1ac
Plan
The United States federal government should offer to substantially ease its economic restrictions on the
Republic of Cuba in exchange for demonstrated Cuban economic reform.
Advantage 1 – relations
US-Latin American relations are low and it undermines the development of strong
regionalism
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
What is at stake is the future of inter-American relations, which today are generally cordial but lack vigor
and purpose . Efforts at hemispheric integration have been disappointing . Effective cooperation in the
Americas— even on widely shared problems like energy security, organized crime and the drug trade,
and international economic volatility—remains limited and sporadic .
It is the good news of Latin America’s progress that has most altered hemispheric relations . In the past
decade, the region has posted its best economic performance in a generation and managed largely to
sidestep the world financial crisis in 2008–2009 . The ranks of the middle classes have swelled . The
region’s political structures have also opened up, giving way to growing participation by women,
indigenous and Afro-descendant populations, and other once-excluded groups . All Latin Americans
across a broadening spectrum have greater access to education and health services, consumer goods,
and foreign travel . They now have real and rapidly expanding stakes in their societies.
These advances have also led to new social stirrings which, along with demands and expectations, are
notably on the rise . There are more and more pressures for further change and improvements .
Impressive economic, political, and social progress at home has, in turn, given Brazil, Mexico, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, and many other countries greater access to worldwide opportunities . Indeed, the
region’s most salient transformation may be its increasingly global connections and widening
international relationships .
Brazil’s dramatic rise on the world stage most visibly exemplifies the shift. But other countries, too, are
participating actively in global affairs and developing extensive networks of commercial and political
ties. China is an increasingly prominent economic actor, but India and other Asian countries are
intensifying their ties to the region as well .
The United States has also changed markedly, in ways that many find worrisome. The 2008 financial
crisis revealed serious misalignments in and poor management of the US economy—which, four years
later, is still struggling to recover . Inequality has significantly widened in the United States, while muchneeded improvements in education and infrastructure are ignored. The most ominous change in the
United States has taken place in the political realm. Politics have become less collaborative . It is
increasingly difficult to find common ground on which to build solutions to the critical problems on the
policy agenda . Compromise, the hallmark of democratic governance, has become an ebbing art,
replaced by gridlock and inaction on challenges that would advance US national interests and wellbeing.
In part as a result of these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown more distant . The quality and
intensity of ties have diminished. Most countries of the region view the United States as less and less
relevant to their needs—and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the
issues that most concern them.
In the main, hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp
antagonisms that marred relations in the past have subsided . But the US-Latin America relationship
would profit from more vitality and direction . Shared interests are not pursued as vigorously as they
should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are being missed . Well-developed ideas for
reversing these disappointing trends are scarce.
US Cuba policy is the vital internal link – greater economic engagement is the litmus
test for engaging all of Latin America
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as shortterm gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez
masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away
from Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in
October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used
for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration
meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of
this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his
free trade agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples
of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all
been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.
The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over thirty percent of
our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over
half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant
portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons
and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political
elite.
Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In
the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new
constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's
case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic
lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization
has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January
2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andeandescent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent
have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes
proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was
rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity.
[*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft
power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in
Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and
their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3
One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a
leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win
over people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.
The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring
sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to
this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage.
A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help
the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4
In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a
diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people,
of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin
America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with
other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and
repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America
is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region,
but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5
When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms
that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability.
Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America, having disproportionately
dominated Washington's policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions
with Havana, America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other
countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S.
had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it
wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. n8 In
short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our
example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout
Latin America , and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.
Stronger regionalism is vital to effective democracy promotion
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
The democratic outlook in the Americas is on balance positive, particularly when compared with
previous periods and to the rest of the world . Free, competitive elections are regularly held and,
happily, the massive human rights violations associated with earlier periods of authoritarian rule have
passed .
Nonetheless, there are fundamental challenges that, if unaddressed, could spread and become far more
serious . These problems need to be dealt with collectively through established regional mechanisms.
Among these is the defense of democracy, an important area for greater cooperation among the United
States, Canada, and Latin America.
Today, threats to democratic rule from the actions of the military, as occurred in the June 2009 coup in
Honduras, are rare . More commonly, elected executives, once in office, centralize power and assume
increasing control of critical institutions, public and private. Checks on presidential authority are,
thereby, weakened or eliminated.
Governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have all followed this pattern, undermining press
freedom and other basic rights . Although the Inter-American Democratic Charter calls for collective
action to prevent and repair such transgressions, they have, in fact, been met with relative silence .
Indeed, the charter has rarely been invoked . This inaction stems from the lack of consensus in the
hemisphere about what constitutes violations of democratic principles and how best to respond to them
. The charter should be reformed to establish mechanisms for redress when elected executives run
roughshod over independent institutions.
Although unlikely to be accomplished in the near future, the long-term goal of the United States and
other hemispheric governments should be agreement on collective actions to hold nations to the
standards of the charter. The United States and Canada cannot be effective if they are the only voices
calling for action to defend democracy and enforce the charter. The United States should pursue a
longer-term strategy of consulting and finding common ground with Latin American and Caribbean
governments on the appropriate use of the charter, which should play an important role in hemispheric
affairs.
Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The
50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and
punitive instrument . It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United
States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba,
Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations
with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American
engagement.
At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the
Americas . At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully
controls the press . Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s
eventual transition to democratic rule . An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside
US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step.
Latin American democracy key to global democracy
Hillman, 2 – Ph.D., Professor and Director, Institute for the Study of Democracy and Human Rights, St.
John Fisher College (Richard S., Democracy and Human Rights in Latin Americai, Preface, p. vii) //SP
Latin American experiences, especially in the areas of democratization and human rights protection, are
particularly relevant for developing countries that are attempting to build stable political and economic
systems in order to provide a decent standard of living and incorporate previously excluded populations
into the national mainstream. The past record, of course, is far from acceptable. The advent of the
twenty-first century, however, appears to be a time of great potential progress for the
institutionalization of democratic human rights regimes that would reduce human pain and suffering.
The number of countries in Latin America and elsewhere that are experimenting with democracy has
never been greater. Clearly, the path toward fulfilling the expectations raised by these experiments is
not an easy one; it is fraught with difficult obstacles deriving from the historical legacy as well as
contemporary challenges. Nevertheless, democracy and human rights have definitively entered the
political lexicon and discourse throughout the world.
Democracy prevents extinction
Diamond 1995 - Hoover Institute Senior Fellow (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,”
http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)
nationalist
aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through
increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to
proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered.
Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the
weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. The
experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to
aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their
own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor
terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten
one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the
long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally
responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of
their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret.
Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights,
and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of
international security and prosperity can be built.
Relations spur effective global cooperation in preventing the dissemination of nuclear
weapons to terrorists and preventing climate change
Inter-American Dialogue 12 (“Remaking the Relationship The United States and Latin America”, the
Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on
issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming
enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues . Several for which US
and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include:
 As the world’s lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to
participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests
do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For
example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of
the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that
context, south-south connections are crucial . Brazil could play a pivotal role.
 Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges . This may position them
as a voice in international debates on this topic . The importance of the Amazon basin to
worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to
play. Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global
policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this
year, will host Rio+20 . Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in
Cancún in 2010 . The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change
policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumption of shared interests on a critical
policy challenge.
 Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could
become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United
States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals
that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the
problem.
Nuclear terrorism results in all-out nuclear war and extinction
Ayson, 10 – Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a
Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33,
Issue 7, pp. 571-593, 6/21,
http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=sersol%3ARefinerQuery&citation
submit=Look+Up&url_ver=Z39.882004&l=DL2AF5JF3E&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsersol%3ARefinerQuery&SS_LibHash=DL2AF5JF3E&SS_Refer
entFormat=JournalFormat&rft_id=info%3Adoi%2F10.1080%2F1057610X.2010.483756&rft.genre=article
&SS_doi=10.1080%2F1057610X.2010.483756&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajourn
al)//SY
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and
especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange
of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and
tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new
state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war
between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and
early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem.
It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an
act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event
of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or
China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as
the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too
responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten
them as well.
Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States
react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had
come from Russian stocks, 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear
laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of
science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear
explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable,
identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency
of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear
material came from.” 41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused
to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift
immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France,
and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list
consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage
would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo?
In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in
Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded
between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst?
Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already
involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting
each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present
time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during
a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing
resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator
or encourager of the attack?
Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility
of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise
and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might
be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert.
In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just
possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force
(and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions
might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a
devastating response.
Current Cuba policy wrecks OAS credibility – regional coalitions overtake it
Reuters 12 (Brian Ellsworth, “Despite Obama charm, Americas summit boosts U.S. isolation,” 4/16/12,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summit-obamaidUSBRE83F0UD20120416)//SJF
(Reuters) - President Barack Obama
sat patiently through diatribes, interruptions and even the occasional eyeball roll at the weekend Summit of the Americas in an effort to win over Latin American leaders fed up with
U.S. policies.
He failed.
The United States instead emerged from the summit in Colombia increasingly isolated as nearly 30 regional heads of state refused to sign a
joint declaration in protest against the continued exclusion of communist-led Cuba from the event.
The rare show of unity highlights the steady decline of Washington's influence in a region that has
become less dependent on U.S. trade and investment thanks economic growth rates that are the envy
of the developed world and new opportunities with China.
It also signals a further weakening of the already strained hemispheric system of diplomacy, built
around the Organization of American States (OAS) which has struggled to remain relevant during a
time of rapid change for its members.
Seen as an instrument of U.S. policy in Latin America during the Cold War, the OAS has lost ground in a region that is no
longer content with being the backyard of the United States.
"It seems the United States still wants to isolate us from the world, it thinks it can still manipulate Latin America, but
that's ending," said Bolivian President Evo Morales, a fierce critic of U.S. policy in Latin America and staunch ally of Venezuela's leftist leader
Hugo Chavez.
"What I think is that this is a rebellion of Latin American countries against the United States."
NEWFOUND UNITY
White House officials disagreed with the notion that the
failure to agree on issues like Cuba signaled a new dynamic to
U.S. relations within the hemisphere.
"We've had disagreements on those issues for decades," a senior Obama aide said. "They are built into the equation. They are about theater -not substance."
In fairness to Obama, the lack of consensus had little to do with his conduct or even that of Secret Service agents whose indiscreet encounter
with prostitutes in the beachside city of Cartagena, Colombia, overshadowed much of the proceedings.
He was in fact commended by several presidents for listening politely to political leaders, helping soften perception of U.S. officials as arrogant
and domineering.
"I think it's the first time I've seen a president of the United States spend almost the entire summit sitting, listening to the all concerns of all
countries," said Mexican President Felipe Calderon.
"This was a very valuable gesture by President Obama."
At a joint news conference with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, Obama emphasized that his administration had made some changes
to its policy toward Cuba already and was open to more if it saw more signs of democratic reforms.
"I'm not somebody who brings to the table here a lot of baggage from the past, and I want to look at all these problems in a new and fresh
way," he said.
But Obama's staid charm was unable to paper over growing differences with the region.
Facing a tough re-election race this year, Obama had no room to compromise on the five-decade-old U.S. embargo on Cuba that is widely
supported by conservatives in the United States, and particularly the anti-Castro exile community in Florida, a key state in a presidential vote.
U.S. insistence that Havana undertake democratic reforms before returning to the hemispheric family led to a clash with a united front of leftist
and conservative governments that see Washington's policy toward Cuba as a relic of the Cold War.
The unexpected result was a diplomatic victory for Havana.
The newfound regional unity on Cuba may augur a growing willingness across the political spectrum to
challenge the U.S. State Department on thorny issues for years considered taboo.
That could include insistence that the United States assume greater responsibility for reducing consumption of illegal narcotics as an alternative
to the bloody war on drugs and its rising toll on Latin America.
"From the so-called Washington consensus ... toward a nascent consensus without Washington for a united Latin America," tweeted
Venezuela's foreign ministry, referring to orthodox economic policies advocated by Washington in the 1990s.
NEW DIPLOMACY, NEW ECONOMY
The stark divide over Cuba - with 32 nations in favor of inviting it to future summits and only the United States and Canada opposed will fuel arguments that the OAS is an outdated institution for regional diplomacy.
The OAS already faces competition from alternative forums such as the Union of South American nations (Unasur)
and the Chavez-backed Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (Celac).
Despite the new winds blowing in regional diplomacy, economics is driving the changes as much as
politics.
Once seen as monolithic block of basket-case economies dependent on U.S. support, Latin American countries are coveted
investment destinations with sophisticated financial systems that have innovated in areas ranging from
energy to aviation.
Chinese companies eager to pump oil, harvest soy and build badly needed infrastructure are showering them with offers of investment and
financing.
With the U.S. economy still struggling to stay above water and foreign aid budgets seen dwindling, Washington
has fewer sticks to
brandish and fewer carrots to offer.
"This summit was a reminder, a wake-up call, that the traditional way of doing business vis-a-vis the
region is eroding," said Geoff Thale, program director at the Washington Office on Latin America
Cyber-attack coming in the Western Hemisphere – OAS legitimacy is key to
coordination
Caribbean News Now 6/25 (“OAS launches cyber security crisis management exercise,” 6/25/13,
http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/headline-OAS-launches-cyber-security-crisis-managementexercise-16500.html)//SJF
WASHINGTON, USA -- The assistant secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS),
Albert Ramdin, noted that cyber attacks are taking place in the region with “frightening frequency,
sometimes with far reaching and disastrous consequences,” in his remarks during the inauguration of a
subregional cyber security management exercise taking place at the headquarters of the OAS in
Washington DC, in which Anne Witkowsky, the acting principal deputy coordinator for the Bureau of
Counterterrorism of the United States Department of State, also took part.
Organization of American States (OAS) Assistant Secretary General Albert Ramdin
Upon opening the exercise, organized by the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) of the
OAS, Ramdin said, “The timing of this event is critical,” as there has been an increase in cyber attacks in
most OAS member states.
“It is important to remember,” he said, “that these attacks do not discriminate between nations big or
small, powerful or not, and can threaten the infrastructure of our nations in unpredictable and
undesirable ways. Cyber incidents target all kinds of public and private entities regardless of political
social or economic factors. Therefore being unprepared for an attack leaves our societies vulnerable.”
The exercise in responding to cyber security crises, which takes advantage of the OAS mobile crisis
simulation laboratory, has three objectives, Ramdin explained. First, it “will test officials’ abilities to
analyze and mitigate the effects of a well organized cyber incident targeting various types of critical
infrastructure.”
Secondly, the exercise “will test communication mechanisms between countries when responding to
cyber incidents,” and finally, it will “foster an exchange of best practices and lessons-learned in
responding to cyber threats, both technically and at the policy-level.”
Since the first crisis management exercise (CME), which was organized by the OAS in Miami in 2011,
there have been seven more, in various countries throughout the Americas, noted Ramdin. Today, he
added, “the world is much different, much more complex, and our exercise has evolved to match those
changing realities.”
Among the adjustments made, said the assistant secretary general, are an upgrade of the infrastructure
of the mobile lab and the inclusion of policymakers in the exercises, to avoid “disconnect” between
policy and technical personnel during crises.
“Cyber threats will continue in this hemisphere,” said Ramdin in his conclusion. “That is a reality which
we can accept. The other reality which we have to establish is how we protect ourselves, how we
prepare ourselves for that situation.”
The senior OAS official expressed in particular his gratitude to the United States for its support of the
program, which he said had made the mobile lab “a meaningful reality.”
For her part, Witkowsky said, “While the United States has seen earlier demonstrations of the cyber
security mobile lab, this will be the first opportunity to gain for ourselves some hands on experience
with it as exercise participants with you.”
“Partnering with other OAS member states in this first ever regional exercise will be an excellent
opportunity for us to explore our own policies and procedures for responding to cyber threats as well as
our abilities to collaborate and coordinate responses with our partners in the Hemisphere during a cyber
incident,” said Witkowsky, who noted that her country is the target of an ever-increasing number of
cyber attacks.
The State Department official commended the OAS and CICTE “for playing such a critical role in the
coordination of cyber security initiatives, including capacity building and facilitating regional
cooperation,” and said the cyber security program of the Organization “has become a key forum in the
Americas for debate and the exchange of ideas about current and future cyber security trends as well as
providing practical training. The United States will continue to support this important program and we
welcome the commitment of the OAS to support it as well.”
The event brings together nearly 50 participants from 19 OAS member states to take part in not only the
crisis management exercises, but also country updates and the sharing of best practices. Participants
come from diverse sectors, including computer security incident response team (CSIRT) members,
policymakers, communications officers, and security specialists, among others. The event will conclude
on Tuesday.
Cyberattacks cause extinction
Andreasen 6/14 – national security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Nuclear
Security Project (Steve, “Cyberwar’s Threat Does Not Justify a New Policy of Nuclear Deterrence,”
6/14/13, http://www.nti.org/analysis/opinions/cyberwars-threat-does-not-justify-new-policy-nucleardeterrence/)//SJF
President Obama is expected to unveil a new nuclear policy initiative this week in Berlin. Whether
he can make good on his first-term commitments to end outdated Cold War nuclear
policies may depend on a firm presidential directive to the Pentagon rejecting any new
missions for nuclear weapons — in particular, their use in response to cyberattacks.
The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board concluded this year that China and Russia could
develop capabilities to launch an “existential cyber attack” against the United States —
that is, an attack causing sufficient damage that our government would lose control of
the country. “While the manifestation of a nuclear and cyber attack are very different,”
the board concluded, “in the end, the existential impact to the United States is the same.”
Because it will be impossible to fully defend our systems against existential cyberthreats, the board
argued, the United States must be prepared to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter
cyberattacks. In other words: I’ll see your cyberwar and raise you a nuclear response.
Some would argue that Obama made clear in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviewthat the
United States has adopted the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attacks the “sole purpose”
of our nuclear weapons. Well, the board effectively reviewed the fine print and concluded
that the Nuclear Posture Review was “essentially silent” on the relationship between U.S. nuclear
weapons and cyberthreats, so connecting the two “is not precluded in the stated policy.”
As the board noted, cyberattacks can occur very quickly and without warning, requiring rapid
decision-making by those responsible for protecting our country. Integrating the nuclear threat into the
equation means making clear to any potential adversary that the United States is prepared to use
nuclear weapons very early in response to a major cyberattack — and is maintaining nuclear forces on
“prompt launch” status to do so.
Russia and China would certainly take note — and presumably follow suit. Moreover, if
the United States, Russia and China adopted policies threatening an early nuclear response to
cyber-attacks, more countries would surely take the same approach.
It’s hard to see how this cyber-nuclear action-reaction dynamic would improve U.S. or global security.
It’s more likely to lead to a new focus by Pentagon planners on generating an expanding
list of cyber-related targets and the operational deployment of nuclear forces to strike
those targets in minutes.
Against that backdrop, maintaining momentum toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the
United States’ national security strategy (and that of other nations) — a general policy course
pursued by the past five presidents — would become far more difficult. Further reductions in
nuclear forces and changes in “hair-trigger” postures, designed to lessen the risk of an accidental or
unauthorized nuclear launch, would also probably stall.
Fortunately, Obama has both the authority and the opportunity to make clear that he
meant what he said when he laid out his nuclear policy in Prague in 2009. For decades,
presidential decision directives have made clear the purpose of nuclear weapons in U.S.
national security strategy and provided broad guidance for military planners who
prepare the operations and targeting plans for our nuclear forces. An update to existing
presidential guidance is one of the homework items tasked by the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review.
Cyberthreats are very real, and there is much we need to do to defend our military and critical civilian
infrastructure against what former defense secretary Leon E. Panetta referred to as a “cyber Pearl
Harbor” — including enhancing the ability to take action, when directed by the president, against those
who would attack us. We also need more diplomacy such as that practiced by Obama with
his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, at their recent summit. Multinational cooperation centers
could ultimately lead to shared approaches to cybersecurity, including agreements related to limiting
cyberwar.
The plan sends a clear signal to improve Latin American relations and reinvigorate the
OAS
White, 13-Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay
and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times,
3/7/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latinamerica.html?pagewanted=all)//TL
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a
partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823,
through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its
allies in Central and South America.
Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention
and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo
Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of
the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an
opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.
Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to
antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro
and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it
ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition
from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.
An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United
States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the
Americas.
I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin
America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s creative response to the
revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic
Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that
had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century.
Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic
change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the
Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the
same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this
effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even naïve, but Kennedy’s focus on Latin
America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed
the whole concept of inter-American relations.
Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la
noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy.
Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were
labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed,
largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism.
During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and
closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the
secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s
responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign
Service.
The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran
revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s
the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins.
We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes.
After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department
asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that
United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling
against social injustice and state terror. As a result, “we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for
ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of
the national interest.”
Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have
undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional
institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in
Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chávez. He promoted the
creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States — which excludes the United States
and Canada — as an alternative.
At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the
most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony
of empire.”
Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick
with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change,
interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and
labor.
Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude
of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin
America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr.
Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.
Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to
renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.
After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and
economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action
and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro
into a folk hero.
And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will
retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that
two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of
Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of
Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is
the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a
continuing ethics controversy.)
Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can
prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?
The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess the
irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his
new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President
Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of
American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on
Cuba and asks your help.
Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral
challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a
sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely
of elected governments.
If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps,
the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations
with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a
hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical
footnote.
Advantage 2 – leadership
Increasing economic engagement with Cuba is the vital internal link to establishing a
credible commitment to multilateralism and successful conflict resolution. This spills
over to conflict prevention in the Middle East and Kashmir
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic
Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS
CUBA,” 1/14/10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//SJF
At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step
towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect
Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership
184
nations voted against the embargo5 - a powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to
and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007,
Cuba . The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a
different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from
coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War .
With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go
a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations.
While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal
Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that
led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What
about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility
to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches
to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba.
On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to
Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor
Loosening or lifting the
embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be
mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better
chance to flourish. If negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached,
with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro.
international support would be easier to garner .
Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our
interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with
retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy.
Policy and National Interest
Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy
remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of
which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989,
communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime
was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly
dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba.
Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a
50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section
will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years.
From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish
Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that
would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that
was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused
to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s
exports came from western governments.7
The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing
conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing
fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the
Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s
attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban
presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred
Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security
Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign
diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech
proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in
Congress.
As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return
to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong
Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and
the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and
destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic
orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British
and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on
Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by
lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban
relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even
allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and
status quo between countries remained.
The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in
Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies
and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops
from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation
to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14
This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first
Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the
1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15
By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a
41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air
force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before
U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in
place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed
property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the
noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.
The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba
has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no
closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.
A History of Anger and Distrust
After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts
to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could
spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba
relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations.
Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S.
owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger
issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by
the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in
negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile
The underlying fear
that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in
U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic
bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government
reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business
Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions.
opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible
and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba.
The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic
progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the
Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading
with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S.
assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo
yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in
February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its
western traders.20
Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was
obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries
like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the
embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened
embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the
U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to
galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating
Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export
communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican
independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s
support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion
efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at
the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping
point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO
compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo
to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the
embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a
renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade
fair.”26
Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he
took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments
and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely
ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries.
It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to
established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it
can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country
affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish
American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted.
Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past
indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S.
national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro.
Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic
engagement
in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a
common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real
progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban
American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and
security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually
accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba.
To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing
on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open
markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with
China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been
somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s
Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29
By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits.
To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to
closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new
Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations.
As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should
expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic
concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic
relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of
the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.
Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis
Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and
suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law
enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement.
The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer
is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S.
involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It
has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story
of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s
feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.
How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement.
It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international
cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true.
If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing
the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro
and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the
international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve
intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding
without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is
necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.
Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how
they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for
“everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to
defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs
for homeland security.
In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the
U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel
Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under
embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic
engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.
Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?
Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an
Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to
our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant.
Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement,
be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other
misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This
scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established
communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal
with regional problems.
While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could
see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980,
120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made
residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where
Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This
scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national
interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.
Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis
If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50
years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive
reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow.
The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are
democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to
advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark,
I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal
and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He
should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with
we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business
opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining
their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate.
Cuba. Finally,
Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business
opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers
associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American
support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President
Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these.
We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial
alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist
approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on
human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different
treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business
practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance.
Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations
through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished.
Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government.
If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then
the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is
serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with
Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international
solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased
removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with
the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety
regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure
before the next elections.
The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement
in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying
could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro
suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.
While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a
prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of
Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the
strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before
complete reciprocation can be expected.
Conclusion
it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains
between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize
negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually
beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be
profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to
flourish.
If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success
in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked
Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall –
problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir . President Obama could leverage this international
reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with
Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order
bringing true peace for years to come.
Middle East war goes nuclear – outweighs every impact and rationality doesn’t check
Beck 5/28 – Middle East Analyst at TheCommentator (Noah, “A nuclear Middle East is doomsday,
5/28/13, http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3633/a_nuclear_middle_east_is_doomsday)//SJF
As the Obama administration tries to unbury itself from snowballing scandals, my apocalyptic thriller
steadily crawls from fiction to fact. The Middle East is an insane place. And it's going nuclear. Yet, too
many optimists, isolationists, and self-deluded analysts think that rationality will prevail and keep us all
safe.
Is it rational to take out the organs of a man you just killed and eat them on camera, as a Syrian rebel
recently did? How about a senior Palestinian Authority official who recently declared on Lebanese
television that the PA would nuke Israel if it had nuclear weapons? Jibril Rajoub, the deputy secretary of
the Fatah Central Committee and the chairman of the PA Olympics Committee, apparently doesn’t mind
that the nuclear mushroom he wants over Israel would also kill millions of Palestinians, just miles away –
the main goal is that Israel be nuked.
At best, one can say that there is a “twisted rationality” in the Middle East, as exemplified by Iran’s
former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a December 2001 speech, Rafsanjani said, “If one day the
Islamic world [acquires nuclear weapons], then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because
the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the
Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. Jews shall expect to be once again
scattered and wandering around the globe the day when this appendix is extracted from the region and
the Muslim world.”
Despite the above, Rafsanjani is considered such a “moderate” that regime hardliners disqualified him
from running in Iran’s presidential election next month. So if Rafsanjani thinks that nuking Israel would
be worth a few million Iranians killed by an Israeli retributive nuclear strike, what does that say about
the rationality of the current, less “moderate” regime (the one regularly threatening to destroy Israel)?
Could the eschatology of Shia Islam further heighten the risk of Armageddon? If the regime under
Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei genuinely believes that an apocalyptic war will hasten the
advent of the Twelfth Imam (the Islamic messiah), doesn’t that make a nuclear first strike on Israel that
much more tempting? Scholars may disagree about the potential impact of messianic ideology on
nuclear decisions, but the mere possibility that geopolitical conflicts could be viewed through a
theological lens hardly adds rationality to the Middle East.
To spread its radical ideology, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard finances, trains, and arms some of the
world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations: Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. These
organizations are collectively responsible for thousands of deaths from decades of terrorist attacks and
wars in Israel, Lebanon, Europe, and Latin America. Iran has also provided support to the Taliban, Iraqi
insurgents, and al-Qaeda. And the Islamic Republic supplies Syria with arms, training, and fighters to
help President Basher Assad stay in power by massacring his own people every day.
If this is how the Iranian regime has behaved without the impunity conferred by a nuclear deterrent,
what can be expected of the regime once it has nukes?
Equally troubling, if Iran’s large-scale and dispersed nuclear program continues, the regime will be able
to produce dozens of nuclear bombs every year. Such massive production only increases the odds of
intentional (or unauthorized) nuclear transfers to state or non-state actors, and spurs regional rivals into
acquiring or developing a matching nuclear deterrent.
Three trends will make a nuclear Middle East even scarier: 1) technological improvements and
miniaturization will make it easier to create and transfer small nuclear devices. 2) Climate change will
aggravate water scarcity, which will only intensify generational conflicts in the Middle East. 3) Increasing
technological interconnectedness will exacerbate sectarianism (as has been the case in Syria, where
atrocities from the civil war are constantly recorded on video and shared, only further radicalizing the
belligerents).
Once Iran has nukes, the potential catastrophes are manifold: a Middle East decimated by a far-reaching
Sunni versus Shia conflict (sparked in Syria) and/or by a nuclear war between Israel and Iran; a nuclear
arms race among other Mideast countries; the end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
terrorists who can target major cities with small nuclear devices. However it plays out, oil prices will
skyrocket and many will die.
The Iranian nuclear threat is the most important global security issue of this generation. To focus public
attention on it, I authored “The Last Israelis” in a breathless ten weeks, hoping to release the book in
time to impact the May 2012 “P5+1” talks in Baghdad, when world powers tried yet again for a
diplomatic solution. To continue raising awareness before Iran crosses the nuclear finish line, I just
released a second edition, and added paperback and audiobook formats to reach more people with my
book’s urgent message.
But what happens when it’s too late to stop Iranian nukes? “The Last Israelis” depicts the doomsday
scenario resulting from a nuclear-armed Iran, as experienced by 35 ideologically divided and ethnically
diverse Israelis aboard the Dolphin submarine. To write the apocalyptic thriller, I dropped everything in
my life and secured interviews with veterans of Israel’s elite and secretive submarine force. Imagining 35
submariners confronting the unthinkable as World War III unfolds in their claustrophobic reality was bad
enough; watching the world gradually move in the same direction, knowing that it’s not my imagination
this time, is far worse.
Current conflict resolution in Kashmir is ineffective – new international action is key to
prevent nuclear conflict
Zargar 6/7 – Middle East reporter, Greater Kashmir News (Abdul Majid, “Kashmir Vs Global
Community,” 6/7/13, http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jun/8/kashmir-vs-globalcommunity-57.asp)//SJF
Normal relations between India and Pakistan offer tremendous benefits & incentives to the global
community. But normalization is itself subject to settlement of core issue of Kashmir between them.
Indo-Pak tensions are especially dangerous because they bring two nuclear states face to face and any
conflict between the two countries sparked by the dispute could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear
war. They distract Islamabad from the urgent task of combating terrorists and militants on its own soil;
and they contribute to Pakistani suspicions about India's activities in Afghanistan. Thus, the long-
standing dispute over Kashmir is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct implications for
global community’s ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat posed by
extremist groups in South Asia.
For Kashmir, the conflict has been a great tragedy and a disaster in all respects: a large death toll,
unabated human rights abuses which in normal course qualify as crimes against humanity or war crimes,
displacement of populations, a devastated economy, serious environmental damage, massive military
buildup, and severe psychological distress. Above all peoples lack of trust & confidence in the local
political system put in place by the New Delhi. And for India Kashmir has been a patient with incurable
disease from day one which it manages by shifting alternatively between Intensive care unit (ICU) and
general ward depending upon the seriousness of the situation at particular point of time and where the
job of the Local attending doctors (Politicians) is limited only to report the situation and take
instructions of medicines & diet from New-Delhi. No serious attempt is made for a permanent cure of
this patient except throwing billions of rupees in a bottomless pit.
But the big question-Is global community doing enough to address the issue? While US and its
surrogates are busy in creating new tensions & disorders in the world, existing long pending disputes like
Kashmir & Palestine are hardly attended to. As far as Kashmir is concerned, though the US treats the
territory as disputed but its State Department, reportedly treats the Indian repression there as “an
internal Indian matter”. A former senior CIA officer, Robert Grenier, sometime back, called this posture
by the Obama administration “craven”. When one contrasts this with the legitimate interest that the US
showed in human rights in Arab states, and the consequent action it took, one loses all faith in
protestations of moral concern underlying American policies and attitudes. And by the way what are the
demands of the people of Kashmir for which they are brutalized day in & day out -a right to vote in a
plebiscite promised long ago - The same right which the America claims to support in other parts of the
world.
But the recent discourse initiated by Norwegian parliament offers a new ray of hope. It has urged for
an early solution to the Kashmir conflict. During discussions, Chairman of the Norwegian Parliamentary
Kashmir Committee and Christian Democratic party leader Knut Arild Hareide referred to Kashmir as a
regressive wound in the relationship between India & Pakistan and a continuing tragedy for the
Kashmiri people. It surely is a comfort to know that the dispute has the attention of European nations.
A mention, in this context, also needs to be made of recent conference held in Islamabad where Mr.
V.P.Vaidik an eminent journalist & political thinker (also chairman of Council for Indian Foreign Policy),
mooted the idea of total demilitarization of both sides of Kashmir. “Pughwash” is also holding a two day
conference in Islamabad starting on 4th July 2013. The event would be drawing regional and
international conflict resolution experts, diplomats, besides political elite from both parts of Kashmir,
from Pakistan, India, USA, and Britain. In Srinagar, a meaningful lecture was delivered by Praful Bidwai, a
noted columnist and political analyst (Also Founder member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament
and Peace)on the occasion of release of 10th Volume of Aina-Numa. In his assessment of the things, if
India & Pakistan fail to find a solution to the Kashmir issue anytime soon and Indian repression &
suppression continues in Kashmir , the whole of South Asia runs the risk of being turned into a nuclear
dust because of a lurking danger of a nuclear war between two Countries. In his opinion the two
Countries came very close to such a catastrophe twice during Kargil war. Recent reports also suggest
that both the countries have increased their nuclear warheads in 2012 roughly by 10% over the
previous year( see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report).
So India, Pakistan & the Global Community need to take a fresh look at Kashmir. Like a festering wound
that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural
medicines of air and light. Injustice must be exposed and options of a final settlement discussed &
explored. The global community can ignore the problem at its own peril. If Kashmiris have been
suffering for decades, it may take only minutes for the whole world to suffer & suffer irretrievably.
Cuba will say yes to efforts to pursue greater normalization
Sweig 12 – Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow for Latin America studies and director for Latin
America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Julia E, “US Cuba Normalization,” 7/6/12,
http://uscubanormalization.blogspot.com/2012/06/julia-sweig-overview-for-council-on.html)//SJF
The second point is what's happening in Cuba. It's
not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of
unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner. I believe we have one in Havana but
have failed to read the signals. Raul Castro has now been in office since the beginning of 2008. Raul holds the reins on
both foreign policy and domestic policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide
range of economic and political and social reforms are his priority. In a deal that was coordinated with the help of the
Cuban Catholic Church and Spain, he released all of the political prisoners in Cuba. He also is taking a number of steps that imply a major
rewriting of the social contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals more freedom--economically, especially, but
also in terms of speech--than we've seen in the last fifty years. He
has privatized the residential real estate and car
market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries, and greatly expanded space
for small businesses. He also is moving to deal with corruption and to prepare the groundwork for a
great deal more foreign investment. He's moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last
fifty years has called upon Cuba to make, albeit under the rubric of a one-party system. There's a broad range of cooperation-neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as Cuba has just started drilling for oil, counternarcotics,
and natural disasters--between the two countries that is still not happening, and that gives me the
impression that the United States has been unwilling to take "yes" for an answer and respond positively
to steps taken by Cuba.
The third geographic part of the story is south Florida. When they're polled, the majority of Cuban-Americans say that the embargo has failed,
and support lifting the travel ban or loosening the embargo or some steps along that continuum of liberalization and normalization. The one
most significant step that Obama did take when he took office was to eliminate the restriction on Cuban-American travel and remittances to
Cuba. Cuban-Americans are now voting with their feet. If you go to the Miami airport, you will see thirty, forty flights to Cuba a week just out of
Miami. Cuban-Americans are now investing in their families' small businesses on the island. The politics of this are strange because we are told
by the Obama administration that we can't rock the boat of the Cuban-American vote, but those very voters are in fact demonstrating that they
support a radically different set of policies than, in fact, the Obama administration has supported.
Offers of economic engagement will eventually spur political reform and
normalization of relations, it will also restore US credibility
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
As discussed above, any major reform in Cuba should first begin in the economic sector, as opposed to
the political sector. The Cuban government will likely accept foreign investment and introduce elements
of private ownership into its economy long before it releases its stranglehold on politics and holds free
elections. Although the first stage of economic reform has already begun, this stage can end at a
moment's notice. Policy performance matters, and nothing breeds success like success. Therefore, the
U.S. should design a policy that helps ensure that these initial reforms are successful.
Success of reform will breed more reform and an increased demand for a different economic
environment. In this way, an initial aperture's success will punch a hole in the Cuban government's
ability to restrain economic [*235] activity while maintaining credibility. While Cuba introduces these
financial reforms, the U.S. should resist calls to strengthen the economic sanctions, and should instead
respond to any economic opening on the island with more bilateral trade opportunities. By engaging
Cuba economically , rather than isolating it politically, the U.S. could help link an entire generation of
Cubans to the capitalist world.
Ultimately, closed regimes survive not because they are constantly adapting to changed circumstances,
but rather because they are able to maintain a certain level of consistency, both domestically and in
their foreign relations. Rapid change in either sphere can become destabilizing. To that end, facilitating
closer economic ties between the U.S. and Cuba could also function as an external shock to the Cuban
regime. n156 External shocks promote reform by forcing the regime to adapt to rapidly changing
circumstances, which may then open the Pandora's box of transformation.
Reformists will quickly gain credibility in the government and among the people if their policies begin to
solve the island's economic woes. The reformists will be more able to sell their policies at the popular
level, solidifying their power bases, which will then encourage more reform. n157 The notion of popular
support will become especially important in a post-Castro environment where any successor will be
particularly sensitive to popular discontent along with popular legitimacy. That being said, a successor
government interested in reforming the system may still resort to kangaroo trials and heavyhandedness. As these reformists gain power, the U.S. should resist efforts to punish the regime when it
resorts to classically repressive tactics to consolidate its power, or when it tries to goad the U.S. into a
reaction it can later use to its advantage. n158 If the U.S. were to react hostilely to these measures, it
would only destabilize the situation and encourage more violence.
Once the political situation has stabilized, violence is likely to subside, and the reformists can refocus
their efforts on changing the system, rather than worrying about a U.S. intervention. Although Cuba
poses no existential threat to America, the fear that America poses an existential threat to [*236] Cuba
runs deep, especially among the regime's hardliners. Reactionaries attempting to truncate the onset of
reforms may seek to entice the United States to overreact to their repressive tactics by either passing
additional economic sanctions, or worse yet, intervening militarily. Both options, in the midst of a
transition, however far along it may be, would be strategically catastrophic.
One might reasonably argue that the success of these piecemeal reforms would give the regime more
breathing space to survive. This is a valid concern, but is analytically unsound. The regime has survived
despite a terrible twenty-year economic depression that began after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Although it sounds counter-intuitive, economic success will be the harbinger of structural collapse in
Cuba.
For fifty years one system has ruled supreme; but if another system, however nascent, begins to show
that it can meet the needs of the people more effectively, the prevailing system will begin to erode from
the ground up. To an extent, the United States can influence this process. As the global financial crisis
begins to negatively affect Cuba's state-benefactors (particularly Venezuela), as well as those private
investors willing to enter a closed economy, the Cuban government will approach the point where only
fundamental economic change will encourage sufficient growth. The United States can help ensure that
Cuba reaches this point by encouraging more travel, rewarding economic liberalizations, and by bringing
the island back into the global financial system.
Conclusion
For fifty years the Castro regime has ruled Cuba with an iron fist. In response, for nearly fifty years, the
United States has tried to isolate Cuba, politically and economically. This policy has failed to achieve any
discernible policy end, and has actually helped isolate the United States from the rest of the world.
Moreover, America's hostile relationship with Cuba has become a symbolic rallying cry for an emerging
class of Latin American leaders determined to convert anti-American sentiments into electoral victories.
As a result, America's image has suffered, as has its ability to influence a region so intricately tied to its
economic and national security interests. This report provides a starting point for dialogue with the
Cuban government, which could eventually be used as a stepping-stone towards the normalization of
relations.
Additionally, this report attempts to accomplish another end: the fostering of a dialogue amongst
policymakers in America who are ready and willing to listen to new ideas and a fresh approach.
Implementing these recommendations will not be easy, but they certainly are not as insurmountable as
some will claim. President Obama was the first Democrat to win Florida's Hispanic vote, and nearly tied
Senator [*237] John McCain in the Cuban-dominated Miami-Dade County. n159 While in 2004
President Bush won 55% of the Hispanic vote, President Obama bettered that number by winning over
57%, compared to only 42% for Senator McCain. This emerging political climate has given the President
enough room to maneuver around those who hope to continue the failures of the status quo.
Freedom has always been an important part of America's narrative, but too many leaders in Cuba see
America's promotion of human rights and democracy as a war on sovereignty. The new central premise
of America's Cuba policy must focus on economic reform, including an American commitment to helping
Cuba develop on its own terms. This approach would support our interest in one day seeing a free and
open society flourish in Cuba.
Solvency
Agent
Executive is normal means
The executive will do the plan – it’s normal means
Perales et al., 10-
senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
(Jose Raul, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson Center Latin American Program, August
2010, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//TL
Whether or not one agrees with the U.S. embargo against Cuba, what must be kept in mind is the fact that the embargo is there for
reasons of human rights, argued Christopher Sabatini, policy director at the Council of the Americas, and that has been how the
embargo been defended. And in this we can’t lose sight of the fact that Cuba’s record on human rights is abysmal. The regime
currently has detained over 200 political prisoners, many of whom have been arrested for the vague charge of “dangerousness.”
Cuba violates freedom of association, strictly limits freedom of expression, and systematically violates the core covenants of the
International Labour Organization (ILO). When the debate strays from this central issue of rights, Sabatini stated, we lose sight of
the real issues facing Cuba and Cuban citizens today. For this reason, any and all changes to the U.S. embargo must first and
foremost be geared toward strengthening the hand of the island’s independent sectors. According to Sabatini, there is broad scope in
the United States for the executive to make regulatory changes that can give U.S. businesses and institutional actors greater scope to
begin developing closer relations inside Cuba. This is important because any change to the status quo in bilateral economic relations
will start with the executive’s authority over the embargo’s regulations. Indeed, a quick perusal of past efforts at
dismantling U.S. embargoes—in particular, against Vietnam—reveals that terminating an embargo has never
been the result of a straight up-or-down congressional vote. Instead, this has been the result of slight,
incremental regulatory changes that have served to allow independent actors to develop their own contacts with counterparts
on the island and empower people. These made the incentives for change easier to recognize, built an active, vested coalition
supporting broader change, and made dismantling more palatable to political audiences. Sabatini noted that the ability to affect
significant change on the embargo falls within the scope of executive regulatory authority, particularly in areas
such as telecommunications and some elements of travel—particularly in licensing for cultural and educational exchanges and even
some elements of marketing trips. In this sense the Obama administration took a first step on April 13, 2009, when President
Obama announced an increased allowance for U.S. telecommunications companies to establish licensing agreements to allow
roaming coverage on the island and establish a fiberoptic cable to Cuba, with the stated purpose of helping Cubans communicate
with the rest of the world. However, according to Sabatini, it turned out that despite the fanfare, the regulations that came out of the
U.S. bureaucracy five months later did little realistically to allow U.S. companies to establish the necessary and sufficient links to
allow broad communication between Cubans and the rest of the world. For instance, in his announcement, President Obama called
for the establishment of a fiberoptic cable linking Cuba to the outside world. However, regulations prohibiting U.S. equipment
transfers or sales to the island for commercial purposes persist. Similarly, the regulations continued to prevent the sale of handsets
on the island for commercial purposes and blocks infrastructure investments such as cell phone towers, routers, and switchers. All of
these sorts of now-prohibited equipment is essential if there is to be any meaningful broadbased access to the tools of
communication. Sabatini contended that other stated goals of the Obama administration have suffered a similar fate, yet he also
claimed this does not mean all is lost. In his view President Obama just needs to take the next step: with the stroke of the
executive pen he can introduce regulatory modifications that can allow the federal bureaucracy to meet
his stated goals regarding Cuba.
AT: Helms Burton
Helms-Burton does not prevent presidential action on the embargo
Perales et al 2010 (Senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars. (Jose Raul, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson Center Latin
American Program, August 2010, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)
Nonetheless, Reinsch noted that there are
far fewer statutory obstacles to a change in U.S. policy than most
observers suggest. The widely held assumption that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of
1996—commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act—sidelines the executive branch’s role in U.S.- Cuban
relations is largely incorrect. Helms-Burton codified the President’s licensing authority and thus his or her
ability to make changes to the embargo. There is sufficient flexibility within existing rules and regulations
to enable U.S. presidents to enact their own initiatives. President Obama appears to know and understand
this, as seen with his mid-April 2009 declaration of a thawing of relations; however, his approach has
been one of modest, piecemeal change. Reinsch postulated that the reason for the Obama administration’s tempered
approach to policy change is that the President assumed that any U.S. concession would be followed by a Cuban concession, in a titfortat scenario. However, Reinsch believes Cuba will not reciprocate because the regime is the biggest beneficiary of the embargo.
The regime is able to deflect criticism away from itself by blaming the island’s ills on the United States. Historically, attempts at
rapprochement by previous U.S. Presidents have not been received favorably by the Cuban Government.
Executive waivers solve
Obama can expand economic engagement by waiving sanctions on the sale of goods
and services to private entrepreneurs and financial services to travelers
Goodman, 13-Reporter for Bloomberg News (Joshua, “Obama Can Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open
Economy, Groups Say”, Bloomberg, 2/20/13, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obamashould-bend-cuba-embargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html)//TL
President Barack Obama should
break free of the embargo on Cuba and assert his authority to promote a
free-market overhaul taking place on the communist island. The recommendation is contained in concurrent reports
to be published today by the Cuba Study Group and the Council of the Americas, two groups seeking to end a decades-old deadlock
on U.S. policy toward Cuba. Among steps Obama can take without violating sanctions passed by Congress are
opening U.S. markets, as well as authorizing the sale of American goods and services, to the estimated
400,000 private entrepreneurs that have arisen since Cuban President Raul Castro started cutting state payrolls in 2011.
The reports also recommend allowing U.S. credit card and insurance companies to provide basic financial
services to licensed U.S. travelers to Cuba. “We’ve been sitting on the sidelines with our hands tied by an
antiquated law that’s being too strictly interpreted,” said Chris Sabatini, an author of the report and senior policy
director for the Council of the Americas, a business-backed group based in New York. “There’s more Obama can do to be a
catalyst for meaningful economic change.” Obama in 2009 allowed companies for the first time to provide
communications services to the Caribbean island of 11 million and lifted a travel ban for Cuban-Americans. The loosening of
restrictions, while heralded by the White House as a way to undermine the Castro government’s control of information, was seen as
insufficient by potential investors including Verizon Communications Inc. and AT&T Inc. Economic Overhaul Now, in a second
term, and with private business expanding in Cuba, Obama has a freer hand to do more, said Sabatini. An
exception to the embargo allowing U.S. businesses and consumers to trade with non-state enterprises in
Cuba would be small in scale though help empower a growing, viable constituency for change on the
island, he said. Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in 2006, Castro has relaxed state control of the economy in the
biggest economic overhaul since the 1959 revolution. To provide jobs for the 1 million state workers being laid off, the government
began allowing the buying and selling of homes and the creation of farming co-operatives and other private businesses. The latest
sign of change are new rules that took effect in January allowing most Cubans to bypass requirements they obtain an exit visa or
invitation from abroad to leave the island. Castro in December said that he hopes that productivity gains will boost economic growth
this year to at least 3.7 percent. Gross domestic product expanded 3.1 percent in 2012.
The Executive Branch solves – there are a degree of talks and reforms the executive
branch could perform that would improve relations and stimulate the economy
Piccone 13 –Deputy Director of Foreign Policy at Brookings (Ted, “Opening to Havana”, January 17,
2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana)//eek
I recommend that your administration, led by a special envoy appointed by you and reporting to the
secretary of state and the national security advisor, open a discreet dialogue with Havana on a wide
range of issues, without preconditions. The aim of the direct bilateral talks would be to resolve outstanding
issues around migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, the environment, and trade and investment that are important to
protecting U.S. national interests. Outcomes of these talks could include provisions that normalize migration flows, strengthen border security,
break down the walls of communication that hinder U.S. ability to understand how Cuba is changing, and help U.S. businesses create new jobs.
In the context of such talks your
special envoy would be authorized to signal your administration’s willingness
to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, pointing to its assistance to the Colombian peace talks as
fresh evidence for the decision. This would remove a major irritant in U.S.-Cuba relations, allow a greater share
of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce, and free up
resources to tackle serious threats to the homeland from other sources like Iran. We should also consider authorizing
payments for exports to Cuba through financing issued by U.S. banks and granting a general license to
allow vessels that have entered Cuban ports to enter U.S. ports without having to wait six months. You can also
facilitate technical assistance on market-oriented reforms from international financial institutions by signaling your intent to drop
outright opposition to such moves. Under this chapeau of direct talks, your administration can seek a negotiated solution to
the thorny issue of U.S. and Cuban citizens serving long prison sentences, thereby catalyzing progress toward
removing a major obstacle to improving bilateral relations. You should, in parallel, also take unilateral steps to expand direct
contacts with the Cuban people by: • authorizing financial and technical assistance to the burgeoning
class of small businesses and cooperatives and permitting Americans to donate and trade in goods and
services with those that are certified as independent entrepreneurs, artists, farmers, professionals and craftspeople; • adding new
categories for general licensed travel to Cuba for Americans engaged in services to the independent
economic sector, e.g., law, real estate, insurance, accounting, financial services; • granting general licenses for other
travelers currently authorized only under specific licenses, such as freelance journalists, professional researchers,
athletes, and representatives of humanitarian organizations and private foundations; • increasing or eliminating the cap on cash
and gifts that non- Cuban Americans can send to individuals, independent businesses and families in Cuba; •
eliminating the daily expenditure cap for U.S. citizens visiting Cuba and removing the prohibition on the use of U.S.
credit and bank cards in Cuba; • authorizing the reestablishment of ferry services to Cuba; • expanding the list of
exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including items like school and art supplies, athletic equipment, water and food preparation
systems, retail business machines, and telecommunications equipment (currently allowed only as donations). The steps
recommended above would give your administration the tools to have a constructive dialogue with the
Cuban government based on a set of measures that 1) would engage Cuban leaders in high-level, face-to-face
negotiations on matters that directly serve U.S. interests in a secure, stable, prosperous and free Cuba; and 2) allow you to assert
executive authority to take unilateral steps that would increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as
mandated by Congress. To take this step, you will have to contend with negative reactions from a vocal, well-organized minority of members of
Congress who increasingly are out of step with their constituents on this issue. Your initiative should be presented as a set of concrete
measures to assist the Cuban people, which is well within current congressional mandates, and as a way to break the stalemate in resolving the
case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross (his wife is calling for direct negotiations). Those are winnable arguments. But you will need to be prepared for
some unhelpful criticism along the way. Current
U.S. policy long ago outlived its usefulness and is
counterproductive to advancing the goal of helping the Cuban people. Instead it gives Cuban officials the ability to
demonize the United States in the eyes of Cubans, other Latin Americans and the rest of the world,
which annually condemns the embargo at the United Nations. At this rate, given hardening attitudes in the
region against U.S. policy, the Cuba problem may even torpedo your next presidential Summit of the
Americas in Panama in 2015. It is time for a new approach: an initiative to test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage
constructively alongside an effort to empower the Cuban people.
XO solves – even if the president can’t remove the entire embargo he can effectively
and discreetly dismantle it using diplomacy and the cabinet
Pascual et. al. 9– Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki
Huddleston, Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark
Falcoff, Damian Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William
LeoGrande, Marifeli Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas,
“CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
Given the strong sentiments and expectations that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for the
Executive Branch to proceed discreetly. The president might first announce the principles he hopes to
achieve in Cuba through a policy of engagement that promotes human rights, the wellbeing of the
Cuban people, and the growth of civil society. To carry out the president’s vision, the Secretary of the
Treasury will then have the responsibility to write and publish the changes to the Cuban Assets Control
regulations by licensing activities designed to achieve these ends. The Secretary of State can quietly
accomplish many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis without any need to publicize them. This
quiet diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal to engage in what some refer to as megaphone
diplomacy, in which our governments trade insults across the Straits of Florida, and which only
contributes to making the United States appear to be a bully. The president’s leadership in carrying out a
new Cuba policy is essential because by law and practice it is his responsibility to determine the overall
conduct of U.S. foreign policy. in the case of Cuba, he has ample executive authority to put in place a
policy of engagement. if he wishes, he can expand bilateral diplomatic relations, remove Cuba from the
list of terrorist countries, and rescind the current policy that grants immediate legal residency to Cubans
who enter the United States without visas. Should bilateral relations improve, he could choose to
negotiate the unresolved expropriated property claims of U.S. citizens and review the status of
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Despite the myth that Congress must legislate to change U.S. policy
toward Cuba, history has shown that presidents routinely take actions to strengthen or loosen the
embargo as they see fit. Thus, like his predecessors, president Obama can change regulations in order to
modify the Cuban embargo without the need for an act of Congress. He will, however, ultimately require
Congress to legislate in order to remove the embargo and lift all restrictions on travel. The Helms-Burton
Act (H-B) of 1996 defines conditions Cuba must meet for the United States to end the embargo. The Act
codified embargo regulations, including the provision that states that all transactions are prohibited
except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury. Accordingly, the Secretary of the
Treasury may use his licensing authorities to extend, revise, or modify the same regulations. president
Clinton did so by instructing Treasury to issue licenses for various categories of travel, regulations that
were subsequently codified by the Trade Sanctions reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSrA) of 2000.
in view of the fact that, unlike Helms-Burton, the TSrA did not provide the Secretary of the Treasury with
the authority to modify its content, legislation is required to remove or expand travel beyond the
provisions of the TSrA. Nevertheless, the president can significantly expand travel to Cuba by reinstating
provisions authorized by law but rescinded under the Bush administration, and interpreting more
broadly all categories of travel codified in the TSrA. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 also
legislated certain prohibitions, most notably on U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba, which, too, can
only be revoked by an act of Congress. in sum, the president does not have the authority to end the
embargo or lift the travel ban, but can effectively dismantle the current commercial embargo by using
his licensing authority to permit U.S. exports of certain goods and services, two-way trade in a wide
variety of goods and services, and/or allow broad categories of travel to Cuba.
Executive order solves – it allows Cubans to take advantage of reforms
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
Second, Cubans lack cash and credit to make full use of their newlygranted right to form businesses. The
embargo and its byzantine sanctions prevent U.S. banks and developers from financing investments in
Cuba. By loosening restrictions on travel and remittances, President Obama mobilized the financial
capital and support of a good portion of the Cuban American community on behalf of Cuba’s economic
revival. There are additional executive decisions the president can take to ease the flow of financing to
Cuba and to spur demand for the activities the emerging private sector is performing. For example, the
president could further loosen restrictions on U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba. Although repeal of the
statutory bar against tourist travel to the island would require an Act of Congress, unlikely in this
political climate, President Obama could use his executive authority to open and expand categories of
opportunities for Americans to visit Cuba.128 As Stephen Propst, an expert on international trade and
investment laws explained, “Although ‘tourist travel’ remains prohibited by statute, the President still
has room under the current legal framework to significantly expand opportunities for legal travel to
Cuba. For example, the existing category of travel for ‘professional meetings’ could be broadened to
include a range of new authorizations for participation in meetings. … If combined with additional
authorizations for the exchange of services with small private businesses in Cuba, the President could
authorize travel for purposes of professional meetings with Cuban architects, artists, musicians,
consultants and others.”129
According to this analysis, President Obama can, for example, order general licenses provided to
freelance journalists, professional researchers, athletes who want to attend international sports
competitions in Cuba, persons engaged in humanitarian activities, private foundations doing research,
and business-related travel for authorized activities such as telecommunications, informational
materials, and some marketing. He could also broaden the licensing for advisors from firms who could
assist the Cubans in safe drilling and environmental protection as Cuba explores for oil in the Gulf of
Mexico (as CDA recommended in the 21st Century Report on energy). There is a broad consensus
extending from the U.S. travel industry to the international human rights community that travel to Cuba
should be expanded: travel is a constitutional right of U.S. citizens and has the added virtue of providing
U.S. businesses broad opportunities. For Cuba’s citizens, it provides a source of profits and jobs for small
businesses.
XO solves – even if the president can’t remove the entire embargo he can effectively
and discreetly dismantle it using diplomacy and the cabinet
Pascual et. Al. – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki Huddleston,
Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark Falcoff, Damian
Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William LeoGrande, Marifeli
Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas, “CUBA: A New policy of
Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
Given the strong sentiments and expectations that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for the
Executive Branch to proceed discreetly. The president might first announce the principles he hopes to
achieve in Cuba through a policy of engagement that promotes human rights, the wellbeing of the
Cuban people, and the growth of civil society. To carry out the president’s vision, the Secretary of the
Treasury will then have the responsibility to write and publish the changes to the Cuban Assets Control
regulations by licensing activities designed to achieve these ends. The Secretary of State can quietly
accomplish many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis without any need to publicize them. This
quiet diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal to engage in what some refer to as megaphone
diplomacy, in which our governments trade insults across the Straits of Florida, and which only
contributes to making the United States appear to be a bully. The president’s leadership in carrying out a
new Cuba policy is essential because by law and practice it is his responsibility to determine the overall
conduct of U.S. foreign policy. in the case of Cuba, he has ample executive authority to put in place a
policy of engagement. if he wishes, he can expand bilateral diplomatic relations, remove Cuba from the
list of terrorist countries, and rescind the current policy that grants immediate legal residency to Cubans
who enter the United States without visas. Should bilateral relations improve, he could choose to
negotiate the unresolved expropriated property claims of U.S. citizens and review the status of
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Despite the myth that Congress must legislate to change U.S. policy
toward Cuba, history has shown that presidents routinely take actions to strengthen or loosen the
embargo as they see fit. Thus, like his predecessors, president Obama can change regulations in order to
modify the Cuban embargo without the need for an act of Congress. He will, however, ultimately require
Congress to legislate in order to remove the embargo and lift all restrictions on travel. The Helms-Burton
Act (H-B) of 1996 defines conditions Cuba must meet for the United States to end the embargo. The Act
codified embargo regulations, including the provision that states that all transactions are prohibited
except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury. Accordingly, the Secretary of the
Treasury may use his licensing authorities to extend, revise, or modify the same regulations. president
Clinton did so by instructing Treasury to issue licenses for various categories of travel, regulations that
were subsequently codified by the Trade Sanctions reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSrA) of 2000.
in view of the fact that, unlike Helms-Burton, the TSrA did not provide the Secretary of the Treasury with
the authority to modify its content, legislation is required to remove or expand travel beyond the
provisions of the TSrA. Nevertheless, the president can significantly expand travel to Cuba by reinstating
provisions authorized by law but rescinded under the Bush administration, and interpreting more
broadly all categories of travel codified in the TSrA. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 also
legislated certain prohibitions, most notably on U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba, which, too, can
only be revoked by an act of Congress. in sum, the president does not have the authority to end the
embargo or lift the travel ban, but can effectively dismantle the current commercial embargo by using
his licensing authority to permit U.S. exports of certain goods and services, two-way trade in a wide
variety of goods and services, and/or allow broad categories of travel to Cuba.
The executive can legally waive sanctions on commerce and financial services for nonstate economic activity
Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13- Americas Society is an organization dedicated to
education, debate, and dialogue in the Americas. The Council of the Americas is an American business
organization whose goal is promoting free trade, democracy and open markets throughout the Americas
(“Seven Steps the U.S. President Can Take to Promote Change in Cuba by Adapting the Embargo”,
AS/COA, 2/20/13, http://www.as-coa.org/articles/seven-steps-us-president-can-take-promote-changecuba-adapting-embargo)//TL
Change, however gradual, is taking place in Cuba. A series of economic reforms announced by President
Raúl Castro in 2010 set out policies that authorize and give greater space to private enterprise. The
reforms are already creating an incipient independent economic sector.
At the same time, the administration of President Barack Obama has used its authority under the
embargo—through exceptions, executive actions, regulations, and licensing adjustments—to take
tentative steps to loosen restrictions on travel, remittances, and telecoms activity by U.S. companies.
Unfortunately, the changes on both sides have not gone far enough. The two countries remain in
diplomatic deadlock—creating an opportunity for private groups to provide channels to share
information and build contacts.
Over the last three years, through its Cuba Working Group, Americas Society and Council of the
Americas (AS/COA) have held discussions and hosted Cuban scholars and public officials at private
events in New York, Washington D.C. and Miami. Since their founding, AS/COA have played a critical role
in bringing together the public and private sectors to engage with and foster policy reform and
entrepreneurship. Today, more than ever, there is room to create dialogue with all parties around
market reforms, economic development and opening, private enterprise, and entrepreneurship in Cuba.
A careful reading of U.S. policy goals toward Cuba and the set of regulations and laws governing the U.S.
embargo on Cuba reveal a series of changes that are essential to ensuring the U.S. administration’s goal
of encouraging independent economic and political activity in Cuba. More important, they are also
legally possible and within the President’s authority under existing regulations. To that end, we propose
the following steps that President Obama can take to encourage private organizations and individuals to
directly and indirectly serve as catalysts for meaningful economic change in Cuba. We explain the
regulatory and legal authority for all these steps in Annex I below.
1. Grant exceptions for commerce—including sales and imports—for businesses and individuals engaged
in certifiably independent (i.e., non-state) economic activity.
This can include allowing U.S. businesses and vendors to buy products and services from independent
actors—artwork, merchandise, materials, and other goods and services—in Cuba for re-sale in the
United States. While such products are likely to be small-scale, a commerce exception for sale of goods
in the U.S. would open up markets for independent entrepreneurs and artists, further empowering
them as well as educating U.S. consumers about their activities and goods, thus providing additional
income and support to independent economic actors.
Legal Basis: Although, multiple Congressional statutes (e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 6040(a) and 22 U.S.C. § 7028)
have re-stated the regulatory prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods under 31 C.F.R. § 515.204,
no legislation appears to codify the restriction. Thus, the President may modify 31 C.F.R. § 204’s
complete prohibition on the importation of Cuban goods to permit some exceptions.
2. Allow for the export and sale of goods and services to businesses, agricultural cooperatives and
individuals engaged in certifiably independent (i.e., non-state) economic activity.
Existing licensing regulations can be amended to establish a presumption of approval for specific
categories of items deemed to support the U.S. stated policy goal of promoting independent economic
activity on the island. Since 2000, legislation has allowed the export of a broad range of agricultural
products and a limited range of medicines and medical devices. This should be expanded to include
other inputs in demand by independent businesses, including—but not limited to—goods such as: art
supplies, food preparation equipment, agricultural inputs (such as seeds and fertilizer), bookkeeping and
basic electronic materials, and equipment required for retail sales to independent businesses and
farmers.
Legal Basis: Consistent with Proclamation 3447, the President and the Commerce Department maintain
executive branch authority to enforce restrictions and establish exceptions related to Cuba, including
those set forth in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Restrictions imposed by the Cuba
Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 and 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(a) do not limit the ability of the President to issue
new licensing exceptions for exports. In fact, President Obama most recently added an entirely new
licensing exception to permit the “export and re-export to Cuba of donated consumer communications
devices that are necessary to provide efficient and adequate telecommunications services between the
United States and Cuba.” Note: even past U.S. sanctions on the Burmese government contained similar
provisions that allowed export or re-export of financial services.
3. Allow licensed U.S. travelers to Cuba to have access to U.S.-issued pre-paid cards and other financial
services, including insurance.
Currently, U.S. travelers to Cuba have no access to U.S. bank accounts, credit cards, debit cards, or other
basic financial services. With few exceptions, U.S. travelers are forced to carry cash with them to Cuba.
Allowing travelers access to electronic payment systems would help ensure their safety and security
while studying or traveling on the island. Moreover, authorizing new electronic payment systems would
facilitate the U.S. administration’s goal of promoting people-to-people contacts, and empower Cubans
and facilitate private economic activity by allowing counterparts in the U.S. to transfer money to
relatives and independent entrepreneurs on the island.
Legal Basis: While there is a clear regulatory prohibition under 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a)(3) and 31 C.F.R. §
515.560(e)(1)-(2) concerning transfers of credit and the use of credit and debit cards, there is still no
specific prohibition on the President’s authority to modify current regulations to permit the use of credit
or debit cards, with the exceptions of agricultural sales and any transaction involving confiscated
property by a U.S. national. Excluding these limited exceptions, the President retains the authority to
change these existing regulations. Moreover, there is legal and financial precedence. Major global
credit/debit card networks routinely process Cuba-originating transactions for non-U.S. cardholders.
Acceptance of card-based payments is growing rapidly on the island. And despite U.S. restrictions, funds
are already being moved to Cuba electronically in a number of ways. [See Annex II]
4. Expand general licensed travel to include U.S. executives and their duly appointed agents to Cuba in
financial services, travel and hospitality-related industries, such as banking, insurance, credit cards, and
consumer products related to travel.
Allowing private-sector representatives from these sectors to travel will permit industry representatives
to develop the necessary infrastructure and commitments that will allow for the use of U.S.-issued
credit cards, pre-paid cards, and insurance—all essential for ensuring the safety and security of U.S.
travelers to Cuba under the current policy. Moreover it will expand the opportunities for financial
support to independent entrepreneurs inside Cuba and opportunities for access to information.
Legal Basis: According to 31 C.F.R. § 212.560(a), travel is permitted to Cuba under twelve specific
categories [See Annex IV for complete list]. These categories are subject to interpretation and the
President has set prior precedent in this area when he amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
(CACR) by expanding the meaning of each travel category. Two specific categories are relevant here.
One possibility is for the President to adapt “professional meeting” category to permit other commercial
activities, as President Obama did in 2009 to permit travel-related transactions of telecommunications
services and facilities. The second is to more broadly interpret the category allowed in “support of the
Cuban people.”
5. Expand general licensed travel to include: law, real estate and land titling, financial services and
credit, and any area defined as supporting independent economic activity.
Expanding general licensing for legal experts, organizations with an established interest and experience
in training, financing, and supporting entrepreneurs (i.e. Endeavor, ACCION International, Women’s
World Banking, among others) as well as scholars in the above areas—beyond those just covered under
research or people-to-people contacts—will assist in the exchange of information, experiences and
standards in these areas. Doing so would help provide a push to the island’s opening for the sale of
property and the formation of small businesses and help in the creation of a legal foundation or legal
capacities in those areas.
Legal Basis: See number 4 above.
The executive has licensing authority
Arnson 2010- Ph.D., International Relations, and M.A., Latin American Studies, The Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies
(Cynthia J., “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship”, 5/24/10,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-united-states-and-cuba-implications-economic-relationship
Wilson center)//KW
Nonetheless, Reinsch noted that there are far fewer statutory obstacles to a change in U.S. policy than
most observers suggest. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, commonly
known as the Helms-Burton Act, codified the President's licensing authority and thus his or her ability to
make changes to the embargo. Given his mid-April declaration to thaw relations, President Obama
appears to know and understand this authority, though his approach has been one of modest,
piecemeal change. Reinsch explained that the Obama administration's tempered approach to policy
change is based on an assumption that any U.S. concession will prompt a Cuban concession, though
Reinsch believes that Cuba—as the biggest beneficiary of the embargo—would not reciprocate.
Executive ‘not withstanding’ authority solves
XO solves – Obama has “non-withstanding” authority to temporarily lift the embargo,
which ensures long term solvency and sends a positive signal
Doherty, 8 – director of the Smart Strategy Initiative at the New America Foundation (Patrick, Masters
in Security Studies from Fletcher University, “An Obama Policy for Cuba”, December 12, 2008,
http://newamerica.net/node/8668)//eek
Finally, Obama must sign an executive order to meet the urgent needs of the hundreds of thousands of
Cuban people who were affected by a record four hurricanes this season. The Cuban people are
suffering and even the wives of jailed political dissidents, in an October teleconference with first lady
Laura Bush and Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, pleaded for the United States to lift the embargo
for humanitarian reasons. This can be done. But since the Cuban government will not accept traditional
disaster assistance, the new president must use his "notwithstanding" authority enshrined in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to lift the embargo for 180 days and allow Cuba to purchase civilian items
with cash or credit on the American market. Such an action will instill immediate good will among the
Cuban people.
With these three objectives accomplished, Cuba policy will once again be back in the hands of the
executive branch, which can begin a deliberate process of negotiations to normalize relations. While
some will say such a policy amounts to "free concessions" to the Castro brothers, we look at it
differently. Fidel and Raul Castro are at death's door. Change is coming. Everyone seems to realize it but
the United States. A new, decisive policy toward Cuba, wrought by the new "change" president, will
send a clear signal to the world that America is back. Moreover, such change will liberate U.S. relations
with Latin America and open the door to dealing effectively with our own hemisphere's many
challenges.
Lifting embargo = Congress
Lifting the embargo requires Congress
Johnson, et al, 10 – Andy Johnson is a director in the national security program at The Third Way (“End
the Embargo of Cuba”, The National Security Program, 9/6/10,
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo__End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)//EX
Although the Obama administration took the largely symbolic step of extending the embargo for
another year under the Trading with the Enemy Act last year, the President did relax some longstanding
restrictions by taking action to make it easier for Cuban-Americans to visit and send remittances to
family members in Cuba.The administration also recently hinted at plans to reduce travel restrictions for
academic, cultural, and religious groups later this year.12 While the executive branch can continue to
chip away at these longstanding restrictions, the law requires that Congress will ultimately need to pass
legislation to repeal the embargo.
Under existing law, established by the Helms-Burton Act, the embargo cannot be lifted until the Cuban
people democratically elect a new government and the transition government is in place. While
President Obama could take an initial step by refusing to issue the annual extension of Cuba’s “national
emergency” status under the Trading with the Enemy Act,13 lifting the embargo will ultimately require
that Congress pass and the President sign into law legislation to repeal both the Torricelli Act and the
Helms-Burton Act. Passing HR 4645 would be a positive first step, but Congress will need to take further
action to see that the embargo is lifted in its entirety.
Loosening embargo = Congress
Helms Burton means the president can’t loosen the embargo
Holmes, 10– B.A. from Georgetown, Master’s Thesis (Michael G., June 21, 2010, “Seizing the Moment”,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?seque
nce=1, pg. 19-20)//NG
The Helms-Burton Act had come to the attention of Fidel Castro almost a year before it was ever put
into law. He mounted a public campaign expounding on the evils of Helms-Burton. One of his most
virulent criticisms of the act was that it was the U.S. government’s attempts to take Cuba back to the
Batista era. 23 In many respects he was right. Beyond Helms-Burton being one of the most punitive
pieces of legislation the United States had enacted against Cuba, it permanently pitted the United
States at odds with the Castro regime.
Helms-Burton contained a provision stating that no President could repeal or loosen the embargo
against Cuba as long as the Castro regime was in power. What this means is even when Raul Castro
took power, (temporarily in July 2006 and then permanently in 2008), the United States or indeed the
president of the United States was unable to lift he embargo against Cuba. The implications of this act
are tremendous. Hypothetically, as the legislation currently stands, even if Raul Castro decided to
implement any degree of diplomatic reform, the United States would not be able to repeal the embargo
because a member of the Castro regime would still hold power. Given that Fidel Castro transferred
power to Raul Castro, isn’t it likely that upon time for Raul Castro step to down that he will transfer
power to yet another Castro?
Easing the embargo requires legislation
Burns, 9 – writer for the Associated Press (Robert, “Obama Lifting Cuba Travel Restrictions”,
Huffington Post, 04/13/09, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/13/some-cuba-travelrestrict_n_186197.html)//eek
Lifting or substantially easing the economic embargo, as set forth in the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations and administered by the Treasury Department, would require legislative action by Congress.
The White House made no mention of any intention to seek such changes; Obama said as a presidential
candidate that the embargo was a form of leverage to press for democratic reforms in Cuba.
Economic engagement solvency
Economic engagement key
Increasing trade is biggest internal link to expanding soft power in Cuba
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (Douglas, “Changing Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”,
Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
The analysis revealed that trade policy represents a potentially lucrative method by which to significantly
enhance U.S. soft power in Cuba and improve relations between the two countries. Under current
conditions relative to the effects of the U.S. economic embargo, the soft power of American markets is
severely constricted; citizen consumers in Cuba are all but denied access to any U.S. goods and services.
A more liberalized trade policy would alter this dynamic tremendously, exposing Cuban citizens to
American consumer products and vice versa, serving to enhance the soft power of each country in the
eyes and minds of citizen consumers in the other. Also, the interchange between agents of the private
and public sectors from both countries would likely foster a sense of good will and trust between critical
elements of civil society, furthering bilateral relations and serving larger U.S. foreign policy objectives to
expand free market enterprise on the island. Although there are some associated risks with this change
in American policy, specifically an anticipated backlash from some U.S. and multi-national corporate
interests, the potential benefits are high and the impact upon U.S. foreign policy objectives would be
direct and positive.
Economic soft power is vital to causing a peaceful transition
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (Douglas, “Changing Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”,
Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
How American economic soft power would further U.S. foreign policy goals on the island is another
consideration. While enhanced economic interchange does not in and of itself push the Cuban
government any closer to democratization, it would introduce a variant of Western-style capitalism into
the socialist state while also enhancing the prospect of additional foreign direct investment from the
United States. Limited bilateral trade links by themselves will not necessarily fast forward a transition to
a full market economy in Cuba, but they will help advance the process by way of forcing the Cuban
government to further recognize and respond to those free market pressures that define and impact the
global economy. Latin American scholar Manuel Pastor Jr. reasons that “this sort of approach could find
some support among mid-level leaders in Cuba, many of whom are frustrated by current government
policy, and could serve as the basis for a peaceful transition.”125 By influencing mid-level and/or upperlevel government leaders, U.S. foreign policy interests would be served.
Economic reform causes political reform
Economic liberalization will cause political liberalization
López-Levy, 13 - PhD candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of
Denver (Arturo, “Getting Ready for Post-Castro Cuba” The National Interest, 4/10,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-ready-post-castro-cuba-8316
If Cuba implements the type of mixed economy proposed by the last Congress of the Communist Party—
a new, more vital relationship with its diaspora and the world—it may also experience a political
transformation. As the economy and society change, the political status quo cannot hold. The rise of
market mechanisms and an autonomous non-state sector will reinforce the newly open flows of
information, investment and technology. These new sectors will seek representation in the political
arena. Citizens will have greater access to the Internet, and will be able to associate more horizontally.
For at least the next five years, this does not imply a transition to multiparty democracy. But economic
liberalization will force an expansion of the current system. Economic and migration opportunities will
channel some of the energy in the direction of new businesses and travel, but it will not be enough. The
party system will be reformed in order to remain at the helm of social and economic life. Political
liberalization will probably start in the lower rungs of government, allowing citizens to vent their
frustrations at that level. Raúl Castro’s decision to limit leadership positions to two terms, at a time
when the older generation is leaving power by attrition, will result in a more institutionalized leadership
that promotes younger leaders in an orderly fashion.
Cuba says yes
Raul wants economic engagement with the US
LeoGrande, 13 - professor in the Department of Government, School of Public Affairs at American
University in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After
Chavez” World Politics Review, 4/2, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-ofdependence-cubas-foreign-policy-after-chavez)
In Cuba, Raúl Castro's historic economic reforms are moving the island toward a mixed socialist
economy, and incipient political decompression is allowing more space for open debate. These changes,
undertaken in response to domestic necessity rather than U.S. demands, are nevertheless moving Cuba
in directions long cited by Washington as necessary for better relations. To exert any positive influence
on the trajectory of Cuba's evolution, however, Washington has to engage not just with Cuban society
but with Cuba's government.
Eager to put Cuba on a more solid footing before passing the torch to the next generation of leaders,
Raúl Castro seems genuinely interested in opening talks with Washington. Unlike his older brother, Raúl
did not make his political career by mobilizing nationalist sentiment against the United States. He has a
strong incentive to settle this conflict so he can focus on renovating the Cuban economy and open it up
to U.S. trade and investment.
Cuba will say yes – it needs desperately needs new capital to aid economic reforms
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
For Cuba, the destitute economy can wait no longer. The Cuban Minister of Economy and Planning,
Marino Murillo, candidly admitted as much in 2010, “the gigantic paternalistic state can no longer be,
because there is no longer a way to maintain it.”75 This confession that the country is in ruins was
confirmed to be literally true by a University of Miami study which uncovered “that in Havana alone an
estimated 300 buildings collapse every year, and that about 100,000 residents there live in unsafe
structures. Highways, utilities and sewage systems, water mains, and other critical infrastructure are in
advanced stages of disrepair.”76
This national disrepair signals an immense latent demand for infrastructure rehabilitation. The
magnitude of the need for public goods developments alone is staggering. One estimate assessed the
requirements at just over $8 billion.77 FDI at these levels would be most welcomed by U.S. capital and if
invested, would help prime the Cuban economic engine. 24
Plan causes economic reform
U.S. should lift sanctions- expedites Cuban economic reform
Bandow 2012 –J.D from Stanford University, special assistant to President Reagan (Doug, “Time to
End the Cuba Embargo”, Cato Institute, 12/11/12, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/timeend-cubaembargo?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(
Cato+Recent+Op-eds) //KW
Ending the embargo would have obvious economic benefits for both Cubans and Americans. The U.S.
International Trade Commission estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as $1.2
billion annually.
Expanding economic opportunities also might increase pressure within Cuba for further economic
reform. So far the regime has taken small steps, but rejected significant change. Moreover, thrusting
more Americans into Cuban society could help undermine the ruling system. Despite Fidel Castro’s
decline, Cuban politics remains largely static. A few human rights activists have been released, while
Raul Castro has used party purges to entrench loyal elites.
Lifting the embargo would be no panacea. Other countries invest in and trade with Cuba to no obvious
political impact. And the lack of widespread economic reform makes it easier for the regime rather than
the people to collect the benefits of trade, in contrast to China. Still, more U.S. contact would have an
impact. Argued trade specialist Dan Griswold, “American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans
who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars would then
find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmers markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food
venders, and other entrepreneurs.”
The Castro dictatorship ultimately will end up in history’s dustbin. But it will continue to cause much
human hardship along the way.
The Heritage Foundation’s John Sweeney complained nearly two decades ago that “the United States
must not abandon the Cuban people by relaxing or lifting the trade embargo against the communist
regime.” But the dead hand of half a century of failed policy is the worst breach of faith with the Cuban
people.
Lifting sanctions would be a victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread
liberty. As Griswold argued, “commercial engagement is the best way to encourage more open societies
abroad.” Of course, there are no guarantees. But lifting the embargo would have a greater likelihood of
success than continuing a policy which has failed. Some day the Cuban people will be free. Allowing
more contact with Americans likely would make that day come sooner.
Cuban economic reforms now
Cuban economic and political reform is increasing now
LIGNET, 3/6/13 - The Langley Intelligence Group Network (LIGNET.com) is a Washington, DC-based
service providing global intelligence and forecasting from former CIA, U.S. intelligence and national
security officers (“Stunned Cuba Ponders Future without Chavez”
http://www.lignet.com/Wire/CORRECTED-UPDATE-1-Stunned-Cuba-Ponders-Future-wit)
Cuba is in the process of lifting some restrictions on civil liberties and revamping the state-dominated
economy into a more mixed and market friendly one.
Experts said that regardless of the election's outcome the pace and depth of reform would most likely
pick up.
An opposition victory, viewed as unlikely, would certainly force Havana to scamper, they said, and while
a Maduro win would spell no changes for Cuba in the short term, the threat of instability in Venezuela's
future would loom large on local leaders' minds.
"Assuming that Maduro is elected, Venezuela will continue its critical oil subsidies, but both
international credit markets and the Cuban leadership can now more clearly see a future where Cuba
will have to bolster its energy self-sufficiency and improve its credit ratings," said Richard Feinberg, a
non-resident senior fellow of the Washington-based Brookings Institution and author of its recently
released report, "The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment?"
"The pro-reform factions within the Cuban system will have additional arguments in their quiver for
moving forward with all deliberate speed," he said.
Growing support for economic reforms in Cuba.
Ravsberg 6/20- staff writer for the BBC Mundo
(Fernando, “Cuba’s Economic System: Reform or Change?” Havana Times, June 20, 2013,
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95012)//HA
HAVANA TIMES — Marino Murillo, Vice-Chairman of Cuba’s Council of Ministers and architect of the
island’s recent economic reforms, has urged the country to aim for growth by eliminating “all of the
obstacles that the current economic model places in the way of the development of the productive
forces.”
The problem is that the greatest obstacle could be the model itself, which is based on relations of
production that hinder the country’s economic development, slow down changes, interfere with
reforms and bring about discontent among the population.
By implementing this socialist model, which dates back to Stalin’s time, Cuba obtained the same results
seen in all other countries which copied it: agricultural production crises, industrial stagnation, shortages
and a disaffected citizenry.
Murillo invoked socialism’s theoretical forefathers, who said that the new, socialist society would need
to nationalize only the “fundamental means of production”, a prescription that wasn’t exactly followed
by a model which placed even junk food stands in State hands.
To be at all effective, every economic change essayed in the country today, no matter how small,
invariably demands a whole series of subsequent reforms. And it is precisely there where the model,
and its defenders, prevent the reform from becoming effective or yielding its best results.
Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s
model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle
without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the
entire pattern.
Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s
model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle
without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the
entire pattern.
The government runs into these obstacles every time it attempts to move one of the pieces of the
puzzle. When it decided to hand over State-controlled lands to the peasants, officials invoked Cuba’s
“current legislation” to forbid farmers to set up their homes in farm areas.
Such absurd restrictions discouraged many and pushed others to quit the food production sector
altogether and devote themselves to securing construction materials illegally, so as to be able to build a
home elsewhere, far from prying looks.
Massive and hugely inefficient, the agricultural sector may well be the very paradigm of bureaucratic
mismanagement, but it is far from being its only expression in the country. Cuba’s import system is a
true bureaucratic gem, in which producers are those with the least say in official decisions.
A Cuban factory wishing to import a piece of equipment from abroad is required to approach the
importing company assigned to it by the State. Technically speaking, this “importer” does not actually
import anything – it merely puts out a bid among foreign companies with offices in Cuba.
Employees from these companies are the ones who travel to the manufacturing country, purchase the
equipment and bring it back to Cuba. Under the country’s current model, the manager of a Cuban
factory is expressly forbidden from contacting the foreign export company directly.
Thus, the person who makes the order is an office clerk who knows little or nothing about what the
company needs and who, in the best of scenarios, will opt for the cheapest piece of equipment
available, something which often leads to serious production problems later.
The status quo relations of production continue to find support in Cuba, from the defenders of “Real
Socialism.” Ironically, or not surprisingly, most of them are isolated from the reality of this socialist
system, enjoying government perks that compensate for the “small inconveniences” of everyday life.
In the worst cases, these “intermediating State importers” are bribed by foreign companies so that they
will purchase obsolete or poor-quality equipment. In recent weeks, Cuban courts tried hundreds of State
employees implicated in these types of “deals”.
These are the “relations of production” which keep equipment in Cuban factories paralyzed for months,
waiting for the needed spare parts, while State importers take all the time in the world to decide what
to purchase.
Most Cubans I know support the changes that have been implemented thus far and want these to make
headway quickly and effectively. It is hard to come by anyone who feels nostalgia for the old model,
which proved more efficient in establishing restrictions than in satisfying the material needs of the
population.
But these relations of production continue to find support in Cuba, from the defenders of “Real
Socialism.” Ironically, or not surprisingly, most of them are isolated from the reality of this socialist
system, enjoying government perks that compensate for the “small inconveniences” of everyday life.
During a recent debate, a Cuban journalist suggested that these officials catch a city bus from time to
time, so as to immerse themselves in everyday reality. When they told me of this, I recalled the old
anarchist graffiti which warned us that “those who do not live the way they think end up thinking the
way they live.”
Cuba is implementing gradual political and economic reform now
Thale and Boggs, 13 – a Program director and a Program officer at WOLA (Geoff and Clay, “Cuba and
the Terrorist List", 5 Mar 2013, http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list)//eek
Recent changes in Cuba itself strengthen the case for taking steps to improve this relationship. The
United States has long conditioned changes in U.S. policy on changes in Cuba's political and economic
system (WOLA has consistently argued that U.S. policy should change independently of changes in
Cuba). But since 2011, we have seen a series of gradual but significant changes in Cuba's economic
system, including the expansion of self-employment, the reduction in state payrolls, and liberalization in
the agricultural system. Even as these economic changes took place, many doubted that Cuba would
consider any changes in its political system. But in the past year Cuba has enacted long-awaited
migration reforms, and Cuban President Raúl Castro has announced that he will retire in 2018,
effectively putting an end date on the Castro era.
Cuba's changes are cautious: Raúl Castro's government is embracing neither free-market capitalism nor
multi-party democracy. But the changes are real. Now is the moment when the Obama administration
should consider taking some cautious steps of its own; taking Cuba off the terrorist list would be a
common sense step that would acknowledge changes in Cuba and serve U.S. interests in the
hemisphere.
Sqo solves – massive economic reforms and other countries’ investments
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
The government also began to reduce and remove items from the libreta, the ration card, a near sacred
document to every Cuban household. For example, the quantity of coffee provided was reduced and
mixed with roasted peas, while potatoes and cigarettes were removed altogether. Items shifted off the
ration card were sold in state stores where the government could receive marginal earnings from their
sale.
A levy system was put in place for Cuban employees at foreign embassies and companies, allowing the
state to capture a share of illegal but previously tolerated cash bonuses from foreign employers. The
move signaled the government would allow more salary stratification, while seeking to redistribute
some of the earnings through a new tax policy.29
Spending cuts and freezes were also imposed at ministries and state companies. Travel abroad for
government officials and state businessmen was reduced by 50 percent. Honeymoon packages and
vacation rewards for state employees were eliminated. Workplace cafeterias offering free or subsidized
food were closed at most ministries and government workplaces, and workers were instead given a
small salary increase and asked to prepare lunch at home or purchase food at state or private cafeterias.
The government announced liberalization of the sale of building materials to citizens, along with the
removal of some regulations associated with private construction of new homes. By May of 2011, the
Associated Press was reporting that more than one-thousand independent shops selling construction
materials had opened in Cuba.30
A long-awaited change in foreign investment regulations legalized 99-year land leases for foreign tourist
companies to assure potential golf-course and condominium developers in Europe and Canada that
investments would be profitable and safe. Four large luxury golf resorts—projects totaling more than
$1.5 billion—were approved. The government’s cut of the profits was estimated to be about half.
Groundbreaking and construction have yet to be reported.
Reforms are coming now – some have been implemented and Raul promises more
Rainsford, 12 – BBC respondent based in Havana (Sarah, “Raul Castro's Cuban reform 'without
haste'”, 12 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16529531)//eek
Cuba's President, Raul Castro, has said that a series of unprecedented economic reforms on the
Communist-run island are being implemented "as they should be", and would be completed "without
haste" in an effort to avoid mistakes.
He was speaking during a brief - and rare - encounter with journalists at the end of a visit by Iran's
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
But Mr Castro also cautioned against expecting too much more from the first-ever Communist Party
conference in Cuba, to be held at the end of this month.
"This is an internal matter of the party, to improve it," he said. "It needs a lot of improving in many
senses, to adapt to the times we live in."
Raul Castro is also first secretary of the Communist Party, the only political party on the island.
Over the past year Cuba has opened up more of its largely state-controlled economy, expanding selfemployment in sectors such as hairdressing and watch repairs.
More than 357,000 people now have licences to trade, helping boost their income considerably beyond
the average state salary of just $20 (£13) a month.
Many restaurants and food stalls are already privately operated
Larger, privately run restaurants have also been permitted as Cuba attempts to slim-down the state
payroll, and cut costs. The goal is to transfer up to 40% of the workforce into the private sector by 2015,
where they'll pay taxes for the first time.
Many moves - such as a decision to allow Cubans to buy and sell property - were approved during a rare
Communist Party congress last April.
A2: Rollback
Be skeptical of their evidence. Their authors don’t know what is going on in Cuba – the
regime is dedicated to reform
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
Because of the ideological and political distance between the two nations, it is difficult for U.S. policy
makers to fully comprehend the extent of what is happening in Cuba. Many question whether the latest
signs of progress are permanent, and assume that these reforms will be rolled back. President Obama
has repeatedly expressed doubts that the changes are significant. His public posture is as a skeptic, even
as Cuba moves—at its own pace and for its own reasons—in directions that U.S. policy has advocated
for years. Experts in Havana believe these reforms will help their country alleviate some of its endemic
economic problems while maintaining two core values overall: its commitment to a communitarian
ethos and guaranteed access to universal health care and education.
Laundry list of reasons the reforms are here to stay
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
Despite doubts on both sides of the Florida Straits, the evidence leads us to conclude that Cuba’s reform
process is here to stay. The changes are most likely irreversible; and the decisions taken to date show
substantial willingness to depart from the status quo. The economic team is different than in previous
attempts for reform, the rhetoric is more deliberate, the policies are more substantive, and the totality
of the changes—the benefits they offer, the expectations they create, and the hardships they will exact
on many Cubans—require a long-term commitment by the Cuban State that makes reversal at a later
date very unlikely.
Fidel Castro no longer runs Cuba. His periodic communications with the Cuban public—through signed
editorial columns called “Reflections”—largely address foreign policy. While President Raúl Castro
regularly pays public homage to his retired older brother, he has replaced every member of Fidel
Castro’s economic cabinet with appointees of his own. By his rhetoric and his actions, Raúl has made it
clear that policies that once guided the economy didn’t work and had to be discarded.
These statements highlight Raúl Castro’s commitment to a new Cuban economic model. “Two
generations of Cubans have spent their lives under this rationing system that, despite its harmful
egalitarian qualityhas for four decades ensured every citizen access to basic food at highly subsidized
derisory prices,” he told the Party Congress. The most durable systemic process of the revolutionary
government, the monthly ration book “has remained with us for too long …it contradicts the substance
of the distribution principle that should characterize Socialism.”
Rhetoric in a top-down society matters. The fact that the Cuban leadership no longer primarily blames
the U.S. for all of its economic problems, publicly recognizes the importance of private entrepreneurs,
and openly, if imperfectly, engages in a public debate about ambitious changes to the Cuban system, all
demonstrate a new direction to the Cuban public.
Raul’s economic reforms are here to stay – he has no choice
The Economist, 12 (“Revolution in retreat”, The Economist, Mar 24th 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21550418)//eek
This time, Raúl has insisted, there will be no turning back: the reforms will happen sin prisa, pero sin
pausa (slowly but steadily). But Raúl is no liberal. He and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the Argentine
adventurer who died in Bolivia in 1967, were the orthodox Marxists among the leaders of Fidel's Rebel
Army, the ragtag band of bearded guerrillas who toppled the corrupt, American-backed dictatorship of
Fulgencio Batista. As defence minister from 1959 to 2008, Raúl set up and led Cuba's formidable armed
forces.
