What support will the UK provide? - Department for International

advertisement
Business Case and Intervention Summary: Humanitarian Response
Intervention summary
Title: Uganda Humanitarian Funding – Landslides and Floods Response
2011
What support will the UK provide?
£215,000 to provide humanitarian relief through the British Red Cross (BRC) to the Uganda Red Cross
Society (URC) over 3 months.
Why is UK support required?
Heavy rains that started at the end of August which have continued through to November in some
northern, eastern and western parts of Uganda including Gulu, Nebbi, Pakwach, Bulambuli, Sironko,
Kasese and Bundibugyo have resulted in mudslides, hailstorms, serious flooding and water logging.
This has resulted in an increase in the number of people impacted by flooding and associated risks.
Tens of thousands have lost homes and livelihoods and are at risk of disease and deterioration of living
conditions on account of inadequate access to shelter, food and medical care.
Floods, mudslides and hailstorms destroyed crops and houses and have affected large numbers of
households; many villages remain waterlogged, making sleeping arrangements difficult as most
children sleep on the floor. As pit latrines are submerged, communities have resorted to field
defecation creating additional health risks. As such there is an urgent need for adequate access to
sanitation and hygiene to prevent outbreak of water-borne diseases.
Some health centres remain cut off, many feeder roads damaged, bridges washed away and schools
closed or severely affected by flooding.
Following the 2011 landslides, hailstorms and floods in eastern, northern and western Uganda, the
URC action team and volunteers, together with community members, police and Uganda People’s
Defence Force carried out search and rescue efforts for victims in the affected areas.
The Office of the Prime Minister has contributed £1.2 million towards provision of food supplies to the
affected population. The other sector Ministries, that is, the Ministry of Education and Sports, the
Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Works are intervening using their own internal resources but the
needs have overwhelmed the Government of Uganda capacity to respond effectively. The
quantification of the total sum of money that the Government of Uganda is spending to respond to the
humanitarian situation in the country is in process. It takes time for the Government of Uganda to put
its sector information together.
DFID support to the URCS through the BRCS will provide:
 Temporary shelter and emergency relief items for 4,000 vulnerable affected households.
What are the expected results?
The impact of the intervention will be reduced impact of disasters in Uganda
The key outcome of the intervention will be that the immediate needs of households affected by
landslides and floods in Uganda in 2011 are met.
Key results of providing support to the URC include, but are not limited to:
 4,000 vulnerable households able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide protection
from the weather.
 4,000 vulnerable households receive emergency relief items and support.
 Learning from the emergency response documented and used to inform future practice.
As well as monitoring progress against the log-frame in Annex A, BRCS will undertake an evaluation at
the end of the programme. DFID will have the opportunity to provide input into the Terms of Reference
(TORs) and be consulted on the choice of the evaluator.
Business case
Strategic case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
From late August to November severe rains have caused landslides and heavy flooding in eastern
Uganda, including the districts of Bulambuli, Kween, Mbale, Soroti, Katakwi, Butalejja, Sironko, and
Kapchorwa. Heavy rains and hailstorms have affected the districts of Gulu, Nebbi and Moyo in
northern Uganda and in Kasese, Bundibugyo and Kosoro districts in western Uganda rains have led to
flooding in many areas. The rains have caused severe damage to property, human, crops and animals.
The government has issued warnings related to the continued rains. At a press briefing on Friday 11th
November 2011, Dr Stephen Mallinga, the Minister for Disaster Preparedness, said the situation is
getting out of hand in some districts as heavy rainfall triggers water-logging and flooding. He added that
“While the flooding in the Karamoja has subsided, the situation is worsening in Teso, Mt. Elgon, parts of
Lango and Bukedia sub-regions”. Mr Musa Ecweru, Dr Mallinga’s deputy, said if the rain continues the
impact of the floods will be on the same level as those in 2007 that affected approximately 60,000
households, or 400,000 people – 80 per cent of them children and women.
Weather forecasts indicate that the current rains are likely to persist throughout December which could
worsen the situation. The impact of the floods has been exacerbated by additional disasters including
hailstorms, civil unrest and fires. To date, URCS has established that 34 have died as a result of the
different disasters and 32,263 households (210,022 people) have been affected across the country.
Most of the affected families are living with host families whose resources have become strained.
Among other things sleeping arrangements are difficult as most people, especially children sleep, on
the floor. Relief assistance is required for many of the affected people, including Water, Sanitation and
Hygiene (WASH) interventions, as flood waters have contaminated water sources and damaged
latrines.
Public infrastructure has been severely impacted with approximately 61 km of roads being washed
away in Karamoja. Bunambutye –Nakapiripit road in eastern Uganda has been cut off as result of
recent rains. Abim-Lira road is nearly unusable for light vehicles, as is the Katakwi-Amuria road due to
weak bridges while some roads in Bulambuli have been cut off. In Tororo, according to the district
disaster management committee (DDMC) and reported in the Monitor in November 28, 2011, rains
swept away 10 bridges. The most affected roads were those had been recently graded under the
Community Agricultural Infrastructural Improvement Programme.
Most of the affected areas require emergency interventions as they have not received any relief
support so far.
There is urgent need for more food and non-food items to support the affected communities especially
since durable solutions have not been tabled. So far only approximately 38% for the non-food item
needs have been met.
The livelihoods of the largely agrarian population have been especially affected; most of the affected
