READING INTERNATIONAL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS
2ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE
29TH NOVERMBER – 1ST DECEMBER
DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE
CHAIRS: DAVID STANTON AND DARAH GHANEM
EMAIL: disec.readingmun@gmail.com
Topic 1 – Page 3, Topic 2 – Page 16
A message from your chairs
A warm welcome to Reading International Model United Nations 2013.
Our names are David Stanton and Darah Ghanem and we’re delighted to
be chairing you over the weekend. We can promise the debate to be both
intense and exciting.
DISEC is the first committee of the General Assembly and features
representatives from all 193 members of the United Nations. Although
for the purpose of this debate, we have selected 40 states from the nations
we believe to be the most relevant to the two topics. As the name
suggests, DISEC is responsible for handling issues of international
security, however it differs from the UNSC in that it is far more limited in
legislative powers. For instance, it is unable to sanction member states.
Nonetheless, it is able to draft encompassing and complex resolutions for
matters of international security and works closely with the UNSC.
Over the weekend, we will be discussing two issues. The first topic is the
issue surrounding the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the
Middle East, something that has become all the more relevant with
current fears of a nuclear Iran and the possibility of a Middle Eastern
Arms race. The second topic covers the question regarding the legality
and precedents of intervening in internal conflicts. This issue has also
experienced renewed debate, owing to the question of Syria and the
recent NATO intervention in Libya.
Both these topics promise to be extremely heated and we have selected
particular nations to ensure a highly contentious debate. This promises to
be challenging but should also ensure a lively and fun debate where
passions should flair. This study guide aims to help you with both topics
but we advise you do not limit your research to just this guide. At the
very least you should aim to learn the general policies of your state with
regards to these topics. If this proves difficult we would advise examining
regional attitudes towards both issues. We recognize any difficulties that
delegates may have in preparing for these topics and if you have any
questions, by all means to do not hesitate to contact us over committee
email. Both the chairs are highly familiar with these topics and we’re
knowledgeable about Asian affairs in general, so if either of us can help
with your research, we would be more than happy to.
We look forward to meeting you!
Head Chair: David Stanton
Co-Chair: Darah Ghanem
Topic 1: Establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone in the Middle East
The Middle East
Perceptions of what constitutes “The Middle East” tend to vary.
However, traditional definitions of the Middle East often feature the
following countries. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Turkey,
Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, United Arab
Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain. Much of North Africa is often included in
what is defined as the Greater Middle East as well as the Sudan, due to
similar cultural values and models of state governance. However it is
worth noting that aside from Libya and Egypt, there is extremely limited
potential for nuclear weapons development in North Africa.
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is a designated region where the member
states that compose the region pledge not to seek or develop nuclear
weapons technology. There are currently several of these in place. Latin
America, Africa, South East Asia, Oceania and Central Asia are all
considered to be nuclear free areas owing to several international treaties.
These zones represent a significant amount of international co-operation
and tie closely to obligations stated under the Nuclear Non Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). No NWFZ treaties cover nations party to NATO, nuclear
weapons states and the Middle East. Given the instability of the Middle
East, it is highly significant that one is established in order to reduce the
risk of nuclear weapons being developed in the region, and to allay
mutual suspicions between states in the Middle East.
The issue of nuclear weapons in the Middle East
The issue of WMD’s have long been an issue in the Middle East. The
Middle East is no stranger to conflict, and the presence of WMD
programs have long played their part in exacerbating conflicts and
shaping regional politics. Many nations within the Middle East have
actively attempted to develop Chemical, Biological and Nuclear weapons
for various reasons, often as deterrents against regional opposition.
Whilst the development of chemical and biological weapons within the
Middle East is obviously a concern for the international community, it is
the possibility of emerging nuclear powers that raises alarm bells in
Washington and other state capitals. The possibility is very real. Syria,
Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Israel and Iraq have all been
connected to the development or possession of nuclear weapons. Due to
the complex political realities of the Middle East, there is a fear that,
should any Middle Eastern nation acquire or admit the possession of
nuclear weapons, an arms race will inevitably occur. One nation will
admit the possession of nuclear weapons in an effort to gain a military
advantage over its rivals, and other nations may turn to develop nuclear
weapons in response as a means to deter the nuclear power.
This is not an unreasonable assumption. Rampant nuclear proliferation
has already been witnessed in Asia, owing to the development of nuclear
weapons by the People’s Republic of China. In response to China’s
atomic bomb tests, India quickly developed its own weapons to deter a
Chinese attack on its soil. In response to India’s tests, Pakistan then
sought to acquire nuclear weapons. The end result was the emergence of
three nuclear weapons in South Asia, and tensions between India and its
neighbours remain high to this day. A similar scenario is believed to be
possible in the Middle East, a region where conflict and mutual suspicion
is even more prevalent. Almost every state in the Middle East is party to
the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Israel is the only exception.
However, it is feared that one or more nation’s may have failed to comply
with NPT regulations or may attempt to do so in the near future if they
feel that developing nuclear weapons is vital to their national interest.
The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Shia-Sunni divide and regional competition
are all to blame for current hostilities within the Middle East. They have
also led to nations seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Today, the
biggest catalyst for a nuclear arms race is considered to be the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Iran has particularly hostile relations with most major
powers with the Middle East and it is suspected of developing nuclear
weapons for various purposes. In the event of Iran becoming a nuclear
weapons state, the responses of states such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and
Qatar could have extreme consequences. To this end, it is becoming
increasingly vital that the international community attempts to decrease
overall tensions within the region and convince the nations of the Middle
East to pledge towards respecting a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
(NWFZ).
