Radical Right Wing Mobilization and Discourses on Europe in Time of Crisis
By Manuela Caiani
Abstract
Although left wing opposition to Europe is very well known and studied, there has been scarce scientific
attention so far on extreme right mobilization and criticism against the EU. However, there are good reasons to
explore how the extreme right-either political parties and movements- respond to European integration
processes, not least since transnationalization of politics (and European economic crisis) are indicated by several
scholars as important explanations of the recent rise of right wing extremism in many European democracies. In
this analysis, focusing on seven European countries (IT, FR, DE, ES, AT, UK) and the USA, we will analyze the
various forms of protest (including violence) and the frames used by extreme right organizations (either political
parties and non-party groups) to address European integration (their targets, contacts and issues), exploring the
ways in which available resources of the actors and political opportunities influence their choices. The study is
based on a protest event analysis of extreme right recent mobilization from 2005 to 2009 (for a total of 1600
events) and on 54 semi structured interviews with representatives of the main important extreme right
organizations in the selected countries. The differences in the framing and mobilization strategies of different
types of groups will be showed, as well as the novelty, but also the non-novelty of the way in which the extreme
right addresses the discourse on Europe, with the construction of a complex (and sometimes contradictory)
identity where traditional nationalistic values and innovative transnational elements coexist.
1.
Introduction1
Although left wing opposition to Europe is very well known and studied (e.g. della Porta and
Caiani 2009), there has so far been scarce scientific attention paid to extreme right criticism
(for important exceptions see Mudde 2004, 2011, Simmons 2003).2 However, there are good
1
This article based on data collected within the comparative project on “The Dark Side of the Web: Right-Wing
Political Mobilization Using the Internet”, coordinated by Manuela Caiani at the IHS (Vienna) and sponsored by
the Austrian National Bank (Jubiläumsfondsprojekt ONB, Nr. 14035). We thank Rossella Borri, Linda Parenti
and Patricia Kröll for conducting the interviews and for their useful suggestions concerning this part. We also
thank Donatella della Porta and Claudius Wagemann (Veto project) for the part on frames.
2
More precisely, there are many contributions in the literature about national positions on the EU and
euroscepticism (among others, see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004, 2013; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Kopecky
and Mudde 2002), also including the extreme right. However, they mainly focus on political parties (and
elections), leaving aside the european discourse and mobilization (outside the institutional arena) of radical right
non-party organizations.
1
reasons to explore how the extreme right responds to the challenge of European integration,
especially since internationalization processes are indicated by several scholars as one of the
main reasons behind the recent mobilization of right-wing extremism in many Western
democracies. Reacting to the structural and economic changes by which modernity is
characterized (Hermet, 2001; Mény and Surel, 2000) along with displaying anti-Europeism
and nationalism are considered to be crucial elements of the new right-wing populism
(Mudde, 2007). The extreme right is on the rise all across Europe (Minkenberg, 2011, 2013).
This concerns either the institutional arena, as also the last 2014 European elections have
confirmed, and (violent and not-violent) protest incidents initiated by radical right groups,
movements and single activists. In Europe, the dynamics of globalization and economic
expansion have led to a growth in unemployment and anti-immigration sentiment as well as
“an increase in the number of racial-nationalist parties and organizations and a rise in antiSemitism” (Wright, 2009, 189). As noted, “racial-nationalist leaders in both North America
and Europe are able to exploit the new political conditions and widespread fears to their
advantage (…). By advocating white-European privilege and heritage, racial-nationalists can
effectively formulate a troubling but potent transnational message” (Ibid., 190).
However, the relationship between extremist right-wing groups and transnational politics is
ambiguous. Despite opposing a supranational system, many extreme right movements
consider it necessary to engage in politics on a transnational level. In recent years, we can
observe the emergence of an extreme right network that extends beyond national borders and
is made up of “close contacts throughout the EU” and supported by the participation of “likeminded nationals from all around the states at right-wing events, such as White Power Music
concerts” (Europol, 2011, 29). Indeed, as argued, “(t)ransnational processes of exchange and
learning play an important role in the success of right-wing extremism and right-wing
populism in Europe” (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011, 22). Confronted with the ‘global
challenges’ of the 21st century, right-wing extremists seek to create a transnational network
based on a ‘global white identity’ (Daniels, 2009).
Therefore, what do radical right wing parties and movements say and actually do about
Europe? Is it possible to imagine the emergence of a new cleavage around EU issues able to
unite these nationalist formations?
2
In this paper, focusing on seven European countries (IT, FR, DE, ES, AT, UK) and the USA,
we will try to address these issues, by analyzing the various forms of protest (including
violence) and discourses used by extreme right organizations3 to address European integration
(their targets, contacts and issues). By looking at different types of extreme right groups
(political party and non-party organizations) in different countries, we will explore the ways
in which the available resources and political opportunities of the actors (e.g. Kriesi 2004)
influence their choices, as well as attitudes towards Europe. Indeed, the differences in the
groups’ framing and mobilization strategies in Europe will be shown, as well as the novelty,
but also the non-novelty of the way in which the extreme right addresses the discourse on
Europe, with the construction of a complex (and sometimes contradictory) identity where
traditional nationalistic values and innovative transnational elements coexist. The study is
based on a protest event analysis of recent mobilization by the extreme right (2005-2009, for
a total of about 1600 events identified) and on 54 interviews with representatives of the
important extreme right organizations in the selected countries. These data will be integrated
with a comparative case study (only for Italy, Germany and the USA) based on a frame
analysis of right wing documents from 2000 to 2006 (for details of the frame analysis and the
codebook used, see Caiani et al. 2012). From the theoretical point of view, the aim of this
study is to test the applicability of concepts and hypotheses developed in the research on
progressive, left-libertarian movements to their (very different) counterpart (see also della
Porta 2012), to which they rarely are applied (for exception see Rydgren 2005), exploring the
entire milieu of the plural radical right family (Caldiron 2001).
2. Methods and data
First of all, we have conducted a protest event analysis (PEA) based on newspapers (between
2005 and 2009, for a total amount of 1565 identified events), looking at the degree and forms
of mobilization of right wing extremist organizations, as well as at their strategies of action.
3
Despite the still open debate on conceptual definition and terminology (which is beyond the scope of this
article to address in detail), we use, interchangeably, the term extreme/radical right to refer to those groups that
exhibit in their common ideological core the characteristics of nationalism, xenophobia (ethno-nationalist
xenophobia), antiestablishment critiques and socio-cultural authoritarianism (law and order, family values)
(Mudde 2007). It goes without saying that in the empirical reality, many of these groups are not easily placed
according to traditional political categories, as they often combine elements of left-wing and right-wing
philosophy, mixed with populist language and rhetoric.
