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Literature Review Term Paper due on December 3, 2013
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Research Question to which the Literature Review applies (agreed to in conference):
How does the exercise of influence/control by gangs inside of the favelas
(shantytowns) affect local politics in Rio de Janeiro and other large Brazilian cities?
We, the undersigned, certify that this literature review term paper is a project in which we
worked together, contributing in more or less equal shares to the final product. Each of us
reviewed the entire document, from the first page to the last, and we affirm that the work
which we are presenting is truly collaborative.
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1
Gang Influence in the Favelas of Brazil
Shantytown squatter settlements or favelas, as they are called in Brazil, have
become the norm in large urban centers throughout the country. The favelas are
compromised principally of urban poor and are often not-recognized by local
governments despite their frequent proximity to middle and upper class
neighborhoods (Shirley 1990). Within the favelas police forces exercise little direct
influence and almost no control. Consequently, legally sanctioned regional and local
political institutions little influence/control over the favela and the favelados who
live there.
Favealas are often run - socially, economically, and politically - by drug gangs
and their powerful leader, the dono. This paper, through the examination of eight
peer-reviewed articles, will examine how gangs control favelas and impact this
control has on local politics in Brazilian cities. Based on the findings in the eight
articles that we selected special attention will be given to the dono as a patriarchal
client figure, and to how gangs shape civic life in the favelas. This review has two
final sections. The first discusses and analyzes the important holes found within the
eight article research, viewed as a body of knowledge. The second specifies two
researchable propositions that could fill these holes. The table that appears at the
beginning of this review includes the formal bibliographical citation for each article
and summaries of the methodology used in the research, types of data collected and
key terms employed. Finally, the table provides summations of each articles’
principal findings.
2
Table 1: Summary of peer reviewed journal articles
Full Citation
Penglase, R. Ben.
“The Shutdown of
Rio de Janeiro:
The Poetics of
Drug Trafficker
Violence.”
Anthropology
Today , Vol. 21,
No. 5 (Oct., 2005),
pp. 3-6.
Method(s) Used
Qualitative
analysis; There
are not many
numbers used,
but instead
accounts of the
actions of the CV.
These actions
are taken into
account to
explain the gang
environment in
Rio.
Kind of Data
Most of the
accounts come
from residents
of the areas
affected by the
shut down.
There are also
interviews
with officials
and activists in
the
community.
Most of the
interviews
took place in
2000, 2002,
and 2003. Also
some quotes
and
information
was taken
from other
studies from
different
years.
Key Terms
Holiday of Terror: Last
day of September 2002,
the Comando Vermelho
told businesses to shut
down and panic spread
throughout the city
Comando Vermelho: One
of Rio’s most powerful
drug syndicates, they
control many
neighborhoods
Traficos: a word used to
describe the drug
traffickers
Findings
1.The traffickers
have a large
amount of control
over the favelas.
Even extending to
the ability to
affect commerce
and the public
transit system.
2. The traficos
present a two
sided coin to the
population. They
are seen as
“polite” by many
and can lead to
stability in the
neighborhoods.
But they can also
be violent and
present dangers
to the families if
they are crossed,
or if a daughter
catches the eye of
a drug dealer and
turns him down.
3. Favelas give a
large amount of
power to the
traficos because
they view them as
the moral and
legitimate
instillers of
violence. The
urban poor view
the elite who
“officially” run the
city as corrupt.
3
Drug dealers are
the ones who
watch out for the
poor, in the views
of favelas
residents.
Arias, Enrique
Desmond and
Rodrigues,
Corinne Davis.
“The Myth of
Personal
Security: Criminal
Gangs, Dispute
Resolution, and
Identity in Rio de
Janeiro's Favelas”
Latin American
Politics and
Society Vol. 48,
No. 4 (Winter,
2006), pp. 53-81.
Qualitative
Analysis, done
through analysis
of specific
examples of
trafficker and
resident
interaction.
Combination of
different studies
done on the
subject by
different
research.
Most of the
data focuses
on direct
quotes from
studies of the
interactions
between favela
residents and
traffickers and
how these
interactions
have lead to a
myth of
personal
protection in
exchanged for
involvement in
the gangs.
Most of the
data focuses
on five favelas
in Rio.
Personal Security: the
belief that if a resident of
the favela pledges loyalty
and becomes involved in a
gang, then they will be
protected from violence
and justice will be served
if they are wronged.
Marginalized: In the
favelas if one is not well
connected to the
traffickers or if one
participates in certain
behavior then they may
become victims of
violence and lose
property.
Lei do silencio: the law of
silence. Describes the
social norms in the favelas
which put pressure on the
residents to maintain
silence when it comes to
discussion the violent
events of the
neighborhood publically.
1. During the
military
regimes of
the later
part of the
20th century
in Brazil,
favela
dwellers
mostly
stayed
within their
own
families to
prevent
violence
against
them. This
has
changed
into favela
norms
where the
gangs
impose
justice.
