MODULE 11 Reviewers
QUESTIONS
1. The most commonly accepted definition of war in Clausewitz’s On War is “the
continuation of policy by other means;” however, he continues throughout Book One,
Chapter 1 to offer various other analogies and metaphors to describe war. Do these
descriptions provide clarity or contradiction to an understanding of the concept of war?
Why or why not?
Proposed Answer
Clausewitz defines war as an “act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” the
object of which is the disarmament or, if necessary, destruction of the enemy’s armed forces.
This definition emphasizes the centrality of combat, which, for Clausewitz, is what separates
war from other human pursuits.
The descriptions provide clarity to an understanding of the concept of war. For instance,
he describes war as “a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed – that is
the only way in which it differs from other conflicts.” Similarly, he summarizes that “war is
fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated
as war.” Comparing those with the definition by the scholar, it is a collision between two living
forces which resulted to submission of the weak forces to strong forces.
Source: On War translated by Col Maude
2. Respond to Professor Menning’s “contention that military thinkers and doctrine
writers should always draw inspiration from the past but should not be bound by it.
Proposed Answer.
The major problem for the military theorist and planner are the constant changing
nature of operations from the pre-industrial warfare where generals and kings raised their army
to fight limited wars to the raising of larger armies by Napoleon with annihilation of enemy
forces, introduction to strategy of the single point by Jomini. the higher-level preparation and
planning, and operations to gain a single decisive battle. The introduction of aircraft, armor and
long range artillery into battles and operations which soviet calculated that future operations
might occupy up to 300 kms of frontage, extend to a depth of about 250km and have duration of
thirty to forty five days. Up to the current situation wherein in just a blink of an eye the war is
over due to modern war fighting technology.
This evolution overview demonstrates some of the realties and ironies inherent in the
history of a concept which are based on ideas, and ideas over time can be picked up, dropped,
and either reborn or refashioned to suit fresh circumstances and changed situations.
In general, operational art first appeared during the 1920s in response to the shifting
content of strategy, the changing nature of operations, and the evolving nature of military
structures. The productive elaboration of this concept in contemporary context supports the
contention that military thinkers and doctrine writers should always draw inspiration from the
past but should not be bound by it. Indeed, the term’s potential for retaining future significance
argues that theorists should seek to expand and refine the limits of operational art. It and related
concepts remain dynamic, and dynamism, while sometimes a source of confusion, is also an
important sign of vitality and growth. Source: Operational Art’s Origins by Bruce W Menning
3.
What is meant by the words “a generic process of operational adaptation
designed expressly to cope with complexity, uncertainty, and change that will define the
future operating environment?” How does this relate to Operational Art?
Proposed Answer
A complex of military actions and battles linked by time, place, and intent, might extend
for several weeks or longer. An operation’s course might witness a major regroupment of forces
and require changed command, control, and logistic arrangements, all within the altered limits of
greatly expanded space and time. The growing realization was that the preparation for and
conduct of operations had expanded beyond the limits of traditional military strategy to
incorporate new content, methods, and concerns. The most important issue was one of
linkages, and within a conceptual framework for the conduct of operations, how to fashion
linkages to contend with changes in time, timing, duration, support, scale, range, and distance.
(Bruce W. Menning’s reading)
BACKGROUND:
Historically, the term operation had been in use at least since the end of the seventeenth
century to describe what European armies did in the field.
During the age of preindustrial warfare, generals and kings raised professional armies to
fight limited wars for the dynastic state’s limited objectives. Within limited war’s framework, the
conduct of operations formed an integral part of strategy, and strategy was conceived as simply
“the tactics of theater-level operations.
By the eighteenth century’s end, Napoleon imparted new meaning to the traditional
calculus when he raised larger armies to fight decisively for objectives that called for the
annihilation of enemy forces and gave rise to empires. Still, the basic technologies remained the
same, and with room for alteration and even poetic license, the next generation of military
thinkers, led by Henri Jomini and his disciples, redefined the traditional preindustrial paradigm to
describe Napoleonic military art. Their view was that military strategy remained the domain of
large-unit operations and that the essence of Napoleonic genius could be understood in his
pursuit of “the strategy of the single point.” Napoleon’s columns march-maneuvered within
theater to force convergence with the enemy at a single point-finite in time and space-for
climactic battle to determine the outcome of a season’s campaign, perhaps even the outcome of
an entire war. Strategy described a limited complex of actions, including approaches, marches,
countermarches, and maneuvers, which took place within theater to leverage mass for decisive
battle. Tactics described what happened within the limited confines of the battlefield
During the nineteenth century’s latter half, about the time when most military thinkers
had grown comfortable with this understanding of strategy and tactics, the industrial revolution
went to war, thereby altering the basic paradigm in ways not fully understood until after World
War I:

The evolution of the modern industrial state enabled governments to tap vast manpower
resources to produce true mass armies based on the cadre and reserve principle or recruitment
and organization.

The application of steam and electricity to military ends enabled governments to mobilize
these armies and project them into potential theaters with unprecedented rapidity and
predictability.

The size of these armies and their preparation for deployment in future conflict
mandated the application of industrial-style planning and directing methods.