3
PEA is a technique of quantitative content analysis, that allows for the quantification of many
properties of protest, such as frequency, timing and duration, location, claims, size, forms,
carriers, and targets, as well as immediate consequences and reactions (e.g. police
intervention, damage, counter-protests, etc.) (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). This technique was
adopted for our analysis following a long-standing tradition of research on social movements
and contentious politics (Tilly 1978, Tarrow 1989). In order to conduct the protest event
analysis we used a formalized codebook. Our unit of analysis (the ‘protest event’) consists of
the following elements (variables for the coding): an actor who initiates the protest event; the
form of action; the target at which the action is directed; an object actor whose interests are
affected by the event; and finally the substantive content of the event, which states what is to
be done (issue). Each protest event concerning the right wing actor and action, taking place in
our selected countries, has been coded.4 We have drawn on newspaper articles published in
the major quality national newspapers in each country analyzed. In particular: La Repubblica
for Italy; Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) for Germany; the Guardian for the United Kingdom, Le
Monde for France; El País for Spain; the ‘US Newspapers and Wires’ included in the
LexisNexis database for the USA.5 In order to retrieve relevant articles we conducted a
keyword search of the electronic editions in each case.6
The PEA was integrated, by means of a common research design, with (54) interviews with
leaders of extreme right organizations (chosen in each country as the most representative from
our PEA results). In terms of sampling the interview partners, we identified three to four
organizations in each of the three main categories of extreme right groups (political parties,
4
In our study a ‘protest event’ consists of a political event initiated by an extreme right actor (either collective or
individual, even an anonymous one), regardless of the type of actor (e.g. political party, subcultural skinhead
group, etc.) and regardless of the form the event takes (e.g. heavy or light violence, unconventional symbolic and
expressive actions, conventional actions etc.).
5
This source contains newspapers published in the United States and wire services covering American news.
6
As for the sampling criterion, data have been collected from the Lexis Nexis database and from CD Rom
versions of the selected newspapers using several keywords (e.g. ‘extreme right,' ‘neonazi,'‘white supremacis*,'
‘far right,' ‘skinhead*,' ‘nazi,' etc.). A reiterative process has been used by searching all keywords for each year,
and then eliminating redundant articles. Copies of original articles were stored to go back to qualitative
information not captured by the variables of the codebook. Inter-coder reliability tests were undertaken for
article selection and coding.
4
political movements,7 and sub-cultural youth groups8), for a total of nine/twelve ideal
interviews per country, in order to offer a representative description of the entire right-wing
sector. The interviews, conducted by telephone, were held between 2010 and 2011.
Establishing contacts and obtaining a positive response from these organizations was
particularly complex and time consuming. Our response rate was less than 40%. In addition,
many interview partners requested anonymity (see the list of organizations interviewed in the
appendix). The semi-structured questionnaire, containing both closed and open questions,
focused on the transnationalization of communication and mobilization strategies of extreme
right organizations (their actions, targets, national and cross-national contacts), including their
judgment of the impact of the EU on them, as well as the general position of extreme right
groups towards the processes of globalization/European integration.9
Finally, in order to shed light on the social and political construction of the external reality by
extreme right groups, as well as on the construction of their collective identity and main
enemies (the ‘us’ and ‘them’), we conducted three case studies (on Italy, Germany and the
USA, for details see Caiani et al.2012) on right wing discourses based on a frame analysis
(Snow and Benford 1988) applied to documents from 2000 to 2006 (such as newspapers,
magazines, leaflets) of different types of radical right organizations-political parties, political
movements, cultural groups. The total number of frames coded is 5192: 1353 for Germany,
2460 for Italy and 1379 for the USA.
7
In this class there are those groups defining themselves as political parties and movements and that openly
partake in political activities (political debates, policy issues, see Tateo, 2005). The main differences between
the former and latter ones are in the degree of institutionalization and participation in the elections. Political
movement’s category also includes youth organizations related to parties, political journals, magazines, and
reviews.
8
These groups are characterized by music (which they define as “antagonistic”) and cultural activities as their
main interests. Their sites often include fascist or Nazi symbols or symbols taken from Celtic mythology.
9
Most of the interviewees were either leaders or spokespersons of the respective organizations, or in charge of
drawing up the general communication and mobilization strategies. More specifically, with regard to political
parties, they were party leaders (presidents or general secretaries) and senior/leading members of the party (e.g.,
members of the executive boards, spokesmen, or regional party leaders). In the political movements they were
presidents, general delegates or secretaries or web-site chief editors in the case of online groups. In the case of
sub-cultural youth groups, we relied on group leaders (in two cases even the founder) and people responsible for
the web-communications.
5
In the following, we shall therefore investigate the mobilization and discourses of the extreme
right vis-a-vis the European integration process, illustrating (the degree and forms of) its
transnationalization in terms of: issues and discourses (section 2); the scope of mobilization
(section 3); targets, organizational contacts (section 4), and action strategies (section 5). In the
conclusion we will reflect on the potential impact (on the extreme right milieu itself and on
Europe) of the transnationalization of extreme right organizations.
3. Visions of Europe (desired and criticized)
An important indicator of the transnationalization of right-wing organizations is the scope of
the issues that they mobilize: How much (and how) do they mobilize European issues? Our
interviews confirm that European issues represent a significantly debated topic in their
political discourse (see tab. A in appendix), which however takes the form of euro-sceptic
sentiments (53% of them are strongly against the EU and another 23% rather against) (Fig.
1).10 This anti European criticism not only affects political parties but is also shared by less
formalized extreme right groups such as political movements and youth subcultural
organizations.11 For example, the representative of the Spanish far right union, Unión
Nacional de Trabajadores, stresses that his organization is “against European integration
primarily when it comes to political and especially economic integration” (ID. 33), and the
Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN), the youth organization of the German NPD
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), especially disapproves the “abolishment of
national sovereignties” (ID. 10). Indeed, the European institutions, are often referred to as the
‘technocratic Europe of Maastricht,' the ‘bureaucratic-financial oligarchy eager of power,' and
(especially in Italy) the ‘Freemason and relativistic’ Europe. They are said to be under the
control of international financial powers and the US, and support, through their policies, the
masters of globalization in destroying the specificities of the European nations12 (only in the
9
The question on the questionnaire was: “Is your organization in favor or against an increasing European
integration?” (4 point scale from zero ‘strongly against’ to 3 ‘strongly in favor’).
10
Indeed, as confirmed by an insignificant Cramer’s V coefficient, there are no relevant differences in the
attitudes towards European integration between the three organizational types.
