged the Campus Infrastructure Committee (CIC), an ad-hoc
subcommittee of the IAC, to develop a policy with the following characteristics:
Effective, allowing the network to be hardened, as described above, resulting
in increased availability and higher capacity as it is upgraded in speed,
Efficient, supporting a single, non-duplicative infrastructure,
Flexible to the extent practicable, establishing usage parameters for the
network that recognizes special circumstances, such as use of the network for
research, yet preserves the quality of the network for other users,
Clear in terms of responsibilities for all aspects of operations, and
Sustainable, enabling the ACNS NOC to maximize administrative and
operational efficiency, availability, and overall reliability of the campus network.
Input from Campus
As part of its consideration of the current network operations model, the CIC has
discussed issues that have rendered operations of the network problematic, as well
as discussion regarding the merits of continuing to allow non-ACNS personnel the
ability to configure and operate network switches. These discussions are included as
Appendix A-C.
During the Spring of 2011, discussions regarding a new network operations policy
were conducted with the Provost, the IAC, the Council of Deans, ISTeC’s Education
and Research Advisory Councils, and campus Subnet Managers.
Approximately 77% of the network switches on the campus today are operated by
the ACNS Network Operations Center (NOC). In those areas, local IT support
personnel are satisfied with the support received from the NOC. In many cases,
concerns about the ability for non-ACNS IT staff to adequately manage their local
area networks can be addressed by defining procedures for things such as Virtual
LAN (VLAN) changes, the ability to monitor network traffic for problem diagnostic
purposes, and the ability to look at traffic levels, port errors, etc. on network
switches in their area.
For this policy to be effective, the CIC believes an exemption request and review
process will be required. Exemptions to the policy are addressed below.
In the context of this policy, Covered Devices shall include:
1. Building distribution switches that have been migrated to dual gigabit
Ethernet connections (via the IAC CIC model)
2. Edge switches in buildings where VoIP, environmental or access control
systems, or life and safety devices have been deployed
3. Exceptions to this policy include network switches used to implement
independent and specific unit requirements, e.g. HPC computing clusters,
SANs implementations, or for purposes other than supporting “edge” devices
such as end-user workstations, laptops, printers, etc.
 Units may request exemptions for their new and existing data
switches, but in doing so must agree to:
i. Configure units’ data switches according to NOC-approved
standards for settings like spanning tree, multicast, etc.
ii. Fund the initial cost of implementing a dual infrastructure (one
for units’ data switches and the other for VoIP, energy
management, life and safety, etc. devices), as illustrated in
Figure 3 of Appendix E, the CIC infrastructure report of
January, 2010.
iii. Independently fund the maintenance and life cycle
replacement of such exempted switches
iv. The NOC will disable connectivity to exempted switches if they
are determined to be disrupting other critical services
Covered Devices, as described above, will fall under the administrative control of the
ACNS NOC. A web form will be developed through which exceptions to this policy
may be requested. Such requests will be reviewed by the CIC, which shall render a
decision within 10 business days from the date the exemption request was
Authorized IT personnel, upon request, will be granted “read” access to Covered
Devices, and as available, assistance with NOC-developed or NOC-supported tools
and utilities useful in monitoring network utilization, port errors, etc. to better
enable end user and application support.
Procedures defined by, and periodically reviewed and modified, per IAC approval,
will be adhered to for:
Port activations and related documentation
VLAN changes for ports, whether they are currently active or pre-configured
with an alternate VLAN Requests to “mirror” edge device traffic to a specific
monitoring port for diagnostic purposes
Such procedures will include reasonable expectations for turnaround time for
requests of various magnitudes (small, incidental requests; medium and large
Procedures will also include an escalation process to ensure timely response by the
Procedures shall also define responsibilities shared between the NOC and other IT
personnel. For example,
Authorized IT staff may physically connect (“patch”) port activations
in response to requests by the units
Any traffic requested for monitoring purposes shall adhere to the
University’s Acceptable Use Policy
Appendix A – Background and Concerns from ACNS NOC
ACNS has seen a continued increase in the number of network applications that
require configuration from the core to the edge. The four basic areas of network
management, design, initial/ongoing switch configuration, monitoring and
troubleshooting are challenged by the current infrastructure. Inconsistencies and
challenges in these four areas exist in the currently distributed switch operational
model. Operating the switches from a centralized point and organizational unit is
proposed as a means of resolving these challenges. This document is broken into
two sections: An analysis of network operational areas as they relate to CSU and a
discussion of concerns expressed by the ACNS NOC and network managers.
Some background is useful in understanding the nature of the CSU network’s scale,
complexity and foundation. Networking is typically broken down into “layers”
(physical through application). ACNS’ NOC, currently composed of seven
individuals, has extensive campus experience across all layers. The campus
network consists of over 900 switches spread across three campuses, 100+ MDFs,
280+ IDFs carrying the traffic of more than 40,000 pieces of equipment. In total,
this comprises 213 subnets coordinated with 60 subnet managers. This background
provides the foundation for understanding the proposal for consistency and
operations of the network from a single, cohesive entity.
Additionally, as part of the background, statistics relating to centralized network
operations are provided:
WestNet Survey
In June, 2011, a survey of 14 institutions of Higher Education attending the
Westnet Conference at the University of Utah, only one of the 14 schools
stated that they have a distributed support model for networking. That
school (the University of Utah), further indicated they were making steady
progress toward centralizing support of networking infrastructure.
Current Estimate of Central vs. Distributed Switch Management
Table 1, below, illustrates the proportion of switches for which the NOC or
college/department is responsible for the daily switch management. It is
important to note that this does not take into consideration the design,
monitoring or troubleshooting features of network management, but rather
the ongoing virtual changes for ports/VLANs or physical
cabling/patching/maintenance. Currently, the NOC is responsible for over ¾
of all virtual management across CSU’s switches and either shares in or is
entirely responsible for ¾ of the physical management.
Table 1. Illustration of the proportion of central vs. distributed ongoing
operational support.
Notes regarding Table 1:
“NOC”: NOC does all work (virtual or physical) on the switch
“50/50”: VLANs and Physical changes shared between
department/college and NOC
“90/10”: NOC responsible for 90% of the changes (virtual or physical)
on the switch, department responsible for 10% of changes (virtual or
“10/90”: NOC responsible for 10% of the changes (virtual or physical)
on the switch, department responsible for 90% of the changes (virtual
or physical).
