Rethinking governance: towards a convergence of regulatory governance and multilevel governance?1
Ian Bartle with Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders, Department of Politics, University of
Sheffield
Paper for the ECPR Standing Group on Regulation and Governance 4th Biennial Conference,
University of Exeter, 27-29 June 2012.
Abstract
Recent studies have emphasised the need to ‘rethink governance’ in particular to move
beyond the ‘hollowed out’ model towards a focus on the relations between state and non-state
actors and processes. This paper explores the origins, development and conceptual
connections of two forms of governance - regulatory governance and multi-level governance
(MLG) – in which these issues are prominent. The ‘two governances’ have very different
origins exemplified notably by the EU in which MLG started as an analysis of multiple tiers
of government in cohesion policy while the predominance of regulation in the EU led to the
conceptualisation of it as a ‘regulatory state’. However, as the two governances evolved each
began to focus on ‘types’ or ‘categories’ of governance which represented in particular the
varied roles and relations between state and non-state actors, institutions and processes.
Despite this there have been different conceptualisations of governance types and relations
between types. It is argued that both governances need to move beyond this towards a fuller
conceptualisation of the relations between categories. This is particularly underdeveloped in
MLG in which two discrete and distinct types have become a central concept. Regulatory
governance is more developed, notably with the analysis of acts of delegation, but it is argued
that this is insufficient for the understanding of relations between categories. From very
different beginnings we are thus seeing a convergence in the pressing questions in each of
these two governances which relate closely to recent calls to rethink governance.
1
This paper is a contribution to the conceptual framework of an ESRC funded project (grant number R130716)
on multi-level governance, transport policy and carbon emissions management undertaken by the authors at the
University of Sheffield and Dr Greg Marsden at the Institute of Transport Studies, University of Leeds.
1
1. Introduction
The term ‘governance’ is slippery, has become ubiquitous and attached to a number of
different descriptors (Bevir, 2011). ‘Regulatory governance’ or ‘regulation and governance’,
the theme of this conference and the associated ECPR standing group is just one. Others
include ‘multi-level governance’, ‘network governance’ and ‘corporate governance’ while
governance itself is seen to have undergone a transformation in the past two decades towards
‘new modes of governance’, the ‘new governance’ and the ‘governance turn’. Despite the
common language of two forms of governance – regulatory governance and multi-level
governance – they have very different origins, developments and intellectual foundations.
Regulatory governance has emerged from the increasing prominence of regulation and
regulatory institutions in governance, particularly in Europe and America, and the frequent
depiction of the modern state as a ‘regulatory state’. Its intellectual roots can be traced to post
World War II US where analysts strived to understand the form that regulation takes and
understand the processes of delegation to independent regulatory institutions (Thatcher and
Stone Sweet 2002). Multi-level governance on the other hand has its roots in the analysis of
the European Union (Bache, 2012). Emerging in the 1990s as a means of analysing the roles
of multiple tiers of government in EU cohesion policy its first few years of intellectual
development was very much with the analysis of European integration in particular capturing
the nature of the emerging EU polity.
In the evolution of the two forms of governance there has, however, been some interesting
parallels. In both forms of governance increasing attention has been paid to a shift away from
conventional hierarchical governance focused on central state institutions. Analysis of the
role of non-state organisations and actors in their interaction with state organisations in
governance has been increasingly prominent, while specialised semi-independent state
organisations have begun to feature in MLG analysis as well as that of regulation. Both forms
of governance have identified different types of governance depending on the involvement of
the various organisations and actors. MLG, for example, has distinguished between generalpurpose governance focused on state institutions at varying levels and task-specific
governance normally involving specialist state institutions or non-state organisations
(Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Regulatory governance continues to identify and focus on
different types of state regulation, co-regulation and self regulation. This reflects a
‘decentring’ process in regulatory governance and MLG reflecting a broader ‘hollowing out’
of the state observed in broader studies of governance.
However, a study on ‘rethinking governance’, while recognising that a wide range of nonstate actors are involved in governance, argues that the state has not been hollowed out in this
way (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). A ‘state-centric relational’ approach to governance is called
for with the emphasis on ‘the extent to which governments, in establishing and operating
governance strategies, develop strategic relationships or partnerships with a range of nonstate actors’ (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p3). This raises questions about the utility of
focusing on different types of multi-level and regulatory governance. While distinguishing
different types has its uses, it may over emphasise difference and shift attention away from
the relations within and between different forms of governance, relations which might be as
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important to governance dynamics and outcomes as the different types themselves. In tracing
the development of governances we therefore give specific attention to the ways in which
relations between types of governance have been conceptualised and analysed.
We argue in this paper that despite the emergence of regulatory governance and MLG from
very different circumstances and with a focus on different issues, there has been a
convergence in the central conceptual questions – the attempts to understand the roles of
multiple actors, different types of governance and relations between the types. Similar
questions, however, have involved different conceptualisations; in particular we see different
conceptualisations of types of governance and their relations. We call for clarity in these
conceptualisations but also a cross fertilisation of ideas and a move away from the intellectual
silos that these approaches governance tend to occupy. We thus call for processes of
analytical convergence to be nurtured in order to secure a more sophisticated grasp of the
architecture of modern governance and its innate fluidity.