When Raúl took over from Fidel, he moved slowly at first, amid factional fighting. To general surprise,
the men who lost out in 2009 were Carlos Lage, who had run the economy since the Special Period and
was seen as a reformer, and Felipe Pérez Roque, the young foreign minister. They were denounced for
having criticised the Castros (Mr Lage was caught on tape describing the leadership as “living fossils”)
and for having been corrupted by power. Instead, José Ramón Machado Ventura, an 81-year-old
Stalinist, was named as Raúl's deputy.
But Raúl also quietly discarded nearly all of Fidel's ministers and key aides. Their replacements are
mostly army officers. Rafael Hernández, an academic who edits Temas, a quarterly journal attached to
the culture ministry, points out that many of them are engineers by profession.
Fidel ruled Cuba through the unbridled exercise of his massive ego. He centralised all power in his own
hands, imposed Utopian egalitarianism and performed frequent policy swerves. By all accounts, Raúl is
more modest, by nature a delegator and team-builder, more interested in getting things done than
making speeches. When he took over in 2006 he put an end to the 4am meetings his brother loved. He
is the Sancho Panza to Fidel's Don Quijote (they even look the parts).
Raúl seems to be acutely conscious that Cuban communism is living on borrowed time. The economy is
grossly unproductive. Venezuelan aid in 2008 was offset by devastating hurricanes and the knock-on
effects of the global financial crisis on Cuba's tourism and trade. The country is running down its capital,
but living standards remain frugal. Its famed social services are no longer affordable. The population is
shrinking. Mr Chávez, its Venezuelan patron, is being treated for cancer and faces a close election in
October. And the Cuban leadership is gerontocratic: Fidel is 85, Raúl is 80 and the average age of the
Politburo is over 70. The históricos, as those who fought in the revolution are known, are dying off. With
Mr Lage gone, they have no visible successors. Raúl's opportunity to institutionalise the system has
come very late in the day. “We either rectify things, or we run out of time to carry on skirting the abyss
[and] we sink,” he warned in his December 2010 speech.
Reforms Solve Econ
Reforms solve the economy – the regime is backing off and these reforms are massive
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
Rather than blaming U.S. policy, as it has in the past, Cuba is addressing its problems in fundamentally
different ways. Recent economic reforms have legalized new private sector activities so Cuba’s citizens
can open small businesses and hire their own workers; facilitated the creation of workers’ cooperatives
that can function as small businesses in sectors from farming to manufacturing; reduced government
funded social benefits, such as the ubiquitous ration card, and ended some state subsidies altogether.1
These reforms are linked to institutional changes that aim to reduce the number of workers on the state
payroll by one million or more; clarify ministerial responsibilities to increase accountability; and turn
over many responsibilities of the State to provincial and municipal governments where legislative and
executive functions would be separated, and capacity built so that decisions could be made and
implemented locally. These are important steps for a nation constituted on socialist principles, where
capitalism has been long considered anathema. It reflects an acceptance that market forces can play a
role in economic policy and that economic growth must be the central criterion to judge economic
success. These restructurings, ratified by Cuba’s Communist Party in April 2011, are the biggest
economic changes in Cuba since Soviet support ended two decades ago. They represent a significant
realignment of the paternalistic relationship that has existed between the State and its citizenry since
the revolutionary period began in 1959. While not overtly political, this shift in thinking shows the Cuban
leadership’s willingness to reduce its role in certain areas of society and to replace policies that stressed
centralized control and moral and ideological incentives with ones that instead emphasize efficiency and
sustainability.
AT: Gitmo alt cause
Removing the embargo compensates for Gitmo – it’s a larger symbol of respecting
sovereignty
Holmes, 10– B.A. from Georgetown, Master’s Thesis (Michael G., June 21, 2010, “Seizing the Moment”,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?seque
nce=1, pg. 65-68)//NG
Guantánamo Bay also touches upon another issue, a contributing factor to the tarnished image
of the United States, the idea of respecting sovereignty. It has been argued that part of the reason the
U.S. government chose to use Guantánamo Bay naval base as opposed to others, is that the base
represents a legal “black whole.” From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the
embargo is symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is pro democracy, it
does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba Democracy Act was an attempt to force
democratic changes in Cuba.
10
By repealing the act the United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations.
Considering that this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not
only sends the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the administration is
taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually respected. Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will
certainly stimulate foreign investment in Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in
Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton
Act.
AT: Inevitable – Diaz-Canel
Reforms won’t thaw with Diaz-Canel
Allam 13 – writer for Miami Herald (Hannah, Miami Herald, “Even if Raul Castro steps down in 2018,
U.S.-Cuba relations may not thaw”, 2.25.13, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/02/25/3253690/evenif-raul-castro-steps-down.html)//EK
WASHINGTON -- Cuban President Raul Castro’s announcement over the weekend that he’ll step down in
2018 after the five-year term he just began ends starts the countdown for U.S. officials contemplating a
thaw in relations with the island nation. But analysts caution that so far the regime’s reforms amount to
window dressing.¶ By law, the United States is restricted from normalizing relations with Cuba as long as
the island is ruled by the Castro brothers: ailing revolutionary leader Fidel, 86, and his brother Raul, 81.¶
Raul Castro said Sunday that not only would he step aside in 2018, he also would propose term limits
and age caps for future presidents, the latest in a series of moves that are hailed by some Cuba
observers as steps toward reform but dismissed by others as disingenuous.¶ But those are hardly the
kinds of breakthrough reforms that State Department and independent analysts say will be needed to
improve U.S.-Cuba relations, which froze after the Cuban revolution of 1959 that saw Fidel Castro align
himself with the communist bloc and the United States impose a trade embargo that 54 years later
remains in place.¶ “Each side is making small, subtle moves, but since it’s a glacier, it’s not going to melt
overnight,” said Alex Crowther, a former U.S. Army colonel and Cuba specialist whose published
commentaries on bilateral relations include a 2009 essay calling for an end to the embargo.
Diaz-Canel might not be the heir, can fall out of favor- empirically proven
Bremmer 13 - American political scientist (Ian, Foreign Policy, “Will Miguel Diaz-Canel lead postCastro Cuba?”, Feb 27, 2013,
http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/27/will_miguel_diaz_canel_lead_post_castro_cuba)//E
K
Still, there is no guarantee that Diaz-Canel will be Cuba's next leader. Other would-be heirs -- most
notably Carlos Lage and Felipe Perez Roque -- have been groomed for succession in the past only to fall
from grace after demonstrating an excess of personal ambition or clashing with Raul and Fidel.
Moreover, though Diaz-Canel has the legitimacy that comes with Raul's backing, his last name is not
Castro, and any transition will likely be challenging, particularly given Cuba's deep economic troubles,
tensions within the ruling party, and intense pressure from the international community to implement
political reforms.
Diaz-Canel won’t reform to a revolution- strictly Marxist/Leninist
Nelson 13 – CBS4 News member, National Association of Television Arts and Sciences (Gary, Miami
CBS News, “Miguel Diaz-Canel: Cuba’s Next President?”, Feb 26, 2013,
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/02/26/miguel-diaz-canel-cubas-next-president/)//EK
“He may be the guy,” said University of Miami’s Professor Jaime Suchlicki on Tuesday, adding that it
wouldn’t seem likely, however.¶ It is the Politburo, the same bunch that elected Raul to a new term
Sunday, that will name his successor.¶ “They’ll get together and they’ll decide who is the next President
of Cuba. Most likely it will be somebody of the military, since the military controls the Politburo,”
Suchlicki said.¶ Even if Diaz-Canel, an immaculately dressed fellow who sports perfectly styled salt and
pepper hair, should assume power; Suchlicki cautions that significant reforms should not be expected in
the Cuban system.¶ “He is the godson of one of the leaders of the revolution. He has been nurtured in
that atmosphere. He is a Marxist/Leninist,” Suchlicki said.
Even if Diaz-Canel wants reform, Castro behind the scenes makes reform impossible
Maestas, 13 – holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of California, Irvine and a
master’s degree in public policy from Claremont Graduate University (Adriana, “Raul Castro to retire in
2018, ending Castro era in Cuba”, Politic365, http://politic365.com/2013/02/25/raul-castro-to-retireafter-term/)//EX
On Sunday, Raul Castro announced that he would step down as President of Cuba in 2018 when his
second full term is up and when he is 86 years old. Raul Castro assumed the role of head of government
in 2006 when his brother Fidel Castro became ill. Since the 1959 revolution, the island nation has been
led by Fidel or Raul Castro.
Raul Castro is noted for making key economic and social changes in Cuba. Some political prisoners have
been released, some business has been encouraged, and travel restrictions have been lifted making it
easier for Cuban citizens to travel abroad.
Castro’s second in line to the presidency is now Miguel Diaz-Canel, who at 52 years of age is a heartbeat
away from the presidency. Diaz-Canel, the first vice president, is too young to have participated in the
revolution that brought Fidel Castro into power.
Despite the announced changes, there is still skepticism in the U.S. about the announcement and what it
may mean in terms of foreign relations with the island. The U.S. has imposed an embargo on Cuba for 53
years.
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Cuban American who represents South Florida, issued a
statement last week about the rumored retirement of Raul Castro saying, “It’s not a matter of if, but
when, the Castro brothers ultimately vacate power – but the real change in Cuba involves much more
than the Castro brothers. If dictator Raul Castro states that he will retire in five years, there will still be
no real change for the Cuban people so long as the Castro brothers remain in any form of leadership
position, even behind the scenes. The whole system crafted by the Castro brothers is corrupt and must
be totally replaced. Shifting the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic won’t produce positive changes. The
U.S. should not change its policy of isolation of the Cuban regime until, according to US law, there are
free, fair and internationally supervised elections, all the political prisoners are released and human
rights are finally respected.”
Diaz-Canel won’t reform – the communist regime will hold him back
Nelson, 13 – has had 42 years of experience being a report and has won multiple awards (Gary, “Miguel
Diaz-Canel: Cuba’s Next President?”, CBS Miami, 2/26/13,
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/02/26/miguel-diaz-canel-cubas-next-president/)//EX
Even if Diaz-Canel, an immaculately dressed fellow who sports perfectly styled salt and pepper hair,
should assume power; Suchlicki cautions that significant reforms should not be expected in the Cuban
system.¶ “He is the godson of one of the leaders of the revolution. He has been nurtured in that
atmosphere. He is a Marxist/Leninist,” Suchlicki said.¶ Should Canel fail to toe the party line he could find
himself working as a “farmer in an interior section of Cuba,” Suchlicki said. “He will be constrained by
the same forces, by the military, by the communist party.Ӧ Suchlicki said the same structure that has
kept the Castro brothers in power for more than half a century will fight to resist democratic or
capitalistic reforms.¶ At the same time, the UM expert noted that Raul Castro has brought greater
communication, freedom to travel and some economic reforms to Cuba that may have room to grow.¶
“That would certainly be our hope,” Suchlicki said.
No change Diaz Canel is loyal to the communist party
Wilkinson, 13 - Mexico City bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, ( Tracy, Cuba's apparent
successor to Castro was carefully groomed, Los Angeles Times, 2-26-2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/26/world/la-fg-cuba-diaz-canel-20130227)//BDS
MEXICO CITY — To most outsiders, Miguel Diaz-Canel was an unknown. But in Cuba, the newly anointed
possible heir to the Castro brothers was a carefully groomed, hardworking and familiar figure. Diaz-Canel
emerged as the likely successor to lead a post-Castro government over the weekend when he was
named first vice president and President Raul Castro announced that he would step down at the end of
his just-ratified five-year term. It marks the first time an expiration date has been put on the Castro era,
during which the island was led first by Fidel and then by Raul after the 1959 revolution that ousted a
dictatorial U.S.-backed regime. Diaz-Canel, 52, is part of a new generation of Cuban political operatives.
Raul is 81 and Fidel, who formally stepped down in 2008, is 86. The heir apparent worked his way up
through the ranks of communist Cuba, serving in the military and filling posts in the provinces. He won
praise from the leadership for fidelity and a roll-up-the-sleeves work ethic that put him in the trenches
alongside regular people. "He is not a test-tube politician," said a Cuban official who spoke on condition
of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss political matters. In other words, he was not a
latecomer dilettante who felt entitled by virtue of class or family. "He worked closely with the people
and gained lots of experience." Essentially, he paid his dues, putting hard work ahead of the overt
ambition that has felled many an up-and-comer on the Cuban political landscape. Tall, with thick silvery
hair, Diaz-Canel is a striking if not particularly charismatic figure. In nearly three decades of work on
behalf of the state, he earned a degree in engineering, taught at the university level, ran local
governments and dipped his toe into international tourism. He was assigned management of what
Cuban officials consider major areas of accomplishment by the revolution: education, sports and
biotechnology. "His legitimacy comes from governing and doing," said Julia E. Sweig, an expert on Cuba
at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the book "Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know." "He
is a problem-solver and very grass-roots. He comes from real on-the-ground actions." More recently, as
his profile rose and his appearances on Cuban television increased, he filled in for Raul Castro at
important events, including a symbolic inauguration of the cancer-stricken President Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela, Cuba's most important ally. He also attended the swearing-in of Mexican President Enrique
Peña Nieto at a time when Cuba is hoping to restore its formerly close relationship with the country.
Raul Castro himself sang Diaz-Canel's praises Sunday after the appointment. "He is not an out-ofnowhere [figure] nor an upstart," Castro said, and went on to detail the younger man's 30-year career.
Castro said Diaz-Canel's appointment represented a historic point in a generational transformation. Of
course, this is Cuba and many things could yet derail the career of Diaz-Canel. If he does succeed Castro,
the task before him is enormous. Castro has embarked on a slow but steady program of reform,
loosening the state's grip on the economy and opening travel for citizens — steps, he says, that were
necessary not to do away with the country's socialist model but to modernize and improve it. Yet it is a
painful and uncertain period for a population mostly reared by a paternalistic state. Castro apparently
trusts Diaz-Canel as a figure of continuity. That may reassure members of the government, but it riles
the exile community that is hoping for more definitive change. "Shifting the deck chairs on the sinking
Titanic won't produce positive changes," Havana-born U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) said in a
statement. It is probably Diaz-Canel's military experience, along with his years of Communist Party duty,
that make him most trustworthy to Castro. He served in an antiaircraft rocket battery in his youth and is
believed to maintain good contacts with the armed forces. "He clearly supports the economic opening
and is trusted by the party and the military, and these are the principal pillars of government at this
time," said Robert A. Pastor, director of the Center for North American Studies at American University in
Washington and a former Carter administration official involved in Cuba. "The naming of Diaz-Canel is a
further sign that the transition — from caudillo rule to cautious institutionalization of the revolution,
from a closed state-controlled economy to one that is opening gradually — is well underway, and the
Communist Party is firmly in control."
Change in the regime is unlikely even with Diaz-Canel
Ventrell,13 - Acting Deputy Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State (Patrick, Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC February 25, 2013 Transcript, US Department of State, 2-25-2013,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/02/205179.htm)//BDS
QUESTION: Can I ask about Cuba? MR. VENTRELL: Go ahead. QUESTION: Do you have a reaction to Raul
Castro saying he will not seek reelection in five years’ time? MR. VENTRELL: So, Brad, we are indeed
aware of the reports that President Castro, Raul Castro, announced his intention to step down in 2018
after another five-year term. We also saw the announcement that Mr. Miguel Diaz-Canel was named
First Vice President. We remain hopeful for the day that the Cuban people get democracy, when they
can have the opportunity to freely pick their own leaders in an open democratic process and enjoy the
freedoms of speech and association without fear of reprisal. We’re clearly not there yet. QUESTION:
Hold on, hold on. I’m glad you’re aware. I guess that confirms that not everybody in the U.S.
Government slept through the entire weekend. But do you have an actual reaction? Do you have a
position on whether this is a good step, whether this is helpful in that process toward a freer, fairer,
Cuba as you stated? MR. VENTRELL: I think -- QUESTION: Or just that you know that things happened in
the world over the last 48 hours? MR. VENTRELL: Well, no. I mean, I think, Brad, what we’re saying is
that we’ve noted that it’s happened, but clearly, a change in leadership that, absent the fundamental
democratic reforms necessary to give people their free will and their ability to pick their own leaders,
won’t be a fundamental change for Cuba. QUESTION: So this is not enough; they still need to do more if
they want to, one, improve the state of their country and, two, repair relations with the United States?
MR. VENTRELL: Absolutely.
Diaz-Canel Unlikely to secede Raul
Democracy Digest, 13 – (A post-Castro Cuba? Not likely, say dissidents, Democracy Digest, 2-26-13,
http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2013/02/a-post-castro-cuba-not-likely-say-dissidents/)//BDS
The regime has adopted a series of anemic reforms in an attempt to kick-start a sclerotic economy
which is now more dependent on Venezuelan aid that it was on Soviet subsidies before 1991.
“Regardless of what happens in Venezuela, the Cuban regime needs to ‘update’ the revolution,” said
Sabatini, a former Latin America program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy. “Even with
the 100,000 or so barrels of oil the regime receives every year it is still struggling fiscally, is still strapped
for hard currency and is still failing to meet people’s basic needs.” But Cuban democrats question
whether the handover will take place. “Raul Castro will be in power until he dies,” said Orlando Gutierrez
Boronat of the Cuban Democratic Directory: He views recent moves by the Castro government as
political gamesmanship and still speculates that Fidel Castro’s daughter, Mariela Castro, could eventually
assume power. Others think it could be one of Raul Castro’s sons, Alejandro. “The Castro family has no
intention of letting go,” said Gutierrez Boronat. “They keep power within a very close familiar group,
together with the people who’ve been helping them in the state apparatus for the last 53 years.”
“They’re giving up power too late and five years is too long to wait for them to actually do it,” said
Francisco “Pepe” Hernandez, president of the Cuban-American National Foundation, a group that has
long lobbied in Washington against the Castros. “‘They’ve already done so much harm to the Cuban
people. And the nerve to think they can name a successor, as if Cuba was their personal farm. The
successor they named better be careful; those guys sometimes just disappear,” he said. On his blog,
Mauricio Claver-Carone, the Executive Director of Cuba Democracy Advocates, wrote: “Here’s a novel
idea — how about letting the Cuban people choose their ‘new generation’ of leaders?” The Obama
administration takes a similar line, suggesting that Cubans deserve the right to choose their own leaders
in free and fair elections. “Absent the fundamental democratic reforms necessary to give people their
free will and their ability to pick their own leaders, it won’t be a fundamental change for Cuba,” said
State Department deputy acting spokesman Patrick Ventrell. The activists’ skepticism is echoed by
independent analysts. “I don’t think Diaz-Canel has any base of power,” said Professor Jaime Suchlicki, a
Cuba expert at the University of Miami. “He’s not military. He doesn’t have any tanks or a regimen. Right
now, he’s the man of the hour. Two years from now, he may not be.” Since inheriting power from his
brother Fidel, Castro has initiated a series of tentative micro-reforms, designed to promote a China
model of limited private enterprise while maintaining the ruling Communist party’s political monopoly.
Changes in Cuban leadership don’t affect policy
French, 13 – editor to The Havana Note on US Cuban relations, contributor to The Washington Post,
The Baltimore Sun, TheAtlantic.com, ForeignPolicy.com, CNN.com, the South Florida Sentinel and The
Atlanta Journal-Constitution and the Havana Note (Anya Landau, U.S. Restarts Migration, Mail Talks with
Cuba, The Havana Note, 6-24-13, http://thehavananote.com/contributors/3/all)//BDS
It’s not that I harbor any great love for Fidel Castro. It's not about Castro at all, and that's the point. It
can be mighty frustrating to have to explain over and over again that waiting isn't a policy, and even if it
were, the conflict simply isn't about Fidel Castro anymore. As Republican Senator Mike Enzi likes to say
about U.S. Cuba policy, if you keep doing what you've always done, you'll keep getting what you've
already got. And yet, waiting is the predominant American viewpoint when it comes to Cuba; nothing
can or should change until Fidel goes. But the reality is that the so-called biological solution is no
solution at all. Fidel Castro has been out of power (if not influence) for 7 years now. In order to try to
right his sinking ship, Raul Castro has steadily been dismantling many of the economic – and even some
political – policies that his older brother either endorsed or neglected. Does anyone truly believe that
anything will change either in Cuba or in the bilateral relationship as a result of his exit from the scene?
Surely not; whatever change his exit might have ushered in, that moment came and went in 2006 when
he gave up the reins of power for the first time since gaining them a half a century ago. Both the U.S.
and Cuban governments have botched this thing over and over, and, arguably, haven’t always wanted
reconciliation or normalization or any other nuanced form of moving on. Over the last several years, the
Obama administration’s policy toward Cuba has been something of a work in progress. Openings to
travel and exchange have been slow, at times arbitrarily approved, but in the end, have proliferated. The
president’s call for a new beginning in the relationship was followed largely by more of the same when it
came to USAID programming, which is not your usual development programming in partnership with
the host country. And when the U.S. had the opportunity to send a message, a gesture, by sending one
of the Cuban Five who was released on parole back to Cuba instead, we didn’t. (Did we really want him
on U.S. soil, anyway?)
Oil mechanism
Cuban oil drilling inevitable
Oil drilling is inevitable – US sanctions mean US companies will be locked out and
drilling will be unsafe
Center for Democracy in the Americas 10
(Center for Democracy in the Americas, “Oil, Energy, and Cooperation” Center for Democracy in the
Americas, Delegation Summary, July 8-12, 2010
http://www.democracyinamericas.org/cuba/cuba-trip-reports/oil-energy-and-cooperation/)//HA
One sentence neatly captures what is happening in Cuba regarding energy and why it should interest
and concern us: Repsol, a Spanish oil company is paying an Italian firm, to build an oil rig in China that
will be used next year to explore for oil off the shores of Cuba.
What this means is that Cuba has oil . Whether it’s available in commercially viable amounts we do not
yet know. Repsol will begin drilling exploratory wells next year. We were told by sources in Cuba that
seven such wells will be drilled throughout 2011-2012. If this drilling finds significant oil, production
could take place as early as 2014 and as late as 2018 (estimates vary). A significant oil strike, even before
production takes place, will likely render the U.S. embargo moot, and change the political and economic
climate of the Hemisphere in profoundly important ways. Unless U.S. policy changes, however,
American firms will be locked out of the exploration process. Similarly, while Cuba has strong
environmental interests and practices in place, current policy only allows for piecemeal approaches that
would enable U.S. firms to cooperate with Cuba if there is another disaster like the BP spill. This problem
would grow worse if Rep. Ros-Lehtinen’s legislation – which would apply Helms-Burton style sanctions
to foreign firms operating in the Gulf – were to become law . Policy makers should instead take
positive short-and long-term steps to address this issue in terms of energy development and
environmental protection.
We strongly believe that the U.S. has an interest in Cuba finding these resources and having U.S. firms
participate in that process, and engaging U.S. expertise in protecting the environment .
Drilling inevitable – US cooperation is vital to safety
Pearre 11- staff writer for CSIS
(Kennon, “Cuban Offshore Oil and U.S. Worries” CSIS, MAY 4, 2011, http://csis.org/blog/cuban-offshoreoil-and-us-worries)//HA
The Scarabeo 9 oil drilling platform, owned by Italian firm Saipem SpA, is projected to leave Singapore where it is undergoing final preparations - by July 1 and arrive in Cuban waters as early as September
2011. After arrival, the Scarabeo 9 will begin drilling for a consortium of companies led by Spanish
Repsol YPF, including Norway’s Statoil and India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp. Cuban authorities estimate
that 20 billion barrels of oil lay off their shores, while the U.S. Geological Survey predicts a more modest
reserve of 5 billion barrels. The untapped region of the Gulf of Mexico has attracted various
international companies, with the Cuban government hopeful that their expertise will bring sizable
financial returns for the nation. However, opposition to the proposed drilling has coalesced among U.S.
policymakers who fear a possible accident could damage Florida’s economy and environment.
The history of oil in Cuba is a history of dependency. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba experienced
fuel shortages due to its over-reliance on Soviet–subsidized fuel that it had enjoyed throughout the Cold
War. Since the early 2000s, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has sold oil through Venezuelan oil
company PDVSA to Cuba at a preferential price in exchange for Cuban medical personnel. The CubanVenezuelan agreement has enabled the Cuban government to even sell excess oil at market prices.
Although a profitable deal for the Cuban government, the recent economic reforms enacted by Raúl
Castro highlight the desperate need for economic restructuring and an increase in government income.
As Cuba lacks the technological and financial resources to develop its offshore oil fields, the doors were
opened to international companies, except for U.S. firms, which are unable to participate due to the 50year-old trade embargo.
Various foreign companies and consortia have contracted 22 offshore drilling blocks with the Cuban
government. While the Repsol consortia will be the first to use the $700 million Scarabeo 9 for
exploratory drilling, other companies such as Malaysia’s Petronas, and possibly Venezuela’s PDVSA, are
in line to use the same drilling platform. At least four more exploratory wells are to be drilled by the
Scarabeo 9, which will last until 2013. Heralded as one of the most technologically advanced drilling
platforms in the world, the Scarabeo 9 is capable of drilling at a depth of 12,000 feet – surpassing the
capability of the Deepwater Horizon. Repsol is said to be leasing the platform for $403,000 per day.
The Scarabeo 9 platform will be positioned just north of Havana, or only 50 miles south of the Florida
Keys, according to Florida Congressman Vern Buchanan’s website. Those opposed to the drilling in the
United States, such as Buchanan and other Florida representatives, have proposed sanctions against
Repsol and its consortia to persuade it from carrying out its exploratory drilling plans in Cuban waters.
These would include revoking visas and entry to executives of oil companies that wish to drill in Cuban
waters, and possibly denying oil and gas leases to any company doing business with the Cuban
government. The main focus for the opposition has been the fear of an oil spill, similar to that which
occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010. Buchanan has reinforced this by adding that a spill could
reach Florida in three days, devastating the regional economy and causing long-term environmental
damage. Many opposed to the deal fear Cuba simply does not have the regulatory framework to ensure
safe drilling techniques are used. There is also trepidation that if a spill were to happen, the Cuban
government lacks the resources to ensure an efficient clean-up that minimizes environmental damages.
The economic hardships experienced by Cuba are forcing the hand of Cuban authorities to reform the
economic system and seek additional forms of income. From the Cuban stand point, the prospect of oil
wealth could not come at a better time. While opposition to Repsol’s exploratory drilling is an
impediment, it is unlikely to stop foreign companies from exploring for oil in a previously untouched
section of the Gulf of Mexico. U.S. fears that Cuba would be unable to handle a spill are a worrying
prospect to those who live in south Florida. If these exploratory drills reveal significant reserves, the
need for increased dialogue between the United States and Cuba will remain as pertinent as ever .
Cuban oil investment is inevitable – only US companies will be locked out
Hemlock 8- staff writer for the Sun-Sentinel
(Doreen, “Cuban oil rigs could be built 45 miles off US coast” Sun-Sentinel, March 17, 2008,
http://www.billnelson.senate.gov/news/details.cfm?id=295062&)//HA
This could happen, as Havana invites foreign companies to explore its probable oil and natural gas
reserves while Washington's embargo against the communist-led island keeps U.S. companies locked
out.
South Florida is watching closely, amid debate over drilling near its shores and concerns over U.S. energy
policy. Oil companies increasingly seek to tap Cuba's deep-water reserves, now that oil prices are
soaring and profits more likely.
"In 34 years following Cuba, I've never seen an issue like this _ so strategically important to the United
States," said Kirby Jones, president of Washington-based Alamar Associates, who advises U.S. companies
on Cuba and opposes the U.S. embargo.
Cuba is courting oil investors to slash its dependence on foreign fuels. The cash-strapped island can't
afford to import all it needs, especially at today's oil prices topping $100 a barrel. The island long relied
on the Soviet Union for subsidized oil and now depends on cheap supply from Venezuela that it pays for
with services from its doctors and other professionals.
Havana began opening to foreign investment in the early 1990s after the loss of Soviet aid, and now
produces almost half the oil and natural gas it consumes. It drills mainly heavy crude on or near shore
with help from Canadian companies.
But the big prize lies in deep water reservoirs miles off the north shore in the Gulf of Mexico. By some
estimates, the area holds nearly as much oil and natural gas as the coveted U.S. Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge in Alaska _ enough to meet Cuban demand for years.
Havana is forging deals with companies from Norway, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, Spain and other nations
to explore dozens of its 59 deep-water blocks. Brazil's president visited in January to seal contracts for
Petrobras, the global leader in deep-water drilling.
Experts say it will take several more years, and hundreds of millions of dollars, for the companies to
figure out where to drill in waters often a mile deep.
But if the pieces fall into place, offshore rigs could be working by 2012 not far from South Florida, said
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba energy specialist at the University of Nebraska in Omaha who has
visited the island many times.
"Cuba also could become a trans-shipment point for oil, refined products and exports for the region,"
Benjamin-Alvarado said.
U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., aims to head off those possibilities and keep drilling far from Florida shores.
In a long-shot move, he seeks to scrap a 31-year-old accord that splits the 90 miles of water between the
United States and Cuba and to redraw the borders.
"Soon, there could be oil rigs within 50 miles of the Florida Keys and the Florida Keys National Marine
Sanctuary," Nelson wrote the Bush administration in late January, after Brazil's president met Cuban
leader Fidel Castro. "And, as the Gulf Stream flows, an oil spill or other drilling accident would desecrate
part of Florida's unique environment and devastate its $50 billion tourism-driven economy."
Today, U.S. companies are the only ones banned from Cuba, under terms of Washington's 45-year
embargo. All other nations trade with the island, the Caribbean's largest.
The American Petroleum Institute, representing U.S. oil industry companies, has long rejected U.S. go-italone sanctions, like the embargo on Cuba. It seeks greater access to oil reserves worldwide, said a
spokeswoman in Washington.
Just four years ago, talk of Cuba becoming a serious producer of deep-water oil seemed far-fetched.
In 2004, Spain's Repsol announced offshore finds but deemed oil samples from Cuba not commercially
viable.
But since then, oil prices have reached new inflation-adjusted highs, and the economics of oil have
changed.
Furthermore, recent events in Venezuela have raised concerns about how long President Hugo Chavez
can keep up oil largesse to Cuba, now estimated to top $2 billion a year.
Cubans worry that if Venezuela cuts off cheap oil, they'll suffer widespread blackouts like they did after
the Soviet Union halted oil aid in the early 1990s. Back then, with fuel in short supply and cash tight,
lights went out up to 16 hours a day, and bicycles often replaced cars.
"The recent high-profile visit by Brazil's President Lula was a way to show there's an alternative to
Chavez, who can be so unpredictable," said Cuban economist and political dissident Oscar Espinosa
Chepe at his Havana home.
"But there's a downside. If those companies find oil offshore, it could delay economic changes needed in
Cuba," said Espinosa Chepe, explaining that a more financially secure regime could tighten control.
"When Chavez started providing oil, Fidel rolled back market-oriented reforms," he added.
Cuba still faces hurdles to exploit its huge north basin reserves, estimated by the U.S. Geological Survey
at 4.6 billion to 9.3 billion barrels of oil and nearly 1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
Deep-water rigs are in short supply worldwide and expensive to use _ sometimes $200,000 a day or
more. Companies in Cuban waters also may be banned from using some cutting-edge U.S. technology
because of the U.S. embargo. Older technologies could make exploration more expensive, said
Benjamin-Alvarado.
As plans proceed, analysts are figuring out which U.S. companies stand to lose the most.
Big U.S. oil producers likely won't be shut out permanently, said Jorge Pinon, former president of Amoco
Latin America and now an energy fellow at the University of Miami's Center for Hemispheric Policy.
Should the U.S. embargo on Cuba end and Cuban waters already be staked out, U.S. behemoths could
swap some of their holdings with partners elsewhere, such as PetroVietnam, for their partners' assets in
Cuba.
The big losers likely would be U.S. oil equipment and service companies, such as Halliburton, which
would need to get in early. They would be shut out of mega-contracts to build refineries, pipelines, ports
and other basics. And their competitors, including Canadian and Mexican companies familiar with the
Gulf of Mexico area, would be supplying food and other services to the oil industry, said Pinon.
For many Cubans, concerns over offshore oil are more immediate, however.
"If they find oil, things can get better," said Antonio Villar, 34, taking a break from hauling trash in a
tractor-pulled cart in Havana province. "We could have more industry. The cost of living would go down.
And there'd be more food to eat, more variety of food."
Drilling in Cuba is inevitable and the US embargo prevents ships necessary for oil spill
recovery.
Goodhue 13-staff writer for keysnet
(David, “Last Cuban offshore oil project ending for now
But Russians pledge continued ‘prospecting’ in Cuban waters” Keyes Net, June 06, 2013,
http://www.keysnet.com/2013/06/06/487368/last-cuban-offshore-oil-project.html)//HA
A Russian oil company using a Norwegian-owned drilling rig is temporarily pulling out of Cuban waters
without finding any significant sources of crude, but industry watchers say it is too soon to dismiss
Cuba’s offshore energy potential.
The Songa Mercur was searching for oil in at least two prospects near the Bahamas’ exclusive economic
zone with Cuba — located fewer than 200 miles from the South Florida coast. The Cuban government
announced in late May the state-run Russian company operating the rig, Zarubezhneft, was leaving the
area but would return to the same spot in 2014.
The announcement has major implications for Cuba’s energy future. The communist island nation is
heavily dependent on imports from ally nations like Venezuela for its oil needs.
Cuba suffered a major disappointment when several countries were unsuccessful in finding oil in the
deep waters of the Florida Straits last year. The area — about 70 miles from Key West — might contain
large amounts of oil, but it is in very deep water, the crude is difficult to find and working in the area
is highly expensive.
Operations in the Straits cost companies about $100 million each in exploratory missions alone, said
Jorge Piñon, associate director of the Latin America and Caribbean Energy Program at the University of
Texas at Austin.
“I have been told that the oil is there, but the traps/structures are very difficult. So oil companies are
probably likely to spend their limited capital dollars in other more promising, less risky areas (not only
technical but also politically) than Cuba,” Piñon said in an e-mail. “They would rather go to Brazil,
Angola, Alaska, U.S. Gulf of Mexico or the new growing market of shale in Argentina.”
The Straits exploration — conducted by four international companies on a giant Chinese-built, Italianowned semi-submersible oil rig — worried both environmentalists and critics of Cuba’s Castro regime.
But the operation was largely a bust and only two of the participating companies are still in the region:
Malaysia’s Petronas and Gazprom, from Russia. They’re operating in a partnership and are now only
conducting “some seismic work,” Piñon said.
The first company to work on the rig, Spain’s Repsol, closed its Cuban offices. And Petroleos de
Venezuela, or PDVSA, is going through too many financial difficulties to invest again in the risky Straits,
according to Piñon. The area near the Bahamas where Zarubezhneft is exploring is much shallower —
around 2,000 feet below the surface as opposed to 6,000 feet in the Straits. This makes it a more
attractive place for companies like Zarubezhneft to search for offshore fossil fuels.
Valentina Matvienko, speaker of the Russian Federation Council — the country’s equivalent of the U.S.
Senate — pledged in a May interview with Cuba’s state-run Granma newspaper continued investment
and involvement in Cuba’s offshore energy projects.
“We are currently negotiating a broad range of projects relating to energy, and Russian companies such
as Zarubezhneft are actively involved in oil prospecting in Cuban waters, and this work is going to
continue,” Matvienko said.
But the company might not use the Songa Mercur when it returns, according to oil industry sources. One
of the reasons Zarubezhneft is leaving Cuba is because the rig was having equipment difficulties.
Instead, Zarubezhneft may come back in a drill ship, a traditional seagoing vessel with oil-drilling
capabilities.
However, Lee Hunt, president emeritus of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, said
finding a ship that complies with the 52-year-old U.S.-imposed trade embargo against Cuba could be
difficult. Such a vessel must have fewer than 10 percent of its parts made in the United States. If the ship
is not compliant with the embargo, companies using it could face U.S. sanctions.
Geir Karlsen, a Songa Offshore spokesman, told The Reporter his company has no agreement with
Zarubezhneft to take the Mercur back to Cuba.
Russia and Cuba are not the only countries hoping the Cuba/Bahamas maritime border abounds with
crude. The Bahamas Petroleum Co., based out of the Isle of Man, received permission to begin
exploratory offshore drilling in the region ahead of a referendum that would give Bahamians a say in the
future energy development of their country. This means drilling in the Old Bahamas Channel, south of
the Andros Islands, could begin by 2014.
The BPC is looking to partner with another oil company in its search for oil. The company is also seeking
European investors. Since the area is so close to the Zarubezhneft site, Russia’s success there could reap
BPC a financial windfall.
“Good news in Cuba would have helped in the search for much-needed capital and/or possible joint
venture partners,” Piñon said. “A discovery on the Cuban side would have certainly helped their
development momentum.”
Natalia Erikssen, a BPC spokeswoman, said the company plans to begin drilling next year regardless of
Zarubezhneft’s success or failure in the region.
“It won’t have anything to do with Zarubezhneft,” Erikssen said in an e-mail.
Hunt said just because no significant discoveries have been found off the Bahamas doesn’t mean the oil
isn’t there. “More than one U.S. wildcatter made his fortune on the last roll of the dice,” he said.
Cuban oil drilling inevitable - it’s only a question of whether or not we tech share
equipment for effective use of resources.
Frank 10- staff writer for Financial Times
(Marc, “Oil exploration in Cuba expected to go ahead” Financial Times, August 29, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63317958-b3af-11df-81aa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XFztbkIZ)//HA
Preparations for full-scale oil exploration are gaining momentum in Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters just 50
miles from the US, testing the limits of the trade embargo on the Caribbean nation.
Cubapetroleo, the state oil monopoly, says seven exploration wells are scheduled for the Cuban waters
up to the end of 2012.
A new Chinese deep-water rig, owned by Saipem, a unit of Italian oil company Eni SpA, is scheduled to
leave its shipyard by the end of 2010 for the two-month trek to Cuba.
The rig was built to get around the 10 per cent limit on US technology demanded under the US trade
embargo of Cuba.
Preparatory work is moving ahead at Mariel, a port west of Havana, the staging area for drilling
operations, diplomatic and industry sources said, and some companies have opened bidding for well
casing.
“It is ridiculous that Repsol, a Spanish oil company, is paying an Italian firm to build an oil rig in China
that will be used next year to explore for oil 50 miles from Florida,” Sarah Stephens, executive director
of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, said.
Ms Stephens, whose Washington-based organisation opposes US sanctions, led the first US energyrelated fact-finding mission by congressional staff and experts to Havana in July. They concluded Cuba
was determined to sink wells and with them the embargo.
Embargo opponents in Washington are backing legislation that would allow US groups to participate
in Cuba’s offshore oil development , while proponents plan legislation that would impose sanctions on
the foreign groups that do. Florida politicians, who have banned drilling off their coast, and CubanAmerican lawmakers, have raised fears of an accident such as the one on BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig.
According to industry and diplomatic sources, companies from Spain, India, Norway and perhaps
Malaysia – all US allies – have already contracted the rig, while others, from Vietnam, Venezuela and
Brazil are not far behind.
Russian and Chinese companies are negotiating to obtain offshore blocks or partner with the other
companies. Repsol drilled the only offshore well in Cuba’s waters in 2004. It said at the time that it had
found hydrocarbons, but not in a commercially viable amount. Since then, according to Manuel Marrero
Faz, oil adviser to Cuba’s Ministry of Basic Industry, extensive seismic work has revealed 15 sites with a
high probability of oil.
Mr Marrero estimates Cuba has up to 20bn barrels of oil in its offshore areas, while the US Geological
Survey puts the figure at a more modest 4.6bn barrels and 10,000bn cu feet of gas.
Cuba currently produces about 60,000 barrels of oil per day, all from onshore wells. It imports about
115,000 b/d from ally Venezuela on favourable terms.
The Obama administration has refrained from denouncing Cuba’s drilling plans and appears to favour
limited co-operation .
The administration recently said it would allow US companies that handle and clean up oil spills to
operate in Cuban waters should the need arise and granted approval for executives from the Houston-
based International Association of Drilling Contractors to visit Cuba last week. Lee Hunt, association
president, told the Financial Times he was impressed by Cuba’s preparations and regulatory regime,
which included measures his group had proposed to the Obama administration after the BP disaster.
He added: “There is one Gulf shared by three countries. We are promoting co-operation between their
industries to insure the unfortunate events that occurred in Mexico and more recently in the United
States do not happen here”.
Jorge Piñon, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute of the Florida International
University, said more should be done to wean Cuba from energy dependence on Venezuela and insure
safety.
“ The United States should enable oil companies working in Cuba access to equipment and technology
that would allow the monetisation of Cuba’s hydrocarbon resources in a safe and responsible
manner,” Mr Pinon added.
Cuban drilling inevitable – production by 2014
Frank 10- staff writers for Reuters
(Marc, “Cuba plans 7 Gulf of Mexico oil test wells - U.S. group” Rueters, August 18, 2010,
http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/08/17/idINIndia-50901120100817)//HA
Cuba plans to drill seven exploratory oil wells in its Gulf of Mexico waters over the next two years,
according to a U.S. organization that visited the Communist-ruled island to discuss energy development.
Sarah Stephens, executive director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, said meetings between
energy experts she brought to the island in July and Cuba's state oil monopoly Cubapetroleo (CUPET) left
no doubt about the Caribbean nation's determination to develop its offshore oil reserves.
"Repsol, a Spanish oil company, is paying an Italian firm to build an oil rig in China that will be used next
year to explore for oil off the shores of Cuba," she told Reuters in a written response to questions.
"Whether it's available in commercially viable amounts we do not yet know. We were told by sources in
Cuba that seven such wells will be drilled over 2011-2012. If this drilling finds significant oil, you could
have production taking place as early as 2014 and as late as 2018," Stephens said.
Her non-profit group, based in Washington D.C., says it works to improve U.S. policy toward the
Americas including Cuba. It opposes existing U.S. sanctions against the island.
Cuba's government has declared its interest in developing the country's offshore oil resources but rarely
gives details of its plans in public.
The energy analysts on the trip to Havana included Michael A. Levi, Director of the Program on Energy
Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ronald Soligo from Rice University, and
Lisa Margonelli, Director of the Energy Policy Initiative at the New America Foundation.
Cuba estimates it has up to 20 billion barrels of oil in its offshore areas, but the U.S. Geological Survey
has estimated a more modest 4.6 billion barrels and 10 trillion cubic feet of gas.
Mexico and the United States, which share the Gulf of Mexico with Cuba, have been producing oil and
natural gas from under its waters for decades.
Cuba currently produces about 60,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd), all from onshore wells. It receives
about 115,000 bpd from ally Venezuela on favorable terms.
OIL EXPLORATION MOVES
Speculation about Cuba's deep water exploration plans and statements concerning imminent drilling
have increased since Repsol YPF drilled the only offshore well in Cuba's untapped waters in 2004. It said
at the time it had found hydrocarbons, but not in a commercially viable amount.
Industry sources blame delays in further oil development on problems with financing and fear of
sanctions under Washington's 48-year-old trade embargo on Cuba, which also put a 10 percent cap on
use of U.S. technology on the island.
But they say it appears serious exploration will finally get under way next year.
Part of Cuba's Gulf of Mexico zone is within 50 miles (80 km) of Florida, where U.S. politicians have
raised fears that Cuban drilling could lead to an accident like the huge BP oil spill off the Louisiana coast.
Drilling is inevitable
Stephens et al, 11 – Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas (Sarah, “As Cuba
plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest,” MacArthur
Foundation, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf) //SP
This year Cuba and its foreign partners will begin drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Drilling will take
place as close as 50 miles from Florida and in sites deeper than BP’s Macondo well, where an explosion
in April 2010 killed 11 workers and created the largest oil spill ever in American waters. Undiscovered
reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil and 9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath the
Gulf of Mexico in land belonging to Cuba, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, although Cuba’s
estimates contain higher figures. The amount actually recoverable remains to be seen.
Finding oil in commercially viable amounts would be transformative for Cuba. Revenues from natural
resource wealth have the potential to provide long-sought stability for Cuba’s economy and are likely to
significantly alter its relations with Venezuela and the rest of Latin America, Asia and other leading
energy producing and consuming nations. Discoveries of commercially viable resources would also have
an enormous impact upon the Gulf environment shared by Cuba and the United States.
The U.S. embargo against Cuba, a remnant of the Cold War, is an obstacle to realizing and protecting our
interests in the region. Not only does it prohibit U.S. firms from joining Cuba in efforts to extract its
offshore resources, thus giving the competitive advantage to other foreign firms, but it also denies Cuba
access to U.S. equipment for drilling and environmental protection—an
especially troubling outcome in the wake of the disastrous BP spill. The embargo compels Cuba’s foreign
partners to go through contortions—such as ordering a state of the art drilling rig built in China and
sailing it roughly 10,000 miles to Cuban waters—to avoid violating the content limitations imposed by
U.S. law.
Most important, due to the failed policy of isolating Cuba, the United States cannot engage in
meaningful environmental cooperation with Cuba while it develops its own energy resources. Our
government cannot even address the threat of potential spills in advance from the frequent hurricane
activity in the Gulf or from technological failures, either of which could put
precious and environmentally sensitive U.S. coastal assets—our waters, our fisheries, our beaches—at
great peril.
The risks begin the moment the first drill bit pierces the seabed, and increase from there. Yet, our policy
leaves the Obama administration with limited options:
• It could do nothing.
• It could try to stop Cuba from developing its oil and natural gas, an alternative most likely to fail in an
energy-hungry world, or
• It could agree to dialogue and cooperation with Cuba to ensure that drilling in the Gulf protects our
mutual interests.
Since the 1990s, Cuba has demonstrated a serious commitment to protecting the environment, building
an array of environmental policies, some based on U.S. and Spanish law. But it has no experience
responding to major marine-based spills and, like our country, Cuba has to balance economic and
environmental interests. In this contest, the environmental side will not always prevail.
Against this backdrop, cooperation and engagement between Cuba and the United States is the right
approach, and there is already precedent for it.
During the BP crisis, the U.S. shared information with Cuba about the spill. The administration publicly
declared its willingness to provide limited licenses for U.S. firms to respond to a catastrophe that
threatened Cuba. It also provided visas for Cuban scientists and environmental officials to attend an
important environmental conference in Florida. For its part, Cuba permitted
a vessel from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to look for damage in Cuban waters.
But these modest measures, however welcome, are not sufficient, especially in light of Cuba’s imminent
plans to drill.
Under the guise of environmental protection, Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Vern Buchanan, Members
of the U.S. Congress from Florida, introduced bills to impose sanctions on foreign oil companies and U.S.
firms that help Cuba drill for oil, and to punish those foreign firms by denying them the right to drill in
U.S. waters. This legislation would penalize U.S. firms and anger our allies, but not stop Cuba from
drilling, and will make the cooperation to protect our mutual coastal environment more difficult should
problems occur.
Energy policy and environmental protection are classic examples of how the embargo is an abiding
threat to U.S. interests. It should no longer be acceptable to base U.S. foreign policy on the illusion that
sanctions will cause Cuba’s government to collapse, or to try to stop Cuba from developing its oil
resources. Nor should this policy or the political dynamic that sustains it prevent the U.S. from
addressing both the challenges and benefits of Cuba finding meaningful amounts of oil in the Gulf of
Mexico.
The path forward is clear. The Obama administration should use its executive authority to guarantee
that firms with the best equipment and greatest expertise are licensed in advance to fight the effects of
an oil spill. The Treasury Department, which enforces Cuba sanctions, should make clear to the private
sector that efforts to protect drilling safety will not be met with adverse regulatory actions. The U.S.
government should commit to vigorous information sharing with Cuba, and open direct negotiations
with the Cuban government for environmental agreements modeled on cooperation that already exists
with our Canadian and Mexican neighbors.
Most of all, the administration should replace a policy predicated on Cuba failing with a diplomatic
approach that recognizes Cuba’s sovereignty. Only then will our nation be able to respond effectively to
what could become a new chapter in Cuba’s history and ours.
There is little time and much to do before the drilling begins.
Lifting restrictions causes oil coop
Removing sanctions boosts international investment in Cuban energy
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 122)//NG
The energy-security environment for the United States is at a critical juncture. The productive
capacity of two of the United States’ largest oil suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela, has declined, and the
supporting energy infrastructure in both countries is in need of significant revitalization. The vagaries of
the politics in the region, the variability of weather patterns, and the overall dismal state of the global
economy create a setting of instability and uncertainty that requires close attention to the national
security interests of the United States vis-à-vis energy. Cuba’s energy infrastructure, too, is in need of
significant repair and modernization (its many energy projects notwithstanding); the price tag is
estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Delaying work on many of these projects increases costs,
because deterioration of the infrastructure continues and eventually pushes up the cost of renovation
and replacement. It also stands to reason that the lion’s share of the financial burden of upgrading
Cuba’s energy infrastructure will fall to the United States, directly and indirectly. Changes in U.S. policy
to allow investment and assistance in Cuba’s energy sector are a precondition for international entities
to make significant investments, yet this change implies a large American footprint. Trade and
investment in the energy sector in Cuba have been severely constrained by the conditions of the
embargo placed on the Cuban regime. These constraints also affect foreign firms seeking to do business
in Cuba because of the threat of penalties if any of these firms use technology containing more than 10
percent of proscribed U.S. technologies needed for oil and gas exploration and production. American
private investment and U.S. government assistance will constitute a large portion of the needed
investment capital to undertake this colossal effort. The longer that work is delayed, the higher the cost
to all the investors, which will then potentially cut into the returns from such undertakings.
Economic engagement over energy boosts US-Cuban energy development
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 16-17)//NG
Recommendations Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the conditions under which the promotion
of cooperative engagement between the United States and Cuba may occur, and provides an
assessment of existing and perhaps new possibilities for energy cooperation in production-sharing
agreements, energy resource development, technology transfer, and other mutually beneficial
outcomes for the United States and Cuba in the energy sector. Following on the discussion of promoting
cooperative engagement between the United States, this section will consider a set of relevant
recommendations in the following thematic arenas:
Develop Confidence-Building Measures and Engagement
Despite the standoff of the past fifty years, the installation of new administrations in both Cuba
and the United States creates an opportunity for the consideration of new modes of engagement that
are initially symbolic and highly instrumental in nature, such as in agriculture and medical sales. Energy
and infrastructure cooperation may be further areas for this type of engagement.
Create Opportunities for Leveraging Cuba’s Human Capital Resources Cuba’s highly trained
cadres of engineers and technicians are largely underemployed. Engaging Cuba in the areas of energy
and infrastructure development may provide opportunities to employ these people and also possibly to
leverage their considerable skills and abilities for cooperative projects across the region.
Transfer Energy Technology The potential of Cuba’s offshore oil reserves may only be accessible
when Cuba and its partners are able to employ first-generation American deepwater exploration
technology. At present, U.S. export controls limit access to this technology. Under conditions favoring
resource development and production-sharing scenarios, the United States may begin to roll back these
export control restrictions.
Transfer Project Management Capacity One of the most critical findings from the analysis of
Cuba’s effort to develop a nuclear energy capability was the absence or notable lack of project
management capacity during the design, implementation, and construction of the nuclear reactor site at
Juragua. 28 Subsequent discussions with senior Cuban government officials have revealed that the
development of this capacity is a high priority for Cuba as it considers the challenges it faces for future
infrastructure and large construction projects. This is an area in which U.S. firms can and should play a
vital role as a model and partner for Cuba. Cubans have openly expressed the desire to work side by side
with American partners in this critical area of development.
Encourage Energy-Sector Trade and Cooperation The United States and Cuba can and should
cooperate in numerous areas, such as exploration, upstream production, downstream processing and
distribution, transportation, and auxiliary services.
Encourage Investment and Development 17 There has been no lack of interest on the part of
American international oil firms in developing a Cuban market for joint-venture projects and technology
transfer and production-sharing agreements in the energy sector. The prevailing Cuban model of jointventure investment and cooperation has proved to be attractive internationally, and Cuba offers
American firms numerous opportunities of this type. There will have to be significant changes to the
Cuban embargo before this type of engagement can occur, but recent history shows that Cuba
possesses the potential to be a strong regional trade partner in the area of energy and infrastructure
development. The numerous joint-venture projects presently under way in energy development and
infrastructure (oil refineries, pipelines, and port facilities) between Cuba and a growing list of foreign
partners is a positive indicator of that potential.
Diversify Regional Energy Resources Creative partnerships in terms of refining, storage, and
engineering services will allow the regional partners to diversify their respective portfolios, in addition to
dispersing resources across the region to take advantage of location, and perhaps mitigate the potential
of market disruptions owing to weather and other natural disasters.
Establish a Cuban Energy Distribution Center A long-term prospect for Cuba may be the
development of energy-related resources that will be strategically positioned to serve the region’s needs
for oil refining and storage, oil and gas production (exploration and infrastructure), and auxiliary
services. Such a distribution and services center could be a boon to Cuban, American, and regional
economic development interests. This is especially relevant in light of growing concerns about the
region’s energy infrastructure— in particular, the oil and gas industries of Mexico and Venezuela, where
there is growing evidence that policy priorities in both countries might be hindering their capacity to
deliver on their contractual obligations to export oil to the U.S. market.
Lifting the embargo spurs US investment in Cuban offshore oil production
Piñón and Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Associate Director of UT at Austin Jackson School of Geoscience’s
Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy (CIEEP) AND Ph. D of Political Science,
University of Nebraska (Jorge R. & Jonathan, Cuba's Energy Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,
p. 31)//NG
Future Upstream Oil and Natural Gas Development Challenges Today, a number of key
preconditions must be positive in order for a major oil company to engage anywhere in the world in the
exploration and production of a new, unexplored hydrocarbon frontier: geology, capital, technology,
know-how, and the ability to monetize the discovered resources, if any. Anyone who evaluates current
and reported future international oil companies that are involved in Cuba’s deepwater search for oil and
gas must understand their competency, strategic objectives, and their possible longterm contribution to
the island’s efforts to become energy independent. 32As long as the economic and trade restrictions
imposed on the government of Cuba by the U.S. government continue, all companies, regardless of their
technical competence, will have a very difficult time in monetizing any newly discovered hydrocarbon
resources because they need access to the U.S. oil services and equipment market . Also Cuba urgently
needs, but does not have, a complex oil-refining system able to process the probable large quantities of
heavy crude oil found in Cuba’s offshore waters. Until Cuba develops its own heavy-oil-refining
infrastructure, any newly found oil most likely will have to be exported. Its natural market is the United
States, the largest importer of oil in the world— yet that market is closed to Cuba by the trade and
commercial restrictions currently in place.
“The good news is we found oil; the bad news is we found oil” will be the likely announcement
of any new oil discovery in the corporate headquarters of the oil companies doing business in Cuba.
Repsol and Statoil– Norsk Hydro certainly have the necessary capacities and competencies described
earlier to develop and produce any oil they find. Their challenge is how and where to commercialize the
“black gold”—refine it and bring it to market. Some international oil companies are in Cuba for strictly
economic and business reasons. Others acquire concessions in the expectations that U.S. policy will
change before the end of their seven-year exploratory term, at which time they will be able to bring in a
majority U.S. oil company as a partner. Others could be grandstanding on behalf of the Cuban
government: putting a spotlight on Cuba’s oil and natural gas potential in order to influence United
States special interest groups to lobby for lifting the economic and trade restrictions.
No other obstacles to drilling besides embargo repeal
Piñón and Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Associate Director of UT at Austin Jackson School of Geoscience’s
Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy (CIEEP) AND Ph. D of Political Science,
University of Nebraska (Jorge R. & Jonathan, Cuba's Energy Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,
p. 31)//NG
Cuba relied extensively on the largesse of Soviet energy resources for its economic vitality during the cold war, importing nearly 90
percent of all of its oil and gas needs. But
Cuba is no longer dependent on Russia to keep its economy afloat— or
to plumb the depths of its oil reserves. Repsol and Statoil– Norsk Hydro’s commitment in spending an
estimated $80 million to $100 million in a new exploratory well, Petrobras’s recent entry onto the scene, and, in the
background, the U.S. Geological Survey’s estimates of undiscovered reserves in the North Belt Thrust— all underscore Cuba’s oil and natural gas
offshore potential. It should by now be abundantly clear that Cuba
possesses the potential for dramatically increasing its
crude oil and refined petroleum production. It stands to reason that if Cuba can successfully extract, refine, and
market the 5 billion to 10 billion barrels of oil available in the offshore reserves, it will mark a significant
change in the structure of Cuba’s energy balance by essentially making it energy self-sufficient. The
challenges presented to oil producers operating in deepwater drilling sites in the EEZ are primarily political in nature,
in large part because of the obstacle presented by effective American export control regulations
regarding the transfer of deepwater drilling technology. Thus, this aspect of the U.S. trade embargo is
having a significant impact on Cuba’s ability to pursue offshore oil production opportunities. Most if not
all of Cuba’s partners already possess the technological acumen to drill successfully in deep water, and in
some cases these partners are already operating deepwater rigs under contract to U.S. international oil firms in the Gulf of Mexico. As of spring
2010, however, none
of those partners is willing to countermand the existing proscriptions against the
transfer of this type of technology to Cuba or even its application in Cuban waters.
The economic and political implications of Cuba’s becoming not only oil self-sufficient but also a possible net crude oil and
petroleum products exporter could represent a major challenge for future U.S. and Cuban policymakers. The
industry’s future
investment potential— possibly worth tens of billions of dollars— will be determined by the results of
exploratory drilling in Cuba’s EEZ in the Gulf of Mexico and by U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Investing in Cuban oil solve Cuban dependence issues, allows the US private sector to
benefit, and ensure the US can maintain a leadership position in the transition of
power,
Pinon, 9 – energy fellow with the University of Miami’s Center for Hemispheric Policy (Jorge, “Oil work
can be part of US-Cuban rapprochement” Oil &Gas Journal, 107.17, 5/4, proquest)//HA
Two thirds of Cuba's petroleum demand currently relies on imports, and Venezuela is the single source
of these imports under heavily subsidized payment terms.
This petroleum dependency, valued at over $3 billion in 2008, could be used by Venezuela as a tool to
influence a future Cuban government in maintaining a politically antagonistic and belligerent position
toward the US.
Cuba has learned from experiences and is very much aware of the political and economic risks and
consequences of depending on a single source for imported oil. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the
2003 Venezuelan oil strike taught Cuba very expensive lessons.
President Raul Castro understands the risks; his recent visits to major oil exporters such as Brazil, Russia,
Angola, and Algeria underscore his concerns. A relationship with Brazil would provide a balance to
Cuba's current dependency, while others could bring with it corrupt and unsavory business practices.
Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore resources, estimated by the US
Geological Survey to be at 5.5 billion bbl of oil and 9.8 tcf of natural gas undiscovered reserves, will it
have the economic independence needed to consider a political and economic evolution.
US restrictions
Although Cuban authorities have invited US oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil
and natural gas resources, US law does not allow it.
American oil and oil equipment and service companies have the capital, technology, and operational
know-how to explore, produce, and refine in a safe and responsible manner Cuba's potential oil and
natural gas reserves. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of the almost 5-decade-old unilateral
political and economic embargo.
The president can end this impasse by licensing American companies to participate in developing Cuba's
offshore oil and gas. Embargo regulations specifically give the secretary of the treasury the authority to
license prohibited activities. The Helms-Burton law codified the embargo regulations as well as the
secretary's power, embedded in the codified regulations, to rescind, modify, or amend them. The proof
of this is that several years after the Helms-Burton law was enacted, former President Bill Clinton
expanded travel and money transfers to the Cuban people and civil society.
Cuba's future
By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the president could claim an early and relatively easy policy
success. Critically, he would position the US to play a role in Cuba's future, thereby giving Cubans a
better chance for a stable and democratic future.
A future Cuban government influenced by its energy benefactors would most likely result in a
continuation of the current political and economic model. If Cuba's new leaders are unable to fill the
power vacuum left by the departure of the old cadre, they could become pawns of illicit busi- ness
activities and drug cartels, and the US could face a mass illegal immigration by hundreds of thousands of
Cubans.
If US companies were allowed to contribute in developing Cuba's hydrocarbon reserves, as well as
renewable energy such as solar, wind, and sugarcane ethanol, the change would reduce the influence
of autocratic and corrupt governments . Most importantly, it would provide the US and other
democratic countries with a better chance of working with Cuba's future leaders to carry out reforms
that would lead to a more open and representative society.
Lifting sanctions against oil drilling is vital to safety and oil cooperation
Krauss 10- correspondent for NYT
(Clifford, “Drilling Plans Off Cuba Stir Fears of Impact on Gulf” NYT, September 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/world/americas/30cuba.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//HA
HOUSTON — Five months after the BP oil spill, a federal moratorium still prohibits new deepwater
drilling in the American waters of the Gulf of Mexico. And under longstanding federal law, drilling is also
banned near the coast of Florida.
Multimedia
Map
Yet next year, a Spanish company will begin drilling new wells 50 miles from the Florida Keys — in Cuba’s
sovereign waters.
Cuba currently produces little oil. But oil experts say the country might have reserves along its north
coast as plentiful as that of the international oil middleweights, Ecuador and Colombia — enough to
bolster its faltering economy and cut its dependence on Venezuela for its energy needs.
The advent of drilling in Cuban waters poses risks both to the island nation and the United States .
Ocean scientists warn that a well blowout similar to the BP disaster could send oil spewing onto Cuban
beaches and then the Florida Keys in as little as three days. If the oil reached the Gulf Stream, a powerful
ocean current that passes through the region, oil could flow up the coast to Miami and beyond.
The nascent oil industry in Cuba is far less prepared to handle a major spill than even the American
industry was at the time of the BP spill. Cuba has neither the submarine robots needed to fix deepwater
rig equipment nor the platforms available to begin drilling relief wells on short notice.
And marshaling help from American oil companies to fight a Cuban spill would be greatly complicated by
the trade embargo on Cuba imposed by the United States government 48 years ago, according to
industry officials. Under that embargo, American companies face severe restrictions on the business
they can conduct with Cuba.
The prospect of an accident is emboldening American drilling companies, backed by some critics of the
embargo, to seek permission from the United States government to participate in Cuba’s nascent
industry, even if only to protect against an accident.
“This isn’t about ideology. It’s about oil spills,” said Lee Hunt, president of the International Association
of Drilling Contractors, a trade group that is trying to broaden bilateral contacts to promote drilling
safety. “ Political attitudes have to change in order to protect the gulf .”
Any opening could provide a convenient wedge for big American oil companies that have quietly lobbied
Congress for years to allow them to bid for oil and natural gas deposits in waters off Cuba.
Representatives of Exxon Mobil and Valero Energy attended an energy conference on Cuba in Mexico
City in 2006, where they met Cuban oil officials.
Right now, Cuba’s oil industry is served almost exclusively by non-American companies. Repsol, a
Spanish oil company, has contracted with an Italian operator to build a rig in China that is scheduled to
begin drilling several deepwater test wells next year. Other companies, from Norway, India, Malaysia,
Venezuela, Vietnam and Brazil, have taken exploration leases.
New Mexico’s governor, Bill Richardson, a Democrat who regularly visits Cuba, said Cuba’s offshore
drilling plans are a “potential inroad” for loosening the embargo. During a recent humanitarian trip to
Cuba, he said, he bumped into a number of American drilling contractors — “all Republicans who could
eventually convince the Congress to make the embargo flexible in this area of oil spills.”
“I think you will see the administration be more forward-moving after the election,” Mr. Richardson
said.
Despite several requests in the last week, Cuban officials declined to make anyone available for an
interview.
Currently, the United States, Mexico and Cuba are signatories to several international protocols in which
they agreed to cooperate to contain any oil spill. In practice, there is little cooperation between
Washington and Havana on oil matters, although American officials did hold low-level meetings with
Cuban officials after the BP blowout.
“ What is needed is for international oil companies in Cuba to have full access to U.S. technology and
personnel in order to prevent and/or manage a blowout ,” said Jorge Piñón, a former executive of BP
and Amoco. Mr. Piñón, who fled Cuba as a child and now briefs American companies on Cuban oil
prospects, said the two governments must create a plan for managing a spill.
Several American oil and oil service companies are eager to do business in Cuba, Mr. Piñón said, but
they are careful not to identify themselves publicly because they want to “protect their brand image in
South Florida,” where Cuban-Americans who support the embargo could boycott their gasoline stations
and other products.
There are signs the Obama administration is aware of the safety issues. Shortly after the BP accident,
the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the agency that regulates the embargo, said it would make licenses
available to American service companies to provide oil spill prevention and containment support.
Charles Luoma-Overstreet, a State Department spokesman, said licenses would be granted on a
“application-by-application basis,” but he would not comment on the criteria.
Mr. Piñón said it appeared that an American company could apply for a license before an emergency but
that a license would be issued only after an accident had occurred. “We’re jumping up and down for
clarification,” he said.
One group — Clean Caribbean & Americas, a Fort Lauderdale cooperative of several oil companies —
has received licenses to send technical advisers, dispersants, containment booms and skimmers to Cuba
since 2003. But it can only serve the member companies Repsol and Petrobras, not Cuba’s government.
Economic sanctions on Cuba have been in effect in one form or another since 1960, although the
embargo has been loosened to allow the sale of agricultural goods and medicines and travel by CubanAmericans to the island.
Mr. Hunt of the drillers’ group said that the association had sent a delegation to Cuba in late August and
had held talks with government officials and Cupet, the Cuban national oil company.
He said that Cuban officials, including Tomás Benítez Hernández, the vice minister of basic industry,
asked him to take a message back to the United States. “Senior officials told us they are going ahead
with their deepwater drilling program, that they are utilizing every reliable non-U.S. source that they can
for technology and information, but they would prefer to work directly with the United States in
matters of safe drilling practices,” Mr. Hunt said.
Mr. Benítez became the acting minister last week when the minister of basic industry, the agency that
oversees the oil industry, was fired for reasons still unclear.
Donald Van Nieuwenhuise, director of petroleum geoscience programs at the University of Houston,
said that if an accident occurred in Cuban waters, Repsol or other companies could mobilize equipment
from the North Sea, Brazil, Japan or China. But “a one-week delay could be disastrous,” he said, and it
would be better for Havana, Washington and major oil companies to coordinate in advance.
Opponents of the Cuban regime warn that assisting the Cubans with their oil industry could help prop
up Communist rule. Instead of making the drilling safer, some want to stop it altogether.
Senator Bill Nelson, Democrat of Florida, is urging President Obama to recall a diplomatic note to
Havana reinforcing a 1977 boundary agreement that gives Cuba jurisdiction up to 45 miles from Florida.
“I am sure you agree that we cannot allow Cuba to put at risk Florida’s major business and irreplaceable
environment,” he wrote the president shortly after the BP accident.
Allowing US companies to explore Cuban oil solves Venezuelan dependence, safety,
relations, and extraction
Pascual et. Al. 9 – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki
Huddleston, Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark
Falcoff, Damian Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William
LeoGrande, Marifeli Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas,
“CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
Licensing U.S. companies to provide services for the development of Cuban offshore oil and gas would
provide benefits to the United States and Cuba. (At this point it should be noted that the Secretary of
Treasury has always had and continues to have the authority—as embodied in OFAC regulations—to
license any transaction found to be in the U.S. national interest. This power has been used over the past
fifteen years by various republican and Democratic administrations to license a variety of commercial
transactions between the United States and Cuba). The following are some of the reasons we might
wish to become engaged in developing Cuba’s offshore oil and gas. First, if U.S. and other reputable
companies are involved in Cuba’s offshore oil development it would reduce Cuba’s dependence on
Venezuela for two-thirds of its oil imports. Second, it is preferable that U.S. oil companies with high
standards of transparency develop these resources rather than, for example, russia’s notoriously corrupt
oligarchy. Third, U.S. influence in Cuba is likely to increase if U.S. companies have an economic
relationship on the ground. Fourth, U.S. companies have the technology and expertise to develop Cuba’s
offshore oil and gas.
Exempting companies from oil restrictions allows massive investment
Energy Compass, 9 – an intelligence service for the energy sector (“Cuba: Rethinking the Embargo”,
May 8, 2009, lexis)//eek
"Only when Cuba diversifies supply and develops its own resources will it have the economic
independence needed in order to consider a political and economic evolution," says Jorge Pinon, a
former Amoco executive and Brookings adviser. "The president can end this impasse by licensing
American companies to participate in Cuba's offshore oil and natural gas."
Cuba's current production of around 50,000 barrels per day is concentrated onshore or in shallow
waters. But the government has its sights set on deepwater exploration in its portion of the Gulf of
Mexico, where reserves could be more abundant. It has awarded exploration contracts to a number of
firms, including Spain's Repsol YPF, Brazil's Petrobras, Norway's StatoilHydro, India's ONGC and
Malaysian Petronas. However, the only true offshore exploration well was drilled by Repsol in 2004 and
failed to find commercial volumes. Repsol planned to drill a second well last year, but postponed it
because of difficulty obtaining a rig that did not violate the US embargo. The company then said it would
drill the well by July 2009, but one industry source says the firm is reconsidering the plan in light of the
steep drop in oil prices. "Many companies are trying to defer their commitments in Cuba because of the
lower oil price and high risk," says one oil executive.
State Cupet's exploration manager, Rafael Tenreyro Perez, boasted in October of 20 billion barrels of oil
equivalent of recoverable offshore reserves. But independent analysts say the figure, based on
comparison with similar geological structures in the US and Mexican areas of the Gulf of Mexico, is
wildly exaggerated. The US Geological Survey has estimated Cuba's potential reserves at up to 9 billion
bbl of oil and 10 trillion cubic feet of gas.
Exempting US oil companies from the embargo would not change the exploration risk, but would open
Cuba's market to more competition and American experience in deepwater drilling. An eventual end to
the embargo would also make Cuba more attractive, as its oil could be sold into the nearby US market.
Removing the embargo is the only way to solve --- keeping it is net worse
Dlouhy, 12 – McClatchy - Tribune Business News (Jennifer A., “Experts say Cuba embargo could
worsen a spill”, McClatchy - Tribune Business News, 11 May 2012, Proquest) //SP
May 11--WASHINGTON -- Although the Spanish company Repsol is moving slowly in drilling an
exploratory oil well in waters north of Cuba and the island nation is monitoring the work carefully, the
U.S. hasn't done enough to help prevent an accident there, experts warned Thursday.
The U.S. embargo against Cuba would impede a response, said William Reilly, a former head of the
Environmental Protection Agency who led a probe of the 2010 Gulf oil spill.
While the Cubans have been attentive to the risks, "the United States government has not interpreted
its sanctions policy in a way that would clearly make available in advance the kind of technology that
would be required" in case of an emergency, Reilly said at a Center for International Policy forum on the
drilling.
The kind of equipment used in the 2010 spill could be ensnared by the embargo, Reilly said.
Because of the sanctions, the new drilling rig on Repsol's site was outfitted with a used blowout
preventer -- the last defense against loss of well control -- instead of a new one from U.S.
manufacturers.
Repsol began drilling in February 16 miles from the Cuban coast.
An accident there could send oil into coral reefs along the Cuban and Florida coasts, said Dan Whittle, a
senior attorney with the Environmental Defense Fund.
The embargo generally bars U.S. commerce with Cuba and caps the amount of U.S.-made components
in offshore equipment at 10 percent. It allows companies to ask the Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control for licenses to do business with Cuba.
But in an offshore emergency, that could take too long, said lawyer Robert Muse, an international trade
specialist.
He said the government should create a general license allowing anyone connected with spill response
or offshore drilling to travel freely to Cuba in an emergency.
Federal officials say they are making plans for companies to move quickly in the event of a spill in Cuban
waters, including licenses for U.S. firms to deploy equipment.
Houston-based Helix Energy Solutions Group has a license to deploy a device to cap a gushing subsea
well, designed for Repsol's drilling. The device is in Houston. Helix has staged chemical dispersants,
remotely operated vehicles and other equipment near Tampa, Fla., but it could be on the scene faster if
it were in Cuba, said Lee Hunt, former head of the International Association of Drilling Contractors.
Cuba says yes
Cuba says yes and the plan spills over to broader relations
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 127)//NG
Ironically, Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their
offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil, oil equipment, and service companies possess the
capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe
and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of our almost five-decades-old
unilateral political and economic embargo. The United States can end this impasse by licensing American
oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources. By seizing the initiative on
Cuba policy, the United States will be strategically positioned to play an important role in the future of
the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and democratic future. The
creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector will bolster state capacity in
Cuba while enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests, and can help Cuba’s future leaders avoid illicit
business practices, minimize the influence of narco-trafficking enterprises, and stanch the outflow of
illegal immigrants to the United States.
If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves,
as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), it will give
the United States the opportunity to engage Cuba’s future leaders to carry out long-overdue economic
reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a more open and representative society
while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region and beyond.
Cuba will say yes and the plan boosts relations
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 120)//NG
Conclusion and Recommendations
Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence
between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions
regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes
that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008, when Fidel Castro officially
stepped aside as Cuba’s president. Now, the opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena
appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations,
universities, and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope
and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and
discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well
versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, Cuban energy
authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working
closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the-art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment
from U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been
overwhelmingly positive. 9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama administration see fit to shift its
policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to
attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing muchneeded familiarity and confidence across these communities.
Oil investment key to LA relations
Expanding Cuban energy cooperation bolsters US energy cooperation regionally
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 3-4)//NG
The development of Cuba as an energy partner will not solve America’s energy problems. But
the potential for improving energy relations and deepening collaborative modalities with other regional
partners is enhanced by pursuing energy cooperation with Cuba for two principal reasons.
1. Cuba’s increasing leadership role in the Caribbean region and Central America might be used
by the United States to promote collectively beneficial efforts to develop a broad range of alternative
energy technologies in the Americas. A Cuba-America partnership might also serve as a confidence
builder in assuaging the misgivings on the part of regional partners regarding American domination.
2. Cuba’s significant human capital resources in the scientific and technological arena have been
grossly underused. Cuba possesses the highest ratio of engineers and Ph.D.s to the general population
of any country in Latin America, and this can been viewed as a key asset in the challenge of maintaining
energy infrastructure across the region. Both Mexico and Venezuela face significant costs in maintaining
their sizable energy production, refining, and storage capabilities. The integrity of these two national
energy systems is of paramount interest to U.S. energy security concerns because of the potential harm
to the economy that would occur if either state were unable to deliver its exports to the American
market.
In this light, the impetus for normalization of relations writ large between the United States and
Cuba is not oil per se, but enhanced energy cooperation, which could pave the way for technical and
commercial exchanges that, given the evolving nature of energy resources and energy security, could
provide an opening of collaborative efforts that could have mutually beneficial effects.
What has the failure to engage Cuba cost the United States in these geostrategic terms? Very
little, one could argue. Strategically, Cuba has been a stable entity in the region. Politically, too, it has
been a mostly static environment: with the embargo in place, policymakers and elected officials have
been able to predict reactions to policy initiatives with relative certainty. U.S. business interests in Cuba
since the early 1960s have been negligible, with the exception of a recent increase in humanitarian
agricultural and medical sales. But a more central issue is this: In light of growing concerns regarding
energy supplies in the United States and demands for domestic and regional exploration to meet
American consumption, what is the cost to the United States of maintaining a status quo relationship
with Cuba? In economic terms, the cost of the failure to engage Cuba has been considerable.
In its 2008 report, Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations, the Partnership for the Americas
Commission, convened by the Brookings Institution, suggested that the basis for effective partnership
between the United States and its Latin American and Caribbean partners is shared common interests.
The report states, “Cuba has long been a subject of intense interest in U.S. foreign policy and a
stumbling block for U.S. relations with other countries in the hemisphere.” 6 Specifically, the report
pinpoints two key challenges facing the region that are directly relevant to the subject of this book:
securing sustainable energy supplies and expanding economic development opportunities. The April
2009 report of the Brookings project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition identified both medium
and long-term initiatives related to energy that directly fulfilled an element of the policy objectives
recommended in their report. 7 In order to specifically promote what the report termed “a constructive
working relationship with the Cuban government to build confidence and trust in order to resolve
disputes, with the longterm objective of fostering a better relationship that serves U.S. interests and
values,” it recommended a medium-term initiative that “allows licenses for U.S. companies to
participate in the development of Cuban offshore oil, gas, and renewable energy resources.” The report
also recommended that a longterm initiative be undertaken to “provide general licenses for the
exportation of additional categories of goods and services that enhance the environment, conserve
energy, and provide improved quality of life.” 8
US oil investment key to safety
Lifting restrictions is key to establish cooperative relations to resolve oil spills
Orsi 12- staff writer for the Huffington Post
(Peter, “Cuba Oil Reserves To Be Explored By Offshore Rig” Huffington Post World, 1/20/12,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/20/cuba-oil-reserves-offshore-rig_n_1218516.html)
It's been a long, strange journey for the Scarabeo-9, Repsol and Cuba, a process shadowed at every step
by warnings of a possible environmental debacle and decades of bad blood between Cuba and the
United States.
The U.S. trade embargo essentially bars U.S. companies from doing oil business with Cuba and threatens
sanctions against foreign companies if they don't follow its restrictions, making it far more complicated
to line up equipment and resources for the project.
To avoid sanctions, Repsol chose the Scarabeo-9, a 380-foot-long (115-meter), self-propelled,
semisubmersible behemoth built in China and Singapore and capable of housing 200 workers. The rig
qualifies for the Cuba project because it was built with less than 10 percent U.S.-made parts, no small
feat considering America's dominance in the industry.
While comparable platforms sat idle in the Gulf of Mexico, the Scarabeo-9 spent months navigating
through three oceans and around the Cape of Good Hope to arrive in the Caribbean at tremendous
expense.
Even after the rig is in place, the embargo continues to affect just about every aspect.
The Scarabeo-9's blowout preventer, a key piece of machinery that failed in the 2010 MacondoDeepwater Horizon disaster, is state of the art. But its U.S. manufacturer is not licensed to work with
Cuba so replacement parts must come through secondary sources.
It's also more complicated to do things like the maintenance necessary to keep things running smoothly
and decrease the chances of something going wrong.
If it does, Cuba would be hard-pressed to respond to a major spill on its own, and getting help isn't as
simple as making a phone call to Washington. The embargo would require licenses to be issued for all
manner of equipment and services for an emergency response.
Few U.S. companies so far have gotten permission to work with the Cubans in the event of a spill –
representing just 5 percent of all the resources thrown at the Macondo blowout, according to an
estimate by Lee Hunt, president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors.
Two U.S. companies have received licenses to export capping stacks, crucial pieces of equipment for
stopping gushing wells, but related services like personnel and transportation have not been greenlighted, Hunt said.
"So what you have is a great big intelligent piece of iron without a crew," he said. "You can't just drop it
on the hole and hope (the spill) will stop. It's not a cork."
Even Tyvek suits worn by cleanup crews cannot currently be exported to Cuba because potentially they
could be used for the construction of bacteriological or chemical weapons, Hunt added.
Meanwhile cooperation between the two governments, which often struggle to see eye-to-eye on
things as basic as delivering each other's mail, has been only bare-bones.
"With any other country – Mexico, Canada or Russia – we would already have in place agreements
between the coast guards of the two countries ," said Dan Whittle, Cuba program director for the
Environmental Defense Fund. "There would be contingency plans written and publicly available. There
already would have been drills, a comprehensive action plan for responding to a spill."
"We don't have that yet."
There has been some movement.
U.S. inspectors examined the rig last week in Trinidad and gave it a clean bill of health, though notably
said that did not constitute any certification. And American representatives at a regional oil meeting last
month in the Bahamas were left impressed by their Cuban counterparts' openness and willingness to
share information.
But the countries' proximity has increased fears of a disastrous spill with the potential to foul not only
Cuba's reefs and gleaming, white-sand beaches, but also, swept up by the Gulf Stream, the coast of
Florida and the Atlantic Seaboard up to North Carolina.
Curiously, those fears have been cited by people on both sides of the embargo issue : Some say the
prospect of environmental disaster shows the U.S. needs to lift the embargo and work with the Cubans
in the interest of safety; others say the fact that the trade ban failed to prevent Cuba from drilling shows
it needs to be made even tougher.
Some of the harshest criticism has come from Cuban-American members of Congress such as House
Foreign Affairs Committee chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who recently accused the Obama
administration of dropping the ball on Cuban drilling.
"Oil exploration 90 miles off the Florida coast by this corrupt, unaccountable dictatorship could result in
horrific environmental and economic damage to our Gulf Coast communities, in addition to enriching
the Castro tyranny," Ros-Lehtinen said.
The exact size of Cuba's offshore reserves, estimated at 5 billion to 9 billion barrels, is still unknown. And
production would not come online for years, so any windfall is still on the horizon. But island officials are
hopeful of a big strike that could inject much-needed cash into their struggling economy, and they're not
asking anyone for permission.
" Cuba is going through its own change regardless of American foreign policy ," said U.S. Sen. Dick
Durbin of Illinois, the No. 2 Democrat in the U.S. Senate who met with Cuban officials in Havana this
week on oil and other matters.
"This discovery, or potential discovery, of significant amounts of oil could dramatically change the
economy of Cuba, and change the relationship with the United States in small ways and large," Durbin
said while visiting Haiti on Thursday.
US engagement transfers safety and expertise to create effective oil spill cooperation
Piñón and Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Associate Director of UT at Austin Jackson School of Geoscience’s
Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy (CIEEP) AND Ph. D of Political Science,
University of Nebraska (Jorge R. & Jonathan, Cuba's Energy Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,
p. 31)//NG
Environmental Issues Some critics have raised the specter of a looming environmental disaster
should Cuba proceed with plans to begin extensive drilling operations in its EEZ. 31 They fear that Cuba’s
efforts to extract oil from its deepwater reserves will result in drilling rig accidents and shipping disasters
that recall the environmental catastrophes of Mexico’s 1979 Pemex Ixtoc I well blowout, or the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound of Alaska in 1989, not to mention the Deepwater Horizon disaster
of 2010, ongoing at this writing. But oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise. There is always a
balance between the positive and negative trade-offs of energy security and environmental integrity. All
of the relevant actors on the Cuban scene— Repsol, Statoil– Norsk Hydro, and Petrobras— are already
working in the Gulf of Mexico operating platforms under contract to international oil companies based
in the United States.
What international oil companies operating in Cuba lack is immediate access to U.S. resources
and technology needed to prevent or mitigate a catastrophic incident in Cuban waters similar to that of
the Deepwater Horizon. The United States administration should review the regulations that prohibit
the transfer of technology, equipment, or personnel to international oil companies operating in Cuba in
the case of an oil-related emergency. Executive orders should be in place that would allow this transfer
along with protocols and emergency plans in cooperation with Cuban authorities.
US investment is vital to safe Cuban drilling
Lopez-Gamundi 11- COHA Research Associate
(Paula, “Cuban Oil Demands Washington’s Attention” Council on Hemispheric affairs, June 22, 2011,
http://www.coha.org/cuban-oil-demands-washingtons-attention/)//HA
Moreover, given the crisis brought on by BP’s Deepwater Horizon in April of 2010, it will be in the best
interest of the United States to cooperate with Cuba to generate some sort of contingency plan in the
event of another environmental catastrophe. Because the new Chinese-built rig can drill in waters as
deep as 3,500 meters, just short of Deepwater Horizon’s capacities, the potential for large-scale
blunders is relatively high. The proximity of the Cienfuegos well site, about 50 miles from the coast of
Florida, demands Washington’s protective eye. Furthermore, the current U.S. trade embargo blocks a
range of U.S. commodities from Cuban markets while also limiting the use of American drilling
technology to ten percent. The Scarabeo 9 does not utilize American technology, thus being able to
operate under the current embargo. By the same token, Cuba would be unable to use any U.S.
containment technology, compelling Cuba to seek such technology from distant partners in the North
and Mediterranean Seas. This lag in response-time would only exasperate the dangerous scope of
damage that could be done to the Gulf Coast in the case of another disaster.
Innovations in drilling technology have given the Scarabeo 9 the advanced capability of drilling
horizontally, striking concerns in both the U.S. and Mexico over the potential siphoning of their oil
reserves. In mid-April, the undersecretary of Mexico’s Ministry of energy, Mario Budebo, called for
talksbetween the three nations to clarify this haziness resulting from this jurisdictional dispute.
Washington’s fairly amicable relations with Mexico may give way to successful mediation between
Capitol Hill and Havana.
While Washington seems to be returning to the redundant and illogical “drill, baby drill” mentality, it is
essential that domestic and international safety as well as environmental regulations, be made a top
priority. For the first time in recent memory, partial reconciliation with Cuba would dramatically
advance U.S. interests. Ignoring all other motivations, extending the olive branch to Cuba is utterly
necessary to protect American consumers and their environment.
The embargo prevents a comprehensive response to an oil spill.
Maffei 12- Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
(Elena, “The Potential of Cuba’s Search for Oil” COHA, May 25, 2012, http://www.coha.org/thepotential-of-cubas-search-for-oil/)//HA
The United States, which is not taking part in the drilling because of its embargo against Cuba, could
nevertheless not be more interested. Washington, alarmed by the drilling site’s location just 60 miles
from Florida’s coast, has been expressing its concerns about the potential environmental risks posed by
the explorations, and has commissioned a panel of environmental and energy experts to discuss
possible solutions to any potential disaster in the region. According to William K. Reilly, former head of
the Environmental Protection Agency under George H.W. Bush, “the Cuban approach to this is
responsible and appropriate to the risk they are undertaking.”[7] But should an accident similar to the
BP disaster of 2010 occur, the absence of a bilateral oil spill agreement between the U.S. and Cuba, in
conjunction with strict American regulations freezing the transfer of technology between the two
countries, would threaten American interests in the region , as well as pose a real environmental
danger to the entire Gulf of Mexico . The matter is further complicated by the fact that offshore
explorations are not taking place in U.S. territorial waters, within Washington’s legal reach, and are
therefore not governed by the Clean Water and Oil Pollution Acts. Thus, any U.S. effort to take control
of the situation in the event of an oil spill would be much more difficult, and would be bound to cause a
diplomatic incident. Clearly, Washington must begin to consider a possible adjustment or elimination
of the restrictions imposed upon the Caribbean country , and ask itself whether the embargo truly still
represents American interests.
Lifting the embargo increases safety cooperation
Sandels 6/25- former professor of history at Quinnipiac University in Connecticut
(Robert, “Oil-Rich Cuba?” Monthly review, June 25, 13, http://monthlyreview.org/2011/09/01/an-oilrich-cuba)//HA
The sanctions themselves work against protecting the Gulf. Repsol, for example, had to turn to China for
the rig because, under U.S. law, no one can sell anything to Cuba with more than 10 percent content
that is made or patented in the United States. Ironically, the closest source for Scarabeo 9’s blowout
protector (the part that failed on the Deepwater Horizon well) is the United States, but it is apparently in
the interests of the United States to deny a license for its sale to Cuba.
Removing the embargo is key to quick response times in the event of an oil spill.
Voss 11-staff writer for the BBC News in Havana
(Michael, “Cuban oil project fuels US anxieties” BBC News, November 15, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15737573)//HA
Be prepared
It has sent alarm bells ringing in the United States because if there were an accident, the ocean currents
would push any oil spill onto Florida's beaches and the Everglades.
Yet under the US trade embargo, neither American firms nor the Coast Guard could come to Cuba's
assistance or provide much needed equipment such as booms, pumps, skimmers and oil dispersant
systems.
The Cubans would need to turn to the Norwegians, British or Brazilians for help.
"In the event of a disaster we are talking a response time in terms of equipment of four to six weeks as
opposed to 36 or 48 hours. This is a serious impediment," warned Lee Hunt, president of the Texasbased International Association of Drilling Contractors.
Mr Hunt was part of a team of oil industry and environmental experts who were given permission by the
Obama administration to visit Cuba to discuss safety issues with the authorities in Havana.
Leading the group was William Reilly, a former head of the US Environmental Protection Agency and coauthor of the government report into last year's BP oil disaster.
He was impressed with Cuba's awareness of the risks and knowledge of the latest international safety
measures.
The explosion and blow-out aboard BP's Deepwater Horizon rig off the coast of Louisiana killed 11
people and spilled 5m barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. It was one of the worst environmental
disasters ever to hit the Gulf Coast.
It took 85 days to cap the well head, which was 5,500 feet beneath the surface. The Scarabeo 9 will be
drilling in even deeper water.
After his talks with Cuban officials, William Reilly said he found them serious about safety and aware of
international best practice but lacking in experience.
He wants to see the US co-operate with Cuba on safety issues and ease the embargo to allow US
companies to assist in case of an emergency.
"It is profoundly in the interests of the United States to prepare the Cubans as best we can to ensure
that we are protected in the case of a spill. We need to make it 'Key West safe'."
But Florida's powerful Cuban-American lobby has other ideas and with the 2012 presidential election
looming, Barack Obama is in a difficult position.
US cooperation is vital to oil drilling safety
Levi 10- Fellow for Energy and the Environment
(Michael, “Regulating Oil Drilling in Cuba” Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2010,
http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2010/10/01/regulating-oil-drilling-in-cuba/)//HA
Cliff Krauss’s otherwise excellent article in the New York Times yesterday on the safety risks from Cuban
oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico had one big and important omission: it said nothing about the quality of
the Cuban regulator. That quality, of course, will have big implications for the odds of the sort of oil spill
that the article talks about. In a trip to Cuba this past July, I had a chance to meet with Cuban regulators
and understand a bit about how they’re thinking.
The Cuban regulators seem to be on firm methodological ground. They proudly pointed out that they
were using the sort of “safety case” approach that was conspicuously absent in U.S. regulation before
the Macondo (BP) disaster. Indeed, in that sense, they’re ahead of the United States.
The top regulators also appeared to be technically solid. This is, of course, a difficult thing to judge from
limited interaction, but I saw no reason to doubt their skill.
What worries me much more is the people I didn’t see — that is, the lower level people. I have two
concerns. First, effectively overseeing operations is not just a matter of studying textbooks – it’s a
matter of experience. And, despite the fact that Cuba has sent many of its people overseas, such
experience (particularly in the Cuban context) is inevitably limited. Second, given the pathetic salaries
that Cuban workers receive, the possibility of bribery (or something more subtle) by oil company
officials is going to be ever-present. That may undermine whatever approach Cuba chooses.
So what’s the United States to do? Senator Bill Nelson has one answer: change the maritime border so
that Cuba can’t drill. Unless the United States wants to go to war, this isn’t going to happen. (To be
completely clear: I think that unilaterally changing the border is a terrible idea.) The only option is to
engage with Cuba as much as possible in an effort to better understand its approach, and, to the
extent possible, to strengthen it.
US expertise in Cuban drilling operations is necessary to prevent oil spills
Helman, 11 – Forbes Staff (Christopher, “U.S. Should Drop Cuba Embargo For Oil Exploration”, Forbes,
12/12/11, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/u-s-should-drop-cubaembargo-for-oil-exploration/) //SP
In a few months Spanish oil company Repsol will start drilling for oil off the coast of Cuba, in a spot just
70 miles south of Key West. Soon Repsol–and its JV partners Norway’s Statoil and India’s ONGC–will be
joined by rigs from PetroVietnam, Malaysia’s Petronas and Venezuela’s PDVSA. But you won’t see any
U.S. companies there. Inexplicably, the U.S. maintains its economic embargo against the Castro regime.