2. In the
favelas
there are
two types
of people.
Those who
are
connected
to the
gangs and
drug
dealers and
4
those who
have
become
marginalize
d and
disconnecte
d from the
mainstream
.
Marginaliz
ed
individuals
are often
the targets
of violence
and usually
the only
way for
those not
connected
with crime
to escape
marginaliza
tion is by
joining an
evangelical
Christian
group.
3. The dono
generally
keeps order
in the
favelas and
punishes
those who
upset the
order.
Since the
police of
the
legitimate
government
are often
corrupt and
responsible
5
Perlman, Janice E.
“The
Metamorphosis
of Marginality:
Four Generations
in the Favelas of
Rio de Janeiro.”
Annals of the
American
Academy of
Political and
Social Science
Vol. 606,
Chronicle of a
Myth Foretold:
The Washington
Consensus in
Latin America
(Jul., 2006), pp.
154-177.
Quantitative
mostly, uses
interviews with
participants to
gauge level of
poverty. Uses
population data
to show growth
of favelas.
Second interview
uses the same
sets of data to
gauge upward
mobility. The
data is only for
two set points in
time,
The data in
this journal is
longitudinal
survey data,
life histories,
and
participant
observations.
These came
from three
low-income
neighborhoods
once in 196869 and once
again in 19992003. The data
is on
population,
SES, and
amenities.
SES: Socioeconomic
status, measures income,
education, household
goods and persons per
room.
Fernando Cardoso: A
president of Brazil who
installed many social
programs, such as school
grants and basic food
baskets. These programs
supported favela families
South Zone: A wealthier
area of the favelas that
had increased growth and
larger incomes since the
1968-69 interviews
for
homicides
it falls to
the gangs
to keep
order
against
things like
rape,
robbery,
and
drunkennes
s.
1. Race and
Gender
have little
to do with
the upward
mobility in
the favelas.
There seem
to be a
mixed
assortment
of
“chronicall
y poor”.
This was
against
what many
studies had
thought
2. The
forceful
removal of
some
housing
projects in
the 1970’s
was not as
bad in the
long term
as
originally
thought.
6
Those in
the projects
during the
original
survey had
a higher
likelihood
of having
medium or
high SES.
Arias, Enrique
Desmond. “Faith
in Our Neighbors:
Networks and
Social Order in
Three Brazilian
Favelas.” Latin
American Politics
and Society Vol.
46, No. 1 (Spring,
2004), pp. 1-38.
Mostly
Qualitative, using
some empirical
cases from three
favelas: Vigario
Geral, Tubarao,
and Santa Ana.
The data was
detailed local
analysis.
The kind of
data used was
empirical
cases of the
residents of
the favelas.
The analysis
here is used to
show the
micro level
politics of the
local conflicts.
The data also
comes from
different
studies on the
same topic.
The cases
Networks: both formal
and informal connections
that favela residents form
to express political ideas
and control violence.
NGO: Non-Governmental
Organization. More
structured networks than
those found at the street
level, these groups often
advocate politically for the
favela residents and are
connected nation-wide.
Casa da Paz: an NGO from
Vigario that helps set up
cooperative work within
3. 40% of the
respondents
in the
1968-69
survey had
achieved
some
upward
mobility
and were
renters or
owners of
legitimate
dwellings
by the
1999-2003
interviews.
1. The police
in the
favelas
have
traditionall
y served to
oppose
popular
movements
and have
been at
odds with
the
residents.
The police
and
officials are
often paid
7
come from
stories from
the three
favelas.
the community. When the
police marched on the
favela and incited a
massacre this group
helped to keep it in the
headlines and promote
the welfare of the
residents.
off to stay
away and
not
interfere
with the
trafficking.
2. Nongovernment
al
organizatio
ns often
take the
place of a
local law
enforcemen
t agency to
curve
violence.
Communiti
es with
more
NGOs are
often
associated
with lower
levels of
violence
and
murders.
3. Every
favela has a
different
culture
associated
with it.
This
culture
exists as a
combinatio
n of the
trafficking
in the area
as well as
8
Pinheiro, Paulo
Sérgio.
“Democratic
Governance,
Violence, and the
(Un)Rule of Law.”
Daedalus Vol. 129
No.2, Brazil: The
Burden of the
Past; The Promise
of the Future.
(Spring 2000):
pp. 119-143.
Pinheiro draws
upon
quantitative
statistical
analysis to show
the trend of
increasing
violence in
Brazil.
Quantitative
and
Qualitative
citing of
homicide rates
in Brazil vs.
developed
countries,
death rates of
civilians killed
by the police,
and the
percentage of
the of judges
vs. police
officers in the
criminal
justice system
of the various
Brazilian
states
the types
and levels
of activity
the NGO’s
experience.
The three
favelas in
this article
show the
contrast
between
different
favelas
even within
the same
city.