The new firepower based first on rifled, breech-loading weaponry, then on its magazine-
fed, smokeless powder variant, increased lethality and ranges and with them, the scale of
modern combat.
However, the overall picture had changed by the beginning of the twentieth century.
Campaigns were no longer governed by the seasons. The nature of operations was increasingly
dictated by the thrust of higher-level preparation and planning, and operations themselves were
no longer finite affairs leading to a single decisive battle.
How does this relate to Operational Art?

Identify strategic objectives within theater.

Visualize a theater in three dimensions.

Determine what sequence of military actions-preparation, organization, support, battles,
and command arrangements-would bring the attainment of those objectives.
Operational art evolution overview demonstrates some of the verities and ironies
inherent in the history of a concept.
Concepts are based on ideas, and ideas over time can be picked up, dropped, and
either reborn or refashioned to suit fresh circumstances and changed situations. In general,
operational art first appeared during the 1920s in response to the shifting content of strategy,
the changing nature of operations, and the evolving nature of military structures. The larger
context included the appearance of major new elements within the international order and the
constant intrusion of new technology into military conflict.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, all these conditions were once again present;
and in one of the ironies of intellectual and military history, they elicited a rebirth of interest in
operational art under different circumstances. The productive elaboration of this concept in
contemporary context supports the contention that military thinkers and doctrine writers should
always draw inspiration from the past but should not be bound by it. Indeed, the term’s potential
for retaining future significance argues that theorists should seek to expand and refine the limits
of operational art. It and related concepts remain dynamic, and dynamism, while sometimes a
source of confusion, is also an important sign of vitality and growth.
4.
What is the purpose of military theory?
Proposed Answer
Although theory is never complete and is always bound to be at least somewhat wrong,
it performs several useful functions when it defines, categorizes, explains, connects and
anticipates. It is primarily the product of mind. The formulation of useful theory demands intense
powers of observation, ruthless intellectual honesty, clear thinking, mental stamina of the
highest order, gifted imagination, and other attributes that defy easy description. Why? Because
of the following: 1) war is an intensely practical activity and a ruthless auditor of both individuals
and institutions. 2) War demands the disciplined acceptance of lawful orders, 3) War is episodic.
Theories exist so that one need not start a fresh each time sorting out the material and
glowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the
mind of the future commander, or more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to
accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s
intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.
According to Clausewitz, the essential role of theory was to aid the commander in his total
learning, which synthesized study, experience, observation, and reflection into a coherent
whole, manifested as an ever-alert, perceptive military judgement.
Source: Chapter 2 On the Nature of Military Theory by Harold Winston
5. What is the practical value in studying military history?
Proposed Answer
The most practical value in studying military history is meant to educate the mind of the
future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany
him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual
development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life." Although there
are clear practical applications of the study of war and warfare, such as understanding the
fundamentals of combined arms operations, the purpose of studying war through the lens of
history would be not to make us cleverer for the next time but instead to help make maneuver
leaders wise forever. Source: http://www.benning.army.mil/
6. How might one approach studying military theory and military history?
Proposed Answer
- Theory cannot precisely teach men what to do in every given case but history points
out errors that can be avoided.
- According to Clausevitz "Theory exist so that commander will not start anew each time.
It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or more accurately guide him in his
self-education, not to accompany him in the battlefield..." (Clausevitz)
- "History is the school of the soldiers"
- Theory educates the judgment of the commander; not to tell him what to do. (Theory
and Practice in War p 32)
- Theory is not a matter of wisssen (knowing that) but of konnen (knowing how).. (Theory
and Practice in War, p 33)
- Theory has a very limited help at the highest level of command because the
uncertainties were too great, the range of possibilities too vast and the array of factors to be
taken into account far too diverse. Hence, the coup d'oeil of the geat commander was needed to
enable him to analyze the situation and find his own solution for himself. (Theory and Practice in
War, p 32)
- One should carefully approach military history with the following two doubts about it:
(Use and Abuse of Military History, pp 19-20)
a) The historians should be conscious of the uniqueness of every historical event. An
example of clear altered historical event is the Xerxes attacked of Greeks in 481 B.C. with 2.5
million strong because of logistical improbability.
b) The second ground for doubt of the utility of military history is one's awareness that he
is studying not what happened in the past, but what historians say happened in the past.
7. What does it mean to study war in width, depth, and context?
Proposed Answer
To develop understanding in “width, depth, and context,” we must be active learners
dedicated to self-study and self-critique. Yet, increasing our understanding of war and our
profession does not mean that we should read and think about our profession on our own.
Discussion and debate with others will further our understanding of war and warfare by
exposing us to different perspectives and interpretations.
First, to study in width: To observe how warfare has developed over a long historical
period.
Second to study in depth: To study campaigns and explore them thoroughly, consulting
original sources and applying various theories and interdisciplinary approaches.
This is
important because we “catch a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience.”
And third to study in context. Wars and warfare must be understood in context of their
social, cultural, economic, human, moral, political, and psychological contexts because “the
roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield.”
And it also reminds us that the purpose of such an approach to the study of military
history and our profession ought not to focus on making “us cleverer for the next time,” but
instead to help make us “wise forever.”