The paper commences with a comparison of the origins and early development of regulatory
governance and MLG. While both have connections to Europe they seem to have taken very
different paths. The next section focuses on actors in governance, types of governance and
relations between types. It is shown how in the development of regulatory governance and
MLG their central questions began to converge towards a focus on the roles of state and nonstate actors, different types of governance that these actors a part of, and the relations
between the types. However, the two governances have developed and conceptualised types
of governance and relations between types in different ways. It is concluded that the
conceptual convergence in the two governances shows the importance of focusing on the
fluidity and variability of governance, in particular the importance of the relations between
different governing organisations and more broadly between different types of governance. A
central aspect of ‘rethinking governance’ is thus a need to move beyond conceptual and
intellectual silos.
2. Regulatory and multi-level governance: origins, comparisons and contrasts
The origins of regulatory governance and multi-level governance are very different in
substance and form. While they both have clear connections to the EU and Europe, their
origins and early development derived from very different aspects of the European politics
and governance. This section outlines and compares the development of the two forms of
governance and shows how they emerged from different circumstances with a focus on
different processes of governance.
Regulatory governance
Regulation, as a policy instrument, is of course at the heart of regulatory governance. In a
definition of regulation that relates to a set of authoritative rules created and implemented by
an administrative agency of some form it was traditionally a rather technical instrument for
the implementation of public policy and consequently was of interest primarily to lawyers
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and economists. The increasing interest in and study of regulatory governance is a reflection
not only of the increasing use of regulation as a tool to achieve public policy objectives but
also the development of a distinct set of institutional processes and policy making norms.
This is far from a marginal process in governance and public policy - an indication of its
significance is the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ in Western Europe and elsewhere.
The rise of regulatory governance and the regulatory state is a reflection of a change in the
nature of state intervention from direct intervention, often based on large public expenditure,
to setting regulations that control private activity in order to achieve public policy objectives
(Majone, 1994, 1997). It arose from a fiscal crisis in countries such as Britain and France in
the 1970s and the limitations of the public sector in the economy and industry (Majone,
1994). Alongside the opening of markets and privatisation in major sectors of the economy
such as car manufacturing, energy supply and telecommunications, the achievement of public
service objectives was still seen as necessary and regulation, as a set of authoritative rules,
rather than direct intervention, was the way it was to be achieved. The EU has also been part
of this process in two main ways. Firstly, the European Commission’s single market
programme has involved actively promoting the liberalisation of previously national
monopolies in major economic sectors such as energy and transport. This naturally means a
move away from direct state intervention leaving regulation as the key means by which
public policy objectives can be achieved. Secondly, regulation has become a central policy
instrument of the EU itself. This is because of the very small budget of the EU, the
limitations on what it can do with it and the desire of European institutions, notably the
Commission to expand their influence over key areas of policy making.
The governance aspect of regulation has increased significantly with the rise of new
institutions, policy norms and processes. The most significant type of new institution is the
regulatory agency set up at arms-length from government and elected politicians. Their rise in
Europe and across the world in liberalised (and often privatised) industrial sectors such as
energy, telecommunications and transport has been well documented (Jordana and Levi-Faur,
2005; Levi-Faur, 2011; Jordana et al 2011). In Europe the EU has encouraged and sometimes
mandated independent regulatory authorities for various sectors at national level, promoted
networks of national regulators across Europe and in some cases, such as
telecommunications, promoted the establishment of EU level regulatory agencies. All of this
has in particular involved a process of controlled delegation of regulatory policy making to
the agencies. A particularly important policy norm is the role of expertise and specialists in
the governance of regulation. Unencumbered by electoral cycles and the vagaries of politics
experts at arms-length from government are able to set regulations suitable for the long term
specific circumstances in the sector rather than short term political imperatives. The most
prominent example of this process in Europe and beyond, though not normally seen as
regulation, is the establishment of central bank independence and the setting of monetary
policy. A further significant aspect of regulatory governance and independent experts is a
variety of new regulatory instruments. In the privatised utility sectors such as energy,
telecommunications and transport where monopoly conditions persist, various forms of
economic regulation have been developed notably the regulation of price. Other
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developments in regulatory instruments include the use of codes, league tables, auditing
processes, auctioning (eg of radio frequencies in telecommunications) and cap and trading
systems (eg for environmental protection) (Baldwin, 2008; Baldwin and Cave, 1999).
Some of the central intellectual questions of regulatory governance have focused on how
regulation and the process of delegation can be understood. Understanding regulation has
been dominated by two competing theories - public interest and private interest, both of
which originated in US analysis of regulation in 1960s. Public interest theory is the usual
entry point for the explanation of regulation because it explicitly addresses its purpose, which
is to achieve publicly desirable outcomes when non-interventionary processes fail (Baldwin
and Cave 1999). In contrast, private interest theory is founded on a critique of public interest
theory which stresses that regulation is derived from self-interested private interests, such as
business or industry groups, who exert a strong influence over the delegation process and the
creation and implementation of regulation. Other explanations of regulation included
institutional theories and regime analysis, the latter of which provides a more synthetic and
multi-causal explanation about how regulatory regimes develop and change (Hood et al,
2001). Understanding the process of delegation has also been the subject of substantial
intellectual inquiry. Principal-agent theory has been utilised in order to explain the incentives
of principals to delegate to agents (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). Less rationalistic
orientated theories such as historical or sociological institutionalism have also been utilised to
explain delegation (Thatcher 2002).
Multi-level governance
Multi-level governance has even closer connections to the EU than regulatory governance but
its empirical focus, issues of interest and intellectual foundations have been very different.
