1AC
Plan: The United States should legalize the sale of nearly all human organs in the
United States.
Transplant Tourism
The organ shortage is getting exponentially worse as global demand increases—
conservative predictions of 50 thousand annual deaths means a market is needed now
Beard, Kaserman, & Osterkamp 13 a Prof of Economics, Auburn U, b. Research Fellow @ Independent Institute & Prof of
Econ @ Auburn, c. Prof of Applied Sciences @ Munich U [T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman, and Rigmar Osterkamp, The Global Organ
Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses, Stanford University Press] page 68-71
If our current predicament looks bad now, future
predictions suggest things may become substantially worse.
Although experience teaches that forecasting such phenomena is hazardous in the extreme, there are a variety of very strong
reasons to be extremely pessimistic about the extent of future shortages if no material changes in policy and/ or
technology occur. While no such predictions can be precise, and while unexpected technological developments, such as cloning from stem cells,
can alter the situation overnight, it is highly irresponsible to merely rely on such events, while ignoring trends and developments that could, if
unchecked, affect the lives of many hundreds of thousands of people. Thus, we briefly examine here what little can be said about the future of
the global organ shortage, with a particular emphasis on kidneys. To begin, one may say that the degree of shortage, and the size of the waiting
list, depends on the confluence of such factors as medical technology, diabetic and hypertension population sizes, disease management
performance, the success of reforms in procurement, and so on. Each of these forces can be substantially affected by impossible-to-forecast
scientific discoveries. For example, the development of drug therapies that allow the widespread use of inferior or poorly matched donor
organs without substantial penalties would affect the supply of organs and the ability to perform transplants. In fact, successful kidney grafts
are performed today with levels of antigen mismatching that would have been prohibitive in earlier times. Likewise, stem cell cloning of
functional organs using genetic material from the patients' own bodies would allow each person with organ failure to become his or her own
donor, with little or no rejection risk. Such advances
will surely one day come about, but it is not responsible to
rely on and wait for them, nor is it possible to forecast future conditions on such a basis. By necessity, then,
our goal here will be much more modest. It is indubitably true that many of the conditions that give rise to renal failure,
such as diabetes and high blood pressure, are rising globally, to some extent as a result of rising levels of obesity, even in developing
countries. The International Obesity Task Force (IOTF), a respected NGO with close ties to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN
Food and Agricultural Organization, attributes about 90 percent of all Type 2 diabetes to overweight. The Commission of the European Union's
(2005) report on obesity provides evidence of the rapid rise in obesity and its costs in Europe. The WHO suggests that 1.7 billion people
worldwide were overweight or obese in 2000.James and colleagues (2001) documented the rising levels of obesity in rapidly developing nations
in Asia, where, only a generation ago, malnutrition was the primary health challenge. Obesity
leads to both diabetes and
hypertension, which, collectively, probably account for about 70 percent of ESRD. These trends, if they continue, will
increase the demand for kidney transplantation and exacerbate the shortage of organs. In contrast to the
grim outlines of the rising levels of global obesity, otherwise favorable developments, such as increasing life spans in many developing
countries, can also increase organ shortages. As people age, their organs work less efficiently and, apparently, inevitably fail. Thus,
societies with many elderly people will see greater demands for transplantation of kidneys, livers, and so on. This phenomenon is readily
apparent today in Japan, which has among the oldest populations of any nation. Despite very low levels of obesity, Japan has the highest
dialysis load of any country, with around 180 persons per 100,000 requiring regular hemodialysis, a result almost entirely attributable to the
very high number of old people in Japan. The combination of longer expected life spans and low birth rates creates special burdens on organ
procurement by simultaneously increasing the demand while reducing the supply. As other countries see their average age rise, the shortage of
organs for transplantation will worsen, all other things being equal. Forecasts of future organ shortages, or waiting lists, are sparse, although
several simple models have been constructed for the United States. Beard and Kaserman (2006) provide a simulation model of the U.S. renal
waiting list that provides short-range forecasts using relatively simple linear extrapolation rules and feedbacks . We examine that model in
Chapter 4, so here we will limit our review to the very simple forecasting model ofBeard,Jackson, and Kaserman (2008), which provides
estimates of deaths and waiting list sizes for the United States. Their approach must be viewed for what it primarily is: an extrapolation that
implicitly assumes no structural change in either the organ procurement system or the technology of transplant medicine. Both assumptions
are, one hopes, entirely too pessimistic. Given this, however, the results are sobering:
by 2015, U.S. organ waiting lists will
balloon to almost 160,000, with annual deaths increasing similarly. They calculate that, without fundamental change in
the observed trends, lives lost to the kidney shortage will exceed 200,000 by 2015. These terrifying figures are
only for the United States and, for various reasons discussed by the authors, understate the consequences of inaction. When
one includes live’s lost in the rest of the world, it becomes clear that 40,000 to 50,000 people per year will die on waiting
lists (or be delis ted for being too ill to receive a transplant) worldwide by the middle of the next decade, and the actual number
may well be far higher as more countries obtain the resources necessary to operate organ procurement and transplant systems and
dialysis becomes more widely available. These estimates, of course, may be far too pessimistic, even in the absence of significant scientific
advances and legal reforms. As discussed in the section on black markets, the
continued existence of shortages leads
inevitably to creative, and largely unregulated, responses by which desperate patients seek transplants. For example, Medscape
Today (www.medscape.com) reported on new insurance policies available to some U.S. residents that provide funds to support travel abroad
to obtain kidney transplants. Both the travel expenses and the expenses of the necessary organ procurement and surgery are partially covered.
Thus, private enterprise can be expected to step in where government is unable or unwilling to act. As
the organ crises worsen in
wealthier, developed countries, we will see increasing patient travel for transplantation to poor countries, usually
utilizing live donation. These activities will, of course, result in waiting list removals not attributable to death or illness and can
attenuate the observed shortage. It seems unlikely, however, that such developments will be as desirable as
fundamental reforms of the existing procurement systems in the wealthier countries. On balance,
demographic trends portend increased shortages of organs for transplantation, longer waiting lists,
and higher numbers of patient deaths. The poor performances of the organ procurement systems of most countries, combined
with relatively predictable increases in diseases and conditions associated with organ failure, strongly suggest that the future will look
a lot like the recent past, only worse..
The massive shortage of organs in the United States is driving the underground organ
market.
Archer 13 Body Snatchers: Organ Harvesting For Profit Kidneys and other organs are selling to the highest bidder on the black market.
Published on November 13, 2013 by Dale Archer, M.D. http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/reading-between-the-headlines/201311/bodysnatchers-organ-harvesting-profitRecently in China, a missing 6-year-old boy was found alone in a field, crying. Upon closer inspection, both eyes had been removed, presumably for
the corneas. In 2012, a young African girl was kidnapped and brought to the UK for the sole purpose of harvesting her organs. She was one of the lucky ones—rescued before she went under
the knife. Authorities feel this is just the tip of the iceberg. This isn't just an international occurrence. Kendrick Johnson, a Georgia teen, died at school January 2013. The local sheriff quickly
determined the death was a freak accident, that he suffocated after getting stuck in a rolled up mat in the school gym. Johnson's parents however, could not—would not—accept that. Six
months after his death, they obtained a court order to have the body exhumed for an independent autopsy. The pathologist was stunned when he found the corpse stuffed with newspaper.
The brain, heart, lungs and liver were missing. He also discovered Johnson's death was due to blunt force trauma to the right side of his neck. The FBI is now involved in this disturbing case
with potentially shattering reverberations. Nancy Scheper-Hughes has spent over ten years studying the dark side of organ harvesting and trafficking which is driven by greedy middle men and
desperate, wealthy recipients.
Black market organs are being transplanted in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles at $150,000 a pop. She reports
there are "broker-friendly" US hospitals, complete with surgeons who either don't know or don't care where the organs come from. Organ
donation is only possible if the organ in question has blood and oxygen flowing through it until the time of harvesting. A living donor can give a whole kidney, a portion of their liver, lung,
intestine or pancreas. Otherwise, the donor must be declared brain dead while circulation and oxygenation remain intact. Today,
120,771 people are waiting for an organ, and
18 will die every day while waiting. Just one donor has the ability to save up to 8 lives. Where there's a demand, there's a way. And for the wealthy money is no
object when it comes to a vitally needed body part. Organ donation is strictly regulated in the US, yet a black market is alive and well. Typically a broker will
team up with a funeral home director, forging consent forms and a death certificate to harvest human tissue before the body is cremated or
buried. Sometimes organs are harvested from a living victim for compensation. In the worst case it involves kidnapping for the purpose of organ
harvesting. Always at the end of the chain is a wealthy recipient, willing to pay big bucks with no questions asked. In some countries, impoverished villagers
may sell an organ for several hundred dollars. In others, organ harvesting is tied to human trafficking. Children sold into slavery or a life of sexual abuse
are also used for their organs. There's a black market for hearts, lungs, and livers, but the kidney is the most sought after. According to the World
Health Organization, approximately 7,000 kidneys are illegally harvested annually by traffickers worldwide and the prices vary widely by country. The average
buyer spends $150,000 (though prices in excess of $200,000 are common) while the average donor gets $5,000. The big profits go the the middle men and
“organ brokers”. In the US 98,463 individuals are waiting for a kidney as of October 25, 2013. Of those, about half will die before they receive one.
The profits are huge, and money is a temptation many brokers and doctors just cannot resist. In 2010 WHO estimated about 11,000 organs were obtained on the
black market. WHO also claims that an organ is sold every hour of every day, 365/7. What is your kidney worth to you? A broker located in China openly advertised
"Donate a kidney, buy a new iPad!" In addition, the donor would be compensated $4,000 and it could be harvested quickly and easily in as little as 10 days. There's an enormous
demand for organs, and whenever there's gap between supply and demand desperate buyers and desperate sellers will dictate a black market.
Now organized crime is involved, sometimes leaving the poor victim without their organ and quite possibly without being paid. Even here in the
U.S., there have been accusations (no proof) of allowing patients on life support to die in order to remove the organs while the heart is still
beating. This is a multi-million dollar industry, and as the wealth gap continues to widen, it’s only expected to get worse.
Prohibition results in global exploitation through transplant tourism
Andrew, 09 - University of Mississippi School of Law, Attorney (Hughes, “You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ
Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models”, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351 (2009))
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global
black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales.78 While nearly all developed
nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws .79 The
illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of
dying on an organ waiting list, and “transplant tourism” has become its own industry.80 In Bombay in 2001,
nearly US$10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants.81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney
sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid.82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as “one of
[the] world’s best black marketplaces for human organs.”83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the
Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest.84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals’
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related.85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can
be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between “donors” and
“donees The
lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor
throughout the world .87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for
abuse.88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited.89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid
less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the
transplants.90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys support the concern about sellers’ lack of adequate information about the
risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had “deteriorated substantially” after their organ sales, and
“[f]our out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs.”91 In short, U.S.
policy and its ban on
organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was
designed to avoid.92
Organ trafficking is a modern day form of slavery – the market is widespread and
growing
The Kubrick Theme. 2012 Human Trafficking is Modern Day Slavery, http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-there-are-27-millionreasons/otherformsoftrafficking/organ-removal/
Organ removal, while not as prevalent as sex and labor trafficking, is quite real and widespread. Those targeted are
sometimes killed or left for dead. More frequently poor and desperate people are lured by false promises. The World Health
Organization estimates that as many as 7,000 kidneys are illegally obtained by traffickers every year as demand outstrips the supply of organs
legally available for transplant. A black market thrives as well in the trade of bones, blood and other body tissues. This activity is listed in the
United Nations’ Trafficking in Persons Protocol: Article 3(a)… Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
The inclusion of this form of exploitation into the Protocol is intended to cover those situations where a person is exploited for the purposes of
a trafficker obtaining profit in the ‘organ market’, and situations where a person is trafficked for the purpose of the removal of their organs
and/or body parts for purposes of witchcraft or traditional medicine. In the former situation, market
forces drive supply and
demand; those in desperate need of an organ transplant will purchase an organ from those who are
desperately poor, or from ‘brokers’ who may have forcibly or deceptively obtained the organ. Kidneys
are generally supplied by live ‘donors’ in underdeveloped countries to developed ones. An article in the
medical journal Lancet reported: “…the circulation of kidneys followed established routes of capital from South
to North, from East to West, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to
white ones and from female to male or from poor, low status men to more affluent men. Women are
rarely the recipients of purchased organs anywhere in the world.” (Scheper-Hughes,Vol. 361, 10 May 2003)
These practices dehumanize and oppress of millions of persons worldwide—a
collective Moral responsibility exists to combat the systemic harms of organ trafficking
Shahinian, 2013 – Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, United Nations (Gulnara, April 26, 2013, “Slavery must be
recognised in all its guises,” The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/apr/26/slavery-recognisedall-guises, Hensel)
¶ Five years ago,
I became the UN's first special rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery. Since then, I have been asked time and again by
government officials, businesspeople and NGOs not to use the word "slavery" at all. I have been asked to change the name of my mandate
and not speak out about what I have seen. They have asked me to use other words instead – ones that don't carry the
same meanings or
implications .¶ ¶ Yet what other word describes people who have been beaten mercilessly, shut indoors, made
to work without pay, sexually abused, poorly fed and threatened with more abuse against themselves and their family if they attempt
to leave? This is not just violence or exploitation. What describes the situation in which a mother has no right over her child, or a father is
forced to put down his own life – and those of his family – as collateral, working for nothing to try to repay a debt that will never go away?
