Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
1
ASSASSINATIONS OF EXILED RWANDAN DISSIDENTS:
A STRUCTURED ANALYTIC APPROACH
Abstract
This article examines whether the Rwandan government has been involved in assassination
attempts on a series of its former high-profile government members living in exile. A structured
analysis of publicly available literature and interviews with subject matter experts confirms
widespread suspicions. The Rwandan government is the culprit in these attacks, and as a result,
Rwanda cannot be considered a peaceful and democratic state. These findings demonstrate that
threats from smaller states who can operate efficiently and ruthlessly to achieve specific
objectives can be equally as troublesome as threats from large, wealthy states. Likewise, states
with Rwandan diaspora populations and outspoken dissident exiles face serious threats to their
territorial integrity and national security. Structured analysis provides new methods to evaluate
these contemporary national security problems that policymakers and Africanist scholars face
while remaining adaptable to new evidence and changing security dynamics.
The return to the past
When the infamous 1994 genocide ended, Rwandans and international observers alike hoped for
a positive future without the ethereal specter of ethnic conflict hanging over the small African
state. The Tutsi rebellion, coming from southern Uganda and through the northern part of the
state, had seen future presidents Pasteur Bizimungu and Paul Kagame and their Front
Patriotique Rwandais (RPF) party claim victory over the Hutu génocidaires. Their victory was a
watershed moment in central Africa, ending a roughly 100-day massacre that took the lives of
over 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The RPF regime emerged as national heroes
with Kagame, head of the Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (RPA – the military wing of the RPF),
leading the way.
This emergence from the darkest part of the nation’s history has since been accompanied
by exceptional economic growth, putting Rwanda on the map in terms of domestic economic
capabilities and attractiveness for foreign investment.1 Rwanda’s surge made the state a “donor
darling”,2 receiving millions of dollars in aid from western states such as the United States and
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
2
United Kingdom as well as from a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Rwanda,
bordering traditionally stronger, larger, and more powerful states such as Uganda and Tanzania
and violent and troubled states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and
Burundi, was beginning to hold its own.
Rwanda became a Lilliputian state,3 a small state exercising power typical of larger
states, not only because of its economic exploits and acquisitions of large amounts of foreign aid
but also because it had developed a robust military and intelligence apparatus that demonstrated
a capacity nearing or equal to some of the strongest states on the continent. This was evident
during the two major wars in the neighboring DRC in which Rwanda intervened in between
1996-1997 and 1998-2003. In addition, Rwanda is the most densely populated state in Africa,
containing a little less than 12.5 million inhabitants in just over 26,000 square kilometers. There
is very little space, if any at all, to suppress tensions or indeed for individuals to hide away
within the Rwandan state or the political arena in the capital of Kigali.
Despite Rwanda’s military prowess and economic success, the post-genocide era has
hardly proceeded untroubled. Involvement in the DRC has garnered heavy international
criticism. Criticism ranged from general concerns about political meddling and resource looting
in the DRC during the two Congo Wars to accusations of supporting destabilizing rebel groups
such as the March 23 Movement (M23) in more recent years in eastern DRC. On the surface,
Rwanda appears to be a modernizing, prosperous central African nation. However, major
concerns began to arise regarding this interpretation as early as the late 1990s when opponents to
the RPF, including politicians, journalists and military officials, began to disappear. These
incidences have been chronicled primarily by journalists and human rights NGOs. The academic
community has addressed the political and social conditions in which Rwandans and the
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
3
Rwandan diaspora live but has only marginally addressed the fate of dissident Rwandan exiles
who suffer attacks, some of which are successful and others not.4 This article fills this gap and
examines whether the Rwandan state can be identified as the responsible actor in these attacks.
Independent journalists and NGOs, both African and non-African, have extensively
covered these assassination attempts on dissident exiles. A report by Human Rights Watch
(HRW) particularly stands out and details the disappearances, deaths, and attacks upon various
Rwandan dissidents both within and outside of Rwandan territory.5 HRW details the
disappearances, deaths, and attacks upon various Rwandan dissidents both within and outside of
Rwandan territory. More critically however, the report addresses the responses of the Rwandan
government and rather briefly, what specific evidence can be offered to place guilt upon the
Rwandan RPF government. However, a number of countries in Africa and across the globe have
repressive governmental tactics but do not attempt to kill or intimidate dissidents outside of their
territory, especially if that territory belongs to “first world” countries. An initial scan of such
reports and news media articles gives the impression that only the Rwandan government could
be responsible.6 Nonetheless, a cursory understanding of the possibilities of the situation should
not be considered sufficient for either academics or decision-making officials.
To bridge Rwanda as a socio-political entity with the concerns of modern Rwandan
officials and the international community, the situation surrounding disappearances and deaths of
dissident exiles necessitates contextualization. This article examines how the post-genocide
regime manages political space in Rwanda and then goes deeper to highlight the nature of the
security apparatus that the leadership has at its disposal. After the background is set the analysis
uses structured analysis to determine where responsibility lies in relation to the assassination
attacks upon dissident exiles. The results of the analysis produce findings with strong
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
4
implications for both Rwanda and the states in the international community where Rwandans
live.