Current Estimate of the Scope of VLAN Change Requests
This analysis was done on all switches backed-up by the NOC. The NOC
monitors all changes on many of the switches across campus departments
and colleges. This is primarily done to have backups of switch
configurations. Additionally, it offers assistance in troubleshooting as the
process also reflects changes in such configurations. Table 2, below,
illustrates that of the changes made over the six week period* 69% were
made by the NOC.
Table 2. Illustration of VLAN change requests handled either by the colleges or
the NOC.
Notes regarding Table 2:
Summary of network changes between April 11 to May 25, 2011
*COB configured a VLAN across 30+ switches in one day.
Finally, in addition to operating the four main focus areas mentioned above, security
and documentation must be done consistently, especially as initiatives such as Voice
over IP (VoIP) are deployed across campus. These combined activities form the
basis for justification of the centralized switch operational proposal.
In most cases, the design phase of networks is already handled by the NOC. The
NOC works closely with architects, Facilities, Colleges/Departments, and
Telecommunications on new building designs and remodels. All aspects of the
network design are dealt with by the NOC: power/UPS needs, cooling requirements,
wireless, VOIP, security, environmental controls, budgets, etc. Building designs and
remodels are a complex process requiring experience along with often daily
communication between NOC members and others on the design team. There is an
established workflow and communication structure to make sure the proper
equipment is ordered and installed. This design process is currently being handled
by the NOC as a coordinated service to the campus.
The second part of network operations is configuration. The first element of this
consists of physical installation of and preparing the cabling in anticipation of the
new switch gear. For most areas on campus, the NOC oversees the physical
installation. This is because the physical infrastructure, both fiber and copper, is a
necessary part of installations. While the copper installation can be done by non
ACNS staff this is not the recommended model for several reasons: 1. The physical
networking infrastructure (fiber, cabling, patch panels, jacks, etc.) is under a 30 year
warranty of service by Commscope. This warranty becomes void if very
prescriptive cabling procedures are not followed. Audits of closets have found
cabling not matching specifications resulting in voided warranties and putting the
infrastructure back into warranty can require extraordinary resources. 2. The fiber
infrastructure is complex, unfamiliar to most, and even dangerous as it’s composed
of invisible lasers that can burn retinas if not handled properly. Thus, for safety and
financial reasons, it is recommended that copper and fiber infrastructure only be
managed by ACNS telecommunications. Overall, new installs and remodels are
handled by the NOC in close work with telecommunications.
The second part of installation that complements the physical installation is the
configuration of the Ethernet switches. Again, except for a few colleges, this is
already done primarily by the NOC. VLAN, multicast, spanning-tree, QoS, and SNMP
are just some of the necessary configuration items that are done on switches. The
NOC has developed a base configuration which can be easily modified to
accommodate the following:
Facilities needs on the network – requiring coordination with the various
entities needing such services: environmental controls, CSUPD, Alarm Shop,
CardKey access, metering, etc.
Central VLANs trunked across campus for such services – NOC keeps track of
all such VLANs and assists on tracking which switch port and jack is assigned
to these along with IP address ranges used to map to those VLANs and for
routing purposes.
PoE needs – NOC manages power consumption and temperature issues
related to closets and PoE. This includes UPS management, temperature
monitoring in closets and power/cooling needs. This is then coordinated
with telecommunications and Facilities for rectification or modification of
existing infrastructure.
Wireless configurations – campus has three wireless vendors across campus.
Careful coordination of which departments and areas need which SSIDs, jack
numbers, and switch port numbers of all wireless APs are tracked as well.
Uplink and downlink physical considerations - fiber and copper
infrastructure play a large part in how MDFs and IDFs are connected. In
addition extensive knowledge of switch models, parts and interaction of
various connectors is necessary to ensure compatibility between and among
Spanning tree configuration, loop detection, bpdu guard and dhcp-protect Improper configuration of spanning tree can lead to widespread network
outages easily affecting multiple departments and buildings. Additionally,
various centrally deployed tools are used to ensure consistent spanning tree
configuration, loop detection, bpdu guard and dhcp protection.
While the above is not intended to be a comprehensive list of consideration needs
for proper switch configuration, it is provided to illustrate the amount of
coordination needed to be overseen by one entity for complete and consistent
deployment of network gear.
The third part of network operations relates to monitoring. This is comprised of a
number of factors, including uptime, traffic loads, errors, and throughput. The NOC
maintains central servers to monitor all of those areas where it has a consistent
picture of the network. Proper monitoring includes configuration settings that
report back to a central server for data collection, traffic monitoring, error
reporting, troubleshooting, and/or security event handling/detection. Currently,
this picture of campus is somewhat limited due to the distributed nature of the
network. A consistent configuration across campus is needed to establish the
foundation necessary for additional and more complicated deployments of services
requiring QoS, service level agreements, specific uptime or security needs.
The fourth area of network operations is troubleshooting. The previous three items
must be in place before effective troubleshooting can be accomplished. Improper
configuration and installation can lead to network problems. An inability to monitor
the entire network to the edge switch in a consistent and complete fashion hampers
troubleshooting. One charge of the CIC in evaluating network management policies
is to consider operational efficiency. A consistent design, configuration and
monitoring process across campus would greatly speed up the NOC’s ability to
troubleshoot problems. Currently, much too much time is spent by the NOC looking
for network devices that aren’t known or dealing with configurations that are not
A major component of troubleshooting is the notification and response structure.
While also reliant upon the monitoring piece of network operations, notification and
response relates to which entities are notified in which order, how the notifications
are escalated, and who actually responds during which times. Currently, many
devices are monitored for Facilities and CSUPD along with basic network services
such as network service to an entire building. The NOC maintains central
monitoring such that devices are monitored during specified hours, and when they
fail, NOC staff is contacted electronically in a specified order. Many of these
responses are 24x7 to address life and safety concerns. Coordinating all of those
alerts, devices, individuals, and entities requires a central base of knowledge and is a
natural extension of the NOC. Besides the notification mechanism, often complete
problem resolution requires response by both Facilities or CSUPD and the NOC.