Death Squad-clandestine 1.Marginilzed
organizations prevalent
groups comprised
during the Authoritarian
of urban or rural
regimes that were used to poor don’t have
suppress political
adequate access
dissidence. They still exist to justice. Strong
in some form well into the racial
Democratic period.
discrimination
still exists
Justiceiro-vigilante, often restricting access
times the police
to justice the
themselves.
most for AfroBrazilian and
Matador-gunman, not
indigenous
mutually exclusive from a populations.
justiceiro.
2.Violence within
CSO-Civil Society
the favelas is seen
Organizations; operates as as a legitimate
censors to hear public
means of solving
opinion.
conflicts between
residents of the
Ouvidoria-ombudsman,
favela, but also
receives and processes
between favela
complaints of police
residents and the
violence to increase
state.
transparency.
3.Brazil’s criminal
justice system is
comprised of an
9
abundance of
police forces, and
a severe lack of
judicial and court
officials. This is
especially the
case in the NE
region and other
poor areas of
Brazil.
Shirley, Robert
W. “Recreating
Communities:
The Formation of
Community In a
Brazilian
Shantytown.”
Urban
Anthropology and
Studies of Cultural
Systems and
World Economic
Development ,
Vol. 19, No. 3
(FALL, 1990), pp.
255-276.
Personal
research within
the Morro favela
of Porto Alegre,
Brazil.
Qualitative
direct
observation
and personal
interviews
with local
community
members and
leaders,
including
Carioca, the
well-respected
leader of the
largest local
gang.
Villas de Invasão:
Squatter settlements.
Often officially “nonrecognized” by
government officials.
Quantitative
collection of
local school
census data.
Codigo de Bandidos-The
Bandit’s Code which
stated that crime
shouldn’t be committed
within the community.
The state of being an
“honest or good” bandit.
Mutirão: Mutual work
group.
Umbanda-Afro-Brazilian
religion that blends
African and Catholic
elements.
Gangues-drug selling
gangs.
1. Drug gangs
exert tremendous
influence within
favela
communities.
They provide a
large number of
wide ranging jobs
(especially for
youth and young
adults) and are
one of the favelas
principle
economic
contributors.
They are
comprised of
home-grown
community
members with
vast kin and
friendship ties
within the overall
favela
community.
2.Gang leaders
10
are known to be
“folkloric” figures
that provide
stability and
charity to the
local community.
3. Outside police
pressure tends to
increase local
community
solidarity. The
police are viewed
in an
overwhelmingly
negative light,
and are
responsible for
much of the
violence in the
community.
Rodrigues,
Corinne Davis.
“Civil Democracy,
Perceived Risk,
and Insecurity in
Brazil: An
Extension of the
Systemic Social
Control Model.”
Annals of the
American
Academy of
Political and
Social Science ,
Vol. 605,
Democracy,
Crime, and Justice
(May, 2006), pp.
242-263.
Logistic
regression
analysis of data
from the 2002
Survey of the
Metropolitan
Area of Belo
Horizonte,
Brazil.
Dependent
Variable-fear of
crime.
Independent
Variables-social
bond, individual
social
demographics,
and
contextualization
of perceived
Kinds of Data:
Survey
contains
quantitative
and qualitative
data
concerning
social control
and perceived
risk, social
bonds on the
private and
parochial
level,
measurements
of types of
local and civic
participation
and confidence
in police and
Perceived risk-To what
extent people perceive the
risk of crime and violence.
1. Due to the
disjunctive
democracy
inherent in Brazil,
Social control-The degree there are high
to which a community is
levels of
organized, bonded, and
perceived risk of
stable.
victimization and
crime, which is
Disjunctive Democracy- felt strongest in
Separation between the
the areas where
successful consolidation
social control is
of political
the lowest (poor
rights/electoral processes areas).
and continued lack of civil
2. The higher the
democracy/democratic
perceived
rule of law.
legitimacy of
police; the lower
Social Organizationsthe perceived risk
strength of social bonds
11
Leeds, Elizabeth.
1996. “Cocaine
and Parallel
Polities in the
Urban Periphery:
Constraints on
Local-Level
Democratization.”
Latin American
Research Review
32, 3: 47-83.
social disorder
democratic
and crime rates
government.
However, for this
author’s
research, only
data from within
the city limits of
Belo Horizonte
was used.
within a
of crime and
community/neighborhood violence was.
Brown Area-area where
law is neither present nor
effective.
3. Community
level social bonds
(private and
parochial) are not
sufficient in
determining
neighborhood
safety.
Qualitative
analysis of
interviews and
personal
observations;
part of a larger
study of the
relationship
between
squatter
settlements,
squatter
residents, and
Brazil. Content
analysis was
applied, but not
explicitly stated.
Structural Violenceconditions that cause or
lead to highly unequal
distribution of basic
resources, that promotes
the characteristics of an
urban lower class.