Limited space for political expression
After the Tutsi-led RPF formed the new government in 1994, what little influence the miniscule
number of Hutus had left after the genocide was soon wiped out. This was accomplished through
a combination of domestic deaths and disappearances alongside the unofficial forced exile of
predominant Hutus and their sympathizers in the state and society. Filip Reyntjens identifies two
main waves of departure for public figures from Rwanda, among a continuous pattern of exile
for Rwandans with dissident views, in 1995 and in 2000.7 The first, in August of 1995, saw
Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu and Hutu Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga resign and
go into exile while Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito resigned but died, apparently of natural
causes,8 in 1997. Twagiramungu continues to live in exile today, managing The Rwanda Dream
Initiative – Rwanda Rwiza (RDI-Rwanda Rwiza) opposition political party, while Sendashonga
was shot and killed in Kenya in 1998. This was the first signal to the outside that the balance of
power had gone awry in Rwanda.
The pattern continued until the second wave when Speaker of the National Assembly
and Tutsi genocide survivor Joseph Sebarenzi resigned in January 2000 and fled to North
America, Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema resigned in February 2000 and left for North
America, and President Pasteur Bizimungu resigned in March 2000 for “personal reasons” but
was soon after charged with financial indiscretion and fraud and jailed in Rwanda despite an
offer of Ugandan asylum.9 President Kagame pardoned Bizimungu in 2006 and he continues to
live in Rwanda today.10 A third wave can be added to Reyntjens’ pattern, starting from the late
2000s and continuing to the early 2010s. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, former RDF Chief of
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
5
Staff, Head of Intelligence, and Ambassador to India went into exile in 2010 to South Africa and
has survived several assassination attempts, including being shot in the stomach in June of the
same year. Likewise, Patrick Karegeya, former Director General of RDF External Intelligence
went into exile in South Africa in 2007 and was found dead from strangulation in a Johannesburg
hotel room in January 2014.
These three waves suggest that the forced resignations and exile of policymakers occur
when they come into disagreement with the Hutu-RPF political establishment and particularly
President Kagame. Each of the aforementioned individuals who went into exile left shortly after
disagreements on Rwandan state policy were aired to and heard by the ruling regime.11 During
and in between these three waves, numerous individuals from the common citizenry all the way
up to the political ranks have been killed, disappeared, or gone into exile.12 It has become such a
noticeable pattern that Rwanda’s post-genocide history can be divided into two periods: 19941997, the multi-party period; and 1997-present, the one-party period or RPF dictatorship. Clearly
Rwanda is still struggling with its ethnic and political identity in ways similar to the pregenocide period.
Even since the inclusion of a limited number of Hutu among the predominantly Tutsi
RPF government that emerged after the genocide, feigning diversity has become a hallmark of
the Rwandan post-genocide era. If a seat is not won by the RPF then a number of “opposition”
parties in coalition with the RPF will win those seats. Most genuine opposition parties such as
the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) and the Mouvement républicain national pour la
démocratie et le développement (MRND) have been outlawed and the RPF-led coalition parties
provide the appearance of choice when in fact the only choice is to support Paul Kagame and his
RPF party. For example, the September 2013 elections for Rwanda’s legislative bodies saw the
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
6
RPF coalition take over 75% of the overall vote which boasted an impressive 99% turnout rate.13
Reports from both the African Union and the Commonwealth Secretariat (Rwanda joined the
Commonwealth of Nations in 2009) lauded Rwanda’s National Election Commission (NEC) for
their efforts in democratic elections.14 These praises could be attributed to a narrow focus on the
direct conditions surrounding the elections. Nonetheless, the existence of positive reports does
not mean that the socio-political conditions are conducive to free and democratic elections. Much
of the RPF’s repression is not conducted openly but quietly and the effects are mirrored in large
voter turnouts supporting the regime.15 Jailing dissidents or forcing them to escape into exile are
two common regime tactics designed to keep genuine dissent from being legitimized in the
tightly controlled political atmosphere. More worrying is that dissidents who have been forced to
leave Rwanda may still be within the lethal grasp of the RPF.
Government control of Rwanda’s political environment is key to the enforcement of the
RPF’s policies. Africanist scholar Andrea Purdekova has addressed the overriding issue of
Rwandan state surveillance, specifically within Rwandan territory, by positing a specific
understanding of how power is distributed in the state. Rather than understanding political power
(coming primarily from Kigali) as being decentralized she suggests that power is dispatched by
the RPF regime.16 Purdekova writes:
What we witness is not devolution of power to conceive and decide, just the devolution
of implementation. Sprawling administration, multiple responsibilities and imihigo, in the
final balance, do not point to decentralisation of power, but rather to dispatching of power
through which, sure enough, control becomes more effective and compliance increases.17
The post-genocide Rwandan political structure and system of surveillance can thus be
understood as a central power that enforces its political will through threat of intimidation and
violence. Decision-making hardly becomes more autonomous or free when moving further from
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
7
the President’s seat in Kigali and provincial and local governance structures only reflect the
unquestionable will of the ruling regime.