These are the forms of slavery that exist today.¶ ¶ Millions of people live in some form of enslavement . The
exact numbers are impossible to calculate. Modern slavery is one of the most powerful criminal industries (pdf), and it is because of our
collective silence and refusal to acknowledge its existence that it thrives and transforms itself into new forms year after
year. By not speaking out, we are helping to perpetuate an industry that strips millions of their humanity and rights.¶ ¶ Slavery did not end
when it was legally abolished. Instead, it is flourishing, extending its tentacles into every corner of the planet.¶ ¶ This is something that touches
all our lives. It is almost impossible not to be complicit. How many of us ask ourselves who makes biofuels, jewellery, vegetables, fruit, clothes,
shoes and even carpets? We all enjoy the cheap fruits of enslavement, while telling ourselves that exploitation happens "over there" and is
nothing to do with our own country or community.¶ ¶ Sex trafficking is finally starting to receive visibility as the horrendous human rights
abuse it is. Yet more widespread forms of slavery and trafficking continue to go unreported and ignored.¶ ¶ I have spent the past five years
talking to people in forced labour, domestic servitude, bonded labour, servile marriages and child slavery. These forms of slavery remain
invisible , since people are silenced by discrimination, fear of retaliation and lack of awareness. These modern forms of human slavery and
criminal acts are often excused as tradition, culture, religion or poverty, or dismissed as nothing more than bad labour practices.¶ ¶ The
slavery industry relies on the invisibility of those it preys on . Those trapped are not visibly shackled, but they do live their
lives under the control of others.¶ ¶ For the world to tackle slavery effectively,
we need to recognise this industry in people in
all of its manifestations . Human rights are equal and inalienable. I have met organisations working on ending forced marriage, or on
the abuse and exploitation of domestic workers and children, who feel they are unable to call these abuses slavery as the word is too loaded
and they would put their work at risk. This must stop. Slavery is slavery, no matter what form it takes.¶ ¶ We must face up to all forms of slavery
or
inadvertently ignore the plight of millions . One type of slavery, such as sex trafficking, cannot be considered more worth
fighting for than another. We have a collective responsibility to end this pernicious and persistent problem.¶ ¶ All countries must ensure that
they have
national legislation prohibiting and criminalising all forms of slavery, and this legislation must be properly enforced. The
failure of justice systems to put anti-slavery laws into action is one of the props the slavery industry relies upon. This needs to change.¶ ¶
To
combat slavery, we need to speak for people who have been silenced by this most brutal of trades . We
must stop being complacent, and find the courage to hold individuals, companies and governments accountable. Complacency is no longer an
option.
The underground market in organ sales leads to organ theft—causes irreversible
physical and emotional trauma as the donors are tortured prior to the sale
Arsenault 11 (Chris- senior online producer with Al Jazeera English. He has held the Wolfson Press Fellowship at Cambridge University,
The Phil Lind Fellowship at the University of British Columbia ,May 17 , “Organ trafficking: 'Her heart was missing'”,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/05/2011515153229450357.html)
The stories are grim and often impossible to confirm: illicit clinics, corrupt doctors and global networks dealing
in human flesh. International organ trafficking is a big business, with an estimated value of $50m in 2008, according to
Michael Bos from the European Platform on Ethical Legal and Psychosocial Aspects of Organ Transplantation. The World Health Organisation
(WHO) estimated in 2007 that organ trafficking accounts for between five and 10 per cent of kidney transplants performed annually across the
globe. Antonio Medina, 23, a paperless Central American migrant moving through Mexico to the US, says he knows
a fellow
traveller who witnessed organ trafficking, after he and his wife were captured by a criminal gang. "He
was travelling with his wife and they [gangsters] took both of them," Medina told Al Jazeera during an interview in
Mexico. "They [gangsters] put them in separate rooms. He heard his wife screaming. After he went in and
saw her on a table with her chest wide open and without her heart or kidney." Medina's friend said he was
saved from the grisly house-turned-clinic by Mexican soldiers. The claims, like many aspects of the organ trafficking business, are impossible to
independently verify. The profit motive "I have no doubt organs are being removed from bodies," says David Shirk, a
professor of political science and director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego who has investigated trafficking. "But for
the most part, organ trafficking occurs in hospitals, where there are corrupt medical practitioners." "Maybe
people are cutting
organs out as a form of torture - a great way to torture someone would be to tie them to a chair and pull their guts out in front of
their eyes - but it is not credible to me that bodies are being used for transplants, as the procedure requires very sanitary conditions and careful
donor matching," he told Al Jazeera. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines organ trafficking as commercial transplantation, where
there is profit, or transplantations occurring outside of national medical systems. Direct organ theft, including the case Medina described,
represents only a small portion of global trafficking. "There
are criminal underground organisations providing kidney
transplantations," says Luc Noel, coordinator of essential health technologies at the WHO. "But most cases involve the poor, the
destitute and the vulnerable that are willing to part with an organ for money." "The common denominator [with theft and "consensual" sales]
is profiteering," he told Al Jazeera. Poor people can reportedly earn between $3,000 to $15,000 for selling their organs, specifically kidneys, to
middlemen who re-sell them to wealthy buyers for as much as $200,000 In a 2009 report on organ trafficking, the Council of Europe and the
United Nations concluded that there was possibly "a high number of unreported cases", attributing this to the "huge profits and rather low risks
for the perpetrators". Mexico is not considered one of the worst countries for organ trafficking; the grisly practice is thought to be most
prevalent in Israel, India, China, Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil, Nepal, the Philippines, Kosovo, Iran, and former Soviet states in eastern Europe.
"Transplant tourisms flourishes in areas with weak authorities," says Noel from the WHO. "We do not want to see a society where the destitute
become a store of organs for the wealthy and powerful." Online buyers Customers normally come from the US, Western Europe, the Arab Gulf
states, Israel and wealthy enclaves in the developing world. "The patients are also vulnerable and often extremely sick," Noel says. "The
solution is that each community should address its needs in organs. Public authorities need to increase awareness on the benefits of
[volunteering] for transplants." Most people are coerced into selling their organs through a combination of misinformation and poverty, says
Debra Budiani, a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania's Centre for Bioethics. So, how does one go about buying an illicit organ? It's a
bit more complicated than walking to a shady part of town and haggling with a guy carrying wads of kidneys in his trench coat. "The procedure
for American patients is to go online and look for these services," Budiani told Al Jazeera. "This has been the framework for transplant tourism."
China has been particularly sophisticated in using the internet to attract transplant tourists, she says. The nominally communist country has one
of the world's highest execution rates, and dead convicts provide a ready supply of healthy young organs. Once patients arrive in China and the
deal is set up, organisers will often force them to compete for the organs in intense bidding wars, Budiani says. "They will get into a situation in
the hospital where they are waiting to see who will get the first organ from an executed prisoner," and the highest bidder gets first pick, even
though prices are normally negotiated before foreigners arrive in China. "There is a lot of dirty business around these operations," she says.
"And it started with a lot of coordination on the internet." In a posting on a free announcements website in Tuxla Gutierrez, the capital of
economically marginalised Chiapas state in southern Mexico, a user offers to pay $25,000 for an organ and promises to be "absolutely discrete
and serious" with whoever responds to the add. The user leaves an e-mail address and says that the operation will be done in Houston, Texas.
The proposed transaction is illegal, Budiani says. New organising tools In addition to her academic work at the University of Pennsylvania,
Budiani directs the Coalition for Organ-Failure Solutions, a grassroots advocacy group. The coalition is planning a trafficking hotline, to take calls
from victims, so they can be linked to doctors and the appropriate authorities."We are establishing a virtual social network, with mobile phones
as the common denominator," Budiani says. "Even if they are illiterate, they still have access to mobile phones." A prototype of the plan will be
tested in Egypt and India in the coming months. The hotline could also act as a resource for understanding the sources of this kind of crime, she
says, adding that Egypt's recent revolution, and the political instability it has caused, creates a "vulnerable period where human trafficking
could thrive". Back in Mexico, Antonio Medina says his friend whose wife had her organs stolen just wants to forget the whole experience. "We
keep in touch by email, he is back in Honduras." As
seems standard with trafficking victims, they fall back into the
shadows, often irreparably physically and emotionally scarred, isolated and alone. "Migrants are
highly vulnerable to various forms of exploitation," says David Shirk. And that reality extends across the
globe, from refugees of Sudan's internal conflicts facing organ trafficking in Egypt to Moldovans and
Kazakhs who have had their kidneys illicitly removed in Kosovo.
Torture must be rejected
Gross 4 (Oren Gross, Professor, Law, University of Minnesota, MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, June 2004, p. 1492-1493.)
Absolutists - those who believe that an unconditional ban on torture ought to apply without exception regardless of circumstances - often base
their position on deontological grounds. For adherents of the absolutist view of morality, torture
is intrinsically wrong. It
violates the physical and mental integrity of the person subjected to it, negates her autonomy, and
deprives her of human dignity. It reduces her to a mere object, a body from which information is to be extracted; it
coerces her to act in a manner that may be contrary to her most fundamental beliefs, values, and interests, depriving her of any choice and
controlling her voice. Torture
is also wrong because of its depraving and corrupting effects on individual
torturers and society at large . Moreover, torture is an evil that can never be justified or excused. Under no circumstances
should the resort to torture be morally acceptable or legally permissible. It is a reprehensible action whose
wrongfulness may never be assuaged or rectified morally even if the consequences of taking such action in any particular case are deemed to
be, on the whole, good. Indeed, one may argue that the inherent wrongfulness of torture and possible good consequences are
incommensurable, i.e., they cannot be measured by any common currency and therefore cannot be compared, or balanced, one against the
other. The conclusion drawn from such a claim is that "the
wrong of torture can be taken as a trump or side constraint
on welfare maximization in all possible cases."
Xenotransplantation
The shortage of kidneys is driving xenotransplantation research
Cowan et al. 2014 (Peter J. Cowan, PhD, David K.C. Cooper, MD, PhD, and Anthony J.F. d’Apice, MD, 1Immunology Research Centre,
St Vincent’s Hospital, 2Department of Medicine, University of Melbourne, 3Thomas E. Starzl Transplantation Institute, University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center, “KIDNEY XENOTRANSPLANTATION” Kidney Int. Feb 2014; 85(2): 265–275.)
Kidney transplantation, the best treatment for end-stage renal disease, is limited by the shortage of human donors.
Although the donor pool has been expanded by strategies such as paired donation and the use of blood group-incompatible and nonheart-beating donors, it remains unlikely to meet the increasing demand in the foreseeable future. This has
driven a search for alternative sources of donor kidneys. Much recent activity has focused on the generation of
transplantable tissue from autologous stem cells, but the complexity of the kidney makes this a long-term prospect at best (1). In contrast,
xenotransplantation using pigs as donors has been studied for several decades (2, 3), and porcine cellular
xenografts have already
reached the stage of clinical trials (4). The pig is the animal donor of choice for a number of reasons including relatively similar
organ size and physiology, high reproductive capacity, and the potential for genetic modification to prevent rejection and correct molecular
incompatibilities. Preclinical studies indicate that pig kidney xenotransplantation is feasible, with renal xenografts supporting life for several
weeks or months in non-human primate recipients (5-8). However, despite considerable progress in recent years, the
immunological
and pathophysiological barriers have not been completely overcome. The major challenge is to place renal
xenografts on at least an equal footing with allografts i.e. with comparable survival rates under similar levels of immunosuppression. This is
likely to require a combination of ‘humanized’ donors and clinically applicable immunosuppressive protocols. Herein we will review the
mechanisms of porcine renal xenograft rejection and describe recent progress in moving kidney xenotransplantation to the clinic.