Presence of Nuclear Weapons within the Middle East
Israel is the first nation that was suspected of developing nations, with
allegations suggesting that Israel sought to develop nuclear weapons
since 1948, and successfully managed to do so between the 1967 Six Day
War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However it was Turkey that first
played host to nuclear weaponry. A key NATO Ally, Turkey hosted
American Jupiter missiles as a means to target the Soviet Union during
the Cold War. To this day, Turkey still hosts American tactical nuclear
warheads as part of the NATO nuclear sharing agreement. Turkey does
not have the ability to launch these weapons and is not considered a
nuclear weapons state by any definitions. Nevertheless, some states
believe that a NWFZ should include Turkey as well. Should Turkey agree
to be part of it, it must renounce its nuclear weapon sharing agreements
with the US and NATO, something it is extremely reluctant to do.
NATO strategic nuclear weapons based in Turkey
Iraq, Syria and Libya all made considerable effort to develop nuclear
weapons. All three states weapons programs were essentially shut down
for varying reasons. Iraq’s nuclear bomb project was started primarily to
establish itself as the defacto regional power and deter both Shia Iran and
Israel. Iraq was largely successful in its research, however Iraqi progress
was utterly destroyed after the US-led coalition defeated the Iraqi army in
the Gulf War and the international community forced Iraq to cease
nuclear weapons development. Gaddafi also commissioned a Libyan
Nuclear Weapons program, however the state ceased its efforts when
Gaddafi handed over the state’s research and capabilities to the USA and
the IAEA after the US invasion of Iraq. Gaddafi likely feared Libya
suffering a similar fate as Iraq. The full extent of Syria’s nuclear
weapons research is unknown, but is has widely been suspected of
repeatedly attempting to develop nuclear weapons. In 2007 Israel bombed
a suspected nuclear reactor in the Deir ez-Zor region that it believed to
have been constructed for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons.
The site was believed to have been receiving regular shipments from a
North Korean freighter, shortly after the DPRK announced that it had
successfully developed nuclear weapons. Syria denies that the facility
was used to develop nuclear weapons. It is likely that Syria was
developing weapons in order to challenge Israel’s military primacy. With
the recent civil war however, it is unlikely that Syria has been able to
continue with the development of nuclear weapons.
Saudi Arabia is another concern. Whilst it does not possess nuclear
weapons, Saudi Arabia is believed to have the capability to deliver
nuclear weapons successfully if it came into possession of nuclear
warheads. After all, Saudi Arabia spends an absurd amount on defence
annually and is suspected to have purchased ballistic missile technology
from Pakistan and China. There is valid concern that Saudi Arabia may
seek to acquire such weapons if Iran became a nuclear weapons state. In
the event of a nuclear Iran, US intelligence suspects that Saudi Arabia
will seek to purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan in order to protect
itself from Iran. Should a nuclear Saudi Arabia become reality, there is
also the very real possibility that other Middle Eastern powers will
attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Qatar, a nation that strives for
political status, is the most likely to do so. Shia-led Syria and Iraq may
also seek to do so in order to increase their security against Gulf States
and Israel. It is unlikely that Egypt will follow suit, given that it is truly
dedicated to the cause of a NFWZ. Despite this, their priorities may
change if faced with an increasingly nuclear equipped region, especially
given the fact that the military coup in Egypt has led to a sharp downturn
in relations with certain Middle Eastern Nations, as well al the Egyptian
military’s close relations with the State of Israel.
Essentially, it is very clear that the possibility of nuclear weapons states
emerging in the Middle East is high. As the technological capability of
Middle Eastern states increase, it is now simpler than ever for many of
the states to pursue them if they feel adequately threatened. In order to
prevent this, there are several key issues that need to be dealt with before
setting up a NWFZ.
Israel
The biggest challenge to establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East is
Israel. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons and is not a
signatory of the NPT. It maintains a strict policy of nuclear ambiguity
and refuses to confirm or deny whether it actually has nuclear weapons.
However, Israel’s nuclear weapons arsenal is often stated to be the “worst
kept secret in the world”, given that the amount of evidence that suggests
Israeli nuclear weapons capability is overwhelming. It is believed that
Israel was given the materials needed to assemble nuclear bombs by
Britain and France in the late 1960s, such as heavy water, uranium and
the technological capabilities required. Nonetheless, Israel refuses to
elaborate. It fears that admitting to possessing nuclear weapons may
entice other Middle Eastern nations to pursue nuclear weapons so as to
seek a deterrent against Israel. On the other hand, suggesting that Israel
does not have such an ability may invite a potential attack against Israel.
Given that Arab militaries are far more technologically advanced in the
21t century, Israel’s conventional invincibility is far from certain; Saudi
Arabia spends triple Israel’s defence budget annually. Threating nuclear
retaliation may be a valuable deterrent against potential aggression from
Iran or any of Israel’s numerous neighbours, most of whom have
extremely hostile relations with the Israeli government.
It is often assumed that Israeli possession of nuclear warheads and
delivery systems to be an actuality, and all negotiations regarding a
NWFZ have been built around the concept of a nuclear Israel. The Arab
league and other nations have stated that establishing such a zone is
impractical and unfeasible without Israeli co-operation. To some nations,
Israel is the main reason that developing nuclear weapons would even be
considered; signing a NWFZ would severely limit states abilities to
respond in the event of Israeli aggression. Therefore, it is vital that Israel
commits to an NWFZ with its neighbours in order for it to be remotely
practical.