Rwanda severely lacks freedoms of speech and press exactly because of these threats of
intimidation, violence, and disappearance.18 Two pervasive concepts, those of genocide credit
and genocide amnesia, work psychologically to mutually reinforce physical threats to safety.19
Dissidents are quickly labeled génocidaires or Interahamwe (see endnote) which consequently
mixes vicious political castigation with varying degrees of public ostracization.20 The
psychological aspect, fully exploited by the Rwandan government, seeks not only to utilize
genocide credit to gain sympathy from the international community but also to prey on and
encourage genocide amnesia. This amnesia does not cause Rwandans to forget the genocide but
rather to ignore that the pre-genocide pattern has been re-created under the RPF-Kagame regime.
This occurs while Rwandans fully relate every aspect of their lives to the genocide in a narrow
fashion that upholds the views and actions of the current regime.
The socio-political nexus has become so deeply ingrained in the current state structure
that it is not initially visible upon observation from the outside. This ingrained nature may
explain why the aforementioned election observation groups produced praiseworthy reports. The
deception is not evident until the layers are peeled away from all of the relevant demographics. If
the RPF regime is responsible for extraterritorial assassinations it is not unlikely that it would
conduct covert operations abroad in the same fashion. That is why in the analysis, evidence is not
only examined for its potential to point directly to Rwandan involvement in the assassinations,
but also to see if it points to actions that facilitate a larger Rwandan attempt to cover up
operations.
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
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The systemic management of repression
The Rwandan state relies on a powerful security apparatus to intimidate and threaten dissident
citizens and officials. The Rwandan judicial system works in concert with the security apparatus.
The judiciary is a tool for the regime to delegitimize opponents. The judicial system does not
encourage the death of dissidents but since the RPF regime controls the judicial system along
with every other part of government, judicial rulings are nonetheless reflective of RPF policy.
Nyamwasa, Karegeya, and a few other former Rwandan military officers were tried in absentia
in 2011 and sentenced to twenty years in prison.21 The voices of political figures such as
President Kagame suggest a policy line for the RPF leadership regarding dissidents that can be
interpreted as more sinister and more clandestine than that of court trials.
The structure of the security apparatus is critical to the affirmation of centralized state
power for the RPF. Figure 1 identifies within this structure each sector that would play a role in
an assassination attack.22 The entire security apparatus is overseen by the RPF regime and is
under President Kagame’s control. The divisions that are most critical to the execution of
extraterritorial assassination are the Ministry of Defense (Rwanda Defense Force – RDF), the
Presidential Guard and the Office of the President. In Rwanda, power is completely concentrated
at the top, and as a result, any major decision is devised and ordered from the highest RPF
offices, that of President Kagame likely in association with that of Minister of Defense James
Kabarebe.23
Kabarebe rose up beneath Kagame during the RPF rebellion and played an instrumental
role in Rwanda’s two wars in the DRC where he was a senior military official for both states. He
has not strayed from Kagame’s side throughout his entire adult life and was an ideal choice for
Kagame as the most senior military official in Rwanda to solidify RPF rule. The Rwandans who
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
9
led the rebellion in the early 1990s grew up, fought, and took part in political and social life in
Uganda. These leaders did not return, some of them even spent a significant amount of time in
Rwanda until their benefactor, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, helped them launch the
rebellion that successfully unseated the genocide government in 1994. Among this core,
individuals like Kabarebe have remained loyal to Kagame, while others such as Karegeya have
chosen dissent.
This situation has effectively limited power to a few select individuals and allows
Kagame to have complete autonomy over decision-making in every sector. It is highly unlikely
that President Kagame did not have the final say in the orders of RPF-directed assassins. A highrisk decision with widespread political implications such as an assassination would certainly not
be made by anyone outside of the President and his cabinet, particularly in a state like Rwanda.
As a result, the hypothesis that Kagame is responsible for attacks on high-profile dissident exiles
is examined in detail in the analysis. In light of the structure of the security apparatus, and more
specifically that sub-section of the security apparatus that would deal with assassinations, a
pattern of power concentration appears. To take this pattern into account the subsequent analysis
will involve two parts: the three individual cases for each assassination and the relevant divisions
and capabilities of the security apparatus.