population is dependent on agricultural activities such as crops, livestock and fisheries. Crops have
been destroyed by landslides and floods which are likely to severely affect the availability of and access
to adequate food for a large proportion of the population in coming months.
Problems have been compounded by weak capacity in the District Disaster Management Committees
in the affected Districts. Data collection by the Government of Uganda has been slow and the
Government appeal for international support has been impeded by fear of being perceived as unable to
feed and protect its own people. As a result, the Government of Uganda has been reluctant to request
international assistance. The desire within Government is to respond through national resources and
within local capacities, which have remained inadequate.
The most robust response to the emergency situations in various parts of the country has been through
the URC. As a result, the Government of Uganda decided that all relief assistance from partners and
sympathisers should be distributed by the URC. It is also clear from the affected districts that there are
not enough resources to meet the needs of the affected communities and that efforts need to be made
by partners to address the existing gaps in response.
The response to date has included £1.2million (UGX5bn) used by the Office of the Prime Minister of
Uganda to procure food.
In addition, Uganda Red Cross Society plans have been supported by:
 USAID – USD 50,000
 Danish Red Cross - £35,000
 World Vision – mosquito nets and water purification tablets
 IFRC - £143,698 (via the DREF)
 ICRC – Non-Food Items (NFI)
 UNICEF - sanitation kits (containing a wheel barrow, shovel, metallic buckets, rope, squatting plate,
rake, pick axe and panga/machete) for 971 households
 ADRA – NFI kits, food and mosquito nets
 Tullow – £23,523
 Salvation Army – Promised to drill 7 boreholes and has contributed food for 400 households in
Bunambutye and Bwikhonge sub-counties in cooperation with the URC
The URC is taking the lead in the distribution of all food and non-food items in the affected sub-counties
as well as being involved in the implementation of WASH, health related activities and support to the
affected communities.
To date, in total, URC has been able to assist 10,691 households (46,709 people) leaving a gap of
21,572 households who have not been assisted.
The URC is maintaining its presence in affected areas but is constrained from taking action on account
of a shortage of funds. The situation in some affected areas is deteriorating and there have been
outbreaks of disease, including malaria.
Uganda Red Cross Society and its relationship with the Government of Uganda
Since its inception in 1939, the URC has grown into a well-respected and leading local humanitarian
agency. It is a member of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent. URC as an
auxiliary to government is recognised by an Act of Parliament and in the draft National Disaster
Preparedness and Management Policy of Uganda. The organisation engages with all national level
disaster rapid response technical committees and emergency response mechanisms. At district levels,
the URC co-ordinates with District Disaster Management Committees and coordinates with all agencies
and organisations that are active in disaster rapid response management.
British Red Cross Role
BRC has supported the URC since its formation providing technical and financial support in disaster
preparedness and response; logistics, planning and accountability as well as monitoring and reporting.
B. Why should DFID intervene?
The UK is firmly committed to applying the core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and
independence to all UK Government humanitarian action, including respect for international
humanitarian Law. All DFID humanitarian action will respond to need, and to need alone.
The existing levels of the emergency needs is such that a failure of donor support to efforts of URC’s
humanitarian action will lead to excess civilian morbidity, mortality (especially among children),
destitution and displacement. So, while other donors are present, it is reasonable to expect DFID to
provide leadership in delivering aid to meet emergency needs in Uganda.
No action will result in:
 4,000 vulnerable households lacking basic temporary shelter and relief items;
DFID Uganda already has a strong track record on resilience-building and disaster preparedness
(DRR), providing £2.6m to URC from 2011-14 to help reduce vulnerability to disaster of ten
communities (12,000 people) in Teso and Mt Elgon sub-regions in eastern Uganda which are at high
risk of landslides and flooding. This funding will go towards increasing the resilience of these
communities (and local governments) to natural disasters through contingency planning, early warning
systems and minor infrastructure activities.
The areas covered by our DRR programme overlap significantly with those affected by the most recent
floods. Not providing immediate relief assistance could have negative impacts on the outcomes of our
DRR programme.
Uganda’s relationship with the UK
Uganda remains a strategic priority for the UK. In addition to providing technical assistance to the
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, budget support up to £20 million for the
financial year 2011/12, the UK has a 5-year £100m Post Conflict Development Programme (PCDP) that
provide recovery and stability to the region. Not reacting to this disaster could compromise the
livelihoods and resilience of households currently covered by the PCDP, undermining the effectiveness
of the programme.
B. Impact and outcome that we expect to achieve
The impact of the UK’s humanitarian response to the humanitarian crisis in eastern, northern and
western regions of Uganda will be to save lives, reduce suffering and maintain the dignity of those
affected by the crisis.
The impact of the intervention will be reduced impact of disasters in Uganda
The key outcome of the intervention will be that the immediate needs of households affected by
landslides and floods in Uganda in 2011 are met.
Key results of providing support to the URC include, but are not limited to:
 4,000 vulnerable households able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide protection
from the weather.
 4,000 vulnerable households receive emergency relief items and support.
 Learning from the emergency response documented and used to inform future practice.
This business case is coherent with:


The Coalition Government priority articulated in the DFID Business Plan which is to “Ensure that
the basic needs of people whose lives have been ruined by disaster (whether natural or conflictdriven) are met, and ensure that emergency relief aid is targeted at those areas where threat to life
is most severe, extent and depth of suffering greatest and response capacities of communities and
authorities most limited”.
HMG Humanitarian Strategy, which commits DFID to build resilience in all countries where we
work and recognises the importance of anticipation, humanitarian leadership and innovation; and
highlights UK’s commitment to the principle of delivering aid according to need and need alone.
Appraisal case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the strategic case?
The options in this Appraisal Case focus on the benefits and costs of intervening versus not
intervening in Uganda.
Option 1 is not to intervene: Do Nothing Option.
Unless URC is successful in obtaining additional, timely funds from other donors this may result in:

4,000 vulnerable households lacking shelter and being at risk from health problems
including malaria and dysentery;

3,000 households falling into severe poverty as a result of losing their livelihoods and
access to basic services, and therefore relying on handouts.
Option 2 is to provide £565,000 to the URC to undertake relief and recovery efforts.
The proposed outputs and results that the URC are seeking to achieve through the intervention are
as follows:
Output 1: Affected households are enabled to repair or construct adequate shelter to provide
protection from harsh climate, with the aim of returning to normalcy
 Activities:
o Targeted households construct new or repair existing structures using methods that
will reduce future risks
o Emergency relief items and support delivered to affected communities.
 Indicators
o 4000 Households enabled to construct new or repair existing structures using
methods that will reduce future risks.
o Emergency relief items and support delivered to 4000 households
Output 2: Households re-establish livelihoods in ways that help reduce future risks
 Activities:
o 3000 households enabled to generate income at least equal to or comparable to preland slide and flood levels.
o 5 communities adopt measures that help reduce the risk or impact of future disasters.
The source will be records of community meetings, assessments and evaluation
reports.
Output 3: Learning from the response used to inform future process
 Activities:
o Documenting response produced and shared with other humanitarian organisations
o Showing evidence that lessons learnt are used to inform the development of future
intervention plans
Option 3 DFID agrees to cover relief efforts only, costing £215,000. The outputs of this option will
be:
Output 1: Affected households are able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide protection
from the weather and receive emergency relief items
 Activities:
o .