Security and Documentation:
Two additional areas were noted that encompass network operations: security and
documentation. There has been an increase in the security and integrity
requirements of networks. Some of these cases deal with ensuring that traffic
cannot be analyzed or monitored except by those with authorization to do so. Right
now, anyone with read/write access to the switches can monitor/sniff ports. Other
cases deal with the physical integrity of the switch infrastructure as relates to its
ability to be physically compromised. One project in particular deals with
radioactive material. For this project, physical access to the switches is restricted
solely to those with a demonstrated and approved need for access. Additional
access restrictions and identification processes are put in place and audits are
composed to ensure compliance. These sorts of security requirements and issues
are increasing across campus. A distributed operational model for the switch
infrastructure is in conflict with those requirements. While the NOC has been able
to work through the existing cases, the concern for the NOC is that the current
model of network management does not scale and does not pass such audit
The second encompassing area of network operations is the documentation.
Accurate and complete documentation is a necessary component of any successful
network operations policy. As the campus moves into the next generation of
networking and network applications, documentation of the four key points of
network operations needs to be addressed. This is something that requires a level
of consistency best done by an individual or small team of individuals, and doesn’t
lend itself to a distributed model. In fact, a consistent approach to the design,
configuration, monitoring and troubleshooting facilitates accurate documentation.
Naturally, the more disparate or distributed entities involved in that process, the
more likely inaccuracies will be introduced, and the more difficult it will be to
operate. Improper documentation causes delays, inefficiencies, and mistakes in all
levels of the network operations process.
Four areas of network operations were discussed: design, configuration, monitoring
and troubleshooting. It was noted that the NOC is already involved in many of the
design stages of the campus network. Currently, many campus entities ship their
network gear to the NOC for consistent configurations. The NOC noted that a more
centralized approach to network management will yield switch configurations that
can prevent some common network outages. The monitoring and troubleshooting
of the network involves having a consistent and complete picture of the campus
network from core to edge in order to note problems and correctly respond to or
troubleshoot them. Finally, two encompassing concerns were presented: security
and documentation. The security component is growing in focus across campus.
Meanwhile, the documentation piece is fundamental to a successful deployment of
any network operations policy.
Discussion on various areas of concern:
1. Patching of cables is one area that has been done by network managers. The
NOC does not have the resources to patch cables with the responsiveness
needed by the entire campus.
The committee must consider this issue as it moves forward. Issues
surrounding this are those already mentioned such as safety and warranty
concerns. Meanwhile, as more devices are added to the network,
telecommunications works closely with the NOC to map network switch
ports to patch panel locations. Switch ports are no longer generic, but rather
switch ports are dedicated to specific services. Knowing which switch ports
go to which environmental control, which camera or which VOIP phone, is
critical for all phases of network operations from design to troubleshooting.
The NOC works closely with telecommunication during installs and changes
to document these items. Color coding and documentation processes are in
place for tracking these services. Unauthorized or un-communicated moves
of copper cabling can result in outages that must be tracked down and fixed,
sometimes on a 24x7 basis.
To that end, the NOC proposes a simple system of color coding, education,
and communication with network managers as to which cables can be
department patched and which carry central infrastructure. To maintain the
status quo on this particular area, the NOC recommends working to preconfigure switch ports to meet most of the network managers needs so that
patching is all that is necessary with an emphasis on limiting the amount of
actual switch configuration that would need to be done by the NOC to meet
these needs.
2. The distributed units may require too many VLAN changes on edge switch
ports for the NOC to accommodate within the units’ expected timeframe.
The NOC has looked at statistics on switch configurations (see example at
start of document). Over a six week period, the NOC was responsible for the
majority of all network changes with only a subset of changes being done by
the departments or colleges. However, it is possible that entities might need
a number of changes made in a hurry for which the NOC, at current staffing
levels, could not meet the demand. Two solutions to this are presented
herein: increased staffing of the NOC to meet these needs (in process), and a
process for allowing network managers to make edge switch port changes
through an automated process that validates the request and permits and
documents the change without human intervention. This latter method helps
to keep an important part of the network support in place – the network
manager who is in the field. Finally, in critical situations, a phone call can be
placed to the NOC for immediate response.
3. The network managers have always had a good working relationship with
the NOC. Why is that not working all of a sudden?
It’s critical to note that the NOC is not singling out any entity or person and
truly believes in the good job that is being done by network managers and
the critical component they are in the system. The concern for the NOC is
solely that the current system does not scale to the demands being made
upon the NOC. Thus, the network managers and the NOC are charged with
working together to find a way to proceed in an efficient manner that
provides a more hardened and consistent network for the future. In the end,
the current good working relationship must continue for us all at CSU to be
4. Why must I provide read/write access to the NOC, but not retain it myself
since my department/college bought the switch?
That’s a fair question, and hopefully largely addressed above. Models for
centrally funding switch replacement are being considered for subsequent
proposal to the campus.
5. We have entities for which we must provide a certain level of service. How
can we do that if central services are to be provided through our network,
especially if those services require a level of QoS with a higher priority than
my data does?
The committee does need to address this issue. Do life and safety packets
have priority over researcher packets and if so, who pays for those life and
safety ports? Do electronic meters prioritize over data packets? What about
VOIP? These types of questions must be answered. An operational model will
indeed facilitate the configuration of the network so that these policies can
be implemented coherently and consistently for the entire network.
6. Why can’t we continue to manage the department/college switches like we
did, just with closer integration with the NOC?
The simple answer is that it is becoming too hard to operate under the
present model, and the additional communication and collaboration
necessary to persist under the current model is unsustainable as it presents
challenges at all levels of network operations. In the design phase, it was
noted that the NOC works with numerous entities to design the network
properly. This process establishes a common knowledge base and
documentation process that is shared amongst the NOC to facilitate the next
steps of proper and efficient network operations. Configuration of the
switches is something that is discussed by the NOC on a regular basis. Base
configurations, naming conventions, product lines and parts are elements
that are constantly re-evaluated, analyzed, discussed with vendors and tech
support. The configurations are discussed with a view to make all services
work across campus. It’s not simply putting a configuration on a switch, but
an integral part following the design phase and building common knowledge
of the NOC. Monitoring is something that is done across campus devices as
many services are spread across all networks. Additionally, switches are
being configured to report back to a central monitoring server for error
collection and data collection. It’s difficult for the NOC to envision the
monitoring done in a distributed manner. Finally, troubleshooting is a critical
component based on the monitoring. The entity with the design knowledge,
configuration understanding and monitoring tools is the one alerted to the
problem and the one armed with the tools to fix the problem. Finally, the
NOC is charged with 24x7 responses for those critical items.