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
Ministry of Defense
10
Figure 1.- Minister
The Rwandan
of Defense:Security
James Apparatus
- Army Chief of Staff
Division Name
– Division Head – Division Components
Kabarebe
- Reserve Chief of Staff
- Chief of Defense Staff: Patrick
Nyamvumba
- Army Chief of Staff: Major
General Frank Mushyo Kamanzi
Presidential Guard
See Ministry of Defense
Military Reserves; Maritime Unit;
Air Force
- Reserves Chief of Staff:
Lieutenant General Fred Ibingira
- Reserves Deputy Chief of Staff:
Jerome Ngendahimana
- Ag. Chief of Staff: Brigadier
General Joseph Demali
Ministry of Internal Security (RNP)
- Sheikh Harerimana Mussa Fazil
Office of the President
- Venantia Tuglreyezu
Ministry of Local Government
- Francis Kaboneka
- Air Force Commander
- Support Services: Administration;
Intelligence (Directorate of Military
Intelligence); Operations; Logistics;
Political Education; Peacekeeping
- Combat Units: Four Army
Divisions: 1st- Kigali; 2nd –
East/North; 3rd – West/North; 4th –
South/West
- Combat Support Units: Tank Unit
and Artillery Regiment
- Special Forces
- Training Centers/Colleges
- Battalion of close bodyguards
- Infantry motorized battalion
- Outer ring battalion forces
- Missile Squadron
- Artillery Regiment
- Support Services: Administration;
Intelligence; Operations; Logistics
- Reserves
- All demobilized military members
turned into reserves and
reincorporated into the general
population
- Maritime Unit
- Lake Kivu
- Presidential home on Lake
Muhazi
- Air Force
- Helicopter Squadron
- Police Headquarters
- Provincial Headquarters
- District
Headquarters
- Police Posts
- National Security Service
– Secretary General
- External Intelligence; Immigration
and Emigration; and Internal
Security
- Local Defense
*All divisions overseen by RPF Regime led by President Paul Kagame (Prime Minister - Dr. Pierre Damien
Habumuremyi until 24 July 2014, 24 July 2014 to present – Anastase Murekezi). All positions current at time of
writing.24
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
11
The RPF under fire
The response of RPF officials and President Kagame to accusations of internal repression and
attacks on dissidents abroad has been disturbing and relatively unrevealing. There is a constant
appeal to genocide credit coupled with aggressive rhetoric against anyone who disagrees with
regime policy. No one in the leadership has, of course, accepted the assassinations as being
conducted by Rwanda but has vehemently lashed out against anyone suggesting that the RPF
government may have been responsible. The example of official responses to the recent
strangling of Patrick Karegeya is telling.25 Prime Minister Pierre Damien Habumuremyi claimed
that “Betraying citizens and their country that made you a man shall always bear consequences
to you.”26 Minister of Defense James Kabarebe stated that “When you choose to be a dog, you
die like a dog, and the cleaners will wipe away the trash so that it does not stink for them.
Actually, such consequences are faced by those who have chosen such a path. There is nothing
we can do about it, and we should not be interrogated over it.”27 Finally, According to President
Paul Kagame: “Rwanda did not kill this person [Karegeya] – and it’s a big no. But I add that, I
actually wish Rwanda did it. I really wish it.”28
The level of disgust conveyed at Karegeya by his RPF critics is indicative of the
polarized and repressed socio-political debate in Rwanda. Sendashonga and Nyamwasa
experienced similar rhetoric and many dissidents face, either before or after they go into exile,
trumped up charges related to spreading genocide ideology or fraud, embezzlement, and
corruption. The response strategy seems to be tripartite: distance, delegitimize, and avoid but
never forget. The regime attempts to distance itself from the death and apparently stalls
investigations that point towards its involvement in the attack. Efforts are made to delegitimize
opponents through aggressive rhetoric, criminal charges, and appeals to genocide credit and
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
12
amnesia. After this, the government avoids questions about the disappearance or assassination by
ignoring them or talking around them.29 Irrespective of their involvement in the assassination,
Rwandan officials and their sympathizers make every attempt to keep trails leading back to them
cold. Despite increased pressure following recent attacks on Nyamwasa and Karegeya, the
government has been relatively successful with this denial strategy as opposed to its more
heavily scrutinized military involvement in eastern DRC.
A structured analysis of government responsibility
An analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH) is now used to examine RPF leadership culpability
in extrajudicial and extraterritorial assassinations of Rwandan dissidents. This structured
analytical technique, used in the realm of national security intelligence, is particularly helpful
because it clearly poses questions, addresses those questions with evidence, and helps in
organizing conclusions. The analysis considers three propositions regarding RPF responsibility
in these attacks. Following the ACH method, available evidence is then determined to be
consistent, inconsistent, or neutral to each proposition, and each hypothesis is examined
individually as well as in comparison to the others. This method combines the disparate findings
of academics, journalists, NGOs, bloggers/social media users, and a host of other sources into a
compilation that represents a near totality of the available open source evidence that has been
mounted for and against Kigali. The propositions explore the possibilities that the Rwandan
government is directly responsible, that the Rwandan government is indirectly responsible, and
that any actor unconnected to the Rwandan government is responsible for the assassination
attacks upon three high-profile dissident exiles: (a) Seth Sendashonga, (b) Faustin Kayumba
Nyamwasa, and (c) Patrick Karegeya.