Xenotransplantation’s not a viable solution to the shortage but research is proceeding
Fovargue & Ost, 2010 (SARA FOVARGUE AND SUZANNE OST* Law School, Lancaster University. August 17, 2010. “WHEN SHOULD
PRECAUTION PREVAIL? INTERESTS IN (PUBLIC) HEALTH, THE RISK OF HARM AND XENOTRANSPLANTATION” Med Law Rev (2010) 18 (3): 302329.)
As the barriers to xenotransplantation have yet to be pre-clinically addressed, there
is limited evidence that genetically
engineered pigs will be a source of viable organs. It is not known whether such an organ will be able to
support the life of a human, neither is it clear what risks the xeno-recipient and others may be
exposed to. Despite these uncertainties , researchers continue to work towards clinical trials, with
some suggesting these are ‘ imminent’ .55 It is thus essential to consider the more theoretical question of whether to allow trials
which may benefit a few but jeopardise the health of many more and, first, the practical question of how, if permitted, such trials are regulated.
Risk of disease spread can’t be ruled out—it’s the most likely scenario for global
spread of a new epidemic
Fano et al 2000
**MAs and MDs doing a lit review of Xenotransplantation [Alix Fano, M.A., Murry J. Cohen, M.D., Marjorie Cramer, M.D., F.A.C.S., Ray Greek,
M.D., Stephen R. Kaufman, M.D., Executive Summary, Of Pigs, Primates, and Plagues, A Layperson's Guide to the Problems With Animal-toHuman Organ Transplants, http://www.mrmcmed.org/pigs.html]
4. We Should Learn From the Past Responsible
public health authorities would steer clear of
xenotransplantation in the interest of human health, particularly in light of the knowledge that animal viruses can jump the
species barrier and kill humans. HIV - the virus that causes AIDS - may be a simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV) that leapt the
species barrier in central Africa. Health authorities were unable to prevent the worldwide spread of HIV
infection. Similarly, they were unable to prevent Ebola outbreaks in Sudan, Zaire (1976, 1979, 1995) and the US (1989, 1996). Furthermore,
there is evidence that humans have become ill after consuming or being injected with animal materials. There
is a reported link between the smallpox vaccine (derived from animal cells) and AIDS, a recently acknowledged link between human lung, brain
and bone cancer and the SV (simian virus) 40 (found in old batches of the Salk polio vaccine), and the threat of emerging infectious diseases,
including human Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) from the consumption of "mad cows" in Europe, the Netherlands, and the US. 5. Why
Nonhuman Primates Should Not Be Used As Organ "Donors" Baboon
viruses flourish on human tissue cultures, before
are over 20 known, potentially lethal viruses that can be transmitted from nonhuman
primates to humans, including Ebola, Marburg, hepatitis A and B, herpes B, SV40, and SIV. Numerous scientists have
urged US public health agencies to exclude primates as donors for xenotransplantation. 6. Why Pigs Should
Not Be Used As Organ "Donors" Given the acknowledged danger from nonhuman primate viruses, pigs are being considered as the
choice "donor" animals for xenotransplants. However, pig retroviruses have infected human kidney cells in vitro; and
virologists believe that many pig viruses have not been adequately studied. Viruses that are harmless to their
animal hosts, can be deadly when transmitted to humans. For example, Macaque herpes is harmless to
Macaque monkeys, but lethal to humans. The deadly human influenza virus of 1918 that killed more than
20 million people worldwide was a mutation of a swine flu virus that evolved from American pigs and
killing the cultures. There
was spread around the world by US troops. Leptospirosis (which produces liver and kidney damage), and erysipelas (a skin infection), are
among the a pproximately 25 known diseases that can be acquired from pigs, all of which could easily affect immunosuppressed humans.
There may be myriad unknown "pig diseases" still to be discovered. In addition, physiological and anatomical
differences between humans and pigs call into question the rationale for their use. These include differences in life-span, heart rate, blood
pressure, metabolism, immunology, and regulatory hormones. A pig heart put into a human will turn black and stop beating in fifteen minutes.
There is no clinical evidence to suggest that this acute cellular and vascular rejection will ever be overcome, or that organs from genetically
bred pigs are any less likely to be rejected by the human body than those from conventional pigs. Moreover,
the massive doses of
immunosuppressive drugs that would be required for such an operation would likely cause severe
toxicity, and increase the patient's chances of developing cancer. 7. Xenotransplantation Gives Animal Viruses Easy
Access to Humans Transplanting living animal organs into humans circumvents the natural barriers (such as
skin and gastrointestinal tract) that prevent infection, thereby facilitating the transmission of infectious diseases from
animals to humans. 8. No Way To Screen For Unknown Viruses There is no way to screen for unknown viruses . Proceeding
with xenotransplantation could expose patients and non-patients to a host of new animal viruses which
could remain dormant for months or years before being detected. Many viruses, as innocuous as the common cold or as lethal as Ebola, can be
An animal virus residing in a xenograft recipient might become airborne, infecting
scores of people, and causing a potentially deadly viral epidemic of global proportions akin to HIV or worse.
It is highly unlikely that scientists and health care workers would be prepared to cope with such a
scenario. 9. Unanswered Medico-Legal Questions Would the US government be prepared to compensate victims of xenogeneic infections
transmitted via a mere cough or sneeze.
(such as people who may inadvertently contract an infection from a xenograft recipient)? The French government was forced to establish a $2.2
billion fund to compensate victims of AIDS-contaminated blood transfusions administered between 1980 and 1985. Compensation claims in the
US have been filed by Persian Gulf War veterans, victims of secret government-sanctioned radiation and syphilis experiments, Vietnam war
veterans exposed to Agent Orange, and parents of vaccine-damaged children. The government may now also be held liable for failing to protect
citizens fr//om SV40-contaminated polio vaccine. And what about patients who may choose to participate in privately-funded research where
there are no mechanisms of accountability to federal health authorities, and little chance (for patients and non-patients) of receiving
remuneration for injury or death. Can we afford another public health catastrophe? 10. The Myth of the "Germ-Free" Animal Xenotransplant
proponents claim that they will breed "germ-free" animals to diminish the risk of viral transmission.
But in its June 1996 report, the Institute of Medicine acknowledged that "it is not possible to have
completely pathogen-free animals, even those derived by Cesarean section, because some potentially infectious agents
are passed in the genome and others may be passed transplacentally." Some British virologists say that it would be "a
daunting task to eliminate infectious retroviruses from pigs to be used for xenotransplantation, given that [they]
estimate approximately 50 PERV [pig endogenous retroviruses] per pig genome." 11. Weak Regulatory Oversight, and Human
Error and Negligence, Would Facilitate Disease Transmission Proposed regulatory oversight of
xenotransplantation procedures is weak and would likely be highly flawed. Virologist Jonathan Allan has stated that, "in
choosing voluntary guidelines to be enforced at a local level [via local institutional review boards], . . . the FDA/CDC committee has
chosen the least stringent and possibly least successful method of policing these transplant
procedures. Moreover, in all areas of human activity, particularly when money is involved, the potential for fraud, error, and
negligence exists. In the past, such behavior has placed human health at considerable risk. Witness the HIV-contaminated blood scandals
in France, China, Japan, and the US, for example, in which employees and/or medical authorities knowingly allowed HIV-contaminated blood to
be used for transfusions and blood-clotting treatments for hemophiliacs. Given the enormous amount of data, paperwork, and filing
it would be naive (given human nature) to assume that data will be properly
recorded, stored, reviewed, and updated. Regulatory mechanisms often fail to prevent or correct
these errors and/or behaviors, the consequences of which could be disastrous in the face of a xenogeneic infection.
xenotransplant procedures would generate,
Zoonotic diseases from xenotransplantation have a high risk of adaptation and spread
Fovargue & Ost, 2010 (SARA FOVARGUE AND SUZANNE OST* Law School, Lancaster University. August 17, 2010. “WHEN SHOULD
PRECAUTION PREVAIL? INTERESTS IN (PUBLIC) HEALTH, THE RISK OF HARM AND XENOTRANSPLANTATION” Med Law Rev (2010) 18 (3): 302329.)
The immunological and physiological barriers to xenotransplantation focus on the pig or the human xeno-recipient individually, and whilst there
is a risk of transmitting infectious diseases following an allotransplant, these are predominantly limited to the individual organ recipient.18 In
contrast, the
microbiological barriers to xenotransplantation may go further as there is an inherent risk
of transmitting infectious diseases from the pig to the xeno-recipient and, possibly, on to her close
contacts and the wider public. The problem is that ‘when one tests animal-to-human transplants, one is also carrying out another,
unwanted, experiment – testing the remote but real danger that animal viruses might jump to humans and cause man- made pandemics’.19
There are two main types of infectious
diseases which may be transmitted to the xeno- recipient and possibly others –
known and unknown diseases. During the 1990s it was discovered that porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) could
infect human cells in vitro and, under certain circumstances, actively infect human cells, meaning they
can replicate and spread to other cells in the patient. As such, they have been the focus of concern. PERVs are
present in multiple copies in every pig genome, have been linked to cancers of the blood, conditions
involving an impaired immune system, and neurodegenerative disorders.20 Retroviruses are dangerous because although
they may be harmless in the host non-human animal they are potentially lethal once transferred
cross-species. HIV is a retrovirus. PERVs are also capable of recombination with viruses from the host
species, raising fears that such recombination could ‘generate viruses with novel mechanisms of
virulence’ .21 And ‘[e]vidence from naturally occurring retroviral zoonosis and cross-species infections by animal retroviruses, for example,
HIV, provides a basis for reasoned speculation on the risk posed by PERVs. In a worst case scenario xenograftrelated PERV transmission would be the starting point of a new viral disease resulting in a public
health problem’.22 The dangers of PERVs may be difficult to categorise definitively, but experiences with other retroviruses indicate they
are unlikely to be responsible for flu-like symptoms; rather, a higher order of fluid-borne infectious disease affecting the immune system or
blood is anticipated. The consequences of PERVs are also hard to identify but we
can reasonably speculate that, given our
may introduce a lethal infectious disease pandemic. It is unclear
whether PERVs represent a small risk to many or a high risk to a few, but it is clear that ‘ the risk of PERV infection following
experiences with HIV, xenotransplantation
[xenotransplantation] will never be zero .’23 The ability of PERVs to cause disease is not known and the nature, existence and
means for detecting them the subject of research,24 but animal retroviruses have adapted and spread within the
human population and there is ‘mounting evidence that both [Human T cell Lymphotropic Virus] and HIV entered
the human population through multiple interspecies transmission events, from nonhuman primates.’25 There
are precedents for other forms of cross-species disease transmission, often with devastating results, including
swine flu, Ebola, and new variant Creutzfeld-Jacob disease. In their report for the UK’s Department of Health, Muir and
Griffin list 26 RNA viruses and seven DNA viruses which may pose an infection risk to xeno-recipients. The risk of spreading an infectious disease
following a xenotransplant (from the xeno-recipient and then to others) will depend on a number of factors including the identification of the
existence of infectious diseases which are capable of replication and transmission, the nature and length of exposure to the disease, the health
of those involved and the status of their immune system.
Even if the risks of xenotransplantation are uncertain, they are grave enough to err
affirmative
Fovargue & Ost, 2010 (SARA FOVARGUE AND SUZANNE OST* Law School, Lancaster University. August 17, 2010. “WHEN SHOULD
PRECAUTION PREVAIL? INTERESTS IN (PUBLIC) HEALTH, THE RISK OF HARM AND XENOTRANSPLANTATION” Med Law Rev (2010) 18 (3): 302329.)
