GWA 2 - Identifying Hindrances: A Review of Trapped by a Mindset
Analyst:Henry Sykes
Contact Info:
SRA 231 Section:
Peer Reviewed by:
Date Prepared:
Purpose: To Find the Hindrances in the following Passages
Title: Hindrances of “Trapped by a Mindset”
Passage 1:
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and his deputy John McLaughlin went
to the White House on Sunday, December 21, 2002 to brief the president, vice-president and
the national security advisor on the intelligence regarding Iraq’s nuclear, chemical,
biological and missile programs. The president was not impressed with the evidence. At the
conclusion of McLaughlin’s presentation, the president asked Tenet, “…is this best we’ve
got?” Tenet replied unequivocally “Don’t worry; it’s a slam dunk case!”1
BLUF: The hindrance that from this passage is an example of confirmation bias. Therefore, Tenet
and McLaughlin made a critical mistake in their assessment.
The hindrance from this passage is an example of confirmation bias. According to Haskens
definition of confirmation bias, it is too notice and find evidence that supports to one’s own
suspicions and undervalue the evidence that may contradict those suspicions. McLaughin’s
presentation did not evaluate all sides of the information and primarily focused on missile
programs. They already have a predetermined mindset that Iraq was hiding WMD and presented
information to back that claim up without looking at other avenues. Tenet confirms this fallacy,
with the “unequivocally “Don’t worry; it’s a slam dunk case!”
Passage 2:
There were three interrelated waypoints along the analytical pathway that led to this
intelligence failure. First, intelligence analysts failed to place their assessment of Iraq’s
alleged WMD program in a strategic and political context and try to understand the
motivations, intentions and interests of Iraq’s government(CB). Second, and perhaps
central to our intelligence failure, intelligence community analysts assumed that Iraq was
hiding WMD(SEL THINK). Hence, trapped by this mindset they narrowly pursued only
one working hypothesis. Finally, analysts failed to convey explicitly to policy makers the
GWA 2 - Identifying Hindrances: A Review of Trapped by a Mindset
ambiguity of their evidence and the reality that their conclusions were far from an
analytical “slam dunk.”(PL)
BLUF: The three waypoints that lead to the failure of the intelligence agencies can be described
with the hindrances of confirmation bias, personal biases, and perception limitation.
The three waypoints that led to the intelligence failure can be described with the hindrances
confirmation bias, personal biases, and perception limitation. With the first waypoint is
confirmation bias (notice and look for information that confirms one’s own beliefs) because they
failed to put the assessment of Iraq’s “alleged” WMD program into proper context. Thus they
failed “. . . to understand the motivations, intentions and interests of Iraq’s government”.
The second waypoint where the analysts assumed that Iraq was hiding WMDs, is personal biases.
Hasken’s definition of personal biases states that we have these predetermined thoughts that
“make it difficult to remain objective and think critically.” The Analysts had this inkling that the
Iraq had a WMD program which only narrowed their thought process to that one working
hypothesis.
The final waypoint is an example of perception limitation. Perception limitation defined
according to Hasken is, “Being unaware of our own perception limitations that can lead to
misconceptions about reality.” The failure of the analyst to accurately describe the ambiguity of
the evidence led to the policy makers to make a big “misconception” in their concluding
assessments.
Passage 3:
More ominously, the 2002 NIE asserted that Iraq had a robust biological weapons (BW)
program and “that all key aspects—R&D (research and development), production, and
weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are
larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.” The foundation of this
sweeping intelligence judgment essentially rested on the information provided by one
GWA 2 - Identifying Hindrances: A Review of Trapped by a Mindset
questionable source known ironically as Curveball, who unfortunately turned out to be an
elaborate fabricator. Interviews with Curveball were conducted by another foreign service
that never allowed the United States access, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
never tried to independently validate Curveball’s veracity; nevertheless, the Curveball
fabrications became not only the basis for the NIE’s sweeping BW assessments but were
also included in the President’s 2003 State of the Union speech and the Secretary of State’s
presentation to the United Nations Security Council.8
BLUF: The NIE made the hindrance of using testimonial evidence. Proper procedures in securing
validation of source could have prevented wrong assessments.
The hindrance of NIE fallacy can be identified with testimonial evidence. Hasken’s definition of
testimonial evidence is the reliance of information that backs up one’s own beliefs from a
questionable source that is subjective and unreliable. The NIE used the information from
Curveball without appropriate confirmation of the source provide too them. If the NIE took
proper procedures and precautions in making sure the source of the information were valid, then
this mistake could have potentially been avoided.
Passage 4:
Pillar acknowledged that while the administration cherry-picked raw intelligence for public
dissemination used policy to drive intelligence and created an environment of hostility
between analysts and policy makers, they did not engage in crude arm-twisting to change
analytical assessments or judgments. Moreover, he too quickly absolves the intelligence
community of its responsibility when he writes regarding the 2002 NIE, that although it
“was flawed…it was not what led to the war.”11 While Pillar is correct that the NIE was not
the proximate casus belli, he is incorrect to undervalue the potential influence of a more
nuanced NIE on Congress, and perhaps even the White House. A more accurate report
would have reflected the uncertain nature of the evidence and the possibility that Iraq’s
WMD programs were far less robust than many assumed.
BLUF: The hindrances in this passage can be described with personal biases and prejudices and
perception limitation. Hindrances invoked causes wrong assessment of responsibility for
causation of war.
The hindrances exemplified in this passage can be accredited to personal biases and prejudices
and perception limitation. The definition of personal biases and prejudices are having
GWA 2 - Identifying Hindrances: A Review of Trapped by a Mindset
predetermined notions that obfuscate the ability to think critically and remain objective. Pillar
noted that the analysts and policy makers refused to change their analytical assessments and
judgments due to their personal biases. Pillar then displayed the hindrance of perception
limitation because he absolved responsibility of the NIE and undervalued the influence the NIE
had on the congress and white house. Pillar did not focus on the facts, in that the evidence
presented had a high amount of uncertainty, and in return created the misconception that NIE
assumed less responsibility when they should have invoked more.