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
13
Figure 2. Analyses of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) for Assassination Culpability in Three
Case Studies of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents30
Cases and Evidence
A. Seth Sendashonga
Was a victim of a previous assassination attempt 31
Sacked/forced to resign from government position before exile 32
Was part of an RPF opposition movement in exile 33
Openly disagreed with RPF policies both before and after exile34
RPF history of dissident repression, detention, and torture 35
Previous deaths of other dissident exiles36
Man arrested for first attack in 1997 was employee at Rwandan Embassy in Nairobi37
Rwanda refused to revoke diplomatic immunity for arrested Embassy employee38
First RPF member preparing to testify at ICTR39
RPF-Kagame already under significant criticism for previous suspected attacks40
At least two Ugandans arrested in connection with death41
With aid of Twagiramungu was creating lists of those murdered by the RPF/RPA42
Rwandan diplomat expelled from Sweden in 2012 for "refugee espionage" 43
London Metropolitan Police warn Rwandan exiles of threat to safety from Rwanda44
Rwanda in talks with FDLR militias to end eastern DRC insurgency 45
Rwanda involvement in both DRC wars and recent rebellions such as the M2346
Was in planning stage of bringing ex-FAR soldiers to train in Tanzania to fight RPF47
Attempted abduction of exile in Uganda during most intense post-Karegeya scrutiny48
European and U.S. diplomats tell RPF not to do "anything like this" there49
Dissenting foreigners - academics, journalists, officials - banned from Rwanda50
Propositions
1
2
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
I
I
I
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
I
I
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
3
C
N
N
N
N
C
N
I
C
C
C
N
I
I
C
I
I
C
I
I
B. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa
Was a victim of a previous assassination attempt 51
Sacked/forced to resign from government position before exile 52
Was part of an RPF opposition movement in exile53
Openly disagreed with RPF politics both before and after exile54
Found guilty in absentia by Rwandan courts 55
Wife claims Kagame said in Parliament he would kill Nyamwasa56
RPF history of dissident repression, detention, and torture57
Possible use of Akagera Park as a secret training ground 58
Previous deaths of other dissident exiles59
Claims to have evidence of RPF culpability in Habyarimana plane crash60
RPF-Kagame already under significant criticism for previous suspected attacks61
Tapes of Col. Munyuza attempting to get exiled Mr. Higiro to kill Nyamwasa62
Rwandan diplomat expelled from Sweden in 2012 for "refugee espionage" 63
London Metropolitan Police warn Rwandan exiles of threat to safety from Rwanda64
Rwanda in talks with FDLR militias to end eastern DRC insurgency 65
Rwanda involvement in both DRC wars and recent rebellions such as the M2366
Accused by Rwanda of involvement in Kigali grenade attacks from 2010-201367
Attempted abduction of exile in Uganda during most intense post-Karegeya scrutiny68
European and U.S. diplomats tell RPF not to do "anything like this" there69
Nyamwasa's guard in South Africa was tipped off about a "Rwandan hit squad"70
Nyamwasa's guard was overpowered, the home ransacked, Pretoria caught no one71
Dissenting foreigners - academics, journalists, officials - banned from Rwanda72
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
I
I
C
C
I
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
3
C
N
N
N
N
I
N
I
C
I
C
I
I
I
C
I
I
C
I
I
C
I
Cases and Evidence
C. Patrick Karegeya
Sacked/forced to resign from government position before exile 73
Was part of an RPF opposition movement in exile 74
Propositions
1
2
C
C
C
C
2
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
I
C
C
I
C
C
C
I
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
3
N
N
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
14
Found guilty in absentia by Rwandan courts 75
RPF history of dissident repression, detention, and torture 76
Possible use of Akagera Park as a secret training ground 77
Previous deaths of other dissident exiles78
No perpetrators caught in relation to death79
RPF-Kagame already under significant criticism for previous suspected attacks80
Parallel intimidation of outspoken regime critic and genocide hero Rusesabagina 81
Kagame: "…I actually wish Rwanda did it [kill Karegeya]. I really wish it."82
Tapes of Col. Munyuza attempting to get exiled Mr. Higiro to kill Karegeya83
South African police have refused to release hotel CCTV footage of alleged assassins84
Strangled rather than shot as other high-profile dissidents were85
Rwandan diplomat expelled from Sweden in 2012 for "refugee espionage" 86
London Metropolitan Police warn Rwandan exiles of threat to safety from Rwanda87
Rwanda in talks with FDLR militias to end eastern DRC insurgency88
Rwanda involvement in both DRC wars and recent rebellions such as the M2389
Accused by Rwanda of involvement in Kigali grenade attacks from 2010-201390
Attempted abduction of exile in Uganda during most intense post-Karegeya scrutiny91
European and U.S. diplomats tell RPF not to do "anything like this" there92
Visited by Apollo Kiririsi, a shady Rwandan businessman, the night before his death93
Dissenting foreigners - academics, journalists, officials - banned from Rwanda94
C
C
C
C
I
I
C
C
I
I
I
C
C
I
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
I
C
I
I
C
C
C
I
I
C
C
I
C
C
C
C
C
C
N
N
I
C
I
C
I
I
I
C
C
I
I
C
I
I
C
I
N
I
Results
For the analyses conducted the results are displayed in Figure 3:
Figure 3. Results of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) for Assassination Culpability in
Three Case Studies of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
Proposition 1
Proposition 2
Proposition 3
C
I
N
C
I
N
C
I
N
17/20
3/20
0/20
18/20
2/20
0/20
7/20
7/20
6/20
A. Seth
Sendashonga
85%
15%
0%
90%
10%
0%
35% 35% 30%
B. Faustin
Kayumba
Nyamwasa
C. Patrick
Karegeya
19/22
86%
3/22
14%
0/22
0%
19/22
86%
3/22
14%
0/22
0%
6/22
27%
11/22
50%
5/22
23%
16/22
73%
6/22
27%
0/22
0%
16/22
73%
6/22
27%
0/22
0%
6/22
27%
11/22
50%
5/22
23%
For Propositions 1 and 2, both of which suggest Rwandan government involvement in the deaths
of the selected individuals, at least 73 percent of the evidence collected is consistent with the
proposition in all three cases. For proposition 3, the only one which does not imply Rwandan
involvement, Seth Sendashonga’s case has the highest amount of consistent evidence at only 35
percent. As far as consistent evidence is concerned, those propositions alleging Rwandan
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
15
involvement in the assassination attacks contain the most evidence by a considerable number of
percentage points.