Given that, the primary concern for the NOC is that undocumented changes
to the switches along with inconsistent configurations across campus force
the NOC to respond to outages they aren’t responsible for nor have
knowledge of. Those that are charged with the responsibility to respond feel
it is only fair that they are the ones to oversee the changes that affect that
responsibility or those that have that ability also share in the response effort
24x7. While the latter sounds plausible, it doesn’t work practically. A
network manager simply isn’t going to have the common knowledge of the
network the NOC has in order to help the CSUPD fix a camera that’s out on
snowy Saturday night. It’s going to take the NOC to do it. (Thus, the
compromise to provide an automated change request process was proposed,
7. Why the concern over security all of a sudden – don’t secure protocols
eliminate much of those concerns?
Two primary concerns are in the forefront: First, some regulatory agencies
require the network to be hardened and accountable in a manner that simply
isn’t workable in a distributed environment. Access, design, and even
knowledge of some of these networks are restricted! Second, while secure
protocols may make sniffing VOIP, and similar traffic, difficult, denial of
service (DoS), arp spoofing, and sniffing of ports lead to integrity of the
network issues and raises liability concerns for individuals and CSU.
8. What are some protocol/technical challenges the NOC has before it that it
says it’s hard to meet campus wide with the current architecture?
802.1x, IP multicast, QoS, VOIP, Facilities networks for environmental
controls, smart meters, card access devices, power/UPS management,
fire/police alarms along with video surveillance services/cameras, and
distance learning in classrooms are the primary ones.
9. What does the NOC want exactly?
Sole read/write access to the switches, while still providing read access to
the units where desired.
10. Will that fix everything?
No. We’ll always have network issues, computers will always break and there
will always be problems. The NOC’s primary objective is to get the network
hardened and managed efficiently and consistently so that such problems are
minimized and response to them is quicker and more effective.
Appendix C – Campus Concerns Regarding Central Management of Network
Switches (Submitted by Ty Boyack, NREL and CIC Member)
Points that colleges/departments/units have brought up as possible barriers
to a centralized network policy:
Overall, I see that subnet managers are willing to find a solution to solve issues that
are hindering NOC operations, but are ready to push back if a sweeping decision is
pushed on them. There are a number of issues, either real or perceived, that will
need to be either addressed or dismissed. This is not an attempt to be a canonical
list of issues or even a document of advocacy, but just things that have been brought
up in recent discussions.
NOC is rightly concerned with inappropriate people being able to sniff traffic, but
the reverse holds true as well. There are projects which know and trust the local
system and network admins, but are unaware of the ability of NOC to sniff traffic.
Many issues and threats have been examined by subnet-level employes using tools
like port sniffing. If the hurdle to get access to these tools is too high, these
problems may go unsolved for a longer period of time than necessary. In some
cases, “iceberg-threats” with a low visible profile may go undiagnosed altogether,
resulting in a decrease in security.
Networking is a large field, and not necessarily a one-size-fits-all system (e.g., The
number of VLANs in each unit varies significantly across campus). If NOC delivers a
world-class network to all of campus, but that design does not allow for units to
deploy specific technologies that meet their customer base, then the local customers
end up suffering. (e.g. port based IDS/IPS/NAC)
The idea of centralized switch management has a vaguely defined “edge” boundary.
I think most people assume it will cover the MDF and IDF main switches, but there
are many other questions:
Could a unit put a switch in an IDF AFTER the “edge” that they maintain
management of?
Would this extend to Blade server embedded switches?
Would in-room switches be included (server rooms, labs, top-of-rack, etc.)?
Is a wireless AP the same as an edge switch?
Could parallel networking be installed to avoid these restrictions?
Wired vs. wireless should be examined in the policy, and either be consistent or
have clearly defined differences, especially with the emergence of higher-speed
wireless that could in some cases supplant traditional wired network
Comparison with other universities may not be representative without knowing
what their server and support model is like. We have a distributed server and
support model, and to centralize the network without centralizing the other
portions may hinder rather than help.
Job Security:
There is a threat in removing daily network operational duties from someone could
result in loss of professional identity, clout, power, pay, or job. This is partly a twolevel perception issue. If a subnet manager spends only 5% of his/her time on daily
network issues, but that person's manager/supervisor perceives that “network
management” is 80% of the job, then that person will feel especially threatened.
A large concern is the response time that NOC will be able to provide for changes to
the network. There are several aspects here:
Prior planning on the part of the subnet managers can mitigate some of this.
Prior planning on the part of the end users can mitigate some of this, but they
are removed from this process, and willing to yell loudly if the local subnet manager
does not respond with a timely fix, regardless of the NOC schedule.
Emergencies on the data network are often (usually?) not the result of a
network outage. As such, the first line response will still be with the subnet
managers, who should be fully equiped with a toolset to solve the problem as
quickly as possible.
NOC is adding a person, going from 7 to 8 people. That's a 14% increase, but
there are fears that NOC is taking on more than a 14% increase in time-sensitive
duties, so actual response time may decrease.
NOC has rightly addressed the problem of the departments not communicating
changes/work/outages upstream to the NOC, but departments are often unaware of
changes that the NOC/facilities/etc. make on the network as well. This puts the
subnet managers in the same position as NOC, yet the subnet manager is expected to
be able to answer any questions to the deans/department heads/local academic
leadership. There is a fear that if all network management goes central that the
communication gap would increase, resulting in even less knowledge of the system
at the unit level.
Financial Perceptions:
Some units have built their “own” networks, and feel like it's being taken away.
Some feel that they paid for the switches for data, and “allowed” NOC to use them (in
a synergistic approach) to carry data for EHS, alarms, etc. Now, because of those
services, they are being asked to give up the access to hardware. If this had been the
stated end-game that use may never have been allowed.