12
For example, the Schengen Agreement which calls for “open borders” is identified by a German regional
youth movement as a disaster, since it enables “black africans to enter on Lampedusa” and to get a residence
permit for all EU states (ID. 12).
6
Italian case does ‘Europe’ appear among the twelve most frequently recurring actors in the
extreme right discourse, in 3 per cent of EU statements).
Figure 1. Position of right wing organizations toward European integration (all countries; %).
9%
15%
53%
Strongly in favour
Rather in favour
Rather against
23%
Strongly against
Note. N = 45; Source: data from our interviews. A cross-national
comparison, however, highlights
some national specificities13. When asked about their position towards European integration,
the totality of the Spanish, German, British and Austrian extreme right organizations stress
that they are (‘rather’ or ‘strongly’) against it. The European Union in its current form is
referred to as “European misfortune” (ID. 03) or “European nonsense” (ID. 01) by these
groups. For example, the representative of the German media network MUPINFO considers
that “The EU Parliament in Brussels today takes more or less the same position as the
Kremlin for the whole Eastern bloc in the Cold War time” (ID. 13) and many groups (German
and Austrian particularly) explain that they would prefer a “Europe of the Fatherlands” (ID.
05, 06, 08, 09) with “strong individual states” (ID. 02), to the current form of the European
Union “which interferes with national laws and budgets” (ID. 12).
On the contrary, many Italian and French right-wing organizations also consider European
integration as a ‘partly’ positive development and they claim to be ‘rather or strongly’ in favor
of the process (60% the former, 44% the latter). This is the case, for example, with the Italian
youth movement Gioventù Italiana, whose leader complains about the lack of “a true
13
The existence of a strong relationship between the organizations’ attitudes towards European integration and
the country is confirmed by a strong and significant Cramer’s V (.51*).
7
European people, at the social and cultural level” (ID. 25) or with the French Nouvelle Droite
Populaire (NDP) whose representative stresses that “France cannot do it alone in spite of what
is stated by our political partners” (ID. 44). In fact, when asked about the impact of European
integration on their organization, some extreme right groups admit that not everything
stemming from the EU is harmful to them and that the EU can also be perceived as an
opportunity vis à vis the nation state. For example, according to the spokesperson of the
German regional media MUPINFO “the European legislation is in some areas less repressive
than the German one” (ID. 13). Other organizations, referring to the attempt of the German
government to ban the NPD party, consider the EU institutions more open to them than the
national context (“if banned, the NPD can go to the European Court of Justice, where the
chances of winning are probably much higher”, ID. 14). Similarly, the chairman of the
Austrian political party, Die Bunten, points out that “one has the possibility to appeal to the
European Court of Justice and sometimes the Austrian state is forced by the EU to be more
flexible” (ID.01). However, most of the organizations believe that the negative effects of the
EU outweigh the positive effects, as for instance, the spokesperson of the English Democrats
stresses “the EU costs money and is a negative consequence for all taxpayers in his country”
(ID. 16).
In particular, our study of right wing documents reveals that the issue of European integration
(and globalization, which often is related to the former in extreme right frames) is prominent
in extreme right discourse (accounting for 26 per cent of statements in Italy and about 10 per
cent in Germany) (see tab. A in appendix). The political aspects of the European integration
process (i.e the relations between the member states and the EU) and the domestic (negative)
economic effects of the European Integration process, emerge as a special concern of extreme
right groups (fig. 2) the former especially for the German extreme right (where they are
treated in 8.6 per cent of statements concerning political globalization), while the Italian
extreme right groups refer mainly to the latter socio- economic issues and the EU which also
include moral and ethical concerns related to European integration.
8
Figure 2. Specific Issues in the discourse of radical right organizations against the EU in Germany
and Italy (N frames analyzed 2460+1353 , 100%)
Figure 2. Specific Issues in the discourse of radical right organizations against the EU in Germany
and Italy (N frames analyzed 2460+1353, 100%)
41
European integration&institutions
0.5
Nation state-EU
8.7
USA-EU
European identity
1.2
Enlargement
1.9
Culture and society
1.5
25.8
Domestic economic system&EU
8.2
International economic system
6.8
Monetary policy
0.9
Agricultural policy
Taxes, pension, employment and social…
0
3.6
10
20
30
40
50
Note: Unit of analysis= the frame, data from frame analysis of right German and Italian wing
documents (Caiani et al.2012).
Indeed, according to the extreme right, globalization not only leads to the ‘loss of identities of
the peoples,' but also brings about ‘limitations to the sovereignty of the national states’ (Forza
Nuova May 2002). Europe is considered a ‘totalitarian super state,' a sort of ‘dictatorship,' an
‘intrusive body,' a ‘distant and oppressing power’ (very often mentioned in opposition to ‘the
European peoples’), and a ‘centralizing state.’ More specific references to the European
policies describe a ‘market oriented’ EU that conditions national political and economic
choices, serving the interests of international finance rather than the real interests of the
nations. For instance, according to the extreme right, at the national level, the EU ‘increases
unemployment,’ ‘damages the competitiveness of small businesses,’ will ‘lead to the closure
of many domestic businesses,’ ‘to the invasion of foreign goods’ and ‘provoke the
development of financial crimes.’
In Italy, the topic of European integration is completely monopolized by political party
discourse (22.4 per cent of all party statements on EU, versus about 2–4 per cent of cases in
the political movement and skinhead discourses), while in Germany it is equally important for
the political party and skinhead groups (treated in respectively 5.5 and 4.2 per cent of their
statements), although not treated at all in the political movement sources. Frames on
European integration were not found in the discourse of the American extreme right,
9
regardless the type of group under analysis.
Nevertheless, in spite of its opposition to the European Union, the current extreme right does
not reject the idea of Europe, according to a position that (at least for the Italian extreme right)
goes back to post-World War II neofascist parties (Tarchi 2009). Quite to the contrary, in
their motivational frames, our organizations call for the rebuilding of a ‘new Europe,' ‘based
on its traditional glorious history’ (i.e. the Roman imperium in the Italian right discourse,
while in Germany there are frequent references to ‘the nations of the past’). They idealize a
Europe that is ‘big and strong, independent from the USA,’ ‘with a single own European
army’ – which could itself become a force of defense against globalization and the American
enemy (Veneto Skinhead May-June 2004). This reflects an abstract and mythical idea of
Europe as the center of civilization and a third power between the two materialist empires,
USA and URSS (Tarchi 2009). Building upon this tradition, the ‘post-1989 scenario has, for
these political groups, strengthened the aspiration to embody an autochthonous and
“authentic” Europe, in contrast with the cosmopolitan tendencies of globalization’ (ibid., 1).