However, disconfirming evidence presents potential flaws in the propositions and
assumptions and directs observers toward alternative propositions. Proposition 3, suggesting no
Rwandan involvement, had the highest percentages of inconsistent evidence at 35 percent, 50
percent, and 50 percent for cases A, B, and C respectively. Inconsistent evidence was highest for
Patrick Karegeya’s case but still only reached 27 percent in regards to both propositions 1 and 2.
The proposition excluding Rwandan involvement has a much larger percentage of inconsistent
evidence compared to far smaller percentages in propositions 1 and 2. These findings indicate
that the propositions suggesting Rwandan responsibility for the attacks have sturdier bodies of
evidence than the proposition that an actor unconnected to the Rwandan government is
responsible.
Neutral evidence was a non-factor for propositions 1 and 2. This is likely because the
work of most writers, reporters, and commentators tends to point directly at Rwanda or away
from it (although the former is far more common). This paradigm in reporting on Rwanda and its
exiles manifests itself with a number of neutral pieces of evidence in regards to proposition 3,
alleging no Rwandan involvement. This is not unexpected as opinions and writing on the subject
have never produced any credible argument that implicates actors unconnected to the Rwandan
government. The Rwandan government and its beneficiaries will point away from Rwanda, often
rather vehemently, but not in any specific or operable direction.
What to do going forward?
Available evidence overwhelmingly incriminates the Rwandan government, unquestionably led
by Kagame, for the assassination attacks on these three individuals. Further examinations into
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
16
the disappearances and deaths of other prominent individuals and common citizenry both inside
and outside of Rwanda could reveal similar results. One or two of the listed pieces of evidence
for each case alone may not be enough to make conclusive statements about guilt but the bodies
of circumstantial evidence constructed for each case suggests the Rwandan government is
responsible.
Combining various types of evidence into one open-source analysis sheds comprehensive
light on the assassination attacks inflicted upon Seth Sendashonga, Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa,
and Patrick Karegeya. What was largely a group of disparate analyses of this problem is now a
unified picture of the situation that strongly implies Rwanda, and specifically President Paul
Kagame, is involved in the operations that have led to the deaths of Seth Sendashonga and
Patrick Karegeya and the injuries of Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. Additionally, it is highly
likely that groups or individuals unconnected to Rwanda are not responsible for the attacks.
While there is minimal evidence against Rwanda’s involvement, there is not a dominant piece of
evidence that would come close to getting Rwanda off the hook. Rwandan officials do not seem
to care how their actions are perceived outside of Rwanda. Had Rwandan officials been able to
counter the accusations placed against them,95 there would perhaps be a shred of credibility to
Rwanda’s argument. President Kagame’s “We didn’t kill them, but we wish we did” approach is
hardly convincing.
These findings highlight not only the need for states to keep a watchful eye over the
Rwandan diaspora and important associated figures, but also the need to the monitor the flows of
peoples across their borders and the potential security threats that smaller, third-world states can
pose. No longer is the only statal threat from large countries with high-tech weaponry but also
from smaller ones who can operate efficiently and ruthlessly to achieve specific objectives.
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
17
Diasporas and refugees, especially those who may possess critical knowledge or hold significant
influence within their state of origin or its peoples globally need to be listened to. Their access to
and understanding of the situations facing certain individuals and groups are likely to be deeper
and more nuanced than an outsider’s view. With these analytical results in hand, more effective
thought and policy can be formulated surrounding the assassinations of exiled Rwandan
dissidents.
Notes
“Rwanda.” World Bank, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda.
Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: Governance in
post-genocide Rwanda,” African Affairs 110 (2011).
3
Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
4
Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: Governance in
post-genocide Rwanda,”; Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006;
Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Andrea Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’:
surveillance and state reach in Rwanda,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 49 (2011), 486-487.
5
“Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch, January 28, 2014.
6
See, for example: “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch; “Gen. Kayumba
Shooting [analysis],” The Independent, June 27, 2010; “Kenya: Inquiry into assassination of Rwandese opposition
leader in exile urgently needed,” Amnesty International; Josh Kron and Jeffrey Gettleman, “London police warn
Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government,” The New York Times, May 20, 2011; Geoffrey York and Judi
Rever, “Assassination in Africa: Inside the plots to kill Rwanda’s dissidents,” The Globe and Mail, May 2, 2014.