7. Discuss Clausewitz’s concept and use of Center of Gravity.
Proposed Answer
The Centers Of Gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a
military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. At the strategic
level, they can include a military force, an alliance national will or public support, a set of critical
capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself. At the operational level, they are generally
the principal sources of power such as combat forces that are modern, mobile or armored that
can ensure or prevent the accomplishment of mission. At its core, this definition is capabilities
based, despite the presence of terms such as “national will” and “public support”. On this view,
all elements whether leadership, national will, or public opinion tend to flow on the enemy’s
capabilities will to resist.
- define COG as “the will of the people.”
- “The most important task confronting campaign planners in this process is being able
to identify friendly and adversary strategic centers of gravity; that is, the sources of strength,
power, and resistance.”
- Centers of gravity are sources of power. Joseph Strange of the U.S. Marine Corps War
College defines centers of gravity as the “primary sources of moral or physical strength, power,
and resistance.” A center of gravity is the source of power that creates a force or a critical
capability that allows an entity to act or accomplish a task or purpose.
- Clausewitz states, “Out of the characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the
hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which
all our energies should be directed.”
- according to U.S. Army and joint doctrine, misses the mark, so the joint community
changed it by limiting sources of power to military systems and by defining centers of gravity as
“those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of
action, physical strength, or will to fight.”
- The simplified joint definition of center of gravity then becomes “a system’s source of
power to act.”
- Critical capabilities, which are “primary abilities [that merit] a center of gravity to be
identified as such in the context of a given scenario, situation, or mission.”10 Critical capabilities
generate force or persuasion.
- The center of gravity is the source of power for critical capabilities, and critical
capabilities are what a center of gravity can do. For example, an organization establishes a
goal. The critical capability is the means to achieve that goal.
- Critical requirements (CR) are “essential conditions, resources and means for a critical
capability to be fully operative.”
- Critical vulnerabilities (CV) are “critical requirements or components thereof which are
deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack (moral/physical harm) in a
manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportional to the military resources
applied.” More simply, critical vulnerabilities are critical requirements or components that are
vulnerable to attack or disruption.
Reference: Center of Gravity Analysis Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, U.S. Army
9. Assess Clausewitz’s theory that defense as the stronger form of war.
Proposed Answer
-
The purpose of defense is preservation; while attack is conquest.
-
Attack increases one’s own capacity to wage war; defense does not.
-
So in order to state the relationship, we must say that the defensive form of warfare is
intrinsically stronger than the offensive.
Clausewitz viewed campaigns as defensive if an army waited for invasion of its theatre
of operations. The defense could be initiated in four ways; however, there are essentially two
different methods. An army could defend at its border, or it could defend by withdrawing into its
interior while waiting for the right opportunity and time to strike at its enemy. Clausewitz also
said defensive campaigns were a mixture of offensive and defensive actions. Armies adopted a
defensive posture only until they were strong enough to go on the offensive. More importantly,
he wrote that offensive battles should be part of the overall defensive campaign and not only as
counterattacks. Clausewitz also emphasized the defense as a means to transition to offensive
operations and insisted on the integration of offensive actions within defensive operations. This
shows that even though he understood the strength of the defense, he realized offensive
actions would often have to be used to attain decisive result. Clausewitz refined his thoughts on
defense while serving as a staff officer under General Von Phull in the Russian Army during the
Russian 1812 campaign.
13. Discuss the Center of Gravity –Ends/Ways/Means Analysis Framework
Proposed Answer
In military planning, determining the center of gravity is too important to leave to
guesswork; therefore, any technique or method that improves COG determination is certainly
worth exploring.
COG FRAMEWORK
The framework is all about strategy, illustrated through a process of end ways and
means. Ends are the objectives or desired outcomes of a given strategy. Ways are actions--the methods and process executed to achieve the ends. More simply, they answer the question,
How are you going to get to the end-state?
Means are the resources required to execute the way.
The ends, ways, and means framework sets the foundation for COG analysis. Identifying
the ends and the ways they may be achieved determines the means required (although in
crisis planning, the means currently available may determine the ways and ends).
The ways of a strategy are the essential determinants of a critical capability, and the
means that possess that critical capability constitute the center of gravity.
As military strategist and planners, this framework prescribes that we need to balance ends,
ways, and means, which can be likens to the three legs of a stool (the stool itself representing
the strategy). A strategy is balanced and entails little risk if the selected way (method) is capable
and has sufficient means (resources) to obtain the desired end (objective). However, if either
the ways or means legs are too short (due to inadequacies), or the end leg is too long (the goals
are unrealistic), the strategy is out of balance. To bring the strategy back into balance, the legs
must be adjusted; for example, desired ends can be scaled back to fit within the available
means, or means can be increased to fully support the selected way(s). When the means are
inadequate, planners must consider alternative ways. Because all of these "balancing" choices
are strategic decisions, the balancing act is the ----the operational art of the military
professional.
Having clarified some of the terms and associated logic, Lets go back and illustrate the
COG framework and analysis through the SIX STEPS METHOD:
1. Identify organization ends state or objectives
2. Identify ways or actions (verbs=CC) --- select those by which analysis suggests is
most likely to work. Remember, ways are actions so express them as verb.