This is easier said than done however. Israel has stated that it is willing
to consider being part of a Middle Eastern NWFZ, but will not do so
without certain security assurances. Israel still operates under the
assumption that its neighbours (Jordan, Turkey and Egypt aside) harbour
hostile intent against the people of Israel and pledging against nuclear
weapons development poses a serious risk to Israeli security. Israel has
often demanded that it will not do so until Arab states officially recognise
Israel as a legitimate state in the region, something only Egypt, Turkey
and Jordan currently practice. To Israel, this is an important first step in
establishing trust between the two parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However this is simply not possible for many Arab states, owing to
Israel’s policies in the Palestinian territories. Arab leaders are severely
opposed to Israel’s occupation of Palestine and recognizing Israel could
serve as a death sentence to many Middle Eastern leaders, who govern
over populations that have extremely negative connotations of Israel.
Israel also has significant reservations regarding Syria and Iran, whom it
suspects have intent to develop nuclear weapons and asks that they
comply with their own NPT obligations so as to assure Israel there is no
nuclear threat. Iranian and Syrian rhetoric has greatly unnerved Israel,
whose government believes that Syria, Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah
actively seek the destruction of the Israeli state. Given Israel’s political
ideology (Zionism, or sometimes argued, Neo-Zionism) regarding attacks
against Judaism and its followers, assurances over Iranian and Syrian
intent is of great importance to Israel before any treaties are remotely
considered.
Israel also feels that it is unjustly singled out in negotiations and by the
United Nations. It cites that despite the fact that Iraq, Iran, Syria and
Libya have all been found to have been in non-compliance with IAEA
safeguards at some point in time, Israel is constantly perceived as the
uncooperative party in all negotiations. In order for Israel to sign on to
such an agreement, it wishes that the international community officially
recognize the fact that there are multiple offenders in the Middle East.
As a result negotiations are often deadlocked, as neither party is willing
to budge and take the first steps. Israel refuses to end its occupation of
Palestine and the states of the Middle East will not recognise Israel until
occupation ends. Many now accept Israel as a geopolitical reality, but
will not under any circumstances accept Israel as a state, despite extreme
pressure from the US to get them to do so. As a result, it is likely that
some compromise needs to be made. Either Israel joins a NWFZ without
demanding instantaneous recognition, or the Middle East establishes a
NWFZ that initially excludes Israel. Either solution could prove an
important first step. It is also important to note that most contemporary
efforts attempt to sidestep the issue of Occupied Palestine, given that it is
implausible for a NWFZ treaty to effectively tackle both nuclear
proliferation and the Palestinian question at the same time; although
solving either issue may go a long way towards solving the other.
Iran and the possibility of an arms race
The other major factor in this dispute is the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Concerns surrounding an Iranian nuclear program have been very much
present since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Iran’s relationship with
much of the Arab world is almost as hostile as Israel’s. Iran’s following
of Shia Islam and its political ideology puts it at odds with many of the
Gulf States. Iran’s ideology adopts a strict anti-monarchical stance,
something that many of the Gulf States take offence to. Whilst neither
Iran nor the Gulf States are particularly liberal in nature, both sides have
often claimed the other to have an extremely oppressive form of
governance.
The tense relationship is best displayed by Iran’s
relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has often
acted as the regional leader and sees Iran as an ideological and strategic
challenger. With the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the toppling of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran’s regional power has grown immensely
and poses a significant challenge to the status quo. Iran has strong
influence within Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, all key strategic
areas for the Saudi Monarchy, resulting in an extremely insecure
Kingdom. As Saudi Arabia perceives Iran as a potential military
challenge, Saudi Arabia and Iran may both seek active deterrents against
one another in the near future. Saudi Arabia’s exorbitant military budget
displays its sentiment of insecurity with regards to Iran and its allies.
The USA and Israel believe that Iran actively pursues the development of
nuclear weapons. Iran has poured funding into nuclear energy research,
which Western and Middle Eastern intelligence services suspect to be in
pursuit of nuclear weapons technology. Iran’s relationship with Russia
and the DPRK has done little to allay these fears. Iran’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons could be for any number of reasons. It desires status and
respect, much like Russia, and nuclear weapons may give it the prestige it
needs in order to be taken seriously as a regional power. Or it may be for
military reasons. Israel and Saudi Arabia pose equally dangerous and
credible threats to the Islamic Republic and the rule of the Ayatollahs, so
it may need a deterrent against these highly militarised states.
Increasingly provocative rhetoric from both these states, as well as their
allies, has done little to reassure the Iranian leadership of its own security.
Iran is extremely determined to harness nuclear energy. It has attempted
to do so through the enrichment or uranium. Indeed, Iran has constructed
several nuclear reactors with the assistance of the Russian Federation,
which it claims to be for purely peaceful purposes. Iran has proven to be
extremely uncooperative with IAEA safeguards however and it especially
secretive with its nuclear program. Most of its facilities are underground,
and Iran has frequently denied IAEA inspectors full access to tis nuclear
facilities. To the USA, Saudi Arabia and Israel, this suggests that Iran
may be harnessing nuclear energy for nefarious purposes. After all,
evidence suggests that Iran was actively pursuing nuclear weapons
technology in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as a means to deter Saddam
Hussein, who was also seeking similar technology. The USA is
especially concerned with the possibility that Iran may be attempting to
enrich uranium past acceptable levels, to the point where its only use is
for weapons technology (known as Highly Enriched Uranium or HEU).