The general background to MLG shares something with the rise of regulatory governance in
the EU. It was especially the advent of the single market programme in the 1980s that
increased the competencies and ambitions of European institutions in a range of areas. The
focus in the study of European integration shifted from an emphasis on big history making
decisions within international treaties (such as the single market programme, creation of new
European institutions or the expansion institutional competencies) towards more day-to-day
decision making within specific sectors and the increasing policy making ambitions of
European institutions, particularly the Commission.
Rather than arising from the increasing prominence of a policy instrument like regulation
MLG initially arose from attempts to understand the multi-level decision making processes in
relation to EU cohesion policy. EU cohesion policy relates to the various funding instruments
aimed at addressing social and economic inequalities in the EU (Bache 2012). It focuses in
particular on developing disadvantaged regions in the context of market integration and the
structural funds are the main financial instruments for this purpose. From the early 1990s
structural funds were to be administered by partnership arrangements in the affected regions
giving subnational institutions and actors a formal role in EU decision making. The analysis
of EU cohesion policy within a framework of ‘multi-level governance’ was first undertaken
by Gary Marks (Marks 1993). In structural fund policy Marks pointed to emerging new roles
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of actors and subnational-supranational alliances which bypassed national governments who
began to lose their central role as ‘gatekeepers’ in EU policy making. From a means of
analysing developments in a particular policy areas Marks and his colleagues quickly began
to develop MLG into a framework for the understanding of EU as a whole as a policy making
system (Marks et al, 1996, Hooghe and Marks 2001).
The early development of MLG thus became embedded within the continuing development
of theories and analysis of European integration and policy making. In particular it was part
of a development which saw European integration theory move from international relations
dominated explanations (notably realism/intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism)
towards a focus on the EU as a political system and use of comparative politics methods of
understanding the EU (Hix, 1994, 2005). Distinct roles for sub-national and regional levels of
government which could not easily be understood within conventional supranational or
intergovernmental theories of European integration. This reflected the sharing of decision
making powers up, down and across the EU rather than being monopolised by national
governments (Marks et al 1996). Political arenas were therefore interconnected rather than
nested – multiple levels of government did not imply a hierarchical system.
Table 1: Regulatory and multi-level governance: origins, comparisons and contrasts
Origins and
focus
Logic
Strengths
Weaknesses
Key
intellectual
questions
Regulatory governance
EU and US
Regulation as an instrument of
governance
Delegation to independent
regulatory agencies
Logic of discipline
Analysis of institutional forms,
processes and relations
Developed from established
theories which purport to explain
regulation (public interest, private
interest)
Depoliticisation – experts
(technocrats) making political
decisions
Principal-agent theory is
problematic
Other approaches (eg historical or
sociological) not well developed in
regulatory studies
Explaining delegation and
independence
Accountability
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Multi-level governance
EU
Multiple tiers of government
Interconnectedness of actors and
institutions
Logic of pluralism
Appealing depiction of the
emergent EU polity – combination
of resilient formal institution
(states), growing importance of
other levels (EU, subnational) and
proliferation of networks and
fluidity.
Overstates demise of national
governments
A descriptive proto-theory - lacks
conceptualisation of relations within
governance and analysis of power
Role of the state
Accountability
Thus while regulatory governance and multi-level governance were initially impelled in part
by the same thing – the increasingly significant policy competencies of the EU (though as
noted the fiscal crisis at national level was perhaps the most significant factor in regulatory
governance) – their early developments took very different trajectories (Table 1 summarises
some of the key aspects of regulatory governance and MLG). While regulatory governance
focused on the institutions, policy norms and processes related to the increasing use of a
particular instrument of public policy (regulation) and developed into an analysis of the
nature of the modern state (the regulatory state), multi-level governance has focused on roles
and interactions of various tiers of government and become enmeshed with continuing
theoretical debates on the EU. Regulatory governance thus emerged from a narrower
analytical lens and institutional focus than multi-level governance and from the discipline of
public administration (notably in the US) rather than political science. Multi-level governance
by contrast emerged with a broader analytical lens with ambitions towards being a macro
theory while regulatory governance was more focused on the micro level.
3. Conceptual development and convergence: actors, types and relations
Despite very different theoretical foundations and issues of interest, in both governances
there has been an increasing convergence of interest in the roles of actors, types of
governance system and relations between types. While these have taken different paths and
different conceptual forms have been developed, a clear convergence can be observed in the
issues of interest. In both governances an increasing area of interest has been about
examining and understanding the roles of a variety of state and non-state actors which are
becoming increasingly active in governance. Associated with the different roles of actors has
been a focus on ‘types’ of governance and relations between types.
Actors in governance
One of the central concerns of regulatory governance, the creation of regulatory agencies and
the processes of delegation to those agencies remains. At the same time, however, there has
been a growing conceptual focus on a variety of actors and institutions, particularly non-state
actors. In a recent overview of regulation and regulatory governance Levi-Faur (2011) notes
the plurality of actors involved in regulation and distinguishes between three broad types of
organisation involved in regulation that are non governmental. There are organisations that
are controlled, owned or dominated in some way by state actors; there are market-orientated
organisations controlled by market actors; and there are civil organisations controlled by civil
society actors. Depending on who is the regulator and who is being regulated and any third
party involvement these organisations can operate together to create a wide variety of
regulatory configurations.