This wrong-headed policy represents a dangerous threat to the environment and a huge missed
opportunity to the U.S. oil industry. The U.S. embargo will do nothing to prevent oil drilling from taking
place in Cuban waters. But it will prevent that work from being done by the most experienced
companies with the highest-quality equipment. Norway’s Statoil is a proven operator with a long history
in the North Sea and the Gulf. The rest of those companies are just getting started offshore.
A group of U.S. lawmakers in September urged Repsol (ticker: REPYY.PK) to call off its Cuba plans or face
the threat of U.S. lawsuits. Repsol wisely called that bluff.
At least the Obama administration is doing something to ensure that Repsol’s drilling rig is up to snuff.
According to an excellent article from Bloomberg today, Repsol’s Chinese-built Scarabeo 9 rig will soon
by boarded by four U.S. inspectors (two from the Coast Guard, two from the Dept. of Interior) who will
do what they can to check out the rig and watch some drills. But, according to the article, there will be
real limits to what the inspectors can inspect. They won’t get to check the rig’s all-important blowout
preventor, or the well casing or drilling fluids that are to be used. Though the U.S. inspectors will discuss
any concerns they have with Repsol, they will have no enforcement authority.
Although the offshore industry’s best service companies and parts manufacturers are right here on the
U.S. Gulf coast, Repsol will have to train its people and scrounge for spare parts from the rest of the
world.
But here’s something that completely blows my mind. The administration, again, according to the
Bloomberg article, has granted some U.S. companies the license to respond to an oil spill were it to
occur in Cuban waters. The government won’t say how many companies have that license or who they
are, but there’s at least two of them: Wild Well Control and Helix Energy Solutions Group. Helix plans to
stage a subsea containment cap on the U.S. coast so it can quickly respond to any Cuban blowout.
Of course it’s smart and safe for the U.S. government to put defensive measures in place in the event of
a spill, but the message to the industry is clear: we refuse to give superior U.S. operators the license to
drill for oil in Cuba, but we want to make sure you’re ready to clean up any problems.
And the message to Cuba: we’re not going to let you use our engineers, just our janitors. Knowing that a
top-notch American clean-up crew is on standby in case of a blowout is not a big incentive for Cuba to
keep its own regulators on top of things.
Think about Cuba in relation to U.S. oil adventures in the rest of the world. Even if Cuba really were a
tyrannical threat to U.S. interests, there’s myriad countries where U.S. oil companies have done business
that are no more democratic than Cuba. They include Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Libya, Equatorial
Guinea and Kazakhstan.
The Castros’ days as rulers of Cuba are numbered. The embargo stick hasn’t brought regime change, and
has only forced Cuba into the arms of autocrats like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Better to use the carrot
of capitalism to gradually bring Cuba into the U.S. sphere of influence. The oil industry is a great place to
start.
US-Cuban cooperation key to stop an oil spill
Muse and Piñon, 10 – *an attorney (District of Columbia Bar) whose practice is devoted exclusively
to public and private international law AND ** former president of Amoco Oil Latin America and a
member of the Brookings Cuba Task Force (Robert and Jorge, “Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.Cuba Environmental Cooperation is Critical”,
5/18/2010,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/5/18%20oil%20spill%20cub
a%20pinon/0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon.pdf) //SP
The sinking of The Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and the resulting discharge of millions of gallons
of crude oil into the sea demonstrated graphically the challenge of environmental protection in the
ocean waters shared by Cuba and the United states.
While the quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result of the latest calamity, it is
unlikely to stop. it came as little surprise, for example, that Repsol recently announced plans to move
forward with exploratory oil drilling in Cuban territorial waters later this year.1
As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves, the consequence to the United
states of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the actual. The
sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of
miles of American coastline and do profound harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative
and proactive planning by Washington and havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important
is the planning necessary to prevent and, if necessary, respond to incidents arising from this country’s oil
industry that, through the action of currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines.
While Washington is working to prevent future disasters in U.S. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its
current policies foreclose the ability to respond effectively to future oil disasters—whether that disaster
is caused by companies at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies operating in U.S. waters.
Context
In April 2009, the Brookings institution released a comprehensive report on United States—Cuba
relations Cuba: a new Policy of Critical of Critical and Constructive engagement timed to serve as a
resource for policymakers in the new Administration. The
Report, which reflected consensus among a diverse group of experts on U.S.-Cuba relations, was notable
for its menu of executive Branch actions that could, over time, facilitate the restoration of normal
relations between the United states and Cuba through
a series of confidence-building exercises in areas of clear mutual interest. The emphasis was on
identifying unobjectionable, practical and realizable areas of cooperation between the two countries.
Among the initiatives recommended to the new Obama Administration were:
• “Open a dialogue between the United States and Cuba, particularly on issues of mutual concern,
including migration, counter-narcotics, environment, health, and security.
• Develop agreements and assistance with the government of Cuba for disaster relief and environmental
stewardship.”
Shortly after releasing its report, Brookings and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) co-hosted a new
era for U.S.-Cuba Relations on Marine and Coastal Resources Conservation, a conference highlighting
the importance and value of environmental cooperation between Cuba and the United states. EDF has
particular expertise in this area because it has been working with Cuban scientists and environmental
officials for over a decade to protect coral reefs, marine life and coastal areas in their country. The joint
Brookings/EDF conference identified areas of potential bilateral collaboration aimed at protecting
shared marine and coastal ecosystems in the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean sea and the Atlantic ocean. The
importance of cooperation on environmental issues stressed at the conference is particularly relevant
now in light of events like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the basic facts of geography and their
relation to threats to contiguous U.S. and Cuban marine areas. Cuba sits at the intersection of the
Atlantic ocean, Caribbean sea and gulf of Mexico and thus shares marine waters with the United states,
areas where oil and gas deposits are about to be explored.
Preserving that country’s marine biodiversity is critically important because it constitutes the natural
heritage of the Cuban people. The health of Cuba’s ocean environment is likewise important to the
economies of coastal communities in the United States where significant numbers of fish species that
spawn in Cuban waters are carried by prevailing currents into U.S. waters and caught by commercial and
recreational fishermen. Florida and the southeastern United states are situated in the downstream of
those currents, which bring snapper, grouper, tuna, swordfish (as well as manatee and sea turtles) to
U.S. waters, but can serve equally as vectors of Cuban spilled oil.
The United States geological survey estimates that Cuba’s Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), which includes
the gulf of Mexico north Cuba fold and Thrust Belt, has over five billion barrels of oil and 8.6 billion cubic
feet of natural gas undiscovered reserves.2Like the United states, the size of Cuba’s oil and gas reserves
is both economically fortuitous and a measure of the threat it poses to the marine environment.
In addition to Spain’s Repsol, over the next few years international oil companies such as norway’s
statoil-hydro, Brazil’s Petrobras and others will be conducting exploratory work off Cuba’s north coast. it
is only a matter of time before production begins in earnest and the environmental risks rise
exponentially.
Responding to Oil Spills in Cuban Waters
To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in or near Cuban
territorial waters will require immediate access to the expertise and equipment of U.S. oil companies
and their suppliers. They are best positioned to provide immediately the technology and know-how
needed to halt and limit the damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of
working relations between the United States and Cuba to facilitate marine environmental protection is
the first step in the contingency planning and cooperation that will be necessary to an effective
response and early end to an oil spill.
A good framework for such practical cooperation is the 1990 international Convention on oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation. The Convention is designed to encourage and facilitate
international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution
incidents. signatory nations are charged with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal
with such an emergency. in the case of Cuba and the United states, those capabilities must be
transnational because there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to
another’s.
Cuba and the United states are also members of the international Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) adopted in 1973. The MARPoL Convention is the main international
convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or
accidental causes.
The 1983 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine environment in the Wider
Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention) is another comprehensive umbrella agreement that provides
the legal framework for cooperative regional and national actions to protect the marine environment.
So, the commitment to marine environmental cooperation already exists at the often aspirational level
of international accords. What is needed now is for the United States and Cuba to develop appropriate
regulatory and procedural protocols that ensure
the free movement of equipment and expertise between the two countries that will be indispensable to
a satisfactory response to a future oil spill. Establishing specific protocols cannot wait because nothing in
U.S.-Cuba relations is ever simple. for example, disaster response coordination between Cuba and the
United states will involve various government departments such as the environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Coast Guard and
the Department of Commerce because U.S.-origin equipment requires licenses for even temporary
export to Cuba. The allocation of responsibilities and the development of interagency cooperation will
take time. That luxury exists now, but will end very soon when the first drill bit hits the Cuban seabed.
On the subject of the legal basis for proactive regulatory action to deal with a future oil disaster in Cuba,
the Obama Administration, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease
or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment to Cuba following an oil spill. It also has the
authority to license U.. citizens to perform emergency response and subsequent reconstruction services
in Cuba in the wake of such a disaster.3
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
The appropriate place for U.S. policymakers to begin is with an expedited identification of all current
regulatory prohibitions on the transfer of the U.S. equipment, technology and personnel to Cuba that
will be needed to combat an oil spill—whether it originates there or here. Once identified, those
regulations should be rescinded or amended, as required.
In particular, the Obama Administration should complete the following actions as soon as possible:
1. Proactive licensing by the Department of Commerce of temporary exports to Cuba of any U.s.
equipment and technology necessary to emergency oil flow suppression, spill containment and cleanup. Examples include the licensing of submersibles and ROVs (remote operated vehicles), as well as
booms and chemical dispersants.
2. The pre-approval of licenses for travel to Cuba by qualified U.S. citizens to contribute to emergency
relief and clean-up efforts. For
example, petroleum engineers, environmental specialists and others should be authorized for such
travel.
3. Plans should be made for providing Cuba with the most up-to-date information, including satellite
imagery and predictive models, to assess the potential impact of an oil disaster and to prepare for the
worst eventualities.
4. The U.S. should hold joint exercises with Cuba to coordinate emergency responses, the deployment of
resources and the identification of the specialized oil well technologies and clean-up equipment that will
be needed to be shipped to Cuba in the event of an oil spill.
5. The U.S. should encourage and facilitate scientific exchanges at both government and ngo levels that
will identify the nature and sequencing of effective responses to a marine disaster and the mitigation of
environmental harm.
The President should also instruct the Department of state’s Bureau of oceans and international
environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) and NOAA to meet with Cuban lead agencies such as the
Transport Ministry’s Dirección de Seguridad e inspección Marítima, and the science, Technology and
environment Ministry’s agencia del Medio ambiente. The goal of such meetings should be a bilateral
agreement on the protocols of cooperation needed to respond quickly and effectively to any incident
that threatens either country’s marine and coastal habitats.
The Obama Administration should also facilitate immediate cooperation between U.s. and Cuban
academic and scientific institutions. For example, Texas A&M University’s harte Research institute (HRI)
for Gulf of Mexico Studies has a long history of promoting a tri-national approach to understanding the
gulf of Mexico ecosystem of the United states, Mexico and Cuba. Among their most recent projects is
the Proyecto Costa nor occidental, a comprehensive multi-year research and conservation program for
Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico coast undertaken in cooperation with the University of havana’s Center for
Marine Research.
Another valuable resource available to the Administration is the Environmental Defense Fund which has
worked on a number of projects with Cuba’s Ministry of science, Technology and the environment in
order to develop cooperative projects and workshops to restore depleted shark populations, protect
shallow and deepwater coral reefs, and manage vulnerable coastal ecosystems such as mangroves and
sea grasses.
In conclusion, it is worth underscoring that the President should use his executive authority to authorize
the above recommended actions now, rather than in the context of an improvised response to a
cataclysmic environmental disaster. should the obama Administration fail to act, then Congress should
consider passing legislation authorizing the provision by U.s. citizens and companies to Cuba of the relief
and reconstruction supplies and services necessary to respond to a marine disaster in that country’s
waters and on its shores
Oil key to Cuban economy
Cuban oil investment solves the economy, poverty, and liberalizes Cuba overnight
Maffei 12- Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
(Elena, “The Potential of Cuba’s Search for Oil” COHA, May 25, 2012, http://www.coha.org/thepotential-of-cubas-search-for-oil/)//HA
Economically, it must not be forgotten that if the investigations of Repsol and others reveal that there is
a considerable amount of oil in the Cuban EEZ, Cuba could be transformed from an oil-importing country
to one of Latin America’s largest oil producers almost overnight . Such a stark transition would
undoubtedly affect relations between Havana, Caracas, and Washington, as well as completely change
the geopolitical equilibrium of the region, possibly producing explosive results.
Another crucial issue is the conflict between the Argentine and Spanish governments over Argentine
President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s nationalization of YPF, a now-former Repsol subsidiary. On
April 19th, the Castro administration announced its support for the takeover, stating that Argentina has
the right to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. Such a controversial declaration,
even if coherent once one takes into account Argentina’s alliance with Havana, could end up being a
risky and counterproductive step for Cuba.
A potential geopolitical turning point for the region, the discovery of oilfields in the Cuban EEZ could
represent Havana’s ticket to the further liberalization of Cuban institutions, an escape from poverty
and underdevelopment, and the end of Washington’s disdain for their Caribbean neighbor. Still, the
Cuban position on the Argentinian YPF seizure could prove problematic, and Havana would do well to
reformulate its position in order to ease tensions with the Spanish oil company. At the same time,
however, if the United States is interested in benefiting from this discovery and in staving off a potential
ecological disaster mere miles from its southern coast, then it, too, must work to ease tension and adapt
to the post-Cold War world.
Oil investment causes Cuban energy independence
New oil investment causes Cuban energy independence
Carroll 8- staff writer for The Guardian
(Rory, “International: 20bn barrel oil discovery puts Cuba in the big league: Self-reliance beckons for
communist state: Estimate means reserves are on a par with US” The Guardian, 18 Oct 2008,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/244311287/13EE7825B9F1022E805/3?accou
ntid=14667)//HA
Friends and foes have called Cuba many things - a progressive beacon, a quixotic underdog, an
oppressive tyranny - but no one has called it lucky, until now .
Mother nature, it emerged this week, appears to have blessed the island with enough oil reserves to
vault it into the ranks of energy powers. The government announced there may be more than 20bn
barrels of recoverable oil in offshore fields in Cuba's share of the Gulf of Mexico, more than twice the
previous estimate.
If confirmed, it puts Cuba's reserves on par with those of the US and into the world's top 20. Drilling is
expected to start next year by Cuba's state oil company Cubapetroleo, or Cupet.
"It would change their whole equation. The government would have more money and no longer be
dependent on foreign oil," said Kirby Jones, founder of the Washington-based US-Cuba Trade
Association. "It could join the club of oil exporting nations."
"We have more data. I'm almost certain that if they ask for all the data we have, (their estimate) is going
to grow considerably," said Cupet's exploration manager, Rafael Tenreyro Perez.
Havana based its dramatically higher estimate mainly on comparisons with oil output from similar
geological structures off the coasts of Mexico and the US. Cuba's undersea geology was "very similar" to
Mexico's giant Cantarell oil field in the Bay of Campeche, said Tenreyro.
A consortium of companies led by Spain's Repsol had tested wells and were expected to begin drilling
the first production well in mid-2009, and possibly several more later in the year, he said.
Cuba currently produces about 60,000 barrels of oil daily, covering almost half of its needs, and imports
the rest from Venezuela in return for Cuban doctors and sports instructors. Even that barter system puts
a strain on an impoverished economy in which Cubans earn an average monthly salary of $20.
Subsidised grocery staples, health care and education help make ends meet but an old joke - that the
three biggest failings of the revolution are breakfast, lunch and dinner - still does the rounds. Last month
hardships were compounded by tropical storms that shredded crops and devastated coastal towns.
"This news about the oil reserves could not have come at a better time for the regime," said Jonathan
Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba energy specialist at the University of Nebraska.
However there is little prospect of Cuba becoming a communist version of Kuwait. Its oil is more than a
mile deep under the ocean and difficult and expensive to extract. The four-decade-old US economic
embargo prevents several of Cuba's potential oil partners - notably Brazil, Norway and Spain - from
using valuable first-generation technology.
"You're looking at three to five years minimum before any meaningful returns," said Benjamin-Alvarado.
Even so, Cuba is a master at stretching resources. President Raul Castro, who took over from brother
Fidel, has promised to deliver improvements to daily life to shore up the legitimacy of the revolution as
it approaches its 50th anniversary.
Investing in oil investigations is key to increased production which solves Cuban oil
dependence and increases revenue.
AFP 13
(AFP, “Russia's Zarubezhneft suspends search for oil in Cuba” Yahoo news, June 18, 2013,
http://my.news.yahoo.com/russias-zarubezhneft-suspends-search-oil-144258613.html)//HA
A Norwegian-owned drilling platform will depart Cuba for Vietnam this week, after six months of
exploration that so far has failed to yield any oil, official media in Havana reported on Tuesday.
The state-run Agencia de Informacion National (AIN) said the drilling work in Cuba will be suspended
because of unspecified "geological complications," and the start this month of the hurricane season,
which runs in the Caribbean through the end of November.
The drilling operation with the platform called Songa Mercur was taking place near the central Cuban
province of Ciego de Avila, about 600 kilometers (370 miles) east of Havana.
A new round of drilling is expected to get underway early next year, AIN reported.
AIN reported that the Norwegian platform, which has been used by the Russian firm Zarubezhneft to
search for oil off Cuba's coast, will depart on Thursday for Vietnam.
Zarubezhneft has been drilling the communist island's deepest offshore well using the Norwegian semisubmersible platform, with cash-strapped Cuba desperate to tap its potential offshore oil wealth.
Oil exploration has been seen as crucial for Havana, which produces nearly half its oil from wells on land
and in shallow water.
Cuba currently imports about 100,000 barrels of oil each day, under very favorable terms, from its
longtime ally Venezuela.
Some studies have estimated that there may be between five and nine billion barrels of crude in ocean
waters off the Cuban coast.
Officials in Havana say however that they have reason to believe the amount could be as high as 20
billion -- enough to provide energy sufficiency and much needed revenue for the communist island.
Venezuelan oil insecurity collapses the regime, economy, and turns oil projects
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 117)//NG
Integration of Cuban Market into the Region To sustain the development of the energy sector it
must be integrated into the market of the entire region. At present the market is segmented by NOCs
and IOCs with different development schemes and priorities. Currently Cuba enjoys preferential trade
arrangements for oil exports with Venezuela, but there is little if any guarantee that a possible successor
regime in Venezuela will be willing to honor the present arrangement. Other factors— including oil price
fluctuations and the integrity of Venezuelan oil production rates— might undermine the prevailing order
and return Cuba to a situation similar to that in the early 1990s. A loss or dramatic reduction of the
supply of Venezuelan oil, though not nearly as catastrophic as the loss of Russian oil in 1992, would
create an economic crisis and bring about the termination of significant oil infrastructure projects
currently under way (oil pipeline and storage facilities, refineries, petrochemical processing, and power
generation plants).
Drilling causes oil spills
Drilling causes oil spills, specifically in Florida
Clark, 12 – The Miami Herald (Cammy, “Offshore oil drilling near Cuba renews spill concerns in Florida
Keys”, McClatchy, April 23 2012, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/04/23/146339/offshore-oildrilling-near-cuba.html#.Uc80vvnVBsk) //SP
In Cuba’s North Basin, the Spanish company Repsol has begun risky exploration for oil and natural gas
on a semi-submersible rig, now just 77 nautical miles from Key West and even closer to the ecologically
sensitive Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary. In a month or so, Repsol expects its drilling through
5,600 feet of seawater and about 14,000 feet of layered rock will reach the reservoir.
That’s frightening for many who live and work along the island chain.
Here, the memory is still fresh of the psychological hysteria and economic havoc caused two years ago
by the explosion of Deepwater Horizon — despite the reality: No oil from the 4.9-million-barrel spill
reached the Keys. For just the scare, British Petroleum has paid out more than $200 million in claims
filed by businesses and residents of South Florida, the bulk of them in Monroe County.
“I had actual visions of oil covering Florida Bay and the mangroves and all the fish being completely
devastated,” said Richard Stancyzk, longtime owner of Bud N’ Mary’s Marina, where 45 fishing captains
dock their boats in Islamorada. “We were hurt financially, but I’d really like to sue BP for pain and
suffering. It actually made me sick and nauseous.”
That vision of oil-slicked beaches, coral reefs and marine habitat was shared by many after some
scientists and government officials predicted strong currents would bring the toxic crude oil to the Keys,
more than 450 miles from the site of the spill. The Today show aired a scary graphic provided by the
federally funded National Center for Atmospheric Research that showed the oil traveling around Florida
and all the way to the North Atlantic Ocean.
Fear set in. Keys residents and business owners took hazardous-materials classes, learned to clean oil off
wildlife, picked up debris on beaches and complained there was not enough protective boom. They
learned about the Loop Current and an eddy named Franklin. And they prayed.
The situation was made worse when national media broadcast the arrival of tar balls in Key West,
leading to the misperception that the spill had reached the subtropical paradise. Visitors canceled
weddings, conferences, fishing trips and diving vacations.
LESSONS LEARNED
Since then, many lessons have been learned from the devastating spill, whose true environmental
effects will not be known for years.
Science has advanced. Coordination of federal, state, local and private agencies has improved. And
communication of information will be a more critical part of future responses.
“We joke about it now, but even if we have the greatest response in the world, if we are not getting the
word out accurately, it doesn’t matter,” said Capt. John Slaughter, chief of planning and force readiness
for the U.S. Coast Guard’s Seventh District, based in Miami.
The Coast Guard has incorporated all the lessons learned into a comprehensive offshore response
plan to deal with the new threat of a major spill in waters controlled by Cuba.
“We’re certainly more ready than a year ago,” Slaughter said. “We’re not as ready as we’ll be in six
months and in a year. Planning for this will never end.”
Coast Guard Sector Key West also has spent the past two years updating its more than 1,000-page area
contingency plan, which now includes responding to the potential near shore and landfall issues of a
massive spill coming from Cuba. Before Deepwater Horizon and the exploration of oil offshore of Cuba,
the worst-case scenario for the Keys’ emergency drill was an oil tanker grounding on a reef.
KEEPING CALM
Capt. Pat DeQuattro, commander of Sector Key West, agreed with Slaughter that communication is a
huge part of the plan.
“Equally as challenging as anything we’ll do on the water or on the shorelines is trying to keep folks calm
and let them know there is a plan — a very detailed organization we will be following with a very large
group of responders,” DeQuattro said. “If we don’t communicate that well, we’ll run into a similar
situation [to Deepwater Horizon], where folks are confused and angry.”
Despite the proximity of the Keys to the Cuban rig site, the statistical probability of significant oil
reaching Keys shorelines is low, even in the event of a massive spill in Cuban waters, according to three
scientists for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
They say geography is in all of Florida’s favor because of the powerful Gulf Stream, which flows between
northern Cuba and the Keys, several miles from any land, before heading north.
“The currents are like a conveyor belt at the grocery store,” said Doug Helton, NOAA’s operations
coordinator for the office of response and restoration. “Oil moves at 2 to 3 percent of the wind speed. It
moves at 100 percent of the current speed. It would take a strong wind and a persistent wind to move
oil out of the current.”
NOAA scientists recently completed new computer tracking models to evaluate the threat. They chose
20 potential drilling sites off Cuba and used 200 different spill scenarios based on six years of current
information of water and weather conditions, including hurricanes, said Brad Benggio, a NOAA scientific
support coordinator.
ONLY A DRILL
To create the scenario of oil reaching the shorelines of the lower or middle Keys for the recent Coast
Guard-led tabletop drill, conditions included winds of 30 knots out of the southeast that continuously
blew for “days and days and days.” That would mean the oil would take a week or more to reach land.
“That would allow for a lot of natural weathering,” said Jim Jeansonne, a NOAA scientific support
coordinator. “We won’t have a lot of black oil coming ashore or threatening the resources of the reefs.
What we will have are tar balls, which are of much less a threat, but not a zero threat.”
Although the chance of oil slicks reaching the Keys or the east coast of Florida was even more remote
during the Deepwater Horizon disaster, that probability was not communicated well. Fears that the Keys
were in for a big mess prevailed. The bigger unknown of what damage oil and dispersants to break it up
would do if any of it did reach Keys fisheries and habitat also was a big concern.
THE SETTLEMENTS
On the same day Sector Key West held its tabletop oil spill drill, two lawyers from Miami were at the
Harvey Government Center across town to solicit clients for the BP settlement, approved last week.
“You are going to have a floodgate of attorneys here, I promise,” attorney Gabrielle D’Alemberte told a
handful of business owners in Key West.
Despite not having any oil arrive, the settlement includes all of the Florida Keys. Miami-Dade and
Broward counties are not part of the settlement.
The oil spill that began as a nightmare for the Keys will end up having a silver lining, said Stancyzk, the
marina owner.
“It rained oil up north but down here it ended up raining money,” he said. “BP threw money at
everybody. There were some inequities, but it was an economic boom.”
Commercial fishermen, dive companies, vacation rental businesses and even a locals’ watering hole
called the Brass Monkey sued BP and the other companies involved with the spill.
With a public relations disaster on its hands, BP set up three claims offices in the Keys and even paid law
enforcement officers $40 an hour to guard them.
To date, BP has paid out nearly $181 million to nearly 11,000 claimants in the Keys, an average of about
$16,450 per claim. One fishing captain based at Bud N’ Mary’s marina received $150,000.
BP paid $21.5 million for 1,895 claims in Miami-Dade County and another $15.7 million for 433 claims
from Broward County.
DeQuattro, the Coast Guard commander, said the massive response to the spill, called the worst
environmental disaster in U.S. history, still is vivid in his memory.
Deepwater Horizon also was a semi-submersible rig that was exploring in deep waters for oil, similar to
the $750 million rig now being used by Repsol.
“That response employed 40 to 50,000 responders, over 200 aircraft, thousands of vessels and technical
specialists from around the country if not the world,” he said. “To say that we are perfectly prepared for
that today is not the case. … But we’ve come a long ways and are progressing towards having a better
plan.”
The Coast Guard now routinely patrols by boat and air in the vicinity of the Repsol oil rig, always keeping
a lookout for any signs of oil despite a good relationship with the Spanish company.
Said DeQuattro: “We do have a good feeling it’s not leaking.”
Drilling causes catastrophic oil spills
Allen, 12 – reporter at NPR (Greg, “U.S. Watches Closely As Oil Drilling Begins Off Cuba”, NPR News,
February 13 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146635957/u-s-watches-closely-as-oil-drillingbegins-off-cuba_) //SP
There are big plans for oil exploration in the Caribbean, not far off the coast of Florida. A Spanish
company recently began drilling in Cuban waters — just 55 miles from Key West.
The well is the first of several exploratory wells planned in Cuba and the Bahamas. The drilling has
officials and researchers in Florida scrambling to make plans for how they'll respond in case of a spill.
The U.S. currently doesn't allow any drilling for oil off its Atlantic coast or in the eastern Gulf of Mexico.
One reason is what's at stake. Florida's tourism-based economy depends on its beaches, fishing and
clear Caribbean water.
Environmental Concerns
The U.S. ban on drilling off of Florida, however, doesn't affect America's Caribbean neighbors. The
exploratory well being drilled off of Cuba has many here concerned, including people like Richard
Dodge. Dodge is the dean of Nova Southeastern University's Oceanographic Center in Dania Beach, near
Fort Lauderdale, and what he's really concerned about is coral.
At the school, Dodge and his graduate students raise staghorn coral in outdoor saltwater tanks. Live
coral grow in the crystal-clear water, some just finger length.
"These are relatively new ones that we're starting out," Dodge says. "But over here, these are ones we'll
be transplanting to the wild."
In another tank, large branches of coral will soon be used to help restore damaged reefs.
Florida is home to more than three-quarters of the nation's coral reefs — and they haven't been doing
so well. Development and warming oceans have already weakened many.
On a map, Dodge points out the location of what he believes is an even bigger potential threat — the
spot where Cuba has approved offshore oil drilling. "The site that will be drilled," he says, "is only about
50 miles from Key West."
The rig drilling off Cuba's northern coast is operating in water that is more than a mile deep. But it's not
the depth that concerns Dodge. In the case of a blowout, it's the operation's proximity to the Gulf
Stream
"We're worried that it could get into that stream fast and therefore, within days, impact our coastal
ecosystem and coastline," Dodge says. A spill could potentially affect hundreds of miles of beaches,
mangroves and estuaries from the Keys to Palm Beach.
Dodge and other marine scientists in Florida are asking the federal government to fund research that
would help identify the resources most at risk, and develop guidelines to protect them.
Embargo Could Complicate Cleanup
Complicating matters is the fact that this new well is being drilled in the waters of a country that's under
a strict U.S. embargo. Unless they apply for and receive special permission from the government, U.S.
companies are banned from doing any work on the well — even if there's a spill.
Oil spills harm the environment
A Cuban oil spill could severally damage the US costal line, the US’s current policy
prevents effective cleanup of an oil spill- that would exacerbate the damage.
Muse and Piñon 10- Attorney AND Former President, Amoco Oil Latin America; Visiting Research Fellow,
Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University
(Robert and Jorge, “Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba Environmental Cooperation is Critical”
The Brookings Institute, May 18, 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/05/18-oilspill-cuba-pinon)//HA
Introduction: The sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and the resulting discharge of
millions of gallons of crude oil into the sea demonstrated graphically the challenge of environmental
protection in the ocean waters shared by Cuba and the United States.
While the quest for deepwater drilling of oil and gas may slow as a result of the latest calamity, it is
unlikely to stop. It came as little surprise, for example, that Repsol recently announced plans to move
forward with exploratory oil drilling in Cuban territorial waters later this year.
As Cuba continues to develop its deepwater oil and natural gas reserves, the consequence to the United
States of a similar mishap occurring in Cuban waters moves from the theoretical to the actual. The
sobering fact that a Cuban spill could foul hundreds of miles of American coastline and do profound
harm to important marine habitats demands cooperative and proactive planning by Washington and
Havana to minimize or avoid such a calamity. Also important is the planning necessary to prevent and,
if necessary, respond to incidents arising from this country’s oil industry that, through the action of
currents and wind, threaten Cuban waters and shorelines.
While Washington is working to prevent future disasters in U.S. waters like the Deepwater Horizon, its
current policies foreclose the ability to respond effectively to future oil disasters —whether that
disaster is caused by companies at work in Cuban waters, or is the result of companies operating in U.S.
waters.
Oil spills kill the environment-empirically proven.
Mansfield 10- CSIS office of the Simon Chair, specializes in trade
(Laura, “Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: An Economic Disaster and Political Opportunity” CSIS, JUN 7, 2010,
http://csis.org/blog/gulf-mexico-oil-spill-economic-disaster-and-political-opportunity)//HA
One of British Petroleum’s underwater oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico exploded on Earth Day and oil has
continued to flow into the Gulf for 49 days. At least 12,000 barrels (504,000 gallons) pollutes the water
daily, creating serious problems for the coastlines of Louisiana and Florida, and possibly Mexico and
Cuba. As the largest oil spill in U.S. history, eclipsed by only two larger international spills in Kuwait
during the First Gulf War in 1991 and a spill in Mexico in 1979, this event will have long-term negative
economic and political consequences. Mainstream U.S. media tends to focus on the immediate impact
on Louisiana and Florida, overlooking long-term international political and economic outcomes. The spill
is likely to impact areas in Mexico and Cuba in addition to those already affected in the United States.
Now, the issue involves not just the United States and BP, but also other countries that economically
depend on the Gulf of Mexico. This event creates economic problems and political opportunities
concerning pollution across maritime boundaries.
Louisiana and Florida, states that rely on their coastlines for many economic activities, have and will
continue to suffer. As the summer months begin, the tourism and fishing industries are deteriorating as
the beaches and waters become polluted with petroleum. In Florida, tourism is one of the most
important economic activities, for which the state has an established infrastructure of restaurants,
hotels, and entertainment. Each year the industry creates massive employment and $6 billion in
revenue. In Louisiana, a large economic activity on the coast is fishing. Shrimp season, which typically
starts in early summer, has been halted by the spill. Locals lament that their businesses, able to survive
hurricane Katrina, have been ruined by a man-made disaster. Some shrimpers have been hired by BP to
use their shrimp nets to capture oil instead . The impact on the environment and businesses will be
detrimental to the economy.
The economic effects are far-reaching past the immediately impacted states of Louisiana and Florida.
Today alone BP lost $1,375,920 worth of oil that escaped through the leak. Additionally, BP has already
spent $940 million on attempts to stop the leak as it faces diminishing public image that will, no doubt,
decrease sales. BP also states that it expects to spend $84 million on loss-of-income claims from the
affected areas in June alone. The political repercussions of the oil spill are also important to note. Most
of the blame is being laid on BP as cleanup actions have fallen short of expectations. However, many
also criticize the United States government for slow and inadequate reactions.
Interestingly, the oil disaster has opened communications between the United States and Cuba. Since
the United States initiated an embargo against Cuba in 1960 the two countries have had less than
optimal relations. Oceanographers predict the oil spill will reach the shores of Cuba if strong currents
exist – likely with the onset of hurricane season starting June 1. Although there are no formal diplomatic
relations between the two countries, representatives at the U.S. interests office in Cuba are increasing
efforts to communicate by keeping the government up to date on the spill’s movement. Both countries
recognize that cooperation is important to prevent and mitigate environmental disasters in the Gulf of
Mexico.
Viewed as an opportunity for oil diplomacy, discussions of environmental and public safety have
become a priority and Houston-based oil contractors are traveling to Cuba. Petroleum also exists within
Cuba’s boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and drilling is expected to start this year. This has increased
concern about problems related to difficult deepwater drilling. Although concern may be primarily on
environmental issues, Jorge Piñon, the former president of Amoco Oil Latin America and Cuba advisor at
the Brookings Institute, mentions that this is also a politically strategic time to re-establish ties with
Cuba through oil diplomacy as the country increasingly relies on Venezuelan petroleum and is influenced
by ties with Venezuelan-President Chávez.
Cuban oil spills collapse Floridian ecosystems --- only the plan mitigates these spills
Stephens and Colvin, 11 – * Executive Director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas AND **
Vice president for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council (Sarah and Jake, “US-Cuba
policy, and the race for oil drilling”, The Hill’s, 9/29/11, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreignpolicy/184661-us-cuba-policy-and-the-race-for-oil-drilling) //SP
To protect the national interest — and for the sake of Florida's beaches and the Gulf of Mexico's
ecosystem — it is time to stop sticking our heels in the sand when it comes to U.S.-Cuba policy.
Before the end of the year, a Chinese-made drilling platform known as Scarabeo 9 is expected to arrive
in the Gulf. Once it is there, Cuba and its foreign partners, including Spain’s Repsol, will begin using it to
drill for oil in waters deeper than Deepwater Horizon’s infamous Macondo well. The massive rig,
manufactured to comply with U.S.-content restrictions at a cost of $750 million, will cost Repsol and
other companies $407,000 per day to lease for exploration.
They are taking this financial risk because Cuba needs the oil and its partners — Spain, Norway, Russia,
India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada, Angola, Venezuela, and possibly China — believe that drilling in
waters said to contain undiscovered reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels of oil is good business.
In virtually every other country in the world, developments like these would prompt high-level
discussions about how to exploit these resources safely or to anticipate a crisis were a disaster to strike.
Experts who have studied the currents say a spill in Cuban waters would send 90 percent of the oil into
the Keys and up the East Coast of Florida. But the embargo leaves Florida’s sensitive coastal resources
defenseless.
Due to the fact that the drilling involves Cuba, American companies and workers cannot lend their
expertise to what could be a risky operation. U.S. economic sanctions prevent our private sector from
helping Cuba drill safely and paralyze the U.S. government, which ought to be convening bilateral
discussions on best practices and coordinating disaster response. In fact, the U.S. has no emergency
response agreement with Cuba for oil spills. While some specific licenses have been granted to permit
U.S. firms to conduct limited transactions with Cuba, current sanctions bar the United States from
deploying the kind of clean-up equipment, engineers, spare parts for blow-out prevention, chemical
dispersants, and rigs to drill relief wells that would be needed to address an oil crisis involving Cuba.
One welcomed development came earlier this month, when William Reilly, a former head of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and co-chair of the Commission that investigated the Deepwater
Horizon disaster, led a group of experts to Cuba to take a look at their plans. While the administration
has done well giving permission to Mr. Reilly, as well as to other experts, to discuss the problem with
Cuban counterparts, it should move more aggressively to work with the Cuban government to
cooperate on plans for safe drilling and responding to a possible crisis.
Florida is a unique biodiversity hotspot
Alles, 07 – Professor of Biology at the Western Washington University (David L., “Biodiversity Hot
Spots: The Florida Everglades”, 3/7/2007, http://www.biol.wwu.edu/trent/alles/Everglades.pdf) //SP
"Biodiversity hot spots are areas where endemic species with small ranges are concentrated. Not all are
in the tropics, but most are. Hot spots can be extraordinarily concentrated; thousands of species may be
found within a relatively small area. Species with small ranges are particularly vulnerable to impacts.
Nature has put her eggs in a small number of baskets, and we are in danger of dropping them. On land,
worldwide 25 areas are recognized as hotspots which contain concentrations of endemic species that
are disproportionately vulnerable to extinction from regional habitat destruction. These areas retain less
than 10% of their original habitat and have unusually high human population densities." (Pimm, 2001)
The Florida Everglades contains one of the highest concentrations of species vulnerable to extinction in
the United States. The 5,000-square-kilometre wetland in southern Florida is home to at least 60
endangered species, including the American crocodile (Mason, 2003). And the area retains less than 10%
of its original habitat as the human population density of southern Florida threatens to over-run one of
the most unique habitats in North America.
The Florida Everglades in the Afternoon Sun
Nourished by the rain soaked Kissimmee River Basin and stretching south from 700 square mile Lake
Okeechobee (left center), the Everglades are a wide slow moving river of marsh and saw grass covering
some 4,500 square miles, flowing slowly towards the mangrove estuaries of the Gulf of Mexico (right
below center). The Everglades are a unique habitat; there are no other everglades in the world. No other
place combines a subtropical climate, a broad, shallow river, and a stunning diversity of plants and
animals into such a complex and fragile ecosystem. No other place is so dramatically defined by annual
rhythms of drought and flood, fire and sunshine and torrential rain.
Everglades National Park is the largest remaining subtropical wilderness in the United States. Its
abundant wildlife includes rare and endangered species, such as the American crocodile, Florida
panther, and West Indian manatee. Alligators, like the one shown above, are an important part of this
ecosystem, and are regarded as a “keystone” species of the Everglades. The Florida Everglades
ecosystem is also the only place in the world where alligators and crocodiles exist side by side.
The American crocodile, shown above, was listed as an endangered species in Florida in 1975. Its
numbers had dropped dramatically because of hunting and loss of habitat. Today, the American
crocodile's habitat is limited to the southern half of Florida, and has an estimated population of 2,000 up
from approximately 200 to 400 two decades ago. They are found in the
U.S. in the remaining tidal marshes in the Everglades along Florida Bay and in the Florida Keys. Though
the species resemble one another, crocodiles vary greatly from the more than 1 million alligators found
in Florida. Crocodile color ranges from olive green to gray compared with the black hue of alligators.
Their snouts are narrower, and the bottom and top teeth are visible from the side when the mouth is
closed; only the upper teeth are seen on an alligator. Adult crocodiles are larger than some other
crocodile species, with some males reaching lengths of 6.1 m (20 ft). Decidedly less aggressive than the
infamous Nile and Australian crocodiles, American crocodiles are rarely seen by people.
The West Indian manatee is a large, herbivorous, aquatic mammal. These gentle creatures are
endangered throughout their range. High annual mortality, primarily associated with human activity, as
well as a low reproductive rate and loss of habitat continue to keep the number of manatees low and
threaten the species’ future. 7
The manatee population has long been the focus of battles between conservationists and boaters.
Boating kills dozens of manatees a year, crushing or gashing the slow-moving mammals as they rise to
the surface to breathe.
Red tide algae blooms have been another cause of mortality for manatees along Florida's south-central
Gulf Coast. The one-cell organism that causes red tide releases a toxin when it dies, sickening manatees.
Once the toxin is in the animal, it affects their coordination and causes paralysis (Flewelling, et al.,
2005).
"Manatees on Florida’s Gulf coast are frequently exposed to brevetoxin, a potent neurotoxin produced
by the dinoflagellate Karenia brevis, during red tide events. In 1996, 151 manatees were documented to
have died in southwest Florida from brevetoxicosis. This epizootic was particularly detrimental to the
manatee population because more adults were killed than any other age class. Other red tide epizootics
in 1982, 2002, 2003, and 2005 resulted in the deaths of 37, 34, 96, and (preliminarily) 81 manatees,
respectively. There is no clear evidence that these events have been increasing in frequency along
Florida’s coast, but
certainly the impact on the manatee population has increased over the past two decades. Viewed
globally, harmful algal blooms have been increasing over the past 25 years in frequency and in their
impacts on the economy, public health, and marine life."
Mangrove Estuaries of Florida Bay
In addition to rare and endangered species, the Everglades are rightly famous for the profusion of bird
species found there, with 347 species recorded within the Park boundaries. The mangrove estuaries of
Florida Bay, in particular, are a breeding habitat for Roseate Spoonbills, Wood Stork, White Ibis, Glossy
Ibis, and eleven species of egrets and herons.
The “River of Grass”
Once, water flowed freely from Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay in a “river of grass”, Florida
environmentalist Marjory Stoneman Douglas's poetic phrase. It is a river that is 120 miles long and 50
miles wide, but less than a foot deep. In this flat landscape, even a few inches of elevation meant the
difference between wet marsh and dry ground.
Today, the Everglades is an ecosystem in danger of extinction. Canals and levees capture and divert its
water for human use, including drinking water, irrigation, and flood control. Often, too much water is
withheld from the Everglades during the wet season, or too much is diverted into it during the winter
drought, disrupting the natural cycles of feeding and nesting which depend on these patterns. Much of
the time the water is contaminated by pollutants.
A Cuban oil spill destroys multiple marine ecosystems
ORR, 12 – Office of Response and Restoration (“Getting Ready for Offshore Oil Drilling in Cuba and the
Bahamas”, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 4/27/12,
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/getting-ready-offshore-oil-drilling-cuba-andbahamas.html) //SP
For the past year, NOAA and the U.S. Coast Guard have been studying the possible threats that new
offshore oil drilling activity near the Florida Straits and the Bahamas pose to Florida.
For example, the proximity of Cuba's oil fields to U.S. waters has raised a lot of concerns about what
would happen if a spill like the 2010 Deepwater Horizon/BP oil well blowout happened.
If a large oil spill did occur in the waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the
oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida. However, a number of factors, like winds or currents,
would determine where any oil slicks might go.
NOAA's National Ocean Service has more information about how we're preparing for worst-case
scenarios there:
The study focuses on modeling the movement of oil in water to predict where, when, and how oil might
reach U.S. shores given a spill in this region of the ocean.
Models help to determine the threat to our coasts from a potential spill by accounting for many
different variables, such as the weathering processes of evaporation, dispersion, photo-oxidation, and
biodegradation—all of which reduce the amount of oil in the water over time.
Currents and winds also play a role in determining where oil will move in water. For example, there are
three major currents that would dominate movement of spilled oil near the Florida Straits: Loop
Current, Florida Current, and the Gulf Stream.
If oil did reach U.S. waters, marine and coastal resources in southern Florida could be at risk, including
coral reefs and the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, located north of the Cuban drilling sites.
We'll be watching the drilling activity there very carefully. If a spill does happen, NOAA will be ready to
share our scientific expertise on oil spill response with the U.S. Coast Guard.
Spills risk destruction of key ecosystems
Padgett, 12 – (Tim, “The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at Arms Length Over Spill
Prevention”, 1/27, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html)
On any other occasion that might have raised the ire of the Cubans, who consider Washington their
imperialista enemy. But the U.S. examination of the Scarabeo 9, which Repsol agreed to and Cuba
abided, was part of an unusual choreography of cooperation between the two countries. Their
otherwise bitter cold-war feud (they haven't had diplomatic relations since 1961) is best known for a 50year-long trade embargo and history's scariest nuclear standoff. Now, Cuba's commitment to offshore
oil exploration — drilling may start this weekend — raises a specter that haunts both nations: an oil spill
in the Florida Straits like the BP calamity that tarred the nearby Gulf of Mexico two years ago and left
$40 billion in U.S. damages.
The Straits, an equally vital body of water that's home to some of the world's most precious coral reefs,
separates Havana and Key West, Florida, by a mere 90 miles. As a result, the U.S. has tacitly loosened its
embargo against Cuba to give firms like Repsol easier access to the U.S. equipment they need to help
avoid or contain possible spills. "Preventing drilling off Cuba better protects our interests than preparing
for [a disaster] does," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida tells TIME, noting the U.S. would prefer to stop
the Cuban drilling — but can't. "But the two are not mutually exclusive, and that's why we should aim to
do both."
Biodiversity impacts
Extinction
Takacs, 96 – Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins University Pr., Baltimore (David) //SP
"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of
many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and
severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I
am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem
collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give
is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So
biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and
Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope
makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human
futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger
rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate,
and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of
perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human
beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war,
which could extinguish civilization.""
Environmental destruction outweighs any other impact
Chen, 00 – Professor of law at University of Minnesota, Now Dean of Law School at Louisville (Jim,
“Globalization and Its Losers”, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 157’ ) //SP
The spread of Homo sapiens around the earth have brought about mass extinctions and related
ecological changes on a scale not seen since the Cretaceous period. In its evolutionary impact,
comprehensive human colonization of the planet easily out- classes an ice age, or even twenty.' The
previous geological event of comparable magnitude ushered out the dinosaurs; the one before that,
the mass extinction that closed out the Permian period, nearly ended the terrestrial tenure of what we
arro- gantly call "higher" life forms.2 In the last 600 million years of geological history, only five previous
extinction spasms have taken place.3 We are living - or perhaps more accurately, dying - through the
sixth.4 "[Half the world's species will be extinct or on the verge of extinction" by the end of the
twenty-first century.5 In environmental terms, globalization merely continues what humanity has
been doing since the glaciers last re- treated: subdue every niche within its reach. he spectacle of mass
extinction gives rhetorical ammuni- tion to all opponents of globalization - not just environmental- ists, but also
those who resist free trade as a threat to labor standards, cultural independence, religious values, declining
languages, agricultural self-sufficiency, and the like. Just as the global expansion of a single "Terminator"
primate species has sparked the Holocene epoch's ecological holocaust, the emer- gence of a global society
threatens a host of human institutions. Where a geological clock once marked the entrance and exit of
species, an accelerated human stopwatch now tracks the rise and fall of regimes, religions,
languages, and civilizations. Time and chance happen to them all.7 The extinction metaphor describes
not only a natural world in ecological cataclysm, but also a human society buffeted by changes of
unprecedented scope and seemingly relentless acceleration. In this dual sense, globalization is nothing
short of the end of the world.8 So apocalyptic an assertion deserves nothing less than the most grandiose of
intellectual frameworks. I will examine globalization through a Darwinian lens, in the hope that an application
of natural evolution as "universal acid" will "eat[ ] through just about every traditional concept, and leave[ ] in
its wake a revolutionized world-view, with most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but transformed in
fundamental ways."9 In economic, cultural, and environmental realms, globalization unleashes the same
Darwinian dynamics of adaptation, natural selection, and extinction. But the natural world and
human society do differ fundamentally. For natural species, extinction truly is forever. The
ecosystems they inhabit will not recover in any time frame that humans can meaningfully
contemplate. Human institutions, by contrast, are much more readily preserved and revived. To the
extent that globalized society must choose, it should systematically favor the environment over jobs
and even culture. One final observation bears notice. Received wisdom in American intellectual circles
distrusts almost any extension of evolutionary metaphors and analogies outside the strictly bio- economic case
for free trade lies beyond reasonable dispute, "so- cial issues" affecting employment and income, community
and culture, and health and environment supply the primary - per- haps even exclusive - fault lines for legal
debate.16 […] Conscious decisions to allow the extinction of a species or the destruction of an entire
ecosystem epitomize the "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" that NEPA is
designed to retard.312 The original Endangered Species Act gave such decisions no quarter whatsoever;313
since 1979, such decisions have rested in the hands of a solemnly convened "God Squad."314 In its
permanence and gravity, natural extinction provides the baseline by which all other types of
extinction should be judged. The Endangered Species Act explicitly acknowledges the "esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of endangered species and the
biodiversity they represent.315 Allied bodies of international law confirm this view:316 global biological
diversity is part of the commonly owned heritage of all humanity and deserves full legal
protection.317 Rather remarkably, these broad assertions understate the value of biodiversity and
the urgency of its protection. A Sand County Almanac, the eloquent bible of the modern environmental
movement, contains only two demonstrable bio- logical errors. It opens with one and closes with another. We
can forgive Aldo Leopold's decision to close with that elegant but erroneous epigram, "ontogeny repeats
phylogeny."318 What concerns us is his opening gambit: "There are some who can live without wild things, and
some who cannot."319 Not quite. None of us can live without wild things. Insects are so essential to life
as we know it that if they "and other land-dwelling anthropods ... were to disappear, humanity
probably could not last more than a few months."320 "Most of the amphibians, reptiles, birds, and
mammals," along with "the bulk of the flowering plants and ... the physical structure of most forests
and other terrestrial habitats" would disappear in turn.321 "The land would return to" something
resembling its Cambrian condition, "covered by mats of recumbent wind-pollinated vegetation,
sprinkled with clumps of small trees and bushes here and there, largely devoid of animal life."322
From this perspective, the mere thought of valuing biodiversity is absurd, much as any attempt to
quantify all of earth's planetary amenities as some trillions of dollars per year is absurd. But the
frustration inherent in enforcing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has
shown that conservation cannot work without appeasing Homo economicus, the profit-seeking ape. Efforts to
ban the international ivory trade through CITES have failed to stem the slaughter of African elephants.323 The
preservation of biodiversity must therefore begin with a cold, calculating inventory of its benefits. Fortunately,
defending biodiversity preservation in humanity's self-interest is an easy task. As yet unexploited
species might give a hungry world a larger larder than the storehouse of twenty plant species that
provide nine-tenths of humanity's current food supply.324 "Waiting in the wings are tens of
thousands of unused plant species, many demonstrably superior to those in favor."325 As genetic
warehouses, many plants enhance the productivity of crops already in use. In the United States
alone, the latest phylogeny" means that the life history of any individual organism replays the entire
evolutionary history of that organism's species. genes of wild plants have accounted for much of "the
explosive growth in farm production since the 1930s."326 The contribution is worth $1 billion each year.327
Nature's pharmacy demonstrates even more dramatic gains than nature's farm.328 Aspirin and
penicillin, our star analgesic and antibiotic, had humble origins in the meadowsweet plant and in
cheese mold.329 Leeches, vampire bats, and pit vipers all contribute anticoagulant drugs that reduce
blood pressure, pre- vent heart attacks, and facilitate skin transplants.330 Merck & Co., the
multinational pharmaceutical company, is helping Costa Rica assay its rich biota.33' A single commercially
viable product derived "from, say, any one species among... 12,000 plants and 300,000 insects ... could
handsomely repay Merck's entire investment" of $1 million in 1991 dollars.332 Wild animals, plants, and
microorganisms also provide ecological services.333 The Supreme Court has lauded the pesticidal
talents of migratory birds.334 Numerous organisms process the air we breathe, the water we drink,
the ground we stroll.335 Other species serve as sentries. Just as canaries warned coal miners of lethal
gases, the decline or disappearance of indicator species provides advance warning against deeper
environmental threats.336 Species conservation yields the greatest environmental amenity of all:
ecosystem protection. Saving discrete species indirectly protects the ecosystems in which they
live.337 Some larger animals may not carry great utilitarian value in themselves, but the human urge
to protect these charismatic "flagship species" helps protect their ecosystems.338 Indeed, to save any
species, we must protect their ecosystems.339 Defenders of biodiversity can measure the "tangible
economic value" of the pleasure derived from "visiting, photographing, painting, and just looking at
wildlife."340 In the United States alone, wildlife observation and feeding in 1991 generated $18.1 billion in
consumer spending, $3 billion in tax revenues, and 766,000 jobs.341 Ecotourism gives tropical countries, home
to most of the world's species, a valuable alternative to subsistence agriculture. Costa Rican rainforests
preserved for ecotourism "have become many times more profitable per hectare than land cleared for pastures
and fields," while the endangered gorilla has turned ecotourism into "the third most important source of
income in Rwanda."342 In a globalized economy where commodities can be cultivated almost anywhere,
environmentally sensitive locales can maximize their wealth by exploiting the "boutique" uses of their natural
bounty. The value of endangered species and the biodiversity they embody is "literally . . . incalculable."343
What, if anything, should the law do to preserve it? There are those that invoke the story of Noah's Ark as a
moral basis for biodiversity preservation.344 Others regard the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, especially the
biblical stories of Creation and the Flood, as the root of the West's deplorable environmental record.345 To
avoid getting bogged down in an environmental exegesis of Judeo- Christian "myth and legend," we should let
Charles Darwin and evolutionary biology determine the imperatives of our moment in natural "history."346
The loss of biological diversity is quite arguably the gravest problem facing humanity. If we cast the
question as the contemporary phenomenon that "our descendants [will] most regret," the "loss of
genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats" is worse than even "energy
depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or conquest by a totalitarian government."347
Natural evolution may in due course renew the earth with a diversity of species approximating that of a world
unspoiled by Homo sapiens - in ten million years, perhaps a hundred million.
Oil investment causes political reform
Energy cooperation spurs political reform
Perales et al., 10- senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. (Jose Raul, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic
Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson Center Latin American Program, August 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//TL
In spite of these developments, Piñón argued it is in the best interests of both Cuba and the
United States to begin energy collaboration today. What is needed, Piñón continued, is a bilateral policy
that would contribute to Cuba’s energy independence as well as support a broader national energy
policy that embraces modernization of infrastructure, the balancing of hydrocarbons with renewable
materials, and conservation and environmental stewardship. He highlighted the case of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, and what would happen if such an incident happened in a Cuban
oil rig (under current U.S. policy banning equipment and technological sales to the island), as a
reminder of the need for an energy dialogue between Cuba and the United States. Moreover, Piñón
contended that if U.S. companies were allowed to contribute to developing Cuba’s hydrocarbon
reserves, as well as renewable energy such as solar, wind, and sugarcane ethanol, it would reduce the
influence of autocratic and corrupt governments on the island’s road toward self determination. Most
importantly, it would provide the United States and other democratic countries with a better chance of
working with Cuba’s future leaders to carry out reforms that would lead to a more open and
representative society. American oil and oil equipment and service companies have the capital,
technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine in a safe and responsible
manner Cuba’s potential oil and natural gas reserves.
Cuban oil key to energy security
Reliance on Latin American oil from National Oil Companies has a strong risk of supply
disruptions and energy competition with China – US/Cuban energy cooperation can fill
the gap
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 9-11)//NG *NOC=national oil company, Cupet= Cuba
NOC
The Geostrategic Environment of U.S. Energy Security
Those involved in managing the security interests of the United States need to understand the
geostrategic implications of interstate relations in the region in terms of energy security, and the extent
to which they affect cooperation between the United States and Cuba. This includes an assessment of
the medium- to long-term evolution of energy cooperation between Cuba and Venezuela; of the
broader relations between states aligned with the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa
Bolivariana para las Americas, or ALBA) and Petrocaribe consortiums; and of the growing influence of
China in the region. 14 Also discussed in this volume is the extent to which the diversification and
dispersion of energy resources in Cuba might be a buffer against disruptions in U.S. energy production
and distribution that could result from natural disasters or market disruptions.
Before analyzing U.S. energy security in a geostrategic context, it is necessary to define “energy
security” and “strategic energy policy.” Energy security is the capacity to avoid disruptions caused by
natural, accidental, or intentional events affecting energy and utility supply and distribution systems.
Energy security is said to prevail when fuel, power production and distribution systems, and end-user
devices possess the five so-called “S” characteristics, as outlined by Drexel Kleber, the director of the
Strategic Operations Power Surety Task Force, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense:
—Surety. Access to energy and fuel sources is assured.
—Survivability. Energy and fuel sources are resilient and durable in the face of potential
damage.
—Supply. There is an identified available source of energy— traditional fossil fuels, alternative
energy (nuclear, clean coal, biomass, landfill gas, municipal solid waste, hydrogen), or renewable energy
(hydropower, geothermal pressure, wind, tidal. and solar).
—Sufficiency. There is an adequate quantity of power and fuel from a variety of sources. —
Sustainability. Operating practices can be perpetuated by limiting demand, reducing waste, and
effectively exploiting alternative energy and renewable resources to the fullest extent possible.
The five “S” energy security and conservation objectives, though initially intended as a guide for the U.S.
Department of Defense, have a much broader applicability; not least, they serve as value parameters for
energy policy decisionmaking. As Kleber has noted, “Expenditures on energy conservation measures are
viewed as ‘investments’ with long-term rewards and dividends which are paid in commodities beyond
money— national security, soldiers’ lives, improved manpower utilization, military to civilian transfers,
and increased foreign policy options for elected officials, to name a few.”
16 What, then, would an ideal strategic energy policy look like for the United States— or any other
country, for that matter? Mahmoud Amin El-Gamal and Amy Myers Jaffe have set out a detailed analysis
of the objectives of a strategic energy policy, including the following:
1. To assure that markets operate efficiently so as to develop the infrastructure necessary to
meet growing energy demand
2. To ensure the well-being of the human habitat and ecosystem
3. To ensure that mechanisms are in place for preventing and, if necessary, managing
disruptions to energy supply. 17
Articulating these objectives doesn’t mean that fulfilling them is simple for policymakers for the
following reasons. First, there are no overnight solutions to the energy supply and infrastructure
bottlenecks facing the global markets. The trade-offs between energy-security considerations and
national (non-energy) goals across the board must be continuously reviewed. States must adopt an
integrated energy policy balancing foreign policy, trade policy, and national security imperatives. In this
way, strategic energy policy has the ability to play a significant role in diplomatic discourse, especially
where bilateral relations with major oil producers are concerned. For El-Gamal and Jaffe this is a critical
consideration, for three principal reasons:
1. U.S. energy independence is not attainable.
2. The policy instruments available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly
inadequate.
3. The United States needs to articulate a new vision for optimal management of international
energy interdependence. 18
Thus, the questions and issues surrounding energy security become existential in a manner that
has hardly been discussed heretofore, but clearly resonates in the face of ongoing changes in access to
secure energy sources, persistent energy dependency, and the seemingly insatiable demand for
petroleum products to fuel the American way of life. These concerns immediately raise three important
questions relevant to our discussion of possible engagement with Cuba in the energy sphere:
1. How will the ongoing development and evolution of Unión Cubapetróleo S.A. (Cupet), Cuba’s state oil
company, limit or obstruct U.S. efforts to meet its strategic objectives?
2. What role can international oil companies play in the shortand longterm development of energy
resources and infrastructure in Cuba?
3. How will the specter of competition with Brazil, Russia, China, and India over scarce petroleum
resources affect U.S. energy-security policy, especially in light of the recent energy-development
agreements between Brazil and Cuba, and Russia and Cuba, and the Chinese incursion into Latin
American energy markets?
These questions deserve consideration, particularly in light of the growing presence of these
external actors in Latin American energy markets. How might they increase competition and
cooperation over scarce energy resources?
In assessing the development of Cupet and its impact on U.S. geostrategic imperatives, it is essential to evaluate how
the United States might promote its interest in a global and regional energy market shaped and
influenced by the activities of national oil companies, especially their influence on developments in Cuba. Including
Mexico’s Petróleos Mexicanos S.A. (Pemex) and Venezuela’s state oil firm, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA)—both of them NOCs— in this
evaluation is critically important for ensuring an acceptable strategic context to U.S. interests. 19 The objective of this highly path-dependent
development is the transformation of Cupet into a stable NOC that exhibits high technical competency culminating in upstream oilfield
production and downstream refining and marketing capabilities. It is path-dependent because the set of decisions undertaken to achieve the
objective (energy self-sufficiency) is limited by the decisions made in the past by Cuban policymakers, even though past circumstances may no
longer be relevant. Prior to 2005, the energy policy objective was clearly centered on the revitalization of existing energy infrastructure and the
expansion of domestic production, as limited as that may have been. Now there is a big change in Cuba’s circumstances: the growing
importance of tapping the offshore reserves.
An NOC, to be successful, must balance national social and political objectives with commercial
objectives. Consequently, U.S. strategic policy must balance the promotion of broader U.S. interests with
those of the NOC if there is to be cooperation. 20 In light of the recent resurgence of oil nationalism, future
cooperation depends largely on the extent to which observers can identify and articulate the common
energy-policy interests of NOCs and the United States. In Venezuela, high oil prices have encouraged the
Chávez government to undertake bold social policy initiatives. 21 Some suggest these decisions have come at
the expense of critical energy infrastructure needs, thereby increasing the likelihood of energy supply
disruptions in the future. Because the United States relies on Venezuela for nearly 1 million barrels of oil daily, the policy
decision to prioritize social spending over energy infrastructure revitalization by the Chávez regime
could have a significant impact in the United States, if it were to result in diminished capacity in
Venezuela to produce and export oil to the United States. 22 In Mexico, state control of the NOC Pemex
has had the “stultifying impact” of prolonged bureaucratic stagnation, resulting in a decline in
production and insufficient funding for reinvestment in new exploration and production. This is highly
problematic for Mexico because the government derives 40 percent of its revenue from Pemex. 23 It also has
raised concerns about the possibility of energy supply disruptions for the United States. In fact, in the first
quarter of 2010 Mexico’s oil exports to the United States fell by over 8 percent, as compared to 2009.24
Concerns over the ability of major oil-producing countries and their NOCs to meet future global
demand is compounded by insufficient levels of reinvestment and the looming specter of interstate
instability. But it is becoming abundantly clear that Venezuela’s growing investment in Cuba’s energy infrastructure creates the basis for a
longer-term relationship that will enable Cuba to expand its productive, storage, and refining capacity, as it simultaneously strengthens the
Venezuelan position in the region as a supplier of both crude and refined petroleum products for its Petrocaribe and ALBA partners.
There is also growing consternation that NOCs
may be “used as instruments of state policy inimical to U.S.
national interests.” 25 In particular, China’s growing presence in Latin America is being interpreted as a sign
of intensifying competition over energy resources. Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader suggest that this competition
could easily be the cause of international conflict in the coming years, as energy demands place a rising
premium on the ability of China— already the world’s third-largest crude oil importer, after the United
States and Japan— to access oil and gas resources.
Cuban oil prevents US supply disruptions due to natural disasters
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. )//NG
Cuba, the United States, and the Five “S” Factors
In chapter 1, I spotlighted five “S” characteristics of energy security and the related imperatives
of strategic energy policy relevant to both the Cuban case as well as that of the United States. The
successful development of Cuban energy resources will enhance the energy security of the United States
and its broader geostrategic imperatives in the Caribbean region. Cuba can do this by potentially serving
as an entrepôt for U.S. downstream activities (refining, marketing, storage, and transshipment). Cuba
has already embarked on an aggressive program of investment and development of its refining capacity,
which could potentially support American energy needs by serving as a hedge against supply disruptions
of refined petroleum products or facilitating the redirection of oil shipments as needed owing to any
number of circumstances.
These capabilities could even meet some short-term U.S. market demands. A case in point is the
loss of U.S. refining capacity due to damage from Hurricane Rita in the Houston area in 2005. The heavy
concentration of U.S. oil infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico region makes hurricanes of Rita’s intensity
very problematic. Very little spare crude oil refining capacity exists in the United States. The Gulf of
Mexico produces some 2 million barrels per day total, as well as having some 30 percent of the total
refining capacity of the United States. 6 Rita’s offshore path traveled through an area dense with
pipelines and oil platforms, and skirted an onshore area with large refineries. 7 The damage to U.S.
refining capacity would have been devastating if Rita had directly hit the Houston region. In the future,
the presence of an expanded refining capacity in Cuba might preempt a supply disruption. Alternatively,
because Cuba also lies in the path of these tropical storms, having access to American markets provides
the Cuban regime with another alternative to respond to and minimize the impact of such events.
Conventional oil sources are vulnerable– an oil partnership with Cuba secures
resources for the future and lays the foundation for cooperation.
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 2-3)//NG
It is relevant to U.S. energy security and geostrategic interests that 77 percent of proven oil
reserves globally are held by national oil companies (NOCs) and that 11 percent of proven oil reserves
are held by NOCs with equity access, meaning that these firms retain the contractual rights for
exploration, extraction, and production of oil drawn from those reserves. Four of the five largest oil
exporters to the United States— Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria— are NOCs. There is
growing concern about the extent to which imports from those countries are assured, given the
potential for political conflict, economic instability, and social upheaval in any or all of those states. This
means that only 11 percent of proven oil reserves not already held by NOCs are presently open to
international oil companies (IOCs), many of which are based in the United States. 3 This political and
economic reality heightens the potential importance of U.S. cooperation with Cuba on the issue of
energy development.
At present Cuba possesses an estimated 4.6 million barrels of oil and 9.3 TFC (total final
consumption) of natural gas in North Cuba Basin. 4 This is approximately half of the estimated 10.4
billion barrels of recoverable crude oil in the Alaska Natural Wildlife Reserve. If viewed in strictly
instrumental terms— namely, increasing the pool of potential imports to the U.S. market by accessing
Cuban oil and ethanol holdings— Cuba’s oil represents little in the way of absolute material gain to the
U.S. energy supply. But the possibility of energy cooperation between the United States and Cuba offers
significant relative gains connected to the potential for developing production-sharing agreements,
promoting the transfer of state-of-the-art technology and foreign direct investment, and increasing
opportunities for the development of joint-venture partnerships, and scientific-technical exchanges. The
Prospects for U.S.-Cuba Cooperation on Energy Policy 3
The relative gains from increased commercial and technical cooperation obviously increases
Cuba’s domestic energy capacity, but it also possesses the potential of enhancing the United States’
energy security by deepening its links in the region. The future vitality of energy security requires access
to energy export markets but also the diffusion and dispersion of technology, innovation, research and
development of enhanced productive capacities, alternative energy technologies, and the effective
management of resources across the region. The economist Jeremy Rifkin argues that “distributive
energy markets,” marked by highly collaborative efforts to integrate diverse energy resources based in
various proportions everywhere, will come to replace the prevailing model of the highly concentrated,
conventional energy elites— coal, oil, natural gas, uranium— which are now found in limited
geographical regions and are finite. 5
Lifting the embargo is key to energy security- investing now is key.
Camargo 10-reporter for Hispanic link news service
(Rasia, “Oil Prospects in Cuba Have Some Rethinking U.S. Trade Embargo” Latin America News Dispatch,
AUGUST 19, 2010, http://latindispatch.com/2010/08/19/oil-prospects-in-cuba-have-some-rethinking-us-trade-embargo/)//HA
WASHINGTON — As speculation surfaces of oil prospects in Cuba, officials are worried that the United
States’ embargo will fall short with trade, as the island continues to attract global investments from
countries such as China.
“If we insist on maintaining the embargo, other countries will benefit from that increased trade,” said
Ronald Saligo, professor of economics at Rice University, through a teleconference Aug. 17 at a luncheon
of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC). “ There is a great deal of potential here . The question is
whether we are going to sacrifice those for this ( embargo) policy, which has not succeeded in 50
years.”
Legislation lifting the U.S. travel ban and removing sales of agricultural commodities to Cuba is still
pending. Yet, recent reports from the White House indicate that the Obama administration might be
willing to ease travel restrictions including granting general licenses for students, researchers and
educators — a policy similar to that of the Clinton administration.
Jake Colvin, vice president Global Trade Issues of the NFTC, said they expect the House Foreign Affairs
Committee either to make a decision on the travel ban by the end of this month or put it off until after
midterm elections.
A group of experts from the NFTC, Center for Democracy in the Americas, Rice University and
congressional staff took a four-day trip to Cuba, from July 8 to 12, to explore energy policies. At the
luncheon, they summarized the urgency to invest in Cuba’s oil reserves that has deadlocked because
of the embargo.
Sarah Stephens, executive director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, took the trip. She said
the U.S. should act swiftly with the embargo, particularly because Cuba has begun exploratory drilling,
with her findings indicating that it’s ripe to become a major oil producer and refiner.
Stephens pointed to Repsol, a Spanish oil company that is paying an Italian firm to build an oil rig in
China, which will explore oil off the shores of Cuba by next year. Lisa Margonelli, who directs the New
America Foundation’s Energy Policy Initiative and who accompanied Margonelli to Cuba, agreed that if
these companies are commissioning a “whole rig” it suggests there’s a fair amount of oil.
“Are we looking at lots of discrete pockets that would require one strategy or is there a big thing in
there that could be producing a significant amount of oil in a ten-year time frame?” said Margonelli,
while adding that although two exploratory wells have been drilled in Cuba, the amount of time to
explore a whole field would be five to ten years because of mapping and production.
Although it would take time, experts at the luncheon agreed that th e U.S. should keep a close watch
on Cuba in its effort to improve economic engagement with the world. Saligo added that the benefits
outweigh the cons.
He said Cuba would provide additional energy security , since exports in Canada and Mexico are
decreasing. The island also has the potential to produce sugar cane ethanol, a renewable energy fuel
that is more cost-effective and environmentally sustainable than petroleum.
Saligo said relying on trade exports from Cuba will supplement the U.S. goal to produce 36 billion gallons
of ethanol by 2022 — a requirement of the Energy Dependence and Security Act signed in 2007.
Venezuela, Dubai and Brazil are investing in drilling exploratory wells in Cuba, which has also attracted
attention.
The members at the luncheon are working on compiling a report of their findings in Cuba.
Oil investment KT US-Venezuela relations
American oil investment in Cuba boosts U.S.- Venezuelan relations
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 122)//NG
U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to
improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a
minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium. The United States could provide muchneeded additional investment capital in the development of upstream, downstream, and logistical
resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives, diversifies regional refining
capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional cooperation and integration
modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo
against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions that create commercial and
trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as
it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba. This discussion is intended to help distill
understanding of U.S. strategic energy policy under a set of shifting political and economic
environmental conditions in Cuba and its implications for U.S. foreign policy for the near and long term.
Because the policies can be considered works-in-progress, an understanding of possible outcomes is
important to those crafting future policy and making changes in the policymaking milieu.
AT: Workforce shortages
No workforce shortages
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 120)//NG
The United States and Cuba will have a unique opportunity to employ a highly educated and
competent cadre of Cuban engineers and technicians to work in critical areas of the energy sector. This
will deploy an underused segment of the Cuban workforce, and allow U.S. oil, construction, and
engineering firms to subcontract work to an emerging class of Cuban firms specializing in these areas.
The Cubans have accumulated experience and training from past energy cooperation projects and
exchanges in Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries in the region. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that these contacts and exchanges have been wildly successful because of the Cubans’ high level of
competence and strong work ethic. The Cubans have gained invaluable knowledge and experience
through the operation and construction of energy facilities in collaboration with their joint-venture
partners on the island.
AT: No Cuban oil
Cuba will keep looking for oil- it’s too early to determine nothing is there.
Maffei 12- Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
(Elena,“The Lure of Cuban Energy Independence: One Twist After” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, June
25, 2012,http://www.coha.org/the-lure-of-cuban-energy-independence-one-twist-after-another/)//HA
With the conclusion of the Spanish company’s operations on the island, the Cuban dream for energy
independence could vanish, especially considering that the leased platform Scarabeo 9,is the only one
allowed to operate offshore in the Cuban Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), an area of 112 square
kilometers in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Repsol’s initial plan was to move the platform to a
different location unless another company stepped up to lease the oil rig, at a cost of $150,000 USD per
day. The Spanish company, in consortium with Statoil of Norway and the Indian ONGC, held an option to
drill another well in the waters of the Cuban EEZ. But Brufau was terse in rejecting the arrangement,
stating that the company preferred to concentrate its search for oil in Angola and Brazil.
Unsurprisingly, Cuba does not want to abandon its quest for oil. In an official statement, the Cuban
government affirmed that Repsol’s decision does not eliminate the potential of the Cuban EEZ. He
asserted that the EEZ could eventually become one of the largest reservoirs of oil production worldwide,
given the high estimates regarding the country’s yet to be discovered hydrocarbon reserves. A U.S.
geological survey, for instance, projects a presence of approximately 5 billion barrels in oil reserves in
the country.(1) In light of such figures, this dry well could be considered isolated and not totally
symptomatic. Cuban oil expert at the University of Texas Jorge Piñón affirms that two unprofitable wells
are not indicative of the presence or lack of oil deposits in Cuba.(2)
The press release by the Cuban government clarifies that the exploration will continue and that the
semi-submerged platform Scarabeo 9 (previously utilized by Repsol) has now been moved to the
Catoche 1X sector, located north of the province of Pinar del Rio. The Malaysian oil company Gulf PC is
operating in the new drilling site in cooperation with the Russian company Gazpromneft. Once this
drilling is completed, the Scarabeo 9 will be moved again, this time further to Cabo de San Antonio 1X,
and another round of drilling will likely commence under the supervision of the state-owned Venezuelan
oil company PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela SA), which will hold the master lease on the platform.(3)
Even if they win we can only find reduced amounts of oil, it’s enough to solve the aff.
Sandels 6/25- former professor of history at Quinnipiac University in Connecticut
(Robert, “Oil-Rich Cuba?” Monthly review, June 25, 13, http://monthlyreview.org/2011/09/01/an-oilrich-cuba)//HA
Industry experts are not predicting a Cuban oil bonanza, but finding reserves even at the lower end of
the estimates would make Cuba energy independent, and eventually a net exporter. This would have an
incalculable impact on its economy, and would send the U.S. sanctions policy into the dustbin of
imperial miscalculations. To prevent this from happening, there have been legislative efforts like the
2007 bill offered by former Senator Mel Martinez (R-FL). This would have required the State Department
both to punish executives of foreign companies that cooperated with Cuba by withholding their visas,
and also to fine foreign investors in Cuban oil.1 “Supporting the Castro regime in the development of its
petroleum is detrimental to U.S. policy and our national security,” said Martinez in 2007.
Cuba has 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 13)//NG
Assumption 1: Cuba’s Energy Potential
First, we accept the U.S. Geological Survey’s estimate of Cuban energy potential, as presented in its
analysis of oil reserves in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), located off the north coast of Cuba. These
reserves are estimated to hold 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of liquid natural gas. 27
In assessing Cuban energy capabilities we offer a sectoral data analysis of energy production capabilities
(actual and potential), including the following: upstream oil, upstream and midstream natural gas,
petroleum supply and demand balance, oil marketing and convenience retailing, petrochemicals,
electric power, sugarcane ethanol, and alternative energy resource potentials.
Cuba has huge potential reserves of oil
Piñón and Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Associate Director of UT at Austin Jackson School of Geoscience’s
Center for International Energy and Environmental Policy (CIEEP) AND Ph. D of Political Science,
University of Nebraska (Jorge R. & Jonathan, Cuba's Energy Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,
p. 31)//NG
Cuba will probably have little choice but to develop an energy policy that relies heavily on cleanburning natural gas as its fuel of choice for electrical power generation. Drivers of this necessity are the
inevitable rationalization of the oil-refining industry in Cuba (because of its outdated technology, which
is unable to process heavy crude oil), and the country’s environmentally sensitive tourist industry.
Cuba’s future natural gas needs could be filled by importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Trinidad
and Tobago, which Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic are currently doing, or by future Venezuelan
production. A regasification facility to receive Venezuelan sourced liquid natural gas is currently being
planned for the southern-coast port city of Cienfuegos by Venezuela’s PDVSA and Cupet. Two onemillionton regasification trains are planned for 2012, at a cost of over $400 million. The natural gas is
destined as fuel for that city’s thermoelectric power plant, local industry, and future petrochemical
plants. 20 Cuba’s Deep Water: The Exclusive Economic Zone
The future of Cuba’s oil and gas exploration and production sector could very well be in the
deep offshore Gulf of Mexico waters along the western approaches to the Florida Strait and the eastern
extension of Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula. Cuba’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Gulf of Mexico is a
46,000-square-mile area that Cupet has divided into fifty-nine exploration blocks of approximately 772
square miles each. The average ocean depth is 6,500 feet, but some blocks are as deep as 13,000 feet.
21
Geography of Oil in the Gulf of Mexico The EEZ lies between Mexico, Cuba, and the United
States, within demarcation boundaries agreed to in 1977. The northernmost of the blocks lies south of
the Dry Tortugas, off Florida’s southwest coast. The northwesternmost blocks are situated next to the
Gulf of Mexico’s eastern gap, a sizable portion of the eastern Gulf, west of the Florida EEZ and north of
the Cuban EEZ, for which economic exclusivity rights have not been negotiated, and 100 kilometers from
the southernmost limit of acreage, offered as lease 181 by the U.S. Mineral Management Services, on
the outer continental shelf off Florida’s west coast. Although the maritime boundary agreement
between Cuba and the United States has been submitted to the U.S. Senate, for political reasons— not
because of any objection in the boundary itself— it has not been ratified by that body. Cuba and the
United States have since agreed to provisional application of the agreement, pending ratification, by
exchanging agreement notes every two years that extend the provisional application of the agreement.
The demarcation of the Gulf of Mexico’s eastern gap itself, which will include Cuba, Mexico, and the
United States, is still open for negotiation, and awaits improvements in the diplomatic relations between
Washington and Havana.
A February 2005 U.S. Geological Survey report, “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas
Resources of the North Cuba Basin 2004,” estimates a mean of 4.6 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and
a mean of 9.8 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered natural gas along Cuba’s North Belt Thrust. The highend potential of the North Cuba Basin could be 9.3 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and of 21.8 trillion
cubic feet of undiscovered natural gas, according to the report. 23 If these undiscovered reserves are
certified as recoverable, they will rank Cuba among major Latin American oil producers and exporters
such as Colombia and Ecuador.
Industry experts have categorized Cuba’s EEZ as high risk from the technical geosciences
standpoint— there might not be any oil or gas there— but some reports indicate that some
hydrocarbon potential might exist. Meanwhile, Cuban government sources estimate the potential of the
whole EEZ at an optimistic 20 billion barrels of undiscovered reserves. 24 This figure includes the 5
billion barrels that the U.S. Geological Survey estimates in the Cuba North Belt Thrust, and an additional
15 billion barrels of undiscovered reserves in the North Cuba Foreland Basin, the Florida and Campeche
escarpments, on the shelf margin of the Florida Platform, and in the Gulf of Mexico Sigsbee Basin. Very
little seismic work and exploratory drilling have been done outside of North Cuba’s Fold and Thrust Belt,
the North Cuba Foreland Basin, and the U.S. Geological Survey’s Florida Platform Margin Carbonate
assessments units (AUs). 25 This can be interpreted as meaning that there is a high likelihood of oil and
gas in Cuba’s offshore reserves. Moreover, a basic analysis of the geological formations by Cuban
analysts suggest that the potential for additional reserves is likely.
In most experts’ opinion, a lot of exploratory work has yet to be done to substantiate the highend estimates put forth by Cuban geologists, regardless of the technical soundness of the data
presented in support of their estimate.
Prefer the Cupet study- it uses newer information than USGS
Soligo & Jaffe, 10– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 92-93)//NG
Supply As pointed out earlier, the U.S. Geological Survey has estimated that Cuba has mean
“undiscovered” reserves of 4.6 billion barrels of conventional oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of gas in the
North Cuba Basin. The USGS defines “undiscovered recoverable reserves (crude oil and natural gas)” as
“those economic resources of crude oil and natural gas, yet undiscovered, that are estimated to exist in
favorable geologic settings.” 25 Recovery of these deposits is technically feasible, given current
technology, but not necessarily economically feasible, since feasibility will depend crucially on oil prices
as well as production costs. The USGS develops a probability distribution of these potential reserves. Its
high estimate puts them at 9.3 billion barrels of oil and 21.8 trillion cubic feet of gas. Cupet claims the
country has 20 billion barrels of recoverable oil in its offshore waters, and asserts that the higher
estimate is based on new and better information about Cuba’s geology than that reported by the
USGS.26
Cuba has huge oil potential
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 111-112)//NG
The authors of chapter 2, Jorge R. Piñón and Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, find that there are a number of key issues to consider
regarding the productive capacity of Cuba’s oil and gas resources. First,
Cuba has seen close to $2 billion of direct foreign
investment since 1991 in its upstream oil and natural gas sector, with very good results. Crude oil liquids
production reached a peak level of 65,531 barrels per day in 2003, up from 9,090 barrels per day in
1991. Since 2005 Cuba has seen its crude oil production level off at around 52,000 barrels per day. Second, Cuba’s realized crude
oil value could improve substantially once the country is able to monetize its heavy oil production by
means of its own future heavy oil conversion refinery processing capacity, or to market its crude oil to U.S. Gulf
Coast refining companies. Third, Cuba’s onshore and coastal heavy oil production seems to have
reached a plateau at around 52,000 barrels per day, but once Cupet has access to the services,
technology, equipment, and capital available through independent U.S. oil and oil services and equipment
companies (when the trade embargo is lifted or modified), Cuba’s heavy oil production potential could
grow to an amount in excess of 75,000 barrels a day.
AT: Oil drilling causes the US to lift the embargo
Increased drilling in Cuba causes the US to increase domestic production
Padgett 8-staff writer for Time Magazine
(Tim, “How Cuba's Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo” Time, 8/23/08,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html)//HA
If Cuba really does have 20 billion bbl. to drill, however, it could more easily find other interested
refinery investors, like Brazil. The question is whether the U.S. will want to step off the sidelines and get
a piece of the action too. Kirby Jones, head of the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association and an embargo
opponent, says Tenreyro's staff has been credible in the past, and he believes the new estimate is
probably accurate. "So for the U.S., this becomes an 800-lb. guerrilla knocking on everybody's door,"
says Jones. "With that much oil, there would be the feeling that there's a real [U.S.] price to be paid for
[maintaining] the embargo. It changes Cuba's economic situation drastically and makes the U.S. less
relevant."
Perhaps, but in the short run it's more likely to make the U.S. more determined to do its own offshore
drilling. Vice President Dick Cheney and other Bush Administration officials point to Cuba's petro
fortunes as justification for opening more of America's coastline to oil production. Recent polls in U.S.
coastal states like Florida support that idea, despite environmentalist complaints that both U.S. and
Cuban offshore rigs will foul the Gulf of Mexico. Meanwhile, embargo proponents on Capitol Hill have
sponsored bills that would, among other sanctions, deny visas to the executives of foreign oil companies
that drill oil in Cuba. Their reasoning: the more oil wealth Havana gains, the less incentive it has to
pursue democratic reform.
That last part may well be true. But at the end of the day, U.S.-Cuba relations continue to exist in a Cold
War time warp. As a result, in both Washington and Havana, 20 billion bbl. of oil might not be such a
game changer after all.
US key
Only the US can solve-multiple barriers to other actors
Padgett 8-staff writer for Time Magazine
(Tim, “How Cuba's Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo” Time, 8/23/08,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html)//HA
Still, the concessions so far represent less than a quarter of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to
exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural
difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital,
equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage
in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block
contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says BenjaminAlvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, the only people really able to do it to the extent the
Cubans need are the Americans."
Cuba now produces about 60,000 barrels of oil per day (BPD) and consumes more than 150,000 BPD. (It
also produces natural gas.) Venezuela makes up the difference by shipping almost 100,000 BPD to Cuba.
The University of Miami's Pinon says the more serious issue is refining capacity: even if Cuba has only
the low estimate of 5 billion bbl. — which could yield more than 300,000 BPD — it needs Venezuela's
investment to upgrade refineries like the Soviet-built plant at Cienfuegos. But plummeting crude prices
mean that Chávez may have a lot less wealth to spread around for his petro-diplomacy projects. "Like
the collapse of the Soviet Union," says Pinon, "this kind of thing has always been Cuba's Achilles' heel."
US sanctions mean foreign competitors still can’t transfer the best drilling tech to
Cuba
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 117)//NG
U.S. Involvement in the Cuban Energy Sector The ability of U.S.-based actors to conduct business
in Cuba is another critical factor. The presence of national and international oil companies from Spain,
Venezuela, and Brazil, among others, does not necessarily imply that U.S. firms will be relegated to the
sidelines. In fact, most if not all of these firms rely heavily on first-generation U.S. technology for their
deepwater oil exploration, yet U.S. trade controls forbid the transfer of these technologies to Cuba.
Thus, it stands to reason that the relaxation of these U.S. trade regulations— permitting the transfer of
these technologies, and sales of oil and gas services— are an essential precondition for the creation and
development of the Cuban energy sector.
Advantages
U.S.-Cuba relations
U.S.-Cuba relations low
U.S.-Cuba relations are low and won’t improve in the status quo
Hanson and Lee, 13-Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, the website of the
Council on Foreign Relations. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic
and political development in Africa and Latin America. Lee is the Senior Production Editor of CFR.org
(Stephanie Hanson and Brianna Lee, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1/31/13,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)//TL
Introduction
Cuba has been at odds with the United States since Fidel Castro assumed power in 1959. Successive U.S.
administrations have employed tough measures against the country, including prolonged economic
sanctions and designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, but none have substantially
weakened Castro's rule. In February 2008, longtime president Fidel Castro formally resigned from office,
sixteen months after transferring many powers to his brother Raúl due to illness. Despite stirrings of U.S.
economic interest in Cuba and some policy softening under President Barack Obama, experts say that
normalization of bilateral relations is unlikely in the near to medium term. Tensions between the two
countries peaked with the 2009 arrest of U.S. citizen Alan Gross, who was tried and convicted of
attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a U.S.-sponsored program. Recently, Raúl Castro
has implemented major reforms, including the lifting of fifty-year-old travel restrictions for Cuban
citizens, which, analysts say, are helping the country strengthen ties with its Latin American neighbors.
What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?
They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal
communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been
two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly
enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could
visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were
reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of
these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush
administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to
travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes.
Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to
Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to
the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by
about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012.
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.
Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross,
a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange
Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize
the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was
subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a
positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel Castro have both criticized
the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castro accused the United States of "giving new
breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."
Relations key to counternarcotics
Cuba is a key import route for drug smugglers – geography
UNITED STATES SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL, 12
(“PREVENTING A SECURITY CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN”, Report to Congress, SEPTEMBER 2012,
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=90bb66bc-3371-4898-8415fbfc31c0ed24)//eek
Deepening our counternarcotics relationship with Cuba would meet key national security goals. Just 90
miles from Florida, Cuba has the potential to be a major transshipment point for illicit drugs. Like the
rest of the Caribbean, the island is located between the United States, the world’s largest drugconsuming nation, and South America, the world’s largest drug production zone. According to the State
Department’s 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Cuba’s geographic location “offers
an incentive to drug trafficking organizations to utilize its 5,746 kilometers of coastline and coastal
waters for transshipment operations that avoid U.S. government counter drug patrol vessels and
aircraft.”
The plan solves drug trafficking – allows increased presence, ship-to-ship
communication, and bilateral cooperation
UNITED STATES SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL, 12
(“PREVENTING A SECURITY CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN”, Report to Congress, SEPTEMBER 2012,
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=90bb66bc-3371-4898-8415fbfc31c0ed24)//eek
While overall cooperation between the United States and Cuba is extremely limited, our countries work
very well together on counternarcotics. Since 2000, a Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist has been
posted at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. This individual communicates with the Cuban Border
Guard on specific drug interdiction cases. This limited Coast Guard presence in Cuba has been useful in
carrying out our counternarcotics goals. However, this is just one individual handling a portfolio that
would normally be shared by multiple people and multiple agencies at most U.S. missions abroad. The
State Department’s 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is very clear in stating
the benefits of increased counternarcotics cooperation between the United States and Cuba. It says,
“Greater communication and cooperation among the U.S., its international partners and Cuba,
particularly in the area of real-time tactical information-sharing and improved tactics, techniques and
procedures would likely lead to increased interdictions and disruptions of illegal trafficking.” Like the
2011 INCSR report, the 2012 report suggests that there would be a potential benefit to a U.S. – Cuba
agreement on counternarcotics. The report states: “The Cuban government presented the United States
with a draft bilateral accord for counternarcotics cooperation, which is still under review. Structured
appropriately, such an accord could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken by both
countries.” The Obama Administration should consider taking the following steps to increase our
collaboration with Cuba on counternarcotics: (1)Expand the U.S. Coast Guard and law enforcement
presence at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Additional Coast Guard personnel should be added
along with at least one Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent. A DEA presence should be
accompanied by enhanced case specific information sharing between the DEA and relevant Cuban
agencies. This would be particularly useful on money laundering cases. (2)Establish protocols for direct
ship-to-ship communication between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard. It would be
very useful to have direct ship-to-ship communication between the Coast Guard and the Cuban Border
Guard. This would allow both countries to take quicker action when interdicting drugs. (3)Negotiate a
bilateral counternarcotics agreement with Cuba. The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs has presented
the State Department with a draft bilateral counternarcotics agreement. It would be useful for our two
countries to negotiate such an agreement. As mentioned above, the State Department’s 2011 and 2012
International Narcotics Control Strategy report noted that, “Structured appropriately, such an accord
could advance the counternarcotics efforts undertaken by both countries.” (4)Allow for Cuba’s
participation in the U.S. – Caribbean Security Dialogue: While current law restricts U.S. assistance to
Cuba under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, Cuba should be invited to participate in the annual
U.S. – Caribbean Security Dialogue so that we can better coordinate our counternarcotics efforts.
U.S.-Latin American Relations
U.S.-Latin American Relations low
Now is key – Latin American countries want greater US engagement or they will
transition to China or independence
Valencia, May 20, 2013 – political analyst and contributing writer for Global Voices Online [Robert, “U.S.
and Latin America: Economic Cooperation without Militarization?”, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-and-latin-americaeconomic-cooperation-without-militarization//cc]
In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica and vowed to strengthen economic ties with these two countries and the rest
of Latin America. He pledged
to expand renewable energy development and education initiatives in
recognition of the joined fates of the United States and Latin America. This approach to Latin America is refreshing,
but its impact on the ongoing War on Drugs remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, the United States bears much of the responsibility for the failed
campaign, but the Obama administration has seen that some Latin American countries are taking their own lead in tackling the drug trade and
are increasingly relying less on Washington. The Obama administration, for its part, has
realized that shifting the legendary
treatment of Latin America as the U.S.’ “backyard” to an economic approach would draw Latin America
closer to Washington, especially given the fact that Latin American leaders like Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto and
Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff want to be considered trade partners and not U.S. subordinates.
President Obama’s meeting with Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto centered on the historic economic relationship between the two countries, and furthered
their conversation on economic and commercial initiatives as well as immigration issues. Additionally, Peña Nieto highlighted Mexico’s economic growth and the
necessity for bolstering student exchange. Both leaders agreed to create an economic team led by Vice President Joe Biden and Mexican Secretary of the Treasury
Luis Videgaray. They resolved to create projects to improve infrastructure and security along the 3,000 kilometer-long border, one of the world’s largest.