The concept of risk is central to our analysis given that the consequences of xenotransplantation are events of the future; it is
a
biotechnology that threatens and promises potential future harm as well as possible benefit. There is much critical literature
on risk, the logic of risk and the repercussions of a focus on risk in contemporary society.13 A widespread fear of risk has arguably made it
easier to rely on knowledge of the possible risks a phenomenon poses to justify preventative (legal) action to forestall harm.14 Yet when
it
comes to the question of whether to utilise a biotechnology that may have a significant impact on
individuals and society, risks of harm cannot and should not be ignored. We do not pretend that the
risks posed by xenotransplantation are certain, but the nature of the harm to public health that this
biotechnology could unleash is severe. We argue that it is sometimes legally and ethically necessary for
the state to act to protect the health of the public, and that xenotransplantation is a case in point . Some
have suggested that because of the risk of possible harm, the public should be consulted about using xenotransplantation and/or that the nonhuman animals, the xeno-recipients and, possibly, others should be subject to surveillance and monitoring schemes pre- and postxenotransplant. However, we go further.15 Because
of the limited evidence that xenotransplants will be a viable
solution to the organ shortage problem (benefit), and the extreme risks of harm that accompany this
biotechnology, it should not proceed to clinical trials . Our conclusion is supported by our modification of the
precautionary principle with Mill’s harm principle to aid us in determining how the tension in the different notions of public health can be
addressed.
Extinction
Bach, Ivinson, & Weeramantry 01 a. Lewis Thomas Professor at Harvard Medical School and Director of the
Immunobiology Research Center at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center b. Former Editor of Nature Medicine and former Publisher of the
Nature monthly journals c. Former Vice President and presently Judge Ad Hoc of the International Court of Justice [Prof. Fritz H. Bach+, Dr.
Adrian J. Ivinson++ and H.E. Judge Christopher Weeramantry*, Ethical and Legal Issues in Technology: Xenotransplantation, American Journal of
Law & Medicine]
One potential risks of xenotransplantation is that a
pig virus might infect the human recipient, mutate and spread first
the general population. The genetic coding of pig viruses lie in the DNA of all pig cells,
including the cells of the transplanted organ. While we do not know how many pig viral sequences exist that could be of
concern to us, we do know from laboratory experiments that some pig viruses can infect human cells. Of course this laboratory
to the close contacts of the patient and then to
demonstration of infection is a long way from the natural world, and a simple, isolated, real life infection is in turn a long way from an epidemic.
Nonetheless, the [*286] risk, however remote, that
a pandemic could result as a consequence of pig-to-human organ
exists. The viruses of most concern, referred to as porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV), n8 belong to the same
family of retroviruses that causes AIDS. Investigators have shown that in the test tube, a pig PERV can infect human
cells. PERV's have captured the headlines, probably because it is a relative of HIV and we really have no effective treatment for AIDS.
transplantation
However, one must realize that PERV are not the only infectious particle that could cause trouble. Just over a year ago, 104 pig farmers died
and many more became sick due to a previously unknown pig virus. What is the likelihood that a PERV or other pig viruses would infect a
human recipient, cause disease and be transmitted to others? There
is no way of quantifying that potential risk. What is
PERV did get out into the general population and cause widespread
disease, the consequences could be devastating by any measure. Even if we did recognize that a patient had an
illness caused by a pig virus, there is no guarantee that we could identify the disease before that patient passed the
disease to a close contact or others. Complicating this picture of ignorance is the fact that we have no way of predicting when a
known is that if the worst happened, i.e. the
virus may manifest itself. The expression of the virus could occur after only a few or perhaps thousands of
xenotransplants have been performed. Almost certainly, we would have to perform xenotransplantation on humans to ascertain this
risk. And only if a patient became infected would we be able to begin estimating the risk. 3. Different
Approaches to the Risk. How does one balance the clear clinical value of pig-to-human transplants (once the problems of
rejection are solved) with this potential, unproven risk to all of humanity? It seems almost an unsolvable problem. Therefore,
classical risk-benefit analysis is most difficult in this situation. Those concerned with this problem can be split into two groups. There are those
who are willing to start xenotransplantation to humans once the research warrants it (a judgment that will not have uniform consensus). n9
These individuals propose a cautious approach: an iterative process in which some small number of transplants would be performed and those
patients would be watched for some period [*287] of time before more transplants are done. n10 If there are no signs of an infection by a pig
virus, more procedures could be performed. Over time, this approach would decrease, but not eliminate, the potential risk that an infectious
epidemic would later emerge due to a dormant virus that manifests only after many years of residence in the human host. Others feel that the
potential risks associated with xenotransplantation are too great to undertake the procedure. n11 They
point out that no matter how small the risk, if a viral outbreak does occur, the consequences could be
globally catastrophic. Further, they contend that alternative therapies to transplantation are under development
that may not carry such a risk and that may be available as soon as, or almost so, as xenotransplantation.
Solvency
Lifting prohibition on organ sales solves the current crisis and saves thousands.
Becker and Elias Nobel Prize Winner 14 “Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs, There is a clear remedy for the growing shortage of organ
donors”,By GARY S. BECKER and JULIO J. ELIAS Updated Jan. 18, 2014 4:58 p.m. ET http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176 Bio Mr. Becker is
a Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr. Elias is an economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in
Argentina. In
2012, 95,000 American men, women and children were on the waiting list for new kidneys, the most commonly transplanted organ.
Yet only about 16,500 kidney transplant operations were performed that year. Taking into account the number of people who die while waiting
for a transplant, this implies an average wait of 4.5 years for a kidney transplant in the U.S. The situation is far worse than it was just a decade ago,
when nearly 54,000 people were on the waiting list, with an average wait of 2.9 years. For all the recent attention devoted to the health-care
overhaul, the long and growing waiting times for tens of thousands of individuals who badly need organ transplants hasn't been addressed. Finding a
way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they
hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend
establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at
Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs.
Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants.
Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't
long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they
get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have
died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. The toll on those waiting for kidneys
and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of
dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much
larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live
The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs.
donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in
In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or
Although these exchanges have
grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death
donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an
inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap
between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be
available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use
informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few
countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we
found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects
from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in
the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and
need of transplants.
pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread.
traditions.
Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap . In particular, sufficient payment
to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would
need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during
a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney
donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even
the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of
the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that
organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get
kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think
Since the number of kidneys
available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no
longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due
to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue
matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs
would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit
the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include
payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants
along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work.
only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are
Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be
more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent.
harvested.
Regulated organ markets prevent black market harms
Calandrillo Professor Univ of Washington Law 04
CASH FOR KIDNEYS? UTILIZING INCENTIVES TO END AMERICA’S ORGAN SHORTAGE Steve P. Calandrillo Bio: Associate Professor, Univ. of
Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. Valuable insights on prior drafts and presentations of this paper were provided by Lloyd Cohen, Dave Undis, Chryssa Deliganis,
Lou Wolcher, Joe Knight, Tom Andrews, Clark Lombardi and Sean O’Connor. Thank you also to Eric Peterson, Radhika Moolgavkar, Wendy Condiotty and the Marian Gould Gallagher reference librarians for their excellent research
assistance, as well as to the Washington Legal Foundation for its financial support of this paper https://www.lifesharers.org/articles/calandrillo.pdf Citations used: Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 74 (1995). 181 See Spurr, supra note 134, at 191-92 (noting that black
markets provide no warranties on their products, and that the competitive forces enabled by open markets and legalized organ sales will help to ensure quality). 182 See Banks, supra note 180. Maria Morelli further fears the potential for children to be pulled into the illegal organ trade. See Morelli, supra note 162, at 920. 183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that
regulated markets are superior to the exist- ing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs,
especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing mar- kets might lead to a “race to the bottom” in terms of regulatory standards, as each country
tries to gain more market share. 184 An analogy can be drawn to various assisted suicide regulatory schemes, which almost invaria- bly call for the patient to be making an informed, competent, voluntary and enduring decision. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Corralling Kevorkian: Regulating Physician-Assisted Suicide in America, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 41, 91-98 (1998). 185 For instance,
sellers could be required to attend an organ sale risk education class, during which the various health risks involved could be explained in detail to remedy concerns regarding lack of information. However, even if society could be certain that sellers were given all appropriate information, it could not ensure against the risk of optimism bias in processing it.
if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible
regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today’s black markets lead to a host
of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy’s advantage.180 Stephen Spurr details the
potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality.181 Gloria Banks decries the
Moreover,
exploitation of society’s most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection.182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated
organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness to- day.183 Unlike black markets,
responsible regulation of an
American human organ market could ensure that each individual’s decision was competent, voluntary, fully informed, and enduring.184 Where
imperfect information about health risks leads organ sellers to underestimate the consequences of their decision , we could remedy that concern by requiring and providing
risk disclosure and education prior to allowing sales.185 Furthermore, responsible regulation could prevent sellers from making hasty decisions
by requiring reasonable “cooling-off periods” prior to sale (perhaps two to four weeks) to ensure that their decision is an enduring one.186 Further, strict
liability could be imposed on individuals or procurement agencies who sell defective or diseased organs to prevent them from concealing adverse health information that might
negatively impact recipients.187 Today’s third party organ brokering that exploits the poor would be prohibited, and organ allocation could be made
far more equitable by providing full state subsidies to the poor.188 To prevent the risk that negative externalities would fall on the state when organ sellers’ health later deteriorated,
we could mandate that a portion of sale proceeds be set aside in an insurance fund with the single goal of providing compensation for the future health risks and medical costs created by the
Thus, given the reality of black markets, as well as the legitimate fears regarding legalized organ sales, any viable market in human organs
contain substantial safeguards to minimize exploitation and abuse. By regulating appropriately, we could
alleviate many of the problems faced by sellers on the black market today, and we could compensate for the enhanced future risks that sellers would be taking without
placing the burden on the state. At the same time, thousands of lives that are being lost today would be saved tomorrow.
decision to sell one’s organs.189
must address the arguments raised by critics and
Markets for procurement are the most ethical solution
-
Blood market disproves altruism t/o
Costs not high enough to coerce, egg sales disprove
Need-based allocation
Sobota, 2004 (Margaret R. Sobota B.A. Biology (2002), B.A. Philosophy (2002), University of North Carolina; J.D. Candidate (2005),
Washington University School of Law, Fall 2004, “THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT
TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT” 82 Wash. U. L. Q.
1225, lexis)
The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor,
destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an informed decision. n142 There are several
flaws with this argument. n143 First, the economic coercion
argument is based on the false premise that the prices
donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about
becoming a donor. n144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either OPOs or the state will be paying
the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs. n145
With only moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral
objections to donation, and thus no economic coercion would occur. n146 Additionally, the current market system for
egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. n147 A
majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue
inducement to undergo the medical [*1246] risks involved." n148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ
donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there
would similarly be no economic
coercion of donors. A second argument commonly advanced against proposed markets for organ procurement is that any such market
would reduce altruism and people who would have donated their organs under an altruistic system will no longer want to donate their organs
under a market system because they find a market for human organs despicable. n149 However, there
is no evidence that
altruism and a market system cannot coexist. n150 A comparison to the current blood market in the United States
shows that there is no evidence of reduced altruism in that system, which relies on altruistic donations as
well as paid donations. n151 A final argument commonly advanced against proposed markets for organ procurement is that such
markets would create unequal access to organs depending on the potential recipient's wealth. n152 This concern only applies to
markets for organ allocation, not procurement as advocated here. n153 A market for organ allocation would likely have this
problem; wealthy recipients would be able to bid for their new kidneys, while poor recipients would be left helpless. n154 However, a market
system of [*1247] procurement will
not in any way affect how organs are currently allocated by UNOS.