However, again, this new Europe is framed through the lens of national identity. In this sense,
the Italian and German extreme right groups seek a ‘Europe of the European peoples,' a
‘Europe of sovereign states,’ a Europe ‘new and different from the EU, which unites nations
only economically with free trade and a stateless coin!’ (Forza Nuova September 2003). The
general call for action is to ‘save, by any means, the millennial history, culture, and tradition
of Europe against foreign interferences.’
3.1 The US Extreme right’s stand on globalization
White supremacist movement entrepreneurs in North America demonstrate a striking
ideological convergence with racial-nationalist actors and parties in Europe concerning
transnational politics and in particular globalization. Just as European extreme right
organizations emerge as Eurosceptics, the great majority of the interviewed organizations
from the US are very critical of globalization. Yet, the term “globalization” includes lot of
different issues, for example, the “inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and
technologies to a degree never witnessed before” (Friedman, 1999, 9), a point also
emphasized in the discourse of American extreme right organizations. Our analysis shows
that regardless of the organizational type, the American extreme right opposes the idea of
globalization which they first and foremost define as “economic globalization and supranational corporations” (ID. 23). For instance, the representative of the Third Party explains
that “globalism, thus the international connections in different fields, has done tremendous
10
harm, not just to the European and white-Americans, but to all people worldwide” (ID. 22).
Indeed, “globalization has in many respects hurt people, especially in terms of personal
economic circumstances”, because it “created ethnic resource competition” and due to this
fact, one US ethno-political advocacy organization explains, its group has gained more
members (ID. 23). Similarly, the spokesperson of the White Voice clarifies that his fellows
are “racial socialist” and therefore “not interested in associating (…) with non-Whites” (ID.
21). In sum, it is commonly spread among right wing groups that “multinational corporations
ship many jobs and production facilities to third world countries, while at the same time
importing third world immigrants to take more jobs from whites” (e.g. ID. 18).
Other US right-wing organizations heavily stress the aspect of ‘political globalization,' that is
sharply opposed, as the leader of Vanguard News Network says, it means a “hypercentralized” politics, where they advocate for a “decentralized politics” (ID. 17) in the form of
“smaller governments, smaller entities of people and small nations” (ID. 19). This goes hand
in hand with the general wish diffused among these organizations that the US does not
interfere in other nations’ business. In this respect, some groups criticize the “NATO in its
past war against Serbians” (ID. 20). Accordingly, they reject other international organizations
such as the WTO, NAFTA, GATT, UN and NATO, “which enter into US affairs”, and they
illustrate that they quite often rely on the internet to organize (or take part in) events against
such international global political institutions, such as demonstrations, petitions and letters to
newspapers (ID. 18, 19, 23). Finally, especially when asked about the impact of globalization
on the situation of their organizations, some groups underline the negative consequences of
‘cultural globalization,' stressing that “the White percentage of the U.S. and the world
population decreases every year”, and this “has produced a backlash in the White population
that has helped to bring America to the brink of disintegration” (ID. 19). However other
aspects of globalization, such as the increasing interconnection of communication worldwide
(i.e. technological globalization) are considered an advantage by extreme right organizations,
as the “internet” “makes it easier to get reports from different places around the world” (ID.
17).
To conclude, a significant distinction between the European and the US extreme right
organizations exists. While the European extreme right organizations are concerned about the
sovereignty of their national community which is endangered by the supranational nature of
the European Union, capitalism and the international finance system, the US extreme right
organizations mainly fight for the survival of the White ethnic group, which is related to their
11
American-European ancestry. Consequently, the US extreme right organizations are guided
by a clear racist attitude.
4. The Transnationalization of Extreme Right Mobilization
Despite strong nationalism being one of the core values of the extreme right ideology
(Mudde, 2007), current right-wing movements appear to adapt to the transformation of the
context in which they mobilize and become more transnational. One indicator of the
transnationalization of the extreme right movements is the scope of their activities (i.e. the
territorial extension of their mobilization), which can vary, in our interviews, from the local to
the international level. Although according to our data, in all countries, extreme right
organizations appear mainly focused on the national (in 73% of cases) and, especially, local
level (in 52% of cases) in their mobilization events (Figure 3), nevertheless the degree of their
internationalization is also relevant (30% declare they are also active beyond national
borders).
Figure 3. Scope of right-wing mobilization (all countries; %).
80%
60%
40%
0.68
0.73
0.52
20%
0.3
0.14
0%
District
Town
Region
Nation/State
International
level
N=45 Source: Interviews
The most internationalized extreme right comes from the US, with 71% of the organizations
(declaring to be) active beyond the country. In this respect, it is worth noting that many US
organizations are wholly Internet based, which, in their view, “helps a lot”, in reaching a
global audience (ID. 17). The Austrian and British extreme right rank second as the most
internationalized, with, in both cases, half of the organizations active internationally, followed
by German organizations in 29% of cases. To the contrary, the Southern European extreme
12
right seems to be, at least according to our interview data, the least internationalized, with the
Italian and French organizations only rarely organizing their mobilization beyond national
borders (in 12% and 11% of cases respectively), and the Spanish groups not being active at all
abroad. These types of transnational right-wing mobilizations are, however, various and they
might include cultural events, such as international concerts or cultural gatherings and
political party meetings and conferences.14 An example of such international work being the
conference ‘Our Europe: Peoples and Tradition against Banks and Usury,’ organized in
March 2009 in Milan by the British National Party, the French National Front and the German
National Democratic Party with the aim of bringing together representatives of the main
extreme right parties and followers in Europe.15 They might also include the participation in
the European elections by extreme right groups (e.g. ID. 02).16 Far right organizations in
Spain, Italy and France were instead the most active at the local level, with 100% of Spanish,
88% of the Italian, and 56% of the French groups declaring to be active at the local level. Our
analysis also shows that there were no significant differences among the different types of
organizations in the scope of their mobilization, the only exception being sub-cultural groups
and political movements more likely to mobilize, overall, at the very local and even district
level (in around one fourth of both cases).
Our protest event data reported in the press (from 2005 to 2009) confirm that, overall, the
main focus of right-wing mobilization is still the domestic (or, more precisely, the local)
level. Some 28.4 percent of registered events have a national scope 39.5 percent are organized
by a right-wing national actor, and 33.4 percent have a national target.17 In addition, 66.2
14
Such as the international neo-Nazi gathering, organized by some French skinhead groups, involving 300–400
participants coming from different countries, above all Germany (Le Monde, January 24, 2005) or the music
festival Hammerfest organized in the United States in 2005, involving extreme right bands from all over the
United States and Europe (The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, October 1, 2005).