o Procurement and targeted distribution of inputs.
Indicators
o 4000 Households able to construct temporary shelters.
o Emergency relief items and support delivered to 4000 households
Output 2: Learning from the response used to inform future process
 Activities:
o Documenting response produced and shared with other humanitarian organisations
o Showing evidence that lessons learnt are used to inform the development of future
intervention plans
The resource costs to DFID in terms of staff time for regular monitoring of the project are negligible
because this is short-term assistance covering 3 months only. The breakdown of costs are detailed
below:
Table 1: Breakdown of programme costs
The impact of the intervention will be reduced impact of disasters in Uganda
Costs (£)
4,000 vulnerable households able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide
protection from the weather.
4,000 vulnerable households receive emergency relief items and support.
Learning from the emergency response documented and used to inform future
practice.
103,838
73,133
2,474
Table 2 Administration/overhead costs of URCS proposal
Total (£)
Operations and Logistics
21,488
Admin (URC/BRC)
14,067
Total Operations and Admin
35,555
215,000
Total Programme + Admin
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
Based on the conditions in areas affected by landslides and floods there are three options for
intervention:

Option 1: Do nothing: DFID does not provide bilateral aid for humanitarian assistance;

Option 2: DFID provides funding of up to £565,000 for relief and recovery efforts;

Option 3: DFID agrees to cover relief efforts only, costing £215,000.
Option 1: “Do Nothing” - DFID does not provide humanitarian assistance bilaterally (the UK
always contributes part of every multilateral response through multilateral contributions).
Limited contributions from stakeholders has had the effect that many households have not been
assisted; without immediate action humanitarian needs are likely to increase further. The
Government of Uganda is partially responsible for the problem by not responding quickly enough to
the emergency and by not prioritising budget allocations or political priority to building resilience
within their own disaster management systems; or prioritising adequate investment in infrastructure in
vulnerable regions.
GoU has said that if the rain continues the impact of the floods will be on the same level as those in
2007 that affected approximately 60,000 households, or 400,000 people – 80 per cent of them
children and women.
Option 2: DFID provides up to £565,000 to the URCS to support relief and recovery efforts for
affected households
URC will be able to respond fully to the crisis. This intervention will reach 5,000 households in
affected areas over a period of 10 months. DFID’s contribution will represent around 28% of the total
monetary cost of the disaster response (73% of total donor funding) and will pay for:
Relief:
 Temporary shelter for 4000 households, benefiting 20,000 people.

Emergency relief items delivered to 4,000 households
Recovery:
 Rebuilding the livelihoods (crop growing and livestock keeping) of 3,000 households.

Basic infrastructure rehabilitation (sanitation facilities and water access)

Support to communities to reconstruct basic flood resistant shelter (including provision of
tools and skills training)
Pros: We will succeed not only in meeting the humanitarian needs of 10,000 households but also
in assisting in recovery efforts, rebuilding the livelihoods of 5,000 of the affected households and
safeguarding resilience.
Cons: A contribution of £565,000 would make DFID the largest contributor, aside from the OPM.
However, in the medium-longer term we can look to devise a lobbying strategy, in conjunction
with the URC and BRC, to increase pressure on the GoU and other donors to do more in this
area.
The URC is an effective, responsive agency and able to manage risks and has the capacity to
provide planned, timely and principled interventions to achieve results in critical sectors. In addition,
there is sufficient humanitarian access for the URC to be able to deliver aid to those in need speedily;
the organisation has a network of at least 200,000 volunteers in the country. Furthermore, the
URC’s interventions supported by the BRC are informed by sound political economy analysis of the
country.
Despite, some problems with access to some areas due to challenges of terrain and poor road
conditions, the URC is already operational in the affected districts and regions.
Option 3: DFID agrees to cover relief efforts only, costing £215,000.
This represents just over 10% of the total financial cost of the disaster response (28% of donor
funding towards the URCS response). This will pay for temporary shelter needs and NFIs for 4,000
households. The programme will take place over a period of 3 months but does not include a
recovery and resilience-building element.
In this option, funding will pay for relief for the affected population but will not cover recovery
elements:

Temporary shelter for 4000 households, benefiting approximately 20,000 people.