One dimension of the analysis of multiple actors in regulation involves a shift in the attention
away from the state. At the heart of regulation is the issue of control. While the classical
regulatory state sees control processes as predominantly hierarchical and based on state law
with state actors and institutions as central, a ‘post regulatory state’ perspective focused on a
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more diffuse series of control processes in the economy and society (Scott, 2004). There are a
variety of ‘controllers’ in regulation such as trade associations, businesses and numerous
forms of NGOs (Scott, 2004, p165). The analysis of self regulation and self regulatory
schemes is part of this trend which has been referred to as ‘decentring regulation’ (Black,
2001).
This should undoubtedly be set against other counter observations of the increasing
importance of the state in regulation and the decline of self regulation (Moran, 2003).
However, it is possible to conceive of increasing variety of regulatory forms with multiple
actors without shifting the attention away from the state. Multiple forms of regulation with a
variety of actors have been observed and conceptualised including hybrids of delegated state
regulation, co regulation and self regulation (Levi-Faur, 2011). Just how these multiple actor
configurations are shaped and operate is dependent very much on their relations with the state
(Bartle and Vass, 2007).
In multi-level governance, although the central focus in early developments was on the
increasing influence of different tiers of government, particularly sub-national and
supranational, the influence of multiple state and non-state actors was also integral. While
Marks et al (1996) in an early broad ranging study of MLG highlighted the importance of
non-central state actors, they also stressed the role of a wide range of non-governmental
actors that have the capacity to bypass central national states, the traditional gatekeepers on
European integration. It is true that the influence of non-state actors in the EU is contested,
and arguably in many areas of EU politics and policy the EU is better depicted as a system of
multi-level government rather than multi-level government (Jordan, 2001). Nevertheless
observation and analysis of an increasing number and variety of state and non-state actors has
been at the heart of the development of MLG since 2000.
In one such analytical development of MLG Hooghe and Marks (2003) identified two
different types of MLG within which different actors and processes were dominant. The first
type, Type I, focused on traditional general purpose forms of governance centred on national,
sub-national and supranational institutions. In the second type, Type II, governance is taskspecific and many more and varied actors are evident. Public private partnerships are
prevalent in Type II, particularly at international level, and there is no single dominant class
of actor; a wide range of public and private actors ‘collaborate and compete in shifting
coalitions’ (Marks and Hooghe, 2004).
In later analyses of MLG multiple actors remain at the heart. In an introduction to a major
collection on MLG while Zürn et al (2010, p2) note that governance relates to addressing
some kind of public problem, they stress that a wide range of public and private actors can be
involved in addressing the problem, and even that private solutions may be appropriate to
public problems (though private solutions to private problems are not counted as part of
governance). Multiple and diverse actors are exemplified in two chapters in the collection. A
variety of primarily private interests, including corporate and civil society interests,
associations, clubs, social movements and coalitions, are actively interested and involved in
policy networks particularly in the EU (Hassel, 2010). In another contribution public-private
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partnerships are shown to be significant aspects of global MLG (Beisheim 2010). Finally in
one of the most substantially theoretical contributions to MLG, Piattoni (2010) argues that a
central aspect of MLG is ‘political mobilisation’ of state and non-state actors at various levels
and that MLG processes are ‘multi actor’ as well as ‘multi-level’ (2010, pp18-20). Piattoni
sets up a three dimensional framework of MLG one of which a state – non-state dimension, ie
a horizontal dimension of actor involvement from central state actors to fully private actors.
This is elaborated in policy areas such as higher education and the environment in which civil
society actors and organised interests at local, national and transnational levels have an
increased role.
Types of governance
The focus on multiple actors in both governances has been associated with attempts to
identify and conceptualise different types of governance depending on the roles of different
actors and the governance functions undertaken. In the study of regulation the creation of
different typologies of process, structure and relations between public and private actors and
their analysis is common practice. In self regulation, for example, one formulation perceives
three key dimensions: first, the informal (regulation undertaken by the regulated organisation)
to the formal (a state-led, highly institutionalised process); second, the voluntary to the highly
legalised; and third, the extent of outsider participation which can vary from participation
only by the regulated organisations to extensive outsider participation, including
state/regulatory agency representatives and private actors (Baggott 1989).
In another categorisation Black (1996) perceives ‘mandated’ self-regulation in which the
framework is specified by the government; ‘sanctioned’ self-regulation in which schemes are
approved by government; ‘coerced’ self-regulation in which schemes are developed in
response to a governmental threat to impose statutory regulation; and ‘voluntary’ selfregulation in which ‘there is no active state involvement, direct or indirect, in promoting or
mandating self-regulation’. In another scheme, regulatory approaches vary from the least
interventionary, ‘self-regulation’ at the bottom of the pyramid, through ‘enforced selfregulation’ and ‘command regulation with discretionary punishment’ to the most
interventionary form, ‘command regulation with nondiscretionary punishment’ (Ayres and
Braithwaite 1992, 39).
In a conceptualisation of the rise of regulation in recent years and its apparent paradoxical
promotion by the state Bartle and Vass (2007) classify different forms of self regulation and
the state. Three forms of ‘mandated’ - ‘cooperative’, ‘delegated’ and ‘devolved’, and two
forms of non-mandated self regulation - ‘facilitated’ and ‘tacitly-supported’ are identified.