15
La Repubblica, “Naziskin d'Europa in arrivo a Milano” (“European Naziskin Coming to Milan”), March 25,
2009, see also Le Monde, January 13, 2007. Another example of transnational campaign is the European
congress organized by the German party Republikaner in Rosenheim in 2008, involving extreme right parties
from all over Europe (Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 19, 2008).
16
An example is the foundation in October 2009 of the far right alliance “European National movements”, a
network of various right-wing parties in several European countries, aiming to become a political group within
the European Parliament.
17
The notion of ‘scope of the actor’ refers to the organizational extension of the organization and/or institution.
In our coding scheme, the categories for the scope of the actor that initiates the event and the scope of the actor-
13
percent of the total events have a local scope, 57.4 percent are initiated by a local actor, and
53.9 percent have a local target. Although only a minority of the coded events imply a
supranational dimension18--however these results are not far from what has emerged in terms
of European protests concerning left wing organizations--our analysis also points out
significant signals of an emerging transnationalization of right-wing action (either in terms of
targets, actors and scope of the mobilization) (Figure 4).19
Figure 4. The development of transnational extreme right actors, events and targets
(2005-2009, all countries) (%)
10.
7.5
Transnational actors
Transnational events
Transnational targets
5.
2.5
0.
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Note: N. of total events = 1344 (actor scope); 1481 (event scope); 1255 (target scope).
target of the mobilization vary from local to international. The notion of ‘scope of the event/action’ refers to the
scope of mobilization. That is, if the article mentions ‘extreme right organizations from different member states,’
the scope is ‘European Union.’ Either for the variable ‘actor scope’ and for the variable ‘event scope,’ we
include in the category ‘supranational/international/crossnational’ also the category ‘multilateral,’ which refers
to ‘actors involved from two or more countries.’
18
Only 3.1 percent of the total registered events have a transnational actor initiating the event, 6.5 percent a
transnational target, and 5.4 percent a transnational scope of the mobilization.
19
For example, research on protest events, collected mainly from newspaper sources and focused on left-wing
movements stresses the paucity of protests directly targeting supranational European institutions (e.g. Imig &
Tarrow; della Porta & Caiani 2009).
The correlation between year and transnational right-wing events is 0.26** (Cramer’s V), between transnational
right-wing is 0.19**, and between transnational right-wing targets is 0.22**.
14
In terms of cross-time trends, a development of transnational extreme right organizations in
the more recent years. Indeed, as Figure 4 shows, the percentage of events initiated by
‘supranational’ extreme right actors increases in the course of the five years under
consideration: from 2.4 percent of all registered events in 2005 to 3.2 percent in 2009, with a
peak of 4 percent of all cases in 2007.20
In this regard we can mention the recent birth of the European movement, Stop Islamification
of Europe, founded in 2007 in the United Kingdom against “the overt and covert expansion of
Islam in Europe” and now active in several European countries.21 Transnational right-wing
events (namely events with a transnational scope of mobilization) also slightly increase in the
period of our analysis (from 3.5 percent of all cases registered in 2005 to 6.3 percent in 2006,
4.5 percent in 2007, 5.6 percent in 2008 and to 4.6 percent in 2009), as well as right-wing
events addressing supranational institutions and targets (from 4.5 percent in 2005 to 9.3
percent in 2006, 6.3 percent in 2007, 5.3 percent in 2008 and 5.6 percent in 2009). These
types of transnational right-wing protests include events such as the European campaign to
boycott the products of American multinational companies; cultural events such as
international concerts; or gatherings or European party meetings and congresses.22
There are, however, some cross-country differences in this regard. From a comparative
perspective (Figure 5) we see that the most ‘transnationalized’ extreme right mobilization
exists in France and the United Kingdom. In these countries, respectively 21.4 and 9.5 percent
of all registered events address a transnational target, and 17.4 and 13 percent have a
transnational scope (which means that the protest has mobilized people coming from more
20
Namely right-wing international organizations or organizations diffused in more than one state, or finally,
European federations.
21
Guardian, October 24, 2007.
22
For example, the demonstration of the Spanish party Falange Española directed toward European institutions,
against the approval of the European Constitution in 2005 (El País, May 20, 2005).
Such as the international neo-Nazi gathering, organized by some French skinhead groups, involving 300–400
participants coming from different countries, above all Germany (Le Monde, January 24, 2005) or the music
festival Hammerfest organized in the United States in 2005, involving extreme right bands from all over the
United States and Europe (The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, October 1, 2005).
As the slogan of the campaign explained, “We are doing consultations among leaders of nationalist
movements in Europe, with the aim of extending the boycott campaign against the USA to a transnational level”
(Forza Nuova, March 2003—our translation).
15
than one country). Also the presence of transnational right-wing actors initiating the events is
significant, accounting for about 8 percent of cases in both countries. Examples are the
international convention organized by the Front National in France in 2007 with the goal of
creating a united European radical right party.23 On the contrary, according to our data, the
Spanish extreme right is the least ‘internationalized’ in its mobilization (either in terms of
actor, event and target). Italian, American and German extreme right groups appear as mainly
nationally oriented in their protest events, not exceeding the 5 percent of cases with a
transnational scope, target, or organized by transnational actors.
Figure 5. Transnational extreme right mobilization, by country (2005-09) (%)
22.5
Transnational actor scope
Transnational event scope
Transnational addressee scope
17.4
15.
13.
21.4
7.5
7.6
4.7
7.8
5.4
9.5
3.8
3.6
2.3
4.3
0.6
3.6
5.
1.4 4.9
1.4
6.5
3.1
2.2
0.
USA
Italy
Spain
FranceUnited KingdomGermany All countries
Note: N. of total events = 1344 (actor scope); 1481 (event scope); 1255 (target scope).
5. Organizing for targeting the transnational level
Indeed, while clearly opposing transnational politics itself, many extreme right organizations
are organizing on a transnational level. As any other kind of political organization, radical
right organizations do not exist in a vacuum, instead are embedded in a larger context of
multilevel governance.
23
Le Monde, January 13, 2007.
16
We asked our interviewees about the political level they try to address (from local to
supranational).24 Our analysis shows (fig. 6) that, although national (and especially
subnational) political institutions and actors are still the main target of right-wing
organizations (59% national targets vs. 82% local and 71% regional), European and
supranational actors and institutions play a role. In fact, almost half (45%) of the
organizations also declare they have tried to influence politicians operating at the
supranational level.
Figure 6. Scope of the targets of extreme right organizations (all countries, in %).
90%
68%
45%
0.82
0.71
23%
0.59
0.45
0%
Local
Regional
National
Supranational
Note. N = 45; Source: data from our interviews.