If edge switches are being used by telecom (VoIP) and facilities (EHS, alarms,
controls, etc.), then there should be a charge to them, rather than funding the
hardware by data chargeback or voice charges only.
Appendix D – College need for Write Access to Network Switches (Submitted by Jon
Schroth, College of Business and CIC Member)
The local colleges within Colorado State University need write access to their
switches in order to speed up day-to-day changes, development of solutions at the
network level, and incident response. This does not imply that the importance and
need for consistency across an environment is not understood; but there is some
room for compromise. Having a subnet manager actively manage their
environment in compliance with campus standards and communication techniques
can offset a lot of the day-to-day burden of minor changes, ease the implementation
of LAN scale network devices, and speed troubleshooting for issues inside the LAN
and across the LAN/WAN link.
Day-to-Day Changes
The one of the most common tasks for a subnet manager is to make ports active for
new or moved devices. For edge ports that only have one subnet assigned to them
the ports can be pre-configured with the needed VLAN. However, in buildings with
multiple subnets and devices that roam with people (such as a printers) if a device
with a static IP on subnet A plugs into a port on subnet B then communication will
break. It is far more efficient to simply change the VLAN of the port going to the
device so it is on the correct subnet, rather than re-IPing the device and going
around re-mapping the device for everyone who might use the device.
Multiple VLANS can be very helpful for deploying private networks used for
isolating communication within a dedicated management cluster for Hyper-V,
Vmware, Sharepoint, implementing NAT as assignable public IP address space runs
out, shunting traffic through systems by having it act as a layer 2 gateway. All of
these can be done by a trained subnet manager working closely with the service
owners to detect, diagnose, and resolve issues without generating work for NOC.
Development of Solutions at the Network Level
When it comes to LAN management, an attentive college should be working with
monitoring tools like to solve questions like “Are their devices are online? When
was my last configuration backup? Can it be automated? What do my normal
network traffic trends looks like? What traffic causes large spikes? Who is doing the
most talking? Are they talking as expected?” Colleges should try to solve security
questions like “Can I associate traffic to a user, not just to an IP address? How can I
protect my servers from malicious clients on the same subnet? How can I throttle
and block traffic from users dynamically without incurring administrative
overhead? How do I slow or stop a virus outbreak?”
NOC already has several of monitoring tools built (for example: Nagios, RANCID,
Cacti) to answer several of these questions. However not all of them are accessible
to the different colleges today. Where possible, existing services built by NOC can be
leveraged. However if a college wants to re-deploy an existing service deploy or a
new service that is not available through NOC, then access to the switches is needed.
Incident Response
Having a clean, systematic, documented environment helps determine what is
versus what should be, a critical step in troubleshooting errors. If a college is going
to ask to retain write access to the switches they have the responsibility of building,
maintaining, and communicating accurate documentation. In the event of the issue
that spills out into the rest of campus, it is also their responsibility to work with NOC
to solve the issue. Speed of resolution is important in preventing people from going
home due to an outage. To this end, having close communication, clean and correct
documentation configurations and topologies, and having write access to the
switches helps at a college level.
Write access to the switch helps by giving the ‘show running-configuration’
command because it cleanly lists how the switch is configured. Write access also
allows the use of monitor ports to sniff traffic, a useful troubleshooting technique. If
a simple error is found by the college’s subnet manager in their environment they
could also correct it directly. Calling or emailing NOC to correct it would slow down
NOC’s Concerns
NOC’s concerns include configuration change management, monitoring, network
security, and documentation. With some changes having campus-wide and lifesaving implications, these concerns should not be casually ignored. If the colleges
are not allowed write access, a compromise to allow the colleges to be as flexible is
Each college should share with NOC documentation of their infrastructure, each one
consistently documented and uniform with the rest of campus. Monitoring key links
to gather information then becomes much simpler, and it is easier to tell what is
really going on. A college’s subnet manager and NOC should work together to
assemble that information. What is important to a subnet manager may not be
immediately important to NOC.
Escalation Process
Though it may seem obvious, below is a generic escalation process that may be used
for contacting NOC about issues. During incidents the subnet manager and NOC
should have an open line of communication about what they each see, what
implications that may have, what each party is doing, and what needs to happen.
Once the issue is solved a report about what the problem was, the resolution, and
steps for possible prevention should be issued to the relevant parties. As seen, the
subnet-manager should be able to take some actions to help diagnose and solve the
issue, such as disabling ports or reloading a switch. Having write access assists in
the subnet managers ability to take care of issues inside the college.
Troubleshoot & try
to fix the issue
Issue Reported
Is the issue
Send out aftermath
report about issue.
[email protected]
Is the issue LAN
Is the issue an
active outage?
Call someone at
NOC, explain issue,
and ask for help.
Day-to-Day Changes
Day-to-day changes should be small changes like VLAN configuration and naming
ports. If the subnet manager does not have write access then these tasks need to be
done by NOC. If an indirect access can be given through a tool like ProCurve
Manager Plus or custom tool restricting modifications to a set of pre-approved
actions, then allow colleges can be as agile as required.
Development of solutions
As colleges grow they will need to deploy solutions at the network level like
network firewalls, Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDS/IPS) systems, Hardware
Load Balancers (HLBs). The ability to design, test and implement these types of
solutions requires non-trivial amounts of time and effort. Involving NOC in all of
these projects, while informative from a campus perspective, may mean timesharing NOC resources and slowing down deployment of college and non-college
projects. Having write access to switches will remove that deployment limitation.
Training the Subnet Managers
To mitigate inaccuracies in change management it may be beneficial to train the
subnet managers to meet NOC’s standards in communication, monitoring, and
troubleshooting. While this improves the quality of change management and
communication process it does not eliminate increased volume of people making
changes and potential for inaccuracies; it just helps limit the scope of inaccuracies.
Below is a generic change management process that trained subnet managers can
use to for day-to-day tasks as well development of solutions. The most complex step
is grasping the implications and scope of a proposed change; it is also the step most
likely to cause the most errors spanning campus.
Undo the change
Change required
Does the change
have implications
for campus or
Does the change
have potential for
Contact NOC
Schedule an Outage
& notify service
owners and NOC at
least 24 hours prior
to the outage
Perform Change
Did the change
make the
Was the change
After arriving at
agreement with NOC,
does the change still
need to occur?
