Doctrine of Necessity Examined
Tom Leddy 2/25/15
1.
There is a common belief that every single fact in the universe is precisely determined by law.
1.1.
Democritus: reflected on the impenetrability, translation and impact of matter.
1.1.1.
Jumped to conclusion that mechanical constraint was the sole principle of action in the universe.
1.1.2.
Epicurus supposed that the atoms swerve by spontaneous chance, giving the theory life and entelechy.
1.1.3.
The molecular [atomist?] hypothesis in physics allows calculus of probability. [i.e. more recent versions of Epicurus allow this]
1.1.4.
Aristotle condemned Democritus holding that events may be caused by external compulsion through efficient causes, their inward nature or final causes, and by absolute chance without definite cause: essence of his thought [which P. seems to endorse].
1.1.5.
Freedom of the will endorsed both by Aristotle and Epicurus.
1.2.
The Stoics seized on the most tangible, hardest element.
1.2.1.
They impugned the inductive method, preferred the reductio.
1.2.2.
They stood for strict Necessitarianism, thus returning to Democritus.
1.2.3.
They combined it with materialism.
1.2.4.
In the Renaissance the Stoics were favored because they departed from Aristotle and because their superficialities were well adapted to literature and art, i.e. philosophy drawn mild [this seems to contradict the hardness of the Stoics above]
1.2.5.
The great discoveries in mechanics [i.e. Newton] and advances in physics seemed to support Necessitarianism.
1.2.5.1.
But the doctrine conflicted with freedom of the will and with miracles.
1.2.5.2.
A philosophical blunder: associationism belongs intrinsically to materialism, and libertarianism was weakened.
1.2.5.3.
Historical criticism then exploded miracles.
1.2.5.4.
The doctrine of necessity is now in its greatest vogue.
1.3.
It holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the mind is under the rigid governance of necessity.
1.3.1.
This implies that minds are parts of the physical world.
1.3.2.
The laws of physics [on this view] determine everything.
1.3.3.
It is all calculable from the positions and velocities of the particles at any instant.
1.3.4.
The usual form of Necessitarianism is mechanical philosophy.
1.4.
I ask what makes you believe that every fact in the universe is precisely determined by law.
1.4.1.
First answer: the proposition is a postulate of scientific reasoning.
1.4.2.
That it is postulated does not make it true or provide rational motive for believing it.
1.4.3.
To postulate a proposition is to merely hope it is true.
1.4.4.
To say that Archimedes’ principle would fail if men had free will would be absurd.
1.4.5.
But this is implied by saying that the two views are incompatible.

1.4.6.
Also, the conclusions of science do not pretend to be more than probable, and this never supposes anything to be precisely true without exception.
1.5.
That postulates belong to reasoning is based on a false conception of logic.
1.5.1.
Non-deductive inference is induction, hypothesis or analogy, and maybe some other extremely unusual complicated mode which reduces down to these three anyway.
1.5.2.
So far as these are ampliative in concluding something not implied in the premises they depend on one principle and the same procedure: all are inferences from sampling.
1.5.3.
A ship is laden with wheat, we stir it thoroughly, take samples from different parts, and find that four fifths have quality A. We infer experientially and provisionally that this amount of grain has this quality.
1.5.4.
We do not pretend to knowledge of the wheat in itself: we are dealing only with the matter of possible experience, experience as affecting the senses but as the subject of thought.
1.5.5.
Hidden wheat that cannot turn up is not our concern.
1.5.6.
Provisionally in that we have not reached any assigned degree of approximation as yet: our experience if indefinitely extended, every fact applied in correcting the inferred ratio, our approximation will become indefinitely close in the long run, determining the variations of the ratio.
1.5.7.
No postulate is involved.
1.6.
A postulate is a formulation of a material fact which we are not entitled to assume as a premise.
1.6.1.
Any fact postulated must be either experience-able or not. If it present itself we need not postulate it and if it never present itself our inference is only valid as far as possible experience goes.
1.6.2.
Every postulate is cut off by provisionality or by experientiality of our inference.
1.6.3.
It has been said that induction postulates that if an indefinite succession of samples be drawn…
1.6.4.
It has also been said that induction postulates that under like experiences like events will happen, which is the same as the principle of universal causation.
1.6.5.
This is a blunder assuming that the ratio is 1 or 0.
1.6.6.
“under like circumstances…different events occur in the same proportions in all the different sets” and this is false and absurd.
1.6.7.
No such thing is postulated.
1.7.
One objection to my theory of induction: I fail to deduce the full degree of force which induction in fact possesses since the next handful of grain might modify the concluded value.
1.7.1.
Random sampling and predesignation of the character sampled should be striven for but if the inquiry is conducted honestly the inference retains value.
1.8.
Thus the principle of universal necessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning.
1.9.
Is it proved by observation of nature?
2.
(92) Essence of the necessetarian position is that certain continuous quantities have certain exact values.
2.1.
The probable error would be zero.

2.2.
Someone in the know about laboratories would think it ridiculous to think this precision is attained.
2.3.
So any idea that a certain continuous quantity has a certain exact value must be founded on something other than observation.
3.
A qualification to this rule is that if no line is seen, the observed length of such a line is zero, but we can only conclude that the length of the line is less than can be seen.
4.
Although there is regularity in nature this does not prove that such regularity is exact and universal.
4.1.
All observation is opposed to this exactitude.
4.2.
The more precise your observations the more certain they will show irregular departures from the law of nature.
4.3.
We are accustomed to ascribe these to errors in observation: but [I am confused here…I think he is saying we cannot be sure that they are not due to chance]
5.
Someone might suggest that if there were an element of real chance in the universe it would produced observed effects.
5.1.
Particles of gases are moving about irregularly as if by real chance, and it is even probable that some movements are contrary to the second law of thermodynamics.
6.
(93) So no one can hold that the precise and universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved or even shown particularly probable by any observation.
6.1.
A defender of exact regularity is driven to a priori reasons.
6.2.
Like Mill.
7.
To say we cannot help believing a given proposition is no argument, although it is conclusive for three types, the blindly passionate, the unreflecting and the person with overwhelming evidence.
7.1.
But what is inconceivable today may become indisputable tomorrow.
7.2.
A vigorous mind will cast off blind compulsion.
8.
Some say that exactly regularity of the world is a natural belief, and such are generally confirmed by experience.
8.1.
But such beliefs require correction and purification from natural illusions.
8.2.
The early formulations of the principles of mechanics were very mistaken.
8.3.
The adaptations of nature are never found to be perfect.
8.4.
So this argument is against absolute exactitude.
9.
Another argument is that absolute chance is inconceivable.
9.1.
But this is not the sort that proves chance does not exist.
10.
It is also argued that chance is unintelligible.
10.1.
10.2.
It does not disclose to reason the why and how of things.
P. answers with a dialogue with his opponent.
11.
The necessetarian will say that irregularity is something which the nature of things we must not seek to explain.
11.1.
11.2.
He explains the uniformity of nature by the laws of nature being immutable.
But my hypothesis of spontaneity does explain irregularity it that it explains the general fact of irregularity, although not each lawless event.
11.3.
It also allows another kind of causation operative in the mind in the forming of associations.

11.4.
Logic revolts against the idea that a universal law is hard, ultimate, unintelligible fact.
12.
Necessitarianism makes the whole action of the mind a part of the physical universe.
12.1.
Our thought that we decide what we are doing is reduced to illusion.
12.2.