Yet here, too, there are significant differences between the countries. The British, French, and
Austrian right-wing organizations emerge as those most likely to target supranational
politicians and institutions (in, respectively, 100%, 67%, and 58% of cases). For instance, the
president of the French organization Bloc Identitaire explains that his group has contact with
some members of the European Parliament, among which is the Italian deputy Borghezio,
from the Northern League (ID. 37). Similarly, the spokesperson for the British Freedom Party
declares that his party speaks with “politicians from the local council level all the way up to
MEPs from Britain and other European countries” (ID. 15). The representative of an Austrian
24
The interview question was: “During the last year, which level of political decision making did your
organization try to influence?” (6-point scale: local, regional, national own country, national other countries, EU,
supranational. Multiple choice possible).
17
political party confirms that he is in touch with “members of the European Parliament and
representatives of other parties” (ID. 02). Conversely, extreme right organizations from
Germany and Spain less frequently address supranational institutions (in respectively 14%
and 20% of cases). Our interview data do not show any significant differences among
different types of extreme right organizations in this respect.
Beyond institutional contacts with politicians, the interviews also reveal that extreme right
groups are characterized by frequent transnational contact between them: 71% of the
organizations declare having contacts with right-wing groups in other countries or at the
international level (i.e., with umbrella federations).25 For instance, the spokesperson of the
English Democrats stresses that they “have been approached by several foreign organizations
such as the Vlaams Belang (the Flemish Nationalist Party) and the Austrian Freedom Party”
(ID. 16). Similarly, the German movement Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN) is in touch with a
variety of youth right-wing organizations in Europe, one being the Nordisk Ungdom (ID. 10)
and the NPD partners with many other European extreme right parties, such as the Falange
Española de las JONS from Spain, the British National Party from the UK, and Dělnická
Strana from the Czech Republic (ID. 09). Also the representative of the American Third
Position explains that his group has recently had ‘transoceanic’ contacts with the French Front
National (ID. 22) and other American organizations have had contacts with Imperium Europe
or the British National Party (e.g. ID. 23).
This high degree of transnational interconnectedness may be related to the weak
institutionalization of supranational right-wing actors, which pushes national movement
organizations to be directly involved in multilevel pressures. Specifically, we observe a higher
degree of supranational interconnectedness among American, English, French, and Austrian
extreme right organizations and a lower level for the Italian organizations, with Spanish and
German organizations falling in between (Figure 7).26
25
The interview question was: “During the last year, did your association/ group have regular contacts with
similar associations/groups in your country?”
26
As indicated by the Cramer’s V coefficient, the correlation between the number of international contacts of
right-wing groups and the country is strong and significant (0.58*).
18
Figure 7. Right-wing International and Cross-national contacts, by country (%).
125
100
100
100
89
75
60
50
80
67
25
25
0
Italy
Spain
France Germany
UK
Austria
USA
Note. N=45; Source: data from our interviews.
From a cross-organizational perspective, transnational contacts seem typical for the most
institutionalized and resourceful organizations (43% for sub-cultural groups vs. 75-78% for
political parties and movements). The ‘ideal’ for these groups is to create a transnational right
wing community or “Pan-Aryanism,” which is “a broad idea of supporting white people all
over the world” (ID. 19).
What are the most internationally oriented types of extreme right organizations? As shown by
our protest event data in Figure 8, political parties and movements and neo-Nazi organizations
are the most ‘internationalized’ actors of the right-wing milieu (either in the scope of
mobilization, or the target).27 This can also be related to the fact that political parties and
movements working in a more institutionalized field, compared to the other more informal
types of extreme right organizations, are more involved in multilevel transnational politics.
However neo-Nazi organizations are those, in all countries, that are more ‘transnationalized’
in terms of organizational structure (i.e. in terms of the development of transnational
organizations). Indeed, many neo-Nazi movements and the actions they perform are not
confined within national boundaries, for instance the memorial gathering organized every
year in memory of Robert Jay Matthews (the leader of the American White Nationalist
27
The relationship between the scope of the ‘event,' ‘actor’ and ‘target,' and the type of organization is strong
and significant: respectively Cramer’s V, 0.265** (event scope); 0.325** (actor scope); 0.233** (target scope).
19
Movement, killed by the police in 1984) by the members of Stormfront, or one of the most
important neo-Nazi, white supremacist international Web forums or the Naziskin rally
organized in Italy or gatherings of militants and extreme right music bands coming from
Germany and other countries.28
Figure 8. Transnational extreme right mobilization, by type of group (%)
9.
8.1
6.8
Transnational actor
scope
7.
6.8
6.
5.7
4.5
5.
4.6
2.3
3.2
2.7
5.4
4.4
3.6
Transnational
event scope
Transnational
addressee scope
0.
Political parties
and movements
Neo-Nazi groups Youth subcultural
Neofascist and
nostalgic org.
Note: N. of total events (100%) = 1290 (actor scope); 1420 (event scope); 1213 (addressee scope).
The second most internationally-oriented type of right-wing organization is represented by
youth subcultural right-wing groups, which are especially internationalized in terms of targets
of their action and the scope of the mobilization they are able to organize.
28
La Repubblica, January 23, 2008.
20
6. Action strategies at the EU level
What action strategies do extreme right groups adopt when acting at the supranational level?
Table 1. Right-wing strategies (action forms) in addressing the transnational level.
ACTION FORMS
Publicizing
Conventional
Court
Mobilization/
Confrontational
activities
political
action
Protest
mobilization
NAT EU
NAT
EU
NAT
EU
actions
Countries NAT
EU
NAT EU
Italy
0.7
0.01 0.5
0.04
0.9
0
0.8
0
0.3
0
Spain
0.7
0
0.2
0
0.8
0
0.6
0
0.04
0
France
0.6
0.2
0.7
0.2
0.6
0
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.07
Germany
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.2
0
UK
0.8
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.5
0
0.7
0.05
0
0
Austria
0.6
0.3
0.6
0.2
0.9
0.1
0.4
0.09
0.03
0.03
USA
0.6
0.2
0.6
0.04
0.6
0
0.5
0.1
0.4
0
0.7
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.6
0.06 0.6
0.1
0.09
0
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.7
0.06 0.5
0.1
0.2
0.05
0.6
0.02 0.7
0.07
0.7
0
0
0.2
0
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.7
0.05 0.5
0.09
0.2
0.02
ORG type
Political
party
Political
mov.
Subcult.
0.6
group
All actors
0.5
Note. N = 45; Source: data from our interviews.