Documentation &
send a copy to NOC
The issues NOC is facing include scale, consistency, communication, documentation,
and security. While having sole write access to the switch environments is one way
to solve those issues, it incurs the burden of the daily tasks and projects that subnet
managers were already doing. To avoid placing the burden of work the subnet
managers do on NOC and slowing down campus projects, allow the subnet
managers to continue to do the work in conjunction with NOC’s standards.
Appendix E
Campus Infrastructure Committee
Report to ITEC Advisory Committee (IAC)
January, 2010
Committee Members
Scott Baily, chair
Academic Computing and Network Services
Jim Cox
College of Natural Sciences
Michael Dennis
Business and Financial Services
Neal Lujan
Division of Student Affairs
Mike Maxwell
College of Veterinary Medicine and Biological
Robin McGee
Warner College of Natural Resources
Mark Ritschard
College of Engineering
Jon Schroth
College of Business
Adam Warren
Public Affairs
Charge to Committee................................................................... 2
Introduction.................................................................................... 3
Proposed Campus Infrastructure ........................................... 4
Comparison of Proposed Topologies ....................... 8
Current Campus Network Management .............................. 10
Final Analysis and Committee Recommendation ............ 11
Charge to the Communications Infrastructure Committee (CIC)
June, 2009
The committee is constituted to formulate and analyze models for providing future
communications infrastructure and services at CSU. The committee shall be chaired
by Scott Baily, interim director of ACNS, and shall also include four members of the
College IT Administrators Council (CITAC) appointed by the elected chair of the
CITAC and four members of the IAC who are not members of CITAC appointed by
the Vice President for IT.
The committee shall formulate and analyze models for providing future
communications infrastructure and services at CSU, including technologies,
equipment, architectures, service levels, user support levels, staffing levels, total
costs including centralized and decentralized staffing costs, security aspects, E911
and other emergency communications requirements and services, levels of risk, and
legal requirements. Specifically, the committee shall first determine requirements
for physical communications infrastructure (fiber and copper cabling), networking
technologies, and telephone technologies. Then, the committee shall explore and
analyze at least three operational models: centralized operations, hybrid
centralized/decentralized operations, and decentralized operations for each
technology, networking and telephony. For each model, the committee shall
evaluate the total costs and benefits of each approach. Note that the committee is
charged with a comprehensive, balanced analysis, and should not strive for any
advocacy position until a comprehensive analysis is completed. The committee
should address strengths and weaknesses of each model. Prior to its reporting, the
committee shall have its analyses assessed for risk by Internal Auditing, the
Facilities Alarm Shop, CSUPD, and CSU Risk Management.
The committee should endeavor to collect feedback from the campus, including
surveys, open fora, etc. as it deems appropriate.
In this initial approach, the committee shall not address chargeback models, as that
will be determined as an outcome after the committee completes its tasks.
As its first task, the committee may review and adjust this charge as it deems
appropriate, in consultation with the VP for IT.
The committee shall endeavor to complete its work by December 15, 2009, and
report back to the IAC.
Since the first campus networks were deployed in the middle to late 1980’s, an
extensive fiber optic cable plant has been developed to support the main, south, and
foothills campuses. The campus backbone network is currently at 1 Gigabit per
second (Gbps), or 100 times the bandwidth of the original campus local area
network (LAN) connections. CSU’s external connectivity is also currently at 1 Gbps,
though there are plans to upgrade both the backbone network and the wide area
connection to 10 Gbps in FY10.
In FY02, a charge back model was implemented to fund the rising costs of
networking on the campus (see for information
regarding this activity). The charge back algorithm is based on the speed of the
connection to the campus backbone network; for each 10x increase in network
capacity there is a corresponding 2.8x increase in the annual charge. This
chargeback model has had the unintended consequence of sub-optimal network
connectivity to many campus buildings in order to minimize the annual recurring
cost of network access.
This document considers alternative topologies and support models that would
enhance performance and availability afforded by a new chargeback algorithm (e.g.
a per-FTE model).
Figure 1.
Illustration of current network topologies on the CSU campus, with multiple buildings often behind a
single connection to the campus backbone network.
Current Topology
As a result of the chargeback system, colleges and departments have “value
engineered” their network connectivity in order to reduce costs. Figure 1 shows
various configurations that have been adopted. While some buildings are attached
via a single backbone connection, it is far more common to have several buildings
attached to the core campus network via a single connection (typically at 100
Mbps). Indeed, the number of connections to the backbone network has been
reduced by 33% since the charge back mechanism was proposed in 2000. This not
only creates a single point of failure for all buildings sharing that connection, it also
presents a bottleneck for all users sharing a common link to the campus and the
Internet. Additionally, when a core campus router fails or is taken down for
maintenance, then all buildings serviced by that router are without connectivity to
the rest of campus or the Internet until service has been restored.
Proposed Campus Physical Network Infrastructure
The CIC proposes two topologies for consideration, both of which include redundant
core router connections to buildings with a significant number of users (or a small
number of users with significant need for bandwidth). The connection to each core
router of the campus network would be nominally 1 gigabit Ethernet, easily
upgradable to 10 gigabit where needs dictate. In this design, buildings would have a
primary connection to one core campus router and a backup connection to the
other, adding resiliency in addition to capacity.
Figure 2.
Campus Design 1: Buildings are connected via primary and backup gigabit Ethernet connections.
Proposed Campus Physical Network Infrastructure: Design 1
Figure 2 illustrates the first proposed topology: each major building has two
redundant network connections, one to each core router. Building connections will
typically be implemented at 1 Gbps, though upgrading to 10 Gbps is certainly
possible. The connectivity between core routers and between core and border
routers will be 10 Gbps, upgradable to 40 Gbps.
Proposed Campus Physical Network Infrastructure: Design 2
The second proposed topology for the campus network infrastructure arose from
conversations with ACNS networking staff and security and policy officers at other
institutions. ACNS staff indicated that from a purely technical perspective, the best
way to guarantee high-quality IP telephony support is to implement a separate,
homogeneous network that is centrally managed. Special-purpose applications, such
as video surveillance, card key access and environmental systems controls could
also be provisioned over such a network. In addition, security and policy officers at
some universities indicated that voice, life, and safety network applications should
be on a physically separate network. Given that the current voice, life, and safety
devices are approximately 17% of the number of active campus network jacks, a
physically separate network would make homogeneity possible. Figure 3 illustrates
the second proposed topology: two physically separate and redundant networks;
one for data and a second for voice, life, and safety.