The key point is that the state is involved in self regulation in a variety of ways, even those
that appear to be ‘pure’ self regulation are often informally or tacitly monitored and
supported.
In the EU Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2008) identify a variety of patterns involving different
combinations of public and private actors and varying from governance through strong
command and control regulation towards self regulation with little or no public involvement.
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Public-private relations often involve explicit acts of delegation but many times when there is
no explicit act of delegation. In another development, particularly within the EU, regulatory
networks involving international networks of public and private regulatory bodies have been
identified (Coen and Thatcher 2008).
Similarly at national and international levels and Börzel and Risse (2010, 116) distinguish
various forms of governance with and without government. Seven categories are identified:
‘public regulation’ (without private actors); ‘consultation and cooptation of private actors’
participation of private actors in public decision making forums); ‘coregulation and
coproduction’ (joint decision making by public and private actors); ‘delegation to private
actors’ (with participation by some public actors); ‘private self regulation in shadow of
hierarchy’; ‘public adoption of private regulation’; and private self regulation (no public
involvement).
While in regulatory governance there have been many different conceptualisations of
governance types, the study of MLG has been dominated by the binary formulation of MLG
proposed by Hooghe and Marks (2003). Type I MLG refers to general-purpose jurisdictions
in which a wide range of governing functions are undertaken. This contrasts with the taskspecific jurisdictions of Type II, which are set up for a specific function or goal. A number of
other characteristics follow. First, Type I jurisdictions have non-intersecting memberships
that are defined by durable features, most often territory but also community, while Type II
memberships, formed by contingent functional factors, are intersecting. Second, Type I
jurisdictions have durable and system wide architecture in contrast to the flexible and
changeable designs of Type II jurisdictions. Third, with their durable architectures Type I
jurisdictions have limited levels, normally varying between three and six. In contrast, with
their functional designs and flexibility, Type II jurisdictions can have many different
jurisdictional levels.
The two MLG forms are also defined by Hooghe and Marks (2003) in terms of governing
locations and biases. Type I jurisdictions are prevalent at the established national and subnational levels. At the international level and the national-international frontier Type II
jurisdictions tend to predominate, though the EU as a Type I organisation is a notable
exception, and Type II are also common within cross-border regions and at the local level. In
addition, Type I jurisdictions are biased towards ‘intrinsic community’ based on durable
identities, such as territory, and governance is characterised by ‘voice’, i.e. political
deliberation and conflict articulation. In contrast, Type II are biased towards ‘extrinsic
community’ based on more fluid and specialised characteristics; governance is characterised
by ‘exit’, choice and competition, i.e. membership is voluntary and the focus is on problem
solving and conflict avoidance. While community, durability and voice characterise the
provision of collective and public goods in Type I, in Type II it is competition, choice and
exit. Barriers to entry are high in Type I and low in Type II, the latter in effect enabling a
market of jurisdictions for the provision of a public good (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 240). At
local level a particular contrast has been made between ‘consolidated’ government (Type I)
with voice, deliberation and a singular institutional structure versus ‘fragmented’ government
(Type II) with choice, exit and multiple institutional structures. These two types of
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governance (summarised in table 2) are seen as ‘logically coherent’ and ‘alternative
responses to fundamental problems of coordination’ (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 234).
Table 2. Multi-level Governance: The Type I/Type II Binary Divide
Based on: Hooghe and Marks (2003, 2010)
Type I
Basic features General-purpose
Non-intersecting membership
Durable, system wide design
Limited levels
National and sub-national levels
Location
EU
Biases
Intrinsic community
Deliberation and voice
Conflict articulation
Consolidation
Type II
Task-specific
Intersecting
Flexible, changeable design
Unlimited levels
International-national border
Cross-border regions
Local
Extrinsic community
Choice and exit
Conflict avoidance
Fragmentation
Since its first publication in 2003 the binary formulation has been widely referenced and
drawn on in a number of empirical studies and collected works. This was to such an extent
that in 2007 the Hooghe and Mark’s (2003) article was considered the most influential article
on the EU published in the previous decade by a prominent network of EU scholars (UACES
News 2007). In empirical studies Type I and Type II forms of governance have been
identified in many settings. For example, a number of studies have engaged with the typology
in relation to cities and the governance of sustainability and climate change mitigation
(Betshill and Bulkeley 2006; Bulkeley and Betshill 2005; Gustavsson, Elander, and
Lundmark 2009). Significant instances of Type II governance are identified at both the local
level with networks of public and private actors and at transnational level with networks of
city based public and private actors (Betshill and Bulkeley 2006; Bulkeley and Betshill
2005). Variety has also been observed, for example in two Swedish cities Sundsvall and
Vaxjo. In relation to climate change mitigation Sundsvall is shown to be more dependent on
‘vertical’ and ‘intergovernmental’ structures (Type I) while Vaxjo is more characterised by
‘independent action and self governance’ (Type II) (Gustavsson, Elander, and Lundmark
2009, 71-72).
Other studies show a tendency for an increase in the Type II forms of governance. For
example, in relation to Hong Kong to mainland China cross boundary governance Yang
(2005) shows a significant increase in task-specific, flexible forms of governance since the
early 2000s. In relation to science policy in France, Crespy, Heraud, and Perry (2007) detail
the increasing involvement of a range of regional public and private actors in science policy
strategy at regional level. In another quite different policy area a ‘looser type II pluralistic
scenario’ is increasingly observed in tandem with a ‘rule based type I governance’ in clinical
appraisal schemes to select health technologies to be deployed in the UK health sector
(Milewa and Barry 2005). In a study of the development of renewable energy in the English
regions Smith (2007) shows the attempts to shift towards ‘problem-focused’ governance
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(Type II) involving an engagement of private, civil society and public partners working with
local and devolved administrations.