The issue of security was only briefly discussed during the visit. Obama offered his support in fighting organized crime and curbing any illegal cash flow and gun
trade, as well as measures to reduce drug consumption, but Peña Nieto quickly shifted the conversation back to economic initiatives to avoid thorny issues such as
immigration overhaul and drug violence. Some experts claim Peña Nieto’s aversion to the issue is rooted in his desire to take on violence without U.S. help. Since
1997, the U.S. government has helped Mexican authorities perform a process of vetting officials by way of polygraphs, in order to identify any “rotten apples” that
cooperate with drug kingpins. Many expect to Peña Nieto to change this policy. In addition, Peña Nieto has rejected any U.S. military help.
Mexico’s take on the war on drugs is borne out of desperation for the lack of action by the U.S. to effectively tackle the effects of drug trade. And it very much
resembles Latin America’s approach in the matter. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has called for a sharp break with established policy on
drug criminalization, and has stated that he would not oppose the legalization of narcotics if necessary. Santos’s comments drew support from chiefs of staff from
Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala. Furthermore, the 43rd Assembly of the Organization of American States, which will take place on June 4-6 in Guatemala, is slated to
address alternative goals for combating the drug trade, including prevention and drug treatment, violence reduction, crime-related activities that are connected to
drug consumption, and money laundering.
The lingering question is whether economic cooperation will be able to supplant entrenched security measures in the short term, especially considering how multimillion dollar aid packages have been earmarked for several Latin American nations for decades. Colombia, for example, has received $7 billion in U.S. military and
police aid grants—the largest of any Latin American nation—followed by Mexico with $2 billion since 1996. President Obama’s meeting with seven leaders of
Central American countries and the Dominican Republic in Costa Rica proved more successful in discussing immigration and the drug war than his trip to Mexico.
Latin American countries with smaller economies, conversely, are seeking more cooperation from the United States. El Salvador’s Mauricio Funes said that the
United States should provide more funding to Central America given its greater share of responsibility for combating illicit drug trade.
The new emphasis on economic initiatives between the United States and Latin American countries
represents a welcome break in stale policies. As President Obama pointed out, “the stronger the economies and
the institutions for individuals seeking legitimate careers, the less powerful those narco-trafficking
organizations are going to be.” Furthermore, economic initiatives need not eclipse security strategies, but
rather work in tandem. The White House must take steps to implement economic cooperation as swiftly as possible, including the
addition of including additional Latin American countries into the Trans-Pacific Partnership--a 2005 free trade agreement that includes more
Asian countries--and encouraging more student exchange programs between the U.S. and Latin America. At present, only 40,000 Latin
Americans are studying in the U.S., a far cry from the 100,000 slots Obama promised to open this year.
Since the George W.Bush administration, the
U.S. has seen its clout wane on the realms of diplomacy and Latin
America’s decision-making as the leftist wave rose among several Latin American countries, while the region
sought to integrate more and more by way of economic and diplomatic blocs like UNASUR and CELAC. If Obama’s words are not
consequent with immediate actions in the next couple of months or years and does not take Latin
America as a serious trade partner (which hasn’t been the case in previous administrations due to the Latin America-is-ourbackyard mentality), the U.S. will continue to lose leverage on important issues that concern Latin America,
and in turn Latin American countries will forge ahead with economic and security integration amongst
themselves.
US-Latin American relations are low and declining
Hakim, 2013 [Peter, “Post Chavez: Can U.S. rebuild Latin American ties?”, March 27, 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2013/03/27/post-chavez-can-u-s-rebuild-latin-american-ties//cc]
The funeral of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez earlier this month was a massive celebration of a
vitriolic foe of the United States. This tribute should make Washington take a fresh look not only at its
relations with Venezuela but also with all of Latin America.
Virtually every Latin American country sent a high-level delegation to show its esteem for Chavez, who,
during his 14 years in office, regularly vilified the United States, disparaged its leaders and campaigned
tirelessly to end the U.S. role in the region. The presidents of Latin America’s six largest nations —
including the closest U.S. regional allies, Mexico, Colombia and Chile — traveled to Caracas for the burial
ceremonies. Never in Latin America, as many commentators noted, has a deceased leader been given a
grander memorial — not even Argentina’s adored Juan Domingo Peron back in 1974.
This extraordinary acclaim for Washington’s most virulent adversary in the Americas was probably not
intended as a deliberate snub. There were other reasons that so many of Washington’s friends ended up
applauding a committed antagonist of the United States.
Some leaders, concerned with politics back home, were seeking to appeal to constituencies on the left,
who idolized Chavez. Some who have benefited from the financial largesse distributed by the president
of oil rich-Venezuela are eager for his successor to continue that support. Still others were reluctant to
stand apart or isolate themselves from their neighbors — so they became part of the crowd.
Yet the fanfare accompanying Chavez’s funeral suggests a troubling degree of indifference to the United
States in Latin America — as if Washington no longer counted.
Aside from his ability to hold onto power and sustain the devotion of so many Venezuelans, Chavez’s accomplishments hardly warranted this
level of attention. His autocratic rule and reckless spending merit no praise from Latin America’s democratic and fiscally responsible leaders.
Make no mistake, however, the foreign leaders came mostly to praise Chavez, not just to bury him.
To be sure, after his presidency, Venezuelans are considerably less poor and unequal than when he came to power in 1999 — though many
other Latin American nations did the same, or better, than Venezuela in this period. They achieved this without a huge oil windfall and without
pushing the economy toward shambles and undoing the country’s democratic and civil institutions.
Chavez does, though, deserve credit for Petrocaribe, a program that supplied discounted oil (and low-interest loans to buy oil) to poor and
energy-deficient countries in Central America and the Caribbean. Cuba got the largest subsidy — some $4 billion to $6 billion a year — without
which the island might today be facing a humanitarian crisis. But 13 other nations, some in great need, were also assisted — and are grateful.
This is the kind of aid program that Washington should consider emulating for the region’s low-income countries.
The Chavez funeral is not the only reason for unease about Washington’s relations with Latin America.
Two months ago, Cuban ruler Raul Castro, another determined U.S. adversary, was elected to head the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC), a new organization that includes every
nation in the Western Hemisphere — except the United States and Canada. Next year’s meeting is
scheduled to be in Havana, though CELAC’s charter requires that members be governed democratically.
At the 2012 meeting of the Summit of the Americas (every country of the hemisphere except Cuba), the
discussion, despite Washington’s objections, focused on two topics: drug policy and Cuba. Both are
sources of long-standing tension between the United States and Latin America. The assembled Latin
American heads of state closed the meeting by warning Washington that, unless Cuba is included in
future summits, they would no longer participate.
The problem is not that Latin America has retreated from democratic rule. Though democratic
governance has deteriorated in some countries, it is still the overwhelming regional norm ‑ and getting
stronger in many places. The commitment of Latin Americans to democracy. however, now largely
applies to their own countries. What they have given up on is the idea of collectively defending
democratic practice in countries other than their own. Regional solidarity is now a higher priority than
democracy, a reflection of the many ideological and political differences among Latin American nations.
Current US-Latin American engagement is low – because Obama is perceived as
focusing on regime change
Lehmann 13 (Catalina, “Officials: Obama Has Yet To Improve U.S.-Latin America Relations”, TRNS, May
30, 2013, http://www.talkradionews.com/us/2013/05/30/officials-obama-has-yet-to-improve-u-s-latinamerica-relations.html#.Ucsv4PnnsnE)
Latin America, particularly South America, has experienced unprecedented political change in the past
15 years said officials who discussed the issue during a briefing held by the Center for Economic Policy
and Research. The briefing analyzed how the Obama administration has responded to the region’s
leftward shifting of political dynamics.
In the past, during the Bush administration, efforts were made to isolate and suppress left-leaning
political movements in Latin America, said the officials.
When President George W. Bush attended the Summit of the Americas in Argentina, his lecture was
received with protests against his administration’s polices. When President Barak Obama attended the
Summit in Columbia, he spoke about the need for “equal partnerships” and “a new chapter of
engagement” with the countries that make up Latin America. Leaders such as President Hugo Chavez
had a new sense of hope instilled after President Obama’s remarks, said CEPR Co-Director Mark
Weisbrot.
“When Latin America’s left presidents watched the campaign of Barack Obama for president in 2008,
they thought that they might finally see a U.S. president who would change Washington’s foreign policy
in the region,” said Weisbrot.
However, panelists claimed that up to this point in time, little has been done to improve U.S.-Latin
America relations. “The Obama administration, like that of President Bush, does not accept that the
region has changed, Weisbrot stated. “That goal is to get rid of all of the left-of-center governments,
partly because they tend to be more independent from Washington.”
Relations low now – Maduro election proves relations won’t improve anytime soon
Boniface and Azpuru 13 (Dexter, Chair of the Americas and Associate Professor of Political Science at
Rollins College, and Dinorah, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, “U.S.Latin America Relations in the Post-Chávez Era”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, March 26,
2013)//WNM
One of the first issues to consider, though too often forgotten, is history. The United States and Latin
America have long had a rocky relationship, and Chávez was not the first leader to express his disgust at
the influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, while anti-Americanism has long
been a staple of the left in Latin America, even conservative elites have historically resented and resisted
imposition from Washington. Distrust of the United States remains extensive in several countries in the
region—and not only in countries where the president is an outspoken critic of the United States. For
example, 2012 survey data from the AmericasBarometer demonstrates that in countries such as
Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay, over forty percent of the population does not trust the U.S.
government, though distrust is low in Central America and the Caribbean (see chart below).
Although the torch of anti-Americanism will not automatically be transferred from Chávez to one of the
other ALBA presidents (Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, Ortega in Nicaragua, or Raúl Castro in
Cuba), these presidents are not likely to soften their anti-American discourse anytime soon. In fact, they
will likely continue to exploit anti-American sentiments as part of what appears to be a highly effective
domestic political strategy. Furthermore, if acting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is elected next
month (as polls currently predict), his recent allegations that Chávez was infected with cancer by
“imperialist” enemies certainly do not bode well for an improved relationship with the United States.
Cuba key to U.S.-Latin America
Cuba is the number one issue in U.S.-Latin American relations
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to
the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba
relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the
ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also
involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately
high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world
issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who
generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to
constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a
healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former
should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.
Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more
serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are
slim, the threat is nevertheless real. If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war,
face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a massive migration to
Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can
help prevent these nightmare scenarios from materializing.
There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it will face additional
difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To address the issues confronting the United
States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington
must restore its heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader.
Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy
and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are suggestions
that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's
greatness is its ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace
not only America's uncanny ability to reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so
great to begin with.
Increasing engagement with Cuba is key to US-Latin American relations
Doherty 8 – deputy director of the National Security Studies Program and director of the Smart
Strategy Initiative (Patrick C, “An Obama Policy for Cuba,” 12/12/8,
http://newamerica.net/node/8668)//SJF
With his national security team in place, President-elect Barack Obama's
foreign policy principals will be immediately
struck by how many complex and expensive challenges they will face. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Israel-Palestine and Russia, will all require enormous energy, all the tools in our foreign policy toolbox,
and will all take years to resolve, if they can be resolved. None of these crises will allow President Obama to signal
swiftly to the world the kind of changes he proposes in American foreign policy. In contrast, U.S.-Cuba
policy is low-hanging fruit: though of marginal importance domestically, it could be changed immediately at little
cost.
At present, that
policy is a major black spot on America's international reputation. For the rest of the world,
our failed, obsolete and 50-year old policy toward Cuba goes against everything that Obama campaigned for, and
the recent 185-3 U.N. vote to condemn the centerpiece of that policy, the embargo – the 16th such vote in as many years –
makes that clear. The entire world believes our policy is wrong.
And the world is right. The fact is that since Cuba stopped exporting revolution and started exporting doctors and nurses, it ceased being a
national security concern for the United States. And yet we restrict travel to the island - unconstitutionally - and constrain Cuban-Americans in
the amount of money they can send to their families on the island. Moreover, the economic embargo hurts the Cuban people more than the
Cuban leadership, and our Helms-Burton legislation imposes Washington's will on foreign businesses who wish to trade with Cuba, creating ill
will in business communities from Canada to Brazil.
Our Cuba policy is also an obstacle to striking a new relationship with the nations of Latin America. Any
21st-century policy toward Latin America will have to shift from the Cold War-era emphasis on right-wing governments and top-down
economic adjustment to creating a
hemispheric partnership to address many critical issues: the revival of militant
leftism, the twin challenges of sustainability and inclusive economic growth, and the rising hemispheric
influence of Russia and China. But until Washington ends the extraordinary sanctions that comprise the
Cuba embargo, Latin America will remain at arms-length, and the problems in our backyard - Hugo Chavez, drugs,
immigration, energy insecurity - will simply fester.
The November elections shattered the old political constraints on Cuba policy. It used to be that Cuba policy was controlled by the CubanAmerican community in South Florida. It had been gospel that to win Florida's 27 electoral votes a candidate for president had to win the
Cuban-American vote. What was once gospel is now history. President-elect Obama won Florida with only 35 percent of the Cuban-American
vote.
Obama now needs his own policy, not a retread of past failure. We see three important elements of such a policy.
First, Obama should call on Congress to end the travel ban on all Americans for any purpose. This action not only restores Americans'
constitutional rights, it also unleashes the greatest ambassadors of democracy and free markets, the American people.
Second, Obama should call on the Congress to repeal two aspects of the Helms-Burton act to restore the Constitution's separation of powers
and to end the disruptive use of extra-territorial sanctions.
Finally, Obama must sign an executive order to meet the urgent needs of the hundreds of thousands of Cuban people who were affected by a
record four hurricanes this season. The Cuban people are suffering and even the wives of jailed political dissidents, in an October
teleconference with first lady Laura Bush and Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, pleaded for the United States to lift the embargo for
humanitarian reasons. This can be done. But since the Cuban government will not accept traditional disaster assistance, the new president
must use his "notwithstanding" authority enshrined in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to lift the embargo for 180 days and allow Cuba to
purchase civilian items with cash or credit on the American market. Such an action will instill immediate good will among the Cuban people.
With these three objectives accomplished, Cuba policy will once again be back in the hands of the executive branch, which can begin a
deliberate process of negotiations to normalize relations. While some will say such a policy amounts to "free concessions" to the Castro
brothers, we look at it differently. Fidel and Raul Castro are at death's door. Change
is coming. Everyone seems to realize it
but the United States. A new, decisive policy toward Cuba, wrought by the new "change" president, will
send a clear signal to the world that America is back. Moreover, such change will liberate U.S. relations
with Latin America and open the door to dealing effectively with our own hemisphere's many
challenges.
US Cuba policy undermines its ability to cooperate with Latin America generally
Cárdenas et al 2008 – Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative
[Mauricio, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World: Report of the Partnership for the
Americas Commission”, The Brookings Institution, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.
pdf//cc]
U.S.-Cuban relations have disproportionately dominated U.S. policy toward the LAC region for years. Tensions
generated by U.S.
policies toward Cuba have affected the United States’ image in the region and have hindered Washington’s
ability to work constructively with other countries. For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has
implications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the rest of the LAC
region more generally. Political change in Washington, combined with recent demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American
community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer a valuable opportunity to change course.
US-Cuba relations are key to Latin American relations – summits, CELAC, and
symbolism
Thale and Boggs, 13 – a Program director and a Program officer at WOLA (Geoff and Clay, “Cuba and
the Terrorist List", 5 Mar 2013, http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_and_the_terrorist_list)//eek
More broadly, the U.S. approach toward Cuba, which is exemplified by Cuba’s designation as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism, hurts the U.S. image in Latin America. In recent years, Latin American leaders have
publicly questioned U.S. policy toward Cuba. At the most recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena,
Colombia, Latin American presidents across the political spectrum challenged President Obama on a
number of issues, including Cuba’s participation in the Summit of the Americas and drug policy. It is also
striking that Cuba is the pro tempore president of CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y
Caribeños), the new regional forum that includes all of the countries of the hemisphere, except Canada
and the United States. The changed geopolitical landscape—and the symbolic importance that U.S.
policy toward Cuba continues to hold for the Latin American public and elite opinion—makes it clear
that policy change toward Cuba would improve the U.S. image in the hemisphere.
AT: Hege key to relations
Hegemony won’t solve Latin American relations, only new cooperation
Barshefsky and Hill 08 (Charlene and James T., Chairs on The Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Latin
America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, PDF)//WNM
For over 150 years, the Monroe Doctrine provided the guiding principles for U.S. policy toward Latin
America, asserting U.S. primacy in the foreign affairs of the region. Over the past two decades, those
principles have become increasingly obsolete. Washington’s basic policy framework, however, has not
changed sufficiently to reflect the new reality. U.S. policy can no longer be based on the assumption that
the United States is the most important outside actor in Latin America. If there was an era of U.S.
hegemony in Latin America, it is over. In most respects, this shift reflects positive developments within
LatinAmerica itself. The region has undergone a historic transformation politically, with militaryauthoritarian rule giving way to vibrant, if imperfect, democracy in almost every nation. Economically,
Latin America is now one of the more open market regions in the world and a crucial global provider of
energy, minerals, and food. None of this is to say that Latin America has entirely overcome its history of
political tumult or done enough to alleviate poverty, improve competitiveness and human capital, or
correct extreme inequality. But it does mean that U.S. policymakers must change the way they think
about the region. Latin America is not Washington’s to lose; nor is it Washington’s to save. Latin
America’s fate is largely in Latin America’s hands. A failure to acknowledge how Latin Americans define
their own challenges has created new political strains in recent years. It has also caused U.S.
policymakers to overlook the ways in which the United States can meaningfully contribute to Latin
America’s progress—furthering the United States’ own interests in the process. By truly beginning to
engage Latin America on its own terms, Washington can mark the start of a new era in U.S.-Latin
America relations.
Relations good - Laundry List
Stable partnerships key to accessing multiple impacts – safeguards on nuclear prolif,
coordination on climate change, and increased markets
Cárdenas et al 2008 – Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative
[Mauricio, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World: Report of the Partnership for the
Americas Commission”, The Brookings Institution, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.
pdf//cc]
If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms
of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the
region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted
more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation
to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather
than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United
States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the
countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new
markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.
It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The
asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a
type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner
country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits.
Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the
key challenges faced by
as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and
adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so
complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country.
Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake
in the future.
the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such
For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be
regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat
posed by these networks can only
be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries,
all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The
process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting
societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from
developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among
the hemisphere’s countries.
Increased relations and cooperation foster a laundry list of positive things for both
regions
Lowenthal 2008 – Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California [Abraham,
“Toward Improving Cooperation in the Americas”, May,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/latin%20america/cooperation_lowenthal//cc]
But although the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean pose no urgent issues for the United
States, they will be increasingly important to the U.S. future, not as areas of dramatic crisis but in a
quotidian way. In fact, Latin America is one of the world regions with the greatest impact on the daily
lives of U.S. citizens. This is true for four main reasons, different from the hoary axioms often cited
about Western Hemisphere security, extra-hemispheric threats and Pan-American solidarity often cited
in the past.
Latin America matters to the United States today, and will matter even more tomorrow, because of:
• Transnational issues that neither the United States nor any Latin American nation can successfully
handle by itself, without close and sustained cooperation from regional partners. These include energy
security, global warming, pollution and other environmental issues, narcotics, crime and public
health.
• Demographic interdependence, arising from massive and sustained migration that has blurred the
borders between the United States and its closest neighbors and given rise to complex “intermestic”
issues—those with 2both international and domestic facets—ranging from education to health care,
remittances to drivers’ licenses, youth gangs to portable retirement pensions.
• Its economic importance to the United States, both as a prime source of energy and other key
resources vital for the U.S. economy and as a priority market for the export of U.S. goods and services.
The United States obtains over half of its energy imports from countries of the Western Hemisphere and
exports $225 billion a year in goods to Latin America, four times more than current U.S. exports to
China. U.S. firms have, but need to sustain, a competitive advantage in Latin American markets arising
from proximity and familiarity plus cultural and demographic ties.
• And shared values, particularly fundamental human rights, including the rights of free political
expression, effective democratic governance and consistent application of the rule of law. The American
people intuit that these core values cannot prevail internationally if they do not succeed in the Western
Hemisphere. At a time when the very difficult experiences in Iraq and elsewhere are discouraging many
Americans about the prospects for expanding the influence of U.S. ideals internationally, the shared
commitment throughout the Americas to the norms of democratic governance and the rule of law
should be increasingly recognized as important.
Relations with Latin America are beneficial to solve for nuclear proliferation, warming,
democracy and human rights
Inter-American Dialogue 12 (“Remaking the Relationship The United States and Latin America”, the
Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on
issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties.
Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with
improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources . Even with its
current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of
capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the
region’s economic performance . For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become
more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future.
The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by
more cooperation on such global matters as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy
and human rights. With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural
and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating
pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership.
Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin
America remain disappointing. If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift
apart. The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild
vigorous cooperation. Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both from the United States and
from Latin America and the Caribbean.
Improving US-Latin American relations through regionalism can boost the economy,
democracy, solve poverty and end drug trafficking
Barshefsky and Hill 08 (Charlene and James T., Chairs on The Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Latin
America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, PDF)//WNM
Likewise, the focus of U.S. security resources on drug eradication and interdiction has done little to
address the underlying factors that drive drug production, trafficking, and consumption. After many
years and billions of dollars, U.S. policy has been relatively ineffective in reducing either the supply of or
demand for drugs, while public insecurity in Latin America has increased sharply. Crime and violence
now rank as two of the most critical threats across much of the region. The United States cannot solve
these problems, but it can help strengthen public institutions and bolster Latin American initiatives to
deal with them. U.S. interests will benefit from explicitly recognizing these deep-rooted challenges and
working more closely with the private sector, civil society, multilateral institutions, and Latin American
governments to address them. The Task Force finds that strong institutions designed to reduce poverty
and inequality and improve citizen security are necessary for Latin American citizens as well as for the
realization of core U.S. objectives in the region—democratization, economic growth, and drug control.
While strengthening institutions is first and foremost an issue for Latin American governments to
address, the United States can play a role by assisting in targeted ways.
Nearly eighteen million Latin American migrants, legal and illegal, now live in the United States, and the
pace of migration—driven largely by the lack of economic opportunity at home—has accelerated in the
last twenty years, despite U.S. immigration policies officially designed to thwart it. Substantial
percentages of the populations of Mexico and many Central American and Caribbean countries reside
and work in the United States; transnational ties formed by individuals and communities constitute de
facto U.S.-Latin America integration.
The increasing importance of energy resources has further deepened U.S.-Latin America ties, while
heightening anxiety over growing ‘‘resource nationalism’’ in countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Ecuador. Latin America already supplies more oil to the United States than does the Middle East, and
the region has great potential to be a major provider of alternative fuel sources, increasing U.S. and
regional energy security through diversification. The Task Force finds that the issues of migration and
energy security represent not only policy challenges, but also opportunities for the United States and for
deepening U.S.-Latin America ties. The United States can play a positive role in the development of Latin
America’s traditional and alternative energy markets, enhancing U.S. energy security in the process,
while a true reform of immigration policy would bring economic benefits and, through cooperation,
enhanced border security for the United States and Latin America alike.
While many policy concerns span the hemisphere, attention to particular bilateral relations is also in
order. Although all the countries in Latin America present unique challenges and opportunities, the Task
Force focuses on the complex bilateral relations with four nations: Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba.
The Task Force believes that deepening strategic relationships with Brazil and Mexico, and reformulating
diplomatic efforts with Venezuela and Cuba, will not only establish more fruitful interactions with these
countries but will also positively transform broader U.S.-Latin America relations.
The realities of poverty and inequality, public security, human mobility, and energy require a more
fulsome approach toward Latin America, one that recognizes urgency as well as the primacy of Latin
American governments in these efforts. The limits on U.S. policy are equally clear, as these four areas
demand concerted efforts by local, state, national, and international governments; the private sector;
civil society organizations; and multilateral institutions. As importantly, these issues present real
opportunities to engage Latin American countries as partners on problems of mutual concern. This
expanded policy framework, combined with greater attention to strategic regional partnerships, will
provide a more effective foundation for U.S. policy goals—stability, security, and ultimately prosperity
for the United States and for its neighbors.
Relations good – US leadership
US-Latin American relations are vital to US global leadership
Sabatini and Berger 2012 – editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at
AS/COA, policy associate at the AS/COA [Christopher and Ryan, “Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America”, June 13th,
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america//cc]
Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called Latin America “a region on the move,” one that is “more important to
the prosperity and security of the United States than ever before.”
Somebody forgot to tell the Washington brain trust.
The Center for a New American Security, a respected national security think tank a half-mile from the White House, recently released a new
series of policy recommendations for the next presidential administration. The 70-page “grand strategy” report only contained a short
paragraph on Brazil and made only one passing reference to Latin America.
Yes, we get it. The
relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other
developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of
political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting
international norms and regional stability.
But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande goes to the
heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it.
Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations:
1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies.
Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S. when it comes to matters
of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention.
Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its
official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.”
At a time of (perceived) declining U.S. influence, it’s
important that America deepens its ties with regional allies that
might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats
on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the
U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them.
If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda.
Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights.
2. Latin America is becoming more international.
It’s time to understand that the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America.
For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate, politically and strategically, from the rest
of the world. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia
free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region.
It’s also clear that countries such as Brazil and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in the region and even on the world
forum.
The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for
the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward
southern neighbors such as Cuba.
3. There are security and strategic risks in the region.
Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials
have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border.
FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government.
At the same time, gangs,
narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central
America.
In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and
increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa
Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states
are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and
violence that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north.
Good Relations are critical for the United States’s soft power
Rabasa 2010 – Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation [Angel,
“Challenges to Security in the Hemisphere”,
August 4, https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Rabasa_Security.pdf//cc]
Overview of U.S. Interests in Latin America
The United States has major strategic interests at stake in Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S.
regional security interests include maintaining U.S. leadership in the region; preventing the
emergence of hostile powers; consolidation of democracy; expansion of open and free markets;
peaceful settlement of disputes; transparency in arms acquisitions; development of security and
confidence-building measures; and effective regional cooperation on transnational problems such
as terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and illegal migration. Historically, a secure and
friendly Latin America provided strategic depth and enabled the United States to concentrate its
economic and military resources to confront adversaries and promote its interests in more distant
parts of the world.
Because of Latin America’s proximity and close ties to the United States, the potential for
spillover of problems in Latin American countries is particularly severe. The management of
these issues has come to dominate the U.S. bilateral agenda with Mexico and the Caribbeanbasin
countries. The closer ties fostered by closer integration have rendered the United States
even more sensitive to developments beyond its borders and increased its stake in political
stability in the region.
This paper focuses on the leading challenges to U.S. interests in Latin America. These include
the impact on the regional security environment of the ongoing drug war in Mexico, the
emergence of Brazil as a major regional power, the rise of neo-populist authoritarian regimes and
movements in Venezuela and other South and Central American countries, the intrusion into the
hemisphere of extra-continental powers such as Iran and Russia, the ongoing transition in
Colombia from a counter-insurgency (COIN) to a post-COIN status, the evolution and new
modalities of the transnational illegal drug trade and energy security.
Relations good – democracy
Cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America fosters sustainable growth, democracy,
rule of law, and human rights
Goodman, May 24, 2013 – President of the Institute of International Education [Allan E, “Cooperation is Key to
Growth for Latin America”, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/opinion/1464//cc]
On a recent visit to Latin America, it was increasingly clear to me that policymakers in
both the public and private sector are
committed to investing in higher education to develop their workforce and future leaders.
Learning, research, institution-building, and community engagement have become top priorities for
many governments across Latin America in the past ten years, and an emphasis on international study
as a means to advance national economic growth has been one of the keys to achieving these priorities.
The Institute of International Education has been involved in many of these developments over the years, beginning with establishing a Latin
America Division at our New York headquarters in the 1930, and then through our Latin America regional office in Mexico City since 1974. Chief
among the programs managed by IIE beginning in the 1970s was the ITT International Fellowship Program, which served as an exemplary model
of corporate involvement in international educational exchange for 17 years.
Over the years, the Institute’s work in the Western Hemisphere has grown to include a number of dynamic initiatives related to higher
education, scholarship, and fellowship programs, promoting study abroad, workforce and professional development, institutional partnership
building, educational advising, and English language testing.
We have launched partnerships with a number of organizations and government agencies to build global
talent in Latin America to undertake new research, develop strategic higher education links, and engage
leaders in dialogue on the role of higher education institutions as incubators of innovation, workforce
development, and international discourse. We have seen firsthand the tremendously positive impact of
these initiatives over time, through our work with the Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program, the Inter-American
Foundation Grassroots Development Program, the GE Foundation Scholar Leaders Program, the U.S. Department of State’s Fulbright Student
and Scholar Program and Humphrey Fellowships, and now with the Government of Brazil’s new Scientific Mobility Program.
A new book published by IIE this spring, Latin America’s New Knowledge Economy: Higher Education, Government, and International
Collaboration, offers views from regional experts on the policies, institutions and programs that have helped bring about impressive growth and
change.
Changing paradigms in Latin America’s higher education system, as well as demographic shifts in the United States, have led to an increase in
educational exchange opportunities between the two regions.
In the United States, the Obama administration has
made it a priority to expand academic exchanges between Latin
America and the United States. The U. S. government is working with foreign governments, universities and colleges, and the private sector to
reach the goal of “100,000 Strong in the Americas” to increase the flow of students between Latin American and the Caribbean and the United States to 100,000 in
each direction. The most recent data in Open Doors report, published by IIE in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs, shows that 64,021 students from the region studied in the United States and 39,871 students from the U.S. studied abroad in Latin America and the
Caribbean. As described in a chapter on Western Hemisphere Academic Exchanges by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Meghann Curtis and Policy Adviser Lisa
Kraus at the U.S. Department of State, “Strong
partnerships in the region are critical to both U.S. domestic and global
strategic interests.” The authors note that science and technology innovations have accelerated through
cooperative partnerships and are key to shared sustainable growth, and that working collaboratively
across borders in the region is necessary to attain energy security and to combat transnational crime
and narcotrafficking, as well as to support the global effort to promote democracy, rule of law, social
inclusion and human rights around the world. “At the center of these partnerships—and U.S. strategy in the region—are educational
exchanges, which help us establish a strong foundation for empowering the best innovators, entrepreneurs, and leaders of today to meet all these challenges.”
Relations good – US economy
Latin American cooperation key to U.S. competitiveness and economic growth
Noriega 2012 – visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute [Roger, “Latin America is crucial to US
competitiveness”, October 22, http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness//cc]
A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. However, the US
economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US
leadership in the region. Although
access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic
benefits is valued in most countries in the region, the United States is not the only partner to choose
from– with China’s influence growing.
The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal
responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.
The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal
narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s
petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges.
Alongside a positive economic engagement, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable
obligation to US security and regional leadership.
Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration
An aggressive trade promotion and foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives.
Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies,
liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall. Since
2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American
income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle
class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability
generates even greater opportunities for US business.
Already the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil, one-third of the world’s
natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering
tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies. Three of the United
States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.
The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities.
Improving US-Latin American relations is vital to sustaining US economic growth
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Expanded trade, investment, and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust US-Latin
American relations. Independent of government policies, these areas have seen tremendous growth and
development, driven chiefly by the private sector. The US government needs to better appreciate the
rising importance of Latin America—with its expanding markets for US exports, burgeoning
opportunities for US investments, enormous reserves of energy and minerals, and continuing supply of
needed labor—for the longer term performance of the US economy.
With Brazil and many other Latin American economies thriving and showing promise for sustained rapid
growth and rising incomes, the search for economic opportunities has become the main force shaping
relationships in the hemisphere . Intensive economic engagement by the United States may be the best
foundation for wider partnerships across many issues as well as the best way to energize currently
listless US relations with the region.
What Latin America’s largely middle and upper middle income countries— and their increasingly middle
class populations—most want and need from the United States is access to its $16-trillion-a-year
economy, which is more than three times the region’s economies combined . Most Latin American
nations experienced quicker recovery from the financial crisis than did the United States, and they are
growing at a faster pace . Nonetheless, they depend on US capital for investment, US markets for their
exports, and US technology and managerial innovation to lift productivity . They also rely on the steady
remittances from their citizens in the United States.
The United States currently buys about 40 percent of Latin America’s exports and an even higher
percentage of its manufactured products . It remains the first or second commercial partner for nearly
every country in the region . And it provides nearly 40 percent of foreign investment and upwards of 90
percent of the $60 billion or so in remittance income that goes to Latin America.
US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years . Just a decade ago, 55
percent of the region’s imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less
than one-third of Latin America’s imports . China and Europe have made huge inroads . China’s share of
trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States; it is a close second in Argentina
and Colombia . Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade much more among themselves .
Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazil’s second largest trading partner,
just behind China .
Still, these changes must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the Latin American market has
diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace .They have more than
doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US exports
worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin America’s growth
continues to be strong . But the United States will have to work harder and harder to compete for the
region’s markets and resources.
While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the region’s expanding
economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability. Today the United States
exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to China;
and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia.
Even a cursory examination of the numbers points to how much the United States depends on the
region for oil and minerals. Latin America accounts for a third of US oil imports. Mexico is the secondbiggest supplier after Canada . Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia sit among the top dozen, and imports
from Brazil are poised to rise sharply with its recent offshore discoveries. Within a decade, Brazil and
Mexico may be two of the three largest suppliers of oil to the United States. The potential for
heightened energy cooperation in the Americas is huge, with wide-ranging ramifications for economic
well-being and climate change.
Latin America is an important destination for US direct and portfolio investments, absorbing each year
about eight percent of all US overseas investment. At the same time, Latin American investment in the
United States is growing fast . And no economic calculus should omit the vital value to the US economy
of immigrant workers; US agriculture and construction industries are heavily dependent on them. These
workers, mostly from Latin America, will drive the bulk of US labor force growth in the next decade and
are important elements in keeping social security solvent over the longer term.
Despite the growing competition for Latin America’s markets and resources, the United States retains
some powerful advantages in Latin America, notably geographic proximity, a dense web of commercial
connections, and a large Latino population . Nonetheless, it has to be more forward looking and
strategic than in recent years, at the same time demonstrating that it is a dependable business partner.
High Relations provide a backstop to economic collapse – partnerships between
countries will drive recovery
Cárdenas et al 2008 – Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative
[Mauricio, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World: Report of the Partnership for the
Americas Commission”, The Brookings Institution, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.
pdf//cc]
The Growing Need for Partnership in the Western Hemisphere In comparison with the nations of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) rarely grab newspaper headlines in the United States. Yet the
LAC region has a
very significant impact on the daily lives of those who live in the United States. More than 30 percent of U.S. oil
imports come from Latin America—more than from any other region, including the Middle East. Over half of the U.S.
foreign-born population is from the LAC region. These immigrants and their offspring make up a large and growing
part of the U.S. labor force, and they are fast becoming an integral part of American society, politics, and culture.
When economic or natural disasters strike the LAC region, the United States is often the first port of call for emigrants and refugees. The LAC
countries buy a fifth of all the United States’ exports and supply a fifth of its imports. Finally, the United
States and most of the LAC countries share fundamental values and ideals—including a belief in
democracy, a market economy, secular government, and civil and human rights.
The advent of a new administration in Washington opens the door to a fresh look at this increasingly interdependent relationship. This report is
also particularly timely in the context of the
current financial crisis, which is having profound regional as well as global
implications. The events of recent months have demonstrated that the Western Hemisphere’s countries remain
interdependent; developments in U.S. financial markets are rapidly reflected in the LAC region. Stock
prices across the region have declined, currencies have weakened, and the cost of funds for
governments and corporations has increased. The real economy has suffered as well, and growth
forecasts for the region have been revised downward, especially for those countries that rely more heavily on trade and
remittance flows from the United States, such as Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean nations. In response, the United
States has approved $30 billion in currency swaps for each Mexico and Brazil to help them stabilize their currencies and meet immediate debt
obligations, and the International Monetary Fund has nearly doubled its limit on loans to developing countries.
Most observers believe that the
countries of the LAC region are better prepared to weather the current global
financial crisis than past episodes of financial turmoil. The region’s current account deficit is small, inflation is
under control in most economies, and fiscal conditions have generally improved. The region has also benefited
from high commodity prices and large capital inflows. Several countries have amassed sizable international reserves. But the region is not
immune from the crisis. Its countries could suffer from a sharp decline in commodity prices, as well as from a
reduction in capital flows from advanced economies. Also, leading international banks—which have a strong presence in the region
and are key players in financial intermediation—could act as transmission lines for external shocks.
As the crisis unfolds, Latin
America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of
will play
a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the
crisis. Conversely, if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may
more than 3 percent a year—as the International Monetary Fund currently projects—even in a weak global economy, its countries
worsen and could potentially spill across borders. For the United States, coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a
major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications.
Latin America is a key factor in the US economy – Oil, manufacturing and exports
prove
Cardenas 11 – Senior Fellow and Director of the Latin America Initiative at Brookings Institution
(Mauricio, “Think Again: Latin America”, Foreign Policy, MARCH 17, 2011
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=0,4)//WNM
"Resurgent Latin America is a Threat to U.S. Interests."
Quite the opposite. Listen to some of the rhetoric in Washington and you would think that Latin America
only impacts the U.S. economy by sucking away manufacturing jobs and flooding the country with illegal
immigrants. The truth is that U.S. economic interests are more entwined with those of its southern
neighbors than ever. This is an overwhelmingly positive development.
For instance, U.S. oil imports from Latin America are larger than those from the Middle East. Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait combined make up only 20 percent of U.S. oil imports. Latin American countries
-- specifically Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago -- account for one third
of U.S imports. For the United States, assuring a stable oil supply from its Latin American neighbors
should be no less important than preserving stability in the Middle East.
Also, the Latin American consumer market is by no means irrelevant for U.S. companies. The region's
GDP is $4.2 trillion, roughly 84 percent of China's $5 trillion. With only 40 percent of China's population,
Latin America's average per capita income is twice that of China's. Therefore, Latin American households
are important consumers of U.S. manufactured goods and services. For example, in 2010, 20 percent of
Citicorp's overall profits came from Latin America.
While the Middle East is currently forging its own path toward democracy and Asian nations are rapidly
competing with the United States for global market share, the United States can partner with its
democratic Latin American neighbors to set a strong path toward mutual economic prosperity.
Stronger hemispheric economic integration is the natural first step. But moving forward in this direction
requires debunking the most pernicious myth. Many in Washington still believe that the United States is
exporting jobs to Latin America. Rather, the opposite is true: The region buys goods and services that
generate jobs in the United States. Mexico is the second-largest market for U.S. exports, Brazil the 8th,
and Colombia the 20th -- even without the passage of the pending free-trade agreement. Their
combined imports from the United States in 2010 exceeded $210 billion, which represent thousands of
jobs in America, especially in the manufacturing sector. But today, Latin America has signed free-trade
agreements with countries like Canada and South Korea that can supply similar goods. Signing the
pending free-trade agreements with Panama and Colombia would be an effective way to preserve U.S.
competitiveness in the region.
Economic success, social inclusion, and political assertiveness are the buzzwords of the new Latin
America, a region that now exudes confidence and optimism. Long-term U.S. strategic interests will be
much better served by a re-engagement with this often-ignored neighbor.
US-Latin American relations is huge to maintain current job creation
Jacobson 13, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (Roberta S., “10 THINGS: YOU
DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT U.S.-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS” Americas Quarterly, 2013 (spring),
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1353313940)
10 Jobs
Okay, maybe you did know this, but it's worth underscoring: the U.S. and our neighbors in the Americas
share a powerful economic connection that remains among the deepest and most enduring in the
world. More than 40 percent of America's global exports remain in the Western Hemisphere. In 2012,
U.S. goods exports to the Americas surpassed $690 billion, up more than $250 billion (or 56 percent
since President Obama took office in 2009). This trade supports nearly 4 million U.S. jobs. With the entry
into force of the Colombia and Panama Trade Promotion Agreements last year, the United States now
has trade agreements with 12 countries in the hemisphere that run uninterrupted from the Arctic to
Patagonia. This hemisphere is home to nearly 1 billion people and collectively represents one of the
most powerful economic forces on the globe- and will be a platform for our shared economic success in
the twenty-first century.
Latin America provides a key export market for the U.S. – it should become a top
priority in our decision calculus
Sabatini and Berger 2012 – editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at
AS/COA, policy associate at the AS/COA [Christopher and Ryan, “Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America”, June 13th,
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america//cc]
Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it
increasingly difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but in
the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states.
There are many other reasons why Latin America is important to U.S. interests.
It is a market for more than 20% of U.S. exports. With the notable exception of Cuba, it is nearly entirely
governed by democratically elected governments — a point that gets repeated ad nauseum at every
possible regional meeting. The Western Hemisphere is a major source of energy that has the highest
potential to seriously reduce dependence on Middle East supply. And through immigration, Latin
America has close personal and cultural ties to the United States. These have been boilerplate talking
points since the early 1990s.
But the demands of the globe today are different, and they warrant a renewed engagement with Latin
America — a strategic pivot point for initiatives the U.S. wants to accomplish elsewhere. We need to
stop thinking of Latin America as the U.S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.
Support for trade is low now – relations increase the integration and credibility of
trade agreements – boosts the economy
Cárdenas et al 2008 – Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative
[Mauricio, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World: Report of the Partnership for the
Americas Commission”, The Brookings Institution, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.
pdf//cc]
In many ways, the
core of the relationship between the United States and the LAC region is economic. U.S.
companies and individuals have nearly $200 billion invested in the region, most of it in Mexico and Brazil. More than
18,000 U.S. companies have operations in Mexico, and a fifth of all U.S. trade is with the LAC countries. About 25 million U.S.
residents travel to the LAC countries every year for business and pleasure. Households in the LAC countries received about $60 billion in
remittance inflows in 2007 alone, much of it from relatives living in the United States. Mexico is by far the largest recipient of remittances in
absolute terms, but in the small economies of El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, remittances represent a major
share of national income.
The flows also run the other way. The
LAC countries invest heavily in the United States. In 2007 alone, the United
States received capital inflows of $120 billion from the LAC countries. About 17 million people from these countries
visit the United States every year. The United States is the main trading partner of countries as diverse as Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Trade and financial flows have grown over time, and in the process they have generated
economic opportunities for all parties involved.
Nowhere has deepening hemispheric integration been clearer than in trade. Between 1996 and 2007, the
cumulative growth of U.S. exports to the LAC region was higher than to all other regions and to the
world as a whole, as shown in figure 5. Mexico remains by far the United States’ most important trading partner in the LAC region
(accounting for 58 percent of the region’s trade with the United States), but U.S. trade with other LAC countries, especially Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, and Peru, has been growing at double-digit rates.
Trade with the LAC countries benefits the United States. It gives U.S. companies access to a $3.5 trillion
market of 600 million people and access to low-cost suppliers, which increases their competitiveness in world
markets. The LAC countries buy goods produced by skilled workers in the United States, and these
workers benefit from greater demand for their labor and receive higher wages. Meanwhile, shareholders in U.S.
companies benefit from more competitive and profitable firms, and American consumers enjoy access to lower-priced goods of greater quality
and variety.
At the same time, trade with the United States is critical to the economies of many LAC countries. Trade accounts
for a third of Mexico’s economy, and more than 80 percent of its exports go to the United States. All the Central American, Caribbean, and
Andean countries count the United States as their single most important export market, with between 40 and 50 percent of their total exports
headed to the hemisphere’s largest economy.
Hemispheric Trade: Running Out of Steam? Despite the
benefits of hemispheric trade, domestic political support for
trade liberalization is weakening in the United States. Between December 1999 and March 2007, the number of Americans who
believe that trade agreements hurt the United States grew by 16 percentage points, to 46 percent, while the 21 number of those who believe
trade helps the country fell by 11 points, to 28 percent. The North American Free Trade Agreement—a symbol of trade and investment
integration more generally—has
come under intense criticism.
Flagging support for trade is based on Americans’ fear that they are not adequately protected from the
painful adjustments that can come with economic integration. Programs designed to help U.S. workers deal with traderelated dislocation, including the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, remain ineffective, hard to use, and underfunded. TAA in
particular has been criticized for not addressing the most harmful longterm impact of work displacement that the middle class faces: reentry
into the labor force at a lower salary. TAA has also been criticized for being so cumbersome that it deters potential applicants. Similar programs
adopted in other countries have faced similar difficulties.
Political support for trade has also waned abroad. The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations has
stalled, and skepticism is growing in Latin America about the benefits of free trade. The process for creating a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), first announced in 1994, has stagnated. Trade agreements have become unpopular in the LAC
countries because they have often been oversold. Trade
has brought considerable economic benefits to these
countries. Recent studies suggest that trade has raised median living standards in the region, especially in relatively
open countries, such as Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. But trade, by itself, is not a development or poverty-reduction strategy, and it should not
be sold as a panacea for poverty or inequality. In the absence of other policies, the benefits of trade are uneven and tend to be concentrated in
certain economic sectors, geographic regions, and segments of the labor force. Populations that are marginalized from the rest of the economy
for geographic, ethnic, or political reasons are unlikely to partake in the benefits of free trade. Trade initiatives must work in tandem with
targeted development and poverty-reduction policies.
Relations good – counternarcotics
US-Latin American Relations are key to stop drug problems
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
In the spirit of “shared responsibility,” often invoked by senior US policy officials, it is critical that the US
government respond to increasing calls from Latin American leaders for a serious review of drug policy .
As the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy made clear, current measures addressing
the drug problem are not working and alternatives need to be considered . That commission, led by
three highly regarded former Latin American presidents—Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Ernesto
Zedillo of Mexico, and César Gaviria of Colombia—rightly emphasized that drug problems and their
contributions to criminal violence and widespread corruption threaten the rule of law in a number of
countries . The commission’s recommendations—including the decriminalization of marijuana, greater
emphasis on drugs as a public health problem, and increased support for harm reduction—should be
taken seriously and should serve as a starting point for an honest US-Latin American dialogue on the
drug question.
More serious attention and resources directed at reducing consumption in the United States are
essential. Since the commission’s report in 2009, even some sitting Latin American presidents, including
Mexico’s Felipe Calderón, Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos, and Guatemala’s Otto Pérez Molina, have
called for collective pursuit of new drug policy options, including consideration of legalization . Although
there is debate about the merits of alternative policies—and political obstacles in the region and,
particularly, in the United States, remain strong—a serious discussion is urgently needed about how to
be more effective in dealing with the drug problem.
This sense of urgency is underscored by the alarming crime statistics reported in the region . According
to the United Nations, Latin America has the highest rate of homicides per capita of any region in the
world. Although the causes are many, the narcotics trade is a key contributor.
A correlated problem is the flow of dangerous arms southward from the United States . According to
credible reports, these weapons are used in the bulk of murders committed in Mexico . There are
political hurdles in the United States to more effective control of such arms flows, but more can and
should be done—without infringing on the right to bear arms—at both the federal and state levels . For
example, there could be more extensive background checks and tougher penalties for states that do not
comply . President Barack Obama’s July 11, 2011, executive order, which tightened reporting
requirements on individuals purchasing multiple dangerous weapons and cracked down on straw
buyers, was a welcome step.
The United States should also be more vigorous in sharing information about criminals repatriated to
the region and more supportive of national efforts at rehabilitation and reintegration of returned
migrants . Returning migrants with criminal records have aggravated an already serious security
situation in such countries as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador . The United States should provide
the critical information that national and local law enforcement agencies need to understand the
dangers represented by each deportee so they can mitigate the risks.
Extensive cooperation between the region and the United States on a range of law enforcement-related
issues is fundamental. Witness, judge and prosecutor protection as well as improved training and
investigative techniques could benefit from US assistance and expertise. The United States should also
encourage the expansion of such instruments as the United Nation’s International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which supports the country’s justice system in tackling high-profile cases,
promotes legislative reforms, and shores up institutional capacity .
For such cooperation to be effective, it will be important for the nations of the region to strengthen
their commitment to institutional, democratic reforms and adherence to the rule of law . Governments,
the private sector, and civil society groups need to assume greater responsibility in dealing squarely with
underlying domestic challenges like weak judiciaries, inadequate taxation, and failing schools . Without a
real partnership, any effort would have limited success.
Relations good – clean energy
US-Latin American cooperation solves energy crisis – that sustains new alternative
energy and economic growth
Jacobson 13, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (Roberta S., “10 THINGS: YOU
DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT U.S.-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS” Americas Quarterly, 2013 (spring),
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1353313940)
2Hemispheric Energy Integration
Think it's only Middle Eastern oil that fuels the U.S. economy? Not so. If current trends hold, it will
increasingly be our Western Hemispheric partners. Already, more than half of U.S. crude oil and
petroleum imports come from the Americas, including Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.
But the new energy grid will involve more than carbon-based energy. To better coordinate and expand
our hemispheric supply and demand, the administration created the Energy and Climate Partnership of
the Americas (ecpa) to coordinate policy on energy and climate change. Through ecpa, public- and
private-sector officials from 15 countries have connected with 200 U.S. clean energy companies,
supporting renewable energy projects in the region and resulting in over $18 million in U.S. clean energy
exports. Our initiative, "Connecting the Americas 2022," is working to get more people on the electrical
grid by promoting power sector development and electrical interconnection among countries. The goal:
ensure that everyone in the hemisphere has access to electricity within a decade.
US-Latin American relations key to solve climate change through energy cooperation
Farnsworth 12 – Vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society (Eric,“Top 10
Policy Drivers for U.S.-Latin American Relations in 2013”, Americas Society Council of the Americas,
November 05, 2012,
http://www.as-coa.org/articles/top-10-policy-drivers-us-latin-american-relations-2013)// WNM
Finally, carbon, as in energy. Latin America is sitting on a pile of energy, including oil and cleaner burning
natural gas, and is also a global leader in alternatives including hydro, wind, and others. These will be
particularly relevant in the context of on-again off-again discussions on global climate change. As the
United States, China, and Latin America itself continue to grow, the region and its broad, cleaner energy
matrix will increasingly be valued as an energy supplier to the world, an important position which does
not come with the same security or other issues inherent in the Middle East energy equation. Energy is
an area for extreme cooperation in the Americas, if we are, collectively, wise enough to pursue it.
Relations solve clean energy technology – cooperation fosters more sustainable ways
to prevent climate change
Edwards 2011 – Brown University Research Fellow & co-founder of Intercambio Climatico [Guy, “Climate,
energy to dominate US-Latin American relations”, 18 Jul, http://www.trust.org/item/?map=climate-energy-to-dominate-us-latin-americanrelations//cc]
Since the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere, Arturo Valenzuela, resigned via Twitter last Friday,
commentators have been debating who should replace him and whether this change presents an opportunity to alter the Obama
administration’s policies in the region.
With the
challenges of climate change, clean energy, resource scarcity and green growth set to dominate
U.S.-Latin American relations, Valenzuela’s successor should have experience in these areas.
These issues are a priority for the Obama administration and present lucrative opportunities for the U.S.
to improve trade and commercial relations with Latin America at a time when the region is a magnet for
investment in clean energy.
In Chile, President Barack Obama spoke of the urgency of tackling climate change and embracing a more secure
and sustainable energy future in the Americas. The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, which aims to accelerate
the deployment of clean energy and advance energy security, is an essential component of hemispheric relations.
Multiple U.S. agencies and departments are carrying out extensive work on climate change. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), which runs the Global Climate Change Initiative, argues that climate change is one of the century’s greatest challenges and will be a
diplomatic and development priority.
The U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern, says that Latin
America is a significant focus of funding with over
$60 million spent in 2009-10 on climate-related bilateral assistance in the region. The U.S. military Southern
Command co-hosted two events in Colombia and Peru focused on climate change concluding that the issue is a major security concern and as a
result could be a powerful vehicle for U.S. military engagement in the region.
This year the Union of South American Nations’ (UNASUR) Defense Council (CDS) inaugurated the new Defense Strategic Studies Center (CEED),
which will look at various challenges including the protection of strategic energy and food resources and adapting to climate change.
THE REGION’S RESOURCES
Latin America and the Caribbean boast incredible and highly coveted natural resources including 25 percent of the planet’s arable land, 22
percent of its forest area, 31 percent of its freshwater, 10 percent of its oil, 4.6 percent of its natural gas, 2 percent of coal reserves and 40
percent of its copper and silver reserves.
The International Energy Agency forecasts that in
the future world consumers are going to become more dependent
on the Americas to satisfy their demand for oil with Brazil, Colombia, the U.S. and Canada set to meet
the demand.
Brazil will host the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 with the green economy theme topping the agenda. Peter Hakim,
president emeritus of Inter-American Dialogue, argues that while U.S.-Brazilian relations are fraught, both countries need to work harder to
improve cooperation.
Climate change, clean energy, resource scarcity and green growth are key potential areas for U.S.-Brazilian
relations. The launch of a U.S.-Brazilian Strategic Energy Dialogue, focusing on cooperation on biofuels and renewable energy, among other
areas, is a productive start.
Although Latin America and the Caribbean continue to be the largest U.S. export market, the U.S.’s
share of the region’s imports and exports has dropped over the last few years. China is now the top destination for
the exports of Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay. Latin American exports to China are concentrated in raw
materials, which account for nearly 60 percent, while exports to the U.S. are more diversified.
THE RISE OF CHINA
Arturo Valenzuela says this makes Latin Americans better off trading with the U.S. because they can take advantage of greater technology in
the value chain. However, crude oil remained the top export to the U.S. for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela in the
2007-2009 time period.
The U.S. may assert it has a superior trade model to China, but the U.N.’s economic commission for the region argues there is a perceived lack
of strategic vision by the U.S. in Latin America. Although the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas is the flagship U.S. initiative in the
region and will be a key focus for President Obama at the 2012 Summit of the Americas, it is not yet comparable to past initiatives such as the
1960s-era Alliance for Progress.
This comes at a time when China’s twelfth Five Year Plan emphasizes technological innovation, improving environmental standards and various
targets such as reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 percent. In 2010, China was the top installer of wind turbines and solar
thermal systems, suggesting there are possible areas to collaborate between China and Latin America.
The U.S. was the largest investor in Latin America in 2010 with the majority of this investment being channeled into natural resources. But as
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reports, Latin America saw the biggest increase in renewable energy investment among
developing regions, presenting U.S. companies with great opportunities south of the border.
The State Department and USAID have announced a new partnership with the Private Finance Advisory Network to accelerate private finance
in renewable energy projects in Central America. However, the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, which aims to encourage
investment in the deployment of clean energy, is yet to receive notable financial support from the private sector.
ENERGY HOTTEST INVESTMENT
Encouragingly, an American Chambers of Commerce Abroad recent membership poll listed “energy” as the hottest investment sector for
members investing in Latin America. Recently, Cannon Power Group, a U.S. wind company, signed a 10-year joint-venture contract with the
Spanish company, Gamesa, to harness wind energy in Mexico.
The threats of climate change and growing resource scarcity, combined with the opportunities
presented by green growth, provide the impetus for increasing trade and investment in low carbon and
high-tech industries.
Although the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative leads U.S. trade policy in the Western hemisphere,
the State Department’s diplomats complement this work and Valenzuela’s successor can make a
valuable contribution in this area with the relevant expertise.
As climate, clean energy, resource scarcity and green growth begin to define U.S.-Latin American
relations, the U.S.’s top diplomat in the region should have the appropriate experience to ensure greater
policy coherence among U.S. agencies and effective dialogue with Latin American governments, many of
which are trailblazing in these areas.
Relations good – energy security
Latin America is key – provides crucial oil and and energy security – waiting increases
potential for oil shocks
Brune 2010 – works on energy security and national security issues at Sandia National Laboratories,
Truman National Security Fellow [Nancy E, “Latin America: A Blind Spot in US Energy Security Policy”, July 26,
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=250:south-of-the-border-americas-key-to-energysecurity&catid=108:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=365//cc]
For more than a decade, America’s
relationship with Latin America could most accurately be described as
unfocused engagement, driven by reactions to events or crises at best and benign neglect at worst. Apart from intermittent efforts to
secure free trade agreements (NAFTA and CAFTA), combat drugs (Plan Mérida and Plan Colombia), and weigh in—often too late and too
sheepishly—to political events (Honduran Presidential crisis or President Hugo Chavez’s saber rattling), the
US has failed to engage
the nations of resource-wealthy Latin America in any strategic manner.
This lack of attention to our closest neighbors—and some of our strongest allies—is quite alarming given US
dependence on Latin America to provide our energy. Currently, more than one-fourth of imported oil
comes from Latin America (and almost 50% from the Western Hemisphere). In 2009, the top sources of US imported crude oil (and
their percentages) were Canada (21%), Mexico (11%), Venezuela and Saudi Arabia (9% each), Nigeria (7%), Russia (5%), Iraq, Algeria and Angola
(4% each), Brazil (3%), Colombia and Ecuador (roughly 2% total). As is widely known, America
imports more than 65-70 percent
of its energy needs, which means that we are vulnerable to disruptions in the supply chain and to price
volatility, which are affected by domestic political and economic conditions in oil-exporting countries
upon whom we depend.
In 2007, speaking at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, ”[W]e are
Our goal should be nothing less than to
usher in a new era of inter-American security in energy.” In June 2009, President Obama pledged to engage
with Latin America on issues of energy, security and trade, and attended the Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad &
Tobago. But very little has happened in the last fifteen months. The Administration’s blind spot to the importance
of Latin America in our energy security matrix is revealed by the disappointing fact that, during Secretary of
State Clinton’s visit to Ecuador in June 2010, her almost 4,500 word policy address on ‘Opportunity in the Americas’ contained no
mention of energy—not a single word.
While our government takes for granted the oil wealth of Latin America, several domestic factors in the
resource-rich countries in the region threaten US energy security. Mexico, which replaced Saudi Arabia as our 2nd
largest supplier in 2008, is by no means a stable supplier of fuel. Years of inadequate investment in the
national oil company Petróleos de Mexico (Pemex) have resulted in falling production rates; production output of
eager to expand our cooperation on energy with more [Latin American] countries […].
crude oil fell 17.5 percent during the period 2004-2008. Although the Mexican government approved a broad set of oil sector reforms in 2008,
including the establishment of a new regulatory body (the National Commission on Hydrocarbons—CNH), actual implementation of the
reforms—viewed by many as ‘timid’—is behind schedule, thus having no impact on reversing the downward trend in production output.
In addition, the
violence in Mexico, which is still largely viewed as a border security issue, has the potential
to impact Mexico’s oil sector and its ability to sustain its current level of exports. According to Pemex, the
number of illegal pipeline taps has quadrupled in the last five years, rising from 102 in 2004 to 462 in 2009. In 2009, the Mexican drug cartels
diverted and smuggled over 8,500 b/d of petroleum products, worth approximately $46 million. While most of this illegally acquired oil was
smuggled into the US, the act is a clear signal that the drug
cartels are willing to use energy as a weapon in their battle
against the Mexican government, which has in turn taken to using more aggressive tactics against the
violent cartels. If the escalation continues, the next stage in this game of hostile engagement may involve the Mexican drug cartels taking
a page from the playbook used by the Colombian guerillas, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army,
that have caused millions of dollars in physical and environmental damage by attacking energy pipelines and infrastructure. Either way, the
falling production and violence in Mexico may affect the surety of oil imports from our closest ally.
Over the course of the last 3-4 years, many of our oil-rich neighbors have nationalized some portion of their
hydrocarbon sector, which has frequently entailed heavy-handed expropriation of assets from private
companies. Venezuela, our 3rd biggest supplier of oil, has been the most egregious violator. Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez launched a major nationalization drive in 2007 and has since nationalized assets of
several international energy firms, including ExxonMobil, British Petroleum (BP) and ConocoPhillips, in addition to forcing many
other companies to pay higher royalties. As recently as June of this year, state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) asked the
Venezuelan National Assembly for approval to nationalize 11 oil drilling rigs currently owned and operated by a US company.
Venezuela’s oil sector is collapsing
under the weight of its own egocentric dictator and his political rhetoric, which has stressed PDVSA operations
and scared away foreign investment, resulting in a decline in production and a strain on Venezuelan
refining operations. Recent estimates suggest that PDVSA has amassed more than $21.4 billion in debt to oil
service companies. In 2009, Venezuela’s import of fuel purchases increased 56 percent, while its exports of fuel products
fell by 17 percent. In both the near to long term, this fall in output, if prolonged, may significantly impact US energy
security. To illustrate this, consider that during a strike by Venezuelan oil workers in 2002-2003, Venezuelan output of heavy crude oil
Unfortunately, the effects of Venezuela’s market-destabilizing actions are already evident.
slowed dramatically, raising US gas prices by 24 percent during the 10 week strike.
But Venezuela is not the lone culprit. In 2006, Bolivian President Evo Morales moved to nationalize his country’s oil and gas reserves, the
second largest proven reserves in South America, and to take control of the commercial and production chain. He ordered the military to
occupy Bolivia's gas fields and gave foreign investors a six-month deadline to comply (with higher royalties and taxes) or leave. Bolivia’s Andean
neighbor, Ecuador, has also been slowly encroaching upon private oil companies operating in its territory. In 2006, Ecuadorian President Rafael
Correa revoked the contract of US-based Occidental Petroleum, operating in some of its Amazon oilfields. Soon after, he imposed a 99%
windfall revenue tax on foreign energy. Since then, Ecuador has expropriated two blocks belonging to Anglo-French oil firm Perenco over tax
disputes, claiming that the company owed millions of dollars in ‘windfall’ taxes. In a bold move, President Correa announced this past April that
he was going to send a bill to the National Assembly that would give him the power to nationalize foreign companies that refuse to sign new
state-proposed agreements.
US-Latin America Relations are key to solve energy security – Oil in Mexico proves
Barshefsky and Hill 08 (Charlene and James T., Chairs on The Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Latin
America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, PDF)//WNM
U.S. anxieties over dependence on foreign energy resources are usually centered on the Middle East,
but the United States relies on the westernhemisphere (includingCanada) for nearly half its oil.45
Recently, resurgent resource nationalism, production bottlenecks, and the politicization of energy trade
have raised concerns that Latin America may become a less reliable supplier and drive up global energy
prices. At the same time, the region presents abundant opportunities for new investment in traditional
and alternative energy resources—making it critical that U.S. and Latin American governments both
confront the energy challenge and seize the opportunity of greater cooperation.
Traditional Energy Supplies: Stalling Production and Integration
Latin America provides nearly 30 percent of the United States’ foreign oil. Mexico—which, via its state
oil company Petro´leos Mexicanos (PEMEX), has about 1 percent of known world oil reserves and
produces some 3 million barrels a day—is the United States’ third most important petroleum source,
following Canada and Saudi Arabia. It currently accounts for 11 percent of U.S. oil imports. However,
rising domesticdemand, declining productivity,anddepleted reserves threaten the country’s position as
an energy-exporting nation. The Cantarell oil field is facing sharp declines in production, and new
exploration is hampered by inadequate investment. Over 60 percent of PEMEX’s revenues go to the
government’s budget, and private and/or foreign investment in the oil sector remains largely prohibited
(in accordance with the Mexican Constitution), leaving only limited opportunities for foreign
participation. In the short term, it remains unlikely that the divided Mexican Congress will approve
private sector investment,46 and even if the reformist Caldero´n government is able to loosen current
investment restrictions, new production would take years to come online. Without significant changes,
some analysts predict, Mexico may become a net importer of oil in as few as ten years. For the United
States, this development would impel a dramatic and difficult shift in energy sourcing.
There are some positive trends in theU.S.-Mexico energy relationship as well, however. Energy
integration in North America has proceeded. Extensive cross-border networks of modern pipelines and
power lines, tariff-free trade across borders, technology sharing, and constant contact between energy
officials in both countries have facilitated fluid commerce and constant dialogue. The North America
EnergyWorking Group (NAEWG), an organization of midlevel career energy officials from Mexico, the
United States, and Canada established in 2001, has sponsored several valuable regional energy studies,
compiled standardized energy statistics, and begun to reach out to various public and private
stakeholders in relevant industries.
Relations with Latin America lead to cooperation over climate change and energy
security
Cárdenas et al 2008 – Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative
[Mauricio, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World: Report of the Partnership for the
Americas Commission”, The Brookings Institution, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.
pdf//cc]
In the coming decades, the
United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere will have to grapple with
two major, interrelated challenges: securing stable and sustainable energy supplies and mitigating
climate change. Concerns about the security of energy supplies are based on several trends: rapidly rising
global demand for hydrocarbons relative to supply, maturing oil and gas fields in the OECD countries and Mexico
(which is the United States’ third-largest oil supplier), constraints on production and refining capacity, political instability
in key oil-producing states, and rising resource nationalism. These appear to be sustained long-term trends, and they will resurface
after the current crisis subsides. The U.S. economy is particularly vulnerable to disruptions in oil supply and price
spikes—the United States has less than 3 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves but consumes nearly a quarter of its oil production. The
LAC countries provide over 30 percent of U.S. oil imports—substantially more than from any other region. The United
States therefore has strong incentives to work with other countries in the hemisphere to preserve the
reliable supply of hydrocarbons from the region.
The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the world’s climate is now well established,
and the consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human activity
remains unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including
declines in agricultural yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent
and destructive storms in the Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation
to Central America, the Caribbean, and the southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and
material toll. As we know from recent storms, the costs of replacing homes, businesses, and infrastructure—along with the higher costs of
energy if refineries and offshore rigs are damaged—will be vast.
Hemispheric Solutions Addressing
the challenge of energy security will require making energy consumption
more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge of climate change
will require finding ways to control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbonintensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing ecosystems. Potential solutions to these
problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a sustained hemispheric partnership.
Latin America has enormous potential to help meet the world’s growing thirst for energy, both in terms
of hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the world’s proven oil
reserves. Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazil’s oil reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if
recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great potential in solar energy
generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in sugarcanebased ethanol production, and the United States is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central
America and the Caribbean, remain underdeveloped.
Relations good – immigration
Good Relations with Latin America provide cooperative solutions to illegal
immigration and inhumane treatment of migrants
Cárdenas et al 2008 – Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative
[Mauricio, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World: Report of the Partnership for the
Americas Commission”, The Brookings Institution, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.
pdf//cc]
For the hemispheric labor market to function, illegal
immigration must be addressed. Its negative effects are a
product of its illegal nature, not of immigration itself. Illegality pervades the lives of undocumented
workers, undermines the rule of law in the United States, and exposes immigrants to abuse. It also harms
native-born workers and legal immigrants by making them less competitive in some segments of the labor market, and it exacerbates social and
cultural tensions that can stigmatize law-abiding Hispanic and Latino residents and U.S. citizens. In the United States, the chief beneficiaries of
illegal immigration are lawbreaking employers and smugglers of illicit goods and people.
An Ineffective Approach The
current U.S. approach to immigration—based largely on devoting more and more resources
to border control—has failed to achieve its objectives. The number of border patrol officers has more than tripled since 1996
to 18,000—about 9 officers per mile of border. Line-watch hours spent policing the U.S. border have increased annually from 2 million to more
than 9 million. The ongoing construction of
a 700-mile-long, 16-foot fence along segments of the United States–Mexico
border has become the most visible symbol of this approach. 17 About half of this fence has been completed, and its
total eventual cost is estimated at $6–12 billion.
Yet increases in funding, the construction of the border fence, and the expansion of the U.S. Border Patrol have not had a
significant impact on illegal immigration flows. Since 2000, the size of the illegal immigrant population has grown by more
than 40 percent; four out of five of these immigrants come from a LAC country. As figure 4 indicates, the number of hours spent policing the
border has increased dramatically since the early 1990s. However, studies based on interviews with illegal migrants suggest that the probability
of apprehension has remained constant. Meanwhile, the fence damages the global image of a country that has historically prided itself on its
open immigration policy.
There are several reasons for this failure. The first is that the flow
of people and vehicles across the border is so large
that policing it effectively is extremely difficult, regardless of the resources allocated to border control. Mexico is the United
States’ third-largest trading partner, and most of that trade crosses by land. Every day, there are 1 million legal crossings of the United States–
Mexico border. A quarter-million private vehicles and 12,000 trucks cross the border into the United States daily, without counting the traffic
running in the opposite direction. Even with large budgets and modern equipment, the U.S. Border Patrol can only inspect a small fraction of
the vehicles and persons entering the United States.
In addition, tighter
policing has made illegal border crossing more dangerous and expensive for migrants, but this
has neither deterred them from attempting to cross nor prevented them from succeeding. Those intent on
crossing the border have found new ways to circumvent more stringent policing. Immigrants are increasingly turning to professional people
smugglers, known as coyotes, whose fee for helping migrants cross has nearly quadrupled since the early 1990s to more than $2,000 per
person today. Hiring a coyote virtually guarantees entry into the United States, and the promise of tenfold increases in earning power in the
United States remains a powerful enticement for would-be immigrants.
More illegal immigrants are also using legal ports of entry to enter the country with fake documents or by
making false declarations of U.S. citizenship. According to a recent Government Accountability Office study using undercover investigators, the
probability of a successful crossing through legal ports of entry is 93 percent. The increased costs and risks of crossing the border are having an
unintended, negative effect for the United States: They are creating incentives for migrants to resettle permanently in the United States, rather
than to go back and forth between the two countries based on shifts in U.S. labor demand.
Meanwhile, enforcement of immigration laws inside the United States remains weak, primarily in the workplace. From 1986 to 2002, the U.S.
government directed 60 percent of immigration enforcement funding to border control—six times the amount allocated to internal law
enforcement. Among the OECD countries, the United States has some of the weakest employer sanctions for hiring illegal workers, and
workplace enforcement in the United States is inconsistent and easily avoided.
The failure of the U.S. Congress and federal government to agree on comprehensive immigration reform has led state and local governments to
devise their own solutions, creating a patchwork of policies ranging from welcoming and inclusive to exclusionary and hostile. In 2007, 1,059
immigrationrelated bills and resolutions were introduced in state legislatures nationwide. Of these, 167 have been enacted. Many more
initiatives and ordinances have been introduced at the city and county levels.
So far, the problem of illegal immigration has been treated by the U.S. authorities mainly as a law enforcement
problem to be handled primarily, if not exclusively, by the United States. However, to develop more effective
policies, migration needs to be framed in a wider context. Immigration is a transnational issue whose
effective management requires cooperation between migrant-sending and -receiving countries. If
migration from the LAC countries to the United States is to be legal, humane, and responsive to the
economic needs of both the receiving and sending countries, both sides must accept certain
responsibilities.
Relations good – regional stability
U.S. influence is decreasing – now is key to mobilize relations – U.S. presence in Latin America solves
crime and regional stability
Sabatini 2013 – senior director of policy at the Americas Society and Council of the Americas [Christopher,
“Will Latin America Miss U.S. Hegemony?”, Journal of International Affairs66.2 (Spring 2013): 1-XVI,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355897201/fulltext?accountid=14667//cc]
For decades, the standard framework for describing and understanding U.S.-Latin American relations
has been the overwhelming hegemonic power of the "colossus of the north." Now, though, with the rise
of regional powers like Brazil, the importance of new emerging economies like China, and the diversity
of political and economic models in the region, policymakers and observers are beginning to discuss the
decline of U.S. power in the region. Whether real or perceived, the effects of waning U.S. influence are
already shaping countries' calculations in their domestic and foreign policies and the formation of
multilateral alliances. What are the implications of the perceived decline of U.S. hegemony for Latin
America? This article explores the possible facets of the decline of U.S. influence in the region. It will
start by examining whether, indeed, the United States' ability to shape outcomes or impose its
preferences in the region has diminished or shifted in how it must conduct diplomacy. Second, it will
examine the possible outcomes of diminished influence. Finally, this article will consider the times when
there have been a convergence of values and interest between the United States and governments in
the region, and the likely effect that diminished U.S. power will have on areas of common interest:
democracy, human rights, and the peaceful resolution of intra-regional conflicts.
From the cover of the September 2010 issue of The Economist to the pages of Foreign Affairs journalists
and observers are proclaiming the decline of U.S. power in Latin America.1 While some populist leaders,
such as former President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, may celebrate what they call the end of U.S.
dominance (and a number of U.S. academics as well), other more sober governments such as Brazil and
Chile are already calling for a rebalancing of power in the western hemisphere.
The standard framework for describing and understanding U.S.-Latin American relations these past
decades has been one where the United States stands as the primary hegemonic power - the "colossus
of the north."2 Since the Monroe Doctrine, that power has shaped a U.S. policy that has allowed it to
intervene either overtly or covertly at will to impose its national interests; support policy preferences
and allies; and in some cases, even overturn governments, often with bloody consequences. But while
Latin America has long chafed over U.S. military, economic, and political overwhelming predominance, is
it possible that, if U.S. power south of its border has indeed waned, Latin America will actually miss the
reduced U.S. presence and even U.S. hegemony?
The united States' reduced ability to unilaterally get what it wants in the hemisphere is already shaping
Latin American countries' calculations of domestic and foreign policies and the formation of multilateral
alliances. The last ten years have witnessed the emergence of regional and multilateral powers seeking
to assert regional diplomatic power, if not to specifically reduce the role of the United States in intraregional diplomacy. The most obvious and pointed example is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of
our Americas (ALBA) formed by former President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, which includes Bolivia,
Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela among others in a bloc vowed to oppose a now-defunct plan
to establish a hemisphere-wide free-trade agreement. At the same time, as its economy rebounded
quickly and strongly from the 2007 global financial crisis until 2012, Brazil has sought a greater regional
and even global role, exerting its new-found diplomatic and economic muscle, often as an alternative to
U.S. influence in matters as diverse as the threat of political upheaval in Venezuela to the UN drive to
sanction Iran for its nuclear ambitions.3
Yet, there may likely be a down side to the retrenchment of U.S. leadership and prerogative in the
region. While there are multiple tragic examples of U.S. intervention and a long history of abuse by U.S.
power that have thwarted the political and economic development of countries such as Guatemala or
Haiti, U.S. leadership and power have also brought benefits. For example, governments have long relied
on U.S. leadership to champion specific causes, at times "passing the buck" to have U.S. support serve as
a foil for a general principle or policy that they support but do not want to lead publicly. Similarly, recent
cases of U.S. technical assistance and cooperation helped focus national attention and energy on
addressing violence and crime in countries like Colombia and Mexico. Moreover, countries in the region
have long benefited from the security provided by being in the U.S. diplomatic and military sphere of
influence. This security has helped states struggling with violence and instability and contributed to
intra-regional peace. Will a shift in U.S. power weaken these hemispheric public goods?
Latin American democracy impacts
Latin America is key to global democracy.
Weintraub, 95 – Chair in Political Economy at CSIS (Sidney, Summer, “U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the
Southern Cone,” Washington Quarterly, Lexis) //SP
Yet this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable
development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the
latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely
by the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing
world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will compromise progress elsewhere in the
world
Latin American democracy is key to prevent regional prolif and war
Fargo, 4 – national security affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution, Hoover Digest (Jeffrey, 2004, no. 3,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3020711.html) //SP
In short, democracy and economic integration are not simply value preferences, but are increasingly
bound up with hemispheric security. To take just one example: The restoration of democracy in Brazil
and Argentina and their increasingly strong and profitable relationship in Mercosur have contributed in
no small degree to their decisions to forsake the development of nuclear weapons. Perceptions of threat
have declined, and perceptions of the benefits of cooperation have grown, and this has permitted
progress on a range of security issues from border disputes, to peacekeeping, environmental protection,
counternarcotic, and the combat of organized crime. Argentina has also developed a strong bilateral
defense relationship with the United States, and is now considered a non-NATO ally.
This leads us to those interests which are most commonly defined as "vital"—i.e., the need to prevent or
contain direct threats to the "survival, safety and vitality of our nation," including the "physical security
of our territory and that four allies, the safety of our citizens, our economic well-being and the
protection of our critical infrastructure."7 The most obvious threat of this kind would arise from the
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction by a hostile government or terrorist organization. The
closest this hemisphere has come to such a scenario was during the Cuban Missile Crisis, though more
recently there was concern about the spread of such weapons to the Southern Cone. That danger has
been at least temporarily alleviated, however, with the result that the short to medium- term threat
from national governments is virtually nil. In military terms, the United States today is the undisputed
hegemonic power in the hemisphere.
Latin American democratization leads to environmental protection
Jacobs, 2 – Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University (Jamie Elizabeth, Winter 2002,
Latin American Politics & Society, p. 59-60) //SP
In Brazil and other Latin American countries attempting to strengthen democracy, the mobilization of
civil society forms a widely recognized part of that democratization. Part of this mobilization may be
participation in ecological movements and other social movements and civic organizations. Though
environmentalism cannot be relied on as a driving factor for democratization in general, it can be seen as
an important component of the changes taking place in the politics and society of transitional
democracies (Hicks 1996). Political participation and interest in environmental policy at the grassroots
involves people in the struggle for citizenship, rights and government accountability in the democratic process.
Failure of Latin American democratization causes Latin American instability
Schulz, 1 – professor of political science at Cleveland State University (Donald E., Spring 2001,
Parameters) //SP
The first theme concerns the importance of democracy for US interests. Unfortunately, terrorism cannot be
restricted to the violence of non-state actors. Latin American history is replete with episodes of state
terrorism. Often, indeed, state terrorism has been a major contributor to the rise of guerrilla
movements, as for instance in the Central American wars of the 1970s and 1980s. [1] In those cases,
democratic transitions became a critical factor in defusing civil war. Today, democracy continues to
serve as an important legitimizing force, inhibiting both state and non-state terrorism. Its decline
would have ominous implications for the region's political stability.
Nuclear terrorism likely
Nuke terror likely – escalates due to false sense of security
Dahl 7/1 – Specialist Correspondent (Frederik, “Governments warn about nuclear terrorism threat,”
7/1/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/us-nuclear-securityidUSBRE96010E20130701)//SJF
(Reuters) - More action is needed to prevent militants acquiring plutonium or highly-enriched uranium
that could be used in bombs, governments agreed at a meeting on nuclear security in Vienna on
Monday, without deciding on any concrete steps.
A declaration adopted by more than 120 states at the meeting said "substantial progress" had been
made in recent years to improve nuclear security globally, but it was not enough.
Analysts say radical groups could theoretically build a crude but deadly nuclear bomb if they had the
money, technical knowledge and materials needed.
Ministers remained "concerned about the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism ... More needs to
be done to further strengthen nuclear security worldwide", the statement said.
The document "encouraged" states to take various measures such as minimizing the use of highlyenriched uranium, but some diplomats said they would have preferred firmer commitments.
Many countries regard nuclear security as a sensitive political issue that should be handled primarily by
national authorities. This was reflected in the statement's language.
Still, Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which hosted the
conference, said the agreement was "very robust" and represented a major step forward.
RADICAL GROUPS' "NUCLEAR AMBITIONS"
Amano earlier warned the IAEA-hosted conference against a "false sense of security" over the danger of
nuclear terrorism.
Holding up a small lead container that was used to try to traffic highly enriched uranium in Moldova two
years ago, the U.N. nuclear chief said it showed a "worrying level of knowledge on the part of the
smugglers".
"This case ended well," he said, referring to the fact that the material was seized and arrests were made.
But he added: "We cannot be sure if such cases are just the tip of the iceberg."
Obtaining weapons-grade fissile material - highly enriched uranium or plutonium - poses the biggest
challenge for militant groups, so it must be kept secure both at civilian and military facilities, experts say.
An apple-sized amount of plutonium in a nuclear device and detonated in a highly populated area could
instantly kill or wound hundreds of thousands of people , according to the Nuclear Security Governance
Experts Group (NSGEG) lobby group.
But experts say a so-called "dirty bomb" is a more likely threat than a nuclear bomb. In a dirty bomb,
conventional explosives are used to disperse radiation from a radioactive source, which can be found in
hospitals or other places that are generally not very well protected.
More than a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and
radioactive material are reported to the IAEA every year, Amano said.
"Some material goes missing and is never found," he said.
U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said al Qaeda was still likely to be trying to obtain nuclear material
for a weapon.
"Despite the strides we have made in dismantling core al Qaeda we should expect its adherents ... to
continue trying to achieve their nuclear ambitions," he said.
Nuclear terrorism impacts
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction – most probable scenario
Creamer, 11 – political organizer and strategist, Strategic Consulting Group (Robert, “Post-Bin Laden, It's
Time to End the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism for Good,” Huffington Post, 5/12,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/post-bin-laden---it-is-ti_b_860954.html)//SY
Worse, al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have vowed to obtain and actually use nuclear
weapons.
The status quo -- the balance of terror -- that for six decades prevented a nuclear war between the U.S.
and Russia is every day being made more unstable by the increasing numbers of nuclear players -- and
by the potential entry of non-state actors. Far from being deterred by the chaos and human suffering
that would ensue from nuclear war -- actors like al Qaeda actively seek precisely that kind of
cataclysm .
The more nuclear weapons that exist in the world -- and more importantly the more weapons-grade
fissile material that can be obtained to build a nuclear weapon -- the more likely it is that one, or many
more, will actually be used.
In the 1980's the specter of a "Nuclear Winter" helped spur the movement for nuclear arms reduction
between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Studies showed that smoke caused by fires set off by nuclear
explosions in cities and industrial sites would rise to the stratosphere and envelope the world.
The ash would absorb energy from the sun so that the earth's surface would get cold, dry and dark.
Plants would die. Much of our food supply would disappear. Much of the world's surface would reach
winter temperatures in the summer.
Nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to humanity – most effective means of
destruction
Gallucci, 12 – President, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Robert, “Preventing Nuclear
Terrorism,” Huffington Post, 4/5 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-gallucci/nuclearterrorism_b_1406712.html)//SY
This is unfortunate, but not surprising. Even though recent presidents and presidential candidates have
all said that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to the national security, people inside and
outside of government do not act as though they believe it. And until they do, real progress toward
securing and then eliminating stocks of fissile material will not be made and, in fact, we will continue to
add to those stocks.
We should all be concerned that perhaps during one morning rush hour in a major American city, a
nuclear weapon of crude and improvised design will be detonated. Such a device's yield will be far
smaller than that of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but still tens of thousands will die
instantly from the blast, burns and radiation. Over the following month, thousands more will succumb to
burns, injuries, or the effects of radiation. The blast area will be uninhabitable for months or longer.
This is not the stuff of pulp fiction or sensational television; it is a credible scenario.
There is clear evidence that terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, are interested in acquiring and
using nuclear weapons. They seek to inflict maximum damage with an economy of means; nothing can
accomplish this end more effectively and with more certainty than a nuclear weapon.
We have no reason to believe that a traditional defense against this threat will be effective. We cannot
expect to prevent access to our territory, and we cannot expect to deter a terrorist who values our
death more than his life.
The danger is not only to the United States or Western Europe, as terror attacks in Moscow, Mumbai
and Bali demonstrate. Any nation that faces a threat from terrorism should be concerned.
Nuclear weapons are easy to use – makes nuclear terrorism most likely scenario for
mass destruction
TRAC, 13 – Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (“Nuclear Terrorism,”
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/nuclear-terrorism)//SY
With the advent of WMD, the basic understanding of terrorism as a phenomenon has moved from a
political and psychological level to a real threat of mass destruction and disruption. The news of
terrorists searching for nuclear weapons in Russia and Afghanistan coupled the threat emanating from
groups such as Al Qaeda and other groups has brought this threat to the forefront of analyst’s attention.
However, while there is a clear consensus about an increased threat of nuclear and radiological
terrorism in the post 9/11 period, there are also others who have tagged this threat as ‘overrated
nightmare’ since using and acquiring nuclear capability may well be beyond the purview of a terrorist
group. At a global level, any form of nuclear terrorism could have a devastating effect when it leads to
war or armed conflict between two countries or among a group of nuclear powers. The impact of a
nuclear-terrorist act would be far greater when it would be misconstrued as an attack by the enemy
country.
TYPES OF GROUPS LIKELY TO TRY WMDS
Scholars have broadly categorized non state terrorists as actors who can resort to a nuclear strike
against a national state. For example, Charles Ferguson and W C Potter have clubbed them into four
groups:
Apocalyptic groups (e.g Aum Shinrikyo),
Politico-Religious Terrorist groups (e.g, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba)
Nationalist and Separatists groups (e.g. LTTE, Baloch Rebel group), and
Single issue Terrorist (e.g eco-terrorist).
OBTAINING WMDS
There are two imaginable ways for terrorists to get nuclear explosives. They could build a radiological
bomb or an improvised nuclear device or they could seek to steal or buy a miniaturized nuclear weapon.
Before dealing with the kind of threat our civil society could face in a nuclear catastrophe triggered by
terrorists, it would be useful to discuss and understand various types and effects of nuclear weapon and
material used in it, on the human environment. A terrorist group or an individual ‘lone-wolf’ terrorist
would not face serious technical barriers in creating a basic or a crude nuclear device. With some degree
of technical sophistication it would be easier to build weapons which could maximize the damage on any
given environment, both civil and military.
OAS advantage
AT: Not Key to OAS
Lack of action on Cuba severs OAS ties
Ellsworth 12 – Senior Correspondent, Brazil at Reuters (Brian, “Obama faces skeptical leaders at
Americas summit,” 4/10/12, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-americas-summit-obamaidUSBRE8390QK20120410)//SJF
(Reuters) - Three years after being feted by star-struck Latin American leaders, President Barack Obama
faces skepticism and disappointment at this week's Summit of the Americas for failing to meet promises
of a new era in relations with the region.
Obama's first meeting with leaders from the hemisphere in Trinidad and Tobago at the height of his
popularity included a vow to mend ties with Cuba and a photo-op handshake with Hugo Chavez, the
Venezuelan president and pugnacious U.S. critic.
This year, Obama is more focused on re-election than foreign policy and is set to receive a grilling over
contentious issues like the drugs war, Cuba and even U.S. monetary policy from heads of state eager to
remind him that Washington is growing less relevant for the region.
"The deception and disappointment are quite real," said Hal Klepak, a Canadian history professor and
Latin America expert. "The last summit's focus was the 'Obama show,' this time what we have are years
of nothing happening."
A senior Obama administration official said the U.S. president goes to the weekend summit in
Cartagena, Colombia seeking to boost trade and commercial ties, specifically in the energy sector at a
time of high gasoline prices.
He is likely to focus on free trade deals with Panama and Colombia, approved by the U.S. Congress last
year, which are seen boosting growth in both countries while also creating jobs at home.
Latin American leaders generally favor him winning a second term, analysts say, in part because of some
of the hardline comments on immigration by the Republican presidential hopefuls. Mitt Romney, for
example, upset some with remarks about immigrants facing "self deportation" because they can't find
work.
But they are nonetheless set to press Obama on allowing Cuba entry into the next Americas summit and
again challenge the 50-year-old U.S. trade embargo against the communist-run island. The embargo is
widely seen within Latin America as an outdated Cold War-era policy.
And presidents spanning the political spectrum will push for a discussion of legalizing and reducing U.S.
demand for illegal drugs, seeking to shift responsibility for the problem toward the world's top
consumer.
"Colombia, and I myself, have put this issue on the table, because if there is any country that has
suffered more from drug trafficking, that has shed more blood, it's Colombia," President Juan Manuel
Santos, who is hosting the summit, said recently.
US unilateralism specifically wrecks OAS legitimacy – disrupts conflict-resolution
abilities
Swanström 2 – Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, co-founder, Research
Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (Niklas,
“Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific Rim,” Department of Peace
and Conflict Research, Report No. 64, pg. 298, 2002)//SJF
The adoption of resolution 1080 in 1991, which set up procedures to react to threats to democracy,
strengthened the OAS crisis management function (OAS, 1991). Resolution 1080 has been interpreted as
a mechanism that can be invoked to “deter illegal action against democracy” (US, 2000). This involves
the possibility of military action commanded by OAS, but possibly led by the US.186 Resolution 1080 has
been invoked four times: Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993) and Paraguay (1996). This has
become the strongest formal function of the OAS conflict prevention and conflict management
functions. Outside of resolution 1080 OAS has not taken any formal and explicit role in conflict
management, although they by default engage in conflict management in most fields. The direct
references to conflict management are few, but not unimportant.187 The management aspects of OAS
will, without doubt, increase after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on the 11th of
September. The security of the region, and in particular US, has become a standing issue on the
agenda for OAS. There are now committees that attempt to find ways to create a regional anti-terrorist
policy and training of anti-terrorist forces. The coordination of the American military forces is based on a
similar principle to efforts to rescue democracy, i.e. that a unified regional policy should be directing
each national strategy (OAS,2002; 2002b). How much of this is conflict management, and how much of
this will turn out to be conflict-creating, remains to be seen.188 The informal mechanisms are relatively
few, and are confined to informal talks between leaders and informal consultations, although these are
subordinated to the formal mechanisms. OAS has initiated several conferences and workshops in
confidence-building and security-building in the Americas (US, 2000). These aim at decreasing historical
rivalries and creating an environment for democratic development and the peaceful resolution of
disputes. One important variable in this effort was the creation of a Committee on Hemispheric Security
in 1993 and the establishment of this as a permanent body in 1995 (OAS, 1993; 1995). These
mechanisms are not formal CMMs, but are nevertheless important as they increase the legitimacy and
confidence in the region and for OAS at large. This can also be seen in the East Asian region where
second-track diplomacy is crucial for the creation of trust.
The normative impact of OAS has been impressive despite the legitimacy problems that the organization
has suffered. This is especially true in the area of the political system and long-term conflict
management, but also when it comes to combating drugs and fighting corruption (US, 2000). The
normative effects and the integrative structure have created a base for regional identification, albeit not
always positive, with US at the helm. The success of the normative effects on conflict management is
limited only by unilateral actions by the US and another Otro Engaño Americano. Unilateral action is as
distasteful for the Latin American states, as it is useful for the US. The problem is that the habit of US
to enforce unilateral actions upon OAS has decreased the legitimacy of the organization. The strength
of US, both militarily and financially, has put Latin America in a dependency relationship with the US,
which limits the actions Latin America can take. It is clear that if the unilateral actions continue, then
OAS will become less important in the region and sub-regional organizations such as the Andean Group,
Mercosur etc that US has little control over, will gain in importance.
OAS Cred I/L – 2AC
US unilateralism shatters OAS compatability – key to Conflict Management
Mechanisms
Swanström 2 – Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, and one of its cofounders, Research Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (Niklas, “Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific
Rim,” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 64, pg. 298, 2002)//SJF
4.5.1 OAS175
OAS could, with a pinch of salt, be said to date from the International Union of American Republics
established in April 1890 (Moore, 1971:131).176 This makes OAS the organization with the oldest roots
in this thesis. It was, however, not until April 30, 1948, that 21 American states met in Bogotá to adopt
the charter of the OAS. The focus for OAS was from the beginning far- reaching and diverse, including
social and economic development, combating drugs, human rights, strengthening democracy, pacific
settlements of disputes, weapons control programs, etc (OAS, 1948; OAS, 2002).