UNOS allocation solves, avoids distribution discrimination
Monti, 2009 - is currently working as a cardiology fellow at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. Her public health work has
focused on social entrepreneurship to address food deserts in urban centers. She founded the Virtual Supermarket Project in Baltimore to bring
healthy food directly into low income neighborhoods (Jennifer, The Case for Compensating Live Organ Donors,
http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Jennifer%20Monti%20-%20The%20Case%20for%20Compensating%20Live%20Organ%20Donors.pdf)
Direct Payment The only country to have implemented a legal direct payment system for organs from live donors is Iran. Dialysis and Transplant
Patient Association (DATPA)—a free-standing non-profi t organization similar to the National Kidney Foundation in the U.S.—administers the
market for live organ donation. Donors receive $1,200 and one year of health care from the government, along with a payment from the organ
recipient, generally ranging from $2,300 to $4,500. If
the organ recipient does not have funds to offer, a charitable
organization will provide such remuneration to the donor. The combination of charitable and
governmental payments ensures that poor recipients are treated as well as wealthy ones. Financial
exchanges take place above board, in terms that include government payment and rewards, in clean, modern
operating rooms. There is no waiting list for a kidney in Iran.14 The historical development of the live organ donation program— known
as a “white” market—in Iran sheds light on the fi nancial consequences of America’s decision to forgo such a model. End-stage renal disease
(ESRD) was untreatable until the development of widely available dialysis in the 1970s. Public enthusiasm for this scientifi c advance was
extremely high, and Congress extended an invitation to its inventors to demonstrate the product in Washington, D.C. In 1971, National
Association of Public Hospitals Vice President Shep Glazer, affected by kidney failure, testifi ed before Congress while receiving dialysis.15 Not
long after, dialysis became a fully funded Medicare benefi t, regardless of patient age. In 2005, Medicare paid for dialysis for 341,000
Americans. This will increase to 400,000 patients by 2010, and to 525,000 to 700,000 patients by 2020.16 Dialysis treatment for ESRD patients
cost Medicare $21 billion in 2005. This total represents 6.5 percent of the Medicare budget being spent on 0.8 percent of benefi ciaries. In
contrast, dialysis became widely available around the time Iran was emerging from the Iran-Iraq war, and there were insuffi cient resources to
justify use of public funds for such expensive treatment. Patients were initially reimbursed to go abroad and get a transplant, until the live
organ donation system came into existence in 1988. Since then, approximately 1,400 Iranians each year have donated kidneys. Kidneys from
living unrelated donors constitute 80 percent of the supply of kidneys in Iran.17 Unfortunately, many donors from lower socioeconomic strata
believe that selling a kidney will solve their fi nancial problems. While such perceptions are undesirable, the presence of a regulated market has
removed any illegal market from Iran, while extinguishing organ broker price mark-ups or transplants in dirty facilities with marginally skilled
surgeons. Individuals without family or without a family match have better access to life-saving transplants. Economists at the University of
Chicago have estimated a kidney to be worth $15,200. These estimates were compared to the average price agreed upon among 305 sellers in
India in 2005 ($1,177).18 This estimate corroborates very well with the underground kidney market in India. When adjusted for standards of
living, the price paid in India for a kidney equals $17,000. Similar modeling estimates a liver donation to be worth $37,600 to the donor. Current
costs of procuring an organ for transplant in the United States are over $50,000. These estimates demonstrate that the cost of transplants
would effectively go down in a well-supplied market system. Legislative action to legalize direct payment for organ donation would result in
substantial cost savings to a government spending exorbitantly for dialysis treatments. Cost savings occurs if a recipient lives free of dialysis for
more than 1.5 years; 95 percent of organ recipients would fall into this category.19 In
the United States, a direct payment
system for live organ donation could be regulated and managed by the United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS), in a similar manner to the non-profi t organization established in Iran. UNOS currently
manages the waiting list for potential organ recipients. It has over 20 years of experience in managing the
cadaveric donor pool and could easily extend its jurisdiction to include donation by living donors.20 Even if a system of payment
for organ donations were instituted in the United States, UNOS could continue to allocate organs to
recipients on the basis of medical, not social or economic, criteria, in line with NOTA guidelines.
It is actually far more exploitative to not compensate donors – circumvents undue
inducement and value to risk. Legal and regulated activity recalibrates the market.
James Stacey Taylor and Mary Simmerling, 2008 “Donor Compensation without exploitation”, Sally Satal, MD editor When
Altruism isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating Kidney Donors, pg. 57
Yet the fact that potential donors are motivated by financial gain rather than by altruism is not sufficient to show they are acting less than fully
voluntarily, that they autonomy is impaired through pressure applied to their will or that they are being exploited. Indeed, perhaps it
is
exploitative not to compensate donors. As altruistic kidney donor Virginia Postrel has written, “expecting people to
take risks and give up something of value without compensation strikes me as a far worse form of
exploitation than paying them. I don’t expect soldiers or police officers to work for free, and I don’t
think we should base our entire organ donation system on the idea that everyone but the donor
should get paid. Like all price controls, that creates a shortage – in this case, a deadly one. And while
giving up a kidney has risks, it is no more risky and far less emotionally fraught than being a surrogate mother. Furthermore, a
compensation program can circumvent the risk of undue inducement by not catering to the desperate.
Such individuals desire cash and want it immediately. The proposed system would establish a months long period of medical screening and
education. It would also provide in kind rewards, or cash paid out in modest amounts over a long period of time (a strategy which, incidentally
would also ensure that donors return for follow up care). Such a system of compensation would probably not be attractive to people who
might otherwise rush to flawed judgment –and surgery on the promise of a large sum of instant cash. Thus, a
legal system of
compensation with strict donor protections creates conditions in which the decision to relinquish a
kidney can be informed and influenced by an offer rather than distorted by it.
Regulated structure of compensation is the best way to prevent abuse of donors
Taylor and Stimmerling ‘8 (James Stacey Taylor is an assistant professor of philosophy at the College of New Jersey, and Mary
C. Simmerling is the assistant dean for research integrity and an assistant professor of public health at Weill Cornell Medical College, Cornell
University. When Altruism isn’t Enough. “Donor Compensation without Exploitation”. American Enterprise Institute. 2008.)
http://www.aei.org/files/2014/07/14/-when-altruism-isnt-enough_161836373082.pdf
Participants in the organ trade are often desperately poor, living on the edge of financial ruin. As Goyal
demonstrated, they are also often worse off after kidney removal than before, for several reasons. First, the
operation itself can pose obstacles to long term gain. Surgeons in third-world countries commonly use a so-called
retroperitoneal flank approach to remove the kidney—a primitive surgical technique that involves a nine-inch incision running from the top of
the hip to the base of the ribs. The
difference in the rate of healing compared to donors in developed countries
who undergo a minimally invasive laparoscopic procedure is significant. Furthermore, most donors are laborers. It
may be several weeks before a patient with a nephrectomy can return to work. When heavy manual labor is involved, the delay is even longer.
With no money being earned during recuperation, no guarantee that medical complications will
receive attention, and no assurance that jobs will be held for them (conditions which, for example, characterize
Iran’s legal system of donor compensation), it is no surprise that donors rarely enjoy financial benefit.47 This
outcome, sad as it is, has little relevance to the donor compensation model proposed here. First,
compensated U.S. donors would undergo a much less invasive procedure. Second, care of surgical and
medical complications would be ensured. Third, expenses, including lost wages, would be covered.
Altruism alone fails - overall organ supply would increase post plans. Empirics prove
market structure works.
Robert Steinbuch∗ Visiting Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Associate
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law.
J.D. from, and John M. Olin Law & Economics Fellow at, Columbia Law School
2009 ARTICLE
KIDNEYS, CASH, AND KASHRUT: A LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND RELIGIOUS ANALYSIS OF SELLING KIDNEYS Houston Law Review, Vol. 45, p. 1529,
2009
The Concern that a Kidney Market Will Displace Altruistic Donations. Some
fear that once kidneys are priced, altruistic
donors will likely drop out of the market or, instead, become organ sellers themselves.368 ìThere is concern
that a system which allows payment for transplantable organs will deter a voluntary donor who considers a payment system unethical or
unsavory.î369 Critics cite, for instance, that in Kuwait, ìseveral well-matched relatives of potential recipients . . . withdrew their offer of
donation after they learned that their relatives [could] go to India and buy a kidney in the market place.î370 But
allowing a market
for human organs would not require donors to accept compensation for their organs; they could and,
more importantly, would often still donate freely.371 As evidence of this fact, we need only examine the
market to compensate donors of blood products, which has not hindered those who wish to donate
blood voluntarily.372 Nonprofit institutions collect roughly fourteen million units of blood a year.373 Similarly, the market
system for producing eggs has not precluded altruistic incentives for donations.374 It coexists with
altruism and functions more effectively than an altruistic model alone would at satisfying the demand for
eggs.375 No valid empirical evidence demonstrates that any possible drop in altruistic donors would not
be significantly offset by the gain in organs obtained from permitting kidney sales.376 Indeed, there can be little debate that
ìthe greater the payment, the greater the increase in transplantable organs.
Framing
Diseases are a bigger threat than war.
WHO, 00, “Overcoming Antimicrobial Resistance”, WHO Report on Infectious Diseases, A Message From the Director-General of WHO
http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/2000/other_versions/index-rpt2000_text.html
Today - despite
advances in science and technology - infectious disease poses a more deadly threat to
human life than war. This year – at the onset of a new millennium – the international community is beginning to show its intent to turn
back these microbial invaders through massive efforts against diseases of poverty – diseases which must be defeated now,
before they become resistant. When diseases are fought wisely and widely, drug resistance can be controlled and lives saved.
War is obsolete and will not occur – ideology, democracy and total lack of benefits.
Michael Mandelbaum, 2-25-1999, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/
My argument says, tacitly, that while this point of view, which was widely believed 100 years ago, was not true then, there are reasons to think
that it is true now. What is that argument? It is that major war is obsolete. By major war, I mean war waged by the most powerful members of
the international system, using all of their resources over a protracted period of time with revolutionary geopolitical consequences. There have
been four such wars in the modern period: the wars of the French Revolution, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Few though they
have been, their consequences have been monumental. They are, by far, the most influential events in modern history. Modern history which
can, in fact, be seen as a series of aftershocks to these four earthquakes. So if I am right, then what has been the motor of political history for
the last two centuries that has been turned off? This war, I argue, this kind of war, is obsolete; less than impossible, but more than unlikely.
What do I mean by obsolete? If I may quote from the article on which this presentation is based, a copy of which you received when coming in,
“ Major
war is obsolete in a way that styles of dress are obsolete. It is something that is out of fashion
and, while it could be revived, there is no present demand for it. Major war is obsolete in the way that slavery, dueling, or
foot-binding are obsolete. It is a social practice that was once considered normal, useful, even desirable, but that now
seems odious. It is obsolete in the way that the central planning of economic activity is obsolete. It is a practice once regarded as a
plausible, indeed a superior, way of achieving a socially desirable goal, but that changing conditions have made ineffective
at best, counterproductive at worst.” Why is this so? Most simply, the costs have risen and the benefits of major
war have shriveled. The costs of fighting such a war are extremely high because of the advent in the middle of this century of nuclear
weapons, but they would have been high even had mankind never split the atom. As for the benefits, these now seem, at least from the
point of view of the major powers, modest to non-existent. The traditional motives for warfare are in retreat, if not extinct. War is no
longer regarded by anyone, probably not even Saddam Hussein after his unhappy experience, as a paying proposition. And as for the ideas
on behalf of which major wars have been waged in the past, these are in steep decline. Here the collapse of
communism was an important milestone, for that ideology was inherently bellicose. This is not to say that the world has reached the end of
ideology; quite the contrary. But the
ideology that is now in the ascendant, our own, liberalism, tends to be
pacific. Moreover, I would argue that three post-Cold War developments have made major war even less likely than it was after 1945. One of
these is the rise of democracy, for democracies, I believe, tend to be peaceful. Now carried to its most extreme conclusion, this
eventuates in an argument made by some prominent political scientists that democracies never go to war with one another. I wouldn’t go that
far. I don’t believe that this is a law of history, like a law of nature, because I believe there are no such laws of history. But I do believe there is
something in it. I believe there
is a peaceful tendency inherent in democracy.
More evidence – economic interdependence, socio-economic conditions, and nuclear
deterrence - checks on conflict are irreversible.
Chirstopher J. Fettweis, 2006, is assistant professor of political science at Tulane University, where he teaches classes on international
relations, US foreign policy and security, Treasurer of the World Affairs Council, National Security Decision Making Department, US Naval War
College International Studies Review, Ebsco Host
However, one need not be convinced about the potential for ideas to transform international politics to believe that major
war is
extremely unlikely to recur. Mueller, Mandelbaum, Ray, and others may give primary credit for the end of major war to ideational
evolution akin to that which made slavery and dueling obsolete, but others have interpreted the causal chain quite differently. Neoliberal
institutionalists have long argued that complex
economic interdependence can have a pacifying effect upon state
behavior (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) has contended that evolution in socio-economic
organization has altered the shortest, most rational route to state prosperity in ways that make war
unlikely. Finally, many others have argued that credit for great power peace can be given to the existence of nuclear
weapons, which make aggression irrational ( Jervis 1989; Kagan et al. 1999). With so many overlapping and mutually
reinforcing explanations, at times the end of major war may seem to be overdetermined ( Jervis 2002:8–9). For purposes of the present
discussion, successful identification of the exact cause of this fundamental change in state behavior is probably not as important as belief in its
existence. In other words, the outcome is far more important than the mechanism. The importance of Mueller’s argument for the field of IR is
ultimately not dependent upon why major war has become obsolete, only that it has. Almost as significant, all
these proposed
explanations have one important point in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution
is typically unidirectionalFfew would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this century. The complexity of
economic interdependence
is deepening as time goes on and going at a quicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons
cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) no foolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination
of forces that may have brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed
an unprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy and
religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difficult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerable institution of
war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become plausible, perhaps
even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proof would seem to be on those
who maintain that the ‘‘rules of the game’’ of international politics, including the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune
to fundamental evolution and that, due to these immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather
than ask how major
war could have grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could
not.