7
Filip Reyntjens, “Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising ‘Liberation’ and ‘Democratisation’,”
Third World Quarterly 27 (2006): 1105-1106.
8
Robert McGill Thomas Jr., “Alphonse Nkubito Dies at 42; Ex-Rwandan Justice Minister,” The New York
Times, February 21, 1997; Nkubito had survived two assassination attempts before his death but had also been
overweight and previously suffered from health issues.
9
Reyntjens, “Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising ‘Liberation’ and ‘Democratisation’,” 11051106.
10
Bizimungu has also remained silent since his pardon, meaning he is allowed to stay in Rwanda as long as
he does not engage in any anti-regime activities.
11
Nyamwasa, Radio France Internationale; “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.
12
“Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.
13
African Union Commission, “”Final Report of African Union Election Observation Mission to the 16-18
September 2013 Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Rwanda.” African Union, 2013.
14
African Union Commission, “”Final Report of African Union Election Observation Mission to the 16-18
September 2013 Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Rwanda.”; Commonwealth Expert Team. “Rwanda
Legislative Election (Chamber of Deputies).” The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2013: 1-29.
15
For one example of repression leading up to elections see: “Rwanda: End attacks on opposition parties,”
Human Rights Watch, February 2, 2010.
16
Andrea Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: surveillance and state reach in
Rwanda.”
17
Ibid; For imihigo, see Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: surveillance and state
reach in Rwanda,” 10-12.
1
2
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
18
18
Anonymous scholar, email to author, June 12, 2014; Anonymous former foreign correspondent to
Rwanda, email to author, June 18, 2014; Robert Mukombozi, email to author, June 16, 2014; For a fairly
comprehensive list of the deaths of disappearances of dissident Rwandan public figures, see “Rwanda: Repression
across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.
19
For genocide credit see Filip Reyntjens. “Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship,” African
Affairs 103 (2004); For genocide amnesia see Susanne Buckley-Zistel. “Remembering to forget: Chosen amnesia as
a strategy for local coexistence in post-genocide Rwanda,” Africa, 76 (2006).
20
Génocidaires is a French word referring to those who took part in the killing during the genocide;
Interahamwe is a Kinyarwanda word referring to the Hutu genocidal paramilitary group that escaped to the DRC
once the genocide itself had been stopped. The most well-known group containing Interahamwe are the Forces
démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).
21
“Exiled Rwandan ex-spy boss murdered in South Africa,” Reuters, January 2, 2014.
22
Constructed with great aid from Robert Mukombozi, email to author, June 16, 2014; See also the
“Government” section of Republic of Rwanda. “Republic of Rwanda.” Accessed July 3, 2014. http://www.gov.rw/.
23
It could be argued that the Presidential Guard’s directives and capabilities are only centered on protecting
President Kagame. However, the intelligence, operations, logistics, and forces close to the President cannot be
assumed to be unconnected to or not trusted with tasks related to external operations or intelligence; Robert
Mukombozi, “Nyamwasa: Museveni wrong on Kagame,” The Observer, July 2, 2014.
24
“Kagame sacks prime minister, cabinet reshuffle expected,” New Vision, July 23, 2014; For a listing of
current officials see Republic of Rwanda, “Republic of Rwanda,” Accessed July 3, 2014. http://www.gov.rw/.
25
“Rwanda: Repression across Borders.” Human Rights Watch; Louise Mushikiwabo, Twitter post,
January 5, 2014, https://twitter.com/LMushikiwabo; Habumuremyi, Twitter post, January 6, 2014, 6:26 am,
https://twitter.com/HabumuremyiP.; “President Kagame: Betray Rwanda, face consequences,” Associated Press,
January 13, 2014.
26
Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, Twitter post, January 6, 2014, 6:24 am,
https://twitter.com/HabumuremyiP.
27
Gahiji Innocent, “Gen Kabarebe On Karegeya: ‘When You Choose To Be A Dog, You Die Like A
Dog’,” News of Rwanda, January 11, 2014.
28
Matina Stevis and Thorold Barker, “Rwanda President denies role in ex-spy chief’s death,” The Wall
Street Journal, January 23, 2014.
29
For a classic example of President Kagame deflecting and avoiding pointed questions about
assassinations of dissidents see: Paul Kagame, Interview with Zeinab Badawi, HARDtalk, July 12, 2012.
30
The ACHs can be read as follows: the listed case (A,B,C) identifies the individual who was attacked and
beneath the name is the evidence collected during the analysis that is relevant to that individual. Some evidence is
unique to certain individuals while other evidence is shared. The letters to the right of the evidence indicate whether
the piece of evidence is consistent (C), inconsistent (I), or neutral (N) to each listed proposition. Totals are displayed
in the results chart in Figure 2.
31
“Kenya: Inquiry into assassination of Rwandese opposition leader in exile urgently needed,” Amnesty
International.
32
“Kenya: Inquiry into assassination of Rwandese opposition leader in exile urgently needed,” Amnesty
International.
33
“Government accused over Hutu killing,” The Birmingham Post, May 18, 1998.
34
“Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.
35
“Rwanda: Shrouded in Secrecy,” Amnesty International, 2012.