3. List their means or resources needed (actors or nodes)--- to execute the ways or CC
4. Select possessor of CC (this is the COG-the doer of the action Key Node) ---It is a
Noun
5. Form the other means, select those critical to execute the capability (CRs)
6. Complete the process by ident from the CRs which are vulnerable to actions.
Your analysis of the systems will suggest direct or indirect attack‘ to neutralize or defeat
the enemy; understand this process and we get our COG.
Validity Test: Does/Uses
The "does/uses" test can verify the aptness of the center of gravity and distinguish it from critical
requirements and critical vulnerabilities. Only centers of gravity are inherently capable of
achieving the specific task or purpose defined in the ways. If something executes the
primary action (critical capability) that accomplishes the way, it is the center of gravity. Put
another way, the system that "does" the work and is the source of power that creates the force
or critical capability is the center of gravity. Or, even more simply, the center of gravity does the
action and uses resources to accomplish it. If something is used or consumed by another
entity to execute the primary action (critical capability), that something is a requirement. If
something contributes to, but does not actually perform, the critical capability, it is a
requirement, not a center of gravity.
Example: Madonna for President
An example of the strategic framework method in action might help illustrate how it works. Let's
suppose that Madonna wants to become president of the United States. Her end, then, is
"become president of the United States." Possible ways she might accomplish her end are by
coup, purchase, or via election. Madonna rules out the first three because she doesn‘t have the
means, that is, the military backing, or sufficient funds to accomplish those ways. She therefore
makes the strategic decision to get herself elected. So the verb or action is "to elect.” Means to
elect. To get elected, Madonna needs the following means (or resources required to execute the
ways) to name just a few: political skills, media access, a campaign organization, funds,
sufficient votes, convincing messages, and ideas. Of these means, which possesses the critical
capability "to elect"? Political skills are needed, but they don't vote. Funding is certainly required,
but dollars don't vote either. People who vote elect; therefore, voters are the center of gravity.
This is the "does" test.
Remember: the center of gravity must be able to perform the way or critical capability. A
political skill or funding source have no inherent ability to perform the critical capability; they are
enablers or critical requirements.
This simple example illustrates the overall concept of using ends, ways, and means
analysis and the does/uses test to identify critical capabilities and the possessor of those
capabilities.
14. What makes Sun Tzu different from theorists we have studied thus far?
Proposed Answer
Sun Tzu may have been the first consultant to write a book
— peddled practical
solutions, promising wealth and power to any who would adopt their complex schemes. Those
whose clients prospered could do very well. A variety of unpleasant fates awaited those whose
advice failed. Moreover, He is the only Asean theorist
Sun Tzu emphasizes the use of intelligence and spies which other theorist dont. Sun
Tzu writes that, if the leader has completely assessed the situation, the outcome of war can be
foreseen. “To gauge the outcome of war we must compare the two sides by assessing their
relative strengths. … Sun Tzu writes, to gather as much information as possible about the
enemy in order to analyse its strengths and weaknesses and gain comparative advantage.
“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be defeated”
Sun Tzu and Clausewitz differ in their views on an ideal victory. For Sun Tzu, ultimate
victory is at the level of grand strategy (Scobell, 2005). A flawless victory is speedy and without
bloodshed: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence” (Sun Tzu, tr.
Shibing, 1993: 105). A good general should aim to ruin the enemy’s strategy, shattering his will
to fight by use of psychology and deception rather than fully destroy the enemy (ibid.). The best
option to win a war is to leave the enemy’s state intact and capture its army.
In contrast, the Western scientific tradition of categorization has separated the concepts
of military arts and warfare from politics and statecraft (ibid.). Thus, Niccolo Machiavelli’s The
Prince is the most prominent book on state craft whereas Clausewitz’ On War is concerned with
military theory (ibid.). Clausewitz definition of war is based on Aristotle’s teleology, his distinction
between ends and means (Coker, 2002: 126). Hence, he sees war as “not a mere act of policy,
but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means” (1989: I/1. 24.
87). This way of perceiving war is still typical for the West today. Sun Tzu sees war as neither
instrumental nor existential but rather as a product of necessity (Coker, 2002: 126). It is evil and
disturbs the Tao, which is why it must be managed (ibid.).
Sun Tzu approach to war, positing that war is a phenomenon wherein diplomacy, espionage,
knowledge of geography, and other non-violent elements are equally if not more important than
Clausewitz’s preferred emphasis on martial combat
Sun Tzu takes a fundamental approach to the art of waging war by analyzing it in terms
of a small group of key factors whose impacts on the attainment of victory in a given conflict are
then estimated with regard to another set of significant elements or considerations. Sun Tzu
asserts that the factors of Moral Law, Heaven, Earth, The Commander, and Method and
Discipline, when properly considered in terms of the advantages and disadvantages they
provide to oneself and one’s adversaries, can be used to effectively determine the potential for
both victory and defeat in battle. While so vehemently emphasizing the necessity to consider
and properly address these factors, Sun Tzu also maintained a firm belief in the notion that
every conflict would be unique, in and of itself, and as such, that the conduct of one’s forces
therein could not be governed by fixed rules or principles. “In the art of war, there are no fixed
rules.