Nuclear war does not cause extinction
Nyquist 1999 [J.R., WorldNetDaily contributing editor and author of ‘Origins of the Fourth World War,’ May 20, Antipas, “Is Nuclear
War Survivable?” http://www.antipas.org/news/world/nuclear_war.html]
The truth is, many prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear winter hypothesis. Nobel
laureate Freeman Dyson once said of nuclear winter research, “ It’s an absolutely atrocious piece of science,
but I quite despair of setting the public record straight.” Professor Michael McElroy, a Harvard physics professor,
also criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis. McElroy said that nuclear winter researchers “stacked the
deck” in their study, which was titled “Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions”
(Science, December 1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create
enough smoke and dust to blot out the sun, causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to Carl
Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could be grown. Humanity would die of cold and
starvation. In truth, natural disasters have frequently produced smoke and dust far greater than those expected
from a nuclear war. In 1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to 10,000 one-megaton
bombs, a detonation greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of planet earth. The Krakatoa explosion
had negligible weather effects. Even more disastrous, going back many thousands of years, a meteor struck
Quebec with the force of 17.5 million one-megaton bombs, creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter. But the
world did not freeze. Life on earth was not extinguished. Consider the views of Professor George Rathjens of MIT,
a known antinuclear activist, who said, “Nuclear winter is the worst example of misrepresentation of science to
the public in my memory.” Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at Harvard University’s Center for International
Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson
and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs.
Thompson and Schneider stated: “the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter
hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level of probability.” OK, so nuclear winter
isn’t going to happen. What about nuclear fallout? Wouldn’t the radiation from a nuclear war contaminate
the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is: absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we
should not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations.
These are: 1) delayed fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, “Delayed fallout will
not, contrary to popular belief, gradually kill billions of people everywhere in the world.” Of course, delayed
fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid.
“However,” says Pry, “these deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now resulting from ... smoking, or
from automobile accidents.” The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of fallout
created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of
people, depending on the targeting strategy of the attacking country. But short-term fallout rapidly subsides
to safe levels in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People who live outside of the affected areas will be fine.
Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground shelters. In some areas, staying indoors
may even suffice. Contrary to popular misconception, there were no documented deaths from short-term
or delayed fallout at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. These blasts were low airbursts, which produced
minimal fallout effects. Today’s thermonuclear weapons are even “cleaner.” If used in airburst mode,
these weapons would produce few (if any) fallout casualties.
Failure to incorporate methods of dealing with structural violence into our politics is
the failure of politics all together
Winter and Leighton 1999 (Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter: Psychologist that specializes in Social
Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department
at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and ustice and intergroup responses to
transgressions of justice) (Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century. Pg 4-5)
Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often
have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to
be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our
normal perceptual/cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice.
Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those
who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between
those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some
way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it
is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible,
outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in
this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its
effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond
guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such
as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it.
Probability outweighs magnitude--- extended link chains and minimax risk calculus
should be rejected as bad scholarship
Berube 2000 (David Berube, professor of speech comm at University of South Carolina, Debunking Minimax Reasoning: The Limits of
Extended Causal Chains in Contest Debating,” CAD, 53-73, http://www.cedadebate.org/cad/index.php/CAD/article/view/248/232)
The lifeblood of contemporary contest debating may be the extended argument. An¶ extended argument is any
argument requiring two or more distinct causal or¶ correlational steps between initial data and ending
claim. We find k associated with¶ advantages to comparative advantage cases, with counterplan advantages, with¶ disadvantages,
permutation and impact turnarounds, some kritik implications, and even¶ probabilistic topicality arguments In practice, these often are
not only extended arguments¶ they are causal arguments using mini-max reasoning. Mini-max
reasoning is defined as an¶ extended argument in which an infinitesimally probable event of high
consequence is¶ assumed to present a highly consequential risk. Such arguments, also known as low-¶
probability high-consequence arguments, are commonly associated with “risk analysis.”¶ The opening
statement from Schell represents a quintessential mini-max argument. Schell¶ asked his readers to ignore probability
assessment and focus exclusively on the impact of his¶ claim. While Schell gave very specific reasons why probability is less important than¶
impact in resolving this claim, his arguments are not impervious to rebuttal.¶ What
was a knotty piece of evidence in the
1980s kick-started a practice in contest¶ debating which currently is evident in the ubiquitous political capital
disadvantage code-¶ named “Clinton.” Here is an example of the Clinton disadvantage. In theory, plan action¶ causes some tradeoff (real
or imaginary) that either increases or decreases the President’s¶ ability to execute a particular agenda. Debaters have argued the following:
Clinton (soon¶ to be Gore or Bush) needs to focus on foreign affairs. A recent agreement between Barak¶ and Assad needs presidential
stewardship. The affirmative plan shifts presidential focus to¶ Nigeria that trades off with focus on the Middle East. As a result, the deal for the
return of¶ the Golan Heights to Syria fails. Violence and conflict ensues as Hezbollah terrorists launch¶ guerilla attacks into northern Israel from
Lebanon. Israel strikes hack. Hezbollah incursions¶ increase, Chemical terrorism ensues and Israel attacks Hezbollah strongholds in southern¶
Lebanon with tactical nuclear weapons. Iran launches chemical weapons against Tel Aviv.¶ Iraq allies with Iran. The United States is drawn inSuperpower miscalculation results in¶ all-out nuclear war culminating in a nuclear winter and the end of all life on the planet. This¶ low-
probability high-consequence event argument is an extended argument using mini-max¶ reasoning.¶
The appeal of mini-max risk arguments has heightened with the onset of on-tine text¶ retrieval
services and the World Wide Web, both of which allow debaters to search for¶ particular words or
word strings with relative ease. Extended arguments are fabricated by¶ linking evidence in which a
word or word string serves as the common denominator, much¶ in the fashion of the soritics (stacked
syllogism): AcaB, BaC, CaD, therefore ActD. Prior to¶ computerized search engines, a contest debater’s search for segments that could be
woven¶ together into an extended argument was incredibly Lime consuming.¶ The dead ends checked the authenticity of the extended claims
by debunking especially¶ fanciful hypotheses. Text retrieval services may have changed that. While text ettieval¶ services include some refereed
published materials, they also incorporate transcripts and¶ wire releases that are less vigilantly checked for accuracy. The World Wide Web
allows¶ virtually anyone to set up a site and post anything at that site regardless of its veracity.¶
Sophisticated super search engines, such as Savvy SearchC help contest debaters track down¶
particular words and phrases. Searches on text retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis¶ Universes and Congressional Universes locate
words and word strings within n words of¶ each other. Search results are collated and loomed into an extended argument. Often,¶ evidence
collected in this manner is linked together to reach a conclusion of nearly infinite¶ impact, such as the
ever-present specter of global thermonuclear war.¶ Furthermore, too much evidence from online text retrieval
services is unqualified or¶ under-qualified. Since anyone can post a web page and since transcripts and releases are¶ seldom
checked as factual, pseudo-experts abound and are at the core of the most egregious¶ claims in extended arguments using mini-max
reasoning.¶ In nearly every episode of fear mongering . . . people with fancy titles appeared. .¶ . . [F]or some species of scares. . . secondary
scholars arc standard fixtures. . . .¶ Statements of alarm by newscasters and glorification of wannabe experts are two¶ telltales tricks of the
fear mongers trade. . . : the use of poignant anecdotes in place of scientific evidence, the christening of isolated incidents as trends,¶ dep,ctions
of entire categories of people as innately dangerous. . . (Glassner 206,¶ 208)¶ hence, any warrant by authority of this ilk further complicates
probability estimates in¶ extended arguments using mini•max reasoning. Often
the link and internal link story is the¶
machination of the debater making the claim rather than the sources cited in the linkage.¶ The links in
the chain may be claims with different, if not inconsistent, warrants. As a¶ result, contextual
considerations can be mostLy moot.¶ Not Only the information but also the way it is collated is suspect. All these engines
use¶ Boolean connectors (and, or, and not) and Boolean connectors are dubious by nature,¶ Boolean logic
uses terms only to show relationships — of inclusion or exclusion¶ among the terms. It shows whether or not
one drawer fits into another and ignores¶ the question whether there is anything in the drawers. . . . The Boolean search¶ shows the
characteristic way thai we put questions to the world of information.¶ When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use keywords,
buzzwords, and¶ thought bits to scan the vast store of knowledge. Keeping
an abstract, cybernetic¶ distance from the
source of knowledge, we set up tiny funnels. . . . But even if we¶ build our tunnels carefully, we still
remain essentially tunnel dwellers. . . .¶ Thinking itself happens only when we suspend the inner musings of the mind long¶
enough to favor a momentary precision, and even then thinking belongs to musing¶ as a subset of our creative mind. . . . The Boolean reader,
on the contrary, knows¶ in advance where the exits are, the on-ramps, and the well-marked rest stops. . . .¶ The
pathways of thought,
not to mention the logic of thoughts, disappear under a¶ Boolean arrangement of freeways.” (Heim 18,
22-25)¶ Helm worries that the Boolean search may encourage readers to link together nearly empty¶ drawers of information, stifling
imaginative, creative thinking and substituting empty ideas¶ for good reasons. The problems worsen when researchers select word strings
without¶ reading its full context, a nearly universal practice among contest debaters. Using these¶ computerized research services, debaters are
easily able to build extended mini-max¶ arguments ending in Armageddon,¶ Outsiders
to contest debating have remarked
simply that too many policy debate¶ arguments end in all-out nuclear war: consequently, they
categorize the activity as foolish.¶ How many times have educators had contest debaters in a
classroom discussion who strung out an extended mini-max argument to the jeers and guffaws of
their classmates? They¶ cannot all be wrong. Frighteningly enough, most of us agree. We should not ignore Charles¶
Richct’s adage: “The stupid man ¡s not the one who does not understand something — but¶ the man who understands it well enough yet acts
as if he didn’t” (Tabori 6).¶ Regrettably. mini-max
arguments are not the exclusive domain of contest debating.¶
“Policies driven by the consideration of low risk probabilities will, on the whole, lead to low¶
investment strategies to prevent a hazard from being realized or to mitigate the hazard’s¶
consequences. By comparison, policies driven by the consideration of high consequences,¶ despite
low probabilities, will lead to high levels of public investment” (Nehnevajsa 521).¶ Regardless of their persuasiveness,
Bashor and others have discovered that mini-max claims¶ are not useful in resolving complex issues. For example, in his assessment of low-¶
probability, potentially high-consequence events such as terrorist use of weapons of mass¶ destruction, Bashor found simple estimates of
potential losses added little to contingency¶ planning. While
adding little to policy analysis, extended arguments using
mini-max¶ reasoning remain powerful determinants of resource allocation. As such, they need to he¶
debunked.¶ Experts agree. For example, Slovic advocates a better understanding of all risk analysis¶ since it drives much of our
public policy. “Whoever controls the definition of risk controls¶ the rational solution to the problem at
hand. ¡f risk is defined one way, then one option will¶ rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the
safest or the best. If it is defined another¶ way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics or
other contextual factors, one will¶ likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is
thus an exercise in¶ power” (699). When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi, as is the
case¶ in mini-max risk arguments, it is a political act, and all political acts need to be scrutinized¶ with a critical
lens.
Conjunctive fallacy--- Specificity makes their disads less likely
Yudkowsky 2006 (Eliezer Yudkowsky, Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks”
Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan CirkovicDraft of August 31, 2006. Eliezer Yudkowsky(yudkowsky@singinst.org)
The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International
Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA
and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA
and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman
1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups
of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were
willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were
willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism
insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and
$7.44 respectively. According
to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the
story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are
necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can
make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare
by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid
and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to
extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert
Bruce Schneier
observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was
guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking
away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.)