The difference between OAS and other regional organizations could not be more apparent. For example,
NAFTA’s focus is solely on economic matters while OAS has a much wider focus that includes
democracy, civil society, combating drugs and free trade (1948, OAS: article 2; OAS, 2002). In this sense,
the OAS focus is much more directed to long-term conflict management, as it strengthens the
democratic institutions of the Americas and follows an integrative policy in the region. The OAS has also
been the driving force behind the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which aims at
integrating the economies and creating increased prosperity and openness in the region (Stephenson,
1998).177 Politics and economics have proven, in East Asia and the Pacific Rim, to be difficult to
integrate into one single policy, although the integration in OAS has been relatively successful. FTAA is a
body subordinated to the OAS structure and currently the OAS is negotiating how the dispute
settlement mechanisms should be structured in FTAA (FTAA, 2001; 2002). FTAA does, however, have a
more autonomous position within the OAS and it is thought to become a independent body in due time.
Concerning the FTAA, it is important to note that there are a large number of states that have not singed
or ratified the agreements and declarations to the creation of FTAA (FTAA, 2001:47).
The structure of OAS has grown since its establishment in 1948, and it is increasingly complex and legally
based. In short, the General Assembly, which brings together the foreign ministers of the Americas, is
the highest decision-making body of the OAS (OAS, 1948: chapter IX). To assist it, the General Assembly
has several bodies, of which the Permanent Council is the most important. This Council takes cognizance
of matters related to peaceful settlements of disputes that have been referred to it by the General
Secretary, General Assembly or Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (OAS, 1948). To
facilitate its work, it establishes committees and workgroups that it considers necessary. The daily
business is supervised by the General Secretary who has a secretariat at his disposal. The structure is
highly legalistic and the informal components are relatively few (cf East Asia).
The role of the United States in OAS can not be overestimated; in all spheres of interest the US impact is
far-reaching. This has worked well in many aspects of integration and conflict management, and less so
in a few. On the positive side, the organization has created several integration efforts and management
exercises, and thanks to the presence of the US it has been possible to enforce them. The financial
problems have been relatively minor, despite a contempt for large bureaucracies from US and Canada,
thanks to the North American engagement.178 On the negative side there are a few drawbacks; for
example when US has little or no interest, it has been difficult to implement and enforce polices within
OAS. It has also been relatively easy for US to control the agenda and only endorse “friendly” proposals.
This has created open opposition against the US control over OAS and demands have been raised for a
democratization of OAS.179 The US is, however, by far the more powerful actor in the region, and not
surprisingly it is easy to establish that US has impacted most of the management polices in the
organization through bilateral actions (LeoGrande, 1998; Schoultz, 1987). OAS has been seen as an
instrument for US foreign policy in the region, during the Cold War, and has lost a great deal of
legitimacy due to this (Fohmann, 2000).
Apart from the institutional effects, the US dominance of the organization has created consderable
dissatisfaction with the US tendency to act unilaterally in issues of importance for OAS. These unilateral
actions have created a decreased legitimacy for OAS among the Latin American states (Bell et al,
1997:15). Acosta has even argued that the unilateral actions from US are destructive for the OAS and
continued integration in the Americas (1997), and in an organization that functions highly efficiently this
is a threat to continued regionalism and effective CMM. Despite decades of US manipulation and
dominance of OAS that have discredited the organization among the Latin America states, there are
great hopes that the organization could serve the interests of the many rather than the few (Bell et al,
1997; Fryer, 1993; Slater, 1969).
The earlier US preoccupation with ideological stability and ─ if possible ─ democracy and the Latin
American concern for sovereignty have mostly been compatible, as both have been satisfied with status
quo. This has enabled the Americas to cooperate over many issues such as combating drugs, economic
development etc. After the Cold War there have been several changes in the North American policy
towards Latin America, and the Latin America preferences have also changed towards a more politically
liberal region with democratization as one of their primary goals (Dominiquez, 1999; Skidmore & Smith,
2001: 58-61, 399-422). The OAS has not been occupied with creating a supra-national organization, like
EU, but more a complement to the nation-state. This might change if OAS increases its legitimacy in
Latin America, and if US refrains from unilateral actions.
The single most important change for the Latin American states is that the reliance on exclusive
sovereignty has changed after the Cold War. Since 1991 the OAS Permanent Council has been
authorized to hold emergency meetings and take appropriate action where democracy is threatened in
individual countries (Cohen, 1997; OAS, 1991: res. 1080). This is a fundamental modification of the 1948
Charter that forbids intervention in internal affairs. This is made possible by the democratic
developments in the Americas and the increased importance of joint operations in OAS, rather than
unilateral operations by US. This change has had a tremendous effect on the development of internal
conflicts and the question of internally displaced people.180 The most interesting shift is the
enablement of the OAS to act when democracy is threatened in the Americas through resolution 1080
(threats to democracy).
Serves as a proximate filter to all 1NC impacts
Swanström 2 – Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, and one of its cofounders, Research Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (Niklas, “Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific
Rim,” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 64, pg. 298, 2002)//SJF
4.5.1.2 Analyzing the linkage between OAS and CMM
In organization, such as NAFTA (section 4.6.1), the strength comes from their strict regulatory system,
which creates predictability and trust between the parties; OAS has a much more comprehensive and
difficult approach, that aims at strengthening institutions, combating drugs and building norms through
democracy and increased cooperation. In this sense, OAS is truly a management organization that aims
at preventing conflicts by creating better democratic institutions, combating drugs and corruption etc.
This overarching aim is not easily accomplished, for several reasons. The strong engagement from US
actually makes the organization lame, as it is perceived as being unilateral and maximizing US interest at
the cost of Latin American interests. This is partly due to the unwillingness of US to be controlled by any
international or regional body, i.e. US considers the OAS to be an important body as long as it does not
contradict US policy. The smaller states also feel uncomfortable with the strong control US has over the
organization and the US tendency for unilateral actions. In organizations such as NAFTA or other
economic organizations, it might be efficient to have a stronger power that enforces trade liberalization
policies since the formality of the dispute resolution is high, which will have a managing effect, but in
political matters it is a very different story.
The reliance on US is also problematic as the organization is sensitive to domestic political changes in
the US, such as the isolationist tendencies US has shown from time to time. Currently, individuals and
organizations, such as Pat Buchanan, Ralph Nader and the Public Citizens, threaten regional cooperation
and the development of regional conflict management mechanisms (Weintraub, 2000a). The US has
decreased their spending on foreign policy since the Kennedy years when 10 per cent of the GDP was
used for foreign policy related areas, such as aid, diplomatic missions and international cooperation; this
accounted for a mere 3.8 per cent in 1996 (Cerdas Cruz, 1999:129). This pattern was not broken until
the September 11th bombings, after which the US increased their foreign policy spending
significantly.189 OAS goals are more than mere trade liberalization, although these efforts can be very
important for conflict management. OAS aims at transforming the political systems of the states in the
region and at strengthening civil society in a region with a history of military rule. There will
undoubtedly be some major problems in implementing the aims of OAS. This does not mean that OAS
has not done wonders, working for many of its aims, and OAS should be regarded as one of the more
successful regional organizations in creating and strengthening norms and democratic institutions, with
the exception of EU and OSCE. These organizations are, however, different from the organizations
analyzed in this thesis.
One priority for OAS is to create a collective management mechanism to decrease US temptation to act
unilaterally in Latin America (Bell et al, 1997:15). The tendency for US to act unilaterally is perceived as
something distasteful among the Latin American states and decreases the legitimacy of the organization.
The strong asymmetry in the region in both power and resources makes it critical that US leads the
region by example, not command. Concurrently with the relative decrease in power, US is forced to
include the Latin American states in the decision- making process.
The formal mechanisms are perceived as relatively legitimate, as long as US refrains from acting
unilaterally and neglecting the Latin American states’ interests. Moreover, the predictability of the
organization is relatively high through the highly legalistic principles that are present in OAS, especially
as all states tend to obey the decisions of OAS, excluding US, although this seems to be changing. The
enforcement power is, however, not as high as the legitimacy factor since OAS has no mechanism that
fully supercedes the sovereignty principle on a broad scale. This has changed, somewhat, with resolution
1080 that enables OAS to intervene if democracy is threatened in an American state. This change is
impressive and indicates that OAS will be given more direct enforcement powers, if the members can
trust US not to hijack the organization. There is no competing mechanism in the region, although there
are sub-regional organizations that could take over some of the functions of OAS if the organization
should come to have less legitimacy. An example of this is the Latin American integration that has
increased in depth during the last 10-15 years. Moreover, the rate of implementation has to be
considered to be relatively high as most mechanisms are fully implemented and followed by the regional
actors; many CMMs, however, never reached a level of formality sufficient to be considered for
implementation.190
Informally, OAS legitimacy has suffered from the unilateral actions of the US in the same way as the
formal mechanisms, although this has improved in the 1990s. This was especially apparent in the 1950s
and 1960s and the Latin American support of UN, rather than OAS and US. This has decreased the
efficiency, although there are clear normative effects from the informal mechanisms. There has
developed an American notion of CMM and a political uniformity: democracy. There are clearly
competing mechanisms in NAFTA and the Latin American cooperation structures, but they mainly focus
on trade, excluding the Andean Community (section 4.7). The formal mechanisms superceded the
informal mechanism, which reduces the impact from the informal mechanism to function as a
complement to the formal mechanism. Moreover, there are several other regional mechanisms that will
be discussed in section 4.6 and 4.7 that are more functional. There are, however, few conflicts in the
region and even fewer open conflicts; this is partly a result of the relatively important confidencebuilding effects of OAS. In conclusion, the formal aspects of OAS have to be considered to exhibit a good
level of impact, while the informal functions serve as a reinforcing mechanism. The informal has been
largely neglected and has had a low impact on the CMM. The most severe drawback in both
mechanisms is the extent of the unilateral actions by the US and the decreased legitimacy the
organization receives after each and every unilateral action.
From a theoretical perspective, one can briefly note that it is clear that the organization would have
decreased in legitimacy after the Cold War; according to the realist perspective this was because the
military threat has lost in importance, but the empirical reality was very much the opposite. OAS
focused on other questions of more value for the Latin American states, such as economic development
and the creation of democratic institutions. This is in accordance with the liberal perspective and,
moreover, it is clear that the assumption that Wallensteen made that the participation of stronger
states, in an asymmetrical relationship, decreases the success of cooperation, is clearly relevant here
(1981). The unilateral actions of the stronger power, US, have directly decreased the legitimacy of the
organization in the past, but post-Cold War the asymmetry has mattered less and even had positive
effects when US has been able to use its own impact to implement changes. The normative changes that
OAS has implemented in the region can be traced directly back to the constructivist theories in
combination with a great deal of learning. OAS is one of the organizations, so far, in this study that has
adapted one of the more successful post-Cold War perspectives by unlearning the Cold War tendencies.
If this is a mere cosmetic change or a truly normative change, is something that will be seen when OAS
has to activate resolution 1080 in internal conflicts in America, that are directed against US interests.
OAS is key – only organization with sufficient CMM capabilities
Swanström 2 – Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, and one of its cofounders, Research Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (Niklas, “Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific
Rim,” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 64, pg. 298, 2002)//SJF
4.5.2 Conflict management in the Americas
Conflict management mechanisms in the Americas outside of OAS do not exist, with the exception of
NAFTA which is considered to be a North American organization in this thesis (see section 3.2). This has
increased the legitimacy of OAS, but has limited the choice of the Latin American states when US has
unilaterally dealt with OAS issues. It also threatens to stalemate conflict management in the Americas if
US acts unilaterally, and the other members refuse to deal with OAS in issues of importance to avoid US
involvement. The development of sub-regional mechanisms in Latin America and organizations that
include the Pacific Rim, has increased the competition between regional organizations. Changes in all
organizations, but specifically in OAS, have made the regional organizations more flexible and functional
for the member-states. The increased selection of cooperation structures and a more diverse selection
of regional organizations force the US to cooperate and refrain from unilateral acts in Latin America and
Canada. Even though track-dependency is important, the Latin American states have, at least, dual
membership in regional organizations and seem to defect to a higher degree than East Asian states.
There have been impressive changes in the region, the most important and exciting being the new trend
to disregard the sovereignty principle in favour of the democratic principles according to resolution
1080. If this were to have a deeper impact than it has had up to date, despite four cases of intervention
with the support of resolution 1080, it would indicate that OAS, similar to OSCE, would have a carte
blanche to penetrate the national sovereignty. It is however not imagined by any regional statesman
that this would include the sovereignty of US. In OAS all members are equal, but US is evidently more
equal than the other members. This creates a distinct problem between US and all other members, as
the Latin Americans perceive that US disregards their position. The situation has, however, been
accepted by the regional governments, as the US position has been useful in protecting democratic
principles in Latin America, but not necessarily in defense of the US notion of a liberal democracy as a
great deal of the traditional elites would not accept a limitation of their current powers.
The democratization of the region has worked as an integrative force, both normatively and
operationally. The existing CMMs in the region are based on the normative notion that democracy is
important and crucial to defend, in contrast to the Cold War argument that ideology and zero- sum
games were the overriding principles of cooperation and conflict management. This is a clear change
from a more realist concept to a more liberal view of cooperation and integration of the Americas.
US is key to effective multilateral strategy coordination
Swanström 2 – Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, and one of its cofounders, Research Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (Niklas, “Regional Cooperation and Conflict Management: Lessons from the Pacific
Rim,” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 64, pg. 298, 2002)//SJF
4.5.3 Concluding thoughts on the Americas
In section 4.5 we have seen that the Americas only have one overarching regional organization that
deals with CMM: OAS. The focus of OAS is wide and includes economic cooperation social development,
drug control, security etc. The organization has, however, been very successful, especially seen from an
international perspective with its integrative approach (EU and the Andean Community are comparable
on different scales). One of the reasons for success is that the economic and political CMMs are not
merged. The FTAA (initiated by OAS) or other sub-regional organizations (sections 4.6-4.7) provides for a
formal CMM and the OAS provides for a political and consensus oriented CMM. Important to note is the
formal mechanism that resolution 1080 stands for. The CMM structure deals with all issues, even
though the organization has recently been most focused on democracy and the threats to it and left the
economic issues for FTAA to deal with. There are both formal and informal mechanisms in the region,
but due to the legalistic tradition there is a preference for the formal tradition. There are not many
negative variables in this region that could threaten the continued regional integration and multilateral
CMM.
The regional trade could be perceived as a positive variable, as the intra-regional trade is relatively high,
the problem is that the trade is overwhelmingly directed towards US and that it creates a substantial
level of dependency on US. This is directly connected to the question of asymmetry in the region. US
controls the trade by being the, by far, most important economic actor in the region. This is reinforced
by its vaste military superiority. The US position in the region has, however, not been all negative; US
engagement in the Americas has structured the democratic process and trade with all states. The reason
that US and the Latin American states can cooperate to such a degree over political and economic issues
is the high degree of trust between the actors (starting in the 1990s) and that there is a cultural
proximity in the American states, such as democracy and liberal trade ideals. The stability of Latin
America should be added to this, as the Latin American region “suffers” from internal weakness
(something that will be further examined in section 4.7), which makes the Latin American states focus
on internal problems rather than to focus on expansionist plans, which has led to regional stability.
In the Americas it is apparent that the domination of a single power determines the outcome of regional
cooperation and conflict management. The superior military force of the US functions as a deterrent
that could be used if democracy, and US interests, were threatened. The political and economic strength
of US are operational instruments to correct the other members in the Americas, but it is impossible to
separate political, economic and military power as they reinforce each other in US foreign policy. It is
something of a paradox that an organization which focuses to such a high degree on democracy as OAS
has done, is anything but a democratic institution; this is a result of the unilateral actions of US and the
strong pressure US puts on opposing states. As the US relative economic power has decreased
(Economist, 2002) there is more maneuverability for the rest of the states in the region and the
diversification of regional organizations has given the smaller states alternatives to a organization that
would be dominated by US. The strong US control over the organization has been a positive force during
the creation of OAS, but in the current phase it threatens the legitimacy of the organization and many
states prefer to deal with conflicts in international organs, such as UN, rather than OAS. The presence of
US is, however, a crucial component for many states in the Americas, both financially and for security
reasons. This will make it unlikely that the, primarily, Latin American states can break with US (Scheman,
1988; Schoultz, 1987).191
The relative peace in the region is not primarily a result of OAS or any other regional organization. It
seems that the Latin American states focus to a lesser degree on inter-state conflicts as they are
preoccupied with their internal weaknesses and disputes (Centeno, 2002); this will be discussed more in
detail in section 4.7. The relative peace has, however, made it possible for the regional actors to
cooperate with a minimum of inter-state conflicts; this is in stark contrast to the Asian region, which has
a high degree of inter-state conflicts.
One of the more interesting changes in the Americas is the limitation of the sovereignty principle in
situations where democracy is threatened. This is the first region outside Europe that has enabled a
regional organization to react on internal disputes related to the political arena. There are a few
question marks related to this principle. Firstly, it is crucial that OAS is in control of the function or the
smaller states will perceive it as a unilateral act by US, once more. Secondly, it is unclear what OAS can
actually do and whether the organization has the mandate to act militarily in a state that has disabled
democracy. If these questions can develop both to the satisfaction of US and the smaller states, OAS has
a potential to act as a stabilizer in the region.
The normative impact on the Americas is impressive, and regardless of whether the US primary goal was
to create democracy or not, there has been a development of democratic institutions throughout the
region. There are few possibilities today that the population in the Latin American states would accept
any other form of government than democracy, although exceptions could happen in extreme situations
as in all regions. It is, however, interesting to note the relative similarities in the normative view of
democracy as the guiding principle. Yet this does not mean that the Latin American states will accept the
liberal economic system that US has made a cornerstone of its version of liberal democracy.
Cybersecurity I/L – 2AC
Successful OAS conflict management is vital to cybersecurity resiliency
Guyana Times 5/4 (“OAS report finds increase in hacking, cyber attacks in Caribbean,” 5/4/13,
http://www.guyanatimesgy.com/?p=12861)//SJF
The Organisation of American States (OAS) through the Secretariat of Multidimensional Security (SMS)
and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) released on Friday the “Latin American and
Caribbean Cybersecurity Trends and Government Responses” report.
OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza
Prepared in collaboration with the company Trend Micro, the report illustrates and analyses
cybersecurity and cybercrime trends in the region. The document contains detailed information on
cyberthreats in the Americas, and for the first time incorporates the perspectives and experiences of
OAS member state governments.
OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza affirmed, “This research responds to the needs of regional
governments to confront cybercrime, which is increasingly frequent and threatening, due to the
accelerating evolution of technology.”
He added, “To evaluate and effectively combat cyber threats, countries need detailed and reliable threat
information, which this report provides. It represents a significant advance, considering that a study like
this has not yet been carried out in our region. Organised crime now utilises modern technology and in
certain cases, these criminals have more resources at their disposal than countries can dedicate to
scientific development. We need to change this.”
The report found an overall increase in cyber attacks, an increase in “hacktivism” or politically motivated
hacking, Internet-assisted money laundering, and attacks against critical infrastructure. Other trends
discussed include levels of malware, spam, and wire fraud.
Pressing need to “maintain parity” with cyber criminals
Conclusions highlighted in the report signal a pressing need to “maintain parity with those seeking to
exploit digital vulnerabilities”. The lack of resources dedicated to building cybersecurity capacity and the
scarcity of specialised knowledge and experience needed to secure networks and implement effective
policies are two of the things that the report cites as hindering information security. In its conclusions,
the report contends that “organised crime groups are increasingly cyber-capable and hacker groups are
growing in number and sophistication”.
The activity of Internet users in the region is also discussed. Users often practise unsafe online habits,
such as running unpatched operating systems or using unsecured mass storage devices. Overall, most
Internet users pay little attention to cybersecurity. Finally, the document discusses cybercriminals’ use
of banking trojans as opposed to malware that predominates in other parts of the world.
In its recommendations, the report urges countries to promote raising awareness of safe cyber
practices: promoting and investing in technical education programmes, strengthening mechanisms to
designate governmental roles and responsibilities related to cybersecurity, and instituting norms for
international information sharing and cooperation on cybersecurity and cybercrime issues.
Government experiences
As opposed to previous reports on cyber activity in the Americas, the OAS and Trend Micro report and
analysis incorporates the perspectives and experiences of OAS member state governments.
The OAS invited its member states to contribute qualitative and quantitative information to the report
regarding instances of hacking, cybercrime, and government efforts. Twenty out of 32 Latin American
and Caribbean member states responded to the request to provide information.
Trend Micro gathered technical data on malicious web traffic and hacking trends. OAS Multidimensional
Security Secretary Adam Blackwell said that the report “presents an opportunity for governments to
showcase what types of initiatives have been successful in mitigating cyber risk”. “Ultimately, the
insights and analysis that came from my team’s extensive research will provide a valuable resource to
those working to secure our vital networks. I would finally like to highlight that this joint effort
represents the type of public-private cooperation that our member states have recognised as pivotal to
achieve sustainable hemispheric security.”
Trend Micro Vice President of Cyber Security, Tom Kellermann, also highlighted some of the key findings
of the report. “Latin America and the Caribbean regions are experiencing rapid technological adoption.
But with this evolution comes the dark side of globalisation – cybercrime.”
He added, “This seminal report depicts the growth of web-based attacks, as well as the use of online
forums for hosting and money laundering. Achieving sustainable economic growth in the region will be
dependent upon a concerted regional effort to strengthen cybersecurity and combat cybercrime.”
Protection against cyberthreats has become a major security concern worldwide. Since 2004, the OAS,
through the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, has worked to develop and enhance the
capabilities of member states to prevent and combat threats to cybersecurity at the national and
regional levels. More information about OAS cyber security efforts is available on the organisation’s
website.
Falklands ! – 1AC
Falklands dispute intensifying
NYT 6/20 (Rick Gladstone, “Dispute Over Falklands Intensifies,” 6/20/13,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/world/americas/dispute-over-falklandsintensifies.html?_r=0)//SJF
The protracted dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands appeared to harden
further on Thursday, as the British side dismissed any thought of inviting the new Argentine pope to
help mediate, and the Argentines rejected a March referendum that showed the islanders want to
remain British.
Both sides made their positions known after an annual meeting of the United Nations Decolonization
Committee, which called on Britain and Argentina to negotiate. Britain has said any negotiations must
include a representative from the Falklands, a condition rejected by Argentina, which calls the islands, in
the South Atlantic, Las Malvinas.
More than 30 years after the Argentines invaded the islands and British forces retook them, the
emotions of the dispute appear to be reinvigorated. They were stoked this year when Argentina’s
president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, sought to enlist Pope Francis, the former archbishop of
Buenos Aires, to advance the cause.
But the idea of papal intervention did not sit well with Michael Summers, a Falklands representative
who attended the Decolonization Committee’s meeting. “I think the last thing we need is religion
inserted into this dispute,” he said at a news conference.
At a separate news conference, Argentina’s foreign minister, Héctor Timerman, rejected Britain’s
contention that Argentina has no claim to the islands. Mr. Timerman also ridiculed the British insistence
on including an island representative in any talks.
“I need to meet with the foreign minister,” he said. “Kings meet with kings, and queens meet with
queens. Usually that is the way it works.”
Legitimate OAS conflict resolution quells Malvinas tensions
MercoPress 12 (“OAS calls on Argentina/UK to find peaceful way to solve Malvinas sovereignty
dispute,” 6/6/12, http://en.mercopress.com/2012/06/06/oas-calls-on-argentina-uk-to-find-peacefulway-to-solve-malvinas-sovereignty-dispute)//SJF
On the last day of session the organization urged both nations “to retake negotiations in order to soon
find a peaceful way to solve the Malvinas Islands sovereignty dispute” that caused a war between
London and Buenos Aires in 1982.
Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman invited the British representative in the OAS assembly to
immediately engage in dialogue in order to find a definitive solution to the conflict.
“I would like to offer Great Britain the opportunity to meet in a room. The OAS secretary general can be
present. I want to negotiate with Great Britain. I want to find a peaceful solution to this colonial
conflict,” he said during the fourth session of the meeting.
Timerman regretted that London chose to ignore the 39 resolutions passed by the UN urging both
nations to solve the bilateral conflict.
Before the final approval of the draft resolution several Foreign ministers read aloud similar statements
in support of Argentina from Unasur, Mercosur and Celac calling for diplomatic negotiations on the
Malvinas issue.
However Canada pointed out that it is for the Falkland Islands people to decide on their future adding
that it did not agree with some chapters of the OAS resolution.
Likewise and as had been anticipated the US delegation adopted a neutral stance but also accepted the
call for a peaceful solution to the bilateral dispute.
The draft resolution was presented to the general assembly by Brazil’s Deputy Secretary for
International Policy, Vera Machado, and was approved by acclamation on request from the Uruguayan
delegation.
The resolution reads as follows:
Considering its repeated statements that the Question of the Malvinas Islands is a matter of enduring
hemispheric concern;
Recalling its resolution AG/RES. 928 (XVIII-O/88), adopted by consensus on November 19, 1988, in which
it requested the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find, as soon as possible, a peaceful solution to the
sovereignty dispute;
Bearing in mind that in its resolution AG/RES. 1049 (XX-O/90), it expressed satisfaction over the
resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries;
Recognizing that the accreditation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, under
CP/RES. 655 (1041/95), as a permanent observer of the OAS reflects principles and values shared by that
country and OAS member states, which facilitate greater mutual understanding;
Noting with satisfaction that the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland maintain important political, cultural and trade ties, share common
values and are also engaged in close cooperation both bilaterally and in international fora;
Bearing in mind that, despite those ties and shared values, it has not yet been possible to resume the
negotiations between the two countries with a view to solving the sovereignty dispute over the
Malvinas Islands, Georgia del Sur y Sandwich del Sur Islands and the surrounding maritime areas in the
framework of resolutions 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII), 31/49, 37/9, 38/12, 39/6, 40/21, 41/40, 42/19 and
43/25 of the United Nations General Assembly, the decisions adopted by the same body on the same
question in the Special Committee on Decolonization, and the reiterated resolutions and declarations
adopted at this General Assembly; and
Having heard the presentation by the head of delegation of the Argentine Republic,
Welcomes the reaffirmation of the will of the Argentine Government to continue exploring all possible
avenues towards a peaceful settlement of the dispute and its constructive approach towards the
inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands.
Reaffirms the need for the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to resume, as soon as possible, negotiations on the sovereignty dispute, in
order to find a peaceful solution to this protracted controversy.
Decides to continue to examine the Question of the Falkland Islands at its subsequent sessions until a
definitive settlement has been reached thereon.
UK draws in Russia, China, and the US – goes nuclear
Press TV 12 (“'Argentina to get Malvinas Islands back',” 1/20/12,
http://presstv.com/detail/222072.html)//SJF
***Quotes Gretchen Small – Executive Intelligence Review
Press TV: This row has been escalating for a year, since oil was found. Is this all about oil? After all, there
are about 8.3 billion barrels of oil in the waters around the Malvinas Islands (Falkland Islands), which is
three times the amount of the UK's reserves.
Small: Oh, I think this the far greater stakes even the oil involved.
The British Empire and it still exists, and it is based on its monetarist system, its control of world
finances, they are bankrupt aren't they?
Their system is breaking down. That's the issue in Europe today.
And they are using war as their main response. Yes they use their current control of the United States,
which we are contesting, as the military might. Because the British military might is pathetic, like the
idea of having a monarchy is still today.
But they're going for war. Their beef for Argentina, in particular is in 2003, the Kirchner government
demonstrated, that a nation can and must reassert the principle, that people, the nation, economic
development, looking good in the future, is far more important, and must be defended against pieces of
papers of debt.
And they forced a write down of their debt, 60-75 percent, which the Greeks are studying today, and the
Italians are looking at.
So this Malvinas war, thirty years ago when this happened, my editor, the founder of the magazines, Mr.
Lyndon Larouche, said the Malvinas war was a precedent for NATO out of area deployment for
collection of the debt. That the financial system was at the root of it!
And today boy, that financial system is far more gone than it was before. So I think that's some of the
background here.
Press TV: During William Hague's most recent visit to Argentina, Argentina's foreign secretary said he
made it clear that all Latin American nations backed Argentina's claim. Why is William Hague claiming
then that aside from some saber-rattling from Argentina, the rest of Latin America is interested in trade
and development with the UK?
Small: Well their trying to make a comeback, I mean Hague are saying we are good.
Their going back to the days when they ran Latin America! And they control it largely through the debt.
This question of were British control lies is extremely important, is through their control over monetary
system.
And they are, you know, they are making a big push for Brazil, for control over Brazil right now to go
back to the days when Brazil was their sort of control point over the area.
But the stakes are much bigger, and I come back to this question, the issues before Latin America, the
issue before Hague and Cameron. These guys, the British financial system is going down.
If the Greeks, the Italians, the Spaniard and the United States, did what Argentina did, of saying, look,
you control, you put the principle, all the derivatives, all the financial speculative, wipe it off.
Here in the United States, that would be the return to Franklin Roosevelt's Glass-Steagall Act.
What do you think happens to the British Empire at that point? What happens to the City of London?
They're wiped out!
These guys are going for war, wherever they could get it. That's what's behind the Syria question, that's
what's behind the attack on Iran.
And their desire, I mean this is really serious, and it may seem chatty that people have to think about
this.
Their desire, the British desire is to use Syria and Iran as a pretext, to set up thermonuclear war,
between the United States, Russia and China, because the transatlantic financial system which is the
core of the City of London, Wall Streets just a part of that
If we're going down, they can't afford Russia and China, Asia as a whole, rebuild.
And that's the stakes behind this. The Malvinas are part of that.
Press TV: Let's go with your statements about the UK and the US being on the downslide, economically
speaking, while Latin America is on the rise, we can mention Brazil, we can mention Argentina.
If the UK would decide to make a move, would they have anybody on board with them? And of course
the first country to come to mind would be the United States.
Small: Well, what their… first off all, I don't think anybody in Argentina is interested in retaking the
islands. This is a smart government, the Christina Fernandez; the Kirchner government is a smart
government.
Their interested in going out into space, their interested in developing their nuclear capability, their
interested in crushing this monetary that they barely survived!
So now, as for what the US, the fight right now… in the US, whether they would go with the UK or not,
really hangs much more around, will they, will President Obama be removed from office, before he gets
the US lined up with the UK in the war, in the new cockpit for global thermonuclear war, which is the,
the new Balkan today is in the Middle East.
And I think that from a strategic standpoint, is far higher on the agenda. I think the British are moving on
the Argentine question, because they want to smash sovereignty everywhere as a principle.
But I think their control of the United States, the game now that we are looking at and being watched, is
what happens over the immediate threat of a thermal nuclear war, in which there are many, many
institutional people, including the highest level of the US military, who absolutely want this stopped!
They do not want that war, in the Middle East, and the idea of getting them involved in Latin America is
just of the chart!
Press TV: If there is a move made on the islands, whether it's from the Argentina, which would be the
likely case, what's going to happen? What would the likely reaction by the UK be?
There have been reports, a few months back, saying that, again I mention that Argentina has plans,
thinking that this is the best time since the defense capabilities of the UK has been reduced.
Small: I think that those stories must come out of London, because I think the Argentines are much
smarter than that. They are going to get the Malvinas back, because this evidence, as the other speaker
said, is ludicrous in this situation.
But they can get it out, understanding, I think they have a much clearer understanding that the issues
here do not really revolve around the Malvinas, it isn't as rightful as Argentina's claim is!
Falklands I/L – 2AC
OAS successfully deescalates conflict
MercoPress 12 (“US delegation at OAS assembly will reiterate Falklands/Malvinas a bilateral issue,”
6/1/12, http://en.mercopress.com/2012/06/01/us-delegation-at-oas-assembly-will-reiterate-falklandsmalvinas-a-bilateral-issue)//SJF
“As you know, the U.S. position has not changed. With respect to the Islands, that is an issue we
should... that should be resolved between Argentina and England” saidActing Under Secretary for Press
Affairs at the State Department Mike Hammer during an exchange with reporters on Twitter.
Hammer anticipated that the coming Organization of American States to be held next week in
Cochabamba, Bolivia will be “a good meeting” with a “good atmosphere”.
“What matters to the US is to work jointly with the hemisphere countries and so advance towards a
better future, fight poverty, attack issues such as climate change and see how we can work together as
we did at the recent Summit of the Americas in Colombia, and ensuring that human rights are
respected, and strengthening democracy” added Hammer.
According to OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza the dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands
sovereignty will again be in the agenda of the OAS members’ Foreign ministers agenda “with the same
resolution and success as last year in the El Salvador General Assembly and more recently at the Summit
of the Americas”.
The US delegation to the OAS meeting will be headed by Roberta Jackson, Assistant Secretary of State
for Latin America and the US ambassador before OAS, Carmen Lomellin, plus the support from the US
embassy in Bolivia.
State Department spokesperson William Ostick justified the absence of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
who will miss the OAS general assembly, recalling that the meeting was originally scheduled for “next
July” and this came “into conflict with a long before programmed trip to Europe in early June”.
Last March British PM David Cameron visited President Obama in the White House and revealed that
the US was content with the status quo in the Falkland Islands and ‘would stop prodding Britain and
Argentina’ to talk to each other.
“President Obama made clear that the US was content with the status quo, under which the Falklands
remain a British overseas territory”, said PM Cameron.
AT: Cyber Mil Turn
Multilateral cyber-deterrence is vital to national security
McConnell 10 – director of the National Security Agency in the Clinton administration and the
director of national intelligence during President George W. Bush's second term (Mike, “Mike McConnell
on how to win the cyber-war we're losing,” 2/28/10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.html?sid=ST2010031901063)//SJF
The United States is fighting a cyber-war today, and we are losing. It's that simple. As the most wired
nation on Earth, we offer the most targets of significance, yet our cyber-defenses are woefully lacking.
The problem is not one of resources; even in our current fiscal straits, we can afford to upgrade our
defenses. The problem is that we lack a cohesive strategy to meet this challenge.
The stakes are enormous. To the extent that the sprawling U.S. economy inhabits a common physical
space, it is in our communications networks. If an enemy disrupted our financial and accounting
transactions, our equities and bond markets or our retail commerce -- or created confusion about the
legitimacy of those transactions -- chaos would result. Our power grids, air and ground transportation,
telecommunications, and water-filtration systems are in jeopardy as well.
These battles are not hypothetical. Google's networks were hacked in an attack that began in December
and that the company said emanated from China. And recently the security firm NetWitness reported
that more than 2,500 companies worldwide were compromised in a sophisticated attack launched in
2008 and aimed at proprietary corporate data. Indeed, the recent Cyber Shock Wave simulation
revealed what those of us involved in national security policy have long feared: For all our war games
and strategy documents focused on traditional warfare, we have yet to address the most basic
questions about cyber-conflicts.
What is the right strategy for this most modern of wars? Look to history. During the Cold War, when the
United States faced an existential threat from the Soviet Union, we relied on deterrence to protect
ourselves from nuclear attack. Later, as the East-West stalemate ended and nuclear weapons
proliferated, some argued that preemption made more sense in an age of global terrorism.
The cyber-war mirrors the nuclear challenge in terms of the potential economic and psychological
effects. So, should our strategy be deterrence or preemption? The answer: both. Depending on the
nature of the threat, we can deploy aspects of either approach to defend America in cyberspace.
During the Cold War, deterrence was based on a few key elements: attribution (understanding who
attacked us), location (knowing where a strike came from), response (being able to respond, even if
attacked first) and transparency (the enemy's knowledge of our capability and intent to counter with
massive force).
Against the Soviets, we dealt with the attribution and location challenges by developing human
intelligence behind the Iron Curtain and by fielding early-warning radar systems, reconnaissance
satellites and undersea listening posts to monitor threats. We invested heavily in our response
capabilities with intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines and long-range bombers, as well as
command-and-control systems and specialized staffs to run them. The resources available were
commensurate with the challenge at hand -- as must be the case in cyberspace.
Just as important was the softer side of our national security strategy: the policies, treaties and
diplomatic efforts that underpinned containment and deterrence. Our alliances, such as NATO, made
clear that a strike on one would be a strike on all and would be met with massive retaliation. This
unambiguous intent, together with our ability to monitor and respond, provided a credible nuclear
deterrent that served us well.
How do we apply deterrence in the cyber-age? For one, we must clearly express our intent. Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton offered a succinct statement to that effect last month in Washington, in a
speech on Internet freedom. "Countries or individuals that engage in cyber-attacks should face
consequences and international condemnation," she said. "In an Internet-connected world, an attack on
one nation's networks can be an attack on all."
That was a promising move, but it means little unless we back it up with practical policies and
international legal agreements to define norms and identify consequences for destructive behavior in
cyberspace. We began examining these issues through the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative, launched during the George W. Bush administration, but more work is needed on outlining
how, when and where we would respond to an attack. For now, we have a response mechanism in
name only.
The United States must also translate our intent into capabilities. We need to develop an early-warning
system to monitor cyberspace, identify intrusions and locate the source of attacks with a trail of
evidence that can support diplomatic, military and legal options -- and we must be able to do this in
milliseconds. More specifically, we need to reengineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation,
intelligence analysis and impact assessment -- who did it, from where, why and what was the result -more manageable. The technologies are already available from public and private sources and can be
further developed if we have the will to build them into our systems and to work with our allies and
trading partners so they will do the same.
Of course, deterrence can be effective when the enemy is a state with an easily identifiable government
and location. It is less successful against criminal groups or extremists who cannot be readily traced, let
alone deterred through sanctions or military action.
To win the cyber-war, look to the Cold War
There are many organizations (including al-Qaeda) that are not motivated by greed, as with criminal
organizations, or a desire for geopolitical advantage, as with many states. Rather, their worldview seeks
to destroy the systems of global commerce, trade and travel that are undergirded by our cyberinfrastructure. So deterrence is not enough; preemptive strategies might be required before such
adversaries launch a devastating cyber-attack.
We preempt such groups by degrading, interdicting and eliminating their leadership and capabilities to
mount cyber-attacks, and by creating a more resilient cyberspace that can absorb attacks and quickly
recover. To this end, we must hammer out a consensus on how to best harness the capabilities of the
National Security Agency, which I had the privilege to lead from 1992 to 1996. The NSA is the only
agency in the United States with the legal authority, oversight and budget dedicated to breaking the
codes and understanding the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies. The challenge is to shape
an effective partnership with the private sector so information can move quickly back and forth from
public to private -- and classified to unclassified -- to protect the nation's critical infrastructure.
We must give key private-sector leaders (from the transportation, utility and financial arenas) access to
information on emerging threats so they can take countermeasures. For this to work, the private sector
needs to be able to share network information -- on a controlled basis -- without inviting lawsuits from
shareholders and others.
Obviously, such measures must be contemplated very carefully. But the reality is that while the lion's
share of cybersecurity expertise lies in the federal government, more than 90 percent of the physical
infrastructure of the Web is owned by private industry. Neither side on its own can mount the cyberdefense we need; some collaboration is inevitable. Recent reports of a possible partnership between
Google and the government point to the kind of joint efforts -- and shared challenges -- that we are
likely to see in the future.
No doubt, such arrangements will muddy the waters between the traditional roles of the government
and the private sector. We must define the parameters of such interactions, but we should not dismiss
them. Cyberspace knows no borders, and our defensive efforts must be similarly seamless.
Ultimately, to build the right strategy to defend cyberspace, we need the equivalent of President Dwight
D. Eisenhower's Project Solarium. That 1953 initiative brought together teams of experts with opposing
views to develop alternative strategies on how to wage the Cold War. The teams presented their views
to the president, and Eisenhower chose his preferred approach -- deterrence. We now need a dialogue
among business, civil society and government on the challenges we face in cyberspace -- spanning
international law, privacy and civil liberties, security, and the architecture of the Internet. The results
should shape our cybersecurity strategy.
We prevailed in the Cold War through strong leadership, clear policies, solid alliances and close
integration of our diplomatic, economic and military efforts. We backed all this up with robust
investments -- security never comes cheap. It worked, because we had to make it work.
Let's do the same with cybersecurity. The time to start was yesterday.
Offensive posture towards Latin America is the only way to deter drug violence
AP 2/4 (Associated Press, “US military expands its billion dollar drug war in Latin America,” 2/4/13,
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/02/04/us-military-expands-its-billion-dollar-drug-war-in-latinamerica/)//SJF
The crew members aboard the USS Underwood could see through their night goggles what was
happening on the fleeing go-fast boat: Someone was dumping bales.
When the Navy guided-missile frigate later dropped anchor in Panamanian waters on that sunny August
morning, Ensign Clarissa Carpio, a 23-year-old from San Francisco, climbed into the inflatable dinghy
with four unarmed sailors and two Coast Guard officers like herself, carrying light submachine guns. It
was her first deployment, but Carpio was ready for combat.
Fighting drug traffickers was precisely what she'd trained for.
In the most expensive initiative in Latin America since the Cold War, the U.S. has militarized the battle
against the traffickers, spending more than $20 billion in the past decade. U.S. Army troops, Air Force
pilots and Navy ships outfitted with Coast Guard counternarcotics teams are routinely deployed to
chase, track and capture drug smugglers.
The sophistication and violence of the traffickers is so great that the U.S. military is training not only law
enforcement agents in Latin American nations, but their militaries as well, building a network of
expensive hardware, radar, airplanes, ships, runways and refueling stations to stem the tide of illegal
drugs from South America to the U.S.
According to State Department and Pentagon officials, stopping drug-trafficking organizations has
become a matter of national security because they spread corruption, undermine fledgling democracies
and can potentially finance terrorists.
U.S. drug czar Gil Kerlikowske, pointing to dramatic declines in violence and cocaine production in
Colombia, says the strategy works.
"The results are historic and have tremendous implications, not just for the United States and the
Western Hemisphere, but for the world ," he said at a conference on drug policy last year.
AT: UK Turn
No impact to US-UK relationship
HCFAC 10 (“Global Security: UK-US Relations,” 3/18/10, House of Common Foreign Affairs Committee,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114.pdf)//SJF
I entirely agree with both the previous points and, as you say, we all have personal experiences. I
remember working at CSIS, where we ended up doing a project, in which people who are currently in
the Administration are involved, pushing for European defence integration. They actually chaired and
pushed the project, as Americans, on behalf of deeper European defence integration, which I find quite
fascinating. I do not think that they see it as a threat, they do not assume that it will be anti-American
and, certainly because of who they see themselves as—the Obama Administration—they do not see this
as being a kind of zero-sum relationship. This is very important in terms of where the UK ends up
because there was a value to the UK, certainly historically—I would even say going back a bit—of being a
potential guard against too much integration, and that was an important role that it played within the
“special relationship”. That aspect of the relationship and that role for Britain as a guardian against
deeper integration is not what is needed. It is not important any more. One thing that I suppose gets my
back up a little bit at the moment is when I hear about US frustration. This has been reported in the
press and comments have been made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe about yellow lights
and frustration with Europeans for not giving enough and not being organised enough. On Afghanistan
there are clearly deep diVerences among European Governments about how central and important that
conflict is. It is deeply important to us, as Brits, and to one or two other European Governments, but it is
not seen that way by others, so it is a matter of choice that we are not organized or engaged. It is not
because European integration is failing in some particular way, it is a very clear political decision by
some not to be engaged. On the other hand, I can see European leaders say, and I have heard them say,
“Look we’re pretty organized on climate change, we’ve been very organised on dealing with the global
financial crisis and we’ve got some pretty clear views on trade issues, so we are organised. We just don’t
happen to be organised, because we don’t want to be, on the one issue that is deeply important to you.
And we are organised—more than we were—on Iran.” There is a dialogue of the deaf going on. There is
a search for greater coordination by aspects of the US Administration on something that is deeply
important to them, but there are things that are important to European Governments, where they feel
that they are organised, on which they are not getting a very clear answer from the US—climate change
being the absolute case in point in the lead up to Copenhagen.
AT: No Malvinas War
Yes war – Britain’s willing to militarize
RT 1/6 (Russian Times, “UK will fight to keep the Falklands – Cameron,” 1/6/13,
http://rt.com/news/uk-argentina-falklands-conflict-455/)//SJF
British Prime Minster David Cameron has said he would send troops to the Falkland Islands if Argentina
attempts to invade and retake the territory. Aggressive rhetoric has recently flared between London and
Buenos Aires.
Speaking on the BBC’s 'Andrew Marr Show,' Cameron emphasized the UK’s “extremely strong” position
after Argentinian President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner renewed her charge that the islands were
stolen by Britain.
Kirchner has taken out advertisements in British newspapers saying in an open letter – initially sent to
David Cameron – that the islands were taken from Argentina in a “blatant exercise of 19th Century
colonialism.”
The move was in response to an advert placed by UK tabloid the Sun in English-language daily the
Buenos Aires Herald, which warned Argentina to keep its “hands off the islands,” and claimed that
British sovereignty over the isles dates back to 1765.
But Argentina-based journalist Daniel Schweimler told the BBC that across the entire country,
Argentinians “believe that the Falklands belong to them.”
Opinion polls suggest that about two-thirds of Argentinians support Kirchner’s position on the Falklands.
Kirchner argued in her letter that in 1833, argentinians on the island were expelled, and “the United
Kingdom subsequently began a population implantation process similar to that applied to other
territories under colonial rule.”
The British Foreign Office posted on its website that an interim governor appointed by ministers in
Buenos Aires was murdered by his own men, and a British warship subsequently “told” his 24-man
garrison to leave.
The Falklands dispute has renewed in recent years – in 2007, Argentina reasserted its claim over the
islands. Kirchner’s position has hardened since the discovery of potential oil reserves off the islands, as
well as last year’s 30th anniversary of the Falklands War.
Argentina invaded the Falklands – known as the Malvinas in Argentina – in May of 1982. Then-Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher sent a task force to retake the islands, sparking a conflict that saw 255
British soldiers and 649 Argentinian troops killed.
Asked if Britain would defend the territory again, Cameron replied, “Of course we would, and we have
strong defenses in place on the Falkland Islands, that is absolutely key, that we have fast jets stationed
there, we have troops stationed on the Falklands.”
Cameron has been warned by admirals in Britain’s Royal Navy that the UK may no longer have the
capability to retake the islands if Argentina invades. The UK no longer has any aircraft carriers, and the
two being built won’t be ready until 2016 at the earliest.
Neil Clark, a writer and a journalist has told RT, that the British government would favor a conflict with
Argentina, because of Cameron’s public rating.
“For Cameron, for this issue to come up now is timely, because the government is way down in the
opinion polls. The government is very unpopular. I can’t recall a government becoming so unpopular so
quickly. So I think he would want to keep this in the news headlines,” Clark said.
Historian Hugh Bicheno told RT in May that the British “learned nothing” from the 1982 Falklands War.
In a controversial book about the war called 'Razor’s Edge,' Bicheno argues that the fight could have
gone either way at any time. He also claimed that in 1982, when the Royal Navy was far bigger than it is
today, Britain did not have the capability to launch large-scale overseas military operations.
But Cameron insisted that Britain’s defenses are sufficient. “I get regular reports on this issue because I
want to know that our defenses are strong, our resolve is extremely strong,” he said.
Cameron has maintained that Falklanders should be allowed to decide for themselves if they want to
remain British or be governed by Buenos Aires.
“The future of the islands should be determined by the Falkland Islanders themselves, the people who
live there. Whenever they have been asked their opinion, they say they want to maintain their current
status with the United Kingdom,” Cameron told reporters during a January 3 visit to Preston.
Falklanders are holding a referendum on the issue later this year, and Argentina should respect their
vote, which has Cameron's “100 percent backing,” he added.
In a further escalation of the row between Argentina and Britain, cruise ships headed for the Falklands
have been subjected to intimidation and protests upon docking in Buenos Aries.
There have been at least 12 reported incidents of cruise liners being disrupted, including officials
refusing permission for entry into Argentinian ports, ships being delayed, and masked militants attacking
and ransacking shipping company offices.
Many cruises will now no longer call at the Falklands – denying the islanders of an important source of
income – in order to appease authorities in Argentina.
Last month, the UK government formerly summoned Argentinian Ambassador Alicia Castro to protest
the incidents.
OAS good – conflict / crime
Reinvigorating the OAS creates a sustainable Latin American conflict resolution
mechanism and also combats organized crime
Barshefsky and Hill 8 (Charlene and James T., Chairs on The Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Latin
America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, PDF)//WNM
Peaceful resolution of the crisis at the Rio Summit in the Dominican Republic showed, on the one hand,
the importance of institutional and legal mechanisms for security cooperation and dispute resolution,
especially those under the OAS. But as a general matter such mechanisms remain weak, and improving
and deepening them will be critical to averting such crises in the future. Other forums for regional and
subregional cooperation, though not specifically dedicated to security cooperation(such as Mercosur
and the Community of Andean Nations), have been beneficial in reducing and managing interstate
tensions. Other proposed o rincipient security forums, such as the South American Defense Council and
the Ameripol regional police force, could also play a positive role. Signed in 1967, the Treaty of
Tlatelolco has, so fa , succeeded in committing the entire Latin American region to remain free of
nuclear weapons. While these mechanisms, taken together, do not provide an especially robust regional
system for managing interstate conflict, they do comprise a system of norms and practices aimed at
resolving such disputes—and offer a platform on which to build.
While Colombia’s cross-border raid led to a regional diplomatic crisis, it also brought to the surface the
concerns of many of the region’s governments apart from Colombia—including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Peru—over the persistence of the FARC and possible efforts by regional actors to abet
and prolong the FARC’s destabilizing presence. The Colombian government has alleged that it found
three laptop computers at the site where Reyes was killed that contained evidence of support for the
FARC by the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments. The alleged support included a $300 million fund
that Chávez’s government was going to set up for the FARC and acceptance by the Ecuadorian
government of the FARC’s presence in Ecuadorian territory. If authenticated by Interpol, the information
obtained from several hard drives in the coming months may substantiate allegations of deliberate
support by Venezuela for the FARC, which the United States, the European Union, and Canada consider
a terrorist organization. The Colombian government also found thirty kilograms of depleted uranium
near Bogotá that it claims were going to be delivered to the FARC, raising fears that the FARC has an
interest in obtaining nuclear material.
Even as the Colombian Armed Forces continue to weaken the FARC militarily and psychologically, the
incident exposed the FARC’s continuing pursuit of international ties and highlighted the need for greater
regional cooperation to put an end to the region’s longest-standing insurgent group. The Task Force
finds that the regional dimensions of the Colombian conflict remain significant and require greater
discipline and cooperation among Latin American countries in order to successfully tackle the shared
challenge posed by violent criminal syndicates and insurgent groups that thrive on weak institutions and
contraband to destabilize governments in the region.
Also troublesome is the vast number of mostly unregistered guns in the region. In Central America,
estimates range from two million to four million (many left over from earlier civil wars and
conflicts),with less than 800,000 registered with the government. The United States is another
important source of illegal firearms and sophisticated weaponry. Over 10 percent of U.S. gun shops are
located near the Mexican border and these businesses sell on average twice the number of arms than
their counterparts more distant from the border.
Smuggling guns into Mexico, a country with strict gun laws, can be a profitable venture: an AK-47 worth
$500 in the United States can be sold for as much as $1,500 in Mexico.27 While Mexico has only6,000
legally registered guns in the country, every year the government confiscates between 5,000 and 10,000
illegal firearms, more than 90percent of which are traced to the United States. Between January and
October 2007 the Mexican government seized 6,000 weapons, 470grenades, and 552,000 rounds of
ammunition.28 Reflecting the plentiful supply of guns in the country, criminals have recently been
leaving their weapons at the crime scene.
International drug trafficking organizations derive their power not only from powerful weapons, but also
from drug money coming from the United States and other consuming countries. The DrugEnforcement
Administration (DEA) estimates that Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations launder
between $8 billion and $25 billion every year. Much of this comes from sales throughout the United
States, where profits are transferred to border towns (pre-dominantly through wire transfers) and then
transported out of the country, usually through bulk cash smuggling across the southern bor-der. Once
the money is in Mexico, it is stashed for future financing of international criminal organizations, moved
further south, deposited in currency exchange houses or banks, or transported back to the United States
via armored car or courier service. This sophisticated smuggling system allows criminal organizations to
claim the funds as legitimate deposits in banks and makes it hard to trace the funds to drug trafficking.
The Mexican attorney general estimates that approxi-mately $10 billion of laundered Mexican drug
money ends up in U.S. banks every year.
These laundered funds and smuggled weapons sustain and reinforce the power of international criminal
organizations, assisting them in compromising or overwhelming Latin American governments. The Task
Force finds that transnational crime is aided by the widespread availability of handguns and small arms,
and ready funding from the lucrative drug trade. Regional cooperation is critical for effective responses,
as illegal non-state organizations and criminal networks do not operate within or respect national or
international borders.
OAS good – democracy
Creating an effective OAS is the best chance of consolidating Latin American
democracy
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important that the United States and
the region increase their attention to reshaping regional institutions to better align them with current
realities and challenges and to make them more effective. The hemisphere’s institutional architecture is
in great flux, and there is growing need for decisions about priorities and objectives.
The Organization of American States, the world’s oldest regional institution, has come under enormous
stress as a result of the rapidly shifting political and economic context of hemispheric relations. It is still
the region’s main political organization, with legitimacy to work across a spectrum of issues, but it is
badly in need of institutional reform, perhaps even a re-launching . For all its problems, the OAS has a
singular capacity to take on critical issues, including human rights, press freedom, and democracy, that
other, newer multilateral mechanisms seem years away from being able to handle adequately. New
groupings—like UNASUR and CELAC—may have key roles to fulfill, but no institution can yet match the
normative frameworks developed over decades in the OAS.
Regional organizations focused on finance and development have emerged from the transformations
stronger than their political counterparts . This may be because there is greater consensus on economic
management than political questions . The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has gone through a
difficult reform process, while the CAF—Development Bank of Latin America, with only Latin American
members, has expanded considerably in recent years and extended its lending throughout the region .
Although not strictly a regional institution, Brazil’s National Development Bank has sharply increased its
funding outside Brazil, chiefly to support foreign investments by Brazilian companies on infrastructure
and energy projects in neighboring countries .
It is encouraging how constructively Washington has responded to Latin America’s growing
independence and greater assertiveness in regional and global affairs . It has readily accommodated the
hemisphere’s emerging institutional landscape even though that includes new regional groupings from
which the United States is excluded . Less encouraging, but indicative of its shrinking political and
diplomatic profile in the region, is the reduced US commitment to and active engagement in some
regional arrangements to which it does belong, among them the OAS and the Summit of the Americas .
As the OAS goes through a troubled period, it must have stronger engagement from member
governments, including effective involvement by the United States, in order to regain a central role in
inter-American affairs.
Leadership advantage
Cuba undermines US leadership
Lack of cooperation reinforces international condemnation – stains America’s foreign
policy rep
Ayuso 12 (Silvia, “ANALYSIS: Lifting Cuba's embargo, a domestic taboo for the US,” 2/5/12,
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/americas/news/article_1689059.php/ANALYSIS-Lifting-Cuba-sembargo-a-domestic-taboo-for-the-US)//SJF Thale = director at the Washington Office on Latin
America
Still, even those timid steps reaped international applause, particularly from Latin America. According to
Thale, the embargo is 'a stain on America's reputation abroad.'
'The US embargo on Cuba is this long-standing symbol of an unpleasant history of US attempts to
dominate Latin America ... and it does complicate US diplomacy in the region, because it reminds people
of the tradition of the ugly American,' he said.
Each year, when the UN General Assembly votes on a resolution condemning the embargo - as it has
done for 20 years - growing US isolation shows the extent to which the policy is unpopular far beyond
the Americas.
Plan spills over globally
The plan’s approach boosts US credibility in negotiating other global hot spots
Hinderdael 2011- M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, B.A in History and Economics from University of Virginia (Klaas, “Breaking
the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, 6/11/11, http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-thelogjam.html?printerFriendly=true, google scholar)//KW
The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it
would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the
promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies. In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the
Obama
administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign
policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact
domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for
example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind. The United
States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism
has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should
look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s
political structure and human rights policies. At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are
amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a
year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping
anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for
a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52 At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there
is
tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to
the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo,
combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years. American
policymakers should see
Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies
toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President
Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries
unclench their fists.
Engaging Cuba is vital to global democratic transitions
Reinsch, 3-President of the National Foreign Trade Council, A group of businesses advocating free trade
and Co-Chairman of USA*Engage, a coalition of businesses against sanctions (William, “Statement of
William A. Reinsch, President of the National Foreign Trade Council & Co-Chairman of USA*Engage
Before the Senate Committee on Finance”, USA*Engage, 9/4/03.
http://archives.usaengage.org/literature/2003/20030904%20testimony%20to%20Senate%20Finance.ht
ml)//TL
This is a sterile vicious cycle that must be broken. We cannot assume that time is on our side in Cuba or
that continuing to pursue our failed policy is without risks. The real issue the U.S. should address is how
to prepare for a post-Castro transition. We have to accept the fact that there are radically different
courses that post-Castro Cuba can take, not all of them to our liking: civil war, domination by drug lords,
a military junta, or rule by another figure from this regime who might compensate for a charisma deficit
with even more repression. Increased immigration to the U.S. could be the result of any of these
outcomes. Second, because of its symbolic importance to the U.S., how we deal with Cuba as it
approaches this transition will affect our standing in the region and beyond. The U.S. should be seen to
be working constructively toward a peaceful transition to free market democracy in Cuba. By moving
now to engage Cuba, the United States will be able to deploy its most powerful arsenal before we are
overtaken by events. That arsenal is our "soft power," which goes beyond American affluence to include
American values, institutions and traditions such as the rule of law, tolerance and freedom of expression
and association. These factors have played a significant role in transitions in places as diverse as South
Korea, Eastern Europe and South Africa.
Now, having failed to influence events in Cuba through a policy of isolation, it is time to call Castro's
bluff and start removing the crutches he uses to stay in power. Increasing contact between Americans
and Cubans is one way to begin.
Kashmir ! – 2AC
Kashmiri water-wars go nuclear
Overdorf 9 – Indian analyst for GlobalPost (Jason, “The coming war for water,” 9/21/9,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/india/090731/the-coming-war-water?page=0,1)//SJF
These troop movements are indeed a constant part of daily life in Indian-controlled Kashmir, where the
Indian army stations 600,000 to 800,000 soldiers — more than double the number deployed for the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. A fragile cease-fire has held here since November 2003, but Kashmir remains
one of the most dangerous places in the world. Anger over the bloody partition that divided India and
Pakistan in 1947 and a bitter feud over the ownership of this majestic portion of the Himalayas have led
the two subcontinental powers to three full-fledged wars and a perilous standoff in 2002, when many
world powers feared the dispute would go nuclear.
There are many reasons for the Kashmir conflict. But perhaps the most important of them is the water
that spews into the sky at my feet. When the British drew the borders partitioning India and Pakistan,
their cartographers failed to consider the run of the rivers that would feed the two countries. Kashmir's
accession to India granted New Delhi control over the headwaters of the Indus — the lifeline of
civilization in what is now Pakistan since 2600 B.C. And although a treaty for sharing the water was
worked out in 1960, its foundation has begun to crack under the pressure of the two countries' rapidly
growing populations and the specter of climate change.
Shortly before he led Pakistan's troops into the Kargil War, a then-unknown Pakistani general named
Pervez Musharraf wrote in his dissertation at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London that the
issue of the distribution of the waters of Kashmir between India and Pakistan has “the germs of future
conflict.” Because water is the one resource that neither India nor Pakistan can do without, many
experts fear that one day the dispute over the Indus — already an incessant source of diplomatic
skirmishes — will propel these two nuclear weapons states into an all-out war.
Battles over water are already mounting in number around the world, according to Peter Gleick, an
expert at the Pacific Institute. But Kashmir could be the most dangerous flash point. According to a
recent United Nations report, Pakistan's water supply has dropped from about 5,000 cubic meters per
person in the 1950s to 1,420 cubic meters today — perilously close to the threshold at which water
shortage becomes an impediment to economic development and a serious hazard to human health.
India, at 1,750 cubic meters per person, is not much better off. Both countries' huge populations are still
growing, and because most of the available water comes from the disappearing glaciers of the
Himalayas it is extremely vulnerable to climate change.
“We already see evidence that the climate is changing water availability and water quality,” Gleick said.
“Kashmir is a place where water may not be the worst of the problem, but like the Sudan, or like the
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers or like the Nile, it's a growing factor in what is already a conflict situation.”
Perhaps worse still, it appears that hawks on both sides are attempting to use water to create an
insurmountable impasse in the dispute over Kashmir, rather than acknowledging that the sharing of
rivers forms a framework for the two enemies to cooperate. This unease was underscored just last
week, when India objected to a Pakistani proposal to build a new dam in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir
with the help of the Chinese.
IndoPak war causes miscalc
The Economist 11 (“A rivalry that threatens the world,” 5/19/11,
http://www.economist.com/node/18712274)//SJF
Armed and dangerous
To Indians Pakistan's existential fears are exaggerated, blown up by the army to scare the people. India
has never been the aggressor, they point out. Even when India intervened to help split Pakistan in two,
in 1971, it only did so late, after seeing mass flows of refugees and atrocities on a horrific scale by the
army against civilians in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
Instead, say Indians, Pakistanis' own paranoia is the root of their instability. M.J. Akbar, an eloquent
Indian journalist and author of a new book on Pakistan, sums up the place as dangerous and fragile, a
“toxic jelly state”. He blames the army, mostly, for ever more desperate decisions to preserve its
dominance. “Pakistan is slipping into a set of contradictions that increasingly make rational behaviour
hostage to the need for institutions to survive,” he says.
Others, including liberal Pakistanis, add that Pakistan cannot shake itself from military men obsessed
with India. “We have become delusional, psychotic, fearing how to protect ourselves from the rest of
the world,” says one. India's most senior security officials say that Pakistan is still, in essence, a state run
by its army. That army, the world's seventh-largest, bleeds the state of about a sixth of all public funds
with almost no civilian oversight.
All that is grim enough. Then consider how Pakistan is rapidly expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons.
That programme was born out of the country's humiliating loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Six years
earlier, around the time of a previous defeat by India, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan's foreign
minister, had declared: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves for a thousand years, even
go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”
Pakistan may now have between 70 and 120 usable nuclear devices—and may be unusually ready to use
them. Some in the West believe Pakistan started preparing nuclear-tipped missiles in the midst of the
1999 Kargil war against India, after Pakistan invaded a remote corner of Kashmir.
Nobody doubts that Pakistan, in the midst of its anxiety over India, is trying hard to get more. Its nuclear
warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of about 15-20 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium. The country produces about 100 kilograms of that a year, but is rapidly expanding its nuclear
infrastructure with Chinese help. And with production long-established, the price of adding weapons has
fallen to almost nothing. A nuclear physicist in Pakistan, Pervez Hoodbhoy, now suggests that “you can
have a working nuke for about $10m, or the cost of a nice big house in Islamabad.”
The new push seems, as ever, to be a response to two developments next door. Pakistan was badly
spooked by India's deal on civil nuclear power with America, completed in 2008. This not only binds
America and India closely; it also lets India buy uranium on international markets, and probably means it
will soon build many more reactors. By one panicky Pakistani estimate, India could eventually be making
280 nuclear weapons a year.
The other change is over doctrine and delivery. India has long held a position of “no first use” of nukes.
Pakistan, by contrast, with weaker conventional forces, refuses to rule out the option of starting a
nuclear war against India, and is now taking steps that could make such first use more likely. Last month
it test-fired a new missile, the Hatf IX, with a range of just 60km and specifically designed for warfighting. Two missiles are carried in tubes on a transporter and can be fired, accurately, at short notice.
The warheads are small, low-yielding devices for destroying large tank formations with relatively little
explosive damage or radiation beyond the battlefield.
Pakistan's generals say their new tactical weapons will meet a threat from India's Cold Start doctrine,
adopted in 2004, that calls for rapid, punitive, though conventional thrusts against Pakistan. But by
rolling out tactical nuclear weapons, Pakistan is stirring fears of instability. Previous efforts to reassure
observers that terrorists or rogue army officers could not get hold of nukes rested on the fact that
warheads and delivery systems were stored separately and were difficult to fire—and that final
authority to launch a strike requires “consensus” within the National Command Authority, which
includes various ministers and the heads of all three services, and is chaired by the prime minister.
But tactical nuclear weapons deployed close to the battlefield pose new risks. Command-and-control
protocols are likely to be looser and more delegated. If field officers retreating in the face of a
conventional attack by India were forced to decide between using or losing their nuclear weapons, a
border incursion could swiftly escalate into something very much bigger and more lethal.
Democracy promotion impacts
A soft power competition for influence is inevitable globally – the US needs to expand
its influence to spur non-violent democratic transitions and decrease radicalism
Kochan, 12 - Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law (Donald, “CIVIL RESISTANCE AND THE
LAW: NONVIOLENT TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: YOU SAY YOU WANT A (NONVIOLENT) REVOLUTION,
WELL THEN WHAT? TRANSLATING WESTERN THOUGHT, STRATEGIC IDEOLOGICAL COOPTATION, AND
INSTITUTION BUILDING FOR FREEDOM FOR GOVERNMENTS EMERGING OUT OF PEACEFUL CHAOS” 114
W. Va. L. Rev. 897, lexis)
We all want to change the world. And when others, like nonviolent revolutionaries, start to change the
world, everyone wants in on the change-- whether it is those in favor of promoting the liberal values
shared in most Western democracies or those espousing radical tyrannical or authoritarian control. Each
wants to influence what kind of change becomes entrenched after a regime disruption. With nonviolent
revolution in particular, displaced governments leave a power and governance vacuum waiting to be
filled. Such vacuums are particularly susceptible to what this Article will call "strategic ideological
cooptation." Following the regime disruption, peaceful chaos transitions into a period in which it is
necessary to structure and order the emergent governance scheme. That period in which the new
government scheme emerges is particularly fragile when growing from peaceful chaos because
nonviolent revolutions tend to be [*898] decentralized, unorganized, unsophisticated, and particularly
vulnerable to co-optation.
Recognizing each of these observed conditions, those with preferences for the direction of such
structuring and ordering must understand that they are in competition with others with similar selfinterested desires. Both sides in that competition have an incentive to take advantage of the
opportunity to co-opt the chaos and strategically position their own ideological preferences in the new
government structure. The events beginning in 2011 that have been popularly named the "Arab Spring"
provide some useful examples n1 for testing the concepts of influence, soft power, and strategic
ideological cooptation discussed in this Article. In countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and other parts of the
2011 Arab Spring, for example, it has been speculated that radical Islamic interest groups seek to gain
optimal placement in the developing regime that will emerge. The West cannot ignore that fact. It is not
only in the interest of the United States and the outsiders in the West and elsewhere to see these postnonviolent revolution nations transition to a democracy, but it is also in the interest of those nations
themselves. n2 If the West fails to position itself to control not just the hearts and minds of the people
in these nonviolent movements but also to influence the wisdom and reason driving the architects of
the emerging, replacement regimes, the West will lose an opportunity to strategically co-opt the
ideological positioning of the new regimes. As a countervailing "interest group," Westerners can use
their soft power to (a) provide a force that moderates the power of the radical interest groups that will
undoubtedly seek to influence the emerging regimes themselves; or (b) win the battle for strategic
ideological cooptation by advancing arguments in favor of classical liberal thought that will consume the
minds and guide the actions of the replacement leaders.
[*899] This Article examines the concept of the West and radicalism as competing interest groups in
the battle for the strategic ideological cooptation of nonviolent revolutions. It makes a case that the
West should exploit soft power mechanisms in an attempt to win this battle. As stated in past work, n3
there is a tremendous opportunity for soft power influence in such situations, and one mechanism is the
infusion of translations of primary texts of Western legal thought as a means of such soft power to
shape societies emerging from nonviolent revolutions. n4
This Article explains that, because the West does not claim a monopoly on the mechanism of soft
power, it should anticipate and position itself and its ideas in such battles. Perhaps one of the most
important ways in which the West must arm itself is with an effective arsenal of translated works of
political wisdom. Radicals cannot be the only ones with a corpus of understandable and accessible
learning material for emerging institutions. Translations of fundamental and foundational matters of
classical liberal thought, particularly regarding the role of the State and the individual in political systems
and governance structures, are effective soft power mechanisms that must be deployed in countries and
regions suffering power vacuums after nonviolent revolutions.
This Article examines each of these points in turn. It also focuses on contrasting the utility of instant
communication, technology, social networking, and the like with deeper transmissions of knowledge. It
concludes that the experience and wisdom of this thought can only be effectively communicated and
transmitted through primary texts and books on the development of a rule of law. Finally, it describes
public translation programs, like the Arabic Book Program, n5 along with a general discussion of private
translation projects that attempt [*900] to strategically educate and communicate fundamental
Western theories and principles on governance, the rule of law, and individual rights.
Whatever your position on what you prefer to emerge in regimes saddled with chaos after nonviolent
revolutions, you must understand that those holding competing preferences will undoubtedly engage in
strategic ideological cooptation. External influence peddling is inevitable . If proponents of one
viewpoint fail to engage in the battle for influence, or unilaterally withdraw from it, their viewpoint is at
a strategic disadvantage and the opposing viewpoint is likely to steer the chaos toward a structure in its
own image.
New Arab regimes are at significant risk of backsliding and collapsing – winning the
strategic battle for influence is vital to a peaceful transition
Kochan, 12 - Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law (Donald, “CIVIL RESISTANCE AND THE
LAW: NONVIOLENT TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: YOU SAY YOU WANT A (NONVIOLENT) REVOLUTION,
WELL THEN WHAT? TRANSLATING WESTERN THOUGHT, STRATEGIC IDEOLOGICAL COOPTATION, AND
INSTITUTION BUILDING FOR FREEDOM FOR GOVERNMENTS EMERGING OUT OF PEACEFUL CHAOS” 114
W. Va. L. Rev. 897, lexis)
The Arab Spring has created power vacuums with an uncertain and as yet unpredictable end result. n41
The instability in the affected countries is evident. n42 "Unlike at the start of [2011], when the
revolutionary momentum seemed unstoppable, uncertainty is far more pronounced today, as several
countries face the prospect of stalemate, sustained conflict or power vacuums that may render them
ungovernable." n43 The multitude and diversity of voices makes it very difficult to predict the powers
that will ultimately gain control as these countries settle after their nonviolent revolutions. n44 After the
recent Arab uprisings-- particularly in Egypt and Tunisia--there is a vibrant debate ongoing about what
structures will emerge and "attention has largely turned inward, as activists deliberate what kind of
state will emerge." n45
There is a substantial risk that non-liberal, at best, and perhaps extremist groups, at worst, will fill the
power vacuum, and the resultant regimes will stray from democratic and liberal principles. n46 The
competition for governance in [*911] Yemen, for example, includes militant Islam and demonstrates
that outside regional sources such as Saudi Arabia are seeking to enter the influence game themselves in
support of the Islamists. n47 Competition from non-liberal groups like the Muslim Brotherhood n48 is
inevitable and indeed already occurring in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East. n49 The decisive
victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis in the first round of parliamentary elections in Egypt
establishes that fact. n50 These Islamist groups are "fairly well organized and popular," whether because
of home court advantage, ethnic solidarity, promise of stability, comfort level, theocratic tendencies in
society, or otherwise. n51 At the end of 2011, a Washington Post editorial took a very pessimistic [*912]
view of the ascendency of Western-style democratic values in Arab Spring nations:
This was a year riven with contradictions: The citizen movement that took flight in Tunisia as the Arab
Spring ended up empowering Muslim political groups across the map, to the point that some secular
Arabs worry it's now an "Islamist Winter," freezing the rights of women and minorities. In Egypt, a
military that began the year as the protesters' ally ended it as their enemy; the Tahrir Square uprising
wobbled unsteadily at year-end, often seeming to be adding another depressing chapter to Crane
Brinton's "The Anatomy of Revolution," a classic study of how such revolts go off track. n52
There is no doubt that the Arab Spring shows some signs of failure if one judges success as Westernstyle democracy. The situation is at least still precarious and demonstrates an area still susceptible to
external influence for good or bad and one that would benefit from the infusion of more foundational
legal and philosophical material that can make the case for liberal governance.
From all the evidence, it seems clear that it remains an open question how the dominoes will fall in the
Arab world after the 2011 uprisings. n53 Vali Nasr, a Professor at Tufts University, cautions that we
should be highly skeptical that Arab nations emerging from peaceful uprisings will resolve their new
governing structures in favor of Western-style liberal values because of their history:
The Arab Spring is a hopeful chapter in Middle Eastern politics, but the region's history points to darker
outcomes. There are no recent examples of extended power-sharing or peaceful transitions to
democracy in the Arab world. When dictatorships crack, budding democracies are more than likely to be
greeted by violence and paralysis. Sectarian divisions--the bane of many Middle Eastern societies--will
then emerge, as competing groups settle old scores and vie for power. n54
For that reason, those interested in shaping the change and the institutions of change that are chosen
cannot sit on the sidelines; they must engage with the [*913] competition that is already seeking to coopt the revolutionary forces in the Arab world in favor of Islamism and non-liberal structures. n55 After
the Arab Spring and for a long time to come, factions will compete for control in the states emerging
from peaceful chaos. n56 But there is a great deal of hope and optimism among the Arab people that
after the post-revolutionary dust settles countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and others will emerge more free
and democratic. n57 People in these countries want change. n58 But evidence suggests that positive
change toward Western-style democracy faces substantial obstacles and opposition. For example, in the
Arab world today, many anti-democratic factions are already engaged in the competition for control of
the emerging governing structures. n59 Thus, those interested in providing support for the democratic
idea and the freedom agenda cannot wait back or unilaterally disengage lest they lose the battle of ideas
to those who do engage. Any interested party must make entry into the marketplace of ideas and
challenge the anti-democratic forces that get footholds.
Expanding soft power is vital to steering global democratic transitions
Kochan, 12 - Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law (Donald, “CIVIL RESISTANCE AND THE
LAW: NONVIOLENT TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: YOU SAY YOU WANT A (NONVIOLENT) REVOLUTION,
WELL THEN WHAT? TRANSLATING WESTERN THOUGHT, STRATEGIC IDEOLOGICAL COOPTATION, AND
INSTITUTION BUILDING FOR FREEDOM FOR GOVERNMENTS EMERGING OUT OF PEACEFUL CHAOS” 114
W. Va. L. Rev. 897, lexis)
With the growth of nonviolent revolutions, there is a great deal of uncertainty, but also opportunity.
Steering the train in the aftermath of a nonviolent revolution can be done by a good conductor, a
neutral conductor, or a destructive conductor. There is an opportunity for those in the United States and
in liberal democracies everywhere to compete for the conductor's seat and to take the train down the
tracks toward limited government, individual rights, and free markets. But those in favor of liberal
democracy must at least try to get on and direct the train. The United States and its ideological allies
must recognize that opposing ideological forces will certainly get control if the Western liberal ideas are
not there to push out the alternative paradigms or theories of governance.
[*919] Nonviolent revolutions quite often leave power vacuums that must be filled. It is naive to think
that there will not be attempts to fill these vacuums from individuals and groups as repressive as the
displaced regimes or perhaps even more so. It is dangerous to believe that the emerging governments
will be friendly or cooperative with the Western world. With all of the attendant risks associated with a
power vacuum, the United States and others interested in promoting liberalism in these merging
societies must enter the competition. They must recognize that others will be attempting to co-opt a
seemingly peaceful movement for their own ultimate means of power. A realistic perspective demands
that we engage the vacuum as much as our enemies would. As we walk a political and diplomatic
tightrope in the Arab region, promoting ideas and using soft power based on the goal of strategic
ideological cooptation is the type of influence approach least likely to backfire. n78
Human Rights advantage
1ac – human rights
The US embargo violates human rights— depriving Cubans’ access to food, electricity,
medicine
Coll 2007- Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul College of
Law (Alberto R., “Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban
Embargo”, 2 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 199, lexis nexis)//KW
The Cuban embargo is not a limited set of economic sanctions affecting a few carefully targeted areas of
Cuba's government and society. Instead, it is a comprehensive program that prohibits virtually all
American trade, investment, travel, cultural and human contact with Cuba outside of a few narrow
exceptions. Moreover, throughout the embargo's 47-year history, different U.S. administrations have
worked aggressively to expand the embargo's extraterritorial reach in order to pressure as many
countries as possible to reduce their contacts with Cuba. The embargo's extensive extraterritorial reach
and power as well as its disproportionate nature are magnified by Cuba's weakness as a small Caribbean
island of 11 million people, its peculiar geographical location only 90 miles from the United States, and
the U.S.'s own international economic and financial preeminence. As currently structured, the embargo
has comprehensive, widespread, and indiscriminate effects on the economic, social, and family
conditions of the Cuban people that cause it to violate widely recognized human rights norms as well as
the basic obligation of states to ensure that sanctions imposed for the sake of promoting human rights
do not have the opposite effect of harming the human rights of innocent people. n259
Apologists for the embargo point out that the embargo has only a limited impact on the Cuban economy
because Cuba is free to trade with virtually every other country in the world. n260 This argument
overlooks two key [*236] issues. First, the U.S. government has not contented itself with denying the
benefits of trade and investment to Cuba. Instead, throughout most of the embargo's history, U.S.
administrations have exerted enormous pressures on foreign governments and companies to discourage
all economic contact with Cuba. A typical example occurred in the early 1990s when Cuba, then in the
midst of a severe economic depression caused by the collapse of its ally, the Soviet Union, attempted to
modernize its antiquated 40-year old telephone network. Grupos Domo, a Mexican-based conglomerate
with substantial economic ties to the United States, began negotiations with Cuba over what would
have been a multi-billion dollar deal but eventually withdrew from negotiations as a result of enormous
pressure by the U.S. government. n261 Ultimately, Cuba found a group of willing international investor
partners, most of whom insisted on anonymity in order to avoid possible American retaliation. Thus, the
reach of the U.S. embargo extends significantly beyond U.S.-Cuba trade relations, and negatively
impacts Cuba's relations with other countries as well.
Second, since Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the subsequent Helms-Burton Act
of 1996, the embargo has sharply increased its extraterritorial reach. Thousands of foreign companies
that could trade with Cuba before 1992 are no longer allowed to do so by virtue of being subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations. Although the European Union and other U.S. allies responded to the Helms-Burton
Act by enacting "blocking statutes" and "claw-back" provisions n262, Helms-Burton has nonetheless had
a [*237] chilling effect on trade and investment with Cuba. n263 Thus, the embargo's economic impact
must be measured not only in terms of the way it has isolated Cuba from U.S. markets but also by its
effect on the willingness of many private international entities to do business with Cuba.
Because the embargo has such far-reaching effects on foreign trade and investment with Cuba, its
effects on human rights are similarly far-reaching, encompassing such areas as public health, nutrition,
education, culture, and even fundamental family rights. In general, economic sanctions affect education
in the sanctioned country by decreasing access to supplies, which ultimately leads to the deterioration
of infrastructure. n264 The Cuban government estimates that the embargo has cost Cuba an estimated
average of $ 2.19 billion a year since 1959, a figure that may be quite conservative in light of several
factors. n265 First, the embargo is unusually comprehensive and affects every area of Cuba's economic
life. Second, it deprives Cuba of the benefits from economies of scale and geographical advantages
associated with the U.S. market. Third, the dollar's role as the international currency of choice, the
preeminent role of U.S. banks in international trade especially in the western hemisphere, and the
embargo's extraterritorial reach combine to [*238] increase substantially the costs to Cuba of trading
with many other countries.
The most recent United Nations report on human rights in Cuba referred to the U.S. embargo as one of
the "factors hindering the realization of human rights in Cuba," and noted that:
The restrictions imposed by the embargo help to deprive Cuba of vital access to medicines, new
scientific and medical technology, food, chemical water treatment and electricity. The disastrous effects
of the embargo in terms of the economic, social and cultural rights of the Cuban people have been
denounced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Children's
Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World
Health Organization ... . n266
Thus, though the embargo is now promoted as a means of improving human rights, the embargo has
had the opposite effect of harming human rights.
Lifting the embargo is vital to make the US a credible leader in human rights
protection
Weinmann 2004- Master of international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at
Columbia University
(Lissa,“Washington's Irrational Cuba Policy”, World Policy Institute, Spring 2004,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209899, JSTOR)//KW
The changed mood in Congress also springs from the realization that the embargo is condemned by the
most important human rights groups. Holly Ackerman of Amnesty International puts it this way:
"Specific embargo provisions such as the allocation of significant amounts of aid for 'democracybuilding' have facilitated the [Cuban} government's efforts to paint dissidents as foreign sympathizers
and ultimately weakened prospects for a strong and independent human rights movement."5 Human
Rights Watch's Jose Vivanco concurs. "If the U.S. is interested in improving human rights conditions in
Cuba, it must change this policy. If it is just interested in satisfying the electoral population in Florida,
then continue this policy because the embargo is not achieving any goals or results in Cuba." He also
stresses the counterproductive nature of the embargo internationally. "Because the embargo is bitterly
opposed by most nations, it enables the Cuban government to divide the international community,
leading, ironically, to less international pressure on Fidel Castro, not more."6
Internationally, the U.S. finds itself alone in upholding Cuba sanctions. When the European Union
decried Cuba's crack- down on dissidents last year, it condemned the U.S. policy in the same breath.
The 1996 Helms-Burton law that extends the embargo to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
violates the very international le- gal standards Washington has worked for decades to create. For ten
years running, the U.N. General Assembly has censured the embargo by increasing margins, most
recently 157 to 3, with the negative votes coming from the United States, Israel (notwithstanding its
extensive investments in Cuba), and the Marshall Islands. In the last year or so, the United States has
lost its seats on the human rights commissions of both the United Nations and the Organization of
American States, which many people see as rebukes to Washington over its Cuba policy. A change in
that policy would signal that the United States is willing to work toward a multilateral approach to
Cuban human rights that would necessarily involve diplomacy and engagement.
Credible human rights protection prevents extinction
Annas et al 02— Edward R. Utley Prof. and Chair Health Law @ Boston U. School of Public Health and
Prof. SocioMedical Sciences and Community Science @ Boston U. School of Medicine and Prof. Law @
Boston U. School of Law
(George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law @ Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for
Science, Law, and Technology @ Illinois Institute Tech), and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics
Fellow @ Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of Public Health), “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION:
CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”,), American Journal of Law &
Medicine, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 151, lexis nexis)//KW
The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of
total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete
with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two
atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire
species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2
Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same,
rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest
the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet
Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival:
[L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the
means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common
link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's
future. And we are all mortal. n3
That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of
the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The
recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of
nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of
Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference:
Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and
most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . .
We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of
deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so
ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human
rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with
its miseries. n5
Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and
respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the
concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it
recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of
the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were
immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations
like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and
inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are
techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of
human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development
of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques,
like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in
extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans
from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity
currently exists or is on the horizon.
Embargo destroys human rights
Cuban embargo is a human rights violation—killing Cuban’s value to life
Hernandez- Truyol 2009- Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law
(Berta E., “Embargo or Blockade? The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on
Cuba” ,The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 2009, 4 Intercultural
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53 )//KW
V Conclusion: The Human (Rights) and Moral Dimension
This essay has presented the history of economic sanctions against Cuba, analyzed the questionable
legality of the sanctions, and detailed the effects of the sanctions. In conclusion, I want to
problematize further the legality of the sanctions under international law. To be sure, the U.S.
commitment to the WTO limits its ability to refuse to trade absent a legitimate, allowed concern. To use
the national security claim vis-a-vis Cuba simply does not pass the laugh test; although the recent talks
with Venezuela and the Russian fleet might cause a reconsideration of that position. Moreover, save for
the regulations, which in any case are limited in light of the entirety of the Toricelli and Helms Burton
laws, the WTO is a "later in time" statement of the law which should then govern.
The other aspect of legality involves the human rights idea. Here, the real impact on real people of the
embargo borders on unconscionable. As the essay has described, the actions have taken a human toll;
they affect health, hunger, education, nutrition quite directly. They also affect the right to travel and
the right to family life of Cubans in the U.S. who can no longer visit their relatives with regularity nor
spend time with them in either times of joy or times of need - although this has been changed
dramatically by President Obama' s policy shift.
Economic sanctions are valuable tools for protecting human rights. The U.S. has used sanctions to
discourage human rights violations. Examples include the U.S. ban of South African gold Krugerrands in
1985 to protest apartheid148, the blockage of Nicaraguan imports to deter terrorist acts of the
Sandinista regime,149 the prohibition of foreign aid to Burma to oppose the government's use of
forced labor,'50 and the 1989 denial of MFN status against China to protest the killing of pro-democracy
protestors in Tiananmen Square to name a few.' 51
The U.S. is not alone in this approach. In fact, human rights violations have resulted in states jointly
taking economic sanctions through the UN Security Council. Examples include NATO states' 1986
sanctions against Libya as a result of Moammar Ghadafi's support for the terrorist killing of 279
passengers aboard a U.S. airline bombed over Lockerbie and 1990 Iraq sanctions for its invasion of
Kuwait.
The Cuba sanctions, however, reflect another aspect of economic sanctions: their deleterious and
harmful effects on civil society, the innocent citizenry of the targeted country. By depriving citizens of
the benefits of trade, of travel, of family life; by creating circumstances in which people's health,
nutrition, standard of living and overall welfare are negatively affected, sanctions have effected serious
denials of human rights - a moral if not legal failure.
Economic Sanctions deprive Cubans of value to life—increases disease, malnutrition,
and expands social gaps
Smith 2k –J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1999
(Adam “A HIGH PRICE TO PAY: THE COSTS OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS POLICY AND THE NEED
FOR PROCESS ORIENTED REFORM”,2000, 4 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 325, lexis nexis)//KW
B. The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Living Conditions Within a Sanctioned Country
Presumably, one of the motivating factors behind the U.S.'s willingness to impose economic sanctions is
a sincere belief that [*346] economic coercion will not harm the living conditions of individuals within a
sanctioned country. Often, however, the use of economic sanctions actually undermines humanitarian
efforts and increases the suffering of the most vulnerable elements of a sanctioned country. n91 Indeed,
economic sanctions can increase the incidence of disease and malnutrition, cause environmental
catastrophes, and weaken the social fabric of a target country even when humanitarian assistance is
specifically exempted. n92 That fact was made apparent in the UN economic embargo of Iraq, where
three years after the UN began its oil for food program, 7,000 people, 4,000 of whom were children
under five, still died each month as a result of sanctions. n93 While it is impossible to quantify the
amount of suffering and hardship that economic sanctions create, it is at least possible to explain the
nature of the impact that economic sanctions can have on the human condition of ordinary individuals
within a sanctioned country.
Economic sanctions can have a catastrophic impact on the health and nutrition of large populations
within a sanctioned country. n94 A lack of seeds, pesticides, animal feed, and fertilizers, which
necessarily accompanies sanctions, can decrease domestic food production and lead to food shortages.
n95 If feasible, the importation of foodstuffs under humanitarian exemptions may not alleviate the
problem, because the unavailability of fuel, spare parts, and a functioning infrastructure can make it
difficult, if not impossible, to transport and distribute food throughout a sanctioned country. n96 In
[*347] certain instances, food can pile up in warehouses or on loading docks while ordinary citizens go
hungry. n97 As food supplies and food distribution dwindle, retail prices can sky rocket, in which case
the daily caloric intake of most individuals can drop markedly. n98 Serious nutritional deficits can lead to
an increase in low birth-weight babies or can cause outbreaks of nutrition related diseases, such as
neuropathy. n99 Women and children, typically the most vulnerable groups in a society, can suffer the
greatest harm. n100
At the same time, economic sanctions can decrease the supply of safe drinking water, which can then
lead to outbreaks of water-borne diseases and diseases related to unhygienic conditions. n101 In some
case, sanctions can deny a country access to competitively priced chemicals, spare parts, and water
treatment equipment, each of which [*348] is necessary for maintaining a clean water supply. n102 For
countries that rely on water trucks to supply potable water throughout their borders, a decay in the
transportation infrastructure and a lack of fuel can make it difficult to provide safe drinking water to
remote populations. n103 Cutbacks in the supply of safe drinking water can increase the incidence of
morbidity and the mortality rates for waterborne diseases, such as typhoid fever, dysenteries, and viral
hepatitis, with the highest mortality rates generally occurring among the elderly. n104 The absence of
purified water and disinfectants can also give rise to outbreaks of scabies, pediculosis, hospital
infections, sepsis, and several other preventable dermatological disorders. n105
As the incidence of disease and illness rises, economic sanctions can further endanger the public health
of a sanctioned country by directly and indirectly crippling its health care infrastructure. n106 A lack of
sufficient fuel, electricity, spare parts, or manufacturing inputs can prevent sanctioned countries from
domestically producing world-class pharmaceuticals and, in certain instances, from manufacturing basic
[*349] medical equipment, such as catheters, sutures, surgical greens, x-ray film, incubators, dialysis
machines, and blood screening equipment. In some cases, economic sanctions can also directly prohibit
a target country from importing those products. n107 In other cases, increased costs of shipping,
arduous licensing provisions, high compliance costs, or incorrect beliefs as to the scope of permissible
trade can effectively prevent their importation. n108 Without basic medical supplies, a sanctioned
country cannot adequately screen blood for HIV or other infectious diseases, perform surgeries, take xrays, or inoculate citizens from otherwise preventable diseases. n109 The undersupply of medical
supplies can give rise to black market profiteering, which can have devastating consequences for the
poor. n110
[*350] Even when medical supplies are available, the decay of a sanctioned country's general
infrastructure can frustrate attempts to offer medical services throughout its borders. Ambulances,
mobile mammography units, and medical supply trucks can sit idle for a lack of fuel, spare parts, or
functioning roads. n111 Erratic or insufficient power supplies that result in blackouts or brownouts can
make it impossible to refrigerate vaccination serums for immunization programs. A decrease in
immunizations can lead to outbreaks of otherwise preventable diseases, such as measles. n112 As that
occurs, the lack of access to state-of-the-art anesthetics, analgesics, and anti-nauseals can make it
difficult, if not impossible, to reduce the pain and suffering of the seriously ill. n113
The imposition of economic sanctions can also have a significant impact on a target country's ecology
and long-term development. n114 As fuel supplies decrease and the cost of energy rises, the population
of a sanctioned country can be forced to substitute wood and charcoal for clean burning fuel and gas in
order to heat homes, boil water, and cook food. n115 In certain instances, individuals may even cut
down trees and sell the timber simply to compensate for their reduced income. n116 Extensive logging
can cause soil erosion, which can lead directly to the clogging of irrigation systems, the decrease of
agricultural diversity, and ultimately to the destruction of entire ecosystems. n117
The environmental stress associated with sanctions can lead to [*351] sharp declines in food
production, causing ordinary citizens to rely on edible plants, fish, and wildlife for sustenance. n118 An
increased reliance on those sources of nutrition can result in the total depletion of fish and wildlife
reserves and, in some cases, the complete disappearance of certain forms of wildlife. n119 Eventually,
the ecological destruction that accompanies the use of economic sanctions can prevent a country from
supporting even a minimal level of self-sustenance. n120
At the same time, the imposition of economic sanctions can damage long-term conservation and
development programs within a sanctioned country. n121 As food supplies and food distribution
dwindle, non-governmental organizations can be forced to expand their food assistance efforts simply
to meet the daily needs of ordinary citizens. With limited resources, those organizations can be forced
to abandon agro-forestry, soil conservation, irrigation, or other developmental programs. n122 When
combined with the rapid deterioration of the natural resource base, the inability to promote
conservation can have a severe and prolonged impact on the long-term sustainability of the human
livelihood in a sanctioned country. n123
Economic sanctions can also increase social and economic disparities among the lower, middle, and
upper classes of a sanctioned country. No matter how tight an embargo may be, porous borders
invariably allow supplies of both essential and non-essential goods to slip through the barriers. n124
Because the wealthy can afford black market prices and in some instances profit from the illegal trade of
[*352] goods, sanctions that create hardship for ordinary citizens can create mere inconvenience, if not
potential opportunity, for the upper class of a sanctioned country. n125 At the same time, shortages of
fuel, manufacturing inputs, spare parts, or energy can force entrepreneurs to close factories. The closing
of factories can lead to shortages of goods, unemployment or underemployment, and ultimately the
loss of middle and lower class income. n126 When combined with the hyperinflation that accompanies a
lack of capital, a decrease in production and employment can have a deleterious effect on the ability of
entrepreneurs to sell their goods and services in the marketplace. n127 It is not surprising, then, that the
practical effect of sanctions can be to devastate a sanctioned country's lower and middle classes while
leaving the upper class relatively unaffected. n128
Economic sanctions can also have a profound impact on a sanctioned country's rural community.
