Rosalind Kelcourse Word Count: 1,617
October 2011
Ethics
Ethics and Drone Warfare
The ethics of war seems to be an almost counterintuitive notion, especially to a pacifist, yet it is widely examined as an important ethical concern. When one thinks of warfare, one might envision something consisting of “man to man” combat; one soldier is encountered by another from the other side and makes the decision to kill or not kill. Although that was how warfare happened in the early years of America, war seems to have taken on a new method of execution due to the rapid technological advancements in recent years. Drone warfare is becoming an increasingly preferred method of war, at least for America, due mainly to its practicality. The goal of this paper is to discuss America’s drone warfare from an ethical standpoint while taking into account just war theory, Thomas Nagel’s argument for moderate absolutism, and the general ethics of this issue as well as a more pacifistic point of view.
In 1914, British guided missile studies began in hopes of determining the possibility of guiding a flying bomb to its target using radio signals. Their two test flights failed and although they still believed it was possible, they gave up. Around this time, America began some testing of their own. “Under the direction of Charles Kettering, development of the Kettering Bug began at the Delco and Sperry companies in 1917. The Kettering Bug was a pilotless bi-plane bomber made of wood and weighing just 600 pounds, including a 300-pound bomb as payload. It was powered by a 40-horsepower Ford engine” (Lethbridge, “History of Rocketry: The Early 20 th
Century”). It was a success, and thus began the history of drone warfare in America. More recently, America has included robots other than aircraft in their drone army. Some of these include “robots mounted with machine guns, self-guided bombs called ‘Brilliant Weapons’, and

even digital camouflage for troops and vehicles” (qtd. in Maine, Brachle, and Arago, “Ethics and the Advancement of Military Technology”).
The first ethical concern that seems to arise from this information is whether it is more ethical to use drones in war than it is to use humans. There is the argument that it is more ethical because there is no human relation involved. It seems to follow from this, however, that that would make it less ethical. The mere fact that we are removing our human presence from the other humans we are destroying implies that we feel the need to protect ourselves from the potential for damage to our own psyche, both individual and as a country. If, for instance,
America sends drones to bomb a terrorist base, we feel less responsible for any collateral damage. In addition, no soldiers will see their friends dying beside them (at least on our side) and we will suffer little to no loss as far as our own combatants go. That argument sounds great for us, but it doesn’t seem to take into account what the other side faces. Although it may be true that drones are becoming far more accurate, there is no place for an argument that says they have no collateral damage. This leads us to the discussion of how much collateral damage is allowed, if any, as well as other aspects of just war theory.
There are two main parts of just war theory: the “ jus ad bellum (justice in the resort to war) principles” and the “ jus in bello (justice in war conduct) principles” (Brough, Lango, van der Linden, “Just War Principles: An Introduction”). As far the discussion of drone warfare goes, the most relevant parts of the just war theory lie in the in bello principles, namely, discrimination and proportionality. The biggest argument against this new form of warfare is that these planes we send out and bombs we drop do not have the ability to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. According to this piece of just war theory, “Soldiers should be able to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants and target only the former”

(Brough, Lango, van der Linden, “Just War Principles: An Introduction”). The obvious problem here is that there are no soldiers in action to separate one type of person from the other. Drones lack the human ability to make this distinction. Another aspect of discrimination is how much collateral damage is acceptable and under what conditions. “Harm of noncombatants is typically seen as an acceptable result of military action if it is not intentionally inflicted and is proportionate to the importance of the goals of military action” (Brough, Lango, van der Linden,
“Just War Principles: An Introduction”). This brings up the question of what proportionality is and how it can be applied to the use of drones in war.
According to the proportionality principle of just war theory, “Force should be used in proportion to the end pursued, and destruction beyond what is necessary to reach a military objective is morally suspect” (Brough, Lango, van der Linden, “Just War Principles: An
Introduction”). For example, it seems incredibly out of proportion to drop a bomb on a place like
Hiroshima, a cultural center full of innocent citizens, in order to make a point. There is the reasoning that there were military centers located there, but it seems that all America wanted to do was scare the Japanese into ending the war. It could be thought that the reasoning behind
President Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only two atomic bombs ever deployed in war, was that benefits (the potential for ending the war) would outweigh the harm caused either in the sense of damage to the “enemy” or what would happen had Truman not acted. As far as the Hiroshima case goes, because such a small portion of the people there actually posed threat to us and the bomb was dropped for the sake of making a point, it is a fair argument that we did not act appropriately. While this is not a case consisting of drone aircraft, it is fair to say that the principle of proportionality is completely relevant, if not the same.