2AC
Xenotransplantation
Die-off not true-increased mortality causes increased transmissability
Gross et al. 5, “The Effect of Treatment on Pathogen Virulence”, Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 233 Issue 1 March 2005,
Science Direct, Travis C. Porco San Francisco Department of Public Health, James O. Lloyd-Smith, Biophyisics Graduate Group, University of
California Berkeley, and Kimber L. Gross Department of Integrative Biology, University of California Berkeley,
The evolutionary fitness of a pathogen is quantified by its basic reproduction number (R0), which is the average number of secondary cases
generated by an initial infection in a susceptible population (Anderson and May, 1991 and MacDonald, 1952). In the absence of within-host
competition among pathogen strains (Nowak and May, 1994), the optimal virulence is determined by maximizing R0 subject to trade-offs
between epidemiological parameters that are affected by pathogen virulence (May and Anderson, 1983 and Chapin, 1926).
However, the
trade-off between disease-induced mortality (often taken as the definition of virulence) and pathogen
transmissibility (assumed to increase with virulence) has been criticized as too simple (Ebert and Bull, 2003a). Recent work
on virulence evolution has explored the importance of host population structure (Read and Keeling, 2003, Boots et al.,
2004 and Thrall and Burdon, 2003) and
2003 and Ganusov and Antia, 2003).
more complex interactions between epidemiological parameters (Andre et al.,
Politics
Republican midterm victory makes sanctions against Iran even more likely
Arash Karami November 6, 2014Some in Iran worry Republican victory could derail talks
Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/iran-worries-republican-victory-derail-talks.html##ixzz3IPytNMwO
In the midterm elections Nov. 4, Republicans took back control of the Senate from the Democrats, giving them full
control of Congress with just two years left in office for President Barack Obama. Summary⎙ Print Iranian analysts are speculating what a
Republican victory in the midterm US elections means for a nuclear deal and reducing tensions. Author Arash KaramiPosted November 6, 2014
The victory has sparked a great deal of speculation inside Iran. Analysts in the media have questioned what impact the
change will have on Obama’s ability to sell Congress on a potential Iranian nuclear deal by the Nov. 24 deadline, one that would remove
unilateral US sanctions on Iran and ultimately decrease tensions between the two countries. Reformist Shargh Daily, which has routinely given
both President Hassan Rouhani and Obama positive coverage of their efforts to resolve the nuclear issue, reminded readers that during
Republican George W. Bush’s presidency, “The threat of war reached the corners of Tehran” and that most well known Republican Senators
have “anti-Iran positions.” While the article acknowledged that Obama has the authority to waive sanctions for a period of 120 days without
Congressional approval, this power is not enough, as Iran is “after a complete deal.” Outspoken University of Tehran professor Sadegh
Zibakalam, who is politically aligned with moderates, told Khabar Online, “Republicans do not
believe in decreasing conflict
and creating friendly relations with Iran.” He said the Republican victory is “not to our benefit," as "Within the Republicans,
there are more who are opposed to Iran, and they think the way our own conservatives do.” Zibakalam added, “The victory of the
Republicans makes the work of Rouhani, Reformists and people like Hashemi Rafsanjani, who want to
decrease tensions with the United States, more difficult.” He added, however, that the chance of a deal is still “very
high” and that once one is made, it will give US officials the opportunity to ask themselves if there are other issues on which there could be an
agreement with Iran. Fars News Agency interviewed analyst
for US affairs Fouad Izadi, who said that he believes the
chances of new sanctions being passed is much higher now, given the Republican victory . He criticized
domestic analysts and officials who have focused entirely on Obama while “The problem is in the Senate.”
XO Solves
Peter Sullivan October 20, 2014, 08:16 am The Hill Report: White House to bypass Congress on Iran nuclear deal
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/221231-report-white-house-to-bypass-congress-on-iran-deal
The Obama administration will seek to avoid a vote in Congress on any nuclear deal with Iran, according to The New York Times. “We wouldn’t
seek congressional legislation in any comprehensive agreement for years,” one senior U.S. official told the Times. The U.S. and five world
powers are negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program ahead of a Nov. 24 deadline. Any deal would likely include Iran cutting back its
nuclear program in exchange for a loosening of U.S. sanctions. The Times reports that the Treasury Department has conducted a study
concluding that President Obama can suspend the vast majority of sanctions without congressional approval.
Obama doesn’t push the aff
Hans Bader • January 19, 2012, Obama Administration to People Needing Bone Marrow Transplants: Drop Dead, Competitive Enterprise
Institute, http://cei.org/blog/obama-administration-people-needing-bone-marrow-transplants-drop-dead
Now, the Obama administration is
asking the appeals court to vacate its ruling allowing donors to be
compensated, and to rehear the case en banc. It argues that whatever the text of the NOTA statute may say, its
reach should be judicially extended beyond organs to peripheral blood stem cells, in order to guard against the
evil of "market forces”: The Obama administration has asked a federal appeals court to reconsider its decision last month to allow
compensation to people donating bone marrow cells harvested from their bloodstreams. In a petition for rehearing by the full U.S. 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, Atty. Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr. argued that the court ignored the intent of Congress to shield all organ sales from "market forces"
when a three-judge panel ruled unanimously on Dec. 1 that marrow cells collected from blood aren't covered by the 1984 National Organ
Transplant Act. But there is no legal prohibition against "market forces" as applied to human cells, however much the
Obama
administration may hate "market forces." Everyone acknowledges that it is perfectly legal to pay for human blood, semen, and
ova donations, which NOTA does not treat as organs. The Institute for Justice cogently argued that peripheral blood stem cells are more
analogous to donating blood than bone marrow. And the Ninth Circuit agreed. For purposes of the Act, the appeals court concluded, peripheral
blood stem cells should be considered blood parts, not organ parts. It "said bone marrow cells filtered from the donor's bloodstream were
blood parts, which can be sold legally, not organ parts covered by the 1984 ban. That law was enacted when bone marrow donation involved a
surgical extraction through needles inserted into the spongy marrow in hip bones -- a painful procedure legislators feared would be
disproportionately endured by the poor if financial inducement were allowed." In short, the
Obama administration's position
goes beyond the text and the policy rationale for NOTA's ban on organ donations.
Political capital’s irrelevant and winners win
Hirsch 2-7-13. Michael Hirsh “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital.” chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to
2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington
bureau. [http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207]
The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive
election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney
wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful
concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a
concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly
defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind
of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason,
political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of
political power, and it
discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it
suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that
a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has
practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present.
unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives
him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he
will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any
And
concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the
immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how
political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of
political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as
Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still
deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many
Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and
political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in
the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but
run successful presidencies say that
there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far
more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next
issue; there is never any known
amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he
gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s
going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”
First striking the nuclear facilities in Iran would eliminate the threat- Arab states and
Israel want it and the US has enough oil to survive any Middle East shortagesempirically proven by Israel’s strikes on Iraq and Syria
Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option Time to Attack Iran
Foreign Affairs- Published by the Council On Foreign Relations January February 2012
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran
The fact that the United States can likely set back or destroy Iran’s nuclear program does not necessarily mean that
it should. Such an attack could have potentially devastating consequences -- for international security, the
global economy, and Iranian domestic politics -- all of which need to be accounted for. To begin with, critics note, U.S. military action could easily spark a full-blown war.
Iran might retaliate against U.S. troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe. It could activate its proxies abroad, stirring sectarian tensions in Iraq, disrupting
the Arab Spring, and ordering terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States. This
could draw Israel or other states into the fighting
and compel the United States to escalate
the conflict in response. Powerful allies of Iran, including China and Russia, may attempt to economically and diplomatically isolate the United States. In the midst of such spiraling violence, neither side may see a clear path out of the battle, resulting in a long-lasting, devastating war,
whose impact may critically damage the United States’ standing in the Muslim world. Those wary of a U.S. strike also point out that Iran could retaliate by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow access point to the Persian Gulf through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s
oil supply travels. And even if Iran did not threaten the strait, speculators, fearing possible supply disruptions, would bid up the price of oil, possibly triggering a wider economic crisis at an already fragile moment.
None of these outcomes
is predetermined, however; indeed, the United States could do much to mitigate them . Tehran would
certainly feel like it needed to respond to a U.S. attack, in order to reestablish deterrence and save face domestically. But it would also likely
seek to calibrate its actions to avoid starting a conflict that could lead to the destruction of its military or
the regime itself. In all likelihood, the Iranian leadership would resort to its worst forms of retaliation, such
as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe, only if it felt that its very
existence was threatened. A targeted U.S. operation need not threaten Tehran in such a fundamental way. To make sure it
doesn’t and to reassure the Iranian regime, the United States could first make clear that it is interested only in
destroying Iran’s nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government. It could then identify certain
forms of retaliation to which it would respond with devastating military action, such as attempting to close the
Strait of Hormuz, conducting massive and sustained attacks on Gulf states and U.S. troops or ships, or launching terrorist attacks in the United
States itself. Washington
would then need to clearly articulate these “redlines” to Tehran during and after
the attack to ensure that the message was not lost in battle. And it would need to accept the fact that
it would have to absorb Iranian responses that fell short of these redlines without escalating the conflict. This might
include accepting token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships in the region -- several salvos over the course of a few days that soon taper
off -- or the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels. To avoid the kind of casualties that could compel the White House to escalate the
struggle, the United States would need to evacuate nonessential personnel from U.S. bases within range of Iranian
missiles and ensure that its troops were safely in bunkers before Iran launched its response. Washington might also need to allow for steppedup support to Iran’s proxies in Afghanistan and Iraq and missile and terrorist attacks against Israel.
In doing so, it could induce Iran
to follow the path of Iraq and Syria, both of which refrained from starting a war after Israel struck
their nuclear reactors in 1981 and 2007, respectively. Even if Tehran did cross Washington’s redlines, the
United States could still manage the confrontation. At the outset of any such violation, it could target the Iranian weapons
that it finds most threatening to prevent Tehran from deploying them. To de-escalate the situation quickly and prevent a wider regional war,
the United States could also secure the agreement of its allies to avoid responding to an Iranian
attack. This would keep other armies, particularly the Israel Defense Forces, out of the fray. Israel should prove willing to accept such an
arrangement in exchange for a U.S. promise to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. Indeed, it struck a similar agreement with the United States
during the Gulf War, when it refrained from responding to the launching of Scud missiles by Saddam Hussein. Finally, the
U.S.
government could blunt the economic consequences of a strike. For example, it could offset any
disruption of oil supplies by opening its Strategic Petroleum Reserve and quietly encouraging some
Gulf states to increase their production in the run-up to the attack. Given that many oil-producing nations in the
region, especially Saudi Arabia, have urged the United States to attack Iran, they would likely cooperate. Washington could also reduce the
political fallout of military action by building global support for it in advance. Many countries may still criticize the United States for using force,
but some -- the Arab
states in particular -- would privately thank Washington for eliminating the Iranian threat. By building
such a consensus in the lead-up to an attack and taking the outlined steps to mitigate it once it began, the United States could avoid
an international crisis and limit the scope of the conflict.
Property Rights DA
Non-Unique: Gene patents happening now
Crichton, 7 Michael, “Patenting Life,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fC%2fCrichton%2c
%20Michael&oref=slogin, Vitz
. Gene patents are now
used to halt research, prevent medical testing and keep vital information from you and
your doctor. Gene patents slow the pace of medical advance on deadly diseases. And they
raise costs exorbitantly: a test for breast cancer that could be done for $1,000 now costs $3,000. Why? Because the holder of the gene patent can charge whatever [they] wants, and does. Couldn’t
YOU, or someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never have been granted in the first place. Sound far-fetched? Unfortunately, it’s only too real
somebody make a cheaper test? Sure, but the patent holder blocks any competitor’s test. He owns the gene. Nobody else can test for it. In fact, you can’t even donate your own breast cancer gene to another scientist without
permission.