Figure 3.
Campus Design 2: Buildings are doubly connected via primary and backup gigabit Ethernet
connections, one redundant network for data a second redundant network for voice, life, and safety
Proposed Intra-Building Network Topologies
Once a building is connected to the campus network via the redundant connections
proposed above, the question remains as to how to handle network traffic within
the building. Similar to the proposed campus topologies, the CIC proposes two
intra-building topologies, one single physical network for all applications and a
separate physical network for voice, life, and safety applications.
Proposed Intra-Building Physical Network Infrastructure: Design 1
Figure 4 illustrates the first proposed design, that of a single physical network
infrastructure, with network traffic segregated as desired with virtual local area
networks (VLANs). In particular, a VLAN would likely be created for IP based
telephones (VoIP), one for life and safety, and one for the campus wireless network.
The redundant connections from the campus backbone would connect to each
building network’s main distribution frame (MDF). From the MDF, single
connections would be routed to each of the network’s intermediate distribution
frames (IDFs); i.e., the network closets. VLANs would then be configured by
network personnel on each switch in each IDF. In this design, every switch must be
supported by a UPS appropriately sized to accommodate the desired run-time of
voice, life, and safety applications during a power outage.
Figure 4.
Building Design 1: One physical network with all traffic segregated as needed by VLANs
Proposed Intra-Building Physical Network Infrastructure: Design 2
Design 2 for the intra-building network follows from the same issues that gave rise
to design 2 of the campus network. Concerns for a high-quality and highly available
network for voice, life, and safety applications could be satisfied by establishing
physically separate networks within buildings, regardless of the design of the
campus backbone network. Such a network would have dedicated edge switches
where needed for voice, life, and safety, and dedicated fiber connections back to the
MDF. Should a homogeneous network for voice, life, and safety be desirable, design
2 reduces the size of the homogeneous network. Run-time considerations during a
power outage would then be separated based on the individual needs of the data
network vs. the voice, life, and safety network. Figure 5 illustrates the physically
separate networks.
Figure 5.
Building Design 2: Dual physical networks within buildings to separate data traffic from voice, life,
and safety applications.
Comparison of Proposed Topologies
Cost Comparison
Equipment costs shown in Table 1 are for the entire project, and are anticipated to
be amortized over 5-6 years. These costs include maintenance and accommodate a
replacement cycle of 5 years for core routers and 6 years for switches inside
buildings. “FTE Yr.” is a measure of the effort (in FTEs) that would be required to
accomplish a particular task in one year’s time, assuming they did nothing else.
Proposed Topology
Approximate Equipment
Campus Design 1
- Approximately $1.8M
(single redundant
Campus Design 2
(dual redundant
Building Design 1
Approximately $2.8M
Requires additional $250K
for electronics and $750K
for fiber builds
(single network with
Building Design 2
(dual networks)
1 FTE Yr.
installation effort,
.25 FTE recurring
1.25 FTE Yr.
installation effort,
.25 FTE recurring
1 FTE Yr.
installation effort,
.25 FTE recurring
1.5 FTE Yr.
installation effort,
.25 FTE recurring
Table 1.
Cost comparisons of the proposed options.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Table 2 illustrates strengths and weaknesses of the proposed topologies, both the
campus designs and the building designs.
Campus Design 1
(single redundant
 Takes advantage of existing
 Does not totally isolate
fiber infrastructure; very little
voice, life, and safety
additional wiring needed.
 Provides a robust, high Cost of electronics and
availability network.
 Provides greater ability to
manage network connection
speeds to end points.
 Eliminates decisions for
building connectivity based
on cost.
Campus Design 2
(dual redundant
Building Design 1
(single network with
Building Design 2
(dual networks)
fiber optics associated
with establishing
redundant connections to
a building.
 Totally isolates voice, life, and  Very expensive
safety, permitting greater
 Longer-term capital cost
control and optimal
leading to higher
management of voice, life, and
replacement costs.
safety applications.
 Provides a robust, highavailability network.
 Provides greater ability to
manage network connection
speeds to end points.
 Takes advantage of existing
 All services subject to
fiber infrastructure; very little
same down-time of single
additional wiring needed.
switch for all services.
 Less expensive; all network
 Homogeneity of VoIP
ports aggregated into larger
network very difficult.
 Allows use of one network
jack in offices to support both
voice and data.
 Highest quality of service
 Highest level of confidence in
E911 accuracy
 Hardware homogeneity for
voice, life, and safety
applications easier to attain.
 Greater ability to fund and
maintain a regular
replacement cycle for voice,
life, and safety due to smaller
network footprint for these
 Cost of voice network is
clearly identifiable and,
therefore, more easily
charged by end-point device.
 Somewhat longer-term
capital cost leading to
slightly higher
replacement costs.
 Implies additional,
dedicated building wiring
to support IP telephones
 Ability to separately provide
UPS service to voice, life, and
Current Network Management Model
A hybrid network management model is in place today for academic and
administrative units, utilizing IT staff from both central (ACNS) and local
(College/Departmental) IT offices, as described below.
The campus backbone network is comprised of the “core” and “border” routers
shown in figures 1-5. These devices and the circuits interconnecting them are
managed by ACNS.
Management by ACNS
ACNS staff installs network switches for new construction and remodel projects.
ACNS gives the building occupants the choice of managing building switches
themselves, or to have ACNS do so. Approximately half of the building switches are
managed by local IT offices. In the case of special-purpose virtual local area
networks (VLANs), as required to support functions such as video surveillance
cameras, card key door access control, and VoIP phones, ACNS manages those
configurations since the virtual path extends well beyond the building perimeter.
The campus’ connectivity to the Internet, Internet2 and National Lambda Rail are all
managed by ACNS. Other centrally managed services include the campus wireless
network, virtual private network (VPN) access, and firewall functionality at the
campus border.
Central monitoring of campus network includes devices on the campus backbone
network, building distribution switches, and most edge switches in buildings. In
cases where departmental firewalls exist, device monitoring inside buildings
typically stops at the building distribution switch.
