Direct Realism – what do I need to know?
Direct Realism: the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their
properties.
Issues:
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
The argument from illusion
The argument from perceptual variation (Russell’s table example)
The argument from hallucination
The time-lag argument
1. Direct Realism
Direct Realism (DR) is a direct theory of perception. DR claims that the immediate objects of our
perception are mind-independent objects and that their properties are independent of our minds
too.
DR (aka ‘common-sense’ or ‘naïve’ realism) argues:
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We see things in the external world immediately and directly.
We don’t see them by seeing anything else.
In short – the objects of our perception are mind-independent i.e. they exist independently of our
perception and our mind.
As a results DR claims that what we perceive is really the external world.
1.2 The Argument From Illusion
The Argument from Illusion is attempting to disprove the crux of DR: what we perceive is really the
external world. It does this by demonstrating that our senses are subject to illusions – something
that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality.
The Argument from Illusion – The Straw in Water
R1. I have a straw, which appears to me to be straight, but when it is half submerged in water it seems to bend
and distort.
R2. I know that the straw is straight and that its apparent flexibility is a result of its being seen through the water.
IC. Yet I cannot change the mental image I have of the straw being bent.
C. Since the stick is not in fact bent its appearance can be described as an illusion. I am seeing the straw indirectly.
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It happens on occasion that I perceive an object which appears to be one thing, when in
reality it is another i.e. the straw in water. The conclusion is drawn that what we
immediately perceive cannot be what is in the world, since what we are perceiving is not
the same as what is really there.
Therefore errors of perception only occur when I make judgments on the basis of sense data
concerning what causes them.
As a result the argument from illusion demonstrates that we perceive mind-independent
objects indirectly.
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DR Replies to the Argument from Illusion
1. In these situations the senses accurately reveal the external world to us; we simply
misinterpret what we perceive i.e. we have misinterpreted the information given to us by
our eyes.
2. The argument from illusion assumes that if we misperceive something then we must
perceive something distinct from reality i.e. we are not directly perceiving the external
world. However DR responds by stating that we are simply misperceiving reality – there is
not something distinct or separate from reality. As such we ‘can perceive a straight straw as
bent without implying that we directly perceive a bent straw and only indirectly a straight
one.’
3. Referring to the straw in water, DR argues that when the straw is in the water it looks bent
and distorted but there is nothing that is bent and distorted in reality. There is a difference
between the property ‘being bent’ and the property ‘looking bent’. Either way we directly
perceive the physical objects and their properties.
1.3 The Argument From Perceptual Variation
The Argument from Perceptual Variation argues that as there are variations in our perception of
physical objects – such as shape, texture and colour – we cannot perceive mind-independent objects
directly.
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The argument from perceptual variation in simple terms: the way we see the object
changes, but the object does not change itself. Therefore we perceive objects indirectly.
R1. There are variations in perception
R.2 Our perception varies without corresponding changes in the physical object we
perceive. (For instance, the desk remains rectangular, even as the way it looks to me
changes as I look at it from different angles.)
IC1. Therefore, the properties physical objects have and the properties they appear to
have are not identical.
IC2. Therefore, what we are immediately aware of in perception is not exactly the same as
what exists independently of our minds.
C.
Therefore, we do not perceive physical objects directly.
Through his discussion of a table’s colour, Russell in ‘The Problems of Philosophy’ Chapter 1 outlines
the argument above:
“It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which pre-eminently appears to be the colour of the
table, or even of any one particular part of the table – it appears to be of different colours from different points of
view, and there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others…This colour is not
something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way
the light falls on the table…”
Bertrand Russell,
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 Thus,
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are not directly aware of the table itself, but the appearance (colour in
this case) of the table to our minds.
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The appearance will therefore change according to each point of view, but the reality of the
table existing independently in the external world does not change (this feeds into the
distinction between primary and secondary qualities).
However, we need a name or term to understand Russell’s discussion of a physical object’s
appearance. The term sense-data is used to describe and further explain Russell’s position
(& subsequently that of IDR).