Ideas of Clausewitz and Jomini
In Europe at the dawn of the Enlightenment, scholars of strategy had other objectives.
Flush with their success at explaining physical phenomena using scientific principles, theorists
started to examine the art of successful generals using similar frameworks
Their first great exponent of strategy was Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712–1786),
whose small, well-drilled armies dominated Central Europe. Under King Frederick, military
strategy took on a chess like quality that allowed the early writers to bolster their arguments with
mathematical formulas and elaborate geometrical designs.
At the end of the 18th century, armies built on the Prussian model were crushed by
Napoleon’s massed columns. New scholars scrambled to explain this phenomenon and to
revise their principles.
Von Clausewitz’s greatest value is probably his philosophical attitude to the relationship
between theory and practice. For him, “real” war was a dynamic process. Every situation was
unique, and no theoretical system could possibly tell a commander what to do: “Theory should
... guide [the future commander] in his process of self-education, but it should not accompany
him to the battlefield.” Von Clausewitz argues that theory can help us focus on and summarize a
topic — to understand history — but theory is inherently descriptive rather than prescriptive. He
regarded principles as rungs on the ladder of imagination — aids to judgment and intuition in
what was fundamentally a creative activity. In von Clausewitz’s view, principles could not be
foundational pillars for action
Von Clausewitz’s contemporary and rival Antoine- Henri de Jomini, on the other hand,
saw actionable principles as central to any science of strategy. Regarded as the founder of the
modern concept of strategy (as opposed to politics and tactics), de Jomini was the most widely
read interpreter of Napoleon’s genius. He had a Platonist’s faith that behind the confusion and
chaos of war were a few immutable scientific principles. The use of prescriptive principles
appealed strongly to military educators, and de Jomini wrote for a wide audience that was eager
to understand the “secret” of Napoleon’s success. Military ties between France and United
States had grown close during the War of Independence, and generations of West Point
engineers had been trained by the “principles” approach. De Jomini’s influence remained strong
in the military academies outside Germany until his reputation collapsed in the bloodbaths of the
First World War. He had always insisted that his principles were independent of technology. In
the American Civil War, when defenders had rifles instead of muskets, the Napoleonic principle
of massed attack had proved merely expensive for the attacker. During the 1914–1918 war,
against machine guns, it proved to be suicidal.
15. Clausewitz has described the attributes of a successful commander. Does Sun
Tzu have any specific traits in mind?
Proposed Answer
Commander according to Clausewitz
Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for
appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in
exceptional achievements, their possessor is called a “genius.”
Genius” refers to a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation.
What we must do is to survey all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear
on military activity. These, taken together, constitute the essence of military genius. We have
said in combination, since it is precisely the essence of military genius that it does not consist in
a single appropriate gift—courage, for example—while other qualities of mind or temperament
are wanting or are not suited to war. Genius consists in a harmonious combination of elements,
in which one or the other ability may predominate, but none may be in conflict with the rest.
We can already guess how great a role intellectual powers play in the higher forms of
military genius
a.
War is the realm of danger; therefore courage is the soldier’s first requirement.
Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept
responsibility,
These two kinds of courage act in different ways. The first is the more dependable;
having become second nature, it will never fail. The other will often achieve more. There is more
reliability in the first kind, more boldness in the second. The first leaves the mind calmer; the
second tends to stimulate, but it can also blind. The highest kind of courage is a compound of
both
War is the realm of physical exertion and suffering. These will destroy us unless we can
make ourselves indifferent to them, and for this birth or training must provide us with a certain
strength of body and soul. If we do possess those qualities, then even if we have nothing but
common sense to guide them we shall be well equipped for war: it is exactly these qualities that
primitive and semicivilized peoples usually possess.
b.
Powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors
on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive
and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.
If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two
qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some
glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint
light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup
d’oeil; the second is determination.
Determination in a single instance is an expression of courage; if it becomes
characteristic, a mental habit. But here we are referring not to physical courage but to the
courage to accept responsibility, courage in the face of a moral danger. This has often been
called courage d’esprit, because it is created by the intellect. The role of determination is to limit
the agonies of doubt and the perils of hesitation when the motives for action are inadequate.
Presence of mind - quick thinking The expression “presence of mind” precisely conveys
the speed and immediacy of the help provided by the intellect
Strength of will - tremendous willpower to overcome this resistance. The ardor of his
spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope.
Only to the extent that he can do this will he retain his hold on his men and keep control.
Strength of its motive, whether the motive be the result of intellectual conviction or of
emotion. Great strength, however, is not easily produced where there is no emotion. Passions
that inspire man in battle
c.
strength of mind, or of character ability to keep one’s head at times of exceptional
stress and violent emotion.
self-control—the gift of keeping calm. to act rationally at all times.