Iran’s suspected attempts to purchase heavy water from the DPRK are of
further concern. Heavy water is used primarily in nuclear fusion reactors
when the goal is to create Highly Enriched Uranium for weapons
purposes. Peaceful nuclear energy programs use solely light water.
Iran’s responses to these allegations have often taken the form of strict
denial. Iran states that the USA, Israel and all its allies seek to deny Iran
the right to develop effectively and ensure that it does not develop to the
point of becoming a regional power. Iran claims that allegations of
nuclear weapons technology serve the purpose of distancing Iran from the
international community. Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was
particularly hostile in this respect. Under Ahmadinejad, Iran’s relations
with the outside world deteriorated due to his standoff attitudes towards
several member states including the USA, Saudi Arabia, The United
Kingdom, Israel, Pakistan and several others. It is already widely argued
that Iran has a very ineffective foreign policy conduct and has had
extreme difficulty bringing itself out of isolation since the Iranian
revolution, namely because of it being largely despised by both the Soviet
Union and the USA during the Cold War and the fact that many
experienced diplomats were either killed or arrested after the Iranian
revolution. This has remained to this day where a prevailing distrust of
Iran amongst member states is still extremely visible. However Iran has
still managed to become fairly close to the Russian Federation over the
last two decades.
Iran’s refusal to comply with IAEA regulations and its increasingly
provocative rhetoric has led the international community to enact wave
upon wave of blanket sanctions against Iran with the aim of forcing it to
comply. The EU and the USA have largely drafted these. The UNSC has
also enacted sanctions. China is particularly concerned about the impact a
nuclear Iran may have towards Middle Eastern stability, whilst Russia
tends to abstain. These sanctions have had a crippling effect on Iran’s
economy. Iran has become increasingly isolated from developed markets
and it has severe difficulty attracting investment. Inflation has also
skyrocketed. As a result, Iran’s new President, Rouhani, has been tasked
with attempting to harmonise Iran’s relationship with the world, which
has included the possibility of dialogue with one of Iran’s biggest
opponents, the USA. Iran has also recently become more willing to be
open about its nuclear program, but it is still extremely clandestine about
the program’s overall nature.
Iran has refused to abandon nuclear research technology, claiming that it
has a right to pursue it in order to satisfy Iran’s growing energy needs. It
also perceives it as unquestionable sovereign right, and the nation’s
willingness to defy the USA in order to pursue nuclear technology is seen
as a point of pride by many Iranians, i.e. a symbol of defiance. Iran states
that it builds its facilities underground so as to protect them from Israeli
airstrikes, as Israel strongly opposes giving Iran even the slightest
opportunity to build a nuclear weapon. USA and Israel have adapted a
new strategy however, having supposedly being the architects behind
Stuxnet, an extremely complex computer worm that targeted control
systems within Iranian nuclear plants and disabled many key processes.
Iran feels that as long as the USA and Israel continue to hinder Iran’s
nuclear capability, it sees no benefits in being completely open, as the US
and Israel may take advantage of the information to cripple the Iranian
program further.
Iran has stated its willingness to be part of a NWFZ, and no effective
treaty would ever exclude Iran for the sake of practicality. It has many
key concerns however. Iran, like Israel, seeks full recognition on the
international scene. This has largely been prevented however by the fact
that its revolutionary ideals infuriate Saudi Arabia and its allies. It also
demands that Israel be party to any such treaty and disarms any warheads
that it possesses. Iran believes Israel’s nuclear capability to be an
undeniable fact and that it acts as an extreme provocation to both Iran and
the entire region. It would also likely seek guarantees that any step made
by Iran would restore some goodwill with the international community
and lead to an eventual lifting of sanctions. Finally it also wishes that its
right to develop nuclear energy be respected. It will not accept pressure
from the international community coercing it to cease its research.
Bloc Positions
The issue of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East is extremely
divisive. However, there is a general consensus amongst the international
community that an NWFZ treaty would be a significant step towards
peace in the Middle East. It is the conditionalities and the steps certain
Middle Eastern States should take that divide the international
community.
The West
USA, Europe, Japan, South Korea and other western leaning nations tend
to be in favour of pressurising Iran and are insistent that Iran be party to
such a treaty if Israel is to be coerced into signing such a treaty. Contrary
to popular belief, very few nations actually support Israel’s nuclear bomb
project. The US and Europe are actually very keen for Israel to sign up to
the NPT and constantly push Israel to be less combative with its Arab
neighbours. The US however, is a staunch supporter of Israel in that it
believes that any resolution introduced has to be consented to by Israel or
it is doomed to fail, as it will only serve to antagonize Israel further.
Essentially, western policy tends to focus on persuading Iran to comply
and set aside its differences with the Middle East, although it also places
a great emphasis on mending relations between Israel and the rest of the
Middle East.
Middle East
Within the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are supportive
of such a treaty but many of them are convinced that it is both Israel and
Iran that need to compromise. As far as the Gulf States are concerned,
they have abided by the NPT treaty in good faith and chosen not to
pursue nuclear weapons, unlike Israel or Iran. The Gulf States have
incredibly poor relations with both nations, although in recent years they
have come to perceive Iran as a greater potential military threat than
Israel. This is especially true given that Israel’s focus has increasingly
shifted towards the Lebanon, Syria and Palestine and poses little
conventional threat to the Arab monarchies. It is worth noting that aside
from Israeli oppression in Palestine, Israel and the Gulf States have
similar geopolitical interests, and are allied to the same nations.
However, out in the open, relations are still exceptionally poor, given that
Israel has diplomatic relations with none of them.