36
“Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.
37
Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental
Catastrophe, 365-368.
38
Ibid.
39
“Slain Rwandan was to testify at genocide court,” CNN, May 18, 1998.
40
“Andrew Mwenda on Patrick Karegeya’s Death,” Youtube Video, 18:29, posted by “Francois Gatete,”
January 3, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvxM8fWALl0.
41
“Human Rights Watch and the FIDH Condemn the Assassination of Seth Sendashonga,” Human Rights
Watch, May 19, 1998.
42
Faustin Twagiramungu, Faustin Twagiramungu to Rapporteur Spécial pour le Rwanda de la Commission
des Droits de l’Homme René Degni-Segui, Bruxelles, Belgique, June 3, 1996.
43
Karl Ritter, “Sweden expels Rwandan diplomat,” Associated Press, February 13, 2012.
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
44
45
19
Kron and Gettleman, “London police warn Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government.”
Kenny Katombe, “Rwandan rebels begin to surrender, but demand talks with Kigali,” Reuters, May 30,
2014.
46
Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics; United Nations, Security Council,
Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security
Council, S/2012/843 (15 November 2012).
47
Prunier, Africa’s World War, 365-368.
48
Frederic Musisi and Risdel Kasasira. “Police foil kidnap of another Rwandan refugee,” Daily Monitor,
April 12, 2014.
49
“Rwanda’s foreign adventures test West’s patience,” Reuters, April 5, 2014; Anonymous Great Lakes
scholar, correspondence with author, July 11, 2014.
50
Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world,” 3-7.
51
Robert Mukombozi, “Nyamwasa: Museveni wrong on Kagame,” The Observer, July 2, 2014.
52
Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, Interview with Sonia Rolley, Radio France Internationale, RFI, July 9,
2013.
53
York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.”
54
Nyamwasa, Radio France Internationale.
55
“Exiled Rwandan ex-spy boss murdered in South Africa,” Reuters, January 2, 2014.
56
“Gen. Kayumba Shooting [analysis],” The Independent.
57
“Rwanda: Shrouded in Secrecy,” Amnesty International.
58
Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’,” 488.
59
See death of Seth Sendashonga; “Rwanda: Repression across Borders.”
60
Nyamwasa, Radio France Internationale.
61
“Andrew Mwenda on Patrick Karegeya’s Death,” Youtube Video.
62
York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.”
63
Ritter, “Sweden expels Rwandan diplomat.”
64
Kron and Gettleman, “London police warn Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government.”
65
Katombe, “Rwandan rebels begin to surrender, but demand talks with Kigali.”
66
Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics; United Nations, Security Council,
Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security
Council.
67
“Gen. Kayumba Shooting [analysis],” The Independent.
68
Musisi and Kasasira. “Police foil kidnap of another Rwandan refugee.”
69
“Rwanda’s foreign adventures test West’s patience,” Reuters.
70
The Independent Team, “State-sponsored killers,” The Independent, March 22, 2014.
71
Independent Team, “State-sponsored killers.”
72
Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world,” 3-7.
73
Robert Mukombozi, “What Col. Karegeya said about Rwanda,” The Observer, January 2, 2014.
74
York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.”
75
Exiled Rwandan ex-spy boss murdered in South Africa,” Reuters.
76
“Rwanda: Shrouded in Secrecy,” Amnesty International.
77
Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’,” 488.
78
See death of Seth Sendashonga and attack on Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa; “Rwanda: Repression across
Borders.”
79
Geoffrey York and Judi Rever, “Africa; For Rwanda’s opposition abroad, a growing threat from home,”
The Globe and Mail, May 14, 2014.
80
“Andrew Mwenda on Patrick Karegeya’s Death,” Youtube Video.
81
U.S. House of Representatives, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Royce decries targeted
killings of Rwandan regime critics abroad, by Ed Royce, Washington D.C., 2014,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/03.11.14 - State%2C Secretary
Kerry%2C Express Concern about Attempted Attac....pdf.
82
Matina Stevis and Thorold Barker, “Rwanda President denies role in ex-spy chief’s death,” The Wall
Street Journal, January 23, 2014.
83
York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.”
Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents
84
20
The Shyaka Kanuma Blog, http://focus.rw/sk/2014/04/sa-investigations-in-nyamwasakaregeya-attacksbecome-more-suspicious/, April 10, 2014.
85
“Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.
86
Ritter, “Sweden expels Rwandan diplomat.”
87
Kron and Gettleman, “London police warn Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government.”
88
Katombe, “Rwandan rebels begin to surrender, but demand talks with Kigali.”
89
Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics; United Nations, Security Council,
Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security
Council.
90
“Gen. Kayumba Shooting [analysis],” The Independent.
91
Musisi and Kasasira. “Police foil kidnap of another Rwandan refugee.”
92
“Rwanda’s foreign adventures test West’s patience,” Reuters.
93
“Assassinat de Patrick Karegeya: l’un des principaux suspects reste introuvable,” Radio France
Internationale, January 3, 2014.
94
Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world,” 3-7.
95
Numerous attempts by the author to contact the Rwandan government and its supporters were
unsuccessful.