Farmers can lose a substantial portion of their income when economic sanctions prevent a target
country from exporting agricultural commodities, such as coffee, cocoa, and fruit. Faced with few
alternatives, farmers can be forced to sell their land and livestock simply to pay expenses or to migrate
to cities. n129 Because any remaining money is subject to hyperinflation, those individuals can fall
deeper into poverty. n130 The situation can worsen as international relief organizations intervene to
prevent food [*353] shortages. n131 Remaining farmers can be forced to lower their prices to compete
in a market flooded with donated food, leading to a further decapitalization of the rural community and
greater welfare dependency among the general population. n132
Education can suffer during a period of economic sanctions due, in large part, to the decay of a
sanctioned country's general infrastructure. n133 The lack of fuel, spare parts, and functioning roads can
prevent children from attending school. In some cases, children can be kept home because their parents
cannot afford to pay for tuition, school clothes, or books due to their country's depressed economy.
Those children who actually attend school can face poor learning environments. Erratic power supplies
can make it difficult to light, heat, or cool buildings, and food shortages can reduce the nutritional
content of school lunches. n134 In certain instances, children may not return to school even after
sanctions are lifted. n135
C. Conclusions on the Effects of Economic Sanctions
Though economic sanctions can be an important means of promoting the U.S.'s foreign policy
prerogatives, they are not a universal solution to every foreign policy crisis. n136 Indeed, the imposition
of sanctions carries a moral and economic price that is difficult to justify. Sanctions invariably can lead to
an increase in disease and malnutrition among ordinary citizens, cause environmental catastrophes, and
weaken a sanctioned country's social fabric. n137 At the same time, the frequent use of sanctions can
have a tremendous impact on the short-term and long-term sustainability and [*354] growth of the
U.S. economy. n138 Because those inescapable side-effects can linger on even after sanctions are lifted,
and because conventional wisdom suggests that sanctions rarely succeed in changing the behavior of
another country, the U.S.'s unfettered willingness to impose economic sanctions is ill-advised.
Cuban embargo is a crime against humanity- Denies Cubans of basic rights
Herrera 2003- Staff writer for Economic and Political Weekly
(Remy, “US Embargo against Cuba: Urgent Need to Lift It”, Economic and Political Weekly, 10/11/3,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4414129, JSTOR)//KW
The US embargo against Cuba deserves to be condemned in the strongest terms for the violation of law
it represents andfor its total lack of legitimacy.
The US embargo against Cuba is condemned by an ever larger and by now overwhelming majority of
members of the UN General Assembly. However, it continues to be imposed by the US government's
isolated but stub- born will, in spite of the UN's repeated injunctions, notably its resolution 56/9 of
November 27, 2001. This embargo de- serves to be condemned in the strongest terms for the violation
of law it represents and for its total lack of legitimacy. These measures of arbitrary constraint are tantamount to a US undeclared act of war against Cuba; their devastating economic and social effects deny
the people to exercise their basic human rights, and are unbearable for them. They directly subject the
people to the maximum of suffering and infringe upon the physical and moral integrity of the whole
population, and in the first place of the children, of the elderly and of women. In this respect, they can
be seen as a crime against humanity.l Imposed since 1962. the US embargo was reinforced in October
1992 by the Cuban Democracy Act (or 'Torricelli Law'), which aimed to restrain the develop- ment of
the Cuban economy's new driving forces by hitting the inflow of funds and goods by: (i) the strict
limitations of the transfers of foreign currencies by the families in exile, (ii) the six-months ban to enter
US harbours of all ships that had anchored in a Cuban port, (iii) sanctions against firms doing commerce
with the island even though under the jurisdiction of a third state. The embargo was systematised by
the Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act ('Helms Burton Law') of March 1996, aimed to harden
the 'international' sanctions against Cuba. Its Title I generalises the ban on import of Cuban goods,
demanding, for example, that exporters give proof that no Cuban sugar has been integrated in their
prod- ucts, as was already the case with nickel. It conditions the authorisation of currency transfers to
the creation on the island of a private sector including employment of salaried staff. Still more
enterprising, Title II fixes the modalities of a transition to a 'post-Castro' power, as well as the nature of
the relationship to have with the US. Title III grants US tribunals the right to judge demands for damage
and interest made by a civil and moral person of US nationality that considers having been injured by
the loss of property in Cuba due to nationalisation, and claims compensa- tion from the users or
beneficiaries of this property. At the request of the old owners, any national (and family) of a third
state, having made transactions with these users or beneficiaries, can be sued in the US. The sanctions
incurred are set out in Title IV, which provides, interalia, for the refusal of the State Department to give
US en- trance visas to these individuals and their families.
The normative content of this embargo - specially the extraterritoriality of its rules, which intend to
impose on the inter- national community unilateral sanctions by the US, or the denial of the right of
nationalisation, through the concept of 'traffic' - is a violation of the spirit and letter of the UN Charter
and of the Organisation of American States, and of the very fundamentals of international law. This
excessive extension of the territorial jurisdiction of the US is contrary to the principle of national
sovereignty and to that of non-intervention in the internal choices of a foreign state - as recognised in
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. It is opposed to the Cuban people's rights to
auto-determination and to development. It also contradicts strongly the freedom of trade, navigation
and movement of capital, all that the US paradoxically claims everywhere else in the world. This
embargo is moreover illegitimate and immoral because it at- tacks the social benefits realised by Cuba
since years and imperils their successes - recognised by many international in- dependent observers (in
particular those of the WHO, UNESCO. UNICEF and many NGOs). They are its public systems of
education, research, health or culture, in plain exercise of human rights. Further- more, the threat that
this coercive opera- tion poses for US nationals and for foreigners extends the practical impact of the
embargo to domains completely or partially excluded from the texts, such as food, medicines or
medical equipment and exchanges of scientific information.
Harmful Economic Effects From an official Cuban source,2the direct economic damages caused to Cuba
by the US embargo since its institution would exceed 70 billion dollars. The damages include: (i) the loss
of earnings due to the obstacles to the development of services and exportations (tourism, air
transport, sugar, nickel); (ii) the losses registered as a result of the geographic reorientation of the
commercial flows (additional costs of freight, stocking and commercialisation at the purchasing of the
goods); (iii) the impact of the limitation imposed on the growth of the national production of goods and
services (limited access to Table: Votes in the UN General Assembly on the 'Necessity to Lift the
Blockade against Cuba' For Against Countries against Lifting the Embargo and hence early retirement of
equipment, forced restructuring of firms, serious dif- ficulties sustained by the sectors of sugar,
electricity, transportation and agriculture); (iv) the monetary and financial restrictions (impossibility to
renegotiate the external debt, interdiction of access to the dollar, unfavourable impact of the variation
of the exchange rates on trade, risk-country, additional cost of financing due to US opposition to the
integration of Cuba into the international financial institutions); (v) the pernicious effects of the
incentive to emigration, including illegal emigration (loss of human resources and talents gen- erated
by the Cuban educational system); (vi) social damages affecting the popula- tion (concerning food,
health, education, culture and sport).
If it affects negatively all the sectors,3 the embargo directly impedes - besides the exportations - the
driving forces of the Cuban economic recovery, at the top of which are tourism, foreign direct investments (FDI) and currency transfers. Many European subsidiaries of US firms had recently to break off
negotiations for the management of hotels, because their law- yers anticipated that the contracts
would be sanctioned under the provisions of the Helms-Burton law. In addition, the buy- out by US
groups of European cruising societies which moored their vessels in Cuba cancelled the projects in
2002-03. The obstacles imposed by the US, in vio- lation of the Chicago Convention on civil aviation, to
the sale or the rental of planes, to the supply of kerosene and to access to new technologies (ereservation, radio- localisation) will lead to a loss of 150 million dollars in 2003. The impact on FDI is
also very unfavourable. The institutes of promotion of FDI in Cuba received more than 500 projects of
cooperation from US companies, but none of them could be realised - not even in the pharmaceutical
and biotechnological industry where Cuba has a very attractive potential. The transfer of currencies
from the US is limited (less than 100 dollars a month per family) and some European banks had to
restrain their commitment under the pressure of the US which let them know that indemnities would
be required if the credits were maintained. In Cuba, the embargo penalises the activities of the bank
and finance, insurance, petrol, chemical products, construction, infrastruc- tures and transports,
shipyard, agriculture and fishing, electronics and computing, but also for the export sectors (where the
US property prevailed before 1959), such as those of sugar, whose recovery is impeded by the
interdiction of access to the international stock exchange of raw materials (New York) of nickel, tobacco
and rum.
Harmful Social Effects The US government's announcements intimating that it would be favourable to
the relaxation of the restrictions concern- ing foodstuffs and medicines went un- heeded and cannot
hide that Cuba has been the victim of a de facto embargo in these domains. The reduction of the
availability of these types of goods exacerbates the privation of the population and constantly
threatens its dietary security, its nutritional stability and its health. A humanitarian tragedy - which
seems to be the implicit objective of the embargo- has been avoided only thanks to the will of the
Cuban state to maintain at all costs the pillars of its social model, which guarantees to every- one,
among others, a staple food for a modest price and free consumption in the creches, schools, hospitals,
and homes for the elderly. That is the reaffirmation of the priority given by the authorities to the
human development, which explains the established excellence of the statistical indicators of Cuba
concerning health, education, research and culture and this despite the extremely limited budgetary
resources and the numerous problems resulting from the disappearance of the Soviet bloc. However,
the continuation of the social progress in Cuba is impaired by the effective extension of the embargo.
The pressures exerted by the US Depart- ments of State and Trade on the suppliers of Cuba have
concerned a wide range of goods necessary for the health sector (medicines destined for pregnant
women, laboratory products, radiology equipment, operating tables and surgery equipment,
anaesthetics, defibrillators, artificial breath- ing apparatuses, dialysis apparatuses and pharmaceutical
stocks) and went as far as to prevent the free supply of food for new- born babies and of equipment for
unities of paediatric intensive care4 . The produc- tion capacities of vaccines conceived by Cuba are
hampered by the frequent lack of spare parts and of essential components that have to be imported, as
well as water treatment centres. This embargo provokes today an unjustified suffering of the Cuban
people. The shortages affecting many medicines, which are not produced in Cuba, complicate the
immediate and complete implementation of the procedures of treat- ment of breast cancer, leukaemia,
cardio- vascular or kidney diseases, and HIV for example. Moreover, the US authority's infringements
on individual freedom of movement and scientific knowledge (re- strictions on travel of US researchers,
the disrespect of bilateral agreements on Cuban researcher's visas, refusal to grant soft- ware licences
or to satisfy the orders from Cuban libraries of books, magazines, dis- kettes or CD-Rom of specialised
scientific literature) have in fact led to the extension of the embargo to areas formally excluded from it
by the law. One of the most fruitful opportunities to develop cooperation be- tween nations on a
solidarity and humanist basis is therefore blocked. The embargo is also in contradiction with the
principles of the promotion and protection of human rights, which are desired by the US people for
themselves and for the rest of the world. For all these reasons, this unacceptable embargo has to cease
immediately. M3
Notes 1 About the historical context see R Herrera (ed), Cuba Revolutionnaire, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2003.
2 Cuba's Report to the United Nations Secretary- General on the UN's General Assembly Resolution
56/9) 'The Necessity to Lift the Blockade Applied on Cuba', November 2002. 3 R Herrera, 'Cuba: une
Resistance en Amerique Latine', Recherches internationales, 69, 2003. 4 American Association of World
Health (1997), The Impact of the US Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba, The Association,
Washington.
Embargo inhibits Cubans from exercising basic human rights
Xinhua News Agency 2012
(“Chinese envoy says US embargo brings "huge sufferings" to Cubans”, Xinhua news agency, 11/14/12,
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, lexis nexis)//KW
United Nations, 13 November - The economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the
United States on Cuba has brought "huge sufferings" to its people, said a Chinese UN envoy here on
Tuesday.
Wang Min, China's deputy permanent representative to the UN, made the remarks while addressing the
UN General Assembly on voting a resolution, which calls for an end of the US embargo on Cuba.
The resolution, which condemns the US blockade of Cuba and urges Washington to end its half-century
embargo against the Caribbean island country, was approved by the 193-nation Assembly with 188
votes for, three against and two abstentions. China voted for the resolution.
This is the 21st year in a row that the UN General Assembly has adopted the resolution by an
overwhelming majority of votes to condemn the US embargo on Cuba.
Wang said the embargo has caused shortage of commodities and dealt a heavy blow to Cuba's
economy. It also stands as the major stumbling block for Cuba's economic development and social
progress.
"Such embargo has brought huge sufferings to the Cuban people and violated their fundamental human
rights including the rights to food, health and education as well as their rights to survival and
development," he said.
The Chinese diplomat noted that one of the most prominent features of the embargo in the last year
has been "interference with Cuba's international financial transactions".
"This has not only hit Cuba's economy hard, but also affected the normal economic, commercial and
financial interactions between other countries and Cuba and hence impairing the interests and
sovereignty of third countries," Wang said.
Moreover, the call of the international community is getting louder and louder, demanding that the US
government change its policy towards Cuba, lift embargo and normalize its relations with Cuba, he said.
China and Cuba have maintained normal economic, trade and personnel exchanges, Wang said,
stressing that the friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation in various fields between the two
countries has been growing.
"China hopes that the US will follow the purpose and principles of the UN Charter and the relevant
General Assembly resolutions and terminate its embargo against Cuba as soon as possible," he said.
"China also hopes that the relationship between the US and Cuba will constantly improve so as to
promote the stability and development in Latin America and the Caribbean region."
Embargo prevents the freedom to travel and inflicts suffering on the Cuban people
Herrera 4- Staff writer for Economic and Political Weekly
(Remy, “Anti-Cuban Embargo: New Curtailment of Freedoms”, Economic and Political Weekly, 9/11/4,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4415528, JSTOR)//KW
George W Bush on May 6 signed a report of the 'Committee for Aid to a Free Cuba', which lists a series
of measures tightening the embargo. The new measures approved by him affect the rights of Cubans
who have acquired US citizenship and who reside in the US. The embargo has also been broadened to
prevent the free
circulation The US government has recently taken another step in its aggressive policy against Cuba.
Repeating that he does not rule out the use of armed force to "hasten the day of liberation" and that
the US army would back a (post-"Castro- communist") "provisional government of transition", George
W Bush signed on May 6 a report of the 'Committee for Aid to a Free Cuba', which lists a series of
measures tightening the embargo. The unjustified and unjustifiable embargo was imposed unilaterally
43 years ago and was meant to cause the Cuban people a maximum of hardship -"to cause hunger and
despair" in the words of the US Department of State in 1959. It placed an enormous burden of sacrifice
on the Cuban people and caused the Cuban economy to lose more than 70 billion dollars [UN 2002]. of
scientists and scientific knowledge.
Practically all of the member states of the United Nations General Assembly have con- demned it. One
hundred and seventy-nine member states voted in favour of it being lifted in 2003, with only three
states voting against: the US, Israel, and the Marshall Islands. Though backed up by the Torricelli1 and
Helms-Burton2 Acts, which already damaged the transfers of private funds, foreign investment and
tourism to Cuba, the arbitrary system imposed by the US did not succeed in blocking a real and
systematic recovery of the economy that began in 1994. The GDP in Cuba has shown a satisfactory
average level of growth over the past 10 years [Herrera 2003]. In spite of its countless negative
repercus- sions, the embargo has not broken the country's spirit. While it is clear that the US blockade
is an assault on the Cuban people's right to self-determination and an attempt to break their will to
establish the autonomous and sovereign society they desire, it is important to understand that the US
government, by attacking Cuba, is waging an attack on freedoms themselves.
A new feature of the measures approved by G W Bush is that they affect the rights Economic and
Political Weekly September 11, 2004 4141 This content downloaded from 141.213.236.110 on Tue, 25
Jun 2013 17:02:18 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsof Cubans who have acquired US
citizen- ship and who reside in the US. First and foremost, their freedom of movement is restricted:
travel to Cuba is henceforth subject to an authorisation on a case-by- case basis (rather than to a
general authorisation as previously), and one visit is authorised only once every three years (instead of
each year heretofore). But the measures also strike a blow at people's freely chosen commitment to
send finan- cial assistance to their dear ones: the ceiling on transfers of currency to Cuba has been
lowered considerably. The recipients are now also restricted to the category of direct relatives:
children, spouses, parents, sib- lings, grandparents and grandchildren only. This ignores the ties based
on affection and solidarity which may naturally bind people to more distant relatives, friends,
neighbours and colleagues.
Furthermore, the US authorities are now allowed to carry out 'secret operations' in order to identify
anyone violating the new regulations and to offer a reward to those who assist in bringing them to
justice. Obtain- ing a visafortravel toCuba, bothforindividuals or institutions, will be made more difficult
by administrative red-tape, which is intended to be a deterrent. The number of US citi- zens who had to
face criminal charges for travelling to Cuba without official permis- sion to leave the US increased
consid- erably since G W Bush became president; their number is likely to go up. Just when the Cuban
administration is relaxing the rules for entry to the island, including for expatriate Cubans, the US is
setting up barriers for their exit - in violation of the migration agreements signed in the past. G W Bush
has declared, moreover, that he intends to ensure that the sanctions provided for by the Helms-Burton
Act, March 1996, shall henceforth be rigor- ously implemented. Title III of this act gives US courts the
right to judge and to sentence citizens of a third country (and their families) who have had dealings with
Cuba. And Title IV, among other things, provides that such foreign citizens (and their families) shall be
denied entry into the US. The regulatory nature of the embargo - and especially the extra- territorial
character of its rules that subject the international community to sanctions unilaterally imposed by the
US - consti- tutes a violation of the United Nations Charter and the foundations of prevailing
international law. This extension of the territorial jurisdiction of the US is nothing less than lawlessness.
It contravenes existing international law, violating as it does the principles of national sovereignty, of
non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, etc.
In addition, the barriers to freedom of move- ment adopted by the US executive broaden the embargo
to cover areas which had been previously exempted by law [AAWH 1997]: the free circulation of
scientists and of scientific knowledge. The following will henceforth be systematically disallowed:
professional visits toCuba by US scientists; visas to the US for Cuban scientists (and civil servants,
including medical doctors); the publication in the US of scientific articles or books by Cuban authors;
grant- ing of software licences; Cuban libraries' orders of books, publications, diskettes or CD-roms on
specialised scientific subjects. This curtailment of the freedom to exercise a scientific profession and to
exchange scientific information destroys one of the most fruitful ways of developing intellectual
cooperation on the basis of human- ism and solidarity among nations. And is it not paradoxical, finally,
to try to force Cubans to give up their civil and political rights, and their jobs as public servants, in order
to receive transfers from abroad? Simultaneously, the US government has announced the allocation of
US$ 59 million of taxpayers money for logistic and finan- cial support to non-governmental
organisations and individuals who shall 'spread information' against Cuba in the world. A special fund
will be used to pay for visits to Cuba by 'volunteers' who will train and lead 'dissidence' on the island.
'Marti' radio and television will soon receive some US$ 18 million and an US army plane will be placed
at their disposal in order to facilitate broad- casts from Miami - in breach of the rules of the
International Telecommunications Union and in violation of the sovereignty of a state member of the
United Nations. The US embargo against Cuba is illegal and illegitimate. Its purpose is to destroy a
nation and, as such, it is an act of undeclared war on Cuba. Since it affects the physical and moral
integrity of an entire nation, above all its children and its elderly, it can be likened, at law, to a crime
against humanity. The toughening of the US anti- Cuban embargo is an attack on freedoms - that of the
Cuban people as well as of all the peoples of the world. B1
Ethanol advantage
1ac ethanol
The plan boosts the Cuban sugar ethanol industry which will displace U.S. corn
ethanol
Holmes, 10– B.A. from Georgetown, Master’s Thesis (Michael G., June 21, 2010, “Seizing the Moment”,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?seque
nce=1, pg. 74-78)//NG
Creating a new market for U.S. goods and services creates a strong financial incentive for the United
States to remove the embargo. Another benefit of removing the embargo presents an economic benefit
for Cuba but also addresses U.S. concerns over alternative fuels. The push for alternative fuel production
as a means of reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil from hostile nations has taken a toll on global
markets. The strain on corn crops caused by ethanol production has caused the price of corn to nearly
double. This in turn has caused the price of all corn related commodities to increase, resulting in a public
outcry. 17 Business Week recently reported that the current rise in gasoline prices has pushed the price
of corn futures to the highest they have been in almost two years. This is based on the idea that as gas
prices rise, the demand for alternative fuels will rise as well. 18 Fidel Castro and Venezuela President
Hugo Chavez, (a protégé of Fidel) both have claimed that U.S. production of corn based ethanol will
inevitably contribute to world hunger. 19 Ironically, Cuba may be the answer to address many of
Castro’s criticisms.
U.S. consumption of corn-based ethanol production has forced corn demand to outpace supply. In 2005
the U.S. Department of agriculture concluded that corn-based ethanol is, “not a renewable energy
resource, is not an economical fuel and its production and use contribute to air, water and soil
pollution and global warming.” It takes just under 6 pounds of corn to produce 1 liter, (a little over a
quarter gallon), of ethanol. It cost approximately six times as much to produce a liter of ethanol versus
a liter of gasoline. The increased production of ethanol has driven up the price of corn, which has
inevitably driven up the price of other food products. Corn is the principal feed for various livestock.
Demand for corn for fuel, increases demand for corn and the cost of feed for livestock. It is estimated
that corn-based ethanol production has increased the cost of beef production by over a $1 billion
dollars. Ethanol production is also overtaking land resources. To produce a little more than 300 gallons
of ethanol a year, .06 hectare, (64, 583 sq ft), of corn must be planted and harvested. It takes .05
hectare, (5,382 sq ft), to feed every American each year. To fill up a car with a fuel mixture that is only
one-third ethanol every year would utilize more land than it would take to feed every American citizen
in a year. 20 Corn-base ethanol is an unsustainable fuel source.
This obvious drawback to the move to corn-based ethanol prompted former President George W. Bush
to meet with President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil. Over the past thirty years Brazil has
successfully managed to create an alternative to gasoline by refining sugar into ethanol. Sugar-based
ethanol production is far more efficient than corn-based ethanol and does not affect the global food
market to such a severe degree. 21 Although the United States will be able to develop and apply the
technology to produce the ethanol, it is unlikely it will able to cultivate the volume of sugar necessary to
meet fuel demands. Historically the United States has only contributed less than 10 percent to the
global sugar market.22 Cuba can play a key role in U.S. fuel production and national security.
As a result of the U.S. embargo and the fall of the Soviet Union Cuba has had to actually reduce its sugar
production. In 2002 the Cuban government closed more than 70 sugar mills and reduced the amount of
land allocated to sugarcane cultivation. 23 Those mills alone had the capacity to process nearly 15
million tons of sugar. This sugar could have potentially been processed into tens of thousands of
gallons of ethanol. Although Cuba has scaled back sugar production, it has reconfigured several of the
remaining mills to not only process sugar but to use the sugar cane residue to actually generate
electricity to power the mills. In Remedios, Cuba the Heriberto Duquesne Mill has already utilized
Brazilian ethanol production technology. It is currently producing more than 13,000 gallons of ethanol a
day.
Removing the embargo will revive a once bustling Cuban sugar market . The increased production will
cause the Cuban government to reopen sugar production facilities, which will create jobs and
reinvigorate the Cuban economy. The increase in trade and investment will stimulate Cuba's
technology sector and potentially increase the ease and volume of ethanol production.
High corn ethanol demand will deplete the Ogallala Aquifer
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
In addition to habitat destruction, water consumption is another environmental consequence
resulting from the expansion of corn production in Great Plains states. The approximate line dividing the
portion of the United States that requires irrigation for agriculture and the portion that has sufficient
rainfall for non-irrigated agriculture, the 100th Meridian West of longitude, runs through the Dakotas
and Nebraska. Therefore, unlike agriculture in the states that form the center of the Corn Belt, Iowa and
Illinois, agriculture in Nebraska and the Dakotas depends to significant degree upon irrigation. The
difference in water consumption between the corn growers of Nebraska on one hand and those of Iowa
and Illinois on the other is dramatic. In 2007, of 9,192,656 acres of total corn production in Nebraska,
5,839,067 acres were irrigated, representing 63% of the total.
This fact is particularly significant because much of Nebraska gets its water from the Ogallala
Aquifer, a resource of vital environmental and economic importance to the United States that stretches
from Texas to South Dakota. Aquifers, geological formations that store water underground, continue to
provide water as long as the amount of water that flows into them from above ground exceeds the
amount of water that is withdrawn from them. If the amount of water withdrawn from an aquifer
exceeds the amount of water that recharges an aquifer, however, the aquifer will be depleted.
Completely depleting the Ogallala Aquifer would have devastating consequences for the United States.
According to Scientific American, losing the ability to irrigate land from the Ogallala Aquifer would cause
$20 billion worth of agricultural losses, and re-filling the aquifer would take 6,000 years. Because the
industry encourages increased corn production in areas irrigated with water from the Ogallala Aquifer,
the depletion of this aquifer must be counted as another detrimental environmental effect of the
domestic corn-based ethanol industry.
It also causes fertilizer runoff and dead zones
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
By boosting the price of corn relative to other crops like soybeans, however, the domestic ethanol industry
encourages farmers to use the same piece of land to grow corn year after year. According to a report in Iowa Ag
Review, growing corn on the same land in successive years rather than rotating it with soybeans significantly
increases the climate change effects of corn production because “nitrogen fertilizer applications are
typically 50 pounds per acre higher for corn planted after corn” and “nitrous oxide has a global warming
potential more than 300 times that of [carbon dioxide].” Additionally, the application of fossil fuel-derived
nitrogen fertilizer has other environmental impacts beyond exacerbating climate change. The so-called Dead Zone,
a region of the Gulf of Mexico where the collective nitrogen runoff of the Mississippi River basin has
caused a process called hypoxia to kill off most marine life, has been linked to corn production and thus to
the domestic ethanol industry.
The plan’s reform plank spurs greater investment in Cuban sugar ethanol
Soligo & Jaffe, 10– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. )//NG
The Structure of an Ethanol Industry If Cuba decides to develop an ethanol industry it will have
to decide on how to structure it. In particular, it will have to decide on the relative roles of the Cuban
state and private citizens as well as the role of foreign companies.
There are several models that Cuba can choose from. One is to resuscitate a national, stateowned sugar industry with the addition of state-owned biorefineries. Sugarcane would be grown on
state farms and cooperatives, processed in state-owned biorefineries, and marketed by an agency of the
government. Past experience suggests that the state has not been able to operate the sugar industry in
a cost-competitive way. Recent land reforms are motivated by that experience. Agriculture depends on
rapid decisionmaking in response to changing location-specific information such as weather patterns,
soil conditions, and pest infestations. Successful agriculture depends on decentralized decisionmaking
with proper incentives given to the decentralized manager, a lesson learned in all highly centralized
economies. In addition to these efficiency considerations, the Cuban government would have great
difficulty in raising the enormous amounts of capital necessary to revive large-scale sugar cultivation and
construct biorefineries and other needed infrastructure if these were to be solely within the state
sector.
Another option is to follow the policies used in the oil and nickel industries, where foreign
private firms currently operate. These firms provide the technology, management expertise, and capital,
while the state provides labor. Workers would have to be well paid and well treated— otherwise this
approach might be politically difficult, since it would hark back to the sugar plantations of the
prerevolution years. Under this model Cuba is able to get access to needed resources, yet still maintain
“control” of the industry and the egalitarian income policies that characterize the Cuban socialist model.
Finally, Cuba can continue its agricultural reforms and encourage sugarcane cultivation by
individual farmers or cooperatives who could sell their output to biorefineries owned and operated by
privately owned domestic or foreign firms. This option might attract foreign capital and expertise in the
biorefinery end of the industry, but it is difficult to see where private and cooperative farms would get
access to the large amount of capital needed to rebuild the agricultural capacity of the country. Farmers
would require access to credit to purchase inputs needed in the cultivation of sugarcane. In the absence
of U.S. sanctions, Cuba would have access to the resources from the international banking institutions
(World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank), but resources from these institutions come
with controls and constraints that the Cuban government would find uncomfortable. Furthermore,
relying on more independent farmers would also create a class of private and cooperative farmers
whose incomes would not be subject to state control, and could lead to income inequalities.
Cuba sugar tradesoff with US/Brazil
Cuban sugar ethanol will outcompete Brazilian sugar and US corn ethanol
Soligo & Jaffe, 10– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 97-101)//NG
Cuba’s Future Sugar Industry: Ethanol Scenarios The success of the Brazilian sugarcane and
ethanol industry suggests that, despite former President Castro’s views on the impossibility of restoring
a viable Cuban sugar industry and the impact of sugar cultivation for ethanol production on food
supplies, the Cuban sugar industry could have a promising future. The increasing use of biofuels in the
transportation fuel mix in the United States and Europe provides a stable and growing market for
ethanol, especially sugarcane-based ethanol, which is cheaper to produce than biofuels from other
crops. The United States, under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, increased the
renewable fuels standard (RFS) to require that the use of biofuels gradually increase, to 36 billion gallons
by 2022. Legislators intended that 16 billion of this consumption would come from cellulosic ethanol,
but so far the development of a cost-effective production technology has been slow, leaving the market
to cornmand sugarbased ethanol.
In 2009 the U.S. consumed 11.1 billion gallons of ethanol, almost all of it produced in the United
States. U.S. policy favors domestic ethanol production by imposing an import tariff of 54 cents a gallon
in addition to a 2.5 percent ad valorem tariff. Tariffs have limited ethanol imports into the United States,
but higher prices in Europe have also been a factor. As of 2009, the United States has been suffering
from an excess of production capacity, which has depressed prices in the States relative to other
importing countries. But as higher U.S. renewable fuel targets kick in and U.S. prices recover from
overinvestment in capacity, imported sugar-based ethanol will be competitive with higher-cost U.S.
corn-based ethanol in coastal regions of the United States, even if U.S. tariffs persist. Given the high
costs to transport corn-based ethanol to coastal regions from the U.S. Midwest by rail or truck, 41
Cuba’s location gives it a large transport cost advantage over both domestic and foreign rivals.
Our analysis suggests that Cuba can produce 2 billion gallons of ethanol per year, equivalent to
94,500 barrels per day of gasoline, after adjusting for the differences in energy content. To arrive at this
estimate we consider several factors that help determine ethanol output:
—The amount of land planted with sugarcane
—Yields (the amount of sugarcane harvested per hectare planted)
—The industrial yield (the amount of ethanol that can be produced from one ton of sugarcane)
—The proportion of sugarcane devoted to the production of sugar and other non-ethanol
products
Amount of Land Planted with Sugarcane Figure 4-2 shows the area of sugarcane harvested each
year from 1961 to 2008. In 1970, the year of the ambitious campaign to produce 10 million tons of
sugar, the area harvested was 1.5 million hectares, the highest level in the post– World War II period.
Between 1971 and 1989 the area harvested averaged 1.28 million hectares, fluctuating between 1.14
million and 1.42 million hectares. After the collapse of the USSR and the end of Soviet aid, the harvested
area plummeted, reflecting at first the decline in imported fuel, fertilizer, and other inputs and later, the
decision to restructure the industry by shutting down inefficient sugar refineries and switching farms to
pasture or other crops. Since the special period in the early 1990s, Cuba has moved to diversify its
agricultural sector in order to emphasize food security. It’s not clear whether this was a response to
economic and political conditions at the time or represents a permanent shift of agriculture away from
depending so heavily on one crop. More recently, in 2008, the Cuban government announced grants of
unused land to all private, cooperative, and state farms, as a spur to enhance domestic food production.
The introduction of the plan was a response to the fact that in 2007, 55 percent of agricultural land
remained idle, an increase from 46 percent in 2002.
42 The shift in acreage devoted to food crops has not been successful in terms of increasing
food output, 43 but reforms to give farmers more discretion in how they operate might produce better
results in the future. But significantly increasing acreage devoted to food crops will not be easy. Food
crops are much more fragile than sugarcane, requiring more labor, weeding, pest control, and oversight
than cane, which has been referred to as the “widow’s crop” because it requires relatively little
attention. As noted previously, thousands of farm workers have migrated to urban areas and it will be
difficult to lure them back. If economic sanctions are removed and Cuba enters the international
commercial system, food security will be less important, and Cuban agriculture will be more likely to
respond to international prices. Historically, Cuba has had a comparative advantage in producing sugar,
not food crops; so opening the economy to freer trade might favor a return to the dominance of sugar
and development of an ethanol industry. More recently, Cuba has expressed interest in producing and
exporting soybeans, and the Brazilian government has offered “technical assistance and seed in order to
grow soybeans on an industrial scale.” 44 Soybeans have many uses, including as a feedstock for the
production of biodiesel, but it is not clear at this point whether soybeans represent a more efficient use
of Cuban land than sugarcane.
Sugarcane Yields Sugarcane yields are highly variable— affected by weather conditions and
other factors. Figure 4-3 shows sugarcane yields since 1961 and the decline in recent years as the
industry has contracted. Yields that had fluctuated between fifty and sixty tons per hectare fell to
twenty-eight in 2006.
Industrial Ethanol Output Levels Table 4-5 shows the level of ethanol output per hectare of land
that is devoted to the production of sugarcane targeted for ethanol production. Output in liters is shown
as a function of sugarcane and distillery yields. At a sugarcane yield of 75 tons per hectare and ethanol
yield of 75 liters per ton (5,625 liters per hectare), an output of 7.6 billion liters, or 2 billion gallons, of
ethanol requires approximately 1.33 million hectares of sugarcane. At 80 tons per hectare, it would
require only 1.26 million hectares to produce 2 billion gallons. Finally, if Cuba achieves yields currently
experienced in the Center-South region of Brazil of 84 tons per hectare and 82 liters per ton of cane
(6,888 liters per hectare), it will need only 1.10 million hectares of sugarcane to achieve this volume.
45 Sugar versus Ethanol The amount of ethanol produced will also depend on how much of the
sugarcane is used to produce sugar and other non-ethanol products. In 2009 Cuba produced 1.25 million
metric tons of sugar on 380,000 hectares with very low yields of 41.3 tons per hectare. At an improved
yield of 75 tons per hectare, 1.25 million tons of sugar would have required only 209,150 hectares,
which at 5,625 liters of ethanol per hectare, would reduce ethanol output by 1,175,625 liters (310,000
gallons).
Sugar prices rose very quickly in 2009 to levels that are high by historical standards, approaching
25 cents a pound. 46 At these prices, producing and exporting sugar is more attractive than ethanol. But
these prices are the temporary consequence of bad weather in other sugar-producing areas and will not
be sustained. Both sugar and ethanol are commodities that will trade on the basis of price, and since
entry into those industries is relatively unconstrained, competition will push prices down toward costs.
When sanctions are lifted, Cuba will be able to benefit from the fact that it is an island economy with
easy access to cheap marine transport— and the close proximity to the United States. Sugar imports in
the United States are limited by quotas, so import volumes cannot change regardless of price. However,
ethanol is protected by tariffs so imports can increase if domestic (U.S.) prices get too far ahead of world
prices.
The fact that sugar exports are an alternative to ethanol is an additional argument for the
development of an ethanol industry. To the extent that sugar and ethanol prices are not closely
correlated, Cuba can alter its output mix between the two products to take advantage of variations in
sugar and ethanol prices and thus smooth out fluctuations in export revenues as well as maximize the
income from its sugarcane industry.
Brazilian sugar bad – Cerrado
Brazilian sugar ethanol will destroy the Cerrado
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
If the United States ethanol tariff that expired at the end of 2011 is not revived by future legislation but the trade embargo against
Cuba is kept in place, Brazil will be the most likely primary beneficiary. The argument can be made that Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol is a
more environmentally beneficial fuel source than domestic-corn based ethanol, because of the nature of sugarcane-based ethanol (discussed
below). Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol comes, however, with its own set of environmental consequences.
While the full debate over the environmental consequences of the Brazilian biofuel production is largely beyond the scope of this
Article, the primary issue in this dispute is worth noting, because it accentuates one of the most significant differences between the U.S. cornbased ethanol industry and the potential Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry. Just as the expansion of corn production to meet demand
for ethanol production in the United States has led to land use changes such as the plowing of native grassland, the
expansion of
sugarcane production to meet demand for ethanol production in Brazil has led to land use changes in
that country. If portions of the Amazon rainforest – one of the most significant repositories of carbon on Earth – were being cleared to
grow sugarcane for ethanol, it would represent a clear example of the environmental costs of ethanol production outweighing its benefits. The
Sugarcane production is, however, contributing to
destruction of another sensitive habitat, the bio-diverse Cerrado savannah region of Brazil.
Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would have the environmental benefits of Brazilian sugarcanebased ethanol without its most obvious negative factor, damaging habitat in the Cerrado. The environmental
Amazon region, however, is largely unsuitable for sugarcane production.
effects of biofuels depend on a number of factors. As Keith Carpenter, executive director of the Institute for Chemical and Engineering Sciences,
explained, whether or not a given type of biofuel is environmentally beneficial “depends on what the fuel is, how and where the biomass was
produced, what else the land could have been used for, how the fuel was processed and how it is used.” Taken together, these factors point to
sugarcane-based ethanol grown in Cuba as one of the most environmentally friendly biofuels possible.
The environmental benefits of using sugarcane to produce ethanol are numerous. First, it is
much more energy efficient to derive ethanol from sugarcane than corn – while creating ethanol from
corn only creates about 1.3 times the amount of energy used to produce it, creating ethanol from
sugarcane creates about eight times the amount of energy used to produce it. Second, unlike much of the corn
now being grown in Great Plains states, sugarcane that is grown in Latin America does not need to be irrigated.
Third, sugarcane requires relatively small amounts of chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides.
Fourth, whereas most U.S. ethanol refineries are powered with coal or natural gas, sugarcane ethanol refineries can be
powered with bagasse, a natural product left over from the sugar refining process (in fact, refineries
powered with bagasse can even produce more electricity than they need and sell power back to the
electric grid). Fifth, although corn can only be planted and harvested once a year, in tropical climates
sugarcane can be cut from the same stalks multiple times per year.
Each of these factors in favor of sugarcane ethanol is true of ethanol from Brazil as well as of any potential ethanol from Cuba.
However, two
additional environmental factors clinch Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol as one of the most
environmentally friendly fuel sources available to the United States under current technology. First,
because Cuba is closer to the United States, transporting ethanol from Cuba to the United States would require less
energy than transporting ethanol from Brazil to the United States (especially if it is used in Florida, an option further
explored in the section on economic effects).
The final factor that would make Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol one of the most environmentally friendly fuels possible is that a
significant amount of ethanol could be produced in Cuba without any negative impacts on native
habitat. This is because a striking amount of Cuban agricultural land — 55% as of 2007 — is simply lying
fallow and is not cultivated with anything. Although its character may have changed due to years of neglect, this land is not
virgin native habitat like the grasslands of North Dakota or the Cerrado of Brazil. Cuba therefore could greatly increase its
production of sugarcane, and thus is production of sugarcane-based ethanol, without negative impacts on wildlife
habitat. While it is not environmentally perfect – no form of energy is – Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would raise fewer environmental
concerns than the fuel sources it would displace – petroleum, domestic corn-based ethanol, and Brazilian sugarcane based ethanol. Therefore,
from a purely environmental perspective, changing U.S. law and policy in order to encourage the importation of Cuban sugarcane-based
ethanol should be encouraged.
And, Cerrado deforestation causes Amazon fires, destroying carbon sinks
Walsh, ’12 (Bryan, TIME Magazine, “Amazonia: What’s Happening to the World’s Biggest Rain Forest?”,
http://science.time.com/2012/01/18/amazonia-whats-happening-to-the-worlds-biggest-rain-forest/)//NG
I’d say you have to see the Amazon for yourself to understand how vast it is, but I’ve been there—and even I can’t imagine it. The rain forest is
more than 2 million sq. miles—two-thirds the size of the continental United States—and the river system of the gigantic basin produces 20% of
the world’s freshwater discharge. The
forest holds 100 billion metric tons of carbon—equivalent to more than 10
years’ worth of global fossil-fuel emissions. And the Amazon is the global capital of wildlife biodiversity, with more species
calling the forest and rivers home than scientists could ever hope to name. It’s safe to say that as the Amazon goes, so goes the
planet’s environment. The problem is that the Amazon is anything but secure. As Amazon basin nations like
Brazil have grown economically, they’ve moved to cut down the forest, making room for agriculture.
(Which, it should be noted, is exactly what Americans did to their own once vast Eastern forests.) The human population in the Brazilian
Amazon has grown from 6 million in 1960 to 25 million in 2010, while forest cover has declined to about 80% of its original area. Deforestation
rates have slowed in recent years, but as a new review in this week’s Nature shows, the Amazon basin is changing, under pressure from natural
variability in the weather, drought, global warming and deforestation. The question remains: just how resilient is the Amazon? MORE: Rain
Forest for Ransom From the Nature article, written by Eric Davidson of the Woods Hole Research Center and his colleagues: Although the basinwide carbon balance remains uncertain, evidence is emerging for a directional change from a possible sink towards a possible source. Where
deforestation is widespread at local and regional scales, the dry season duration is lengthening and wet season discharge is increasing. We
show that the forest is resilient to considerable natural climatic variation, but global and regional climate change forcings interact with land-use
change, logging and fire in complex ways, generally leading to forest ecosystems that are increasingly vulnerable to degradation. Specifically,
researchers worry about Climate and weather change: Drought is a fact of life, even in the ultra-wet Amazon. The El Niño effect can produce
lengthy droughts, while the corresponding La Niña effect can lead to increased flow and even flooding. The Nature paper notes that the
intact Amazon forest—with its deep roots that can access soil water—is resistant to normal seasonal
droughts, but that the transitional forests and Cerrado (the tropical savannah) are much more
vulnerable. But even the existing forest may find it difficult to withstand lengthy droughts of the sort that may become more common with
climate change—the severe 2005 drought in the southwestern Amazon resulted in the loss of several tons of living tree biomass carbon per
hectare. Deforestation and land-use change: It’s not quite true that the Amazon is being clear cut—as the Nature paper describes, more small
land holders in the Amazon, even farmers, keep mature or secondary forests on more than half of their land. Much of the forest that’s being
lost is being converted to cropland for soybeans—Brazil is a major producer—as well as pastureland for cattle. Still, attempts to curb
deforestation in the Amazon appear to be working—forest clearing has fallen from about 11,000 sq. miles a year in 2004 to less than 3,000 sq.
miles a year in 2011. But if
deforestation continues, it could change the very climate of the Amazon, resulting in
less precipitation over the region. There are even models that suggest that deforestation exceeds 40% of the
Amazon basin, a tipping point could be reached that would vastly reduce precipitation and result in a
forest “dieback.” That would be bad. Forest fire: It’s no surprise that drought increases forest fire in the Amazon—about
15,000 sq. miles of forest burned during the El Nino-influenced drought of 1998. But as fires become more common, they can
reduce rainfall (because of the action of the smoke in the atmosphere) and retard forest regrowth. Fires keep the
Amazon from bouncing back. Greenhouse gases: Right now the Amazon is a major carbon sink, sucking up and
storing some of the greenhouse gases we emit—gases that would otherwise accelerate the warming of
the atmosphere. Disturb the Amazon—as we’re doing—and the system may become less efficient at storing
that carbon, thus speeding climate change. The good news here is that studies indicate that the mature, intact Amazon forest is
still accumulating carbon. But as the forest is disturbed, it causes a net loss for carbon, and the Amazon goes
from being an ally to an enemy in the fight against warming. The conclusion here is the Amazon is an unimaginably
complex system, once that needs more systematic study before we can know what’s really happening within the forest. But it would be better
to understand that now—instead of waiting to see the consequences of change.
The Cerrado is a crucial carbon sink– destroying it pushes us over the brink
Eirenne, 9– Degree in International Affairs from Carleston University, cites multiple studies (Arielle K., “From Cutting Trees to Slashing
Emissions: Reducing Deforestation in Brazil”, http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/49/from-cutting-trees-to-slashing-emissions-reducingdeforestation-in-brazil)//NG
Where, however, does Brazil fit into this equation? Like China and India, Brazil is a prominent, populous developing country and a member of
the Group of 8’s ‘Plus-5’ contingent, yet the dialogue on climate protection touches upon this South American state far less often.[1] What can
Brazil’s leaders contribute to the global anti-climate changefight, and what political and economic pressures encourage/discourage their
action? Unlike China and India, Brazil produces roughly three-quarters of its emissions through deforestation
(Blunt 2004); hence, though Brazil must continue to implement climate protection measures in its energy sector, decreased deforestation will
be essential to the country’s emissions-curbing efforts. This paper will thus explore the potential for Brazil to reduce its deforestation, analyzing
the political and economic concerns that its leaders must address if reduction initiatives are to succeed. Though multiple actors are at work
within Brazil’s forests, the principle players appear to be medium- to large-scale cattle ranchers. Thus, though its deforestation efforts may
attempt to dissuade every manner of deforester, Brazil must focus greatest attention on the ranching group. Key to this task is the expansion of
the Brazilian police presence into the areas where ranchers work. The analysis begins with an overview of the relationship between
deforestation and climate change and of general proposals for forest preservation. Next, an examination of Brazil’s particular deforestation
scenario introduces the key players perpetuating the Brazilian forest’s destruction, as well as the main political and economic
pressures/incentives/concerns involved. Also noted are government anti-deforestation efforts to date. Given Brazil’s present situation and the
political/economic forces at play, the discussion shifts to probe potential strategies for dealing with deforestation concerns. Deforestation
as a Driver of Climate Change “There’s been a lot of fuss lately about burning the forest,” remarked one Brazilian rancher, “but
everyone knows that it’s the First World, not us, that’s responsible for the greenhouse effect. It’s the carbon emissions from all their cars. The
amount generated by burning the forest is miniscule by comparison” (quoted in Le Breton 1993:77). Recent scientific analyses, however,
indicate that few things could be further from the truth. Yes, the
burning of fossil fuels is the prime culprit in climate
change, but the Union of Concerned Scientists labels deforestation, combined with “other land-use
changes,” as yielding the second-most greenhouse gas emissions (2007). The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) has likewise identified fossil-fuel burning and deforestation as the top
contributors to the rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide, with “most” emissions in recent years resulting
from fossil fuels but a substantial 10 to 30 percent arising from land-use changes, deforestation
foremost among them (2001). Per the 2001 IPCC report, other emission sources bear minimal impact in comparison.2 Moreover,
Moutinho, Schwartzman, and Santilli place deforestation’s contribution at 20 to 25 percent of global
emissions (2005:7). Unfortunately, the current state of research thus leaves ambiguous the exact proportion of climate change for which
deforestation is responsible, yet these figures suggest that deforestation, aside from contributing the bulk of Brazil’s emissions, remains a key
driver of climate change for the planet as a whole. The phenomenon is likely to loom large in the future as well:
“If current trends
continue, tropical deforestation will release about 50% as much carbon to the atmosphere as has been
emitted from worldwide combustion of fossil fuels since the start of the industrial revolution” (Houghton
2005:20).3 The above statistics capture, albeit imperfectly, one side of the deforestation-climate change dynamic: deforestation releases
emissions, for when chopped trees burn or otherwise decay over time, the carbon once contained within them flows into the atmosphere,
primarily as carbon dioxide but also as methane and carbon monoxide (Houghton 2005:13).4 The other
way that deforestation
harms the climate is that it in some cases eliminates carbon sinks that could have captured future
emissions from other sources. In other words, forests, by absorbing carbon from the atmosphere, “sink” greenhouse gases, and as
deforesters chop down more trees, the world becomes less able to cope with its ever-growing emissions. The potency of various forests’ sink
capacities varies, both over time (Forests and the European Union Resource Network n.d.) and space. To what extent Brazil’s forests, for
example, serve as a carbon sink remains unknown, with researcher Antônio Manzi suggesting that though sequestration occurs in partsof Brazil,
“each locale has its own specificities” (quoted in Rohter 2003:2). Thus, though the primary concern about deforestation is the amount of
greenhouse gas the practice immediately emits into the atmosphere, its obliteration of a potential climate-change mitigation tool is likewise of
concern. Prospects for mitigating climate change through reduced deforestation are huge: per the most recent report from the IPCC’s Working
Group III, approximately half of the world’s “mitigation potential” may lie in the possibility of curbing the phenomenon (2007:21).
Unfortunately, the full Working Group III report, which details suggestions for incorporating forest management into climate change mitigation
initiatives, is not yet available for citation or quotation. Until the report’s final release, analysts must rely on a summary thereof, which
recommends several currently available general strategies for offsetting deforestation’s impact and/or curbing the phenomenon itself, among
them afforestation, reforestation, and “reduced deforestation” (p. 14). Afforestation entails the replanting of forest on land cleared several
(e.g., 20 to 50) years earlier and used for non-forest purposes in the interim (IPCC 2000:6). Reforestation, in contrast, involves replanting on
land that has been cleared but not yet converted for alternative (e.g., agricultural) use; this takes place shortly after the deforestation originally
occurs (IPCC 2000:6). Both activities, instead of halting deforestation emissions themselves, encourage the reestablishment of carbon sinks. The
wisdom of such practices remains in question, however, for the Forests and the European Union Resource Network (FERN) notes that sunk
carbon may burst back into the atmosphere following forest fire, insect infestation, decay, changes in land use, and other disturbances (n.d.).
FERN thus contends that reliance on carbon sinks allows for increased anthropogenic emissions, which, though able to be sequestered today,
may threaten the atmosphere in the future. Decreasing deforestation in the first place is thus preferable. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows entities from the industrialized world to earn credit for funding mitigative programs in
developing countries, can offer credit for afforestation and reforestation of areas cleared prior to 1990 (Schlamadinger et al. 2005:26). It
cannot, however, provide credit for prevention of deforestation (Fearnside 2005:686). Parties to Kyoto rejected inclusion of “deforestation
avoidance” for a variety of reasons, including “non-permanence,” the concern that forests saved today might be destroyed anyway in the
future; difficulties in determining exactly how much deforestation would have occurred under business-as-usual conditions; and the concern
that industrialized countries might embrace the ease of paying to reduce deforestation abroad at the expense of making domestic cuts in
emissions from fossil-fuel burning (Schlamadinger et al. 2005:30).5 Nevertheless, expansion of the CDM or the establishment of a similar
compliance mechanism to include avoidance remains a possibility for the post-Kyoto (i.e., post-2012) period (Schlamadinger et al. 2005). The
Brazilian Context Deforestation has
wreaked havoc in both of Brazil’s largest biomes, the Amazon rainforest
and the smaller Cerrado, a region of savannas, woodlands, grass, and forests (see Klink and Machado 2005:708 on
the Cerrado). Brazil’s portion of the Amazon rainforest once stretched over a region roughly the size of Western Europe (Fearnside 2005:681).
For centuries, those settling in Brazil have chopped away chunks of the forest in order to secure livelihoods,
yet until recently, their efforts have been of relatively limited magnitude. “Almost five centuries of European presence before 1970 deforested
an area [100 x 103 km2] only slightly larger than Portugal,” writes Fearnside (2005:681), whereas in the mere 33 years thereafter, total
deforested space (648.5 x 103 km2) had grown larger than France (547.0 x 103km2). In 2002 alone, new clearings encompassed more land than
the state of New Jersey (Rohter 2003:2). Similarly,
Brazil’s Cerrado withstood centuries of minor settlement by Native
peoples and “backwoodsmen” but has recently fallen prey to large-scale destruction: “All that has changed,
however, and during the last twenty-five or so years the cerrados have been extensively developed … with the active
encouragement of the Brazilian government” (Ratter, Ribeiro, and Bridgewater 2006:88-89). Klink and Machado estimate that
since 1970 or so, settlers have destroyed over half of the Cerrado (2005:708); though not the entire region
was originally forested, leaving the prevalence of Cerrado deforestation unclear, Klink and Machado’s figures
indicate considerable human interference.
Corn ethanol destroys the environment
Domestic corn ethanol is bad- it consumes more oil than it saves, depletes soil, and
encourages the destruction of the Great Plains
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
A chief argument advanced in favor of the domestic corn-based ethanol industry is that it is environmentally beneficial because it
reduces greenhouse gas emissions. The degree to which greenhouse gas emissions are reduced by replacing a percentage of U.S. gasoline
consumption with domestically-produced corn-based ethanol is a question that is hotly contested by scientists and industry advocates and
critics, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to weigh in on which evaluation is correct. The factors that go into these scientific evaluations,
however, are important for understanding the larger picture of the ethanol issue, and thus will be discussed.
At the most basic level of analysis, using
any form of ethanol as a transportation fuel combats climate
change because the carbon released when ethanol is burned was captured out of the atmosphere by
the plants used to make it, whereas the carbon released when gasoline is burned had been stored in the
earth for millennia in the form of crude oil. This simple fact is complicated, however, by the reality that the entire
process of getting ethanol into the fuel tanks of drivers, from growing crops, to creating a refined
product, to delivering blended ethanol to gas stations, is reliant on fossil fuels. According to a report in the Iowa
Ag Review, “If corn growth required only photosynthesis, if ethanol were produced using solar power, if corn were instantly transported to
ethanol plants, and if no land use changes were needed to grow the corn, then displacing a gallon of gasoline with ethanol would reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by approximately [the equivalent of] 11.2 kilograms of [carbon dioxide]. However, fossil fuels are used to grow corn
and produce ethanol.”
The debit side of the domestic ethanol industry’s climate-change ledger begins to subtract from
the credit side before the corn it uses is even planted. As author Michael Pollan, a well-known critic of federal agricultural
policy, has written, “America’s corn crop might look like a sustainable, solar-powered system for producing food, but it is actually a huge,
inefficient, polluting machine that guzzles fossil fuel.” While advocates for corn production would dispute Pollan’s characterization of the
industry as “inefficient” and “polluting,” it is undeniable that conventional
corn production techniques use large amounts
of climate change-exacerbating fossil fuels. Conventional (that is, non-organic) corn production
techniques involve annual applications of fertilizers and pesticides, both largely derived from fossil fuels.
The process by which incentives for ethanol production change land use patterns and thereby impact climate change, known as
By increasing demand for corn, corn-based ethanol
production drives up the price of corn. As the price of corn increases, farmers want grow more of it. By
making corn more appealing to farmers to grow than other crops, and thereby increasing national levels of corn-production, the
corn-based ethanol industry makes the negative environmental effects of corn production more
widespread. Conventional corn-growing techniques involve applying more pesticides and fertilizers to
corn than is usually applied to other row crops such as soybeans. This effect is exacerbated when high corn
prices disincentivize crop rotation. A common technique in American agriculture today is rotating corn and soybeans. Because
indirect land use change (ILUC), happens roughly as follows.
soybeans are a nitrogen-fixing crop (that is, they take nitrogen out of the atmosphere and release it into the soil), corn that is grown on land
that was used to grow soybeans the year before requires a lesser input of nitrogen fertilizer.
By boosting the price of corn relative to other crops like soybeans, however, the domestic
ethanol industry encourages farmers to use the same piece of land to grow corn year after year.
According to a report in Iowa Ag Review, growing corn on the same land in successive years rather than
rotating it with soybeans significantly increases the climate change effects of corn production because
“nitrogen fertilizer applications are typically 50 pounds per acre higher for corn planted after corn” and
“nitrous oxide has a global warming potential more than 300 times that of [carbon dioxide].”
Additionally, the application of fossil fuel-derived nitrogen fertilizer has other environmental impacts
beyond exacerbating climate change. The so-called Dead Zone, a region of the Gulf of Mexico where the
collective nitrogen runoff of the Mississippi River basin has caused a process called hypoxia to kill off
most marine life, has been linked to corn production and thus to the domestic ethanol industry.
Incentivizing farmers to grow after corn instead of growing corn after soybeans is only the least damaging of the environmentally
detrimental land use changes that the domestic ethanol industry encourages. Land
is primarily converted to corn production
in one of three ways: land that is already used to grow another crop is converted to corn production,
land that is used for pasture or is enrolled in a program like the Conservation Reserve Program is
converted to cropland, or native habitat is plowed and converted to cropland. Each of these has varying levels of
negative environmental effects. All three types of land use conversions are under way in the Great Plains states, which have ramped up corn
production in response to demand from the ethanol industry. While it is not the only reason corn production is increasing in these states, the
corn-based ethanol industry and thus the governmental policies encouraging it are clearly factors driving land use conversion. According to a
report from the National Wildlife Federation, “While many factors influence land use changes, the relationship between ethanol incentives and
habitat destruction is fairly clear. Ethanol
incentives increase demand for corn, which in turn increases corn
prices. Increased corn prices lead to land being converted to corn from other uses.”
While converting pasture or Conservation Reserve Program Land to cropland causes more damage than changing crop rotation
patterns in already cropped land, the most environmentally damaging way of converting land to crop production is to plow native habitat and
plant it with row crops. This process is underway now in the Great Plains, with devastating environmental effects. Although its most recent data
is from 2007, the USDA’s census of agriculture (published every five years) provides a clear picture of the trend lines of U.S. agricultural
production. This picture is one of greatly increased corn production in the Great Plains states. According to the Census of Agriculture, the
number of acres of corn production in North Dakota has increased from 592,078 acres in 1997 to 991,390 acres in 2002 to 2,348,171 acres in
2007, representing more than a doubling over five years and close to a quadrupling over ten years. Similarly, in South Dakota, the number of
acres in corn grew from 3,165,190 in 2002 to 4,455,368 in 2007, an increase of 41% over five years. In Nebraska, the number of acres in corn
increased from 7,344,715 in 2002 to 9,192,656 in 2007, a more modest but still significant increase of 25% over five years.
While a major portion of this increase in corn production in the Great Plain states is attributable to farmers converting land already
used to grow other crops or pasture to corn production, much
of it also derives from plowing native habitat. In the
words of a National Wildlife Federation report, “Recent dramatic increases in corn plantings have been heavily concentrated
in the Prairie Pothole region, displacing other crops as well as sensitive prairie pothole habitat.” The trend of replacing native
habitat with fields of corn is an extremely worrying development, and is arguably the strongest reason
for displacing at least some domestic corn-based ethanol with Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol. Therefore,
this trend will be discussed in some depth.
That crushes ecosystems and destroys carbon sinks, exacerbating warming
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
The Great Plains states have two environmentally significant habitat types that are being degraded by
increased corn production, grasslands and wetlands. According to The Nature Conservancy,
“[G]rasslands and prairies are the world’s most imperiled ecosystem.” While grasslands once stretched
across the entire central portion of the United States, 95% of the original grassland habitat in the United
States has been lost. U.S. grasslands are the native habitat of a number of threatened and endangered
species, such as the greater prairie chicken, which cannot live in cornfields. In addition to reducing the
overall amount of habitat available to native species, the process of plowing grassland to grow crops
fragments habitat by splitting it into disconnected segments. The negative effects on wildlife of
converting grasslands to corn fields, and thereby also fragmenting what habitat remains, are welldocumented. According to a study by the National Wildlife Federation, “In counties with high corn
[production] increases, the average number of grassland [bird] species was found to decline significantly
from 2005 to 2008.”
Furthermore, in addition to providing habitat for wildlife, grasslands act as a carbon sink,
keeping centuries’ worth of accumulated atmospheric carbon in underground root systems. When
native grassland is plowed to grow crops like corn, the carbon stored in its soil is released into the
atmosphere, further exacerbating climate change and counterbalancing the greenhouse gas benefits of
replacing fossil fuel-based gasoline with corn-based ethanol. Taken together, the environmental
benefits of increasing domestic corn-based ethanol production by plowing native grasslands in the Great
Plains are starkly outweighed by their costs. To quote Julie Sibbing, the National Wildlife Federation’s
Director of Agriculture Programs, “Plowing up our nation’s last remnants of native grasslands to grow
more corn for ethanol is like burning the Mona Lisa for firewood.”
Along with grasslands, wetlands are the other major habitat type in the Great Plains that are
being damaged by the domestic corn-based ethanol industry. The draining of wetlands to convert them
to agricultural production is a centuries-old trend in American agriculture that long predates the
domestic ethanol industry, and this trend has been exacerbated by a number of legal and policy factors
unrelated to ethanol production (including a 2001 Supreme Court decision interpreting the Clean Water
Act). To the extent that it increases demand for corn and thus the price of corn, however, the domestic
ethanol industry is clearly a factor driving the conversion of wetlands to corn production. This
conversion process is a land use change with wide-ranging environmental consequences. The Prairie
Pothole region of the Dakotas and surrounding states – which is composed of a mixture of grasslands
and wetlands - is a habitat of international significance. Nearly 40% of all species of migratory birds in
North America – over 300 species – utilize this habitat at some point in their life cycles or yearly
migrations. The region is, in the words of Ducks Unlimited, where “millions of ducks and geese are born
each year.” The two greatest threats to North American ducks are the destruction of wetlands and the
degradation of prairies, both of which are being driven by the expansion of U.S. corn production. In
addition to providing habitat for wildlife, both grasslands and wetlands help to clean up pollution and
prevent flooding. In the words of Dr. Kristen Blann, freshwater ecologist for The Nature Conservancy,
“Those areas with native vegetation, and the soils beneath their surface, also retain the water
throughout the season and use up the water through evapotranspiration.” Thus, converting grasslands
and wetlands to cropland for corn increases the risk of flooding.
Taken together, the consequences of converting grasslands and wetlands in the Great Plains to
increase corn production for the domestic ethanol industry are devastating. To quote a National Wildlife
Federation report, “If we proceed along the current trajectory without changing federal policies
[including those promoting corn-based ethanol], the prairie pothole ecosystem may be further degraded
and fragmented, and the many services it provides will be impossible to restore. The region will no
longer be able to support the waterfowl cherished by hunters and wildlife enthusiasts across the
country. Grassland bird populations, already declining, will be unable to rebound as nesting sites are
turned into row crops. Water will become increasingly polluted and costly to clean as the grasslands and
wetlands that once filtered contaminants disappear.”
Sugar ethanol KT Cuban economy
A sugar cane industry would be established to produce sugar and ethanol- that’s vital
to the economy and a great potential source of growth.
Veiga and Gonzalez 13- staff writers for the Havana Times
(Robert and Leneir, “Does Cuba Have a Future in Oil?” Havana Times, May 7, 2013,
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=92634)//HA
The other issue is ethanol and the sugar industry in Cuba. I may be one of the few people in the industry
who disagree with the use of grain, the use of food, to produce ethanol, a fuel used only by the middle
class or the rich, because the poor don’t own cars.
From a social point of view, I recognize ethanol’s high cost. So I agree with those who say that we
shouldn’t use corn or other grains, that we shouldn’t engage in deforestation to plant raw materials for
ethanol production. I’m against that.
Now, the cases of Cuba and Brazil are totally different , because you’re talking about a raw material
that’s sugar cane. In Cuba, you can regain one million hectares of land that historically was always sugar
land, so we’re not talking about deforestation.
The studies we’ve done show that a totally recapitalized sugar industry can contribute about $3.5
billion a year to the Cuban economy . That’s because ethanol is priced at $2 per gallon and sugar is
priced at 18 to 20 cents.
You can bring in Brazilian companies in a joint venture with Cuban companies. Gentlemen, everyone can
participate here, so long as the State grants everyone a concession. It’s not that the land will go into
private hands. The land remains in the hands of the State. But you allow that experience, that capital in
partnership with the State, to cr eate a Cuban sugar industry that could make an incredible
contribution to Cuba , not only in economic terms but also in strategic terms.
Jorge Piñon. Photo:www.jsg.utexas.edu
If we can sow one million hectares that will produce 60 to 70 tons of sugar per hectare, the harvest will
give us much, in terms of ethanol. The advantage of this in the sugar industry (such as Brazil’s), is that
when the guarapo [sweet extract] or honey arrives at the mill, you can choose whether it goes to the
distillery or to the sugar factory. In other words, you can now send it to two markets.
If the better profit comes from sugar, you turn to the sugar, but if it comes from ethanol, you turn to
the ethanol . Today we have that flexibility. Besides, remember that you’re producing plenty of
electricity, because you have all that chaff going into those new, efficient plants, so you’re also
contributing with electricity to the national system.
That’s another added value that we sometimes forget but is humongous for Cuba.
Cuba could produce 70,000 barrels of ethanol per day. That means that, in Cuba’s economic future, if
you import cars from Brazil – cars that can use either 100 percent ethanol or 100 percent gasoline – you
would not need a single drop of oil for transport fuel.
All those different pieces need to be studied long-range. The salvation of a country that is not selfsufficient in energy depends not on one product but on several.
Oil infrastructure and energy future
There’s the refinery at Cienfuegos, the pipeline from Cienfuegos to Matanzas, the storage for 600,000
barrels that was built in Matanzas. There’s the port of Mariel. Cuba is strategically located. That is why
Cuba’s national shield bears the picture of the key to the Gulf. That gives Cuba a very advantageous
position.
Sugar ethanol solves oil dependence
Other alternatives fail- only switching to liquid fuels like sugar ethanol solves oil
consumption
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
“The United States of America cannot afford to bet our long-term security and prosperity on a resource
that will eventually run out.” This dramatic quote from President Obama opens the White House’s 44page Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future. The resource referred to, oil, is indeed finite. According to
estimates from the chief economist for the International Energy Agency, assuming no major changes in
oil demand or major new oil field discoveries, “the output of conventional oil will peak in 2020.” In the
United States in the past thirty years, while consumption of oil by residential and commercial users and
electric utilities has declined, and consumption by industrial users has been level, consumption by the
transportation sector has increased. Simply put, America’s oil problem is an automobile problem. There
are a number of ways the amount of oil consumed by the U.S. transportation sector could be brought
down: raising vehicle fuel efficiency standards further, increasing and improving light rail and other
public transportation options, making communities more walkable so that daily errands could be made
without using an automobile, encouraging people to live closer to where they work, and increasing the
availability of electric cars.
Yet, even using all of these strategies comprehensively will not change a fundamental fact of our
oil-based transportation system – in certain areas (like rural communities and far-flung outer suburbs)
the automobile is essential for transportation, and liquid fuel is extremely convenient for automobiles.
With a liquid fuel engine, a driver can “re-charge” his or her car in a few minutes with a substance that is
widely available from Boston to Boise and everywhere in between. With the conveniences of oil,
however, come costs. Oil is a finite resource, and its consumption pollutes the air and contributes to
climate change. Furthermore, it is expensive (costing $96 a barrel as of September 2012 ) and will only
get more expensive in the future. Given the geography of the United States, the state of the current
domestic transportation system, and the ease of using liquid fuel for the personal automobile, however,
any realistic plan for dealing with a future of reduced oil use must include liquid fuels that are similar in
convenience and availability to gasoline.
Economic reform key to sugar ethanol
Labor market shortages block Cuban sugar ethanol – economic reform is prerequisite
to foreign investment
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
Like all new capitalist industries to emerge in the post-Castro era, whatever ethanol industry
arises will have to deal with the painful transition from socialism to capitalism. The Cuban sugarcane
ethanol industry will face similar challenges to other private sector industries that arise in the post-Fidel
era. One of these challenges will be simply a lack of people with skills necessary for any industry.
According to Edward Gonzalez and Kevin McCarthy of the RAND Corporation, “[A]s a result of 40-plus
years of communism, the labor force lacks the kinds of trained managers, accountants, auditors,
bankers, insurers, etc., that a robust market economy requires.” While these challenges will not be
unique to Cuba’s ethanol industry, they will put the country at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
existing ethanol exporters such as Brazil, especially if there is a significant lag time between the
expiration of the ethanol tariff barriers at the end of 2011 and the eventual removal of the United States
trade embargo against Cuba.
Additionally, because it is currently almost non-existent, Cuba’s ethanol industry will need a
great deal of foreign expertise and investment to get started. However, such investments are unlikely to
be made unless Cuba makes fundamental changes in its business climate. In the words of Gonzalez and
McCarthy, “Similarly, capital investment, which Cuba’s economy desperately needs and which is most
likely to be supplied by foreign investors, will be difficult to attract without enforceable contracts, access
to neutral adjudication of disputes, and a degree of predictability that has heretofore been lacking.”
While any post-Castro government will likely begin to make such changes to increase the appeal of the
island nation to foreign investment, implementing them will take time and trial and error, which will
slow the creation of a sugarcane-based ethanol industry.
Sugar ethanol key to Cuban power sector
Additionally, the waste product from sugarcane can be used to produce electricity
Soligo & Jaffe, 10– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. )//NG
Ethanol and the Production of Electricity The economics of ethanol production from sugarcane
is enhanced by using the sugarcane waste (bagasse) to produce electricity by burning it. One estimate is
that Cuban mills produce 20 and 40 kilowatt-hours per ton of sugarcane, depending on the age and
efficiency of the steam turbines. 51 This is below the 55 kilowatt-hours reported for plants in Central
America and significantly below the 100 kilowatt-hours per ton achieved by some Hawaiian mills. 52
Although bagasse is available only during the harvest season, these plants can be fueled with woodchips
and other waste in at least part of the non-harvest season. Even at the modest yield of 55 tons of
sugarcane per hectare and 55 kilowatt-hours per ton, a million hectares of sugarcane will produce
roughly 3 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, almost 20 percent of the 16.5 billion kilowatt-hours
produced in Cuba in 2006. With higher yields, 1.3 million hectares could produce 4 billion to 5 billion
kilowatt-hours.
Sugar ethanol solves warming
Ethanol doesn’t cost too much energy to produce– three reasons
Griffin and Lave, 6– Executive Director of the Green Design Institute & Professor of Economics at the Tepper School of Business,
Carnegie Mellon University (Michael & Lester, Aspen Institute, “A High Growth Strategy for Ethanol”, pg. 37-38)//NG
“Net Energy”: A Brief History of the Controversy—For
about the last 25 years a small but vocal group of ethanol critics
has argued that corn ethanol, and more recently, cellulosic ethanol, has a negative “net energy”. Simply
stated, their argument is that more fossil energy is used in the production of ethanol, for example in fuel for producing, transporting, and
processing the corn, than is delivered in ethanol’s usable energy. Their viewpoint has been widely disseminated in the country and is a major
perceived drawback to ethanol fuel. However, both the basic premise of the net energy argument and their analysis are wrong. Here is why.
Problems with the Net Energy Analysis—The critics’ most recent such paper1 concludes that corn ethanol has a -29 percent net energy and also
that cellulosic ethanol from switchgrass has about - 50 percent. Ethanol’s net energy is defined as ethanol’s heating value minus the fossil
energy inputs required to produce the ethanol divided by ethanol’s heating value. Ethanol’s heating value is a scientifically fixed, known
quantity and is about 68 percent that of gasoline. Thus the only potential point of controversy resides in the fossil energy inputs required to
produce ethanol. Here these
ethanol critics make three fundamental errors, one of premise and two of
methodology. These errors are treated in turn. All Btu are Not Created Equal—Energy markets clearly show us that all Btu
are not created equal. Otherwise, we would not pay 12 times as much for a Btu of electricity (at $0.08 per kWhr) as we do for a Btu of
coal (at $40 per ton). For accounting convenience, the proponents of net energy analysis assume that one Btu of
energy available from any energy carrier is equal to a Btu from any other energy carrier. But is this
assumption valid? A little reflection and analysis shows that it is not. We do not value energy per se but rather the
services or “qualities” that the energy provides. For example, the energy in coal cannot directly light our
homes. Coal must be converted to electricity in a power plant to provide many desired energy services.
We always lose some energy in such conversion systems, including the conversion of crude oil to
gasoline. IMPACTS OF CELLULOSIC ETHANOL ON THE FARM ECONOMY 37Data and Methods, and Lack of Comparisons—Recent
independent high profile metastudies in the leading journals Science 2 and Environmental Science and Technology 3 have
showed that the ethanol critics used some obsolete data and inadequate methods in their analyses.
Further, the ethanol critics were wrong about how energy will be provided in a cellulosic ethanol plant. The
metastudies also highlighted a very important fact from all studies of ethanol’s energy balance, both pro
and con. That fact is that corn and cellulosic ethanol both greatly extend existing petroleum supplies. If we
“invest” a barrel of petroleum to produce ethanol we will get much more liquid transportation fuel (on an
energy basis) than we will if we invest that same barrel to make gasoline. Thus using ethanol greatly extends
the life of our existing petroleum reserves. A final flaw in the arguments against ethanol’s net energy is that they provide
no comparisons with alternative energy sources. Comparisons of alternatives are central to science and
sound policy decisions, and it is not difficult to do so in this case. Using precisely the same net energy methodology
and assumptions of ethanol’s critics, one quickly finds that gasoline has a net energy that is no better than -37
percent while electricity’s net energy is about -235 percent, compared with corn ethanol’s supposed -29
percent net energy. Thus ethanol is actually superior to other fuels in its “net energy”
Ethanol effectively remedies US greenhouse gas emissions
Griffin and Lave, 6– Executive Director of the Green Design Institute & Professor of Economics at the Tepper School of Business,
Carnegie Mellon University (Michael & Lester, Aspen Institute, “A High Growth Strategy for Ethanol”, pg. 21-22)//NG
Even with abundant petroleum, concern for limiting greenhouse gas emissions requires curtailing the use of petroleum and other fossil fuels. To
achieve even modest emissions goals, the use of gasoline-diesel would have to be cut drastically. In order for the US to continue growing while
slowing then eliminating the growth of greenhouse gas, CO2 emissions per dollar of GDP would have to fall sharply. Assuming that GDP grows
at 3 percent per year, emissions per dollar of GDP would have to fall by 75 percent in 50 years and by 95 percent in 100 years. Thus, a century
from now, there cannot be any CO2 emissions from motor vehicles and gasoline and diesel will not be permissible fuels, even if fuel economy
were increased to 100 miles per gallon. Cellulosic ethanol
has the potential to begin the migration to a greenhouse
gas neutral fuel supply over the next few years. The use of cellulosic ethanol simply recycles recent origin
CO2 by capturing the CO2 as the plant grows and then releasing it as the ethanol is burned as a fuel. The
fossil fuels used in growing the biomass (fertilizers, herbicides, tractors, etc.), transporting the biomass, and transporting the
ethanol to the end user are offset to some extent by using excess energy generated from burning the lignin
fraction of the biomass for grid electricity. Process energy for the production of ethanol is provided by lignin combustion. The
midpoint of a range of values from a number of studies looking at life cycle CO2 emissions from “wells to tank” showed on average that E10
could reduce CO2 emissions compared to gasoline by 27 percent, and E85 by about 240 percent. Very
recently new studies have shown even greater reductions in overall CO2 emissions. The cost of CO2
abatement is important. There are many potential methods for point source emissions reduction, but mobile sources are more
difficult. The potential of CO2 reductions generated by producing and using cellulosic ethanol versus gasoline makes cellulosic ethanol an
important approach. The cost of abatement is sensitive to the price differential between cellulosic ethanol and gasoline. For instance, in 2004
the average US wholesale price for ethanol was $1.72. The corresponding gasoline wholesale price was $1.27, making the cellulosic ethanol
CO2 abatement cost $240 to $270/ton of CO2 for E85 and E10 respectively, taking into account energy density differences. However, in 2005
the gap between the gasoline and ethanol prices narrowed to a $0.13 differential. The resulting abatement costs would then decrease to $70 to
$77/ton CO2, for E85 and E10. If the price
of gasoline exceeds ethanol, which is entirely plausible, then the CO2
abatement costs could be essentially zero.
AT: Harms Cuba environment
There are no environmental consequences to Cuban sugar ethanol – they assume
Brazil-like conditions
Soligo & Jaffe, 10– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. )//NG
In response to recent increases in ethanol prices, there is some support in Cuba for increasing
ethanol production. A member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, Conrado Moreno, has indicated that
there are plans to upgrade eleven of the seventeen Cuban refineries to add annual production capacity
of as much as 47 million gallons. 31 It remains to be seen whether this will happen without the support
of top administration officials, especially Former President Fidel Castro.
Castro has rightly pointed out that there can be a direct trade-off between using land for food
production and for ethanol. And in many areas of the world, the shift in land use to crops for ethanol
has resulted in rapidly rising costs for food. There are also trade-offs between increasing acreage
devoted to crops for ethanol and other objectives such as issues related to climate, environment, and
biodiversity. In Brazil, for example, increasing acreage under sugarcane cultivation has resulted in
shifting other crops to newly cleared areas, often in the rainforest, a process that ultimately could have
devastating effects on climate and biodiversity within and beyond Brazil.
Cuba, however, has had a traditional comparative advantage in the production of sugar.
Although some of the land used for sugar in the past is being shifted to food crops and reforestation,
much of it is not currently being cultivated at all. Thus, for Cuba a restoration of the sugar economy does
not necessarily have to involve environmental and food production trade-offs.
AT: US won’t adopt sugar ethanol
Lifting the embargo creates political pressure to invest in and adopt Cuban sugar
ethanol
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
While it is currently impossible to blame any single climatological event, even one as large as a major
regional drought, on climate change, it has long been predicted that such droughts as the Midwest
experienced in 2012 are the type of events that will result from climate change. Adding to the already
overwhelming evidence that climate change is occurring (and should no longer be a matter of debate),
July 2012 was the hottest month the United States has experienced in 118 years of meteorological
records. The key to halting (or at least slowing) climate change will be to keep as large an amount as is
possible of the carbon stored in fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – in the ground and out of the
atmosphere. By providing an alternative to petroleum, biofuels can help to reduce oil consumption and
therefore aid in the extremely important challenge of keeping carbon underground.
As the United States faces the twin challenges of climate change and peak oil, biofuels must be a
part of the solution. They must, however, be done right. Neither a wholesale abandonment of federal
involvement in the development of biofuels nor a continuation of the corn-centric status quo is an
acceptable way forward. The development of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry is part of a
potential solution. Whether the former incentives for the domestic ethanol that expired at the end of
2011 will be revived by a future Farm Bill remains to be seen. Even if they are not, however, as long as
the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba continues there will be little chance of that country making a
substantial investment in the development of an entire new industry. While it is understandable, for
face-saving reasons, that United States policy-makers would not consider ending the decades-long trade
embargo against Cuba as long as Fidel Castro remains alive, as soon as possible after a governmental
transition begins in Cuba, United States policy-makers should consider taking steps to encourage the
creation of such an industry.
Although they represent different parts of the country, when Congress and the president make
decisions in Washington they are supposed to act in the best interests of the entire country. Thus, it
would seem difficult to suggest that the federal government should decide to make legal and policy
changes that would clearly economically favor one part of the country, Florida, to the detriment of
another part, the Midwest. Arguably, however, through its policies encouraging the corn-dominated
domestic ethanol industry and (until the end of 2011, at least) discouraging ethanol imports, the federal
government has already decided this question, and come down in favor of benefitting the Midwest to
the detriment of Florida. As the effects of the drought of 2012 illustrate, this has been a policy decision
fraught with wide-ranging consequences.
Although, as was noted in the introduction, the possibility of importing ethanol from Cuba has
been almost completely ignored in U.S. political discourse, after the Castro era ends and the United
States moves toward normalizing trade relations with Cuba it will almost certainly become a more
prominent issue. Sooner or later, it is likely that the issue will even come up in presidential campaigns. It
is thus particularly salient that the two states that would arguably have the most to lose or gain from the
importation of Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol, Iowa and Florida, are the archetypal political
battleground states in presidential elections.
The difficulty of weighing a decision to implement policy changes that would have a number of
positive environmental effects and (regionally, at least) some negative economic effects is made more
difficult by the fact that the free market system in its current state does not put a direct monetary value
or cost on many environmental effects. In the words of Kristen Blann, a freshwater ecologist for The
Nature Conservancy, “Some people are uncomfortable with the idea of trying to figure out the economic
value of ecosystem services such as clean water. I’m very sympathetic to that, but the problem right
now is that we take those free services for granted despite their obvious value to society.” Just as
positive ecosystem services (like the water filtration provided by a wetland) do not yet have positive
economic values attached to them, negative environmental decisions like burning coal or plowing a
native grassland to plant corn do not yet have negative economic values attached to them.
This does not necessarily need to be the case. For example, if the United States put a tax on
greenhouse gas emissions, there would be a greater correlation between the economic and
environmental costs of utilizing a given resource (such as coal or ethanol from corn grown on former
native grassland). However, given that the majority of the current House of Representatives even
disputes that climate change is happening, the likelihood of a carbon tax or even a cap and trade system
for carbon emission credits being passed into law in the immediate future ranks lower than the
likelihood of the United States unilaterally deciding to end its trade embargo of Cuba while Fidel Castro
is still alive.
This does not mean, however, that the climate change effects of different fuel sources will not
be weighed by decision-makers. As is often the case in American politics, on the issue of climate change
a state government has acted before the federal government. In 2007, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger signed an executive order directing California to set a goal of reducing the “carbon
intensity of California’s transportation fuels by 10% by 2020.” This standard, known as the Low Carbon
Fuel Standard (LCFS), applies to all “refiners, blenders, producers, or importers...of transportation fuels
in California” and is measured on a “full fuels cycle basis” (that is, it looks at the carbon consequences of
a type of fuel’s entire production process and not just of burning the fuel.) Assuming that California’s
LCFS survives the constitutional challenge that has been brought against it, if Cuban sugarcane-based
ethanol would indeed produce fewer carbon emissions than domestic corn-based ethanol, then
California may exert pressure on federal policy-makers to encourage the growth of an ethanol
industry in that country. Given that it is geographically remote from both the Corn Belt and Florida, and
thus has relatively little at stake economically in the debate between deriving ethanol from domestic
corn or Cuban sugarcane, California could point to itself as a neutral decision-maker, interested
primarily in reducing the fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions of its vehicles.
AT: Can’t produce enough ethanol
Cuba could export 2 billion gallons of sugar ethanol a day with no food or
environmental tradeoffs
Benjamin-Alvarado, 10 – Ph. D of Political Science, University of Nebraska (Jonathan, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. )//NG
Should Cuba successfully tap its energy production potential, Jaffe and Soligo estimate that
Cuba could produce as much as 2 billion gallons or 130,000 barrels per day of ethanol. Adjusting for the
energy content of ethanol, this is the equivalent of 97,500 barrels per day of gasoline. Having three
different energy streams will give Cuba the flexibility to exploit world price differentials and to choose
which fuel to reserve for domestic production and which to export. In many areas of the world, the shift
in land use to crops for ethanol has resulted in rapidly rising costs for food, but this is not the case in
Cuba, which has had a traditional comparative advantage in the production of sugar because of its yearround growing season. Although some of the land used for sugar in the past is being shifted to food
crops and reforestation, much of it is idle. Thus, for Cuba a restoration of the sugar economy does not
necessarily have to involve the sort of trade-offs in food production and environmental quality that are
issues in the United States and Brazil.
Cuba’s ethanol potential is second to that of Brazil in Latin America. Of course, achieving high
levels of ethanol production capacity in Cuba will take time. There are many obstacles to achieving an
ethanol industry that could produce as much as 2 million gallons of ethanol output. Increasing the area
under sugarcane will require substantial investment. The land has been neglected and much of it has
suffered from compaction with the use of very heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. As previously
mentioned, the land will have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane. Harvesting machinery has
not been maintained and much of it will have to be replaced.
AT: Midwest economy turn
Reducing corn prices has a net greater positive effect on Midwest agriculture
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
Outside of the Midwest and Florida, from a purely economic (rather than environmental and
economic) perspective, the question of whether the United States replaces a portion of its gasoline with
domestic corn-based ethanol or Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol would appear to largely be a wash. The
U.S. trade deficit would increase to the extent that a domestically produced product was being replaced
with imports, but the opening of trade relations with Cuba generally would also open many
opportunities for exports from the United States to that country – including exports of corn and other
products from the Midwest. Perhaps the primary U.S. beneficiaries of replacing a portion of domestic
corn-based ethanol with Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol, outside of Florida, would be livestock farmers
and ranchers. The primary economic considerations for whether a given dairy, beef, pork, or chicken
operation can be profitable are the costs of feed and the price of the product sold (milk, beef, pork, or
chicken). By driving up the cost of corn, the domestic corn-based ethanol industry threatens the
profitability of U.S. livestock operations. Thus, by lowering demand for corn and thus the price of corn,
importing sugarcane-based ethanol from Cuba could actually benefit a sector of the U.S. agricultural
industry, including the portion of it in the Midwest.
Corn prices won’t decrease enough to cause a farm crisis
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
Whether or not policy and law changes successfully encouraging the growth of a Cuban sugarcane
ethanol industry would, in fact, severely damage the domestic ethanol industry and the Midwestern
economy would depend on a number of factors. Perhaps the most important of these factors is whether
the Renewable Fuels Standard of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 remains in place or
is repealed by a future act of Congress. In the words of a 2008 USDA report, the Renewable Fuels
Standard “will serve as a floor for the future trajectory of renewable fuels consumption, including
ethanol.” Thus, because it mandates that a certain percentage of U.S. fuel comes from corn-based
ethanol, even if other forms of federal support are not revived the Renewable Fuels Standard will
provide a source of U.S. demand for ethanol.
Additionally, while exposing the domestic ethanol industry to competition from imported
ethanol might bring down corn prices, it would likely not be enough to make them low enough to bring
a 1980s-style farm crisis to the Midwest. There are many sources of demand for corn in addition to
ethanol. Contrary to popular perception, the majority of U.S. corn production does not become food for
people – at least not directly. The largest percentage of the annual U.S. corn crop – between 48 and 59%
in the mid years of the 2000s – goes to animal feed. In addition, about one fifth of the annual U.S. corn
crop is exported. The remaining percentage of the crop is mostly processed in a number of ways. The
products from corn processing include corn sweeteners (high fructose corn syrup), corn oil, corn starch,
and biodegradable plastics.
Even if corn-based ethanol production were to decline, U.S. corn prices are likely to remain
relatively high for the near-to-midterm future. This is mainly due to global rise of the middle class, a
resource-intensive phenomenon that is especially pronounced in countries like India and China and is
driving up prices for a large number of commodities. For example, if the Chinese economy continues to
grow and more Chinese citizens move from rural areas to cities, join the middle class, and therefore
start eating more pork, there will be upward pressure on demand for U.S. corn and therefore on U.S.
corn prices. Thus, because of factors outside of the entire debate over importing ethanol from
elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere (and indeed, outside anything in the Western Hemisphere) a
reduction in demand for corn-based ethanol would not necessarily lead to low corn prices
China
China 1ac cards
Russian and Chinese influence in Cuba are growing rapidly – facilitates greater
espionage against the US
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
Though its military decline has devastated the island’s power projection, it continues to court substitute
replacements to past Soviet patronage. Militarily these solicitations epitomize the adage that “the
enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The most obvious candidate is the current country of its old state
sponsor, Russia. Over the last few years, relations with Russia have rekindled. While lacking its historic
ideological alignment, the longstanding alliance against the U.S. still has significant geo-political appeal
to both countries. As recently as 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Havana for those
purposes. Later that same year, the Russian Navy made its first port call on the island in several decades.
Raúl Castro’s reciprocated with a Moscow visit the following year. A closer parallel to the USSR-Cuban
alignments, China has also intensified its affairs with the GOC. Also in 2008, Chinese Paramount Lead Hu
Jintao visited Cuba. During the visit, the communist countries signed dozens 19 of agreements including
significant Foreign Direct Investments to upgrade the island’s oil refining capabilities.” 53 Finally, CubanIranian relations have significantly intensified over the course of the last decade. 54 As recently as
January 2012, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Raúl Castro during a Latin American tour which U.S.
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida aptly called a “tour of tyrants.”55
A Cuban military capability that all of these countries would certainly like to leverage is Cuban
intelligence penetration of the U.S. Because of relatively low cost of the human-centric spying, GOC has
grown exceptionally capable in this threat. Brian Latell, a CIA agent who has led Cuban analysis, has
affirm just that, “ They’re one of the best intelligence services in the world … they’re comparable in a
way to the Israeli intelligence. They’re very focused on a couple - one or two very central core issues.
They do those missions very, very well.”56 This threat will endure as long as Cuban and American
governments remain adversaries and can only intensify if sufficiently coveted by potential international
patrons.
US economic isolation of Cuba is driving it towards Russia and China – a substantial
lifting of the embargo counters growing Russian and Chinese influence
Goodes 9 – Senior Military Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (Jeffrey, “Marine colonel:
Drop the Cuba embargo,” 10/23/9,
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo)//SJF
The Obama administration's decision to extend the U.S. economic trade embargo on Cuba for an
additional year is detrimental to our national and regional security and further emboldens our
economic, military, and infrastructure rivals. What is most perplexing is the fact that earlier this summer the Obama
administration decided to relax some of the regulations regarding personal travel and personal money
transfers from Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, as well as telecommunication exchanges between private U.S. and
state-run Cuban companies: all
are steps in the right direction for U.S. interests - but are not enough . While these
relaxed restrictions are certainly a step forward in normalizing relations, these steps do not outweigh the heavy diplomatic,
information, and economic influence of Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, China, Russia, India, and Iran, all of
whom support the Cuban government and all of whom seek to be peer competitors with the United
States.
In short, the U.S. unilateral embargo will continue to retard regional security and stability, and further
serve to erode our influence in the Americas at a time when U.S. credibility is globally scrutinized. The
arguably outdated and undeniably ineffective embargo will continue to halt progress at every turn;
more specifically, the diplomatic influence and credibility of the U.S., the social and political progress of
Cuba, and the security and stability progress of the region. The U.S. embargo will continue to impede
potential and future cultural and scientific trade investments, shared agricultural advancements, and
pertinent meteorological and environmental exchanges regarding the shared Florida Straits ecology.