Turkey, Egypt and Jordan are often considered the moderators within the
Middle East. All three maintain ties with both Israel and Iran and are all
highly integrated with the global community in general. Egypt and
Jordan have made considerable effort to bring Iran and Israel to the table
but have so far found little success. Turkey is very supportive of an
NWFZ, but is reluctant to be part of one itself. Turkey argues that as it
does not own the US nuclear warheads housed within Turkey, it does not
necessarily violate set treaties and it does not want to compromise
NATO’s European defence strategy. It therefore supports an NWFZ
inclusive of nations such as Syria, Iran and Israel, but it does not feel that
Turkey is part of the problem, given its general neutrality in most of the
Middle East’s conflicts such as the Shia-Sunni divide and the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Syria, Iran, and to some extent Iraq, perceive the situation differently.
The see that in order for an NWFZ to work, the Gulf States must
recognise the legitimacy of Iran, and likely now Syria as well, and Israel
must disarm its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. To Iran and Syria, Israeli
compliance is non-negotiable; they will not be a party to any treaty that
does not force an Israeli compromise. Outside the Middle East, North
Korea and Sudan are also stringent proponents of this policy and are
ardent supporters of Iran.
Israel stands relatively alone in pursuing its current policy. It staunchly
argues in favour of its current ambiguity policy as it brings regional
stability and Israel would rather not find itself in conflict with other
nations. It refuses to sign the NPT and is unlikely to do so as long as it
feels there is a potential threat posed to Israel from within the Middle
East. Israel has few allies in this regard. Only India, a fellow nuclear
state, and Myanmar, an exceptionally close military ally of Israel, support
this current policy. Nonetheless Israel has many allies who are
sympathetic to it, especially in the west.
Rest of the World
As this is a regional problem many nations are not overly invested in the
particular of the conflict, however the potential damage a nuclear Middle
East could inflict is well understood. Russia and China tend to lead this
movement. Russia and many other non-aligned states are extremely
supportive of Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy, but do not favour the
possibility of a nuclear Iran. Russia in this sense is likely Iran’s greatest
ally on the world stage. China is an exceptional case; it favours total
stability in the Middle East and sees the inclusion of Israel, Iran and Syria
in any resolution to be integral to overall success. Officially it is a neutral
power but its relations with Iran has declined in recent years as China is
exceptionally concerned about the possibility conflict would have on
global oil prices. Israel and China have also become increasingly close
and China has extensive military and technological co-operation with
Israel, so it would not want to be seen supporting a resolution that
antagonises its newfound ally.
The majority favour dialogue and compromise from all sides. Nations in
Asia, Africa and Latin America have repeatedly stressed a need for
dialogue between all parties, perceiving that Israel, Syria, Iran and the
Gulf states to all be guilty of extremely provocative rhetoric that only
escalates tensions. To those on the fence, the inclusion of Iran and Israel
may be seen as overly ambitious in the preliminary stage, however they
can all agree that both nations should at least make some form of
compromise in order to reassure other Middle Eastern Nations towards
signing a NWFZ treaty.
Things a resolution should address
- A treaty that includes all most or all members of the Middle East,
ideally supported by Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia
-Israel’s nuclear ambiguity policy
-Guarantees of Israeli security
-Pledge for Saudi Arabia not to seek nuclear weapons technology
-Cessation of rhetoric from the Islamic Republic of Iran
-Iranian compliance with IAEA safeguards
-Conditions outlined supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy
-Convincing an overall reduction in military spending amongst Arab
Nations
- Whether or not Turkey should be included in any established NWFZ
(Advice from the chairs is to try not to be tempted to get too involved
in trying to solve the Palestinian Question as a means to bring Israel
to the table, this is a whole new issue in itself that our committee has
little chance of solving within in a weekend and it may be too
tempting to go off topic. However by all means recognise it as the
legitimate obstacle to establishing an NWFZ that it indeed is)
Topic 2: Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflicts
Foreign intervention in the UN after the Cold War
The legality of intervening in internal conflicts is a highly contentious
issue for the UN. Articles 2(1) and 2(4) of the UN Charter highlights the
sovereign right of individual nations and states that other nations will
refrain from aggressive actions infringing on a nation’s sovereignty. In
the case of internal conflicts that have yet to have had significant external
consequences, the conflict is often stated to still be within the bounds of
state sovereignty. It is not up to the international community to interfere
in the matters of other nations. There are grounds for intervention if it is
deemed an act of self-defence, but the issue with civil wars is that their
internal nature means that it can seldom be construed as self-defence if
another party intervenes.
However, the United Nations also vows to uphold the principle of
ensuring basic human rights for all, regardless of race, nationality or
gender. In many instances, internal conflicts often lead to the
compromise of said human rights. This leads to a complex and
contentious divide regarding what measures the international community
should take in order to ensure the continuation of basic human rights.
This often cited as humanitarian intervention. The UN has designated
that humanitarian intervention is based on three characteristics:
1. Humanitarian intervention involves the threat and use of military
forces as a central feature
2. It is an intervention in the sense that it entails interfering in the
internal affairs of a state by sending military forces into the
territory or airspace of a sovereign state that has not committed an
act of aggression against another state.
3. The intervention is in response to situations that do not necessarily
pose direct threats to states’ strategic interests, but instead is
motivated by humanitarian objectives.