Attributes of a Commander according to suntzu
Cardinal Virtue of Chinese
Commander stand for the virtue of Sun Tzu
1. Humanity/benevolence
1. Wisdom
2. Uprightness {replaced by strictness}
2. Sincerity
3. Self control {replaced by courage}
3. Benovelence
4. Wisdom
4. Courage
5. Sincerity
5.
strictness
LAYING PLANS
a. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
b. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject
of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
c. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in
one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
d. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth (4) The Commander; (5)
Method and discipline.
e. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that
they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
f. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
g. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and
narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
h. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage
and strictness.
i. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its
proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by
which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
j. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be
victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
k. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions,
let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:-l. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? (2) Which of the two
generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (5) Which army is stronger? (6) On
which side are officers and men more highly trained? (7) In which army is there the greater
constancy both in reward and punishment?
m. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
n. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a
one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will
suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!
o. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful
circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
p. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans. Flexible
– {flexibility}
q. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple were the
battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do
many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation
at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.
What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer and achieve
things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge. {Use of spy)
16.
What is Sun Tzu's view on intelligence?
Proposed Answer
Intelligence can also be defined as “processed, accurate information, presented in
sufficient time to enable a decision-maker to take whatever action is required. Poor intelligence
can be attributed several factors: the lack of intelligence funding or skills; limited methods
available to obtain, conduct analysis, or the dissemination of intelligence; the inability of
leadership to understand which is most important; or the belief by political leadership the
intelligence gathering is unfair or unethical. Sun Tzu repeatedly emphasizes the significance
and advantages of intelligence and drives the issue home with his focus on knowing the enemy.
He addresses why we must use all the tools available to us including imagination and innovation
to be victorious
His attitude towards the significance of intelligence could not be more clearly stated than
in his words “Know your enemy and know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in
peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing
are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in
peril.” Belief that we can shape our circumstances implies ownership of a thorough and
sophisticated understanding of the operating environment. Central to any understanding is
access to credible intelligence—or in Sun Tzu’s words, foreknowledge. According to Sun Tzu,
“what is called foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, not from gods, nor by analogy with
past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy
situation.”
Decision makers need knowledge about ourselves, our enemies—and knowledge of our
friends. It is not something as simple as projecting the future based on events of the past.
Though opponents may not always know each other’s intentions, they can at least understand
each other’s capabilities. Good leaders will know their enemy’s strengths and weaknesses, their
preferred behavior, and how susceptible they are to deception. Most of this knowledge can only
be achieved through human agents who know personally the enemy leaders they are dealing
with. Sun Tzu drives the importance of this home by stating “secret operations are essential in
war: upon them the army relies to make every move.”
Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and
achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.
That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means to do.
Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively
from experience, nor by any deductive calculation.
Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies;
(3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This
is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty
Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district
Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the enemy
Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our
own purposes
Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and
allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy
SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.
Geertz defined culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in
sym-bols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which
men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.”
According to Kartchner, et al., strategic culture is a set of “shared beliefs, assumptions,
and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral
and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which
determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”
An analysis of the usefulness of strategic culture must necessarily depart from a
theoretical discussion, as the utility of strategic culture for security analysis depends on whether
one believes the concept should be used to ‘explain’, or to ‘understand’ strategic decisionmaking (Meyer, 2005a: 526). The ‘explaining-understanding’ dichotomy refers to two distinct
approaches to international politics: ‘explaining’ emphasizes the structural and causal
conditioning of international politics, whereas ‘understanding’ focuses on the conditioning of
actors by factors such as rules, intentions and context (Hollis & Smith, 1990: 7-9). This
translates to the question whether strategic culture determines or shapes the strategic decisionmaking of states (Biava, Drent & Herd, 2011: 1228).
Strategic culture is, however, still necessary for a proper understanding of a state’s
strategic decision-making.
Understanding a state’s strategic culture, and thus how actors are constituted, enables
one to improve predictions of strategic behavior in accordance with that culture. While it cannot
be said that strategic culture determines strategic decision-making, understanding a state’s
strategic culture can provide the insight that strategic behavior a, being appropriate within the
strategic culture, is much more likely to happen than inappropriate strategic behavior b. As
ideas about the appropriateness of the use of force often differ greatly, strategic culture is
essential for understanding why strategic decision-making is shaped differently in different
states.
Not only can ideas about appropriateness differ greatly, they are also very resistant to
change. Although strategic culture is not permanent, it is very stable. A strategic culture often
outlives its era of inception and can at best only be marginally affected by political leaders
(Longhurst, 2004: 17). This is because strategic culture is strongly rooted in the collective
memory. Historical experience is especially important: ‘traumatic defeats, oppression, betrayal
and exclusion, guilt as well as military triumphs plant themselves deep into collective memories
as ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘beliefs held’’ (Meyer, 2005: 51). While strategic culture may gradually
evolve, it will not change frequently or radically, as long as no event of sufficient magnitude
occurs which requires thorough revision (Gray, 2007: 14).
It is important to consider a state’s strategic culture, as it provides insights in (i) a state’s
unique standards of appropriateness regarding the use of force, and (ii) why strategic behavior
is stable over time, despite political change or internal and external pressure.
The real utility of the concept of strategic culture is its ability to deepen our ‘explicative
understanding’ of the patterns of security behaviour of states.