1. Largely due to
the selective
presence and
absence of the
state in poor
communities, the
distribution and
selling of drugs
from the poor
favela
communities to
the surrounding
middle and upper
class
communities has
created both
economic and
political
relationships
between the
various
communities, the
state, and the
drug gangs.
Research
conducted in
1987-1989,
1991, 1994,
and 1995
involved both
interviews
with local
community
leaders in 25
favelas as well
as government
officials, and
with inmates
in 3 prisons in
Rio de Janeiro.
Lei de seguranca-law of
security; under the
authoritarian regime
political prisoners were
combined with common
criminals and equal
national security threats.
The political prisoners
passed on an ethos of
collectivism based on an
internal system of
authority that resulted in
prison law and justice
enacted by prisoners
against prisoners.
Comando Vermelho-Red
Command, the largest and
most organized of the
prison collectives.
Favelado-resident of a
2. Large cocaine
dealing networks
both within
prisons and in the
favelas were
12
favela.
O Dono-local drug lord, a
person of respect within
the community.
Parallel security-Both
the drug gangs and the
police serve as competing
security forces within the
favelas, with the drug
gangs exerting more
influence and pragmatic
protection against
violence.
developed by the
organizational
abilities and
collectivism ethos
of the prison
organizations
(like Red
Command).
3. The increase of
the cocaine trade
has created a
sharp rise in the
number of
weapons within
the favela to be
used against
police as well as
competing drug
rivals.
4. Lack of
support for the
police by the
favela community
as a whole as
created patronclient
relationships with
the head drug
lord as the chief
client.
Furthermore, the
community as a
whole, due to lack
of helping the
police, harbors an
environment for
the profitable
distribution of
cocaine.
Source of Gang Influence in Brazilian Favelas
13
The favelas of Brazil hold a significant amount of urban residents within their
loosely defined borders. Favelas began (and in many cases continue to be) as
squatter settlements on the fringes of legally recognized communities. Favelados,
the residents of a favela, are therefore often not the legal owners of their land, which
creates civic, social, and political problems between residents and the local, state,
and national governments (Shirley 1990). Furthermore, favela residents, especially
outside the southern cone, often possess Afro-Brazilian or indigenous heritage.
These groups historically have the lowest access to state sponsored justice
institutions, such as local courts (Pinheiro 2000, 130).
Due to this reality, one of the biggest interactions favelados have with the
state is through interaction with the police. However, from the standpoint of the
residents of the favela these interactions with the police are by and far negative
experiences. Furthermore, the police presence is not regular; the police generally
only come into the favelas to conduct violent raids against the various drug gangs
(Leeds 1996; Shirley 1990). For this reason, the favelados don’t see the police as
their benefactors or protectors. In fact, they usually see them as the opposite.
Favelado’s perceptions of the police range from general distrust to outright hostility,
and often times by implication, the institution the police represent, the state, is
treated with hostility as well (Shirley 1990).
Many parts of a favela, if not the entire favela itself, are viewed by the state as
a “brown area”. The brown area denotes a space that the law is neither present nor
effective (Rodrigues 2006, 248). Thus creating an environment prone to criminality
14
and subversive activity. However, this does not mean there is no rule of law within
these areas; law exists but not in a state sponsored form.
Without the police playing the role of public protector and the state largely
outside of people’s daily lives, the favelados turn to other people for protection and
support. Gangs and by implication the leaders of the gangs often fulfill this role
(Leeds 1996). Usually the gang members are born and bred from within the favela
community (Shirley 1990, 265). This means they have vast and far-reaching family
and friendship ties with community members of all ages and occupations. This
simple fact makes it much more likely for the overall community to support gang
members and to shield them from the police during raids or drug busts.
Because favelados often don’t rely on the state to act as a benefactor they
participate in a patron client relationship with the gangs, specifically the head of the
gang, the dono acting as the chief patron (Leeds 1996). The dono is a person of
respect within the community. Depending on the extent of his philanthropic efforts
towards the local community he is often seen as a folkloric figure garnering love and
support from the entire community (Shirley 1990, 265). It serves the dono’s
interest, as well as the gang’s interest, to be viewed positively. This is because the
community will do what they can to aid the gang, or at the very least not help the
police. This harbors an environment that promotes the profitable distribution of
drugs by the gang (Leeds 1996).
The gang’s deep permeation of its favela, especially at the social and
economic levels, makes them very important to the life of the favela. The gangs
understand that a secure and stable environment is more profitable than a violent
15
and tumultuous environment for organized crime (Shirley 1990). For this reason,
the gangs serve as advocates of justice within the favelas. They protect members’
physical safety, especially because there is a severe lack of regular police presence
in the community. Furthermore, the gangs promote the codigo de bandidos. This
bandit’s code states that crime should not be committed within the favela itself, the
gang members will leave the favela to commit crimes in other parts of the city
(Shirley 1990), leaving the local favelados largely unharmed. The favelados are not
opposed to this and their ethos often mirrors this. A survey demonstrated that,
although the typical favela resident sees drug use within the favela as a bad thing,
they don’t see the practice of leaving the favela to sell drugs to middle class
urbanites as wrong or destructive. In fact it is almost seen as a form of justice to
profit from their bourgeoisie neighbors (Shirley 1990, 264).