In dire instances of civil war, the afflicted nation may ask for the
international community’s assistance in dealing with the crisis. This will
often be the case when the state is simply unable to resolve the crisis
itself i.e. insurgent groups outmatch the government’s ability to combat
them. In the event of this, the UN or a designated organisation may enter
the conflict with the aim of restoring stability. The most notable example
of this is the Somalia Civil War. In 1992, the United Nations authorised
a US-led intervention into Somalia with the aim of restoring the Somali
government. This involved a co-ordinated effort to take back Somalia
from the warring factions that had overthrown the state following the fall
of the Siad Barre regime. Whilst the operations that followed were
deemed a disastrous failure, it nonetheless set a precedent for intervening
within internal conflicts in certain circumstances.
This is not always the case however. In many instances since the end of
the Cold War, there have been numerous examples where internal
conflicts have resulted in mass atrocities and certain states have felt
compelled to intervene. As the state itself may sometimes be complicit in
these atrocities, there will often be no consent for foreign intervention. As
mentioned, this has been a matter of some dispute between member
states. Some nations, particularly western nations, emphasize that human
rights must take precedence over the principle of state sovereignty. On
the other hand, many developing nations and eastern powers feel that
state sovereignty is something that must be adhered to and that the
international community should not create a precedent for breaching it.
The most obvious case where no consensus could be reached was the
example of the Rwanda Civil War. The Rwandan Genocide is widely
regarded to have been one of the most brutal civil wars in human history,
resulting in up to one million deaths in less than eighty days. Despite the
prevalence of mass atrocities, no consensus could be reached in the
Security Council at to how exactly the international community could
intervene. As the Hutu government and its various militias were largely
the perpetrators of the genocide, any intervention would likely have
involved direct action against government forces, thereby acting directly
against the state itself, something theoretically forbidden by the UN
Charter.
Rwanda is also seen as one of the UN’s greatest failures. In response to
this, there has been an attempt to change international norms within
society, in order to favour intervention in the event of substantial
breaches of human rights. This has had somewhat limited success. Libya
stands as an obvious example where this norm was applied. Despite the
internal nature of the conflict, the UNSC authorised a NATO no-fly zone
to protect civilians, which involved a direct breach of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya’s sovereign authority. The resulting operation led to a direct
action against the Libyan Army and resulted in an eventual overthrow of
the Libyan government. In this instance, intervention was possible due to
an overall consensus between the major powers.
UNSC
In order for any intervention to be deemed fully legitimate, the action
must be approved by the United Nations Security Council. Chapter VII
of the UN Charter gives the UNSC the sole authority to approve the use
of force against another member of the international community. A
resolution must be drafted and accepted by at least nine of the fifteen
members and must not be vetoed by any of the permanent members. The
permanent members are the USA, France, the UK, the Russian Federation
and the People’s Republic of China. These five members are all arguably
the most influential members in international affairs and are quite
feasibly the five most militarily capable nations on the planet.
Whilst it sounds relatively simple in principle, there is strong divide
within the UNSC as to the legality of humanitarian intervention. France,
the UK and the US are often strong proponents of international
intervention. All three states are capable of immense projecting power on
a global scale and can intervene militarily almost anywhere in the world
if political will is favourable enough. They are also often perceived as
the leading members of NATO, an organisation that’s mandate has
steadily evolved to focus towards humanitarian intervention since the mid
1990s. In the past, NATO has intervened in Kosovo and Libya on
humanitarian grounds. In mid-2013, there was also significant debate as
to whether or not NATO should intervene against the Syrian Arab
Republic. China and Russia however, are very sceptical of humanitarian
intervention. Russia often views western led interventionism as a means
of furthering western interests by attempting to use humanitarian crises as
grounds for soliciting regime change. China meanwhile, often expresses
that the notion of tolerating intervention against a sovereign state is a
dangerous precedent that the international community should avoid if
possible. Russia and China are also very sceptical as to the exact
effectiveness of humanitarian intervention, and often fear that military
force against a sovereign state may only escalate and prolong a conflict,
rather than ending it.
More often than not, debates regarding humanitarian intervention are
often accused of being centred around great power politics. In most
instances the state guilty of human rights atrocities are often central to
Russia or China’s strategic interests. Examples include: FR Yugoslavia,
Syria, Myanmar and the Sudan. Many of these nations tend to be vital to
Chinese or Russian economic interests as western nations often sanction
nations guilty of such atrocities. On the other hand, western nations are
accused of using humanitarian intervention as a means to solicit regime
change in unco-operative nations such as those just mentioned.
Regardless, there is often little consensus within the UNSC as to whether
or not humanitarian intervention is a feasible concept.
In reality, the UNSC only every authorises intervention if there is consent
of the afflicted state itself or if the state is universally unpopular among
the great powers. Libya is often seen as an example of this; Gaddafi had
few allies and was widely disliked by the great powers. As a result, any
intervention would not be to the detriment of Russia, China, UK, USA or
France, thereby making a consensus far easier. This has not been the case
with Syria, a close ally of Russia, nor was it the case with Kosovo and FR
Yugoslavia in 1999, which Russia was also closely allied to.
In recent years, France and the UK have been the most active nations
participating in internal conflicts. The UK was largely responsible for
assisting the Sierra Leone government from ending the civil war within
the state by using military force to target rebel held areas and securing
Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone. France has recently been involved
in two major internal conflicts. Firstly is the Ivorian Civil War, where
France intervened militarily in order to ensure a continuation of
democracy after the previous government, led by Laurent Gbagbo,
refused to relinquish power. It has also been strongly involved in the
conflict in Mali, where it has assisted the Mali government in combating
Islamist militants. The international community as well as the afflicted
states have often lauded these instances of intervention and have seldom
faced controversy. Therefore, controversy often stems when debating
humanitarian intervention without the consent of either the afflicted state
or the UNSC.