Furthermore, the U.S. unilateral embargo will continue to encourage Cuba to partner with Russia, China,
and Brazil for off-shore oil and natural gas exploration within the shared U.S. and Cuban economic
exclusion zone. The U.S. embargo will continue to endear many of the poor Caribbean and Central American nations to the Chavez
Venezuelan PetroCaribe initiative, and the embargo will ensure that no official U.S. - Cuban dialogue and/or planned cooperative action occurs
with regards to such crucial issues as regional and transnational criminal organizations, illegal immigration and extortion issues, and the
growing Islamic influence on Latin American from Iranian, Syrian, and Lebanese diasporas.
We must face the facts: the
U.S. efforts to isolate and force a regime change in Cuba for nearly half a century
have failed.
These 50 years have successfully driven Cuba to aggressively seek support elsewhere, as is evident in their forming and
fostering diplomatic ties, seeking infrastructure support, establishing military liaisons, and accepting economic support from every government
in the Americas - to include Canada - with the exception of the United States. Most of Cuba's economic and diplomatic partners have "Leftist"
governments with close ties to state and non-state Islamic fundamentalists, porous national borders and often rampant organized crime cartels
coupled with violent gang warfare fueled by drug trafficking, human trafficking, and extortion. After all, Cuba has the backing of Hugo Chavez'
endorsed ALBA and doctors for oil initiative, Evo Morales' endorsed MAS, China's $600M economic and trade stimulus grant, and Brazil's
$300M infrastructure and modernization credit to list a few. To be sure, the United States should be very concerned with the company that
Cubans keep.
A less adversarial tone with Cuba will reestablish much needed dialogue in the region and help address shared national border security
The necessity for the
Obama administration to lift the U.S. economic embargo is painfully obvious. It would enhance the
region's security, promote economic prosperity, establish shared environmental regulations, and help
re-establish our credibility and leadership vis-à-vis some of our most prominent global allies and
competitors. Lastly, let's ask ourselves, "Has our 50 year embargo brought Cuba any closer to democracy, or have we denied the Cubans
vulnerabilities, transnational and regional crime consortiums, and environmental and ecological initiatives.
an opportunity to see the best that our free and democratic society offers?"
US-Latin American relations are slipping and China is challenging US regional status –
it threatens all of US hegemony
Martinez, May 23, 2013 [Guillermo, “America losing influence throughout Latin America”, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-0523/news/fl-gmcol-oped0523-20130523_1_drug-cartels-latin-america-pri//cc]
Once upon a time, as many fairy tales start, the United States was the prevailing force in Latin America.
It had a coherent policy for its southern neighbors, and its opinions mattered to those who governed in
the region.
Despite President Barack Obama's recent trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, and Vice President Joe Biden's
upcoming trip to the region, that is no more.
The days when John F. Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress and was a hero to the young
throughout the western hemisphere have been gone for more than half a century. The time when
Jimmy Carter pledged to back only those governments that respected human rights and encouraged
that caudillos be ousted is also a historical footnote.
True, the world has changed.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 made everyone look to the East; to Iraq, to Afghanistan, to Iran, Syria
and other countries in the Middle East. Israel is still crucial to American foreign policy, more so now that
militants are willing to die to kill Americans and Israelis.
Latin America also changed when the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez was elected. The rising
price of oil gave Chávez riches beyond belief and he began sharing it with similar-minded leaders in
Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Argentina; just to name a few.
Colombia once depended greatly on the Plan Colombia assistance from the United States to fight the
FARC guerrillas and the drug lords that governed much of the country. The emphasis on the Plan
Colombia since Juan Manuel Santos took office has decreased. Santos also believes in negotiations with
the FARC and closer ties to those who govern in Venezuela.
Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartels until Obama's
visit to Enrique Peña Nieto, recently elected president.
The communique at the end of the meeting talked about new economic cooperation between the two
nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Not highlighted was the Mexican-imposed
position that the United States agents would no longer be welcome in their country and that the
cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. Peña Nieto, the candidate of the PRI
(Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would
mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade.
Finally, China has helped change the equation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for
several years the United States was the only super power. When American presidents spoke, the world
listened. Now China offers both a challenge to the United States, as a second super power, and has
become an alternative economic trading partner for countries throughout the world.
Still, it is inconceivable that American media and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe
those around President Obama have not told him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and
Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuela are so close that many critics of
President Nicolás Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, only part
in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela – the alliance between Cuba's Raúl
Castro and Maduro's supporters is so close.
It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European
consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the
consumers at home.
Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists' presidents in the
region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendly relations with
Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.
The task is not easy, granted. Yet it would help if the United States and the Obama Administration
articulated a policy for its neighbors in Latin America. They should not be a second thought in America
foreign policy. The region deserves better. So does the United States. This country needs to improve
those ties or continue to lose status as a premier world power .
This is no fairy tale.
China will use Cuba as a platform to conduct cyber-war against the U.S.
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has also given China the
opportunity to step in as a major player, both economically and politically, in regions all around the
world, but particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested a tremendous amount of
soft power in Latin America, where it is now the continent's third largest trading partner, with an annual
trade growth of 30% since 2001. n115 American disinterest in Latin America has convinced many
countries to adopt a "Pacific view," whereby China steps in to fill the gap left by America's absence. n116
After signing a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that
country's largest export market. China also [*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading
partner. n117 In 2000, trade between China and Latin America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007,
that number had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at $ 140 billion. n118
Even despite the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during
the next five years.
China's interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly assertive global political agenda. In
2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese
officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free
trade agreement in 2010. n119
China also timed the release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with
President Hu's most recent trip to the region. It charts China's growing relationship with Latin America
and promises increased cooperation in scientific and technological research, cross-cultural educational
exchanges, as well as political and economic exchanges. n120 As China's role in Latin America increases,
American clout correspondingly decreases in terms of relative power. To be sure, the U.S. will remain
the major powerbroker in the Americas for decades to come, but will increasingly have to make room
for a new player. Given this diminishing economic position, Washington will have to rely more heavily on
diplomatic initiatives that shore up credibility rather than simply economic incentives and disincentives,
such as bilateral trade agreements.
(7B) China's Strategic Interest in Cuba
China's presence in Cuba is rather significant: after Venezuela, China is Cuba's second-largest trading
partner with $ 2.3 billion worth of goods exchanged. n121 In fact, China purchases over 400,000 tons of
Cuban sugar, as well as half its annual output of nickel, which is Cuba's top export. n122 In 2008, on a
visit to Cuba, Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to not only defer for ten years some of Cuba's debt
payments, but also to invest $ 80 million in the island's health industry. n123 Moreover, as long as
Taiwan is a [*225] thorny issue for U.S.-Sino relations, China will have a stake in Cuba. China is neurotic
about the functional American presence in Taiwan and has made its intentions for the island known to
everyone; the only thing standing between Beijing's re-appropriation of Taipei is Washington. An
increased Chinese presence in Cuba might be a strategic move by Beijing to later leverage their presence
on the island for a change in America's Taiwan policy.
In the unlikely event of hostile engagement with the United States, China has an incentive to develop
technological capabilities in Cuba, which can be used in tandem with cyber and communications warfare
against Washington. Development of such capabilities may already be happening. China has a huge
presence at Lourdes, a former Soviet espionage base just outside of Havana, where in 2004 Hu Jintao
visited and confirmed that most of the technology housed there, including almost all of the computers,
came from China. n124 Another former Soviet base in Bejucal may now also house both Cuban and
Chinese intelligence analysts. n125 But China's leadership is pragmatic, not ideological, which begs the
question: what is China getting in return for all this assistance? If China is cooperating with Cuban
intelligence to spy on the United States, a greater American presence on the island would be needed to
fully understand the scope of this rather disturbing operation.
The plan undermines Cuba’s ties with Russia, Venezuela and China
Frye 2012- research associate at COHA (Alexander, “U.S. Embargo against Cuba: Washington's Sterile
Strategy”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 4/26/12, http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/3907.cfm,
google news)//KW
In 2010, Fidel Castro himself stated in an interview with Atlantic correspondent Jeffrey Goldberg that
"the Cuban model doesn't even work for us anymore." After its publication, the aging ex-dictator
claimed his comment was misinterpreted, but such a statement cannot be readily misunderstood, and
the past few years have been telling. Cuba is less ideologically motivated today than at any point in
recent history, and the Castro brothers have repeatedly stated their desire to achieve reconciliation with
the United States.
Yet Washington, for its part, continues its irrational and imprudent support of a policy that over the past
five decades has proven itself an unequivocal failure. The Castros are still in power, and Cuba is still
militantly socialist—though no more so than China or Vietnam, with which the United States maintains
relatively healthy diplomatic and economic ties. Havana's record on human rights remains lackluster—
but so, too, do those of Beijing and a score of other U.S. trading partners. And Cubans still do not enjoy
fully free elections, but neither do the Saudis or Russians, and the U.S. has no compunction about
dealing with them. Washington routinely associates with nations more oppressive and less democratic
than its Caribbean neighbor, and yet with Cuba, it balks. Such a towering inconsistency, in light of the
productive relationships the U.S. pursues with other questionably democratic societies and the wholly
unproductive nature of its Cuba policy, cannot stand. And were it not for Florida's position as a swing
state and the influence of the many pro-embargo Cuban Americans who live there, it would not.
Washington's stubbornness has cost the United States billions of dollars in lost sales, and has, by
Havana's own estimate, cost the Cubans upwards of $975 billion since the embargo's inception. Though
such a figure may be inflated, there can be no doubt that the United States, whose economic size and
close proximity make it a natural Cuban trading partner, is at least partly responsible for the island's
dearth of badly needed medical supplies and crushing shortage of building materials. Unfortunately for
the United States, to combat shortfalls, Cuba has increasingly turned to countries like Venezuela, Russia
and China, which have all condemned the U.S. embargo—along with the entirety of the U.N. General
Assembly, save Israel—and which have all been eager to peddle their goods and influence in the
Caribbean. The United States, in both prestige and trading opportunities, is patently missing out.
President Obama has taken a step in the right direction by easing restrictions on travel to the island for
Cuban Americans and certain student and religious groups. But if the United States would truly like to
see an open Cuba, then it must go further. Considering the massive concessions it is prepared to make
to such absolute pariahs as Iran and North Korea, it is long past time for Washington to end its 50-year
tantrum. The Cold War is over; five decades of senseless stalemate is enough.
The U.S. and China are competing for Latin American influence – US economic engagement is key to
winning
Mallén, May 30, 2013 – MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism
[Patricia Rey, “Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean”,
http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean-1284839//cc]
The battle is on. The world's two largest economic superpowers, China and the United States, are
making moves on Latin America, hoping to gain more geopolitical influence in a booming region.
U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden arrived in Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday, while Chinese President Xi Jinping just landed in the Caribbean island
nation of Trinidad and Tobago and is following closely in Biden’s steps.
Biden’s visit to Brazil marks the end of a six-day swing through the region, which included stops in
Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago. Xi’s trip to Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico is the first since the
formal transition of power ended in China in March. These parallel journeys from the world’s top
powers to Latin America emphasize how the region’s vast natural resources and steady economic
growth are making it an increasingly attractive trading partner.
China's designs on Latin America have long been apparent, with imports to the Asian giant surging from
$3.9 billion in 2000 to $86 billion in 2011, as calculated by the Inter-American Development Bank. Now,
China seeks to start buying massive amounts of soy beans, copper and iron ore from Latin nations,
reports the South China Morning Post.
The U.S., on the other hand, which has had deep involvement in many Latin American nations for the
past two centuries, has nonetheless been less than consistent in its recent trade policies, said Boston
University economist Kevin Gallagher, who has written about China's incursions in the region. “The onus
is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer, but that’s not so easy because it doesn’t
have the deep pockets like it used to,” he told Bloomberg.
During his visit to Colombia, Biden signed a two-year free trade agreement between the countries, calling it “just the beginning.” The VP said, at
the end of a particularly tense discussion about trade in Trinidad on Tuesday, that the U.S. is deeply invested in the region, and wants to expand
that investment with more agreements. “Our goal is not simply growth, but growth that reaches everyone,” he added.
In Rio de Janeiro, Biden met with President Dilma Rousseff and invited her to a meeting in Washington to finalize a strategic accord. Biden
mentioned being particularly interested in oil and energy companies like state-owned Petroleo Brasilero, better known as Petrobras (NYSE:
PBR), reported Brazilian newspaper O Globo.
Biden mentioned that trade with Brazil could be increased by 400 percent from the current $100 billion, if trade between the two largest
Western Hemisphere nations included biofuels and aviation.
Meanwhile, China’s blossoming relationships with the region evince a shift in its strategy; indeed, in the
past Beijing deferred to U.S. economic interests in Latin America, due to geographic proximity, even
referring to the region as “Washington’s backyard.” But now, in a globalized world, China seems to view
the entire planet as its own "backyard."
“You don’t hear that anymore from Xi’s team,” said Evan Ellis, professor at the National Defense
University in Washington, D.C. In fact China has recently ousted the U.S. to become the top trade
partner for Brazil and Chile, reported Bloomberg News.
Moreover, China is seeking to advance its footprints in the region in gradual steps -- for example, Beijing
plans to lend Costa Rica $400 million to help expand a highway, reported local newspaper La Nación.
“If the Chinese decide to unroll one of their little packages in Trinidad [the biggest energy supplier in the region], they will win the entire
Caribbean over,” said Gallagher.
Still, the U.S. and China both deny they are competing in the vast region. Ultimately, the decision lies
with Latin American leaders, says Gallagher. “If I was [a Latin American leader], I’d be very happy
because I now have more chips to play with,” he added.
China-Cuba relations high
China investing in Cuban energy now
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
China has rapidly emerged as Cuba’s second most important commercial partner, behind only Venezuela
and quickly outpacing Cuba’s early post-Soviet leading trading partners, Canada and Spain . In 2010
China sold Cuba just over $1 billion of a wide variety of vehicles, machinery, consumer goods, and
industrial inputs . Brightly colored Chinese Yutong buses (despite maintenance problems) are visible
throughout the island (Figure 2 .3) . In return, China imported just under $800 million in goods, primarily
nickel and sugar . According to Chinese sources, these sugar purchases are driven less by economic
efficiency criteria than by the mutual Chinese-Cuban interest in reducing the bilateral trade imbalance
(Table 2 .2).
Chinese firms have made a number of modest joint venture investments in Cuba . Taiji Farms grows rice
for domestic consumption . Other joint ventures produce shoes, bicycles, and home electrical
appliances . 36 Red Chinese flags fly over the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC)-Cuban joint
venture on-shore oil drilling fields on the north-central coast (Figure 2 .4) . CNPC investments in five
blocks pertaining to the EEZ off-shore oil and gas fields are also under discussion . If these energy
investments materialize, China would add petroleum to nickel and sugar as its major commodity imports
from Cuba . Chinese-Cuban relations are given a degree of symmetry by Cuban SOE investments in
China, in hotels, tourism, pharmaceutical production (of anticancer drugs and interferon), and
ophthalmic hospitals
Over time, China has undertaken 70 development assistance projects (separate from joint ventures) in
Cuba, a combination of donations and low-interest credits, according to the Chinese embassy in Havana
. 37 These have included two hydro-electric projects, agricultural irrigation, a duck farm, blood bank
equipment, housing construction, and donations of medicine and school books
In June, 2011 visiting Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (and possible future president) and CNPC
President Jiang Jiemin signed memoranda of understandings with the Cuban government and national
oil company, Cupet, on a wide range of issues including possible large Chinese investments (up to $5
billion according to authoritative Cuban sources) in expanding the Cienfuegos and Matanzas oil and gas
refineries . However, Chinese officials privately emphasize that these MOUs were merely general
statements of intentions and that the hard details are still to be negotiated . Other MOUs touched on
debt restructuring, investment protection, prospective non-interest bearing assistance credits tied to
Chinese exports, and future aid donations . Among topics for technical cooperation were university
research laboratories, standards for digital television, banking supervision, and economic planning
(“Cuba needs assistance in making five-year plans,” said one Chinese official privately)
China-Cuba relations high now – ideological, geopolitical, and economic alliances
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
Chinese officials downplay Chinese interests in Cuba: “It’s just another commercial partner, there is no
special relationship,” noting that even within commercial terms, the $2 billion in annual two-way
commerce is but a small portion of Chinese trade with Latin America and the Caribbean . In fact, China
has long held a diplomatic interest in Cuba . 38 In the early days of the revolution, Cuba recognized the
People’s Republic of China—the first Latin American country to do so . Che Guevara led an economic
delegation to China in November 1960 . But when Fidel Castro allied with the USSR, relations with China
deteriorated . History took another turn with the passing of the Soviet Union . Chinese President Jiang
Zemin visited Cuba in November 1993 and Fidel Castro paid a return visit to China in 1995 . Raul Castro
has visited China twice, in one visit spending 20 days to tour six provinces . Today, Cuba backs Chinese
positions on Taiwan and Tibet, and the two nations share similar views on “anti-hegemonism” and
“non-intervention” and preferences for a more multi-polar world order
For China, a growing presence in Cuba strengthens a friendly regime similarly ruled by a communist
party, and fits into a global strategy of expanding Chinese presence throughout the developing world .
39 Chinese officials assure U .S . diplomats that they have no intention of challenging U .S . security
interests in the Western Hemisphere, but Chinese trade and investments, de facto, soften the impact of
U .S . economic sanctions against Cuba . Geopolitically, Beijing would prefer a reduced U .S . presence in
its own Asian neighborhood, and may imagine that a Chinese presence in the Caribbean serves as an
offsetting asset—one that might, some day, be a useful bargaining chip in a global realignment of forces
.
For Cuba, the growing Chinese presence has obvious economic and geopolitical advantages . This will be
especially so if Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) are successful in their off-shore explorations and
realize big investments in refinery expansion . And China fits squarely into Cuba’s emerging market
strategy . More subtly, China may help to balance Venezuelan influence and offer a more durable
partnership
China sphere of influence high in Latin America – Investment and relocating factories
The Economist, 13 (“Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?”, Jun 6th 2013,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3)//eek
However, as our story on Mr Xi’s visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for
picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia
by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard. China’s business
relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of
investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National
Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient
of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin
Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica
may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin
America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron,
oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with
its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been
frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten
times as much to Mexico as it imports.
But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from
China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate
Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the
Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China
will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does
suggest that China’s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If
that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on
their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.
AT: China stabilizes Latin America
Chinese investments in Latin America are unsustainable – demand will eventually go
down and there is a major need for structural reform
Cárdenas 11 – former assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International
Development (José R., “The U.S. is MIA in Latin America” , Foreign Policy, December 29 2011,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/29/the_us_is_mia_in_latin_america) //WNM
The administration's complacency may also be due to the current economic boom the region is
experiencing, as commodity producers are riding the great wave of Chinese demand. If the U.S. profile
in the region has diminished, does it really matter? Times are good, government coffers are relatively
full, and poverty is declining.
The problem with this scenario is that Chinese demand will not always be there. The Chinese economy
as it exists today will not be the same one a decade from now. Moreover, long-term regional prosperity
is not going to be built on producing raw materials for the development of the Chinese economy today.
All the current boom is accomplishing today is masking over the deep structural changes that are still
desperately needed in most of the region's economies.
There will be many who will cheer-lead that Latin America is finally out from underneath the United
States' long shadow and doing great "on its own" - but such sentiments are short-sighted. Many
challenges remain: transnational criminal organizations involved in the drug trade continue to wreak
havoc, making a mockery of rule of law along with corruption in many countries; too many citizens in
the region are shut out of their country's economies through excessive regulation and other barriers;
and doing business in the region is still too difficult to draw the kind of investment that is flowing to
Asia.
Soft power zero sum
Soft power is zero-sum – expanding US power comes at the expense of regional
competitors
Kochan, 12 - Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law (Donald, “CIVIL RESISTANCE AND THE
LAW: NONVIOLENT TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: YOU SAY YOU WANT A (NONVIOLENT) REVOLUTION,
WELL THEN WHAT? TRANSLATING WESTERN THOUGHT, STRATEGIC IDEOLOGICAL COOPTATION, AND
INSTITUTION BUILDING FOR FREEDOM FOR GOVERNMENTS EMERGING OUT OF PEACEFUL CHAOS” 114
W. Va. L. Rev. 897, lexis)
The concept of soft power focuses on the strength and influence that a nation can project in the world
on the basis of their ideas, models, and example. As I explained in my earlier work, "[s]oft power is the
means of leveraging [*920] popularity, power, prestige, prosperity, envy, enlightenment, and
experience to affect foreign nations and foreign policy." n80
Soft power of persuasion has the capacity to induce others to change their behaviors. But soft power
can be used with good or ill effect. That is why the recognition of a soft power competition and the need
to win becomes so critical. Once we understand that there is a global marketplace of ideas, where ideas
compete and ideologies vie for privileged position, the exertion of soft power is critical for any selfinterested nation. n81
Joseph Nye is widely considered the originator of the term "soft power" and has written extensively on
the subject for more than fifty years. n82 Soft power has come to be recognized as an effective means of
shaping global policy and extending influence. n83 In his 1955 text, Nye describes it as an alternative to
hard power interventionist mechanisms:
"[H]ard power" is the ability of the United States to conduct foreign policy and achieve its wishes on the
world stage through means of force, force projection, threats, and implied threats. "Soft power" is the
ability of the United States to achieve these [*921] same goals by powers of persuasion or envy or
other emotions felt by those countries that are the target of U.S. policy. n84
More recently, Nye has further elaborated on the concept and refined it somewhat--describing the
interrelationships between soft power traditionally understood and public diplomacy to inscribe a
"smart power" permutation on the concept, which is defined as a combination of soft power and hard
power. n85 For purposes of this Article, only the soft power component will be considered. To be sure,
however, soft power and hard power are not mutually exclusive, and by advocating soft power, this
Article takes no position on various hard power strategies of influence in the nations or regions herein
discussed.
Part of the allure of soft power rests in its enduring effects as ideas and values become accepted and
embedded in a new society n86 and the fact that it creates new connections and development of
similarities based on newly shared values. n87 Moreover, soft power is generally less likely to face
resistance than hard power intervention. n88
Very importantly, in relation to nonviolent revolutions in areas where perhaps the United States has not
been historically held in the highest regard, n89 the best exertions of soft power are those that take the
words "influence" and "persuasion" seriously--resting on the force of the ideas themselves rather than
[*922] on lectures or other paternalistic means for the introduction of the ideas into a society. n90 It is
a matter of attraction and acceptance by the target audience. n91 And, the changes in today's world-including the proliferation of nonviolent revolutionary movements--underscore the already clear need
for a vigorous focus on soft power as part of United States foreign policy. n92 There must be recognition
of this synergy between soft power interventions and nonviolent regime change. It is likely that those
engaged in nonviolent change are more reflective, thoughtful, patient, and willing to use ideas as
weapons. Assuming those things are true, it is not surprising that societies engaged in nonviolent change
may be more receptive to soft power intervention so long as it is based on the provision of ideas with
their own organic, persuasive power that they can freely adopt rather than ideas imposed by an artificial
force.
It is, indeed, a soft power competition in which other countries are engaged and a practice that matters
worldwide. In addition to more localized concerns like competing ideologies in the Middle East, there is
worldwide competition for influence . For example, China, often touted as the emerging dominant
economic and political superpower, understands the influence of soft power to spread its own values to
other nations. China is beginning to recognize the ability to compete on the geopolitical stage through
soft power influence. n93 Nonetheless, [*923] the quality and maturity of a nation's soft power
product matters--one author, for example, posits that "development of China's soft power is still in an
early stage" and "China lacks some of the crucial elements of soft power such as the attractiveness of its
political values." n94
Regional influence is zero-sum – increasing US influence trades-off with China
Cárdenas et al 2008 – Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative
[Mauricio, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World: Report of the Partnership for the
Americas Commission”, The Brookings Institution, November 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.
pdf//cc]
The second change is that the
LAC countries are diversifying their international economic relations. Their range
of trading and investment partners is expanding, with China in particular playing a prominent role in the
region. Chinese imports from the LAC countries increased twentyfold between 1990 and 2005, while Chinese exports to the region grew even
faster, from $620 million in 1990 to $37 billion in 2005. Latin America is also attracting significant foreign investment from nontraditional
sources. Between just 2003 and 2005, the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in the LAC region increased by 40 percent. China has
become a key buyer of commodities, driving up prices and reversing the long-term decline in the region’s terms of trade. Meanwhile, the
Caribbean countries have recently signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European 8 partnership for the americas commission
Union, immediately opening all European markets and gradually opening Caribbean ones. With more valuable exports and less expensive
manufactured imports, living standards in the LAC region have improved significantly.
At the same time, many LAC countries have moved beyond their traditional reliance on resources from the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil now enjoy investment-grade status from credit-rating
agencies and in recent years have been able to raise capital readily in international markets. The same is true of several other countries,
including Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay, which until the recent financial crisis enjoyed ready access to private international
capital. Regionally owned institutions, such as the Andean Development Corporation and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration,
have also reduced the region’s dependence on traditional sources of capital.
Some Latin American countries are investing abroad on an unprecedented scale. In 2006, for example, Brazil invested more abroad ($28 billion)
than it received in foreign direct investment ($19 billion). In Chile, private pension funds and the government have become active international
investors. Surpluses have allowed Venezuela to inject billions of dollars into other countries, particularly through subsidized oil exports. Many
Latin American multinationals—such as Brazil’s Vale, Gerdau, and Odebrecht; and Mexico’s CEMEX, America Movil, and Grupo FEMSA—have
become global corporate giants. The current crisis may no doubt affect the relative magnitude of these investments, but economic
relationships in the hemisphere will continue to diversify as the world economy recovers.
The third change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their political and diplomatic relations. The most notable example is Brazil, which has
opened thirty-two new embassies in the past five years. Together with Venezuela, Brazil is playing a more active political role in the region
through the Union of South American Nations, which is already active at the presidential level and is expected to become a key forum for the
discussion of defense issues. Mexico and Brazil are also playing prominent roles in international forums and organizations, including the finance
ministers’ Group of Twenty and the trade ministers’ Group of Twenty. Brazil has announced its intention to join the Organization of the
Petroleum-Exporting Countries and the Paris Club. Chile and Brazil are expected to become members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the not-too-distant future. Mexico, Peru, and Chile are active members of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum. In sum, this diversification of political and economic relations reflects many LAC countries’ new confidence in their capacity
to chart their own course in the world.
Their enhanced confidence and autonomy will make many LAC countries much less responsive to U.S. policies that are perceived as patronizing,
intrusive, or prescriptive, and they will be more responsive to policies that engage them as partners on issues of mutual concern. Also, the
LAC countries’ diversification of economic and political relations means that Washington will have to
compete with governments both outside and within the region for regional influence. In particular, Brasília
and Caracas are both vying for leadership in South America; and though they may have different visions
for regional integration and different ways to approach other governments, they agree that Washington should
play a more limited role in their part of the world.
The fourth change is that, today, the LAC countries are better positioned to act as reliable partners. Despite remaining governance challenges,
the vast majority of these countries are stable democracies for which competitive elections and peaceful transitions of power are the norm, not
the exception. Throughout these countries, civil society groups now participate extensively in the policymaking process, and there is much less
tolerance of violence as a means of political expression.
Economic progress has also made the LAC countries more reliable partners. Leaders, including some on the left, are committed to fiscal
responsibility. Most central banks are now independent bodies focused on inflation control. Exchange rates largely reflect market forces. As a
result, many LAC countries can now look beyond their borders and commit to sustained partnerships and responsibilities on regional and global
issues. 9
In sum, the countries of the LAC region have made significant strides in economic and social development and will continue to prosper even if
U.S. leaders remain disengaged. Washington
must decide whether it wants to actively reengage and benefit from the
region’s dynamism and resources or be sidelined as other economic and political actors fill the void left by its
absence.
Russia
Russia-Cuba relations high
Russia-Cuba relations increasing – counters American influence in the region
Nechepurenko 13 – Master of Science in International Relations from the London School of
Economics and International Relations, analyst of foreign and internal affairs of Russia and the CIS for
many think tanks (Ivan, “Russia seeks to restore influence in Latin America”, May 30, Russia and India
Report,
http://indrus.in/world/2013/05/30/russia_seeks_to_restore_influence_in_latin_america_25591.html)//
ID
Russia has demonstrated its increasing leverage in Latin America with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
meeting representatives of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in Moscow on
Wednesday.
The foreign ministers of Cuba, Costa Rica and Haiti and the deputy foreign minister of Chile discussed
trade, political dialogue and a visa-free regime with Lavrov, with everyone in agreement that Russia's
relations with the region are ripe enough to establish "a permanent mechanism for political dialogue
and cooperation in a Russia-CELAC format," a statement from Russia's Foreign Ministry said.
CELAC was founded in 2010 as a counterweight to the U.S.-led Organization of American States. It
consists of 33 states representing almost 600 million people and producing $7 trillion in annual GDP.
"This is a serious attempt by Latin American states to counter U.S. economic and political influence in
the region," said Mikhail Belyat, an independent Latin American expert and lecturer at the Russian State
University for the Humanities.
Cuba-Russia relations increasing now – three reasons
OxReach Daily Brief Service 13 – (“Cuba/Russia: Improved ties play in Cuba's favour”, April 01,
Oxford Analytica: Global Strategic Analysis, ProQuest)//ID
SUBJECT:Cuba-Russia bilateral ties.
SIGNIFICANCE:In the coming months, Cuba and Russia will settle the details of the repayment of
Havana's remaining debt to Moscow over ten years, after reaching an agreement that partially writes off
obligations inherited from the Soviet-era. A new phase in relations between Cuba and Russia was
cemented by the visit in February of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev -- the second in five years.
ANALYSIS: Impacts.
The agreement allows for Cuban purchases to upgrade its ageing fleet of mainly Soviet-era passenger
aircraft.
Access to new finance for capital imports from Russia will help to lift Cuba's investment rate from its
current low level.
The sale of airport and port services to Russian businesses marks a new phase in the diversification of
Cuba's services exports.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-91, Cuba's formerly close economic ties with Russia
were broken, and political relations soured. Although Russia continued to buy some of Cuba's sugar, the
price was no longer preferential, and the supply of Russian financing disappeared completely. Trade
between the two countries, which had been such a large share of Cuba's total trade, became almost
insignificant.
The new agreement, which follows a gradual warming of relations over the past decade, marks the start
of a new phase of cooperation. It includes not only trade, but also broad scientific assistance, the
provision of shipping and aviation services by Cuba to Russian customers and, crucially, the resolution of
a long-standing dispute over Cuba's debt to Russia, inherited from the former Soviet Union.
For Cuba, the acquisition of Russian aircraft is important for two reasons:
As the existing stock is mainly from the former Soviet Union, Cuban engineers and pilots are familiar
with the technology, and the easier access to supplies of spare parts will help maintain the fleet.
In recent years it has become increasingly difficult for Cuba to purchase aircraft from other countries, as
suppliers have been wary of falling foul of US sanctions, which threaten fines if more than 10% of the
content of products is produced in the US.
Inherited debt.
The debt agreement is a long-awaited breakthrough, which opens the way for further bilateral trade and
investment, and helps ease the damage to the Cuban economy caused by US sanctions. The exact
nominal value of the debt that is inherited from the Soviet Union is unclear, but it has been estimated -in nominal terms, at the official rate of one Soviet rouble: one US dollar -- at between 20-30 billion
dollars. Since 1991 Cuba has made no payments on this debt, with its negotiators arguing not only that
the current value is a small fraction of the official Soviet rouble valuation, but also that they have a
counter-claim, arising from the non-fulfilment of delivery contracts during the final crisis of the
communist bloc, which should be set against its debt.
Until now, efforts to settle the matter have failed. In 2001 Cuba withdrew from negotiations with the
Paris Club when the latter attempted to include Russian debt in the talks, arguing that the Cuban debt to
the former Soviet Union should be treated as a separate issue. Since then, despite the thawing of
relations with Russia, the unresolved issue of the debt has been an obstacle to the expansion of bilateral
trade and financing flows. Now, two decades after the Soviet Union disappeared, the Russian
government is ready to write off long-dormant accounts inherited from former USSR partners, where
this could create new business opportunities.
In the case of Cuba, interest was stirred by deep-water exploration in the Mexican Gulf; the construction
of new port facilities at Mariel, near Havana; Cuba's renewed interest in diversifying trade partners to
reduce dependence on Venezuela (see CUBA: Oil outlook looks gloomy - September 20, 2012) and the
growing prospect that the Cuban economy might begin to take-off thanks to reforms and a possible
relaxation of US sanctions against Cuba (see CUBA/US: Long-frozen bilateral ties may face thaw February 1, 2013).
Officials have stated that the agreement writes off 'most' of the debt, but the exact proportion has not
been revealed. In the next few months, negotiators will work out a formula for the 'regularisation' of the
remainder. A ten-year period for repayment has been mentioned, with an indication that this will be
linked to Cuban earnings from supplies of services to Russia.
Export shift.
The identification of new opportunities for services exports continues Cuba's shift from exports of goods
to services.
Under the Soviet trading system, the country specialised in production of sugar, earnings from which
were boosted by favourable prices (around three times the world market price in 1990). Since then, the
economy has had to adapt to world market prices while being severely disadvantaged by its lack of
access to the US market as a destination for exports. As a result, the recovery of goods exports has been
difficult, with sugar earnings only around 10% of their former level, and little diversification beyond
nickel, citrus, tobacco and rum.
In contrast, services earnings in 2012 were almost 20 times their 1990 level: first tourism, then
professional services (mainly medical, but also including education and others), and now the emergence
of a new income stream from transport services.
Financing priority.
The opening of new sources of financing from Russia, which will result from this agreement, is a priority
for Cuba, because of the restrictions to its access to international financial markets caused by US
sanctions. Not only do US laws block flows from the US and most official international financial
institutions, but the threat of prosecution by the United States also deters institutions in third countries
from offering US dollar credits or financial services to Cuba.
Dependence on financing from Venezuela has increased in recent years, and although its extent is
unknown -- as Cuba publishes very little data for its external debt or its balance of payments, claiming
that to do so might increase the vulnerability of its creditors to US punishment or help the US target its
sanctions -- finding alternative sources of finance has become a priority for the Central Bank. The
agreement with Russia follows Cuba's recent progress in gradually improving access to finance from
other important trading partners, including Brazil and China.
CONCLUSION: A bilateral cooperation agreement between Cuba and Russia paves the way for increases
in the volume of both trade and investment flows in the medium term. For Cuba, this will make an
important contribution to the diversification of production and trade relations, helping to reduce its
dependency on preferential trade with Venezuela.
Russia increasing arms sales to Cuba
Daily News Bulletin 11 (“Russia to build Kalashnikov ammunition plant in Cuba”, Dec 1,
ProQuest)//ID
KLIMOVSK, Moscow region. Dec 1 (Interfax-AVN) - Russia will build a Kalashnikov ammunition plant in
Cuba, Deputy Director of the Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service Konstantin Biryulin told
Interfax-AVN on Thursday.
"The production equipment was supplied to Cuba several years ago. It must be unpacked and started
up," he said.
Biryulin thus commented on media reports claiming that Russian enterprises would soon help Cuba
build a Kalashnikov ammunition plant.
Biryulin did not say when the plant might be built, which ammunition or how much it would produce.
Kommersant daily reported earlier that Russia is resuming military-technical cooperation with Cuba, and
a contract on an ammunition production line may be signed soon, the newspaper Kommersant said on
Wednesday.
"Cuba has expressed its interest in buying an ammunition production line from Russia," a source close to
the Industry and Trade Ministry told the newspaper.
In his words, Cuba wants to make 7.62-millimeter cartridges of the 1943 model and 7.62-millimeter rifle
ammunition. The production line may be supplied to the Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara defense
plant.
"Cuba applied to Rosoboronexport last year and the latter drafted a commercial bid, which envisaged, in
particular, the transfer of the production license and the ammunition disposal technology," the source
said.
The appeal was lodged after Cuban officials and military commanders visited the ammunition plant
Russia had been building in Venezuela since 2006.
"It was planned originally that the Koshkin Plant, an element of Rostekhnologii, would meet the Cuban
request. However, the Industry and Trade Ministry assigned the contract to the Central Precision
Engineering Institute (CNIITochmash) - the head designer, tester and experimental producer of firearm
cartridges," the source told the newspaper.
He refused to name the sum of the contract but said that Russia aspired for modernization of all
ammunition plants in Cuba built with the Soviet's assistance in the late 1970s - early 1980s.
A source close to Rosoboronexport confirmed the information, and CNIITochmash General Director
Vladimir Ivanov refused to comment.
The newspaper thinks that closer relations with Cuba may lead to cooling between Russia and the U.S.,
which has not lifted its unilateral trade embargo enacted in 1961. The U.S. Congress adopted the HelmsBurton Act in 1996 to introduce additional sanctions on foreign companies trading with Cuba.
The newspaper recalled that U.S. President Barack Obama extended the sanctions against Cuba this
September until September 14, 2012. CNIITochmash has been blacklisted by the U.S. Administration
before, Kommersant said. The institute and some other Russian companies were put under U.S.
sanctions in April 1999 - April 2004 for supplying Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank missile launchers to
Syria, the newspaper said.
Increasing military cooperation in Cuba in response to US support of Georgia
Forman and Flanagan 8 - *senior associate with Americas Program at CSIS, **senior vice president
and director of the International Security Program at the CSIS (Johanna M., Stephen, “Russia's
Reengagement in the Western Hemisphere”, November 25, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, http://csis.org/publication/russias-reengagement-western-hemisphere)//ID
The arrival of a Russian naval squadron and antisubmarine aircraft in the Caribbean for exercises with
the Venezuelan Navy this week marks Moscow’s first significant military deployment in the Western
Hemisphere since the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. However, this exercise presents a
political rather than a serious military challenge to the United States. Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez
and the Russian leadership see the exercise as a provocative way to challenge U.S. influence in Latin
America and what they describe as Washington’s “unipolar vision.” The leaders of both countries have
other agendas as well.
The exercise allows Chávez to hype his accusations of a growing U.S. threat to the region and the notion
that Latin American leaders should look elsewhere for security partners. In the aftermath of the
Georgian war, Moscow wants to put Washington on notice that if the United States continues to
support countries like Georgia, which Russia claims as part of an exclusive sphere of influence along its
borders, it is prepared to intrude in the United States’ backyard. The fact that the Russian squadron
could deploy far from its Barents Sea base is remarkable, given the poor state of the Russian Navy,
illustrated by yet another submarine disaster earlier this month. Although President Dmitri Medvedev is
committed to military modernization, Russia spends about one-tenth what the United States does on
defense. It will be years before Russia can sustain even such modest long-distance operations.
The Russian leadership finds Chávez’s anti-American politics quite useful. It is telling that Deputy Prime
Minister Igor Sechin, a staunchly anti-American member of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s cabinet and
who served in Soviet times as a senior KGB operative in Africa, is managing the Chávez relationship.
Chávez has been given a red carpet reception in Moscow during four recent visits to Russia (July 2006,
June 2007, July 2008, and September 2008), and President Medvedev is stopping in Caracas, now
conveniently coincident with the rescheduled naval exercise, on the way home from the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. This has paid Moscow some political dividends. During his August
visit, which included a reception at Putin’s Moscow home, Chávez usefully blamed the United States for
the Georgian war and lauded Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as “honorable acts.”
Chávez and the Russians also signed energy deals between Gazprom and PDVSA, the Venezuelan stateowned petroleum company, for gas exploration. During his visit to Caracas this week, Medvedev is
expected to announce plans to build Venezuela’s first nuclear reactor and possibly agree to additional
arms transfers, including submarines.
Finally, as discussed below, Russia values Venezuela as a client for its arms that can readily pay cash.
Arms exports have been critical to sustaining Russia’s defense industrial base over the past two decades
of reduced procurement at home. As its relatively unsophisticated weapons systems have become less
attractive to longtime customers such as India and China, Russia has been anxious to find new markets.
Q2: Does Medvedev’s visit to Latin America mark the beginning of a new period of competition between
the United States and Russia?
A2: President Medvedev has denied that his visit to Latin America is designed to challenge the U.S. role
in the hemisphere and has suggested that such zero-sum thinking is a relic from the Cold War.
Medvedev claims he is simply trying to revive ties with Latin America, which have languished since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and to pursue mutually beneficial economic relations. However, it is clear
that Medvedev is seeking to expand Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere, hoping to take
advantage of his country’s new energy-driven economic clout and lingering negative sentiment toward
Bush administration policies during the U.S. political transition.
However, Medvedev’s hand is weaker than when he planned his trip. Moreover, falling oil prices and the
global financial crisis, which have hit Russia particularly hard, have raised questions about Russia’s
reliability as an economic partner. A recent Latinobarómetro poll confirmed diminished U.S. influence,
but it also revealed that most Latin American countries strongly desire more cooperative relations with
the United States. The election of Barack Obama has raised hopes throughout the region that a new era
in hemispheric relations is dawning, and Latin American leaders want to be on the right side of history.
Medvedev’s visit to Brazil was designed to advance cooperation on aerospace, energy development, and
nuclear propulsion projects and to promote sales of Russian military equipment. However, Brazil has
other suitors on the military sales, including France, with whom it is expected to sign a strategic
partnership agreement next month for licensed production of French submarines and helicopters to
modernize its defense forces and industry. Brazil is also expected to drive a hard bargain with the
Russians on Gazprom’s interest in a partnership to develop Brazil’s newfound oil reserves. Moreover,
advisers to Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva have made clear that he has no desire to foul
relations with Washington at the outset of the Obama administration.
Medvedev’s stop in Cuba marks the first trip by a Russian leader to the island in eight years. The Kremlin
announced earlier this month a loan of $335 million to Cuba for purchasing Russian goods and services.
That compares with $300 million in trade for all of 2007. Moscow is also reportedly considering
reestablishing Soviet-era intelligence cooperation with Cuba and exploring offshore oil potential. This
kind of engagement is welcomed by the Cuban leadership, but it is unclear what kind of assistance
Moscow can sustain. Moreover, U.S. relations with Cuba could undergo a dramatic transformation
during the Obama administration.
Russia increasing ties with Cuba in response to US missile defense in Asia
Macias 8 - journalist, public relations strategist and social media forecaster @ Huffington Post (Carlos,
“Reheating Russo-Cuban Relations”, August 7, Americas Society/Council of the Americas,
http://www.as-coa.org/articles/reheating-russo-cuban-relations)//ID
Recent twists and turns in U.S.-Russia relations have drawn comparisons to Cold War era tensions,
sparked in particular by Washington’s plans military defense shield in Eastern Europe. During a July visit
to the Czech Republic to sign a related agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted that
the shield’s construction was not a strategic move against Russia, but was instead intended to protect
NATO allies from Iranian and North Korean threats. Still, Russian leaders seem unconvinced and, after
plans to build the shield in Russia’s backyard were inked, a story arose that Moscow planned to station
nuclear bombers in Cuba. The report may have been little more than a rumor, but this week Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin announced intentions to restore ties with Havana.
In the days between the bomber rumors and before Putin’s call for warmer Cuba ties a Russian
delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin visited Cuba. Kommersant reports that Cuban
leaders were displeased by the possibility that the bomber story was a means for Moscow to use Cuba
as a pawn in a chess game with Washington. Nonetheless, Cuban and Russian officials forged a number
of energy and commercial agreements. Most significantly, Russian oil companies gained the right to
explore and harvest oil in the Gulf of Mexico. A Stratfor podcast explores Moscow’s intentions to
upstage Washington by demonstrating Russian influence in the Western hemisphere. Some Russian
military experts say the door could still be open for Moscow to expand its military presence into Cuba.
“It is an open secret that the West has been establishing a buffer zone around Russia during the recent
years, getting European, Baltic states, Ukraine and the Caucasus involved in the process. The expansion
of the Russian military presence abroad, particularly in Cuba, could become a response to US-led
activities,” Leonid Ivashov, president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences, told RIA Novosti.
Russia rebuilding Cold War relations with Cuba
Clover 8 –FT's Moscow bureau chief (Charles, “Putin moves to bolster Cuba ties”, August 4, Financial
Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b9e1ce10-6262-11dd-9a1e000077b07658.html#axzz2XpI8jyGU)//ID
Vladimir Putin has called for a restoration of Moscow’s influence in Cuba, once a Soviet satellite, as
tensions with the US deepen over Washington’s planned anti-missile system in eastern Europe.
“We need to re-establish positions on Cuba and in other countries,” the Russian prime minister said at a
weekly cabinet meeting, according to Interfax News Agency.
It also emerged that Igor Sechin, the Russian -deputy prime minister, had recently returned from a
three-day visit to the island, where he discussed trade and investment issues and met Raúl Castro, who
in February took over from his brother Fidel as -president.
“We agreed on a priority direction for co-operation, this being energy, the mining industry, agriculture,
transport, healthcare and communications,” news agency RIA quoted Mr Sechin as saying.
Mr Putin’s directive comes in the midst of a sharp increase in tension between the US and Russia.
Moscow is angered by US-inspired plans to expand Nato to include Ukraine and Georgia, proposed this
year, as well as Washington’s proposals for an anti-missile defence system to be based in eastern
Europe, which Russia says would threaten its own security.
An official at the Russian foreign ministry last week gave a background briefing for journalists in which
he appeared to threaten Washington with a complete breakdown in relations over the missile defence
system. He said that Moscow could allow itself “not to have any relations with some of its partners, if
they would ­prefer it that way”.
During the cold war, Cuba was often used by Moscow as a thorn in the side of Washington and, in 1962,
Soviet plans to base nuclear missiles in Cuba nearly caused a war with the US.
Mr Putin’s comments suggest that the Kremlin might be seeking to re-establish cold war strategic links
that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Last month, an article in Russian newspaper Izvestia
suggested Russia might use Cuba as refuelling point for its strategic nuclear capable bomber fleet. The
Russian defence ministry eventually denied the report and said it had no plans to open any military
bases abroad.
Accession of Raul Castro provides unique opportunity for Russian influence in Cuba
Lee 8 - Stanford Ph.D., president of Global Advisory Services, authority on nuclear security (Rens, “In
Havana, waiting for Obama or for Putin?”, August 26, International Relations and Security Network,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=90543&lng=en)//ID
Cuba-watchers debate whether lifting the embargo and flooding the country with US tourists and
businesspersons would erode the legitimacy of the current regime or breathe new life into it. Yet there
are very good strategic reasons why America should not continue its policy of isolating Cuba, even in the
absence of positive signs of democratization on the island.
One reason is that the current US policy makes Cuba a target of opportunity for a resurgent and
increasingly hostile Russia. Vladimir Putin talks openly about "restoring our position in Cuba," and hints
are surfacing in Moscow that Russia might reestablish a military and intelligence presence on the island
in response to the planned missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.
Points of cooperation under consideration include use of Cuba as a refueling stop for long-range
bombers and for reconnaissance ships and aircraft, and also reopening of a gigantic Soviet-era electronic
monitoring and surveillance facility at Lourdes, near Havana.
A state visit to Havana in July by hard-line Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (an ex-KGB member of
Putin's inner circle) and head of Russia's Security Council Nikolai Patrushev could presage a new
strategic dialogue between Moscow and Havana, even though the visit was officially touted as
investment-related.
It is hardly coincidental that the warming of Cuban-Russian ties and discussion of a renewed military
relationship follows closely on the accession of Raul Castro as de facto Cuban leader.
Moscow has historically regarded Raul's brother as a bit of a nut case, stemming from Fidel's erratic
behavior during the Cuban missile crisis, when (in the Soviet's view) Castro was trying to provoke a USSoviet nuclear conflict. With Raul - who resembles a Soviet-style apparatchik - in charge, Russia may feel
more comfortable about deploying strategic or intelligence assets on the island.
Russia-Cuba oil investment high
Russia investing in Cuban oil now
EFE News Service 11 (Fourth largest news source in the world, “Cuban, Russian firms sign oil partnership
agreements: Cuba-Oil”, June 25)//ID
Havana, Jun 25 (EFE).- Cuba and Russia have signed three economic association contracts here for oil
exploration and production, official media reported.
The deals signed between state-owned Cuba Petroleo and Russian state-controlled Zarubezhneft pertain
to an oil deposit near Boca de Jaruco, a fishing village in Mayabeque province, northeast of Havana, the
official AIN news agency reported.
Cupet director Raul Felipe del Prado hailed the significance of this accord for the island's economy and
said it is a "milestone" in the partnership between Cupet and the Russian firm, which are planning other
business deals.
He said the goal is to recover and increase production in that coastal region and predicted that the use
of new technology there will produce "good results."
For his part, Zarubezhneft director Nikolay Grigonievich said the partnership is "beneficial" and he is
hopeful the exploration methods will help boost oil recovery efficiency.
Russian Ambassador to Cuba Mijail Kaminin said Zarubezhneft came to Cuba "to stay and continue
cooperating with Cupet for the good of both countries."
The Russian firm opened an operations office in Havana a year ago with an eye to boosting output of oil
and associated gas over the coming years.
Earlier agreements the Russian firm signed with Cuban authorities allow it to operate for 25 years in
blocks located in the Cuban provinces of Matanzas, Sancti Spiritus, Villa Clara and Ciego de Avila.
Cuba opened its energy industry to foreign investment in 1991, since which time international
companies have invested more than $2.8 billion in oil exploration and production.
Cuban and Russian state oil companies cooperating over prospective reserves now
BBC 9 (“Cuba trip results in Russia's 'highly risky' involvement in oil industry”, August 1, BBC Monitoring
Former Soviet Union)//ID
Vice Premier Igor Sechin's recent visit to Cuba resulted in the signing of four agreements at once
between Zarubezhneft and the local Cubapetroleo on the joint opening up of the island's hydrocarbon
riches. At the same time the Russian state company will participate in the entire spectrum of subsoil
resource utilization, ranging from geological prospecting and extraction to processing and marketing.
Such cooperation would enable Russia to emerge onto new sales markets and Cuba to significantly
strengthen its independence thanks to the flow of petrodollars, experts believe, while at the same time
pointing out that the actual reserves of Cuban "black gold" may prove significantly smaller than the
volumes stated by Havana.
Following the prolonged lull in Russian-Cuban relations, which lasted from the nineties, cooperation has
resumed in recent years -in several spheres, moreover. Thus, since 2005 Havana has bought several Tu204 and Il-96 aircraft, and in 2006 it received a loan of $355 million to purchase Russian hardware and
equipment. At the end of last year President Dmitriy Medvedev visited Cuba, and Raul Castro came to
Moscow on a return visit in February of this year. That trip to Russia proved extremely successful for the
Cuban leader. Havana obtained a new loan of $350 million, and a further $20 million was allocated to
repairing and purchasing spare parts for military hardware delivered to the island back in Soviet times.
In addition, $37 million was provided as free aid to purchase 125 tonnes of grain. It should also be
pointed out that a whole slew of accords was reached on the creation of various joint ventures,
particularly in the spheres of machine building, civil aviation, shipbuilding, energy, and tourism. Bilateral
agreements with Cuban partners were concluded by Nornikel (it will develop deposits of serpentinites),
AvtoVAZ (it will service the Lada vehicles in Cuba), Farmstandart (it will supply medicines to the island),
and KamAZ (it will organize production of motors on the country's territory).
Vice Premier Igor Sechin, who is in charge of Russia's fuel and energy complex, is also pleased to oversee
ties with the Island of Freedom. "Every time I travel through this region I come to Cuba to advance our
joint economic projects," the official declared during his latest visit to Havana. In practice, a
memorandum of joint understanding was signed back in December between the National Oil
Consortium (created 8 October 2008, Rosneft, Gazprom, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, and TNK-BP each have
20 per cent of it) and the Cuban state Cubapetroleo, and yesterday it became known that Zarubezhneft
will open up the island's shelf.
"This company was created for just such projects. In addition, the Russian authorities lobby for
cooperation with Cuba, and so it is not at all surprising that the contract went to a state company,"
Dmitriy Lyutyagin, analyst for the Veles Kapital Investment Company, said. At the same time it was
specially pointed out when the treaty was signed that the Russian side will have access to the entire
production cycle. "From the viewpoint of our oil industry this cooperation will embrace all spheres,
ranging from geological prospecting to extraction, processing, and marketing," Vice Premier Sechin said.
Cuban-Russian cooperation over oil now
IPR 11 (Info-Prod Research, “Cuba Signs Contracts For Oil Prospecting With Russia”, June
27, ProQuest)/ID
According to ACN: Cuba and Russia signed on Friday in this capital three contracts of international
economic association for oil prospecting and exploitation at the Boca de Jaruco oilfield. Raul Felipe del
Prado, director of Cubapetroleo (CUPET), explained that the objective is to in that northern littoral
region of Havana, and added that good results are expected with the introduction of the new
technology they will use. He assessed this investment as important for what it represents for the
country's economy, and described it as a milestone in cooperation between CUPET and the Russian
company Zarubezhneft, with which they plan other business. Nikolay Grigonievich, director of
Zarubezhneft, pointed out that this association will be beneficial for the two countries, and that he
hopes that all prospecting methods to be used will have good results, since they will make it possible to
increase the oil recovery coefficient as it is planned. For his part, Russia's ambassador to Cuba, Mijail
Kaminin, said that economic, commercial and investment relations between the two nations over the
last few years are developing with dynamism. He described as significant the fact that a Russian entity as
important as Zarubezhneft has come to stay and to continue cooperating with CUPET for the good of the
two states.
Russian investment in Cuban oil now and key to modernizing the sector
Interfax 12 – (Interfax : Russia & CIS Business & Financial Daily, “POLITICS. ECONOMY; Economic
interests unite Russia, Cuba - Cuban Ambassador”, February 9, ProQuest)//ID
MOSCOW. (Interfax) - Russia-Cuba economic cooperation is historical; it strengthens year to year with
various projects, Cuban Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia Juan Valdes Figueroa
said in an interview with the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper published on February 9.
"This is a time tested relationship. Our peoples have always had high and noble goals. Currently, we also
put an emphasis on common economic interests, which unite us," he said.
It is the question of not only investments but also of joint mutually beneficial projects, the ambassador
noted.
Russia may give efficient assistance to the development of mineral resources in Cuba, he said.
"Gazpromneft is already working in Cuba. It is making survey and drilling wells in the Cuban economic
zone in the Gulf of Mexico. Zarubezhneft cooperates with us on other shelf projects and builds up the
efficiency of oil production," he said.
Some other Russian companies are interested in biotechnologies and prepared to invest in nickel
production in Cuba, he said. "Cuba has one of the world's largest nickel reserves, which implies broad
opportunities for joint work," he said.
Energy and electric power cooperation is also possible, the ambassador said. He recalled that over 40%
of Cuban power plants were built with the assistance of Soviet specialists and by Soviet technologies.
"It will not be easy to modernize them without Russia. Capital, investors must be drawn in. The
possibility of doing that has grown with the actualization of the Cuban economic model," Figueroa said.
Investments in transport infrastructure modernization are also welcome. "Cuba is a small country, but it
stretches out for approximately 1,200 kilometers from the West to the East, and it needs modern
railroad traffic, a modern railroad line for passenger and cargo traffic. Therefore, cooperation with
Russia in this area is of huge importance to us," he said.
"We are interested in projects that will foster the development of Cuban raw materials, primarily oil, gas
and nickel," he said.
Russia oil companies given preferences in Cuban oil projects
Interfax 12 – (Interfax : Russia & CIS Business & Financial Daily, “Cuba could give preferences to
Russian oil companies - official”, September 21, ProQuest)//ID
MOSCOW. Sept 20 (Interfax) - Cuba is expecting cooperation proposals to arrive from Russian oil and gas
companies, said Cuban Chamber of Commerce President Estrella Madrigal.
"Oil prospecting is a sector of special importance for Cuba. Naturally, projects to be proposed by major
Russian companies that have vast experience in this business would be welcome," she said in an
interview with Interfax.
"The corresponding Cuban agencies which, incidentally, are as important as in any other country, assess
the potential of bilateral energy projects and the national characteristic features of this business," she
said.
Madrigal arrived in Russia as leader of a 23-member delegation, representing various branches of Cuban
economy.
Asked whether Russian energy companies would be given advantages in Cuba, she said, "We are here
precisely because of that."
"Our businessmen have arrived in Russia with their budgets, and this is an example of their interest and
of the priority importance which we attach to the Russian market. We are thinking not only about today,
but also about our medium and long-term prospects," she said.
Russian oil companies starting to invest in Cuban oil exploration
EFE 11 (EFE News Service, leading Spanish language news agency and the fourth largest news agency,
“Cuban, Russian firms sign oil partnership agreements: CUBA-OIL”, June 25, ProQuest)//ID
Havana, Jun 25 (EFE).- Cuba and Russia have signed three economic association contracts here for oil
exploration and production, official media reported.
The deals signed between state-owned Cuba Petroleo and Russian state-controlled Zarubezhneft pertain
to an oil deposit near Boca de Jaruco, a fishing village in Mayabeque province, northeast of Havana, the
official AIN news agency reported.
Cupet director Raul Felipe del Prado hailed the significance of this accord for the island's economy and
said it is a "milestone" in the partnership between Cupet and the Russian firm, which are planning other
business deals.
He said the goal is to recover and increase production in that coastal region and predicted that the use
of new technology there will produce "good results."
For his part, Zarubezhneft director Nikolay Grigonievich said the partnership is "beneficial" and he is
hopeful the exploration methods will help boost oil recovery efficiency.
Russian Ambassador to Cuba Mijail Kaminin said Zarubezhneft came to Cuba "to stay and continue
cooperating with Cupet for the good of both countries."
The Russian firm opened an operations office in Havana a year ago with an eye to boosting output of oil
and associated gas over the coming years.
Earlier agreements the Russian firm signed with Cuban authorities allow it to operate for 25 years in
blocks located in the Cuban provinces of Matanzas, Sancti Spiritus, Villa Clara and Ciego de Avila.
Cuba key to Russian sphere
Russia will use Cuba to reassert its position in the global system
Bain 10 – PhD University of Glasgow (Mervyn J, “Havana and Moscow, 1959-2009: The Enduring
Relationship?”, University of Pittsburgh Press – Cuban Studies, ProQuest)//ID
Russia's desire to reassert itself in global politics, which has continued under both Putin and Medvedev,
has been important to improved CubanRussian relations, as it perfectly illustrates to Washington that
Moscow is again a great power and not a peripheral actor in international relations, as it had been in the
early to mid-1990s. Moreover, the high price of oil at the start of the twenty-first century helped fund
Russia's more assertive foreign policy.44 The island's importance for Moscow has only increased as
Russia has taken a more general interest in Latin America; and it is perfectly logical that this orientation
begin with the country about which it has the most knowledge in the region. Moreover, the use of the
listening post at Lourdes as a counterbalance to NATO expansion to the east and, after September 1 1,
2001, to U.S. military involvement in Central Asia and Afghanistan - traditionally considered in Moscow's
sphere of influence - has further increased the geostrategic significance of the island for Moscow. In late
2008, the Russian newspaper hvestia suggested that, in an attempt to counter the proposed U.S. nuclear
shield in Europe, Russian bombers should be stationed on the island.45
The geostrategic significance of Cuba in Moscow's more assertive foreign policy has seen the return of
global Russian naval maneuvers in the Caribbean, as in December 2008, when Russian naval vessels
visited Venezuela.46 As part of these out-of-area deployments, Russia requires "friendly" ports for
docking where it can carry out refueling and maintenance. Cuba has been willing to open its ports in this
manner, and the result is the return of Russian naval warships to Cuban waters. Contemporary
international relations are vastly different from those at the time of the inception of the HavanaMoscow relationship, but an original reason that drew the Kremlin toward the Cuban Revolution, the
geostrategic importance of the island relative to the United States, has reemerged.
Cuba-Russia militarization now
Increasing Cuba-Russia relations threatens US-Russian relations
Logan 8 – reporter on Security in Latin America for the ISN (Samuel, “Cuba's emerging leverage”,
August 20, International Relations and Security Network, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Articles/Detail/?id=90231&lng=en)//ID
When Russian daily Izvestia reported on 21 July that Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers had landed
in Cuba, it set off a sprint in Washington as analysts and military leaders struggled to understand the
situation.
At first, it appeared that Moscow had made a very serious gesture. Russia's perceived geopolitical
maneuver in Cuba, many thought, was in response to the US' plans for an anti-missile shield defense
system in Poland and the Czech Republic.
By 24 July, after three days of media hype and speculation over Russia's true intentions, Russian Defense
Ministry spokesman Ilshat Baichurin, dismissed any intention for a strategic deployment in Cuba.
Two events quickly followed up this announcement. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin arrived
in Cuba on 30 July for extended talks with Raul and Fidel Castro. A former KGB operative and known
confidant of now-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Sechin was an active operative during the Cold
War and enjoyed a deep relationship with the Castros.
Putin then followed up Sechin's visit with a 5 August announcement that Russia ought to "restore [its]
position in Cuba and other countries."
Observers agree a military presence in Cuba is not in Moscow's best interests; rather, closer economic
ties would behoove both nations. Sechin's recent visit underlines the latter observation and coaxes
Washington into a more open posture toward Cuba, an island nation the next US presidential
administration would likely prefer not to lose again to the Russians.
The country is seemingly in a position to leverage its newfound attraction in two powerful nations. If the
Castros can capitalize on Cuba's emerging position with both countries, it might find a way to pull the
right geopolitical levers to win badly needed foreign direct investment (FDI).
"Cuba has more to gain and more to lose," Dan Erikson, senior associate for US policy and director of
Caribbean programs with the Inter-American Dialogue told ISN Security Watch, commenting on if a
closer relationship with the US than with Russia would be advantageous to Cuba.
"On the economic level, if travel and trade with the US were normalized, it would boost the Cuban
economy," Erikson pointed out. "But then on the other hand, the Cuban government's number one
preoccupation has been to maintain control over the island, and that is much easier within the context
of the US embargo," he said, adding, "Cuba prefers to deal with countries that shares its ideology or at
least respects it."
Moscow's interests
"The ideological rationale for close relations with Cuba ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, of
course, and there has been little interest in Moscow in reviving the relationship until now," Derek
Averre, a research fellow with the European Institute's Center for Russian and East European Studies,
told ISN Security Watch.
"However, Moscow is keen to support the idea of a sovereign Cuba which does not fall wholly under a
US sphere of interest," he added.
The rumors of Moscow's interests in using Cuba as a military forward operations location (FOL), some
analysts argue, were most likely generated to signal Washington over Russia's displeasure for ongoing
maneuvering in what used to be the latter's close sphere of influence, not to completely disrupt its own
relationship with the US or Cuba.
Moscow intends to close the gap with Havana that occurred when it ceased financial aid to the island
and further widened in 2001 when Russia closed a listening post there.
The electronic monitoring and surveillance facility near Havana at Torrens was closed in October 2001,
precipitating the removal of an annual US$200 million payment Russia gave Cuba for use of the 28square-mile area.
It was one of Russia's largest signal intelligence listening posts in the Western Hemisphere, but one
Moscow could no longer afford. The unilateral and sudden closure of this base incensed Cuban leaders.
They were neither consulted, nor were there any diplomatic overtures made to include Cuba in the
decision process leading up to the closure of the base.
Since then, relations between Moscow and Havana have been chilly at best.
With the recent installment of Cuba's new leader, Raul Castro, Moscow has decided to repair relations
with the high-level and overt visit recently made by Sechin: a man feared in Washington and welcomed
in Havana.
His visit to Cuba began the process of business deals in tourism, pharmaceuticals, civilian aviation and
oil, including most importantly the discussion of a refinery operated by Russian oil firm LUKoil.
If conversations over strategic interests were discussed in private, Cuba has publicly made its position
well known. It is happy to receive FDI from Russia but will not engage in any military-military relations.
Military realities
Both Cuba and Russia know that any military-military relations between the two countries will provoke
an immediate and negative response from Washington.
The US has geopolitical pulleys in place to pressure Russia, vis-à-vis relationships in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere in Russia's neighborhood, and can pressure Cuba with a direct withdrawal from what has
heretofore been the slow opening of a diplomatic aperture between the two historical enemies.
Any FOL for Russia in Cuba would mean an immediate departure for the latter from Washington's good
graces and the declaration of the restart of a geopolitical battle between Moscow and Washington,
thereby erasing any gains made by Putin during his presidency.
Russia reestablishing ties with Cuba threatens US security
Smith 9 – Researcher for UK Defence Academy, PhD in Political Science @ Oxford University (Mark A,
“Russia & Latin America: Competition in Washington's "Near Abroad"?”, August, International Relations
and Security Network, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?id=104344&lng=en)//ID
Cuba – the revival of an old alliance.
Russia has also made a serious effort to develop its relationship with Cuba. The Soviet-Cuban
relationship deteriorated towards the end of the Gorbachev period, and the Russo-Cuban relationship
remained cool at the beginning of the Yeltsin period due to Moscow’s desire at that time to pursue an
Atlanticist foreign policy and shun allies from the Soviet era. The relationship did however begin to
improve in the mid-1990s. This improvement was maintained under Vladimir Putin, who visited the
island in December 2000. Although Moscow closed down its intelligence gathering facility in Lourdes in
Cuba in 2002, the relationship remained good.
The Moscow-Havana relationship developed strongly during Putin’s second presidential term. This has
continued since the election of Dmitry Medvedev as president in March 2008. In July-August 2008 Igor
Sechin visited Cuba with energy minister Sergey Shmatko for a session of the Intergovernmental RussoCuban Joint Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. A few days later
this was followed by a statement from Vladimir Putin that “We need to restore our positions in both
Cuba and in other countries”.56 Moscow has consistently argued for the lifting of the US embargo
against Cuba.
The Foreign Ministry denied claims made in Izvestiya in July 2008 that Russia was thinking of re-opening
Russian military bases in Cuba, but in spite of this the relationship was moving to a higher level, as in
September the head of Roskosmos, Anatoly Perminov, stated that a Russo-Cuban space centre might be
set up in Cuba.57 A centre to analyse earth remote sensing information may also be set up. The joint use
of space telecommunication systems was also discussed. Furthermore, a Russian military delegation
visited Cuba at the end of October 2008. This delegation was headed by the chief of staff of battlefield
air defence of the armed forces, Lt-Gen Alexander Maslov.58 This was the first visit of a Russian military
delegation to Cuba since the closing of the Lourdes intelligence gathering facility. The Russian MOD
stated that the visit was concerned purely with technical issues linked with the use of Igla, Osa-AK and
Kvadrat surface to air missile complexes, plus mobile radars P-18, Terek and P-19. Moscow has denied
that it intends to re-open Lourdes, or that it is interested in deploying missile defence systems in Cuba in
response to the deployment of US missile defence systems in Central and Eastern Europe. Closer
cooperation in the space sector and the possible development of closer military ties could however have
security implications for the USA, as would the re-activation of the Lourdes facility should that ever
occur in the future.
Russia also invited Cuba to participate in the GLONASS satellite navigation system, when Minister of
Telecommunications and Mass Communications Igor Shchegolev visited Cuba in October. In November
2008 Russia and Cuba signed a number of agreements in oil production, transport and nickel mining as a
result of the visit of Igor Sechin to Havana in August. Further agreements were signed during the visit of
Medvedev at the end of November 2008.
In January 2009 on the occasion of the visit of Cuban leader Raul Castro to Moscow an agreement on a
credit line of $20 million was signed. During Castro’s visit, he and Medvedev signed a memorandum on
the principles of strategic partnership. An intergovernmental agreement on granting a state credit to
Cuba for the purchase of agricultural and construction equipment, an agreement on food aid gratis was
also signed.
In July 2009 Igor Sechin visited Cuba. He said Cuba and Russia have signed an agreement under which
Russia is to grant Cuba a loan of $150 million to purchase Russian construction and agricultural
equipment. The two sides also initialed documents about the activities of the Zarubezhneft in Cuba's
exclusive economic zone in the Gulf of Mexico
Although Sechin said in January 2009 that Moscow intended to continue military-technical cooperation
with Cuba, it is highly unlikely that Russia would seek to re-establish the military presence the USSR had
in Cuba in the 1970s and early 1980s. However the potential for an expansion of military ties cannot be
ruled out, especially if US-Russian ties were to deteriorate further. Putin’s comments on restoring old
positions can be seen as an indication that Moscow wishes to develop at least a quasi-alliance with
Cuba. This is again linked to the desire to manifest a presence in Washington’s “back yard” as a response
to US policy in the Russian near abroad.
Cuban-Russia militarization increasing
Franks 8 (Jeff, “Cold War ghosts raised in Cuba; Russia looks to restore relations with former client in
U.S. backyard”, Aug 23, The Ottawa Citizen, ProQuest)//ID
HAVANA, Cuba - Cuba and Russia have stirred memories of their Cold War alliance with recent talk of
restoring "traditional" ties in what experts said was a warning to their old adversary, the United States.
Russia, once the island's top economic benefactor and military ally, has hinted at re-establishing a
military presence in Cuba in a tit-for-tat for U.S. activities in Eastern Europe, including plans for a missile
defense system, they said.
"Russia is clearly irritated at what it perceives as U.S. meddling in its neighbourhood," said Cuba expert
Phil Peters at the Lexington Institute in Virginia. "It seems to be sending a message that if you play on
our periphery, we'll play in yours."
The ghost of Cuba-Russia relations past was raised last month by a news report that Russia might use
Cuba as a refueling base for its nuclear-capable bombers. Russia later denied the report.
Such action would cross a "red line," said a U.S. Air Force general in language that brought to mind the
1962 Cuban missile crisis when the United States and Russia, then the Soviet Union, almost went to war
over Soviet missile bases on the island 145 kilometres from Florida.
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin went to Havana this month on what was billed as an economic trip
and, accompanied by Russian Security Council Secretary General Nikolai Patrushev, and met with Cuban
President Raul Castro.
The security council, which guides Russian national security policy, said in a following statement the two
countries planned "consistent work to restore traditional relations in all areas of co-operation."
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chimed in later, saying, "We need to re-establish positions on Cuba and in
other countries."
But analysts said Russia was a lot more likely to get increased trade with Cuba than it was military cooperation.
"It's impossible to imagine that anyone in the Cuban leadership would want to put their country in the
bull's eye of another superpower showdown reminiscent of the missile crisis," said Brian Latell, a former
CIA analyst now at the University of Miami.
After Mr. Sechin's visit, the Cubans described the Russians' talk with Raul Castro as "cordial and friendly"
and said both sides stressed the "reactivation of economic ties."
They did not mention possible military ties but on Aug. 10 Raul Castro issued a declaration supporting
Russia in its military clash with Georgia after the former Soviet republic sent troops to try to reclaim the
breakaway enclave of South Ossetia. He accused Georgia of launching its attack "in complicity" with its
ally, the United States.
Cuba-Russia security cooperation strains US-Russia relations
Meyer and Temkin 12 (“Russia eyes naval bases outside country; In talks with Cuba, Vietnam, Seychelles
to establish relocation supply depots”, July 28, The Gazette, ProQuest)//ID
Russia is in talks to set up naval bases in former Cold War allies Cuba and Vietnam as President Vladimir
Putin undertakes the country's biggest military overhaul since the Soviet era.
"We are working on establishing navy bases outside Russia," Vice-Admiral Viktor Chirkov said in an
interview with the state-run RIA Novosti news service and confirmed by the navy. "We aim to set up
resupply bases in Cuba, the Seychelles and Vietnam."
Russian plans for overseas military expansion threatens to further strain relations with the U.S. at a time
when the former superpower rivals are at loggerheads over U.S. missile-shield plans and fighting in
Syria. Putin's government plans to spend 23 trillion rubles ($721 billion) this decade on defence
spending, including 4.4 trillion rubles next year, an increase of 19 per cent.
"There's a lot of tension between Washington and Moscow right now, as Syria is creating a lot of bad
feeling between them," said Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent defence analyst in Moscow. "This will
be seen by some in the U.S. as the Russian bear growling in its lair."
Russia risks losing its only military base outside the former Soviet Union, a naval resupply facility in the
Syrian port of Tartus, as President Bashar Assad fights for survival in the face of a 17-month uprising.
U.S. air force Gen. Norton Schwartz, in 2008, warned Russia not to cross a "red line" by stationing
bombers in Cuba, where the deployment of Soviet missiles brought Moscow and Washington close to
nuclear conflict in 1962.
Schwartz commented after the newspaper Izvestia said Russia planned to build a refuelling base for
strategic aircraft in the Communist island state in response to U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile
defence system in Europe. The Russian Defence Ministry later denied the report.
Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang said in an interview broadcast by Voice of Russia radio that his
country is ready to allow Russia to set up a servicing facility in Cam Ranh Bay, a former Soviet naval base,
though Vietnam will not lease its territory to any country.
Sang held talks with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow Thursday and met President Vladimir
Putin in the Black Sea resort of Sochi Friday. Cuban leader Raul Castro held talks with Putin in Moscow
this month.
Vietnam backs Russia's criticism of U.S. plans to expand missile defence sites, which improves security in
some nations at the expense of others, the countries said in a joint communique Friday after the talks.
Russia will militarize Cuba in response to US intervention in the East
Franks 8 (Jeff, “Cold War ghosts raised in Cuba; Russia looks to restore relations with former client in
U.S. backyard”, Aug 23, The Ottawa Citizen, ProQuest)//ID
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is calling for Russia to regain its influential position in former Cold War ally
Cuba, Russian news reports said Monday.
The statement comes amid persistent speculation about whether Russia is seeking a military presence in
a country just 90 miles from the U.S. coastline in response to U.S. plans to place missile defense
elements in Poland and the Czech Republic.
"We should restore our position in Cuba and other countries," Putin said, according to the Interfax news
agency.
Putin spoke Monday while hearing a report on a recent Russian delegation's trip to Cuba. Vice Premier
Igor Sechin and others met with the Cuban leadership and discussed an array of cooperation projects.
"We agreed on the priority for the direction of cooperation -- energy, mining, agriculture transport,
health care and communications," Sechin said, according to the RIA-Novosti news agency.
Military issues were not mentioned in the reports. But RIA-Novosti quoted an influential analyst and
former top defense official as saying Russia could make a military return to Cuba.
"It is not a secret that the West is creating a 'buffer zone' around Russia, involving countries in central
Europe, the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Ukraine," said Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Academy of
Geopolitical Problems.
"In response, we may expand our military presence abroad, including in Cuba," he said.
Russia is expanding military presence in Cuba
XNA CEIS 8 (Xinhua News Agency - China Economic Information Service, “News Analysis: Russia seeks
military presence in Cuba in response to U.S. missile shield: analysts”, August 7, ProQuest)//ID
News Analysis: Russia seeks military presence in Cuba in response to U.S. missile shield: analysts
MOSCOW, Aug. 7 (Xinhua) -- Russia's seemingly newfound interest in resuming its positions in Cuba has
appeared at a time when Moscow is growing increasingly apprehensive about the proposed U.S. missile
defense system in Eastern Europe, analysts say.
"We need to reestablish positions on Cuba and in other countries," Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin said earlier this week after hearing a report from Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who had just
ended a three-day visit to the Caribbean state, along with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai
Patrushev.
Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs Andrei Klimov seemed more
unequivocal about the topic. "Russia should take advantage of all its capabilities to protect its national
interests, including the interests in the field of security," he said after the talks in Cuba between Russian
and Cuban officials.
Russia should "own its supporting points" in different regions in the world, Klimov said, noting that
"Cuba's location has geopolitical importance" and that a presence in both economic and military affairs
must be built in America.
Klimov did not rule out the possibility of a military presence on the Caribbean Island just off the U.S.
coast. "If America deploys its AMD systems closely to our border, Russia can also deploy its systems on
the territories of the states which will accept it," he said.
But he quickly added that Russia's plans would not involve targeting its missiles at the United States.
Leonid Ivashov, a Russian political analyst and former top defence ministry official, said the retrieval of
the Russian military presence in Cuba may pose as a response to growing U.S. military and political
pressure on Russia.
"It is not a secret that the West is creating a 'buffer zone' around Russia, involving in the process
countries in Central Europe, the Caucasus, the Baltic states and Ukraine," Ivashov was quoted by the RIA
Novosti news agency as saying.
"In response, we may expand our military presence abroad, including in Cuba," he said.
Ivashov, also president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences, said "there are convenient bays for
reconnaissance and battleships and a network of so-called forward staging posts in Cuba. We can
resume the operation of the radar center in Lurdes upon the agreement of the Cuban administration."
Analysts said huge pressures are building on Moscow, especially in security field, after the United States
proposed to place its missile defense shield in Poland and the neighboring Czech Republic last year -- a
step Washington insists are necessary to prevent possible attacks from "rogue states" such as Iran.
Some media reports also drew attention to the repercussions of the U.S. foreign policy, like supporting
the "color revolutions" in the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, as well as the
deployment of the missile shield.
According to media reports, some of Russia's top military brass, angered by the U.S. plans to install a
missile defence shield in eastern Europe, suggested last month that Russia should use Cuba as a
refueling stop for nuclear-capable bombers.
The Russian defense ministry then denied the reports, but the United States warned that such a move
would cross the "red line."
U.S. State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said Monday Washington continued to oppose
improving relations with Cuba but that countries were free to conduct their own bilateral relations,
according to the DPA.
The U.S. could have more reaction to Russia's plan "if it moves forward," Gallegos said, adding that "we
don't see dealing with the Cuban government as particularly productive."
Analysts said a Russian military presence in Cuba would make Washington extremely uneasy, although
there is still a long way to go for any military cooperation between Russia and Cuba to be put in place.
The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 shows that the United States won't allow any real threat deployed in a
place as close as Cuba. In October 1962, the United States and the then Soviet Union went on the brink
of war after a U.S. spy plane revealed missile bases being built in Cuba.
Russia-Latin America Relations high
Russia taking advantage of US’s absence in Latin America
Vakulenko 12 - Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Darya, “Economic Cold War:
Russia And US Battle For Influence In Western Hemisphere – Analysis”, August 29, Eurasia Review,
http://www.eurasiareview.com/29082012-economic-cold-war-russia-and-us-battle-for-influence-inwestern-hemisphere-analysis/)//ID
The current economic competition between the Russian Federation and the United States in the
Western Hemisphere bears striking similarity to the political antagonism prevalent during the Cold War.
This deep seated rivalry still influences world affairs, as the United Nations Security Council cannot enact
any major decision without an agreement between those two powers. However, a pragmatic view of the
world economy plays a greater role now in the determination of Russia’s priorities and strategies as it
begins to catch up with the U.S. in its exposure to Latin American economic interests.
As of late, the Russian Federation has gained economic ground over the United States in various parts of
the Latin American region. For example, Washington’s embargo on Cuba gives Russia the opportunity to
fill in the economic hollows left by the “imperialist neighbor.” While Washington engages in very limited
trade with its ancient foe, Russia-Cuban links have been growing stronger with each passing year.
Recently, the Russian oil company Zarubezhneft announced its plan to invest $100 million USD in Cuba
by 2025. Considering that deposits of Cuban oil are estimated to reach 20 billion barrels, the Russians’
investment plan appears as if it will bring considerable profits in the near future to both sides.[1]
The recent activity in Ecuador presents another aspect of Russia’s growing economic attraction to Latin
America. At the end of July 2012, the Ecuadorian government signed the “memorandum of
understanding” with Gazprom, Russia’s largest oil and gas company. The memorandum will launch the
exploration of the natural-gas field in the southern coastal areas of Ecuador.[2] This “Bolivarian country”
(in reference to the state’s left-leaning state ideology) will gain ample royalties in conjunction with the
development of its energy sector, while Russia will secure market access into Ecuador via their already
impressive natural gas reserves. Notably, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa continues to advocate
continental leadership independent of U.S. influence, thereby welcoming Russian influence.
Gazprom, together with another oil company, Rosneft, are clearly linked to Russian foreign policy. The
Russian government owns 50.002 percent of shares in Gazprom and 75 percent in Rosneft thus
President of Russia, Putin, oversees strategies of both companies.[3] Gazprom is the world’s largest
producer of natural gas and the second largest producer of oil in the world with 9.7 million barrels per
day, just behind Saudi Aramco. Rosneft is the world’s 15th largest oil and gas producer.[3] The wielding
of such economic weight serves as a powerful foreign relations force as Russia looks to enter new global
markets, firming up the already inextricable relationship between politics and economics.
The Cuban and Ecuadorian examples demonstrate how the United States’ continuing ideologically-based
economic ties with Latin America could invite other large world players to represent investment
portfolios to the region. The United States clearly does not take full advantage of its geographical
proximity to Latin America, even as Russia pushes for greater markets throughout that region. At the
time of the Cold War, bipolarity was intensified by a constant ideological race to include as many Third
World countries under either Soviet Union or or the U.S. umbrella. Today the two compete over markets
and trade partners throughout Latin America. In this battle Russia is clearly winning, because of its firm
economic pragmatism.
Russia filling US’s gap by increasing military exports to Latin America
Sanchez 7 – Research Fellow at COHA (Alex, “Pluralism Bursts into the Western Hemisphere”,
November 16, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, http://www.coha.org/pluralism-reaches-the-westernhemisphere/)//ID
The Russian Bear
Russia has just begun to regain a privileged position of influence in the Western Hemisphere, a status
once enjoyed during the days of the Cold War when, as a result of its close ties with Havana, it was able
to maintain close relations with Nicaragua, Grenada, and Allende's Chile. Moscow also had the sympathy
of military governments like Peru during the Juan Velasco Alvarado rule (1968-1975). Today, Russia is
attempting to come up with a new strategy to recover a resource-drilling position of influence in the
hemisphere, and has focused on the military export industry as its line of attack. During the Cold War
several Latin American governments purchased Soviet weaponry, and today are familiar with utilizing
this type of equipment and prefer its use (not to mention Russian weapons are currently very
inexpensive) over having to purchase them from other manufacturers (i.e. France, Israel). For example,
Peru is in the process of upgrading its Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters, having placed its order with Moscow.
Russia is increasing its presence in Latin America
Saradzhyan 8 - Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center (Simon, “Backyard games”,
October 16, International Relations and Security Network, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Articles/Detail/?id=92776&lng=en)//ID
More than two decades after the Kremlin rolled back its program to support ideologically friendly
regimes world-wide, Russian is again making inroads into what leaders in Washington thought might be
its backwater in the aftermath of the Cold War.
For some Latin American countries, Russia's return to the continent is a welcome development that
limits US dominance. But for others, it bodes ill as they fear deliveries of Russian arms to the region may
tilt the military balance, if not lead to a Cold War on the continent.
"Of course we missed the times when we could always tell the US that we would turn to the Russians if
something didn't work out," one Latin American diplomat told ISN Security Watch in a recent interview.
The diplomat - who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to speak to the press on the
issue - said Russia's ability to project influence in the region was a far cry from the Soviet days, but "still
it is good to have more serious external players to interact with."
Russia's chief expert on Latin America and director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Latin America
Institute, Vladimir Davydov, concurred in a recent op/ed published by Russia's Kommersant daily
newspaper. "It is evident that our country has.... strengthened its potential and this factor is becoming
all the more important as Latin Americans look to abandon an orientation towards one player and are
interested in alternative partners."
And Russian authorities do not make any secret of their intention to stage a comeback in Latin America.
"We need to reestablish our positions in Cuba and in other countries," Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
said in 2001, ordering the closure of Russia's Cuban electronic reconnaissance base, known as the
Lourdes listening post.
Venezuela is clearly Russia's closest ally in the region. Not a year goes by without Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez - who shares Russian leadership's discontent with Washington's unilateralism - visiting
Moscow to sign new deals. Last month saw the Russian leadership warmly welcome Chavez with a
promise of US$1 billion in loans to purchase Russian anti-aircraft missile systems, among other
hardware.
According to a statement issued by the Kremlin press service ahead of Chavez's visit, the two countries
signed 12 arms deals worth a total of US$4.4 billion in 2005-2007.
Chavez said he would likely spend most of the loan on Tor-M1 air defense equipment, mostly to protect
Venezuela's new Su-30 MK2 jet fighters. Chavez also said Latin America should embrace Russia, that the
region needs Russia for "economic and social development, support and peace."
Venezuela's purchases catalyze a climate in the Western Hemisphere where its neighbors have begun to
seriously question such a rapid military build-up. On 4 October, Colombian Defense Minister Juan Santos
said Russia's presence could lead to a new Cold War in the region. Days later, he was pressured to
change his statement, saying he was only citing world opinion. However, he did state that the upcoming
naval exercises held in the Caribbean between Russia and Venezuela could "affect the balance of power
in the region and its stability."
Andy Webb-Vidal, a Jane's Intelligence Review correspondent based in Colombia, told ISN Security
Watch he believed that Russians were selling arms to Latin American countries in order to show
Washington that Moscow was capable of making inroads into the US neighborhood as well.
"Obviously the problems in Georgia over South Ossetia have multiplied the tension between
Washington and Moscow," Webb-Vidal said, explaining, "so from [the Russians'] point of view, they
want to poke Washington in the eye because they've seen Washington pull strings in Georgia."
Russia looking to expand influence in Latin America
Smith 9 – Researcher for UK Defence Academy, PhD in Political Science @ Oxford University (Mark A,
“Russia & Latin America: Competition in Washington's "Near Abroad"?”, August, International Relations
and Security Network)//ID
The contemporary Russian leadership sees Latin America as playing a role in enhancing the trend
towards the development of a multipolar international system. This is welcome to Moscow as the
emergence of a multipolar system is a process which will result in the diminution of US influence. In
September 2008, Vladimir Putin said that "Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the
multipolar world that is forming…We will pay more and more attention to this vector of our economic
and foreign policy."6
In November 2008, foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said:
We welcome Latin America's role in the efforts to democratize international relations in the context of
the objectively forming multipolarity in the world. We believe that these processes are in the interests
of the whole of mankind. Russia is interested in the closest cooperation with our Latin American
partners in reply to the reciprocal interest they are showing.7
It is considered that Russia’s increased interest in Latin America is a response to the strong US interest in
extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. The extension of US influence into various parts
of the former Soviet Union is immensely irritating to Moscow, as was the Bush Administration’s decision
to station ballistic missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, as these countries were
members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact.8 By seeking to expand Russia’s relations with various
countries in Latin America (particularly with anti-American regimes), Moscow is demonstrating to
Washington that it can extend its influence into the USA’s “near abroad”.
Russia increasing sphere of influence in Latin America to counter-balance US
Smith 9 – Researcher for UK Defence Academy, PhD in Political Science @ Oxford University (Mark A,
“Russia & Latin America: Competition in Washington's "Near Abroad"?”, August, International Relations
and Security Network, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?id=104344&lng=en)//ID
Medvedev’s November 2008 visit demonstrates that Moscow intends to pay greater attention to Latin
America, and wishes to expand its influence there. As Medvedev states, Russia sees the upgrading of its
presence as long-term in nature. It also demonstrates publicly the common interests of Russia and Latin
America in both politics and economics, primarily, of course, in the energy sphere. Medvedev also
stated that “one should not fear competition”, which would appear to indicate that Moscow is
interested in competing with the USA for influence in Latin America.
It is indeed likely to be the case that Moscow is interested in expanding its presence largely as a
response to US policy in the former Soviet Union, particularly in relation to US support for eventual
NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow wishes to demonstrate that it can develop a
presence in Washington’s “near abroad”, just as the USA can develop a presence in Moscow’s “near
abroad”. Russia wishes to encourage cautiously anti-American tendencies in Latin America, and has thus
concentrated on developing a cooperative relationship with Venezuela, which is keen to challenge the
US presence in Latin America. Russian policy is likely to continue in this direction, but is unlikely to avoid
undertaking any commitments in the region that could be deemed provocative by Washington. The
naval exercises with Venezuela are of symbolic value. The Russian navy is currently in no position to
pose a challenge to US security interests in the Caribbean.
It would also be rather self-limiting of Moscow to concentrate on developing relations with antiAmerican regimes such as Cuba and Nicaragua. The influence of these states in the region is limited.
Venezuela is a different case, due to its importance as an energy producer. It is using energy diplomacy
to challenge the US in the region, and for this reason Moscow will cultivate its strategic partnership with
Caracas.
Latin America key to Russian multipolarity
Presence in Latin America is key to Russian acceptance of a multipolar order
OxResearch 10 (OxResearch Daily brief Service, “LATIN AMERICA: Russian/Chinese regional focus
differs”, February 22, Oxfor Analytica, ProQuest)//ID
Russian goals and tactics Ties with Latin America strengthen the Russian authorities' conviction that
Russia remains a global power and affirm their position that the world is becoming more multi-polar and
less under US control:
Developing ties with important countries in what some consider the strategic 'backyard' of the United
States also shows that Moscow can 'retaliate' for Washington's support of Georgia (and to a lesser
extent, Ukraine) and placement of missile defences in Russia's declared sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe.
In September 2008, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin observed that, "Latin America ... is becoming
an obvious link in the chain making up a multi-polar world."
Russian companies also pursue profit with the countries of the region, but the significant overlap
between Russian and Latin American commodity exports suggests that these companies' expansion
efforts have more than purely commercial motivations. This potential for competition is especially
evident in the hydrocarbons sector, and Russian energy majors are aware that expanding production in
Latin American fields could deprive domestic exports of much-needed capital and markets. Nonetheless,
Russian energy companies have signed important oil and gas deals with several Latin American
countries:
Russia and Venezuela recently announced a 20 billion dollar deal to develop the Junin 6 oil field in
Venezuela's Orinoco Belt (see VENEZUELA: Limited options may buoy IOC investment - January 13,
2010).
Bilateral trade between Russia and Latin American countries amounted to approximately 11 billion
dollars in 2007. Although this fell sharply in late 2008 as the recession took hold, Russian officials have
established the goal of reaching a 20 billion dollar level of annual trade with the region by 2020.
Russia enjoys good commercial ties with the anti-Washington regimes of Cuba, Nicaragua and
Venezuela. With the United States limiting its economic contacts with these left-leaning governments,
and encouraging European businesses to do the same, Russian companies may have a receptive
environment for their business deals.
Addons
Terrorism addon
Enforcing the embargo drains resources from the war on terror
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic
Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS
CUBA,” 1/14/10, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//SJF
Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on
Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these
burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the
homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.”
This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the
embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to
our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable
tradeoffs for homeland security.
A Cuban crisis will collapse the war on terror – economic engagement solves
Gorrell, 5 - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
(Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074 GWOT=Global War on Terrorism
U.S. policy makers need to confront the real Cuba of today in order to build a “free” Cuba of tomorrow
that is capable of taking its place in the world community as a responsible, democratic nation. Given the
history of the past 100 years, and particularly our Castro centric policy, the U.S. needs to make a bold
change toward Cuba. The U.S. has pursued a hard-line approach toward the Castro regime for over 40
years. While this policy was easily justified during the Cold War era and, to a certain degree, during the
1990s, it fails to address the present U.S. national security concerns. The globalization trends of the 21st
century are irreversible, Fidel Castro is in the twilight of his life, and a new generation of CubanAmericans is supportive of new strategies that will ease the transition to a post-Castro Cuba while
buttressing economic and social opportunities in the near term. Furthermore, there is a new dimension
that U.S. policy strategists must take into account in deciding the course of U.S.- Cuba relations – the
GWOT. World-wide asymmetrical threats to U.S. interests, coupled with the Iraqi occupation and the
potential for any one of the present hot spots (i.e. Iran, North Korea, Taiwan, etc.) to ignite, should
prompt strategic leaders to work harder to mitigate a potential Caribbean crises. The prudent action
would then be to develop strategies that can defuse or neutralize these situations before they require
the U.S. to divert resources from protecting its interests in the GWOT .