Still the rise in the drug trade, especially cocaine, has seen a sharp increase in
the amount of weapons within a favela. These weapons are used to fight the police
as well as rival gangs trying to compete for bigger involvement in the drug trade
(Leeds 1996, 55). The increase of guns in favelas naturally leads to an increase in
gun crimes throughout the urban area. Since the gangs still follow the bandits code
they may not necessarily use guns to rob their neighbors, but they can, and do, use
guns to rob or kill people outside their individual favela community. Violence is
currently seen as a legitimate means of conflict resolution, both within the favela
community (rival gangs) and with the police (Pinheiro 2000, 123).
Despite the violence that goes with it, drugs are not necessarily destructive to
individual favelados. In fact, Robert Shirley argues that drug gangs account for the
16
principle economic contributor to the favela (Shirley 1990, 265). Not only do the
drugs bring money from outside the community into the favela, the gangs also
employ a large number of people, especially youth and young adults. They need
couriers, drivers, processers, low-level dealers, lookouts etc. to help run their
business. These peripheral jobs even extend into the gangs domestic life. High level
gang leaders will often hire cooks and caretakers from within the local community.
Also, the gangs are involved with other illegal enterprises outside the sale of drugs,
such as the distribution of stolen goods.
Even though these are not legitimate state accepted businesses they do
create significant profits for the gangs, which allows them to employ many
favelados. Also of note is the fact that many of the gangs pay better than legitimate
legal work, and due to their illegal nature are not subject to taxes either. The fact
that it is then the drug gangs that provide the jobs is very significant in multiple
ways.
First, by employing so many people they are expanding their social patronclient and kinship network. Most people are likely to have a friend or family
member who is involved with the gangs, even if it is only a very minor role (Shirley
1990). Clearly this gives them more social prestige and more influence in the
community. Families have personal relationships with the gangs because of their
personal relationship to individual gang members.
Furthermore, it is immensely important to understand that it is the gangs,
not the state, that is providing jobs and economic security for the favelados. Thus
giving the favela a social and political tie with the various gangs. The gang leader
17
then is seen as a job giver and promoter of social welfare despite his criminal status.
In any society, someone who provides economic support to his or her community
usually is a powerful social and civic figure.
The Dono: Patriarchal Client Figure
Often the Brazilian government faces many challenges when attempting to
impose state control over the favelas. Much of the challenge stems from the
transition between military dictatorships and democracy. The state, now weaker
than before, struggles to impose basic rule and to provide basic services to the
neighborhoods in and around the largest cities. Gangs and other non-governmental
organizations will often emerge to fill the void left by the state (Leeds, 1996). These
shortcomings have led to increased violence and led to the development of an
entirely new power structure within the favelas. Leading this new hierarchy are the
leaders of gangs, donos. Most donos exercise their power remotely, some even
operate from behind bars, but all of them have enormous impacts on the daily lives
of the favela residents. Quintessential to the extra-state power structure of the
neighborhoods of Brazil, these donos must be understood if one wishes to
understand the specific power politics and economies of Brazilian favelas.
Much of the power enjoyed by the donos comes from the inability of the
government to connect with the lower levels of society. Poor and disenfranchised
citizens of large cities, especially Rio de Janeiro, have been systemically
disconnected from the established government and over the past twenty years have
learned to develop their own small-scale power structures. Much of the
18
disconnection stems from neoliberal reforms and the struggles of Brazilian officials
to adjust to democracy (Arias, 2004). Often due to either intense draconian
violence, or to corruption of police and other government officials, the favelas feel
that the legitimacy of the government is unfounded. In these types of scenarios drug
traffickers often establish their own rule of law within communities through which
they maintain order. Starting in the 1980’s these gangs began to employ local
residents to help work the neighborhoods and aid in the narcotics trade. As more
money poured into the favelas, and summarily into the pockets of the drug gang
leaders, more officials and police officers gained “financial incentive” to work with
the traffickers as well. Kickbacks such as these opened the door yet wider for gang
influence to enter the favela towns. Today residents are more likely to aid traffickers
than investigative officers within the neighborhoods (Arias, 2004). With the last
remnants of state control strained to breaking, there remains little to prevent gang
leaders from experiencing unprecedented autonomy in their daily narcotics
trafficking.
The tremendous levels of influence the traffickers experience can be often
underestimated to those outside the favelas. A shocking example that sums up the
vast power of these organizations can be seen in the September 2002 “holiday of
terror”. This “holiday” left vast portions of Rio de Janeiro at a standstill. Shops were
warned for days beforehand to close down for their own wellbeing. With the fear of
retribution from one of the most powerful drug syndicates in the city, many
businesses obeyed.