R2P
This leads on to the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P is an
attempt by the international community to redefine international norms
surrounding intervention and state sovereignty. It attempts to refocus the
principle of sovereignty as a responsibility rather than an unarguable right
for states to enjoy. In a sense, as a sovereign entity, a state is responsible
for ensuring the security of its citizens. Should it fail to do so, than the
state is no longer deemed sovereign, as it can no longer fully exercise a
monopoly on violence, or it has abused its role as a guarantee of security.
In this event, the international community should feel obligated to
intervene in order to ensure the continued security of civilians. This often
involves acting against insurgent forces responsible for numerous
atrocities, or sometimes against the local government who has not
consented to international intervention. R2P’s three foundation pillars
are as follows:
1. A state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist the state
to fulfil its primary responsibility.
3. If the state manifestly fails to protect its citizens from the four
above mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the
international community has the responsibility to intervene through
coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military
intervention is considered the last resort.
This follows on from the criteria outlining probable cause for
humanitarian intervention outlined by the ICISS in 2001, which are as
follows:
1. Just cause – Is the threat a "serious and irreparable harm occurring
to human beings"?
2. Right intention – Is the main intention of the military action to
prevent human suffering or are there other motives?
3. Final resort – Has every other measure besides military invention
been taken into account? (This does not mean that every
measurement has to be applied and failed, but that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work
in that situation)
4. Legitimate authority
5. Proportional means – Are the minimum necessary military means
applied to secure human protection?
6. Reasonable prospect – Is it likely that military action will succeed
in protecting human life, and are the consequences of this action
sure not to be worse than no action at all?
R2P has been frequently debated in international law. Western nations
often welcome it as a means to redefine a state’s responsibility to its
people and the overall obligation of the international community. Some
nations however, particularly non-aligned nations, do not view to so
favourably. They instead perceive it as simply another attempt to justify
and harmonise the notion of international intervention by the western
world. Russia and its allies see R2P as a means to disguise the strategic
objectives of western nations. To many African nations, intervention is
not justifiable even as a last resort. Although this is likely due to the fact
that many African nations simply fear that these laws will be applied
against them in the near future due to the vast majority of them being
implicated in human rights abuses.
R2P has been widely cited in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. R2P was
used to justify international action against Gaddafi’s military in Libya as
the state was actively persecuting civilians and made little attempt to
disguise it. The result was an overwhelming military response from
NATO forces. The American, British and French leaderships also
highlighted a need to protect Syrian civilians from chemical weapons use
in the Syrian Civil War. R2P was used to justify the consideration of
military action against Syrian installations in the summer of 2013.
France also tried to state the principles of R2P in 2008 tin order to call for
international action the State of the Union of Myanmar. Myanmar had
just been devastated by Cyclone Nargis and left hundreds of thousands in
need of dire aid. The paranoia of the junta however, meant that the
military would actively deny UN aid to affected areas, resulting in tens of
thousands of preventable civilian deaths. The military government
claimed that the US would use UN food trucks as a means to supply prodemocracy fighters in the region. This was just the latest in a long list of
extremely vicious actions committed by the Myanmar military, who had
already been implicated in genocidal actions on numerous occasions.
France called for immediate military action against the Burmese junta
and attempted to draft a resolution authorising force, with the suspected
aim of crushing the junta once and for all. Russia and China vetoed the
resolution, most likely due to Myanmar’s status as a key ally to China at
the time. Nevertheless, fearing western action, Myanmar agreed to open
its borders to allow UN aid to flow into the country.
Acting Outside the UN
Despite the UNSC’s apparent monopoly on the use of force, there have
been instances where certain nations have intervened militarily without
the consent of the Security Council. These instances warrant discussion
within the UN, as there is considerable contention as to whether or not
they breach international law.
The most notable instance of this is the 1999 NATO intervention of
Kosovo. At the time, separatist forces in Kosovo had engaged FR
Yugoslavia in an attempt to ensure the independence of Kosovo from the
Milosevic government. Milosevic was already an unpopular figure in the
western world, having collaborated with Bosnian Serbs in the early
nineties to instigate a policy of genocide against various ethnic groups
within the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo independence forces had been
guilty of numerous terrorist attacks within Kosovo and FR Yugoslavia
but their ability to cause damage was limited, owing to poor supplies.
Milosevic launched an aggressive retaliatory strategy however, targeting
civilian populations within Kosovo deemed sympathetic to independence
groups. This was done using heavy artillery and mortar-based weapons,
which were utilised indiscriminately, resulting in significant civilian
casualties. Both the US and the UK, called for an immediate cessation to
the violence, but Milosevic proved un-cooperative and FR Yugoslavia
continued their attacks against Kosovar civilians. As a result, both
nations sought the use of force against the Serbian military in order to
stop the continued killings. Tony Blair and Bill Clinton admitted to
fearing that the conflict may result in similar mass killings that were seen
in the early Yugoslav wars. Russia however, was a major ally to FR
Yugoslavia and was considered to be deliberately impeding efforts for
international action against the state. China had also grown ore confident
in asserting its position by the end of the 20th Century. This rendered a
solution through the UNSC highly unlikely. Instead a military solution
through NATO was sought. Aside from Greece, NATO was almost
unanimously in favour of co-ordinated strikes against Serbian Army
targets and a large air campaign was undertaken without UNSC
authorisation.
Whilst the campaign was largely successful in achieving its objectives, it
resulted in collateral damage on both sides and NATO forces were
subject to intense scrutiny from the international community as a whole.