Emergency relief items delivered to 4,000 households
Evidence.
The table below shows that:

The quality of evidence for the Appraisal is Strong/Medium; and

The likely impact on climate change and
medium/manageable potential risk/opportunity;
Option
1
2
Evidence rating
environment
is
Climate
change
and
category (A, B, C, D)
Strong/medium. Whilst field level B
monitoring
remains
a
challenge,
available
evidence
points
to
humanitarian interventions having an
impact on basic indicators.
Strong/medium
B
categorised
as
B,
environment
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each
feasible option?
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk /
opportunity; C, low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
•
The likely impact on climate change and environment is categorised as C, no
risk/manageable potential risk/opportunity;
Option Climate change and environment
risks and impacts, Category (A, B, C,
D)
2
C – This option holds no risk and
impact to the environment and
climate change.
3
C - This option holds no risk and
impact to the environment and
climate change.
Climate change and environment opportunities,
Category (A, B, C, D)
C – This option offers a limited opportunity to
reduce the impacts of climate change and
environmental degradation.
C – This option offers a limited opportunity to
reduce the impacts of climate change and
environmental degradation
The programme is considered not to have a significant negative impact on the climate or the
environment. Although Option 2 will increase the short term resilience of the communities to future
shocks, through the provision of short term livelihood support and planned recovery options. We
have however categorised this option as C given that effective implementation is dependent on
integration into these components of lessons from the URC’s DRR programme, which is currently at
the inception stage.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
Option 1:
The direct financial costs of not intervening are zero.
There are no benefits and multiple costs of not intervening. Suffering will be increased and dignity not
protected. Without intensified humanitarian support, humanitarian needs will increase further. Not
intervening could also have a significant indirect financial cost – earlier interventions that support
people’s coping capacities in their home areas are much more cost effective than emergency
interventions to address acute humanitarian needs due to displacement.
The affected populations , in especially eastern and northern Uganda, are amongst the poorest in the
country.
The cost could also be reputational. Not intervening in the face of severe humanitarian needs in
eastern and northern Uganda could impact on DFID’s reputation as a leading needs-based
humanitarian donor; and make DFID less influential in humanitarian donor discussions in Uganda.
Option 2:
The costs of this initial humanitarian response £565,000.
The benefits are “lives saved, suffering reduced and dignity protected” as per DFID’s humanitarian
policy and commitments in the HERR response.
Anticipated results include:




4000 vulnerable households abled to construct new or repair existing structures using methods
that will reduce future risks.
Emergency relief items and support delivered to 4000 households
3000 households able to generate income at least equal to or comparable to pre-land slide and
flood levels.
Learning from the emergency response documented and used to inform future practice.
4,000 households are in immediate need of shelter and settlement. It is unlikely that the economic
agents (the breadwinners) of these households are able to be productive when faced with
homelessness. Until these homes are rebuilt, we assume an economic loss of household income
equivalent to the average household income for the regions of the country affected by the floods and
landslides. To be conservative, we use the Uganda National Household Survey which estimates
household income for rural Northern Uganda – the lowest of all regions in the country. This is equal
to UGX 117,200 per month in 2009 (=$581). With 4,000 households rendered homeless, at worst,
lost earnings are equal to $232,000 (£145,000) per month. The home building component of this
intervention has the potential to reverse these lost earnings in full or in part. At 75% intervention
efficacy, lost earnings can be restored to £109,000 per month.
However the rebuilding work will need to be informed by the GoU’s plans to aid the displaced
households, which has yet to be formulated.
Unquantified Benefits
 DFID engagement with the URC can contribute to a strengthened and more coherent local
government disaster response system and a better understanding of the concept of serving the
1
BoU exchange rate for 2009: UGX 2030 = £1


most vulnerable by district officials.
Reduction in severe social, psychological and physical toll that homelessness has on people,
prolonged suffering reduced and dignity protected.
Maintains a principled approach to DFID’s humanitarian support, focusing assistance where
needs are greatest and not just where it is easiest to work. URCS can most effectively meet the
needs of the affected people, even if the organisation is not able to absorb large volumes of
funding.
Option 3:
The cost of this humanitarian response is £215,000.
The benefits will be that “lives saved, suffering reduced and dignity protected” as per DFID’s
humanitarian policy and commitments in the HERR response. Expected results include:



4,000 vulnerable households able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide protection from
the weather.
4,000 vulnerable households receive emergency relief items and support.
Learning from the emergency response documented and used to inform future practice.
In this option, funding will pay for relief for the affected population but will not cover recovery
elements. Unquantified benefits remain the same as above.
The intervention replicates similar URC programmes. It is highly unlikely that any of the key
assumptions about need will change over the 3-month period. Even if we relax the link that
homelessness reduces economic activity, there are a whole range of unquantified benefits (e.g.
dignity, suffering, and psychological impacts of displacement) that mean the expected benefits
continue to be large.
In the districts affected by landslides and floods critical needs exist in health, WASH and shelter.
Engagement through the URC will reduce suffering and save lives in critical needs. URCS is already
operational in the affected districts and regions.
D. What measures can be used to assess value for money for the intervention?
The BRC has a strong logistical capacity and has a strong financial accountability system. The
URC’s value for money is demonstrated by the scale of its volunteer network (over 200,000
registered volunteers), and the number of people who are already on the ground when disaster
strikes.
D. What measures can be used to assess value for money for the intervention?
Evidence of the economy of inputs being sourced through URCS procurement systems can be
collected by monitoring unit cost information as follows:
- cost of newly constructed shelter
- average cost of repairs to houses destroyed by floods and landslides
- cost of emergency sanitation kits
Comparison with costs of emergency relief programmes in other countries
Unit costs can be compared to similar, DFID-funded humanitarian programmes in Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
E. Summary value for money statement for the preferred option
There is strong evidence to show that Option 2 will provide the best value for money in the long term,
given the evidence on earnings lost as a result of homelessness. However, there are uncertainties
surrounding intervening at this stage as the recovery work will need to be informed by the GoU’s plan
to aid the displaced households, which has yet to be formulated.
Therefore at this point the best value for money option is Option 3, to provide £215,000 for relief
efforts only, over and above the do nothing counterfactual.
Intervention through the URC with technical and management support from the BRC will provide
good value for money in the rapid humanitarian response in the affected areas of eastern Uganda.
There may be a case in future for providing the additional funds required for the recovery efforts as
set out in Option 2 once more evidence is available (in particular on GoU’s plans to aid the displaced
households).
Commercial case
Direct procurement
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
DFID will not undertake direct procurement. All procurement will be done by the URC with the
logistics support of the BRC. All major tenders will be verified and technical support provided by the
BRC before procurement for relief items progresses.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage
for DFID?
The intervention design does not use competition to drive commercial advantage for DFID because
DFID funds are passed on to the URC through the BRC.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
The BRC and the URC use competition in their procurement processes to drive down costs. In the
2010 Multilateral Aid Review the BRC was recognised as having strong logistical capacity and, like
the IFRC, the URC’s value for money is also demonstrated by the scale of its volunteer network (over
200,000 registered volunteers), and the number of people who are already on the ground when
disaster strikes.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and
how will we measure and improve this?
Not applicable.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
Not applicable
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the
intervention?
Not applicable
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
DFID will put in place a Memorandum of Understanding with the BRC through which funding will be
passed on to the URC to implement interventions.
URC is the only national organisation with a large nationwide volunteer network and proven capacity
to respond, at scale, to disasters and emergencies. As such it is uniquely placed to deliver this
intervention. Technical support and contract management has been successfully provided by the
BRC and this will continue in the future. In this context, the scope for the intervention to use
competition to drive commercial advantage for DFID is limited. However, the BRC and URC use
competition in their procurement processes to drive down costs.
DFID has a longstanding working relationship with the BRC. There is a standing agreement with the
BRC that all funds donated by DFID to the IFRC or a National Society should pass via the BRC. This
agreement is linked to the statutes of the BRC where BRC functions as a legal auxiliary of the UK
government authorities and both HMG and the BRC share mutual responsibilities. This working
arrangement enables DFID to interact with one entity rather than deal with 187 National Societies
that form the Red Cross movement. The agreement also offers value for money in terms of the
technical support and quality assurance role provided by the BRC.
B. Value for money through procurement
The BRC has strong logistical and management capacity to provide oversight over the URC so that
aid is allocated according to agreed schedules. Both the BRC and the URC have competitive
procurement procedures that drive down costs. Further, the BRC has strong systems for financial
accountability while the URC has the ability to ensure that activities are always timely and
appropriate to the context.