“If we take any common object of the sort that is supposed to be known by the senses, what the senses
immediately tell us is not the truth about the object as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sensedata which, so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and the object.”
Bertrand Russell
Sense data, under Russell’s definition therefore, is the name for what we are immediately aware of
in perception i.e. the colour and shape of the desk as I see it now.
DR Replies to the Argument from Perceptual Variation
Although we may not perceive the world precisely as it is, does not imply that we don’t perceive it
directly  what varies is not what we see, but the way in which we see it.
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In perception we are aware of a range of properties: ‘some of which the object has
independent of our minds, and some of which it has in relation to being perceived.’
For example, a rectangular desk has the property of ‘looking obtuse’, which is distinct from
the property of ‘being obtuse’. A DR would argue that the rectangular desk – which we know
to be rectangular from prior knowledge through science and mathematics – can be both
rectangular and look obtuse.
DR can further defend itself through the concept of a relational property – the property of
‘looking obtuse’ is a relational property because the desk has this property in relation to me
when it is a certain distance, angle etc from me.
Therefore DR can claim that what we perceive are physical objects and not sense data, as it
does not have to claim that all their properties, as we perceive them, are mind-independent.
1.4 The Argument From Hallucination
The Argument from Hallucination argues that our perception is susceptible to hallucinations, both
visual and auditory. Therefore when we are hallucinating we perceive something or something
having a particular property. Why – Because a hallucination is believed to be real by the perceiver.
(See Macbeth’s example with the dagger!) This means that during a hallucination it is impossible for
me to distinguish my experience from genuine perception (veridical perception i.e. I perceive
something that is true or an experience that represents the world as it really is).
However a hallucination is an experience involving the apparent perception of something that is not
actually present. Therefore we don’t perceive the object at all! This attacks DR as what a
hallucination is, is sense data and never a mind-independent physical object. See argument – using
Macbeth’s dagger – below:
R1. When Macbeth has his hallucination of a dagger, there is something that he sees before him.
R2. The thing he sees is not a physical object.
C. So it must be a mental image (i.e. sense data).
DR Replies to the Argument from Hallucination
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One can identify when we are hallucinating. i.e. use other senses to determine that we
are hallucinating.
Deny hallucinations are really perceptions at all. i.e. we are simply imagining something
which is not the same as perceiving sense-data. To imagine something is not to perceive
it.
Disjunctive theory of perception: (extension material)
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Since an either/or
claim is known as a
disjunction, this
form of direct
realism is called
disjunctivism.
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According to the disjunctive theory of perception, if something looks a
certain way, then one of two different things is going on: either I am directly
perceiving a mind-independent object or in the case of a hallucination it
appears to me as if there is something (i.e. a physical object). As a result I
may be unable to tell which I am seeing.
Therefore as hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical
perception, a DR can argue that hallucinations tell us nothing of perception
and as a result cannot be used to critique DR as a theory of perception.
1.5 The Time-Lag Argument
The Time-Lag argument argues that what you see is not how the physical world is, because
it takes time for sound and light to travel from the physical object to your senses. This
attacks DR as it suggests that we do not directly perceive the objects around us. Russell
observes a similar problem:
‘It takes about eight minutes for the sun’s light to reach us; thus, when we see the sun we
are seeing the sun eight minutes ago…if the physical sun had ceased to exist within the last
eight minutes, that would make no difference to the sense data which we call ‘seeing the
sun’.’
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter 3
In standard form:
R1. If the sun had just winked out of existence, there would still be something that I see when I look
in its direction.
R2. This thing cannot be the sun, since the sun would no longer exist.
C. So it must be an image of the sun – i.e. a sense datum.
DR Replies to the Time-Lag Argument
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DR can accept that there is a time lag in perception, but can deny this implies that we don’t
directly perceive physical objects or that we must introduce something different i.e. sense
data.
All that follows is that we perceive objects as they were, not indirectly.