ACNS networking staff is on call off-hours to respond to critical outages affecting the
campus backbone network or to assist with large departmental outages. Monitoring
of building network devices by local IT offices varies by department and College.
Management by College and Department IT staff
The degree of management by local IT offices varies by college or department. Some
IT offices manage the physical network among many buildings, while smaller IT
offices manage the network within a single department. Local IT offices partner
with ACNS and Telecommunications at various levels depending on the expertise
and capabilities of the local IT staff.
The IT office in most of the colleges install, configure, and manage network switches
for the buildings in their college and often across several locations scattered among
the campuses in Fort Collins. The colleges use a variety of network management
tools and monitor their networks using automated tools. All network switches are
configured following campus guidelines and often include college-specific VLANs.
Local IT offices also maintain network maps for buildings and offices within their
areas of responsibility.
Local IT staff are responsible for all network jack activations for their buildings and
trouble shoot network jack problems. The installation of new data jacks and
physical repairs for the wall jack or wiring are coordinated with
Telecommunications. Colleges also rely on Telecommunications for fiber
connectivity within and among buildings.
Final Analysis and Committee Recommendation
Physical Network Recommendation
For the physical network infrastructure, the committee recommends adoption of
single redundant network backbone for both data and voice, life, and safety (Campus
Design 1) and a dual network for intra-building networks (Building Design 2). While
the ideal network for voice, life, and safety applications would be a homogeneous
separate network throughout the entire campus, a dual redundant backbone
infrastructure (Campus Design 2) is acknowledged to be prohibitively expensive.
The committee agrees that the ideal network for voice, life, and safety, is a
homogeneous network across campus. However, given the decentralized funding
for network switches at CSU, having a campus-wide homogeneous network for data,
voice, life, and safety would be very difficult. Even with infrastructure funding
provided centrally, the sheer magnitude of switches on campus would require an
annual replacement plan over a period of years. For example, a five-year
replacement cycle of all campus network switches would create five different
models of switches on campus, preventing the possibility of a homogeneous
network for voice, life, and safety. As a result, network service for voice, life, and
safety, would compete with data and likely make quality of service difficult.
If all telephones on campus were voice over IP sets, approximately 17% of all
networked devices would be telephones, with some very small percentage being life
and safety devices and/or connections. With about 17% of the network being
needed for voice, life, and safety, the possibility of having a homogeneous network is
within reach. The separate physical network would be small enough to enable all
equipment to be replaced en masse, providing for long-term homogeneity of the
voice, life, and safety network.
Regarding networked voice, life, and safety applications, there are two opposing
camps in higher education. The first camp is networking professionals, including
chief technology officers with primarily technical backgrounds, who prefer a single
network with voice, life, and safety on separate virtual networks. In the second
camp, security and policy experts – including chief technology officers with
backgrounds in security – prefer a physically separate network for voice, life, and
Included in the first camp are Notre Dame, University of North Carolina at
Pembroke, Columbia, California State, and Bryn Mawr, among others. In the words
of the chief technologist at UNC Pembroke, "It's the whole value of convergence."
The second camp was probably best represented by the CIO of the Community
College system of New Hampshire: “I agree…that fire alarms,…phones and other life
safety devices should be on their own dedicated circuits…most data folks that I have
worked with over the years (and I have worked with some great people) do not
have a clue as to the responsibility they are taking on by trying to converge those
systems onto their data networks… Yes, there could be some savings by converging
voice and data but are those savings worth a life?”
There is always a space between the two camps, and both Idaho State and Louisiana
State are in that space. The chief information officer at Idaho State said, “Certainly a
separate physical and logical network is by far the best from a management and
security standpoint”, but they use a single network for cost reasons. The
chief IT security and policy officer at Louisiana State said two physical networks are
desired on campus, but the networking group proceeded with a single network
before the security and policy issues could be vetted.
Even Bryn Mawr, in camp one, stated “If funding and staffing permitted we would
choose option 1 [two physical networks] but as with most things in life compromise
is necessary; we are using option 2 [single physical network].” As it turns out,
though, Bryn Mawr has left critical phone systems on their PBX switch.
Two physically separate networks would also reduce the cost for providing up-time
to voice, life, and safety applications during power outages. Whether the voice
connections are power-over-Ethernet or “injected power”, a UPS would be needed
to keep the systems up. Smaller switches would require smaller UPS units or keep
switches up longer. If cooling is needed for these separate switches, the cooling
needs are also less and more easily handled in the separate network scenario.
The downside to two physically separate networks is the expense, including the cost
to create the separate network, the initial staffing to implement it, and the
consumption of data drops in offices (many office areas were wired with one data
jack on a wall, typically already consumed by computer). However, the cost of
equipment is not that much greater than a single network, as network ports have to
be provided for all the new IP phone sets, regardless of the resulting topology. Once
implemented, the additional management cost of the separate network would be
very low. As the gentleman from Idaho State said, “I think one of the weak points to
VoIP is the fact that it is just another data application on your network. It is subject
to all the issues and concerns of a network. You can control the environment when
it is separate, but you lose the cost savings of convergence”. All agreed that the longterm cost differential is minimal, but not many schools are willing to make the initial
investment. In summary, a separate physical network for voice, life, and safety
applications provides the homogeneity needed for excellent and consistent network
Network Management Model Recommendation
In general, the recommendation for managing network devices will be largely the
same as described above under Current Network Management Model. For example,
ACNS network staff will continue to operate the core and border routers and other
elements currently managed centrally.
In the proposed building design 1, which combines voice and data over a common
infrastructure, ACNS and the distributed IT staff will need to develop policies and
procedures for coordinating changes. A balance must be struck to allow the
efficiencies of utilizing existing IT staff distributed around the campus and ensuring
the integrity of both departmental data and special purpose (i.e. VoIP, video
surveillance, environmental controls, etc.) VLANs.
In the proposed building design 2, switches specific to the special purpose VLANs
would be managed by ACNS, while the departmental data switches would be
managed by either ACNS or distributed IT staff, as preferred by the building
Random flashcards
Arab people

15 Cards


17 Cards

African nomads

18 Cards


14 Cards

Create flashcards