There are also two collected works on MLG in which the typology appears as a significant
aspect of MLG (Conzelmann and Smith, 2008; Enderlein, Wälti, and Zürn 2010). A revision
of Hooghe and Marks’s seminal 2003 article provides the first chapter of the collection by
Enderlein, Wälti, and Zürn (2010) (Hooghe and Marks 2010) and the formulation is
described in the introductory chapter of Conzelmann and Smith’s collection. Contributors to
the volume by Enderlein, Wälti, and Zürn (2010) relate the Type I-Type II formulation to a
wide array of national and international forms of governance. Zürn (2010, 90) engages with
the formulation in relation to global governance, contrasting formal, durable and wide
ranging governing architectures (Type I) such as the EU with less formal structures elsewhere
in global governance. Beisheim, Campe, and Schäferhoff (2010, 371) analyse transnational
public-private partnerships noting that they are an example of Type II. Similarly a variety of
instances of the two types are identified by Hallerberg (2010) on fiscal federalism (Type I),
Stein and Turkewitsch (2010) on intergovernmental relations within Canada and America
(Type I), Obydenkova (2010) on post-Soviet Eurasia (Type II), Jachtenfuchs (2010) on the
EU (Type I with elements of Type II) and Slaughter and Hale, (2010) on transgovernmental
networks (Type II).
In MLG therefore we see a distinct and clearly defined typology which many empirical
analysts have drawn on. In regulation, by contrast, several different typologies have arisen,
although reflecting the same basic thing, ie varying amounts of state actors and control, they
are less clearly defined and no single model has been followed by empirical analysts.
Relations between types
The focus on types of governance raises questions about the relations between types. To what
extent are they related and how are the relations conceptualised? In the literature on
regulation two forms of relation are evident and have been conceptualised. One is the relation
between state regulation and self regulation and the second, within the state, is the relation
between government (ministers and departments) and arms-length independent regulatory
agencies. The relations between these types have been analysed and conceptualised in various
ways in the literature on regulatory governance.
Two regulatory ideal types can be depicted - state regulation and self regulation - the latter, a
private and voluntary arrangement, is often described in polar opposition to the former, a
public and mandatory form. However, studies of self regulation show that it is better seen in
terms of a spectrum from highly formal and legalised regulation dominated by state actors to
informal self regulatory schemes of private actors and with little involvement by the state
(Baggott 1989; Gunningham and Rees 1997; Ogus 1995). While some of these conceptions
are of the types as separate and unconnected entities, inherent in some common regulatory
forms are relations between types. This is particularly the case in variants of enforced or
supervised self regulation or coregulatory systems, some of which are referred to as ‘metaregulation’ (Bartle and Vass 2007; Gilad 2010). The central focus of supervised or enforced
12
self regulation or coregulation is on the relationship between the state and the self regulatory
system. This can be one of legal compulsion, as in enforced self regulation in which the state
defines the self regulatory system in law, or could be one of co-working in which state
regulatory agencies work with, or delegate certain regulatory responsibilities to self
regulatory bodies. ‘Meta regulation’ is one label given to the variety of arrangements which
go beyond prescriptive state led regulation towards more flexible co-regulatory arrangements
such as process orientated forms of regulation the latter of which involves state regulators
auditing compliance to their own rules (Gilad, 2010, p488).
In recent decades an increasing prevalence of interconnected state and self regulatory systems
has been observed. This has been advanced by two apparently contradictory trends. On the
one hand the late twentieth century and early 21st has seen a broadening ambit and attention
of the state in many fields of activity (Moran 2003) while at same time there has been an
increasing interest by the state itself in promoting and exploiting self regulation rather than
traditional state led command and control (Bartle and Vass 2007). As a result, we are
witnessing a decline in pure forms of state or self regulation and an ever increasing
interconnection and indeed interlocking of public and private actors in regulatory processes
and institutions.
Even in state dominated regulatory systems there are important relations between governing
forms and these have been conceptualised. These relations are represented by the delegation
of narrowly defined powers by government to independent regulatory agencies. The
conceptualisation of these relations has been dominated by the principal-agent framework
(Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002). Located clearly within rational choice analysis it is
essentially a means of analysing the transaction costs and benefits involved in delegation.
Delegation will take place if the costs of a degree loss of control and discretion given to
agencies is outweighed by the benefits of expertise focused on specific tasks at arms-length
from political pressures. Depoliticised independent agencies and expert knowledge are
central to the design of modern state regulatory agencies, for example in utility regulation (eg
energy, water, rail), financial services and monetary policy (central banks). They thus appear
to epitomise features such as task-specificity, conflict avoidance and consensus, and are
clearly separate from political institutions.