19
Throughout the city schools were closed and public transportation ground to
a halt; banks, shopping malls, and health clinics closed their doors out of fear of
retribution. The reason behind all of the terror focused around one man;
Fernandinho Beira-Mar. Beira-Mar was a powerful dono who, after a prison riot, had
been transferred to a more secure facility. By shutting down the city a clear message
of the arrant power possessed by the traffickers was given to the officials of Rio.
Indeed the slogans spray-painted on buildings in the city declared “Parallel power”,
a reference to the fact that the gangs held very real power outside the influence of
the state. This served as a chilling reminder to the government officials of their lack
of control in all parts of the city(Penglase, 2005). With the type of violence
traffickers are capable if it’s little wonder why threats are taken seriously. However,
just as there exists a power structure to implement fear and impose the harsh will of
the gangs, there are other aspects of the groups that give the locals peace of mind
and a base of protection they can connect with. It is this aspect of the favela life that
most entrenches the power of the donos. They have capabilities that no other
groups, not even the police, can imagine, the ability to enforce a rule of law.
Pre-existing structures led to the emergence of donos in the favelas.
Patronage and patriarchy have always been part of the culture of South America.
The psychological state of the neighborhoods centers around the feeling that the
order which traffickers provide, and the ‘code’ they follow for neighborhood
conduct enhance the environment of the favelas. In places where police are often
more violent than criminals, residents have to choose from the lesser of two evils
when it comes to order. Even as the gangs enforce the rules, they also have the
20
ability to break them on a whim. One resident described them as snakes, stating that
one must be careful when passing one so as not to get it angry (Penglase, 2005).
Indeed during the “holiday of terror” the officials of Rio saw all too clearly the
venomous effects the gangs strike against society well outside of the favela.
Yet for the most part, a code of rule protects those under the donos wing.
Stemming from a strong feeling that the patriarch must watch over the weaker,
often feminized, members of his family, this system entices loyalty from the locals.
This sense of family protection is rooted in Brazil’s history. Under the military
dictatorships of the last half-century many families reverted into themselves and
shied away from the public sphere in hopes of not attracting any unwanted
attention (Arias and Rodrigues, 2006). However, under the protection of the gangs,
public services such as financial assistance, water service, and transportation began
to enter the daily lives of favela citizens. Fanciful stories of charismatic leaders
often permeate the favela streets and figures such as a man named Anão, the dwarf,
gain almost celebrity status for their financial support and protection given to the
favelas. (Shirley, 1990)
Under the protective wings of their patriarchs many neighborhoods
experience benefits the local government could never give. However the wings are
also known to stifle, and such an environment has brought about a law of silence.
The dono’s influence often silences would be dissenters and leads to a type of
situation where only prominent community leaders can even dare to utter a word
against the patriarch. Yet talk does persist, and this talk helps normalize the
circumstances of favela life. Often talk persists on different societal levels however,
21
those with connections to the dono experience luxuries from their connections,
whereas those with few connections may be pushed out of business or even killed
(Arias and Rodrigues, 2006).
To maintain a semblance of order the gangs often set aside different classes
of citizens, with family men and workers at the top, receiving prestige. Inversely the
drunks and addicts receive scorn from the traffickers. When one of the scorned
needs to be taken care of, it becomes a community event. Often residents will know
of a murder before it happens, another layer of psychological control enjoyed by the
favela leader. Acting as judge, jury, and executioner, the gangs often administer law
with beatings or house arrests. Interfering with the gangs, however, is certain death.
When it comes to smaller infractions however, a more personal touch is applied and
traffickers interact intimately with the families (Arias and Rodrigues, 2006). This
builds bonds and reinforces the idea of a family in the favela under one dono.
Residents of the favelas have a complex relationship with the leaders of the
drug gangs. They are the fathers of the neighborhoods, providing care and goods.
They are tough fathers however, enforcing their laws with absolute authority. In
many cases they are revered, one beloved dono, Carioca, was murdered in prison
after being caught by authorities; the community erupted in fury and flew black
flags in protest (Shirley, 1990). In some they are feared, as seen in the
“holiday of terror” that irrupted following the detention of Beira-Mar. Whether
through fear or love these men have risen to lead the favelas and hold total
authority over them. They provide protection and public goods in places where the
established government cannot, and for that reason they are respected and revered.
22
They may bring crime and violence to places outside of their control, but they
maintain a sense of order in the favelas they maintain.
Growing from the void left by the old military dictatorships and the feeding
off of the easily corruptible officials, these men inherited the marginalized sections
of Brazil’s largest cities, and use their inheritance well. Donos are kings of the
shantytowns, fathers to the residents and leaders of their communities. In a place
outside the control of government, the forgotten children of the city have found
patriarchs to guide and protect; even if that means living in a world run by a
criminal.