Therefore, the U.S. can best serve its security, the Cuban people, and the Western Hemisphere by
abandoning the present draconian policy toward Cuba. The U.S. should implement a new policy
designed to achieve its goals through lifting all sanctions and pursuing normalized diplomatic relations;
encouraging people-to-people dialogue and trade. The policy should continue to pursue human rights,
democracy, and free market ends. However, the ways to realize these objectives should be grounded in
full economic engagement, an approach that has not been fully attempted. The present U.S. policy has
failed miserably. What does the most powerful nation on earth have to lose by attempting a bold shift in
its policy toward Cuba?
Improving relations is vital to counterterrorism
Weinmann 2004- Master of international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at
Columbia University
(Lissa,“Washington's Irrational Cuba Policy”, World Policy Institute, Spring 2004,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209899, JSTOR)//KW
The avowed goal of the embargo - the over- throw of the Cuban government - puts front and center
the likelihood of destabilization that would be profoundly traumatic to the United States, and
particularly to Florida, forcing thousands of Cuban refugees to seek the safety of our shores and
requiring the vast commitment of personnel and re- sources. "During an earlier, smaller Haitian
boatlift, for example, the U.S. needed 17 Coast Guard cutters, 5 Navy ships, and 9 aircraft to interdict,
rescue, and transport," said Robert Bach, a former Immigration and Naturalization Service official at an
October 2003 National Summit on Cuba in Miami. In rashly cutting off migration accords, the Bush
administration has all but invited Castro to allow a mass exodus. On Febru- ary 27, President Bush
issued an emergency proclamation directing Homeland Security personnel to patrol the seas between
Florida and Cuba to prevent U.S. pleasure boats from illegally entering Cuban waters. This allows U.S.
authorities to be prepared for a potential Cuban exodus as the weather turns warmer, while warning
Cuba that Washington would view any increased number of rafters as a hostile act. A Chicago Tribune
editorial of October 27, 2003, expresses the sentiment of many members of Congress and military
personnel whom this writer has interviewed: "In an age of very real terrorist threats, Cuba hardly
makes the list. For the Department of Homeland Security to re- double its efforts and tie up more
money and personnel in enforcing the travel ban against Cuba...is an incredible waste of resources."
Retired general Charles Wilhelm, former chief of the U.S. Southern Command, says: "I'm convinced that
a pragmatic relationship with Cuba will further the national security interests of the U.S." The lack of
relations with Cuba, he said at the National Summit on Cuba in Washington, D.C. in 2002, translates
into "a 47,000 square mile blind spot in our national security rearview mirror ninety miles south of Key
West." Retired general Jack Sheehan and former Clinton drug czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey, among
others, have called for increased interaction with the Cuban authorities and many military leaders have
decried the administration s politicization of the Cuban threat.
The embargo trades off with terrorism prevention-heightens national security threats
GAO, 7-Govenrment Accountability Office (“Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S.
Embargo on Cuba: Report to Congressional Committees”, GAO, November 2007,
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ok1N65oi62KWMlnTOqhr3NmMQjCKbkRtBrZiptEVq-c/edit)//TL
The impact of CBP's Cuba-related inspections process on its ability to carry out its primary mission of
protecting against terrorists and terrorist weapons at the Miami airport occurs in the context of recent
GAO reports that found weaknesses in CBP's inspections capacity nationwide and highlighted that
effective use of secondary inspections are critical to CBP's primary antiterrorism mission. In November
2007, we reported that CBP staffing shortages have affected its ability to carry out antiterrorism
programs and have created other vulnerabilities in its inspections process at U.S. ports of
entry.[Footnote 92] There is also a growing concern that terrorists with no criminal record may use
legitimate travel documents when they attempt to enter the country through ports of entry. The report
observed that the shortages and weaknesses increased the potential that terrorists and inadmissible
travelers could enter the country and that failure to apprehend a potentially dangerous person increases
the possibility that homeland and national security may be compromised.
The embargo trades off with other sanctions for dangerous countries and spreads thin
anti-terrorism resources-huge risk to national security
GAO, 7-Govenrment Accountability Office (“Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S.
Embargo on Cuba: Report to Congressional Committees”, GAO, November 2007,
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ok1N65oi62KWMlnTOqhr3NmMQjCKbkRtBrZiptEVq-c/edit)//TL
Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, several agencies redirected resources from enforcing
the Cuba embargo to accomplishing homeland and national security priorities, such as stopping
terrorism, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering. For example, reflecting
DHS's strategic emphasis on targeting its resources to priority threats and vulnerabilities, ICE devoted 30
percent fewer staff hours to investigating Cuba embargo violations in fiscal years 2002-2006 than in the
previous 5 fiscal years. However, reflecting administration policy and embargo rule changes, two
agencies maintained a focus on enforcing the Cuba embargo. Based on its assessment of the risk of
embargo violations after 2004, DHS's CBP increased its intensive, secondary inspections of arrivals from
Cuba at Miami International Airport--one of the nation's busiest--and, in fiscal year 2007, conducted
secondary inspections of 20 percent of arrivals from Cuba versus 3 percent of arrivals from other
countries. Our analysis of CBP data and interviews with CBP officials show that this intensive inspection
of travelers and the numerous resulting seizures of small amounts of Cuban-made products have
sometimes occupied a majority of the airport's secondary inspection facilities and delayed inspections of
other passengers, straining the agency's resources for accomplishing its priority mission: keeping
terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible aliens out of the country while facilitating the flow of legitimate
trade and travel. This impact is especially troublesome in the context of recent GAO reports of
weaknesses in CBP's inspections capacity at major ports of entry nationwide, which increase the
potential of terrorists' and inadmissable travelers' entering the country. In addition, since 2000,
Treasury's OFAC--responsible for administering more than 20 sanctions programs--has conducted more
investigations and issued more penalties related to the Cuba embargo than for all of the other sanctions
programs it administers. OFAC officials stated that Cuba embargo cases required fewer resources, but
they could not provide data showing that the agency's resource allocations appropriately support its
responsibility to enforce other sanctions, including those on countries engaged in terrorism, weapons
proliferation, and narcotics trafficking.
Enforcing the embargo tradesoff with counterterrorism
Johnson, et al, 10 – Andy Johnson is a director in the national security program at The Third Way (“End
the Embargo of Cuba”, The National Security Program, 9/6/10,
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo__End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)//EX
Keeping the embargo in place requires that the US government devote time and resources to fighting a
Cold War-era threat. Senator Chris Dodd argued in a 2005 oped that the US spends “extraordinary
resources” each year to enforce the sanctions instead of devoting such resources to the fight against
terrorism.4 While the financial resources dedicated to enforcing the embargo may be limited compared
to resources dedicated to other causes, lifting the Cuban embargo could put the US in a better position
to fight terrorist organizations by freeing up resources currently enforcing the embargo.
For example, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which governs travel
and trade between the US and Cuba, is also responsible for maintaining sanctions against truly
problematic countries, including Iran and North Korea. OFAC also is responsible for responding to
economic threats posed by terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers. By ending OFAC’s need to
regulate the Cuban embargo, OFAC could instead devote those resources to respond to the current
threats posed by rogue states and terrorist networks.
Cuba also remains on the State Department’s state sponsor of terrorism list along with Iran, Syria, and
Sudan,5 despite claims by experts such as former National Coordinator for Security and
Counterterrorism Richard Clarke that Cuba is only on the list for domestic political reasons.6 A 1998
report by the US Intelligence Community determined that Cuba does not pose a threat to US national
security,7 yet the State Department continues to keep Cuba on the list. By normalizing relations with
Cuba and removing Cuba from the list, the State Department could better focus on actual state sponsors
of terror and instead use resources in the Western Hemisphere bureau to initiate a new path for
engaging Cuba.
Enforcing the embargo trades off with customs and border protection resources – it is
expensive and time consuming to patrol all the regulations
Lacey, 7 – reporter for the New York Times (Marc, “Report Finds U.S. Agencies Distracted by Focus on
Cuba”, December 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/world/americas/19cuba.html)//eek
Catching Americans who travel illegally to Cuba or who purchase cigars, rum or other products from the
island may be distracting some American government agencies from higher-priority missions like
fighting terrorism and combating narcotics trafficking, a government audit to be released Wednesday
says.
The report, from the Government Accountability Office, says that Customs and Border Protection, which
is part of the Department of Homeland Security, conducts secondary inspections on 20 percent of
charter passengers arriving from Cuba at Miami International Airport, more than six times the inspection
rate for other international arrivals, even from countries considered shipment points for narcotics.
That high rate of inspections and the numerous seizures of relatively benign contraband “have strained
C.B.P.’s capacity to carry out its primary mission of keeping terrorists, criminals and inadmissible aliens
from entering the country at Miami International Airport,” says the audit, a copy of which was obtained
by The New York Times.
The audit also called on the Treasury Department to scrutinize the priorities of its Office of Foreign
Assets Control, which enforces more than 20 economic and trade sanctions programs, including those
aimed at freezing terrorists’ assets and restricting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but
has long focused on Cuba.
Between 2000 and 2006, 61 percent of the agency’s investigation and penalty caseload involved Cuba
embargo cases. Over that period, the office opened 10,823 investigations into possible violations
involving Cuba and just 6,791 investigations on all other cases, the audit found.
Diverts focus from fighting terror networks
Lukas 1 – analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies (Aaron, “It’s Time, Finally, to
End the Cuban Embargo,” 12/14/1, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-finally-endcuban-embargo)//SJF
Not only has the embargo backfired, it wastes American resources that are needed to fight terrorism.
Treasury officials who could be unraveling terrorist financial networks are instead tracing property
owned by Spanish hotels in Cuba to make sure it wasn’t stolen from Americans decades ago. INS agents that could be
watching our borders for suicide bombers are instead worrying about tourists who may have spent
money in Havana. These shouldn’t be our top priorities. In fact, they shouldn’t be priorities at all.
Along with an end to the embargo, funds currently wasted on attempts to de-legitimize the Castro regime could
be diverted to more productive uses. For instance, money currently spent on Radio Mardi (which is electronically jammed by the
Cuban government) could go instead to a Radio Free Afghanistan—a region where the broadcasts might actually do some good.
But perhaps most significant would be the message that scrapping the embargo would send to the
Taliban and other regimes that sponsor terrorism: foreign governments need not follow the American
model, but states that attack us forfeit the right to choose their own destiny.
Of course, the reason that the embargo has persisted in the face of overwhelming evidence that it’s failed has been the strength of the CubanAmerican lobby in Congress. Yet pro-embargo sentiment is weaker than ever for a variety of reasons, including bad press garnered by Miami
Cubans over the Elián González standoff. Moreover, armed conflict has a way of lending political capital to presidents that is unavailable in
times of peace. President Bush thus has a unique opportunity to change direction on Cuba that his predecessors lacked.
The Cuban embargo long ago outlived its usefulness. With war now raging against radical Islam, it’s time
to let go of a policy that only serves to punish the innocent and antagonize our friends. Let Cubans freely
taste the carrot of our prosperity through trade and let’s save the sanctions stick for true enemies.
US economy addon
Loosening the embargo is vital to export led growth
Piccone 11- Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy the Brookings Institution
(Ted, “U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS: MOVING POLICY FORWARD IN 2011 AND BEYOND” The Brookings
Institute, February 15, 2011” pp. 19-20
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/2/15%20cuba/20110215_cuba.pdf)//HA
In 2000 there was a partial easing of the embargo under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act. The sale of agricultural exports was permitted but with a variety of restrictions and
licensing requirements. We saw, as a result, the U.S. exports to Cuba rose from less than a million
dollars to $392 million in 2004 and U.S. agriculture exports or products captured 42 percent of the
Cuban market In 2005, the last Administration tightened those terms of engagement to require
payments before the goods departed a U.S. port. The result was that U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba
decreased by 15 percent.
As currently interpreted, exporters to Cuba cannot take advantage of private U.S. financing and this has
disproportionate impacts on would-be small business - - excuse me, smaller exporters, who avoid the
Cuban market because of the complexity of the regulations and in fact it nearly completely stymies the
ability of these smaller exporters to do business at all in Cuba even under the terms that are allowed
under current law.
U.S. exporters are missing out on significant opportunities here . While the Cuban economy is small
and under developed, firms from third countries today operate freely on an island that is only 90 miles
from our shore and is a natural market for U.S. goods and services. Prior to the embargo, the United
States accounted for nearly 70 percent of Cuba’s international trade. It was the seventh largest market
for U.S. exporters, particularly for agricultural products.
The embargo forced Cuba to seek out new sources for its domestic consumption and many years ago
now, 2001, the International Trade Commission estimated that American exporters were losing up to
$1.2 billion annually in sales . It seems very likely that this sum has grown in the intervening decade.
Today, you know, it’s no longer Russia doing the bulk of the trade with Cuba. Today we see Venezuela,
China, Vietnam, Canada and Brazil dominating the Cuban market. The U.S. is losing the ability to be a
player when and if there is an opening in Cuba.
We’ve supported recent Congressional efforts such as those of Congressmen Peterson and Moran, in
the last Congress, to ease restrictions on agricultural trade which represent an important first step to
restoring the competitive advantage of U.S. goods and enabling our U.S. exporters to recover lost
markets . In particular, easing the terms of already legal trade with Cuba, particularly by applying the
commercial term of cash in advance payments, would have a demonstrable impact on the ability of
America’s small exporters to access the Cuban market.
Easing the embargo stimulates U.S. economy
Safran 2012 -Master of Science in Global Affairs (with distinction) at New York University
(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-EmbargoBrian-Safran, google scholar)//KW
Those that support the embargo often make the claim that as such a small Caribbean country, the
economic advantage to be gained by the United States in lifting its embargo on Cuba would be
negligible. This assertion is simply without merit, and the evidence proves it. A committee of former
Department of Transportation economists recently noted that eradicating the embargo would add 1.6
billion dollars in revenue to the U.S. economy and establish approximately twenty thousand additional
jobs in the U.S. (Weinmann, 2004, 29) Analysts have asserted that had the embargo been lifted, the
Cuban people would have been able to use revenues derived from tourism to purchase significant
amounts of machinery and agricultural products from the United States. (Griswold, 2005, 2) In fact, the
American Farm Bureau has stated that the embargo has caused U.S. businesses to lose out on a major
potential export market in agriculture which could have led American farmers to profits upwards of one
billion dollars, and to an additional quarter million dollars per year in the exportation of farming
machinery and accessories. (Griswold, 2005, 2) The passage of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, which
banned all trade in foodstuffs to Cuba through U.S. subsidiaries, effectively deepening the Cuban
depression, further served to damage U.S. agricultural business interests abroad. (Weinmann, 2004, 24;
29) In addition, the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which allowed U.S. citizens, including those CubanAmericans who had not been citizens at the time, to commence lawsuits against companies that had
engaged in indirect business transactions with the Castro regime has had a crippling affect on a
multitude of U.S. businesses. (Vanden, 2006, 360-61) In addition, the maintenance of the embargo
requires a significant utilization of national security resources that can clearly be put to better use in
protecting America from substantive terrorism threats rather than by using them to enforce an
inconsequential ban on Cuban travel. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Thus, from an economic standpoint, the
United States does indeed have the potential to benefit from a liberalization of trade with Cuba.
Iran sanctions addon
Spills over – undermines credibility of ALL sanctions
Fitzgerald 5 – professor of law at the Stetson University College of Law in Florida, and a recent
Fulbright Distinguished Scholar to the United Kingdom, serves on the International Advisory Board of
SanctionsWatch.com (Peter L, “THE CUBAN THISTLE CRISIS: RETHINKING U.S. SANCTIONS,” Foreign
Service Journal, http://www.law.stetson.edu/faculty/fitz/media/Fitzgerald_FSJMarch2005.pdf)//SJF
Last October, the third National Summit on Cuba was held in Tampa, Fla. Once again, those advocating
abandoning policies and sanctions that have clearly failed to lead to political change in Cuba for more
than 40 years faced those who argue for ever-tighter and more onerous sanctions to counter the human
rights abuses and oppression of Fidel Castro’s regime.
This is a dance with unique steps that is peculiar to Florida, but one that is particularly popular with both
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in election years. It is also a dance that highlights the
misplaced focus of U.S. sanctions policy in an era of global terrorism.
A Question of Credibility
The Cuban embargo is often cited abroad as a prime example of a U.S. unilateral economic sanctions
program that has clearly failed to achieve its stated aims, and is now maintained purely for domestic
political purposes (while costing American exporters an estimated $3-4 billion annually). The embargo’s
extraterritorial application to ostensibly control the dealings of foreign commercial entities and
transactions well removed from Cuba and Castro’s government is a cause of friction with our nation’s
trading partners. And the periodic efforts to extend and tighten the controls’ extraterritorial impact
overseas, such as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, are perceived as
an affront to the sovereignty of our trading partners and undermine the credibility abroad of the U.S.
sanctions programs generally — and not just with regard to Cuba.
U.S. insistence on applying these measures in third countries is problematic under international law and
has prompted several foreign governments, along with the European Union, to pass laws prohibiting
their nationals and companies from complying with the terms of the U.S. embargo. Ironically, these
foreign “blocking measures” are partially patterned after the United States’s own anti-boycott laws,
prohibitions that are aimed at countering the extraterritorial application of the Arab League boycott of
Israel to American nationals and companies.
The perception of weakening sanctions spurs nuclearization – destabilizes the entire
Middle East
Rubin 12 – former Pentagon official whose major research area is the Middle East, with a special focus
on Iran, Syria, Arab Politics, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Turkey (Michael, “The West should hand
Iran's leadership a chalice of poison,” 1/4/12, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defensepolicy/the-west-should-hand-irans-leadership-a-chalice-of-poison/)//SJF
It would be a mistake to relieve the economic and military pressure on Tehran.
Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are at a more than 20-year high after Iranian authorities threatened to close the 34-mile-wide channel through
which more than one-third of the world's oil tanker traffic passes. The
threats come against the backdrop of renewed
international discussion of sanctions in the wake of an International Atomic Energy Agency report
cataloguing Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapon technology.
Many academics and retired diplomats call for renewed diplomacy and less coercion. A letter sent last month to the White House by the former
British, French and Italian ambassadors to Iran declared that while sanctions have a place, winning Iranian concessions ''requires the renewal of
effective negotiations''.
Amin Saikal, a professor at the Australian National University, suggested on this page this week that Western concerns about Iran's nuclear
intentions were misplaced, and argued that, regardless, the West had no choice but to negotiate. ''Neither sanctions nor military operations
can really work,'' he declared. He is wrong.
"So long as Iran does not attain nuclear weapons, its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz remain simple bluster."--Michael Rubin
To relieve economic and military pressure on Iran would be counterproductive. So long as Iran does not
attain nuclear weapons, its threats to close the Strait of Hormuz remain simple bluster. If Iran is allowed
to develop nuclear weapons, all bets are off. Tehran's ability to amplify its leverage over the international economy would
increase exponentially.
Make no mistake: Iran cannot close the Strait of Hormuz for more than a day. When its navy mined the Persian Gulf in 1988, damaging a US
vessel, president Ronald Reagan responded with Operation Praying Mantis, decimating the Iranian navy, a bloody nose that led Tehran to
respect international waters for more than two decades.
Nor can Iran itself afford a closure of the strait. Not only does it need to export oil itself through the waterway, but, because of decades of
financial mismanagement, it also depends on the strait for the import of refined petroleum products.
Without imported gasoline to fuel its car and factories, Iran's economy would grind to a halt. To close the strait even for a day would do far
more economic damage to Iran than it would to Australia, east Asia or the West.
The leadership in Tehran knows better than anyone that every time Iran has experienced a fuel
shortage, protesters have poured into the streets.
Despite bluster that sanctions have had no effect, Iranian behaviour suggests the opposite. Both the March
2007 Iranian attack on British sailors in the waters between Iraq and Iran, and the November 2011 attack on the British embassy in Tehran,
came two days after the British government lent its support to new sanctions. Both attacks were overreactions that belied Tehran's insistence
that sanctions are meaningless.
Even Iranian parliamentarians do not buy their government's rhetoric. Last month, 30 representatives called for a
closed session of the parliament in order to dispense with polemic and to discuss sanctions truthfully. Abolghasem Mozaffari, the head of
the Revolutionary Guards' economic wing, confessed that ''the sanctions have not been without
impact''.
Iran's current provocations may have more to do with its own desperation than any real grievance. After the US Congress imposed
unilateral sanctions on Iran last month, Iran's currency lost nearly half its value. Unemployment and
inflation are both in double digits.
To keep afloat, Iran needs high oil prices. Simply threatening tanker traffic drives up the price of oil, adding hundreds of millions of dollars to
Iran's coffers. The irony of such a psychological strategy, however, is that the spike in oil prices mitigates any increase that would result from
military strikes.
Nor are military strikes as difficult as some believe. While Saikal argues that ''most Iranian nuclear installations are buried deep underground'',
itself an admission that they have no civilian purpose, pilots point out that they need only destroy entrances to such facilities rather than blast
the underground centrifuges, reactors and potential assembly plants and storage depots.
While no Australian, American, or European wants to pay more at the petrol pump, the status quo is
unsustainable. Should the Islamic Republic develop nuclear weapons, Tehran will have a free hand to
lash out indiscriminately, feeling secure behind its own nuclear deterrent. A limited conflict in the Persian Gulf
might add $20 to the price of oil for a month, but a nuclear Iran could permanently add $100 a barrel.
History can be a guide. Twice, in the Islamic Republic's history, revolutionary authorities have sworn no
surrender. In 1979, they said they would not release their American hostages until Washington met revolutionary leader Ayatollah
Khomeini's demands. Then, they said they would accept no end to the Iran-Iraq war until Saddam Hussein was in Iranian hands. In both
cases, however, isolation and sanctions took their toll.
When Khomeini announced a ceasefire with Iraq, he likened it to drinking a chalice of poison but said
the cost of continuing to fight gave him no choice.
When it comes to Tehran's nuclear program and its Hormuz threats, it is time to hand Iranian leaders
such a chalice, not to relieve the pressure.
Iranian prolif causes nuclear war, rapid arms races, cold war 2, and interventionism
Kurtz 6 – senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center (Stanley, “Our Fallout-Shelter Future”,
National Review Online, 8/28,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OWU4MDMwNmU5MTI5NGYzN2FmODg5NmYyMWQ4YjM3OTU=
)//SJF
Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks,
proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the
peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to
act in a post-proliferation world.
Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran
gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection,
and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you’ve got to at least add Egypt to this list.)
With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence?
A
key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of
geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on
each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what
if a nuclear missile is launched at the
United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say,
Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had
attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the
nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile?
It might be almost impossible to trace the attack
back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict.
MORE
TERROR
We’re familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But
With several Muslim countries in possession of the
bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very
difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states — like Pakistan’s intelligence services or Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the
weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a
nuclear terror strike.
Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis “enjoy” an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have
imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world.
established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by
Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the
two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the
current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a
multi-polar nuclear Middle East is
unlikely to follow the South Asian model.
Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist,
apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is
likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a
weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world’s non-proliferation regime also raises the
chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan.
And of course,
possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop
weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait’s oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will
not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran
would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand,
to the extent that we do see conventional war
in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear
strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many “hot” proxy wars. If conventional wars
break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into nuclear
confrontations. DUCK!
What would life be like in such a world? Rosen argues that we must lose no time in constructing a specialized
radar and satellite warning network trained on the Middle East. Without knowing who’s sending missiles against us, we cannot strike back or
deter. Rosen also argues that even a somewhat leaky anti-missile defense system is going to be a must. A star-wars-type missile-defense system
may have seemed powerless against the massive might of the old Soviet nuclear force. But against a growing nuclear power with a small
arsenal, or against Islamic radicals who manage to commandeer an isolated nuclear-armed missile, an anti-missile defense could make a real
difference.
This leads us to what may be Rosen’s most striking recommendation. “Duck and cover” is back! In a post-proliferation world, we
are going to be raising another generation of children (probably several generations of children) marked by nerve-wracking “retention drills.”
And get ready...the fallout shelter is coming back, too. Given the Soviets’ overwhelmingly large nuclear arsenal — capable of turning the entire
United States to dust in the event of a major nuclear exchange — fallout shelters came to seem like a joke. But when dealing with a possible
strike from a single weapon, or at most a mere handful of weapons, the logic of the fallout shelter is compelling. We’re going to need to be able
to evacuate our cities in the event of a direct attack, or to avoid radiation plumes from cities that have already been struck. Tens or hundreds of
thousands of lives could be saved by such measures.
But what about the problem of retaliation? Is there a middle way between the seemingly
intolerable option of doing nothing to respond to a nuclear strike on New York or Washington, and indiscriminate nuclear retaliation against a
country that may not even have attacked us? Rosen says the answer is a massive conventional campaign to take over and transform the
countries that have struck us. That may seem intolerable now, but the public will demand no less in the wake of a nuclear attack on American
soil.
So this is the upshot of Rosen’s remarkable article. Now let’s think through the implications.
DEAD DOVES
For starters, the dovish
Democrats are doomed. In “Hawkish Gloom,” I pointed in broad terms to the imminent hawkification of the United States. Well, Rosen’s
detailed account of a post-proliferation world makes it clear that the revitalized George McGovern-Howard Dean wing of the Democratic
party cannot survive much past the moment when Iran gets the bomb. As soon as that happens, we’re going to
plunged into a proliferation crisis and a new Cold War, at least as dangerous as the first Cold War (arguably
more so). At that point, the Democrats are going to beg Joe Lieberman to come back and give them his blessing. It turns out that we really are
going to see a purge of the Democratic doves, and the accession of a Truman-like party, although it will probably take quite a few election
cycles before the Democrats finally manage to remove taint of their Ned Lamont wing.
Funny how the very thing the doves don’t want — a
preemptive strike on Iran, is the only thing that can save them. A
nuclear Iran, followed by cascading proliferation
throughout the Middle East and beyond, means the death of the dove. Even a negotiated and verifiable agreement to
put an end to Iran’s nuclear program is inconceivable without the sort of credible threat of force the doves
have made impossible to sustain.
A fully nuclearized, multi-polar Middle East will put us onto a
permanent war footing. With Americans building fallout shelters, running evacuation drills, and otherwise preparing for a terrorist
nuclear strike, dovishness won’t even be an option. Our political choices will probably be of two types. Exactly how hawkish shall we be, and
how shall we shape our alliances?
After Iran gets the bomb, the fantasy that we can handle the post-9/11 world with our tiny military is going
to disappear. As Rosen points out, the only middle way between helpless
acceptance of nuclear terror and massive
nuclear retaliation against countries that may not even have attacked us, is going to be through conventional invasions. Before,
and certainly after a nuclear attack (even a terrorist and/or Iranian nuclear strike on Israel or Saudi Arabia), Americans will be forced
to raise a large army capable of transforming the Middle East before final Armageddon strikes.
What’s that you say?
We tried that in Iraq and it didn’t work. Well, after the bomb goes off, I assure you we’re going to try it again. In fact, you’ll
demand that we try it. And with your patience and political support, at that point, who knows, it just may work.
NEW ARGUMENTS
Over and
above our political arguments over precisely how much to expand our military (really a lot, or a whole heck of a lot), we’re also going to argue
about our alliance strategies. With multiple nuclear powers, there will probably be a lot of shifting coalitions. True, the initial alliances are
already evident. In a nuclear Middle East, we will be allied with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia against Iran. But who knows whether Iran may
try to strike a deal with one of the other Muslim states at some point, perhaps cozying up to Saudi Arabia if America puts too much pressure on
the House of Saud. Just as America (very imperfectly) peeled Pakistan away from the informal rogue-state coalition after 9/11, shifting alliances
between multiple nuclear camps will become a real possibility. American
power will no longer command a fully
nuclearized world. Instead, we’ll be the first among nuclear equals, jockeying for position against coalitions
of powers who collectively may be able to stand us down. In this new world, Ned Lamont and the Daily Kos will be a
distant memory.
The most egregious American doves don’t even bother to think out a position on the prospects for deterrence in a postproliferation world. Implicitly, however, like their realist counterparts, the Howard Dean doves are proliferation optimists. Whether they’ve
thought it through or not, their policy preferences require them to believe that a nuclear Iran can be deterred on the model of the Cold War.
Rosen claims to be neutral between the dovish proliferation optimists and the hawkish proliferation pessimists. But the truth is, everything
Rosen says inclines us toward pessimism. One after another, Rosen knocks down the pillars of the Cold War deterrence analogy, showing that
in a post-proliferation world, the balance of forces will tend toward instability. The lesson is that we face two choices: preemptive war with
Iran, or a nightmare world on the brink of nuclear war and nuclear terror for the foreseeable future. Anyway you slice it, the doves are doomed.
Unfortunately, so may we be all. Ready or not...duck and cover!
UN addon
The embargo alienates EU support in the UN
Piccone 9 – senior fellow and deputy director for Foreign Policy at Brookings, specializes in U.S.-Latin
American relations (Ted, “The United Nations Denounces the U.S. Embargo on Cuba … Again,” 10/27/9,
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2009/10/27-cuba-un-vote-piccone)//SJF
For the 18th year in a row, the
United Nations General Assembly unequivocally calls for the end of "the economic,
commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba." And once again,
the United States finds itself completely isolated from even its closest friends in the international
community.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. President Obama is committed to a new course of multilateral engagement in which the United States
reassumes its mantle of responsible global citizen. And in many ways, from the formal creation of the G-20 to re-joining the UN Human Rights
Council, the administration has not just talked the talk, but walked the walk, earning him a rather premature though welcomed Nobel Peace
Prize.
But when it comes to Cuba, it’s back to the same old story: all politics is local, in this case, Miami, Florida. Earlier this year, there was some
justified hope that, after eight years of an increasingly onerous set of laws and regulations restricting trade, travel and remittances between the
United States and Cuba, President Obama would fulfill his promise to try a new path of pragmatic but principled engagement. And winning
Florida last November – despite losing the majority of Cuban American votes in Miami – should have given the White House some elbow room
to take some bold actions. But even supporters are disappointed by the excessively cautious steps this administration has taken so far to extend
that "unclenched fist" to our closest island neighbor.
If anything, the president seems to have limited his options by locking himself in to a policy of mutual reciprocity that lets Havana determine
the pace of progress in unfreezing 50 years of icy relations. On more than one occasion, the president has reiterated his view that, in return for
letting Cuban-American families travel and send remittances to their loved ones on the island, the Castro regime must take the next step
toward better relations. He reportedly asked his Spanish counterpart, Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero, to tell President Raul Castro to get
moving on democratic reforms. According to an unnamed U.S. official quoted in El Pais, Obama said, "We're taking steps, but if they don't take
steps too, it's going to be very hard for us to continue." Of course, the fact that financial donations from pro-embargo Cuban Americans to the
Democratic Senate Campaign Committee, which happens to be led by pro-embargo Cuban-American Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), have
jumped six-fold since 2006 also may have something to do with this approach. It at least seems to reaffirm another old cliché: money talks.
While a tit-for-tat approach may assuage the shrinking number of hard-liners in Miami, it is unlikely to have any effect on the intended
audience – the Cuban regime, now ruled by Fidel Castro’s "younger" brother (78 years old) and a cohort of aged revolutionaries. Cuba has made
it very clear that it is prepared to sit down and talk with the United States in a spirit of mutual respect, i.e., accepting the regime as it is, rather
than as we would like it to be. Until then, it will happily promote the image of David vs. Goliath on the world stage. It is just too potent and too
successful a narrative in winning friends for Havana to abandon, even more so now that its economy is in a shambles and it needs all the friends
it can get.
Similarly, the
modest steps the administration has taken so far is unlikely to get much mileage with the
other group one would want to influence – the European and other allies who are rooting for a more
multilateral, cooperative and pragmatic U.S. policy on this and a host of other issues. Washington will
have to do much more to begin turning the tide of international public opinion against the embargo. This does not
mean that the United States should abandon its defense of human rights for all Cubans. But it might want to change its tactics. Spain is touting
its policy of quiet diplomacy as a better model for the European Union, which it chairs in 2010, and has a few, albeit meager concessions by
Havana to back up its argument. We, after 50 years of attempting to punish Cuba for its bad behavior, have none.
So a policy designed to isolate a small, poor Caribbean island has come around full circle to isolate the
superpower instead. The lopsided UN vote reminds us yet again that it’s time for a change. If President
Obama wants to show the world he is prepared to lead in a new direction, there are a multitude of steps
he can take to ease the embargo and improve bilateral relations without waiting for Congress to act. These include
expanding licenses for people-to-people travel for educational, cultural and humanitarian purposes; allowing more Cubans to travel to the
United States; easing the licensing of tradable medicines developed in Cuba; reviewing whether Cuba should remain on the list of state
sponsors of terrorism; and pursuing agreements on disaster relief and marine conservation. But something tells me that at next year’s UN vote,
very little will have changed, in Havana or in Washington.
Improved EU integration is vital to all forms of crisis management – serves as a
terminal filter to all Neg impacts
Alonso 12 – Public Law Department, University of Salamanca, Academic Visitor at the Centre for the
Study of International Governance, Loughborough University (Luis N Gonzalez, “Rethinking EU-UN
cooperation in international crisis management: Lisbon and beyond,” Policy Paper 9, February 2012,
http://dseu.lboro.ac.uk/Documents/Policy_Papers/DSEU_Policy_Paper09.pdf)//SJF
Owing to the development of its security and defence policy, the European Union became at the outset
of the past decade a more attractive partner for the United Nations in the field of crisis management. In
addition to its traditional support through different financial instruments, for the first time from the
perspective of the UN, the EU has turned itself into apotential direct provider of civilian or even military
capabilities for peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. The 2003 Joint Declaration, signed in New
York by representatives of both organisations in the immediate aftermath of operation Artemis/DR
Congo, formalised this new pattern of cooperation2.
Nevertheless, and in spite of some other significant and to a certain extent unexpected achievements
such as the military operations EUFOR DR Congo and EUFOR Chad, the momentum of this relationship
has clearly tended to decline over the last few years. Leaving aside controversial episodes such as the
one prompted by the launch of EULEX Kosovo, the EU has proved to be a not so reliable partner when it
comes to mobilising key capabilities, both civilian and military, at the request of or in cooperation with
UN missions and, what is probably more important, to deploying them according to a comprehensive
approach; this is precisely one of the main concerns and more demanding challenges ahead for the UN
itself in the field of crisis management.
Assuming that major reforms relating to these issues are underway in both organisations -in the case of
the EU following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and in that of the UN mainly as a consequence
of the implementation of its “New Horizon Initiative”3-, this seems to be a suitable moment to review
the general orientation of that partnership and to explore the prospects for real improvements in it.
Furthermore, and from a strictly EU perspective, cooperation with the UN in crisis management appears
to be a meaningful test case for verifying effectiveness in enhancing the coherence of its new external
action instruments, particularly as far as the sensitive link between security and development is
concerned. This policy paper aims to briefly assess the more significant aspects of this on-going process.
US ag addon
Increasing trade will substantially boost US ag
Griswold 9- director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute
(Daniel, “The US Embargo of Cuba Is a Failure” CATO institute, June 15, 2009,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-embargo-cuba-is-failure)//HA
In 2000, Congress approved a modest opening of the embargo. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act allows cash-only sales to Cuba of US farm products and medical supplies. The results
of this modest opening have been quite amazing. Since 2000, total sales of farm products to Cuba have
increased from virtually zero to $691m in 2008. The top US exports by value are corn, meat and poultry,
wheat and soybeans. From dead last, Cuba is now the number six customer in Latin America for US
agricultural products. Last year, American farmers sold more to the 11.5 million people who live in Cuba
than to the 200 million people in Brazil.
According to the US international trade commission, US farm exports would increase another $250m if
restrictions were lifted on export financing. This should not be interpreted as a call for export-import
bank subsidies. Trade with Cuba must be entirely commercial and market driven. Lifting the embargo
should not mean that US taxpayers must now subsidise exports to Cuba. But neither should the
government stand in the way.
USITC estimates do not capture the long-term export potential to Cuba from normalised relations. The
Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Guatemala spend an average of 2.8% of their GDP to buy
farm exports from the US. If Cuba spent the same share of its GDP on US farm exports, exports could
more than double the current level, to $1.5bn a year.
Removing sanctions saves the American agriculture industry
Zimmerman 10 (Chelsea A., “Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a
Broken Policy”, Barnard College,
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf)//ID
Trade levels between Cuba and the U.S. could reach $5 billion annually by removing the trade embargo,
resulting in a boost to American agribusinesses while also helping to alleviate hunger among Cubans. A
policy environment open to international trade and investment is a necessary ingredient to sustain
higher rates of economic growth and to promote political freedom through exposure to new
technology, communications, and democratic ideas (Griswold, 1; Sachs and Warner). Allowing Cuba to
more freely import U.S. food is a means of lowering domestic prices and increasing incomes of the
poor, food availability and domestic production. U.S. companies will introduce new technologies and
production methods, while raising wages and labor standards as a result of trading with Cuba. The
additional creation of wealth will help to advance social, political, and economic conditions independent
of the governing authorities in Cuba. The most economically open countries today are more than three
times as likely to enjoy full political and civil freedoms as those that are relatively closed (Griswold, 1).
Lifting certain trade restrictions would assist Cuba in its efforts to recover from the damage caused by
its recent hurricanes. If the U.S. exempted construction equipment and agricultural machinery from the
Cuban trade ban through regulatory action, the Cuban people could benefit from the loosening of
restrictions without overhauling the entire embargo.
By allowing free travel to and from Cuba, potential for the marketing and sale of agricultural and
medical goods would expand enormously, further boosting the economies of the U.S. and Cuba. The
U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that if travel restrictions to Cuba were lifted, the
number of U.S. travelers would increase from less than 200,000 to between 550,00 and one million
annually (U.S. International Trade Commission). The increase in U.S. visitors would in turn increase
demand for more and higher quality goods and would provide more money for the government to
purchase U.S. goods, according to the Commission report. Allowing U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba would
boost the tourism industry in the U.S. and create thousands of new jobs. Even lifting the travel
restrictions on groups or individuals directly engaged in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba would be a
significant advancement. Business leaders and entrepreneurs from the U.S. would gain a competitive
edge by having the opportunity to travel to Cuba and becoming familiar with the Cuban market and
meting face-to-face with their Cuban counterparts.
Elimination of the trade embargo immediately is not a feasible solution, as such a proposal would not
attract sufficient political support. Furthermore, the Cuban political and legal infrastructure does not
have the capability of adapting to such a radical change. Instead, I recommend incremental measures
that would 1) reduce the restrictions on the financing of Cuba’s purchase of U.S. products by allowing
payments to be made directly to U.S. banks; and 2) reduce and eventually eliminate the restrictions on
travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba by initially permitting travel for educational and cultural purposes and
eventually permitting direct commercial flights from the U.S. to Cuba. The U.S. International Trade
Commission’s analysis of the effects of government restrictions on export financing estimates that the
U.S. share of Cuban agricultural, fish and forest product imports would increase between one-half and
two-thirds, and that all U.S. agricultural sectors would benefit from the lifting of financing restrictions
(U.S. International Trade Commission). The Commission also studied the effect on U.S. agricultural sales
to Cuba if travel restrictions were eliminated, and concluded that significant increases in U.S. exports of
processed foods, poultry, beef and pork and fish would result (U.S. International Trade Commission)
This proposal sets forth multiple reasons for the failure of the U.S. policy of economic sanctions to
promote democracy in Cuba, but I will now focus on the costs and benefits of a gradual modification of
the current policy. The U.S. needs to adopt a new approach to Cuba that is not based on sanctions,
passivity, and waiting. The U.S. government should instead take a more pragmatic approach when
trying to encourage change in Cuba, especially with the opportunity created by the change in leadership
of both countries and with the recent reforms announced by Raul Castro which will over time eliminate
the state’s information monopoly. The opportunities involved in gradually loosening trade restrictions
with Cuba and promoting cooperation on issues of mutual benefit far outweigh the risks. Benefits for
the U.S. in reducing financing restrictions and travel restrictions with Cuba include the following: 1) U.S.
agribusinesses will benefit from substantial revenue increases derived from a more significant share of
food exports to Cuba, from reduced transportation costs and delays caused by travel restrictions, and
from the elimination of cumbersome payment requirements; 2) the U.S. government will benefit from
additional tax revenues on the increase in sales; 3) funds wasted on attempts to de-legitimize the Castro
regime, such as Radio and TV Marti, estimated to be in excess of $35 million annually, instead can be
used for more productive purposes, such as academic and cultural exchanges; 4) the U.S. Treasury’s
administrative expenses of enforcing complex financing restrictions and investigating illegal U.S.
investments and travel to Cuba will be reduced and redirected to a more practical use, such as
investigating terrorist networks abroad; and 5) improved foreign relations with some of the U.S.’s most
important allies including the European Union and OAS partners will result from the reform measures
(Sweig). Offsetting these benefits are the costs of enforcement of increased trade activities and travel
with Cuba as well as the reality that these measures will not force the collapse of Cuban communism or
result in a rapid transition to a democratic government.
The probability of implementing these changes within the next six months seems likely. The political
strength of the farm lobby has eclipsed the power of Florida’s Cuban-American community, which did
not play a significant role in the election of President Obama. Because all of these reform measures,
with the exception of lifting the travel ban, can be adopted through administrative action rather than
Congressional or executive action,1 a political showdown would not be necessary to accomplish these
measures.
Lifting the embargo provides an immediate boost to US agriculture
Williams 2002-J.D. from Drake University Law
(Alexander III, “Lifting the Cuban Embargo May Help Revive American Farms”, 2002, Drake J. Agric. L.
455, heinonline)//KW
To further its foreign policy goals, the United States' tool of choice seems to be implementing economic
sanctions against other countries.' The United States legal system allows commercial and trade
embargoes to extend to any situation that threatens its national security or the American economy.2
"With so many countries under sanctions, the efficacy of using economic sanctions to promote the
United States' foreign policy has been called into question."3 Thus, the support for these sanctions has
greatly diminished within the international community."
The economic embargo against Cuba "illustrate[s] the ineffectiveness and cost, both politically and
economically, of unilateral sanctions."' Basically, the Cuban Embargo reduces Cuba's chances for any
possible future development and it unnecessarily prevents American businesses from creating a
successful trade relationship with Cuban businesses.6
As a result of these sanctions, the American farmer is prohibited from selling its food in the Cuban
market. This is senseless because American food producers do not have markets for all of their products
and a secure Cuban market actually exists.7 Furthermore, Cuba is no longer considered a serious threat
to our national security." Thus, considering that the American farmer is presently experiencing a
financial crisis, the embargo should be lifted so American farmers can reduce their financial difficulties.
This note gives an overview of the Cuban Embargo and the farming crisis in the United States and then
explores whether lifting the Cuban embargo would be an adequate solution to the farming crisis or at
the very least would serve as a kick-start to the American farmers' quest for financial stability.
Lifting the embargo boosts US ag and tourism industries
Lloyd, 10- Writer for the NYT among other major publications and former Political Science teacher at the
University of Chicago (Delia, “Ten Reasons to Lift the Cuba Embargo”, Politics Daily, 8/24/10,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/08/24/ten-reasons-to-lift-the-cuba-embargo/)//TL
In that spirit, here are 10 reasons that lifting the embargo makes sense:
1. It's good economics. It's long been recognized that opening up Cuba to American investment would
be a huge boon to the tourism industry in both countries. According to the Cuban government, 250,000
Cuban-Americans visited from the United States in 2009, up from roughly 170,000 the year before,
suggesting a pent-up demand. Lifting the embargo would also be an enormous boon the U.S.
agricultural sector. One 2009 study estimated that doing away with all financing and travel restrictions
on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba would have boosted 2008 dairy sales to that country from $13
million to between $39 million and $87 million, increasing U.S. market share from 6 percent to between
18 and 42 percent.
Lifting the embargo would boost the US economy and agriculture industry
Griswold, 05- Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Daniel, “Four Decades
of Failure: The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba,” Cato Institute, 10/12/05,
http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/four-decades-failure-us-embargo-against-cuba)//TL
Cuban families are not the only victims of the embargo. Many of the dollars Cubans could earn from U.S.
tourists would come back to the United States to buy American products, especially farm goods.
In 2000, Congress approved a modest opening of the embargo. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 allows cash-only sales to Cuba of U.S. farm products and medical supplies. The
results of this opening have been quite amazing. Since 2000, total sales of farm products to Cuba have
increased from virtually zero to $380 million last year. From dead last in U.S. farm export markets, Cuba
ranked 25th last year out of 228 countries in total purchases of U.S. farm products. Cuba is now the fifth
largest export market in Latin America for U.S. farm exports. American farmers sold more to Cuba last
year than to Brazil. Our leading exports to Cuba are meat and poultry, rice, wheat, corn, and soybeans.
The American Farm Bureau estimates that Cuba could eventually become a $1 billion agricultural export
market for products of U.S. farmers and ranchers. The embargo stifles another $250 million in potential
annual exports of fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides and tractors. According to a study by the U.S.
International Trade Commission, the embargo costs American firms a total of $700 million to $1.2 billion
per year. Farmers in Texas and neighboring states are among the biggest potential winners. One study
by Texas A&M University estimated that Texas ranks fifth among states in potential farm exports to
Cuba, with rice, poultry, beef and fertilizer the top exports.
Cuba economy addon
Current economic pressure risks collapsing Cuba’s economy
Piccone 2011-Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy The Brookings Institution
(Ted, “To Effect Change in Havana, Support the Cuban People”, South Florida Sun Sentinel, 1/31/11,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/01/31-cuba-piccone, brookings institute)//KW
We've all heard the stories about modern life in Cuba — menial wages, long lines for public services,
fewer subsidies for basic necessities, restrictions on travel both on and off the island, vigilante
committees that monitor and harass anyone who questions the regime. No doubt, life for the Cuban
people is tough, and only getting tougher.
So why should the United States make it even harder for them?
For 50 years now, the United States has seen Cuba as the enemy, with a long list of laws and regulations
codifying an embargo to show for it. Over the last two decades, however, as Cuba has sunk lower and
lower on the list of countries of concern to our security, it has become harder to justify our outdated,
Cold War notions of enemy and friend.
By any conventional measure, Cuba poses little to no security threat to the United States. Its active
military has shrunk from an estimated 235,000 in 1999 to 50,000 10 years later. According to the State
Department, the regime no longer has the resources to project power abroad. Its place on the official
U.S. list of country sponsors of terrorism continues despite the U.S. government's own conclusion that it
provides no direct financial assistance to terrorist groups or armed struggle in the region or beyond.
Moreover, Cuba's economy is in woeful condition. Its sugar industry has collapsed due to lower prices,
the end of Soviet subsidies, mismanagement and lack of investment, sapping the potential it offers in
the era of ethanol. Economic activity has suffered further from multiple devastating hurricanes and
droughts. As a result, hundreds of thousands of public employees are being forced off the government
payroll with little hope of productive employment in the near future.
As Cuba continues its inexorable decline, the United States has remained on the sidelines while others
have stepped in to throw Cuba a lifeline. Hugo Chavez's Venezuela has led the way mainly through
subsidized oil imports in exchange for Cuban medical services. China and Russia have also increased
their trade, investments and direct aid, including a $6 billion investment from China's state oil company
to expand Cuba's main refinery. Spain and Canada remain robust partners, particularly in tourism. And
although remittances from Cuban exiles play an important part both in improving the lives of the Cuban
people and generating revenue for the state, most reports indicate life has gotten noticeably worse for
most Cubans over the last decade.
If anything, the United States' main concern now should be the potential of a failed state just 90 miles
from its borders. Given the austerity measures recently adopted by President Raul Castro, we should not
be surprised to see an influx of Cuban economic migrants to our shores, reviving fears of the chaos and
turmoil generated during the rafters crisis of the early 1990s.
In addition to preventing a sudden and potentially violent collapse, the United States has a fundamental
interest in fostering a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba, one that reflects the aspirations of the
Cuban people to determine their own destiny, freely chosen through a fair, open and competitive
democratic process. On this point, there is general bipartisan consensus in this country. The problem is
there is little agreement on how best to support those aspirations with a small but vocal minority of
legislators, particularly from Florida and New Jersey, demanding a continuation of the failed embargo
policies of the past in the hopes the regime will collapse any day now.
It is hard to understand how a unilateral policy of isolation and punishment advances the cause of
democracy and human rights in Cuba. Even in the bad days of the Cold War, the United States
championed support to rights advocates behind the Iron Curtain while simultaneously conducting direct
diplomacy with states in the Soviet sphere. When history eventually turns in Cuba, as it will, should we
be on the side of the Cuban people who are fighting for a better future? Or will we be remembered for
acts of aggression, denial and obstruction?
Biodiversity addon
Engagement creates a framework for environmental protection – it will be modeled
and protect biodiversity globally
Conell, 9-Research Associate at COHA (Christina, “The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an Environmental
Duo?”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 6/12/09, http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-anenvironmental-duo/)//TL
•Cuba’s abundant natural resources need to be protected with heightened vigilance
•Lifting the trade embargo would open up the possibility for a constructive partnership between Cuba
and the U.S. by developing compatible and sustainable environmental policies
•With the support of the U.S., Cuba could become a model for sustainable preservation and
environmental protection on a global scale
Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. The United States
should capitalize on its proximity to this resource-rich island nation by moving to normalize relations and
establishing a framework for environmental cooperation and joint initiatives throughout the Americas.
Cuba is the most biologically diverse of all the Caribbean Islands. Since it lies just 90 miles south of the
Florida Keys, where the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico intersect, the U.S. could play a
key role in environmental conservation as well as the region in general. However, when it comes to
environmental preservation, the Obama administration is obstructing progress and hindering any
meaningful cooperation with its current U.S.- Cuba policy.
Climate change and environmental degradation are two of the most pressing contemporary issues. If
President Obama is sincerely committed to environmental sustainability, he must forge international
partnerships to implement this objective. Where better to begin than in the U.S.’s own backyard, where
Cuba has a huge presence. Only then can Cuba and the United States move forward to find joint
solutions to environmental challenges.
Environmental Riches and Implications
Cuba’s glittering white sand beaches, extensive coral reefs, endemic fauna and diverse populations of
fish compose the Caribbean’s most biologically diverse island. Based on a per hectare sampling when
compared to the U.S. plus Canada, Cuba has 12 times more mammal species, 29 times as many
amphibian and reptile species, 39 times more bird species, and 27 times as many vascular plant species.
Equally important, adjacent ocean currents and the island nation’s close proximity, carry fish larvae into
U.S. waters, making protection of Cuba’s coastal ecosystems vital to replenishing the U.S.’s ailing
fisheries. Therefore, preserving the marine resources of Cuba is critical to the economic health of North
America’s Atlantic coastal communities.
The U.S. and Cuba also share an ancient deepwater coral system that stretches up to North Carolina.
The island’s 4,200 islets and keys support important commercial reef fish species such as snapper and
grouper as well as other marine life including sea turtles, dolphins and manatees in both countries. Fifty
percent of its flora and 41 percent of its fauna are endemic, signifying the importance of protecting the
island’s resources in order to safeguard the paradisiacal vision that Christopher Columbus observed
when landing on the island in 1492.
Oro Negro and Dinero
The recent discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the Florida straits in Cuban waters has attracted
foreign oil exploration from China and India, both eager to begin extraction. Offshore oil and gas
development could threaten Cuba’s and Florida’s environmental riches. Together, Cuba and the U.S. can
develop policies to combat the negative results coming from the exploitation of these resources. The
increased extraction and refining of oil in Cuba could have detrimental effects on the environment.
Offshore drilling is likely to increase with the discovery of petroleum deposits in the Bay of Cárdenas and
related areas. Excavation increases the possibility of oil spills, which would in turn destroy the
surrounding ecosystem, including fisheries and coral reef formations. The amount of pollutants released
into the air from refining crude oil and the amount of wayward oil residuals would also increase with
drilling and extraction. Those conversant with the very sensitive habitat issues are calling for immediate
consultations aimed at anticipating what should be done.
However the U.S.’s enormous oil usage and its development requirements will cultivate economic
growth on the island. Washington must work with Cuba to create an ecological protection plan not only
to establish an environmentally friendly public image, but to make it a reality as well. Degradation of the
environment will deprive Cuba, in the long run, of one of its most important sources of present and
future revenue: tourism. Consequently, it is in the mutual interests of the U.S. and Cuba to develop a
cooperative relationship that will foster tourism and growth in a sustainable manner.
Sustainability through Collaboration
In many parts of the country communism has inadequately acted as a seal to preserve elements of
Cuba’s past as the centralized government prohibited private development by not giving special
permission. A number of tourist resorts already dot the island, but Cuba has been largely exempt from
mass tourist exploitation due to frozen relations with the U.S. Although the island remains
underdeveloped, Fidel Castro has used his unchecked power to back policies, which have been heedless
to environmental considerations, thus damaging some of the island’s pristine ecosystem that once
defined the island. Roughly the size of Pennsylvania, Cuba is the largest Caribbean island, and if
preservation and conservation measures are planned and carried out in a cognizant manner, it could
become a paradigm for sustainable development at the global level.
The Obama administration’s recent easing of travel restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting relatives on
the island could be of immense importance not only to Cuban families, but also to the preservation of
Cuba’s unique and increasingly threatened coastal and marine environments. Such a concession on
Washington’s part would mark a small, but still significant stride in U.S.-Cuba relations, yet the travel
restrictions still remain inherently discriminatory. The preposterous regulations that allow only a certain
category of Americans into Cuba signify only a meager shift in U.S. policy towards Cuba.
The 50-year-old U.S. embargo against the island has resoundingly failed to achieve its purpose. Obama’s
modifications fall short of what it will take to reestablish a constructive U.S.-Cuba relationship. Cuba’s
tropical forests, soils, and maritime areas have suffered degradation as a result of harmful policies
stemming from a Soviet-style economic system. Cuba’s economy could be reinvigorated through
expanded tourism, development initiatives and an expansion of commodity exports, including sugarcane
for ethanol. U.S. policy toward Cuba should encourage environmental factors, thereby strengthening
U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere.
An environmental partnership between the U.S. and Cuba is not only possible, but could result in
development models that could serve as an example for environmental strategies throughout the
Americas. The U.S. has the economic resources necessary to aid Cuba in developing effective policy,
while the island provides the space where sustainable systems can be implemented initially instead of
being applied after the fact. Cuba’s extreme lack of development provides an unspoiled arena for the
execution of exemplary sustainable environmental protection practices.
Biodiversity key to ecosystem stability and sustaining the human population
Cardinale, 13 – Associate Professor, School of Natural Resources & Environment, University of Michigan
(Bradley J., “Opinion: Biodiversity Impacts Humanity,” The Scientist, 2/20, http://www.thescientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/34448/title/Opinion--Biodiversity-Impacts-Humanity/)//SY
Nature has provided the goods and services needed to sustain human life for so long that most people
take them for granted. But growing evidence suggests that Earth’s natural capital, and the biological
diversity that underpins these goods and services, are being eroded. Some even claim that Earth is in the
midst of a 6th mass extinction. Though this claim is a bit misleading—over the past 400 years, we’ve lost
1-13 percent of known species, compared with 75 percent or more lost during the five prior mass
extinctions—the concern is not about the total number of species that have already gone extinct.
Rather, the concern is how quickly species are being lost—and we are losing species faster than ever. In
the fossil record, we normally see one species per thousand go extinct every millennia. Rates of
extinction in the past century have increased to 100 to 1,000 times faster than normal. Add to this the
abnormally high number of threatened and endangered species, and projections suggest we could truly
reach the point of a mass extinction in 240-540 years.
So what? Beyond conserving species for the sake of biodiversity, does it matter if a large fraction of
Earth’s life forms cease to exist in the next few centuries? Biologists have spent much of the past 20
years addressing this very question, and they have now run more than 500 experiments in which they
have simulated the extinction of species in nearly every major biome on Earth. Results have been
surprisingly consistent. Whenever ecosystems lose species, they generally become less efficient and less
stable. Less diverse communities are not as good at capturing biologically essential resources like
sunlight, water, and nutrients. In turn, the growth of plants slows, as does the animals that eat the
plants. Less diverse systems are also less efficient at decomposing waste products and recycling
essential nutrients; thus, they become more “leaky.” Less diverse ecosystems tend to be more variable
through time, which causes them to exhibit greater fluctuations and higher levels of unpredictability.
Collectively, these things cause ecosystems with fewer species to be less efficient and reliable at
providing society with many fundamentally important goods and services, like the provision of crops and
fisheries, control of many types of pest and disease, production of wood, and the ability to remove
carbon from the atmosphere, to name a few.
On the other hand, it’s important to acknowledge that biodiversity is not always “good” for society.
Biodiversity is, after all, the very reason we have antibiotic resistance. There is also no evidence to
suggest we must conserve all species to maintain ecosystem services. Species have come and gone
throughout Earth’s history, and yet, higher life continues to exist. Furthermore, humans have shown a
unique ability to develop low diversity systems through domestication and bioengineering that can
provide select products and services quite well.
Even so, it is naive and dangerous to ignore our fundamental dependence on other life forms. It is clear
that the loss of certain key species can have strong impacts on biological processes, and while it is
sometimes obvious which species play the biggest roles, other times we don’t realize their importance
until they are gone. It is also naive and dangerous to think we can bioengineer a planet that will be able
sustain the growing human population. If we were unable to build a life-support system that could
support 8 people in Biosphere II, who believes we can engineer a planet able to support 9 billion?
We are taking the very genes and species that have made Earth an inhabitable and biologically
productive planet over the past 3.8 billion years, and we are lining them up on the edge of a cliff from
which there is no return. If the ever growing human population is to continue to prosper, we must
better appreciate how our own well-being is directly linked to the great variety of life that is the most
striking feature of our planet.
--Cuba is a keystone biodiversity site
Cuba is the single most important biodiversity hotspot in the region
Houck, 2000- Professer of Law, former General Counsel and Vice-President of the National Wildlife
Federation, and consultant in the development of environmental law in Cuba and other Latin American
countries (Oliver, “Environmental Law in Cuba”, Florida State University Journal of Land Use &
Environmental Law, Fall 2000, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/landuse/vol161/houck.pdf)//TL
On a worldwide basis, biodiversity tends to be concentrated in the southern countries, while the
institutions and resources for studying it tend to be located in the northern countries … Cuba provides
an extreme case. With respect to biodiversity, it is the single most important country in the Caribbean
islands, and this is true to an overwhelming degree.288
Dr. Michael Smith
As the Castro government loses its tight control over the population, the mountain land will again be
open to development. Additional pressures on the rainforest will arise because this is also a mineral rich
area with proven deposits of manganese, copper, silver and gold. It is necessary to plan to protect the
rain forests now. If plans are not in place, there will be little time to make them when Castro's fall
triggers a rush to repopulate the area and clear the rain forests for agriculture.289
Bioprospective, in a Post-Castro Cuba
The idea of protecting biological diversity originated in the 1990’s, relatively out of nowhere, and took
center stage in international environmental law. Propelled by academic research, agency scientists and
pharmaceutical companies, biodiversity became a swing issue for federal land management in the
United
States,290 a battleground at the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro,291 and a generator for national
conservation programs around the world. And in Cuba.
As a concept, biological diversity means two related but different things. The first is the conservation of
biological resources, which most countries including the United States, have been approaching in a
halting, piecemeal fashion for many years. Indeed, the history of conservation in the United States
began with the setting aside of parks and forest reserves in the 1800’s,292 adding protections for
certain wildlife species293 and, then, endangered species in the 1900’s,294 without any particular
effort, even by the year 2000, to identify the diversity of domestic species or to provide for their
longterm perpetuation. The second face of biodiversity concerns access to and use of biological
resources, basically genetic materials, for medicines, crop improvements and the exploding field of
biotechnology. On this theme, the United States finds itself even more in arrears, with virtually no
program to determine either access or uses beyond that found in traditional food and drug laws.295
In Cuba, both issues of biodiversity would become critical at the close of the century. Its biodiversity was
extraordinary and largely unprotected, and the economic value of these resources in biotechnology
became an element critical to Cuba’s economic survival.
It is hard to overstate the biological importance of Cuba. A basic principle of conservation biology holds
that the diversity of species increases on two axes, one being the size of the land mass under study, and
the other being its isolation from other land masses and their species.296 Large islands meet both
criteria, hence the rich diversity of flora and fauna in Madagascar, Australia, Hawaii, and Cuba.297 The
Caribbean Islands host about 15,000 identified plant species, nearly the same number found in all of the
United States and Canada combined.298 Cuba, with 6,500 known plant species,299 holds the lion’s
share of Caribbean plant kingdom, more than half of which are endemic, found only in particular
locations and habitats.300 An estimated 900 Cuban plant species are endangered.301
Moving up the food chain, Cuba hosts 2,947 species of mollusks, 1,300 species of spiders, and another
7,493 identified insect species, which may be only the tip of the iceberg.302 According to Cuban
scientists, forty percent of the fauna encountered in recent biological surveys are new to science;303
more than ninety percent of the principal groups of terrestrial invertebrates,304 and thirty percent of
the vertebrates, are endemic species.305 The potential limitations and peril faced by these species are
obvious. The West Indies have lost over ninety percent of their land mammals since the 1500’s.306
Since that time, twenty-five to thirty percent of worldwide mammalian extinction has occurred on these
islands.307 That Cuba would hold such a rich, remaining inventory of flora and fauna is largely an
accident of its history and relic pockets of its geography, which bought time for conservation to come
into play.
--AT: Lifting embargo kills environment
We control uniqueness – Cuba’s environment will collapse absent a transition to
democracy
Cepero, 4-Environmental assessment coordinator at the Hemispheric Center for Environmental
Technology at Florida International University (Eudel, “Environmental Concerns for a Cuba In
Transition”, Cuba Transition Project, 2004,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/ECepero.pdf)//TL
The ecological costs of the Cuban totalitarian model have yet to be assessed; however, future
generations will inevitably have to pay a high price to repair the damage. Among the Cuban
archipelago’s most serious environmental problems are, in order of importance, soil degradation,
deforestation, water pollution and contamination, deterioration of urban environments, and loss of
biodiversity.
The only way to avoid increasing Cuba’s heavy ecological burden is to establish basic
environmental guidelines at the outset of a transition to democracy. These new guidelines should be
based upon the principles of sustainable development and be part of a new economic design. During the
transition to democracy, there will be three overarching stages or phases for dealing with the country’s
primary ecological problems: 1) the environmental emergency phase, 2) the institutionalization phase,
and 3) the sustainability stage. Each stage will include a logical sequence of actions to allow the
understanding (that is, social environmental awareness) required for the timely establishment of a new
legal framework, upto-date regulations, and incentives that will lead to a sustainable development
model. At the end of this paper, suggested actions to be taken during each of the three phases are
listed.
Soil Degradation
Domestic food production is severely limited and compromised because 60 percent of Cuba’s
farmlands are affected by soil degradation. Soil erosion affects more than 4 million hectares of
farmlands and acidity is widespread in over 1.7 million hectares. Elevated saline and sodium levels exist
in more than 1 million hectares. Compaction is present in some 2 million hectares and poor drainage
problems are reported in 2.7 million hectares.
Deforestation
The irrational use of forests has become common practice under the Castro regime. As no current data
are available on the actual total area of cover forest, the value of Cuba’s forest resources is unknown.
Most of the remaining natural forests are in poor condition from being overexploited. An average of 200
forest fires occur each year, affecting some 5,000 hectares of forest. Reforestation has been precarious,
due to poor quality seeds, a low survival rate of plantings, and a narrow range of forest species utilized.
Water Pollution and Contamination
Contamination and pollution of freshwater and inshore seawater have increasingly worsened,
especially during the past few years. Water quality in most cities has deteriorated for the following
reasons: 1) sewage networks are poorly maintained and insufficient to service the population; 2) many
more wastewater treatment plants need to be built and the ones that exist are in critically poor repair;
and 3) potable water service is deplorable, due to chronic insufficiencies in chlorination and
deteriorated facilities for potable water treatment.
Deterioration of Urban Environments
The collection and disposal of solid waste in cities is lacking, as are the hygienic-sanitary conditions of
landfills. It is common practice to collect and dispose of hospital waste together with residential
garbage. Most facilities that produce hazardous wastes do not have systems in place for treating them.
According to official figures, there are more than 2,200 contamination focal points considered to be
highly toxic in the country.
Loss of Biodiversity
A substantial, unquantified loss of biodiversity exists, due, among other reasons, to improper
management of certain ecosystems, the application of intensive farming, the marketing of endangered
species, as well as conditions making it easy for important genetic resources to leave the country.
Among the most serious biodiversity losses are the disappearance of substantial numbers of plant and
animal species, the reduction of ecosystems, the destruction of coastal environments, and the collapse
of urban sanitation systems.
Cuba’s environmental status has been compromised, and catastrophes have begun to surface,
such as the soil-related disaster involving the appearance of significant desert areas in some regions of
the archipelago. The current situation is the result of a chain of unsustainable actions and
factors inflicted on ecosystems, especially during the past 40 years of developmental experiments,
characterized by governmental willfulness, irrationality, and stubbornness.
If current negative trends in environmental variables continue, Cuba’s national ecological
account will fall dangerously close to possible bankruptcy . Tourism and agriculture—economic sectors
identified as key to Cuba’s future market economy—are based upon key natural resources. If those
resources continue to deteriorate, projections for socioeconomic recovery in the medium term will be
useless.
Engagement creates space for US-Cuban environmental cooperation – it outweighs
damaging effects of increasing trade
Conell, 09-Research Associate at COHA (Christina, “The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be an Environmental
Duo?”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 6/12/09, http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-anenvironmental-duo/)//TL
Fear of “Cancunization”
Many Cuba well-wishers fear if President Obama lifts the trade embargo, the invasion of raw capitalism
could destroy Cuba’s relatively pristine environment. Although the Cuban government points to its
environmental laws and the government agency which was established to develop a sustainable
environmental policy, these measures have done little up to now to affect substantial change. In several
distinct sectors, Cuba seems to remain unprepared for the lifting of the embargo and the island
inevitably could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, eager to exploit the
beautiful landscapes of the island, at great cost and risk.
After years of relying on government subsidies and protectionism, this rapid growth could generate
irreparable shock waves through the economy. Oliver Houck, a professor at Tulane University who aided
the Cuban government in writing its environmental protection provisions, said “an invasion of U.S.
consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it (Cuba) like a bulldozer,” when the embargo
ends. The wider Caribbean region has experienced water contamination, mangrove destruction and
sewage problems due to large quantities of tourists and inadequate plumbing. Therefore, U.S. tourism
regulations need to be in place in order to protect the precious ecosystem of the island and prohibit
over development. Collaboration between the U.S. and Cuba would be mutually beneficial, as the U.S.
could use Cuba as a laboratory of sustainable development and U.S. tourism would stimulate Cuba’s
stagnant economy, if its negative impact could be controlled. Both countries must agree upon a mutual
plan for development.
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has conducted research in Cuba since 2000, working with Cuban
partners on scientific investigations and strategies for protecting coastal and marine resources.
Operating under a special license from the United States government, EDF experts are collaborating
with Cuban scientists on research projects aimed at ensuring that if Cuba taps offshore oil and gas
reserves, it will be done in an environmentally concious way. The US should establish more partnerships
like these as President Obama has the legal authority to institute far-reaching cooperation with Cuba on
joint marine environmental projects. These partnerships should be implemented as the first step in
creating an elaborate alliance for environmental protection between the two countries.
If the embargo is lifted, symbols of meretricious American capitalism are likely to invade the once
relatively isolated island. Opinion columnist Cynthia Tucker has commented on such matters: “Mickey
Mouse is sure to arrive, bringing with him the aptly predicted full frontal assault of American culture and
consumer goods,” suggesting that if Obama lifts the embargo, a functioning system of environmental
protection supported by both the U.S. and the Cuban public must be present for the island to be
protected.
It is Cuba’s lack of development that makes the island attractive to tourists and although tourism boosts
the economy, it also could have detrimental effects on the environment. If the embargo is lifted, strict
development restrictions need to be in place in order to prevent further environmental exploitation.
Currently, without a severe shift in enforcement of environmental laws and the formation of a hardworking U.S.-Cuba partnership, the Caribbean’s most biodiverse island will continue to be damaged. The
key to a new dynamic in the U.S.-Cuba relationship might be to embark on a series of strategic actions
that aim to establish a bilateral relationship for sustainable development and associated activities based
on mutual respect and the autonomy of each country’s sovereignty and traditions.
--Biodiversity impacts
Catastrophic human responses to loss of biodiversity result in extinction
Howard, 11 – Professor, School of Anthropology and Conservation, University of Kent (Patricia, “Tipping
Points and Biodiversity Change: Consequences for Human Wellbeing and Challenges in Science and
Policy,” British Academy and the Royal Society, 3/13,
http://academia.edu/537857/Tipping_Points_and_Biodiversity_Change_Consequences_for_Human_We
llbeing_and_Challenges_for_Science_and_Policy)//SY
In the 20¶ th¶ century, we became aware that the fate of biodiversity and the fate of humans are
intimately interconnected. Before this, only some religions (and a few philosophers) predicted the end
of life on Earth or human extinction through different versions of Armageddon, which was generally
caused by the divine consequences of wayward human behaviour. Darwin’s theory of evolution
provided the means to understand continual species extinctions, and scientists began to unearth the
evidence of previous mass extinc-tions. However, the idea that extinction might extend to the human
species was not taken up until the 20¶ th¶ century, when it was argued that¶ all ¶ species invariably
become extinct (Raup 1991). Scientists came to un-derstand that the human species could disappear
through catastrophic natural events, much as the dinosaurs disappeared, as a result of bolide impacts or
large-scale volcanism. A secular concept of self-annihilation emerged less than 50 years ago with the
spectre of global nuclear holocaust, which would also render muchother life on Earth unviable (see e.g.
Robock et al. 2007), and where the life that remained would be distinct-ly antithetical to humans. Many
now argue that there are other catastrophic threats to the human species, some of which threaten life
on Earth more generally (Rees 2003, Posner 2004, Bostrom & Cirkovic 2008,Al-Rodhan 2009). We can
only speculate whether the sixth mass extinction of species that appears to be un-derway has
implications for the continued evolution of the human species, but we do know that it is the syn-ergies
and feedbacks between global environmental change and biodiversity change, combined with maladaptive human responses to that change (e.g. global nuclear conflict; unintended effects of
technological re-sponses), that leads to the most catastrophic scenarios.
Loss of biodiversity causes extinction – biggest threat
Sanjeeva Raj, 12 – Head of Zoology Department, Madras Christian College (P. J., “Beware the loss of
biodiversity,” The Hindu, 9/23, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/beware-the-loss-ofbiodiversity/article3927062.ece)//SY
He regrets that if such indiscriminate annihilation of all biodiversity from the face of the earth happens
for anthropogenic reasons, as has been seen now, it is sure to force humanity into an emotional shock
and trauma of loneliness and helplessness on this planet. He believes that the current wave of
biodiversity loss is sure to lead us into an age that may be appropriately called the “Eremozoic Era, the
Age of Loneliness.” Loss of biodiversity is a much greater threat to human survival than even climate
change. Both could act, synergistically too, to escalate human extinction faster.
Biodiversity is so indispensable for human survival that the United Nations General Assembly has
designated the decade 2011- 2020 as the ‘Biodiversity Decade’ with the chief objective of enabling
humans to live peaceably or harmoniously with nature and its biodiversity. We should be happy that
during October 1-19, 2012, XI Conference of Parties (CoP-11), a global mega event on biodiversity, is
taking place in Hyderabad, when delegates from 193 party countries are expected to meet. They will
review the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which was originally introduced at the Earth
Summit or the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) is the nodal agency for CoP-11. Today, India is
one of the 17 mega-diverse (richest biodiversity) countries.
Biodiversity provides all basic needs for our healthy survival — oxygen, food, medicines, fibre, fuel,
energy, fertilizers, fodder and waste-disposal, etc. Fast vanishing honeybees, dragonflies, bats, frogs,
house sparrows, filter (suspension)-feeder oysters and all keystone species are causing great economic
loss as well as posing an imminent threat to human peace and survival. The three-fold biodiversity
mission before us is to inventorise the existing biodiversity, conserve it, and, above all, equitably share
the sustainable benefits out of it.
Loss of biodiversity results in extinction – preservation key to essential goods for
survival
Germanos, 13 – Staff Writer, Common Dreams (Andrea, “UN: Accelerating Biodiversity Loss a
'Fundamental Threat' to the 'Survival of Humankind',” Common Dreams,
https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/05/28-6)//SY
The accelerating loss of biodiversity poses a "fundamental threat" to the "survival of humankind,"
warned the head of the United Nations new biodiversity body, as he also sounded the alarm on the
declining biodiversity on farms.
"We are hurtling towards irreversible environmental tipping points that, once passed, would reduce the
ability of ecosystems to provide essential goods and services to humankind,” Zakri Abdul Hamid of IPBES
warned on Monday. (Photo: Peter Blanchard/cc/flickr)
Zakri Abdul Hamid, founding chair of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES), made the comments at the 7th Trondheim Conference in Norway on Monday.
On the widely noted declining plant and animal biodiversity in the wild, Zakri said “we are hurtling
towards irreversible environmental tipping points that, once passed, would reduce the ability of
ecosystems to provide essential goods and services to humankind.”
But biodiversity loss is hitting farms also, said Zakri, threatening the world's food supplies, both in terms
of livestock as well as crops.
“The good news is the rate of decline is dropping but the latest data classify 22% of domesticated breeds
at risk of extinction.”
Zakri cites incentives for more uniform breeds from industrialized countries as a contributing factor in
the decline of livestock diversity.
“Those genetics are irreplaceable. Once they’re gone they’re gone,” Jeannette Beranger, research and
technical programs manager at the American Livestock Breeds Conservancy, said.
Biodiversity loss causes human extinction – four reasons
Howard, 11 – Professor, School of Anthropology and Conservation, University of Kent (Patricia, “Tipping
Points and Biodiversity Change: Consequences for Human Wellbeing and Challenges in Science and
Policy,” British Academy and the Royal Society, 3/13,
http://academia.edu/537857/Tipping_Points_and_Biodiversity_Change_Consequences_for_Human_We
llbeing_and_Challenges_for_Science_and_Policy)//SY
With biodiversity change, there are a number of vulnerabilities to which the majority of the globe’s
human population are exposed not only because they are impacted by this change at local level, but also
be-cause even local changes can have global repercussions due of global interdependencies. One is the
rapid emergence and transmission of new infectious diseases and pests that both threaten plants and
animals (and thus the humans that depend upon them), as well as humans directly (e.g. Chivian &
Bernstein 2008, Pong-siri et al. 2009, Keesing et al. 2010, Sharma 2010). A second is invasive species,
where species disperse be-yond their ‘normal’ range, invade many different regions on different
continents, affecting the invaded eco-systems in highly unpredictable ways (e.g. GISP n.d., Walther et al.
2009, Perrings et al. 2010). Both may contribute strongly to a third such vulnerability, which is addressed
here, presented by tipping points that may emerge at regional scale, such as the loss of the Amazon
rainforest or the collapse of coral reefs, thatcan have extra-regional or even global repercussions not
only due to the loss of species and ecosystems, but as well due to the loss of some of the ecosystem
services that these provide e.g. as CO¶ 2 ¶ sinks, which creates synergies with phenomena such as climate
change and ocean acidification. Finally, the fourth vulnerability is posed by human maladaptation to any
of these dynamics, where maladaptation can exacerbate biodiversity change and can lead to other
negative effects for human welfare and ecosystems. Conflict over dwindling biological resources and
ecosystem services is likely to become pervasive, and conflict over the understand-ing of the causes and
effects of such change are likely to be just as serious. The global security implications of climate change
are of great concern and are being assessed (e.g. GACGC 2007) but, to our knowledge, no such
assessment exists for biodiversity change. Many of the global, regional, and national institutions that in
the past have evolved to manage human-biodiversity relations have so far been shown to be relatively
inef-fective in stemming biodiversity loss (see e.g. CBD 2010) and thus they are likely to be even more
ineffec-tive in dealing with surprises or with the large-scale repercussions of the loss of benefits, e.g. of
food, and new institutions will have to emerge if such threats are not to translate into local, regional,
and even global, catastrophe.
Politics answers
EE popular in Congress
Bipartisan support for easing the embargo
Weinmann 2004- Master of international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at
Columbia University
(Lissa,“Washington's Irrational Cuba Policy”, World Policy Institute, Spring 2004,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209899, JSTOR)//KW
Congress: The Real Battleground Just as the Cuban- American community and Florida are changing, so
is the U.S. Congress. Sentiment among lawmakers has shifted dramatically in favor of easing the
embargo on Cuba. The passage of the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act,
which lifted the ban on food sales to Cuba, was propelled chiefly by farm-state Republicans, one of
the leaders being the former senator from Missouri, John Ashcroft. The new law encourages those
who doubted the embargo could be eased in an election year. Momentum has continued to build.
Fifty-two members of the House and twelve senators have formed bipartisan Cuba working groups
action on Cuba, which function as caucuses to help rally action on Cuba.
Oil lobby turn
The oil lobby is pressuring to ease the embargo
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they
will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. 35 Oil companies have a long history of
utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes.36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy
costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures. 37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when
then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil
is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are, in
cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to
high prices is more supply."38
This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption
rates.39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.40 Thus, more leases,
including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock valuation. 41 "The last thing that American energy
companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin
American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." 42
THE BP DISASTER ADDS TO CONCERNS Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing
environmental concerns about Cuba's drilling plans.43 These concerns are undoubtedly more poignant
in the wake of British Petroleum's ("BP") historically tragic Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 44 Currently,
there is no agreement between the United States and Cuba to deal with oil spills. 45 The embargo
would prevent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S. companies to aid any cleanup efforts. 46 In
addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies designed to prevent or contain oil spills from being sold
to Cuba.47 David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington Ocean Foundation punctuated the
United States' concerns over the potential impacts of Cuba's drilling by remarking that "the Gulf isn't
going to respect any boundaries when it comes to oil spills." 48 This statement was recently exemplified
by Cuba's own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach its shores. 49 The Deep Horizon
oil spill's threat was enough that several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba's own plan
to extract oil off its shores.50 Nonetheless, Cuba's oil exploration plans seem unfazed.5'
Farm lobby turn
Farm lobby supports the plan and it outweighs the opposition of hardliners on Cuba
Zimmerman 10 (Chelsea A., “Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a
Broken Policy”, Barnard College,
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf)//ID
The probability of implementing these changes within the next six months seems likely. The political
strength of the farm lobby has eclipsed the power of Florida’s Cuban-American community, which did
not play a significant role in the election of President Obama. Because all of these reform measures,
with the exception of lifting the travel ban, can be adopted through administrative action rather than
Congressional or executive action,1 a political showdown would not be necessary to accomplish these
measures.
Business lobby turn
The business lobby supports lifting the embargo
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (Douglas, “Changing Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”,
Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
U.S. and multi-national corporate entities represent another major stakeholder in this analysis. The
evidence indicates that a preponderance of American and multinational corporations and business
organizations favor lifting economic sanctions. Their motivations are driven primarily by the potentially
lucrative export opportunities available should the two nations resume normal commercial trading
activities.
The United States Chamber of Commerce, representing three million business owners, has expressed its
support for efforts to ease trade restrictions and to “broaden economic engagement with the island.”28
The Chamber, along with 11 other business organizations, including the American Farm Bureau
Federation, Grocery Manufacturers Association and National Retail Federation, signed onto a letter sent
to President-elect Obama in December 2008 urging him to end the embargo and reevaluate the United
States‟ Cuban policy: “it is clear that the embargo is not having – and will not have – the type of
economic impact that might influence the behavior of the Cuban government. It is time to consider new
approaches that would benefit U.S. national security and economic interests, as well as the Cuban
people.”29 The letter cites a 2001 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission which estimated
$1.2 billion in annual lost sales for American exporters due to the embargo.30
Although the chamber and other business organizations seek enhanced trade and economic
opportunities with Cuba, there remain a handful of powerful American and multi-national corporations
whose Cuban-based assets were seized by the Castro government after the revolution that continue to
support the embargo and oppose efforts to improve diplomatic relations. According to the U.S. Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, there are more than 5900 outstanding compensable corporate claims
against the Cuban government totaling $1.8 billion.31 Corporations with outstanding claims include
Borden, General Motors, Goodyear, Hilton, Procter and Gamble, and United Brands. The Joint
Committee on Cuban Claims, a voluntary non profit organization that represents the aggrieved
companies, is unequivocal in its view: “The uncompensated taking of the property of United States
citizens must be resolved before normal, productive trade and tourist relations between the two nations
can be restarted.”32 It can be expected that the committee and the corporations it represents will
continue to vehemently oppose diplomatic efforts to bridge the divide between the U.S. and Cuba until
its conditions are met.
EE popular with the public
The public supports lifting the embargo
Holmes, 10– B.A. from Georgetown, Master’s Thesis (Michael G., June 21, 2010, “Seizing the Moment”,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?seque
nce=1, pg. 64-65)//NG
With the exception perhaps of the Cuban American Lobby, there will be little to no backlash from the
American public resulting from the removal of the embargo. However even within the large Cuban-exile
community, which has traditionally been pro-embargo, many have changed course and begun to see
the benefit of lifting the embargo. A 2009 poll of 400 Cuban- Americans conducted by the Miami
Herald, found that 41 percent of those polled were against the United States maintaining the embargo.
40 percent felt the embargo should remain and 19 percent were undecided.
4 Although 41 percent is not a super majority, it is a majority. Furthermore when presented with sound
data highlighting the benefits of removing the embargo versus keeping it, the undecided 19 percent
could be persuaded to see the long-term benefits of this policy change. Those Cuban-Americans and
lobbyist who continue to support the embargo, such as the Center for A Free Cuba will tend to argue
that removing it simply rewards the Castro regime. Furthermore by rewarding the regime in this way
the United States encourages it to continue to behave in the manner in which it has for so many
decades. The flaw in this argument is clearly that leaving the embargo in place has produced the very
result pro-embargo Cuban Americans are trying to discourage.
No link – the Cuban-Americans don’t care anymore
Haven, 13 – Reporter for the Associated Press (Paul, “Cuba, US try talking, but face many obstacles ”,
Miami Herald, 6-21-13, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/21/v-fullstory/3462855/cuba-us-trytalking-but-face-many.html)//eek
Despite that rhetoric, many experts think Obama would face less political fallout at home if he chose
engagement because younger Cuban-Americans seem more open to improved ties than those who fled
immediately after the 1959 revolution.
Of 10 Cuban-Americans interview by The Associated Press on Thursday at the popular Miami restaurant
Versailles, a de facto headquarters of the exile community, only two said they were opposed to the U.S.
holding migration talks. Several said they hoped for much more movement.
Jose Gonzalez, 55, a shipping industry supervisor who was born in Cuba and came to the U.S. at age 12,
said he now favors an end to the embargo and the resumption of formal diplomatic ties. "There was a
reason that existed but it doesn't anymore," he said.
Santiago Portal, a 65-year-old engineer who moved to the U.S. 45 years ago, said more dialogue would
be good. "The more exchange of all types the closer Cuba will be to democracy," he said.
Those opinions dovetail with a 2011 poll by Florida International University of 648 randomly selected
Cuban-Americans in Miami-Dade County that said 58 percent favored re-establishing diplomatic
relations with Cuba. That was a considerable increase from a survey in 1993, when 80 percent of people
polled said they did not support trade or diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Discount old link evidence – there have been major pro removal changes in public
opinion
Thale, 13 – a Program director at WOLA (Geoff, “The Writing is on the Wall: The Cuban-American Vote
and the Future of U.S. Policy toward Cuba", 8 Nov 2012,
http://www.wola.org/commentary/the_writing_is_on_the_wall)//eek
As Anya Landau French pointed out yesterday in The Havana Note, and Phil Peters in the Cuban Triangle,
Cuban Americans voted for Obama in record numbers. Recent reports suggest that Obama secured 48
percent of the Cuban-American vote, edged out only slightly by Romney. Obama, who liberalized
people-to-people travel, dropped the Bush administration’s hostile rhetoric toward Cuba, and allowed
Cuban-American families to visit Cuba as much as they want and send as much money to Cuba as they
want, increased his percentage of the Cuban-American vote by ten points. The size of the shift is
especially significant: until this year, Bill Clinton’s 1996 campaign had held the position as most
successful Democratic campaign ever in garnering Cuban-American votes. On Tuesday, Obama
surpassed Clinton’s numbers.
Also, on Tuesday night, the hardline bloc’s historical dominance of Cuban-American politics was finally
broken: Rep. David Rivera was defeated by moderate Cuban-American Joe Garcia. Rivera introduced
several pieces of harsh anti-Cuba legislation, including an amendment to turn back travel regulations to
the George W. Bush era. After a bizarre election scandal, in which Rivera allegedly funneled thousands
of dollars in cash to support a previously unknown primary challenger, Garcia defeated Rivera by ten
points.
And, as William Vidal noted in On Two Shores, Democratic candidate for Florida State Legislature Jose
Javier Rodriguez, a Cuban American who supports Obama’s liberalization of travel to Cuba, defeated the
hardline incumbent Alex Diaz de Portilla in the district that includes little Havana.
Majority of Americans support lifting the embargo
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (Douglas, “Changing Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”,
Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
American citizens have varied interests in regard to U.S.-Cuban relations. While a vocal minority of
Cuban Diaspora in the United States remain adamantly opposed to renewing relations with the Cuban
government, at least not before major structural changes occur (see further analysis below), most
Americans are quite supportive of the idea. A 2009 public opinion survey found that a clear majority of
the American people, 59 percent, believe that it is “time to try a new approach to Cuba, because Cuba
may be ready for a change.” Seventy-five percent favored dialogue between top government officials
and 69 percent of those surveyed told pollsters that they favored re-establishing diplomatic relations
between the two countries.25 These data provide rather unambiguous evidence of American public
support for changing the United States‟ current Cuba policy and seem to clearly indicate that the
American people would back U.S. government efforts to push forward with reengagement with Havana.
Plan is popular among Cuban Americans- 2012 election proves
Bandow 2012 –J.D from Stanford University, special assistant to President Reagan (Doug, “Time to
End the Cuba Embargo”, Cato Institute, 12/11/12, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/timeend-cubaembargo?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(
Cato+Recent+Op-eds) //KW
The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate
wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant
voting bloc.
But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with
no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana:
“for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many
more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba.
Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly
carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote
four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States.
Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He
also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential
politically.
Plan popular among Florida Cuban Americans
Safran 2012 -Master of Science in Global Affairs (with distinction) at New York University
(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-EmbargoBrian-Safran, google scholar)//KW
In addition, U.S. public opinion appears to be shifting in favor of eliminating the embargo. By virtue of its
geography, influence in national elections, near even split in terms of ideological composition, and
preponderance of Cuban-Americans living within its borders, U.S.-Cuban policy is often procured by
considering the views of the now anti-embargo Floridian constituency (Schechner, 7, 1994).
Traditionally, Cuban-Americans living in Florida have tended to support the embargo, seeing it as a way
to force democracy upon Cuba so as to make the Cuban government more responsive to the demands
of the Cuban people, and by extension, their own interests abroad. (Schechner, 1994, 7) In recent years
however, many have begun to view the embargo as a failure of foreign policy. In addition, the U.S.
government has placed numerous restrictions upon them, prohibiting them from visiting their families in
Cuba more than once every three years, and decreasing the amount of remittance that they are entitled
to provide for their Cuban relatives. (Lovato, 2004, 23) Based in part upon changing public opinion, the
U.S. Congress has enacted numerous measures to decrease the extent of the Cuban embargo, including
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which allowed for limited sales of
U.S. agricultural products and medical supplies. (Griswold, 2005, 2) In 2003, both the U.S. House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate passed measures designed to prevent the U.S. treasury from
providing the funding necessary to enforce the ban on Cuban travel. (Weinmann, 2004, 28) Even within
the Bush administration, many senior officials remain highly divided on how to best confront Cuban
politics. (Weinmann, 2004, 25) Thus, many U.S. citizens and politicians believe the Cuban embargo to be
unfounded and unnecessary in the contemporary world.
Winners win
No link – plan goes through the executive and it’ll be spun as a policy win
Pinon, 9 – energy fellow with the University of Miami’s Center for Hemispheric Policy (Jorge, “Oil work
can be part of US-Cuban rapprochement” Oil &Gas Journal, 107.17, 5/4, proquest)//HA
The president can end this impasse by licensing American companies to participate in developing Cuba's
offshore oil and gas. Embargo regulations specifically give the secretary of the treasury the authority to
license prohibited activities. The Helms-Burton law codified the embargo regulations as well as the
secretary's power, embedded in the codified regulations, to rescind, modify, or amend them. The proof
of this is that several years after the Helms-Burton law was enacted, former President Bill Clinton
expanded travel and money transfers to the Cuban people and civil society.
Cuba's future
By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the president could claim an early and relatively easy policy
success. Critically, he would position the US to play a role in Cuba's future, thereby giving Cubans a
better chance for a stable and democratic future.
2ac
AT: Diplomatic capital
The plan frees up dipcap
Sweig 12 – Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow for Latin America studies and director for Latin
America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Julia E, “Getting Latin America Right,” 1/2/12,
http://nationalinterest.org/article/getting-latin-america-right-7880?page=6)//SJF
With serious initiatives on Cuba and guns, backed up by his now-stated interest in pursuing a major second-term move on
immigration, the president can free up considerable diplomatic capital in the region to focus on issues
that really matter. The Obama administration seems to recognize that the major regional issues are not
problems Washington can fix alone but rather transnational challenges that the United States faces with
other nations of the Americas—whether energy security, education, social inclusion, global
competitiveness, climate change, citizen security, or China’s political and economic rise. Paradoxically, at a
moment when Latin Americans have never been more cognizant of their human ties to booming Latino populations in the United States, most
of the resilient democracies and growing economies of the region prize their autonomy and do not—
with the exception of Haiti—expect big-ticket assistance packages Washington cannot afford. Thus, by
choosing to slay the domestic political dragons that bedeviled his first term, Obama can create the
running room to align his analysis with policies that finally reflect new regional realities as well as his
country’s national interest.
Engagement preserves U.S. diplomatic capital
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
Finally, U.S. international legitimacy and influence have a great deal to gain from a more inclusive and
less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N. anti-embargo resolutions that bilateral relations are exempt
from General Assembly scrutiny have had longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically undercut
American’s legitimacy and wasted political capital on this central world sta