However, it can be questioned just how independent the agencies are and to what extent the
principal-agent model represents reality. Some question whether the functional logic of the
principal-agent framework adequately explains the decision to delegate. In other accounts
social and historical factors, which cannot be reduced to functional factors, can influence how
certain organisational forms, such as decisions to set up independent agencies, can develop,
standardise and spread across social systems and at particular points in history (Thatcher and
Stone Sweet, 2002, p8). Even after delegation there are times when ‘rational’ decisionmaking by experts can come under pressure from politics and government, for example
during the crisis in the UK rail industry in the early 2000s and the economic crisis since 2008
(Roberts 2010). While nominal independence has been maintained during these periods,
agency decisions-making has been subject to increasing conflict and political pressures from
central government. Indeed after the economic collapse of 2008 ‘central bankers were caught
13
flatfooted; collaborating closely with elected leaders to avoid a collapse of the financial
sector they quickly compromised the show of independence’ (Roberts 2010, 20).
In multi-level governance although the types are clearly defined the relations between types
have not been conceptualised to the same degree as in regulatory governance. One of the key
features of the binary typology is that they are ‘contrasting visions of multi-level governance’
(Marks and Hooghe 2004). Although it is noted that ‘type II multi-level governance tends to
be embedded in legal frameworks determined by type I jurisdictions’ (Marks and Hooghe
2004, 24) and significant diversity within Type II is recognised, their main thrust is the idea
that they are separate entities and jurisdictions: ‘type I and type II governance arise - under
different guises and with different labels - as fundamental alternatives’ (Hooghe and Marks
2003, 241).
There is literature on MLG that directs us away from Type I-Type II as two distinct visions of
governance and towards a focus on interconnections. Skelcher (2005), in an analysis of the
problems of jurisdictional integrity in a world of polycentric governance, argues that an
analytical starting point must be ‘the reality of an interlinked duality between “traditional”
Type I and “emergent” Type II governance’ (Skelcher 2005, 95). Four categories are
suggested for the understanding the interlinked dualities: parallel, complementary,
incorporated and oppositional (p101). In the most substantial theoretical treatment of MLG it
is not conceptualised in terms of the Type I-Type II formulation but in terms of three
interconnected and interdependent dimensions, X1, X2 and X3 (Piattoni 2010). The X1 axis
represents varying degrees of federalisation of the traditional tiers of government, X2
represents the national-international dimension, while X3 corresponds to the public-private
(or state-society) dimension. Type I and Type II (or her equivalent X1/X3 axes) are in a
dynamic balance and coexist in a complex relationship (Piattoni 2010, 207-209). It is
interconnectedness itself, meaning the movement of actors in one dimension induces counter
moves of other actors elsewhere, which is the defining characteristic of MLG and
distinguishes it from other forms of governance.
In empirical studies relations the limitations of the model of two separate and discrete types
has been noted. For example, in relation to city based climate policy, Gustavsson, Elander,
and Lundmark (2009, 62) note that local authorities are involved in Type I and Type II
relationships and that city based governance networks ‘do not easily fit into either of the
easily distinguished type-I or type-II models of multilevel governance’ (Gustavsson, Elander,
and Lundmark 2009, 71). This overlapping and intermeshing theme is echoed by Bulkeley
and Betshill (2005, 59) who argue that ‘rather than seeing the two emerging accounts of
MLG, either relations between state institutions [type I] or new forms of network governance
[type II], as alternatives we have argued that both are necessary for understanding the politics
of urban sustainability’. This indicates that rather than identifying two separate types of
governance what is more important is how different types of governance are interrelated and
how they interact. As Milewa and Barry (2005, 507) conclude in relation to UK health policy
‘the very coexistence of the prescribed rule based type I governance of health technology
appraisal and the far looser type II pluralistic scenario suggests a need for some consideration
of how the two forms are melded’.
14
The ways in which public institutions and private actors are connected can be a key factor in
defining whether governance forms are Type I or Type II. For example in relation to
organised interests Hassel (2010, 154-156) suggests that the form of access to the policymaking process is a key factor. Stable interests with institutionalised access to policy-making,
termed ‘clubs’ and ‘associations’ and which typically include industry associations, are said
to coincide with Type I jurisdictions, while fluid and temporary interests with less formal
access to policy-making, referred to as ‘social movements’ and ‘coalitions’, coincide with
Type II. In other studies it is the nature of the governmental structures to which actors are
connected that determines the type of governing arrangement. Thus governing structures
involving private actors in federal-provincial intergovernmental relations in America and
Canada, for example in fiscal or environmental policy, are better seen as Type I because of a
small number of closely integrated tiers of government (Stein and Turkewitsch 2010, 197).
On the other hand the governing arrangements involving ‘public-private partnerships’ in
‘global governance’ are deemed by virtue of the co-governance of state and non-state actors
to be examples of Type II (Beisheim, Campe, and Schäferhoff 2010, 370). Rather than two
distinctly different governing arrangements determined by type of actor, or type of
government, there are a range of private actor types and many different ways in which they
interconnect to governmental organisations.
In other empirical studies there is particular evidence of Type I governance shaping Type II.
On UK renewable energy policy Smith (2007, 6278) notes that Type II measures and activity
are ‘framed and justified within the economic regeneration priorities of type I regional
arrangements’ and that ‘problem-focused type II activities ultimately depend on type I
authority for their effectiveness’. He concludes that while Type II governance has been
encouraged it has been constrained by formal administrative institutions (Type I) and
‘hierarchy persists in the delivery of energy policy’ (Smith 2007, 6278). Similarly, in two
very different case studies - on French science policy and cross-boundary governance in
Hong Kong and mainland China - the role of central government in the development of new
Type II governance forms is stressed (Crespy, Heraud, and Perry 2007; Yang, 2005).