The Gangs in Civic Life
The reviewed literature clearly puts the gangs, and the dono, at the forefront
of favela life across all levels. They are the principle contributors to the local
economy, and are important public figures. They represent both justice (albeit often
harsh justice, but justice none the less) and charity to the favelados who live in their
communities. The literature was sparse on explicitly defined political control they
exert, but was rich in its implications.
One of the most striking examples of a gang’s use of interest articulation was
the mass strikes and protests during the “holiday of terror” in Rio de Janeiro. The
gangs were able to literally close down businesses, causing real economic damage,
as well as state and privately run institutions like hospitals and schools. This was a
powerful display of power and influence that the city, state, and national
governments could not ignore or deny.
23
The gang’s real influence, however, is local. The dono rules as an
authoritarian figure exercising his will. This partly goes back to the military
authoritarianism inherent in Brazil when many favelas began to really take shape
and assume significant population numbers. It is also tied into the concept of
disjunctive democracy. In Brazil, even though there has been a successful
consolidation of electoral processes and political rights for the national government,
there is still a continued lack of civil democracy and democratic rule of law for much
of the population (Rodrigues 2006). This is especially true for the marginalized
sections of society, of which favela residents are a part.
However, this doesn’t mean the dono or gangs are not reliant on the support
of the community to remain in power and make the biggest profits. If they rule
without any of the communities needs in mind then the community will not shield
them from police and they will have less influence in hiring local favelados to help
with the various economic efforts of the gang.
Still, the gangs do have access to weapons and money, which are powerful
tools in influencing local communities. Favelas are not necessarily devoid of local
political organizations, neighborhood councils, religious organizations, and other
various institutions (Shirley 1990). The gangs can use their influence to make sure
candidates they support will become members of these different organizations.
They can also use the threat of violence to coerce current council members and
community leaders to do what they want. Since the police have such a minimal
presence in the favelas they don’t have the means to protect these people from the
24
drug lords. Furthermore, the gangs can just pay off the police to turn the other
cheek.
This in tune with their other powerful motivational force the gangs use:
money. The gangs can bribe or buy off community members to make decisions that
will benefit the gang. They also donate money to local organizations and charities,
and even the local schools. If any of these organizations wish to continue to receive
monetary support from the gangs they can’t make decisions or pass policies that will
hurt the gangs or their profits. So even if the dono rules with a benevolent hand, he
is still an extremely influential person with many resources and avenues available to
articulate his interests in the community.
Even when drug lords are caught and imprisoned they are still able to impose
their will on the favela. In fact, one of the reasons the gangs became so organized
was because of the lei de seguranca, which put leftist political prisoners, during the
authoritarian regime, in jail with common criminals including narcotics traffickers.
The better organized, and often better educated, political prisoners taught the drug
gangs how to operate as a collective and cohesive organization capable of exerting
social as well as political influence in their home communities (Leeds 1996).
The end result is that the gangs and their powerful leaders impact local
politics in their hometowns because of their ability to both help and harm favelas.
They keep the police and other state institutions, like tax collectors (Shirley 1990)
out of the favela. Allowing them free reign to exercise their agenda, whether
political, social, or economic on the favelas they are part of.
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Holes in the Research
These articles provide a rich understanding of how gangs exercise their
influence and do a thorough job of describing the social dynamics of the dono within
a favela. However, there were certain areas that the research didn’t acknowledge or
overlooked. These holes were primarily a lack of quantitative data concerning death
rates within the favelas themselves, little research on the impact that the adoption
of democracy has affected the rule of law in Brazilian society as a whole, and lack of
research concerning crack cocaine and other cheap drugs that typically target the
poor in society as opposed to the middle and upper class.
The first hole in the research was that no actual data was present to record
the exact number of deaths in the favelas under different conditions. Many of the
articles focused on interviews or generalizations that, although good for
understanding, did not add to the numerical logic behind favela violence. For
instance, if a different type of police policy were enacted would that lead to fewer
murders? Numerical research would be able to evince this if it was the case. One
reason behind this lack in numbers may be that information is simply not available.
Many of the factors that were actually covered gave the impression that life
in the favelas was rather secretive, often enforcing a law of silence for those living
within. Although rough estimates would be available through police investigation,
there would be little scientific muster to back up the claims. Another possible reason
for this could be that the data showing murders would be either lost or purposefully
misplaced, as often officials are influenced by the gangs to join the residents in
keeping quiet.
26
One way to address this issue of no solid information could be to petition the
officials responsible for the area requesting information. The information could be
manipulated to take into account the levels of control from the different
organizations such as government or gangs. The levels of control would, when taken
against the number of violent crimes, show which side had a greater impact on
improving life in the favelas.
Traditionally research has pointed to more stability coming from the gangs
exercising influence over the neighborhoods, but does this stability translate into
real decreases in violent crimes? Another aspect to look into when addressing the
lack of data on deaths and other violent crimes would be to simply count the
incidents in different areas of the favelas. It can be assumed that while the violence
of each incident may differ, if applied to a large N survey there is little doubt that at
least some patterns would emerge. If these numbers were to be applied to the
research there would be more merit and concrete evidence to support the papers
than currently exists with mere interviews and personal accounts.