The response from NATO command was that there simply wasn’t the
time to debate the issue in the UNSC and action was needed sooner rather
than later so as to minimise overall casualties. To date, the intervention is
still contentious. In Kosovo, the act of intervention is held in
exceptionally high regard. In Serbia however, it is deemed an
exceptionally unlawful action motivated by NATO’s strategic ambition
that not only violated Serbia’s sovereignty, but also cost the lives of
Serbian military and civilian personnel. The legal aspect is also debated.
To some it violated Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well as the
principle of state sovereignty. To others, it upheld the promotion of
human rights when both FR Yugoslavia and the international community
failed to do so.
A key issue of debate is what can be done about instances such as this
however. Whilst NATO was condemned by several nations for its
actions, the international community could not inflict any sort of
consequences against NATO’s member states for defying international
law. After all, NATO composes some of the world’s largest economies
and most technologically capable military forces in the world. Therefore
if nations such as the US have the political will to defy the UNSC, there
is very little that can be done to stop them. This was seen recently with
regards to Syria. The US, France and the UK seemed exceptionally
willing to defy UNSC rulings and engage Syria militarily after the use of
chemical weapons had been discovered. Even though Russia and China
strongly protested such action, there was very little they could do to
prevent a NATO strike against Syria had it gone ahead. Had the Syrian
government not relented and agreed to the Russian backed plan to remove
its chemical stockpile, it is within the realm of possibility that the US and
France may have taken action against Syria, despite disapproval from
much of the international community.
Bloc Positions
The international community is extremely divided on the issue, although
for the most part there are very clear bloc positions. The Western world
tends to favour the use of humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts
as long as there are reasonable grounds and all other options have been
exhausted. This belief is outlined by the criteria listed by the ICISS and
the pillars of R2P. France, the USA and the UK tend to be the strongest
proponents of intervention. This is likely due to their experiences during
World War II, where the Allied powers’ conflict against the Axis
arguably benefitted global stability and human rights in the long term.
Eastern and Southern Europe tend to strongly back the ideals of NATO’s
leaders, and are often amongst the nations contributing to NATO
operations. Germany, Scandinavia and Western Europe tend to be more
cautious with regards to the application of force. However, they all
strongly favour the promotion of human rights and often argue in favour
of the ideals set out by R2P. Western allies such as Japan, South Korea,
Philippines and Israel all tow the western line of supporting intervention
in dire circumstances, albeit somewhat more cautiously. A prevailing
thought amongst western nations is that human rights a abusers mean to
use sovereignty as a shield to deflect international pressure and that
international laws should be altered in order to compensate for states that
attempt to do so.
China and Russia are often considered to be the most formidable
opponents of intervention although for very different reasons. As
mentioned, Russia perceives intervention as a western tool to promote
strategic objectives and has little issue stating this belief. China on the
other hand, is more diplomatic in its opposition and is simply concerned
about setting precedents. Indeed China has often supported intervention
that is undertaken with the consent of an affected nation i.e. Mali.
Nonetheless both are exceptionally hostile to intervention against states
deemed imperative to their strategic interests, such as Syria or the Sudan,
although neither will admit that their opposition is due to their own
strategic interests. In that sense Russia can be portrayed as extremely
hypocritical, much as much as the western world is often accused of,
given that it attacks other states for using international law to further their
strategic goals, however it is also guilty of using contradicting laws for
precisely the same goal.
Many African and autocratic states are also opposed to the notion of
international intervention. African nations are extremely protective of
their own sovereignty and have a prevailing distrust of the UN. There is
the perception that the international community is biased against Africa
and that state are frequently threatened with force for failing to meet
unfeasible levels of development and security. The African Union
however has intervened militarily in several conflicts within Africa, so
among more developed African nations such as Ghana and Kenya, there
is a belief that international intervention can be an effective solution in
certain instances.
The Middle East tends to be divided. Officially, Middle Eastern states
tend to oppose humanitarian intervention, no doubt owing to the lack of
many basic human rights in several Middle Eastern countries. Middle
Eastern states have quickly changed their attitudes however, if there is a
conflict where intervention will not be detrimental to their own interests,
or may in fact be beneficial for them. For instance, despite little support
from the Middle East for R2P, nations such as Saudi Arabia, U.A.E.,
Qatar and Kuwait have repeatedly called for intervention in Syria. Qatar
was also a major contributor to the Libyan intervention in 2011. As a
result, the Middle East tends to fall in the centre of the debate.
Latin America tends to be fairly similar. Nations such as Mexico,
Colombia and Brazil have been very supportive of intervention with state
consent, but Latin America as a whole has been divided over the issue.
States that have exceptionally anti-American attitudes such as Venezuela,
Cuba and Nicaragua all vehemently oppose intervention, for obvious
reasons. The rest tend to be on the fence regarding the issue.
Issues a Resolution Should Address
- Whether or not sovereignty should take precedence over
human security
- The possibility of delegating responsibilities to regional
organisation such as the AU
- The exact criteria that would support intervention in internal
conflicts against a state’s will
- Adoption of R2P as a standard international norm or to
maintain it as simply an idea
- Strengthening or weakening the UNSC’s monopoly over the
authorisation of force
- Whether or not instances such as the Kosovo intervention
should be prevented in future, and if so how?
- Preventing great power politics interfering with the
international community’s overall responsibilities.
Thanks for reading. We wish you the best of luck and
look forward to meeting you November 29th!
All the Best
David Stanton and Darah Ghanem