Financial case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate
forecasting?
£215,000. This was based on actual assessment of needs on the ground by the URC.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
The funds will come from the programme budget. There are sufficient funds within the 2011/12
resource budget to cover this intervention.
C. How will funds be paid out?
Funds will be managed by DFID Uganda through the BRC. The A2 Head of the Humanitarian Team
supported by the task team members will provide oversight through the BRC/URC.
DFID funds will be managed with the support of BRC, which provides technical and management
back up to the URC. The BRC charges some direct costs to DFID but does not charge for all the
staff time associated with support. An administrative fee of 2% is charged by the BRC.
Payment will be made to the BRC in advance, in one tranche on 15 December. To avoid risk of
delays funding commitment will be made for the entire period and, provided that all requirements are
met, funds will be remitted as per MoU agreement with BRC. Agreement for funding modalities will
be included in the Memorandum of Understanding.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
The assessment of financial risk and fraud is low; the BRC which provides technical and logistical
support to the URC has strong financial accountability system.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
At the end of the programme, BRC/URC will submit a narrative and financial report to DFID. The
narrative report will include lessons learnt from the experience and how URC is reaching out to other
donors.
The BRC financial system is prepared in accordance with SORP (for charities) which is based on UK
GAAP. Funds are managed using the BRC Aggresso system, which will be used to record direct
expenses and cash transfers made to URC. The URC financial systems comply with financial
standards in Uganda. Standard financial accounting procedures and controls have been adopted
which include defined authority limits and an internal audit function. Financial transactions are
recorded on the URC System’s Navision system which is used for overall budget management.
Logframe
See Annex
Management case
A. What are the management arrangements for implementing the intervention?
The Head of DFID Uganda and DFID Humanitarian Task Team, Uganda, will provide oversight for this
intervention with day to day management provided by the BRC working together with the URC.
Primary stakeholders include DFID Uganda, the BRC, the URC, local governments in the affected
areas and the beneficiaries. Regular contacts with the BRC and the URC will inform DFID Uganda’s
overall picture of the evolving response regarding gap analysis, response strategies and priorities.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
The key risks to delivery are:
(a)
Lack of funding – Due to slow government process and information gathering there is the chance
that donors will not be as generous to fund Uganda humanitarian needs, particularly given competing
pressures in Libya and the Horn of Africa.
The risk mitigation strategy is that DFID funding will help address this.
(b)
Access – Mountainous terrain in the Eastern Region and impassable roads will make
distribution difficult in some districts.
The risk mitigation strategy here is the network of local communities with which the URC will develop
ways of reaching those in need.
(c)
Accurate information – Information on the floods affected population is evolving as rains
continue to batter different regions of Uganda. A lot of rains leading to floods in new areas in the
country could mean that the URC staff becoming over-stretched.
The risk mitigation strategy is that the URC is working, through its regional officials, with local
government officials in vulnerable areas to have up to date information.
(e)
Humanitarian leadership and capacity – There is a risk that the effectiveness of the response
will be hampered by a lack of strategic leadership or capacity within local government systems in the
affected areas.
The risk mitigation strategy is that through the BRC, DFID will work with the URC to improve
performance of local governments in the affected areas.
(F)
Risk of Corruption/Diversion of Resources at local levels – There is risk of corruption in the
allocation of resources to those in need; often this could mean that beneficiaries have to pay bribes to
access assistance.
(g)
Fluctuation in exchange rates. – Appreciation of the UGX against the £ sterling may have
detrimental impact on the programme. DFID will continue to monitor the exchange rate and work with
URCS to overcome any difficulties that arise.
The risk mitigation strategy is that DFID through the BRC and URC will focus efforts on activities that
are clearly targeted and reduce, to the extent possible, the opportunities for diversion.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
Not applicable
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
The umbrella log frame provides details on baselines and targets against which the performance of the
programme will be measured.
Through the BRC DFID will receive a narrative and financial report within two months of the end of the
programme period.
For this programme, an evaluation will be undertaken commissioned by the BRC. The evaluation may
be undertaken by internal or external evaluators. DFID will have the opportunity to provide input into
the Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the BRC will share the CV of the evaluator with DFID ahead of the
evaluation process. DFID will be consulted as one of the stakeholders in the evaluation that will be
managed by the BRC.
In terms of financial monitoring the BRC will provide support to the URC. The BRC will also contract a
local audit company to undertake pre-reporting reviews and assist the URC in the preparation and
validation of the final financial report. The BRC will provide financial support from its regional/UK office
as needed.
The approach of working through the BRC is effective and cost efficient for DFID.
E. Logframe
See Annex for the logframe.
Download