Cultural proficiency at the policy and strategic levels means the ability to consider
history, values, ideology, politics, religion, (VIP-HR) and other cultural dimensions and assess
their potential effect on policy and strategy.
The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) is one systematic
and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses. The national
security community is interested in cultural features or dimensions that drive political and
strategic action and behavior. The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be
of fundamental importance in determining such behavior and thus are of importance in policy
and strategy formulation and outcomes. These dimensions are (1) Identity, or the basis for
defining identity and its linkage to interests; (2) Political Culture, or the structure of power and
decision-making; and (3) Resilience, or the capacity or ability to resist, adapt or succumb to
external forces. Identity is the most important, because it ultimately determines purpose, values
and interests that form the foundation for policy and strategy to attain or preserve those
interests.(Kim Cultural Dimension of Strategy)
19.
How does a phenomenon like globalization shape the evolution of a state’s
strategic culture? (America as an example)
Proposed Answer
One test of American resilience is America’s relationship with globalization.
Perhaps more than any other society, the United States has been able to innovate and
adapt to the forces of globalization. Indeed, America has been and remains one of the engines
of globalization. Another test of resilience is how America approaches its integration with
transnational institutions (e.g., the United Nations [UN] or the World Trade Organization [WTO]).
It does so with the determination to protect individual and national prerogatives while remaining
open to institutions that support its ideas of liberal democracy, economic openness, and
universal human rights. These cultural considerations affect American policy and strategy. To
begin with, most Americans have a distinct worldview and beliefs about America’s place in that
world. That view is very much founded on the legacy of 18th century enlightenment that also
animated America’s founding revolution. A democratic world with a capitalist economic system
based on free trade is America’s idealized utopia, and Americans see America as destined to
have a leading role in bringing about such a world. (Kim Cultural Dimension of Strategy)
20. How do strategic cultures differ for non-state actors?
Proposed Answer
A. Strategic culture is defined as “shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior,
derived from common experiences and common narratives that shape collective identity and
relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving
security objectives” (Johnson Strategic Culture p. 3).
The definition suggests a common set of determinates of strategic culture (such as:
political traditions, history, beliefs, climate, resources & geography) derived from the study of
states. (p. 4)
For non-state actors, these determinates must be adjusted to the specific circumstances
of the actor. For example, for a sub-state group or a distinctly national non-state actor, factors
such as geography and climate that are often very significant for states may still apply much as
they do with states. However, for transnational or non-national non-state actors, these factors
may have to be adapted to a regional or other broader focus, or some may even become minor
or irrelevant. For transnational or internationally networked VNSA, there may be widely
separated “national” nodes with very different influences and as a result multiple cultural
variants. In these cases, there will likely be both similar and varied determinates and outcomes.
So while there is no single priority or weighting of these factors, individually and together they
exercise strong and sometimes complex shaping forces on both states and non-state actors,
resulting in distinct strategic decisions and actions. (pp. 4-5)
20-2. Does viewing violent non-state actors as influenced by strategic culture
provide operational insight?
A. Identity and ideology define the strategic culture of the VNSA. VNSA strategy flows
directly from the identity and ideology, and it is driven by the objectives derived there from. The
chain then flows directly to its operational structure and the operational capabilities needed to
carry out the strategy and achieve the objectives. Full analysis and understanding at each step
provides a window into analyzing and understanding the next link. Finally, this culturally shaped
strategic to operational chain also provides the doctrine, or operational code, for applied political
violence by the group. Tactical details flow from, and are not fully decipherable without the
context of, strategic and operational level factors and their driving influence. This set of linked
factors is further linked in turn to potential VNSA operations. (pp. 7-8)
20-3. What leverage can this perspective provide for how to combat ASG?
A. The perspective provides a vital culturally based lens into the inner thinking and
actions of a VNSA like the ASG. It applies directly to describing, understanding, and countering
VNSA strategic decisions and actions. It explains how the group defines itself and what it hopes
to achieve.
21: Perhaps Clausewitz’s most important and useful advice to political and
military leaders is for them to understand the war they are fighting. He writes,
“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman
and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which
they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something
that is alien to its nature.” Choose an example of a conflict from the CGSC
curriculum and discuss whether or not the statesmen and commanders followed
Clausewitz’s advice. Your answer should include an examination of any of the
following: politics, civil-military relations, economics, leadership and morale, and
other key factors.
Proposed Answer
One of the most important and lasting contributions of Clausewitz is his insistence that
before any conflict begins, civilian-and military leaders and strategists must understand the kind
of war upon which they are embarking. “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of
judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . .the kind of
war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into,
something that is alien to its nature.” Coming to grips with the nature of the war is the first,
and most comprehensive, question that must be answered. A mistake in identifying the nature
of the conflict can lead to defeat on the battlefield. The following must be carefully considered in
this identification:
1) The political objectives of the enemy as well as our own.
2) The power and condition of the enemy's state as well as our own.
3) The character and capacity of the enemy's government and of his people as well as our
own.
4)The political connections of other states and the effect which war will produce on these
states.
Clausewitz said the "means" (capabilities) must be addressed when considering war.