The gene may exist in your body, but it’s now private property. This bizarre situation has come to pass because of a
mistake by an underfinanced and understaffed government agency. The United States Patent Office misinterpreted previous Supreme Court rulings and some years ago began — to the surprise of everyone, including scientists
decoding the genome — to issue patents on genes. Humans share mostly the same genes. The same genes are found in other animals as well. Our genetic makeup represents the common heritage of all life on earth. You can’t patent
snow, eagles or gravity, and you shouldn’t be able to patent genes, either. Yet by now one-fifth of the genes in your body are privately owned. The results have been disastrous. Ordinarily, we imagine patents promote innovation, but
that’s because most patents are granted for human inventions. Genes aren’t human inventions, they are features of the natural world. As a result these patents can be used to block innovation, and hurt patient care. For example,
Canavan disease is an inherited disorder that affects children starting at 3 months; they cannot crawl or walk, they suffer seizures and eventually become paralyzed and die by adolescence. Formerly there was no test to tell parents if
they were at risk. Families enduring the heartbreak of caring for these children engaged a researcher to identify the gene and produce a test. Canavan families around the world donated tissue and money to help this cause. When the
gene was identified in 1993, the families got the commitment of a New York hospital to offer a free test to anyone who wanted it. But the researcher’s employer, Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, patented the gene and
refused to allow any health care provider to offer the test without paying a royalty. The parents did not believe genes should be patented and so did not put their names on the patent. Consequently, they had no control over the
outcome. In addition, a gene’s owner can in some instances also own the mutations of that gene, and these mutations can be markers for disease. Countries that don’t have gene patents actually offer better gene testing than we do,
because when multiple labs are allowed to do testing, more mutations are discovered, leading to higher-quality tests. Apologists for gene patents argue that the issue is a tempest in a teapot, that patent licenses are readily available at
minimal cost. That’s simply untrue. The owner of the genome for Hepatitis C is paid millions by researchers to study this disease. Not surprisingly, many other researchers choose to study something less expensive. But forget the
costs: why should people or companies own a disease in the first place? They didn’t invent it. Yet today, more than 20 human pathogens are privately owned, including haemophilus influenza and Hepatitis C. And we’ve already
mentioned that tests for the BRCA genes for breast cancer cost $3,000. Oh, one more thing: if you undergo the test, the company that owns the patent on the gene can keep your tissue and do research on it without asking your
permission. Don’t like it? Too bad. The plain truth is that gene patents aren’t benign and never will be. When SARS was spreading across the globe, medical researchers hesitated to study it — because of patent concerns. There is no
clearer indication that gene patents block innovation, inhibit research and put us all at risk. Even your doctor can’t get relevant information. An asthma medication only works in certain patients. Yet its manufacturer has squelched
efforts by others to develop genetic tests that would determine on whom it will and will not work. Such commercial considerations interfere with a great dream. For years we’ve been promised the coming era of personalized medicine
— medicine suited to our particular body makeup. Gene patents destroy that dream.`
Supreme Court Isolated naturally occurring DNA will not be Patented
Drug Discovery Today, US Supreme Court: Isolated DNA cannot be patented June 13, 2013)
(
The US Supreme Court has today dealt a blow to the worldwide biotech industry by declaring that inventions deriving from isolated human
DNA cannot be patented. After months of speculation, it handed down its decision in the Association for Molecular Pathology, et al. v Myriad
Genetics case, which sought to establish if Myriad’s patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which increase susceptibility to breast cancer,
were valid. The Court also ruled that because it is not a naturally occurring product, complementary DNA (cDNA) remains patentable. Although
other researchers have been able to study the genes since Myriad’s patents were filed in 1995, the intellectual property rights held by the Salt Lake City-based molecular diagnostic company have meant that only it can
commercialize the use of the genes , together with genetic testing for the presence of BRCA1 and 2 mutations (also protected by the patents). Other parties would have to obtain a license from Myriad to do so. In
2009, a
federal court suit was filed against Myriad by a group of plaintiffs, including the Association for Molecular Pathology, the American College of Medical Genetics, and the America Civil
Liberties Union, claiming that Myriad’s patents had stifled research and were invalid because they covered naturally-occurring products (human
genes). This decision from the Supreme Court is definitive and follows a series of referrals and appeals between the United States District Court (for the Southern District Court of New York) and the US Court of Appeals.
K
2AC Framework
Role of the ballot is to evaluate effects of the plan- topicality & specificity justify - neg
RTB's self-serving & decontextualize then exclude 9 mins, sandbag excludes 18 - voter
& new answers
Perm do both
Perm do the alt in every other instance
Perm do the plan then the alt—either it’s legit or the alt’s not durable enough to solve
Judges choose reps to best test plan - debate dialectic sufficient filter for knowledge
production and epistemology- prefer specific warrants over vague buzzwords- Value
requires existence
Organ sales foster communal ethics—to argue against the plan is to argue against
right to life of those on the wait-list
Cherry, 2005 (Mark J. Cherry is associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Saint Edward's University in Austin, “Kidney for
Sale By Owner” p. 35-36, Georgetown University Press)
The question that Reddy et al. are faced with is "Do
we buy or let die? Acknowledging that in India money often
covertly changes hands even among related living donors and recipients, they rebut the purported
moral repugnance that appears to be foundational to the supposed "global consensus." Organ selling is not mere
utilitarian spare-parts medicine, they argue; rather, it focuses on basic human values, community
connectedness , and fundamental social goals. It conveys essential moral, social, and medical benefits. To
dismiss the idea of paid donors as the ethics of expediency is to deny these patients the right to live. We
serve only the corrupt and the unscrupulous if we deny the patient benefit of a transplant that is
medically indicated because of our fear that the paid donation process is too complex to be regulated.
Purchasing human organs for transplantation, Reddy, Thiagarajan, and Shunmugasundaram et al. conclude, is in keeping with
ethical values, social goals, and fundamental commitments to quality medical care.
Prior questions will never be fully settled—must take action even under conditions of
uncertainty
Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International
Relations”, 1999, pg. 272
To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist
debates continue, while we are still unsure as to
what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about
the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed
with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but
for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social
sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/ political concerns hang in the
balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered.
Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional
order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken
and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which
practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued
together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit
us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as
pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.
UTIL IS GOOD- means we have to treat the symptoms of all impacts
Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for
the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002,
Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have
taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may
be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It
fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.
Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like
the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral
good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence
and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in
injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a
potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose
certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about
unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of
action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often
the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it
is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the
effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized
ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It
promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
WHAT WOULD IT mea n for the America n left right now to take s eriously the centrality of means in politi cs? First, it would mea n taking ser iously the s pe cific means employ ed by t he S eptember 11 atta ckers --t errorism. T here is a te nde ncy i n some quarter s of the left to as similate the death a nd destruction of Septem ber 11 to m ore or dinary (and still de plora ble) inj usti ces of the worl d system --the starvation of childre n in
Africa, or the re pres sion of pea sants i n Mexico, or t he conti nue d occupati on of the West Bank a nd Gaza by Israel. But t his as similation is only possi ble by ignoring t he s pecific m odalitie s of Septem ber 11. It i s true that i n Mexico, Pal estine, and elsew here, t oo many i nnoce nt pe opl e suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be tr ue that the experie nce of suffering is e qual ly terrible i n each cas e. But neit her the Mexica n nor the Isra eli gover nment ha s ever hij acke d civilia n airlin ers and deli berately flown them i nto cr owded office buil ding s in the middle of cities w here i nnoce nt civilia ns w ork and live, with the i ntenti on of killi ng thousa nds of pe ople . Al-Qae da di d pre cisely thi s. That doe s not make the ot her inj usti ces unimportant. It sim ply makes them different. It makes the S eptember 11 hij acki ngs di stinctiv e, in their defini ng and malevole nt purpose --to kill pe ople a nd to create terr or and havoc. T his was not a n ordinary injusti ce. It wa s an extra ordinary inj ustice . The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluous nes s of huma n life. Thi s premise i s inconsiste nt with civilize d living a nywher e. It threate ns people of every race
. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be
necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong t hat confronts us and the means--perhaps the
dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it.
and cl ass, ev ery ethni city and religion. Beca use it t hreatens everyone, a nd thre atens val ues central t o any dece nt concepti on of a good society, it must be fought . And it must be fought in a w ay comme nsurate with its malev olence. Ordi nary inj ustice ca n be reme died. Terrori sm can only be stoppe d. Second, it would mean fra nkly ack nowle dging somethi ng well un derstood, often too eagerly embra ce d, by the twentiet h ce ntury Marxist left --that it is often politically ne cess ary to empl oy morally troubli ng means i n the name of morally valid e nds
In s uch situati ons there is a dang er that "realism" can become a rational e for the Ma chiav ellian w ors hip of power . But equall y great is the danger of a righteous ness t hat transl ates, in effect, into a refusal to a ct in the fa ce of wro ng. What is one to do? Pr oceed wit h ca ution. Avoi d casti ng oneself as t he incarnati on of pure g oodne ss locked i n a Ma nichean struggle with evil . Be wary of violence. Look for alternative mea ns w hen t hey are availa ble, a nd s upport the devel opme nt of such mea ns when they are not. And never sa crifice democratic free doms a nd ope n de bate. Above all, a sk the har d questi ons a bout the sit uation at ha nd, t he means avail able, and the lik ely effectivene ss of different strategies. M ost striki ng about the campus left's res ponse to Se ptember 11 was its ref usal to a sk thes e questions. Its appeals t o "internati onal la w" were naive . It exaggerated t he likely neg ative
To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider
the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a
sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.
.
conseque nce s of a military respons e, but failed to consider t he consequences of failing to act deci sively against terrorism. I n the best of all imaginable w orlds, it might be pos sible t o defeat al -Qaeda wit hout usi ng force a nd w ithout deali ng with corr upt regimes a nd politi cal force s like the Nort her n Alliance. But in t his w orld it is not possi ble. A nd thi s, alas , is the only w orld that exists
Cap’s inevitable
Barnhizer 2006 (David Barnhizer, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, Articles Editor of the Ohio State Law Journal and then
served as a Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellow in Colorado Springs Legal Services Office, a Ford Urban Law Fellow, and a Clinical
Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Law School, Senior Advisor to the International Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council, a Senior
Fellow for Earth Summit Watch, and General Counsel for the Shrimp Tribunal. He has served as Executive Director of The Year 2000 Committee,
2006 “waking from sustainability’s “impossible dream”” Georgetown environmental law review)
Devotees of sustainability pin their hopes on an awakening by an enlightened populace that will
rise up and insist that business and government behave in ways that reflect the idea that "[a]
sustainable society is one that can persist over generations, one that is far-seeing enough, flexible enough,
and wise enough not to undermine either its physical or its social systems of support."81 This awakening is not
going to happen. There will never be a populist revolution in the way humans value the
environment, social justice, and other matters of moral consequence. We frequently "talk the talk," but
rarely "walk the walk."82 This discrepancy is partly an individual failure, but it is even more a result of the
powerful forces that operate within our culture. Residents of Western cultures are shaped by the system in
which they live. They will never possess either the clarity of agenda or the political will essential to
a coherent and coordinated shift in behavior due to a combination of ignorance, greed, sloth,
and inundation by political and consumerist propaganda. This combination means there will be no
values shift welling up from the people and demanding the transformation of our systems of
production and resource use.
1AR
TT
Less than 1% of cadaverous organs are transplantable
Satel, 2006 (Sally Satel M.D., is a resident scholar at AEI “Organs for Sale,” The American, November/December 2006,
http://www.sallysatelmd.com/html/a-amer01.html)
Despite decades of public education about the virtues of donating organs at death, the level of such gifts has remained disappointingly steady.
Only about one-third of Americans have designated themselves as donors on their driver’s licenses or on state-run donor registries. For the
rest, the decision to donate organs will fall to family members, who about half the time deny the requests of hospitals. More important,
however, is that very
few of the Americans who die, perhaps 13,000 a year (or less than 1 percent of all deaths),
possess organs healthy enough for transplanting—so even if every family consented, the need for
thousands of kidneys would go unmet.
Framing
1AR Yes Counterforce
Counterforce strikes are the most likely scenario—means no extinction, substantive
waste
Mueller 2009 (John Mueller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science @ Ohio State University,
2009, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, p. 8)
To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal
annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs would be required.
Even in such extreme cases, the area actually devastated by the bombs' blast and thermal pulse effects
would be limited: 2,000 I-MT explosions with a destructive radius of 5 miles each would directly demolish less
than 5 percent of the territory of the United States, for example. Obviously, if major population centers
were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such
devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a number of studies were conducted to estimate
the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks. One of the most prominent of these considered several
possibilities. The most likely scenario--one that could be perhaps be considered at least to begin to
approach the rational-was a "counterforce" strike in which well over 1,000 thermonuclear weapons
would be targeted at America's ballistic missile silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in an
effort to destroy the country's strategic ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target
population centers, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates
that from 2 to 20 million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first
month.