That is not to discredit the qualitative analysis; often the single cases can be
indicative of general trends. Trends can then be applied to data to determine which
numbers should be used and which numbers should be discredited. However if such
numbers did exist to compare to the interviews and narratives, the research would
garner more credibility.
A second hole is the fact that the research deals almost exclusively with the
favelas themselves. For this reason it treats the favelas as exclusive islands within
the greater urban society. This is not the case, although favelas possess unique
27
social, political, and economic realities the favela is indeed part of a larger urban
community, and the favelados interact with the greater urban community on a daily
basis.
The articles deal with the problems of disjunctive democracy and its effects
on the favelas, but not on its effects on the middle or upper class communities. Are
they subject to the same lack of democratic rule of law? A first inclination would
probably guess that the richer areas probably possess greater democratic rule of
law, but without quality research to back this up it remains a mere guess.
However, it makes sense that these articles don’t address this issue because
it would require significantly more time and money to conduct research describing
the democratic relationships between all the various communities inside a
particular Brazilian urban area. This research would be very important to
understanding just how marginalized favela communities are, and to what extent
drug lords would be able to exert their control outside their individual favela.
The final hole in the research is the lack of information regarding crack
cocaine. Although the Leeds article deals significantly with cocaine in its pure form
(Leeds 1996) it, nor the other articles talk about crack. Crack cocaine is a very
different drug from normal cocaine because it is very cheap and very addictive. One
of the principle findings in the research was the fact that the drug lords would sell
drugs to middle class and upper class Brazilians outside of the favela, and local drug
use was condemned.
However, crack cocaine tends to be used by urban poor, the precise people
who inhabit favelas. Do the drug gangs allow the use of crack cocaine in the favela?
28
Do they sell it within their own community? It seems that crack cocaine presents an
entirely different social problem for the favela community and the drug gangs. It
seems that the use of crack would be detrimental to the security and well being of a
particular favela, but due to its highly addictive nature would be difficult to keep
out.
The prevalence of crack cocaine use would be relatively easy to analyze using
statistics gathered from within various favelas. Also one could analyze police
records to see whether an increase in crack cocaine arrests/seizures correlates with
an increase or decrease with local’s perception of gang’s legitimacy. However, this
is assuming that people were honest when dealing with the interviewers and did not
fake or refuse answers out of fear for their well being.
Hypotheses to be investigated in future research
Certain research measurements can be identified to fill the two of the holes
in the research. The first hypothesis would deal with crack cocaine use in the favela,
and the second would deal with homicide rates in the favelas.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the number of crack cocaine users in a favela the
higher the perceived risk of crime and violence will be to local residents.
The dependent variable for this hypothesis would be crack use, broken down
into a five point scale: 1-never use crack cocaine, 2-have used crack cocaine but
haven’t in the past six months, 3-use crack cocaine on a monthly basis, 4-use crack
cocaine on a weekly basis, 5-use crack cocaine on a daily basis. Both 1-2 would be
grouped as non-crack users, 3 broken down as possible but not confirmed regular
29
user, and 4 and 5 would be grouped heavy users. This means in a binary model both
1-3 would be labeled as 0 to indicate lack of crack cocaine use and 4 and 5 would be
labeled as 1 to indicate heavy crack cocaine use/addiction.
The independent variables would address the perceived risk of crime and
violence. The first variable would measure perceived risk of robbery again based on
a five-point scale: 1-very great, 2-great, 3-medium, 4-little, 5-very little. These
measurements of perceived risk would again be broken down into a binary model
where 1-2 would be labeled as a 1 to indicate great risk, and 3-5 labeled as a 0 to
indicate little risk. The other independent variables would be perceived risk of
assault, and perceived risk of murder. Both these variables would be broken down
in the same five-point scale and then again broken down into a binary model in the
exact same way as the first independent variable, perceived risk of robbery.
The comparison of crack use in a given neighborhood against the perceived
risk of crime and violence would indicate cracks influence on societal perceptions of
control and safety.
Hypothesis 2-The greater the number of homicides in a favela then the
lower the community support of the drug gangs would be.
The dependent variable is straightforward and would simply be the
homicides numbers in a particular favela garnered from police reports.
The independent variables would analyze community support of drug gangs
through a similar model as the independent variables in hypothesis 1. The
questions would measure support for a particular dono, support for a gang itself,
and support for the police. The five-point scale would be 1-very great support, 230
great support, 3-medium support, 4-little support, and 5-very little support. This
would be broken down into a binary model where 1-2 are labeled 1 for support, and
3-5 are labeled 0 for lack of support.
Comparing the homicide rates in a particular neighborhood against support
levels of the dono, gang, and police would indicate to what extent homicide rates
influence community support of the gangs and its leaders.
31