21
Table 1 shows the intensity and forms of actions used by extreme right organizations at the
national as well as at the supranational level.29 According to our interviews, the majority of
right-wing organizations (79%, without any significant differences between countries and
types of organizations) have undertaken some kind of action at the supranational level in the
past five years. However, if we observe quite a rich and expansive repertoire of action at the
national level, the same cannot be said with respect to supranational level. Overall, all rightwing organizations tend to employ ‘conventional political’ (especially the French, German,
English, and Austria groups) and ‘media-related’ strategies (especially the German, English,
and Austria groups) when they act at the European level. Examples of these actions are:
taking part in the European Elections (as in the cases of the French parties Parti de la France,
Mouvement National Republicaine, the English Democrats and an Austrian political party,
ID. 39, 43, 16, 02), or lobbying members of the European Parliament (e.g. ID. 44). Action
strategies at the transnational level may, however, also include more informal and expressive
cultural initiatives, such as “commemoration marches” and “public assemblies” organized at
the EU level (ID. 07, ID. 09). Finally, although to a lesser extent, we also find transnational
protest actions, such as the case of the “campaigns against the Euro” organized by the Spanish
Falangist Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (ID. 33), the NPD (ID. 09) and other German
organizations (ID. 14); the “petitions” calling for referendums on the EU, organized by the
British Freedom Party (ID. 15); and various demonstrations against the EU in general (ID.
08), such as boycotts (ID. 20). Protest actions (but also confrontational and violent strategies)
are much more frequent when extreme right organizations mobilize at the national level. We
also find cross-country differences in the action repertoire of the extreme right, with the
29
We developed five detailed indicators in the interview questionnaire: (1) “publicizing activities,” which
included strategies aimed at informing the public or getting informed about the preferences of the public, for
example, via opinion polls; as well as the media-related repertoire including activities such as distributing press
releases or giving interviews to the media; (2) “conventional political actions,” including actions addressing the
political-institutional sphere such as contributing to specific political campaigns or establishing/maintaining
contacts with members of the parliament or government; (3) “court action,” including filing suit or engaging in
some sort of litigation; (4) “mobilization” activities, including petitions, protesting, organizing boycotts, striking;
(5) “confrontational or violent actions”, including actions such as taking part in illegal demonstrations, clashes
with the police or with political adversaries. The additive indexes in table 1 show the frequency of the use of the
corresponding strategies at the national and at the European level, by different types of organizations and
countries. They have been standardized to the 0-to-1 range by dividing the resulting score by the maximum
possible value, in order to allow comparability.
22
French, German, and American extreme right organizations more active at the supranational
level (through conventional actions), and, in a comparison between the different
organizational variants, sub-cultural youth groups less active, overall, at the supranational
level.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the intensity and trends of extreme right transnationalization (in
terms of mobilization, issues, targets and organizational contacts in the seven selected
countries, and the related frames on Europe, relating them, when possible to the country’s
contexts and the group characteristics.
Our study has pointed out that all right-wing organizations, regardless of their prevalent
nature and country, are slowly moving towards a transnationalization of their activities, either
in terms of political communication, or in terms of political mobilization. In particular, in all
countries, extreme right protest events mainly take place at a local level (especially in the case
of the more informal groups of the extreme right sector, namely the sub-cultural youth ones
and political movements), however, the transnational arena is assuming an increasing role. As
we have seen from our data, one out of three organizations also mobilize beyond national
borders (scope of mobilization), almost half of them have contacts with transnational
institutions and politicians and half of them have organizational contacts with similar groups
in other countries.
Furthermore, as shown by our frames data as well as the interviews, transnational issues (such
as the topic of EU integration and globalization) are clearly present in right-wing discourses
in the selected countries and they are mobilizing around them, with some similarities but also
differences among countries. If the various aspects of Europeanization and globalization are
addressed, from the European economic system, to international migration and the emergence
of multicultural societies, to the threat for traditional values, the focus of opposition by the
extreme right towards these trends is more on the loss of national sovereignty in Europe and
in the USA, than on the racial threats resulting from globalization. In general, however, the
interpretation of European integration through the lens of conspiracy theories allows the
extreme right to carry on a (rather abstract) antagonistic and rebellious discourse against the
ruling powers. This confirms the observation made by Bar-On (2013, 208) that the “stances of
most of the extreme right-wing political parties” within the European Union “have become
identical: support for pan European unity, and rejection of the contemporary ‘technocratic’
23
EU.”
Some prognostic frames appear, even at first sight, similar to those mobilized by the left-wing
discourses on Europe – such as the generally critical attitude towards the main patterns of
European integration and austerity policies; the increasing importance of business actors (and
the simultaneous weakening of the state in the economic arena); and the hegemonic position
of the international (not legitimated) institutions over national politics. However, if the
diagnosis is similar, the solutions, proposed to resist European integration differ between the
two camps. Most prominently, right-wing activists call for a new strengthening of the nationstate and a restoration of the „original“ national, cultural, ethnic, and religious identities of a
country, and a retreat from international engagement. Indeed, the extreme right is engaged in
the new debate on European integration, using old schemata related to its traditional ideology,
focused on aspects such as nationalism, identity, conspiracy, and its obsession with
immigration and security. Some main explanations for the differences between countries can
be found in the cultural and political sphere, especially in political and discursive
opportunities. For example, European integration seems to play a more important role for the
Italian than for the German extreme right, and this can be linked to different discursive
opportunities. In Germany since 1945 there has been no political legitimacy for anti-European
nationalism, and thus no tradition of Euroskepticism (Dietmar 2009, 27). In fact, all of the
mainstream parties support European integration (except for some eurosceptical elements in
the Bavarian CSU and in the left ‘Die Linke’), whereas explicit anti-European and
nationalistic discourse is only found among the extreme right parties which are marginal in
the political arena. Additionally, there is a predominance of pro-European attitudes among
German citizens (Eurobarometer 2012). To the contrary, in Italy, in spite of the assumed
traditional pro-Europeanism of the political elites, anti-European attitudes are expressed at
both the governmental and the opposition levels (for example, the Northern League, as well as
in some periods the party Forza Italia).