In MLG therefore the focus on relations between types derives primarily from empirical
studies and is more inchoate and less conceptualised than in regulatory governance. In the
latter the conceptualisation of relations are inherent within types such as supervised, enforced
or facilitated self-regulation while there are more elaborate frameworks such as principalagent, to understand the processes of delegation.
4. Conclusion
The recent call to ‘rethink governance’ has focused particularly on the need to move beyond
notions of ‘decentring’ and ‘hollowing out’ towards one which emphasises and
conceptualises relations between different types of governance, particularly state-centric and
society-centric types. In our comparative analysis of the conceptual development of multilevel governance and regulatory governance we wish to advance a similar argument. The two
15
types of governance emerged from very different contexts with regulatory governance a
narrower analytical lens with a micro focus while multi-level governance has a broader
analytical lens with ambitions towards being a macro theory. Despite this they have evolved
to focus on similar issues and questions, notably the role of multiple actors in governance, the
conceptualisation of types and relations between types. We question just how distinct and
separate these different types of multi-level and regulatory governance are and stress the need
for a cross fertilisation of between the two governances with a specific attention on the ways
in which relations between types of governance have been conceptualised and analysed.
In our comparison of three pillars of the two governances – actors, types and relations – we
see some particular differences in the ways in which types and relations have been
conceptualised and analysed (the three pillars are summarised in Table 3). With regard to
types of governance we see particular parsimony and clarity in MLG with a focus on two
specific types and this single typology has been followed through in much empirical literature
in recent years. This single typology contrasts with the multiple typologies deployed in the
regulatory governance literature. The picture is a little different with regard to relations in
which regulatory governance has developed models of relations while there is little
conceptualisation of the relations between Types I and II in MLG.
Our call for cross fertilisation includes the possibility of regulatory governance learning from
MLG. In particular two types model of Hooghe and Marks (2003) has the virtue of simplicity
and clarity. Much subsequent empirical analysis within MLG has settled around this model in
areas as disparate as the governance of sustainability within networked cities, governance in
China and Hong Kong, energy, science and health policy. A consistent and parsimonious
conceptual framework enables analysts to make clear comparisons and draw broad
conclusions about the dynamics and architecture of modern governance.
Reversing this learning process we think that MLG can learn from regulatory governance.
There is undoubtedly a debate to be had between the parsimony of MLG’s two types model
and the complexity within some of the conceptualisations in regulatory governance. Is the
two types model an oversimplification to the extent that it becomes meaningless and are
multiple types too complex to enable effective analysis to be undertaken? Arguably the two
types model fails to capture the diversity of modern governance and regulatory governance
may be able to suggest more sophisticated formulations. It is with regard to the relations
between types, however, where we think MLG has the most to learn from regulatory
governance. In the two types model in MLG there is little recognition of the connections
between the types, they are perceived primarily of as ‘contrasting visions’ of governance
(Hooghe and Marks, 2004). In particular several subsequent empirical studies have shown
how Type I governance interacts with and shapes Type II (Smith 2007, 6278, Crespy et al
2007; Yang, 2005) and yet MLG offers little in the way of conceptualising and analysing
those relations. Regulatory governance in contrast, by various means such as the principalagent framework, has a well developed analytical tradition of modelling the relations between
governmental bodies and regulatory agencies which are broadly equivalent to the type I and
type II governing forms in MLG. Care is required, however, in the analytical framework
utilised. The functional rationale of type II MLG governance is suggestive of the kind of
16
functional analysis used in the principal-agent framework. The limitations of the latter in
regulation have led to suggestions for other forms of analysis to understand regulatory
governance such as historical or sociological institutionalism (Gilardi 2004, Thatcher and
Stone Sweet, 2002). Although less developed in the regulatory literature these may provide
better ways of conceptualising relations in MLG than the principal-agent framework.
The similar recent evolutions of regulatory governance and MLG have thus involved
different conceptualisations, in particular we see different conceptualisations of types of
governance and their relations. Clarity in these conceptualisations is required as is a cross
fertilisation of ideas and a move away from intellectual silos that different forms of
governance tend to occupy. Processes of analytical convergence thus to be nurtured in order
to secure a more sophisticated grasp of the architecture of modern governance and its innate
fluidity.
Table 3. Actors, types and relations in multi-level and regulatory governance
Actors
Types
Multi-level governance
 Central focus on state actors at
multiple tiers of government
 Increasing focus on
interconnected state and nonstate actors at all levels of
government
 ‘multi-actor’ governance as
well as ‘multi-level’
governance




Relations


Type I general purpose,
political
Type II task-specific,
functional
Types clearly defined
A single typology followed
through in empirical literature
Little recognition and no
conceptualisation of relations
in the definition of types
Many empirical studies
indicate importance of relations
Regulatory governance
 increasing focus on a diverse
range of non-state actors
 one trend de-emphasises the
state and focuses on social and
self regulatory forms of control
 another trend stresses the
continuing influence of the
state – actors, processes,
networks shaped primarily by
the state
 a variety of different typologies
 a diverse range of state, coregulatory and self regulatory
systems within the typologies
 many different typologies
followed in empirical literature




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importance of relations
recognised
processes of delegation clearly
conceptualised but nondelegation relations less so
principal-agent framework well
developed
other non-functional, rational
choice approaches (historical
and sociological) less
developed in the literature
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