The enemy's means are of primary concern,
Questions that must be asked include:
1) Will he fight conventionally or unconventionally? Air, land or sea?
2) Will he likely give in easily? How much punishment can he take?
3) Will he fight according to the Geneva Conventions?
4) What will it take to be successful against him?
Historical Examples:
1) From 1808 to 1813, France was involved in the Peninsular War with
Spain. The Spanish military forces were defeated and Napoleon put his brother on the throne.
French revolutionary reforms were institutes in the government and in the church. The Spanish
people rejected these reforms, refused to be defeated, and 100,000 Frenchmen a year were
killed in Spain during the ensuing harshly fought partisan war. Napoleon's military lost many fine
troops that he could have used elsewhere.
Because Napoleon failed to understand the
motivations of the Spanish people, he could not possibly comprehend the nature of the war in
Spain.
2) From 1954 to 1972, America was bogged down in a war in Vietnam with an elusive
enemy and no clear objectives. America's high technology weapons were not suited to a jungle,
guerrilla type war. There was confusion regarding the enemy centre of gravity. As the war
dragged on and casualties mounted, American public support waned. The United States then
accepted a political settlement designed to save face; many believed that thereafter a
communist takeover was inevitable. Was it a civil war? A revolutionary war? A conventional
war? A case of overt aggression from North Vietnam? American civilian and military leaders
could not agree on answers to these questions--questions critical to identifying the nature of the
conflict in Vietnam.
Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War
The United Nations during the latter half of 1990 established clear objectives for the
conflict in Southwest Asia:
1) Iraq must leave Kuwait unconditionally.
2) The legitimate government of Kuwait must be restored.
3) Iraq must pay reparations for damages inflicted as a result of its aggression.
These objectives were clear, and in line with guidance provided by Clausewitz. "No one starts a
war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he
intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." (9:579)
During late 1990 and early 1991, the United States embraced the United Nations
Security Council resolutions and established the following additional objectives:
1) Restore some semblance of stability and ensure free movement of oil out of the Gulf
Region.
2) Restore the international status quo and show would-be aggressors that aggression
does not pay.
3) Destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.
4) Weaken Iraq's military and destroy Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage offensive war.
5) Remove Saddam from power (not officially stated).
The Bush administration was careful to establish very specific objective early in the
campaign. The administration did not want to be accused of not clearly establishing policy.
Thus the administration produced a comprehensive strategy that proved to be a major asset for
the Allied powers. American officials understood the kind of war that occurred in Southwest
Asia. The SCUD firings at Saudi Arabia and Israel were anticipated. The SCUD firings at Israel
were an attempt to get the Jewish state involved in the war and divide the coalition. These
SCUD launchings were Iraq's primary offensive thrust. It is reasonable to state that the Bush
administration was fairly accurate in predicting the kind of war that evolved.
On the other hand, it appears that Saddam did not understand the nature of the war
upon which he embarked. Initially, he may not have understood that the invasion of Kuwait
would mean opposing over half a million American and Allied troops with modern equipment.
Nor did he choose to pull back in the face of this build-up.
22. What skills are especially important for a leader in operational decision
making? Are these skills different from those required for tactical and strategic decisionmaking? Provide examples from the curriculum that show when such operational
decision making skills were particularly important to success or failure in peace or war.
Proposed Answer
Strategy – Strategy applies to peace as well as war. We distinguish between national
strategy, which coordinates and focuses all the elements of national power to attain the policy
objectives. Military strategy, which is the application of military force to secure the policy
objectives. Military strategy thus is subordinate to national strategy. Military strategy can be
thought of as the art of winning wars and securing peace. Strategy involves establishing goals,
assigning forces, providing assets, and imposing conditions on the use of force in theaters of
war.
Tactical - the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in combat at a
particular time and place. In noncombat situations, tactics may include the schemes and
methods by which we perform other missions, such as enforcing order and maintaining security
during peacekeeping operations
Operational - The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels. It is the
use of tactical results to attain strategic objectives. The operational level includes deciding
when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle and when, where, and
under what conditions to refuse battle in support of higher aims. Its means are tactical results,
and its ends are the established strategic objectives.
Skill – temperament to cope with uncertainty, requires flexibility of mind to deal with fluid
and disorderly situations. It requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with
initiative and boldness, an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity, and
the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior.
Reference: Warfighting MCDP 1
Adaptive leadership - exploring the practice of creative thinking that uses adaptive
approaches drawn from previous circumstances or les- sons learned, along with creating
innovative approaches.
Adaptability has two key components:
●The ability of a leader to identify the essential elements critical for performance in each
new situation.
●The ability of a leader to change his practices or his unit by quickly capitalizing on
strengths and minimizing weaknesses. Adaptive leaders are open-minded, do not jump to
conclusions, are willing to take risks, and are resilient to setbacks. They must learn to lead
across cultures, seek challenges, and leverage their cognitive abilities to counteract the
challenges of the operational environment through logical problem solving.
Reference
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120630MC_art
007.pdf
Note: Same skill is required for tactical and strategic level, it only differ from the impact of the
result of the action on the level of war. (Ex. CSS template vis a vis long lecture)