In sum, despite being an understudied aspect of right-wing radicalism, Euro-skepticism is a
common trait of current radical right-wing formations, as a stance of both political parties
(e.g. Mudde, 2013; Vasilopoulou, 2011) and non-party organizations (Caiani and Della Porta,
2011). This negative attitude towards European integration stems from a series of perceived
threats to the national community including immigration, multiculturalism, and the loss of
national sovereignty and traditional values. These are all core and traditional myths of the
radical right (Bar-On, 2011, 217) but also resonate with attitudes increasingly spread across
European societies. The potential success of the radical populist right in the recent European
24
elections can be certainly related in part to institutional political factors as the second-order
nature of these elections that rewards opposition parties (Schmitt, 2005), as well as to the
capacity of such parties to represent sentiments that are widespread in society, but little
represented by national governments. For example, De Vries and Edwards (2009) show that
the Euroskeptical rhetoric of radical parties has also contributed to shaping widespread
discontent in public opinion. In turn, Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers (2013) show that (beyond
perceived ethnic threats and political distrust) Euroskepticism (and the building of
propaganda and ideologies by the radical right) is a contributing factor in explaining citizens’
vote for the radical right.
Finally, a sort of implicit contradiction is worth noticing within the current radical right. Even
if extreme right groups are strongly against political globalization and European integration,
they become entrepreneurs of a sort of transnationalization of the right wing movement itself.
In order to resist Europeanization and protect the nation-state against processes encouraging
globalization, they frequently propose to unite the forces of the European nationalist
movements (for details see also Caiani 2014); they ask for contacts with other European
‘national oppositions’ and they launch concrete initiatives-as we have seen from the protest
event and interview data - to create international networks among extreme right movements.
In the institutional arena we can also mention the recent attempt of the creation of a
‘European’ right-wing group within the European Parliament, the ‘European Alliance for
Freedom’. The group, formed in 2013 among euro-skeptic formations coming from old and
new member states, includes the French Front National, the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) of Heinz-Christian Strache, the Flemish Interest (VB) in
Belgium, the Swedish Democrats, the Lithuanian of ‘Order and Justice,' and the Italian
Northern League. It is clear that the transnationalization of the extreme right parties may
create the establishment of greater coherence of action within this political area. This
impression- of an increasing transnationalization of the European extreme right (at least in its
political discourse, as it has emerged from our data)- is reinforced by governmental reports
which indicate a tendency of the European extreme right to increasingly organize crossnationally (Europol Report 2007, 7), as well as to appeal via the internet to an international
audience (Gerstenfeld et al 2003). As it has been noticed for leftist social movements (della
Porta and Caiani, 2009), the European and international institutions, beyond being the target
of a more and more critical discourses, evidently provide occasions for the creation of
supranational networks and identities even for the extreme right.
25
Regardless of the precise number of seats that the radical right will gain in the next European
elections, they are likely to increase their agenda setting capacity, due to the criticism they
voice and the policy effects this might have on mainstream moderate right wing and
progressive parties (Minkenberg, 2001; Lefkofridi and Casado-Asensio, 2010, 3). On delicate
issues such as immigration, unemployment, social policies and economic decisions in times of
crisis, the radical right can insert exclusive and protectionist discourses in the agenda, based
on nationalistic rhetoric. In addition, the way radical right wing parties perceive and
(negatively) represent the EU through discourses and slogans is strikingly similar across the
European countries, despite the fact that these organizations do not yet cooperate on a
meaningful level, and may even find themselves in competition with one another. Ultimately,
despite many factors being mature for issue mobilization and the creation of a new cleavage,
in the national political party system, around the EU, the success of this process largely
depends on the ability of the radical right organizations to come to terms with their
ideological background, give priority to this emerging cleavage and establish more synergies
with each other (Caiani and Conti 2014).
26
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Appendix
Tab. A. The role of European integration (and globalization) in the discourse of the
extreme right in Italy, Germany and the USA6
Issue Area
Germany
Italy
US
Total
Politics
29.6%
19.8%
14.7%
21.0%
Us
18.3%
14.8%
10.8%
14.7%
Globalization
5.4%
14.6%
14.6%
12.2%
Social/economic
12.3%
10.2%
8.3%
10.3%
Values/identity
12.3%
12.1%
20.5%
14.4%
Migration
9.3%
11.6%
20.0%
13.3%
EU
4.6%
10.6%
0.0%
6.2%
Nation
8.3%
6.2%
10.9%
8.0%
(1353)
(2460)
(1379)
(5192)
issues
Quoted interviews with right-wing organizations:
ID. 01 Political party “Die Bunten”. Austria, October 7, 2011.
ID. 02 Political party. Austria, November 9, 2011.
ID. 03 Organization. “AFP-Kommentare”. Austria, November 10, 2011.
ID. 04 Political party “Heimatpartei Österreich (HPÖ)”. Austria, November 25, 2011.
ID. 05 Media organization. Austria, November 28, 2011.
ID. 06 Organization. Austria, December 2, 2012.
ID. 07 Political movement. Austria, December 2, 2012.
ID. 08 Political party “Bund für Gesamtdeutschland (BGD)”. Germany, October 28, 2011.
ID. 09 Political party “Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)”. Germany,
November 4, 2011.
ID. 10 Political movement “Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN)”. Germany, January 9, 2012.
30
ID. 12 Regional youth organization. Germany, February 5, 2012.
ID. 13 Regional media network “MUPINFO”. Germany, March 3, 2012.
ID. 14, Single activist “Christian Worch”. Germany. March 16, 2012.
ID. 15 Political party “British Freedom Party (BFP)”. United Kingdom, February 19, 2012.
ID. 16 Political party “The English Democrats”. United Kingdom, March 29, 2012.
ID. 17 Media network “Vanguard News Network (VNN)”. USA, January 10, 2012.
ID. 18 Political movement “White Revolution”. USA, January 10, 2012.
ID. 19 Organization “The Insurgent.” USA, January 19, 2012.
ID. 20 White nationalist network. USA, February 4, 2012.
ID. 21 Organization “White Voice”. USA, February 17, 2012.
ID. 22 Political party “American Third Position (A3P)”. USA, February 22, 2012.
ID. 23 Ethno-political advocacy organization. USA, May 11, 2012.
ID. 25 Youth Group “Gioventù Italiana”. Italy, January 16, 2012.
ID. 29 Political Movement “Fronte Sociale Nazionale”. Italy, February 13, 2012.
ID. 30 Political Party “La Destra”. Italy, February 13, 2012.
ID. 31 Organization “Casapound.” Italy, March 6, 2012.
ID. 33 Political Movement “Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT)”. Spain, February 2,
2012.
ID. 34 Political party “Falange de Las JONS”. Spain, February 16, 2012.
ID. 36 Political party “Falange Autentica”. Spain, April 11, 2012.
ID. 37 Organization “Bloc Identitaire”. France, January 31, 2012.
ID. 39 Political Pary “Parti de la France”. France, February 18, 2012.
ID. 43 Political Party “Mouvement National Republicaine (MNR)”. France, March 8, 2012.
ID. 44 Political Movement “Nouvelle Droite Populaire (NDP)”. France, March 8, 2012.
31