Thomas Nagel’s discussion of the ethics of war through his view of moderate absolutism brings up some very interesting ideas. One point that he makes is that, “Hostility is a personal relation, and it must be suited to its target” (Nagel, “War and Massacre”). As soon as drones become involved, the potential for a “personal relation” vanishes. Ignoring the reasons officials have given to justify their use, ie. accuracy benefits, less damage to our side, etc., it can be argued that a major benefit is the complete avoidance of personal relations. Another relevant idea that Nagel discusses is “that hostility or aggression should be directed at its true object. This means both that it should be directed at the person or persons who provoke it and that it should aim more specifically at what is provocative about them” (Nagel, “War and Massacre”). The use of a drone to drop a bomb or simply gain intelligence (which for pacifists is a rather ironic term) removes the interpersonal relation that Nagel discusses so thoroughly. It’s almost as though
America is hiding behind its technology so we don’t have to feel so awful about our past, current, and future actions.
One major argument in favor of the rapid advancement in military technology in America is that ultimately, when we must choose war over peace, our weapons will be so accurate that there will be no collateral damage. This goal sounds extreme, but it is certainly a great one to have. Another argument for this side is that even though the drones are doing the jobs, people are controlling them. Drone warfare may eliminate any “man to man” combat in the future, but it isn’t much different in essence. This is reminiscent of the saying, “guns don’t kill people; people kill people.”
This paper was not on pacifism nor was the term in the prompt, but it seems important to mention nonetheless. As great as the idea of “zero collateral damage” sounds, doesn’t peace sound even better? It is true, at times, that war may be necessary in order to bring an end to an

evil in hopes of bringing about a greater good, but it is also true that in many cases war could be prevented through a little pacifism and diplomacy. Maybe America should try “talking things out.” It sounds elementary, but honestly, it might be worth a try. For example, had we employed a little diplomacy, we might not be at war right now. Our immediate reaction to an attack such as the 9/11 disaster and the alleged existence of “weapons of mass destruction” was to invade and destroy. It is quite possible that, had we taken a more peaceful route, or even simply sought out accurate information, over ten thousand families would still have their sons and daughters; fathers and mothers.
Drone warfare seems like it could go either way in ethics, depending on what becomes of it in the future and how it is used. On one hand, it eliminates the potential for human relation and hasn’t been perfected to the point of being a just method of conduct in war. On the other hand, the future advancements in military technology seem promising in that they could lead to drones that could be incredibly accurate which would result in zero collateral damage. This issue is much more complex than it seems in this essay, but essential considerations are here addressed.
Drone warfare has the potential to be considered ethical, especially when used in accordance with the principle of just war theory, but that doesn’t mean that steps should be not taken to prevent war in the first place.

Works Cited
Brough, Michael W., John W. Lango, and Harry Van Der Linden. "Just War Principles: An
Introduction." Rethinking the Just War Tradition . Albany: State University of New York,
2007. Print.
Lethbridge, Cliff. "History of Rocketry: The Early 20th Century." Spaceline: Dedicated To
Covering The Past, Present And Future Of Cape Canaveral . 2000. Web. 24 Oct. 2011.
<http://spaceline.org/history/3.html>.
Maine, Tim, Jon Brachle, and Art Arago. "Ethics and the Advancement of Military Technology."
Ethica Publishing . Web. 24 Oct. 2011.
<http://www.ethicapublishing.com/ethical/3CH9.pdf>.
Nagel, Thomas. "War and Massacre." Philosophy and Public Affairs . Vol. 1. Princeton UP,
1972. Print.