THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO AFRICAN UNION (AU) THE
JOURNEY SO FAR……….
‘By
GAD- PETERS D. Beauty
07/15CA049
BEING A PROJECT SUMMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FACULTY OF ARTS,UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN,ILORIN IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIRMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF BACHELOR OF ART (B.A) HONS
DEGREE OF THE HISTORY & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF
ILORIN, ILORIN, NIGERIA
MAY, 2011
i
CERTIFICATION
This dissertation has been read and certified as meeting the requirement for the
Award of Bachelor of Arts, Degree (Honors) in the Department of History and
International Studies, Faculty of Arts, at the University of Ilorin, Nigeria.
………………………………….
………………………………
Mr. Lemuel E. Odeh
Date
Project Supervisor
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Dr. S.O. Aghalino
Date
Head of Department
…………………………………
…………………………………..
External Examiner
Date
ii
DEDICATION
This research work is affectionately dedicated to Almighty God, The Alpha
and Omega, The beginning and the end, the author and finisher of our faith, and
to my beloved family MR.AND MRS. NELSON DOKUBO PETERS for the great love
they have for education and my being educated, this work is also dedicated to all
those that stood by me throughout my course in the University.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I am grateful to God Almighty who is the founder of all knowledge for the
successful completion of this work. My acknowledgment and sincere appreciation
goes to my supervisor MR LEMUEL E ODEH, who painstakingly read through my
work, making corrections and suggestions where need be. I am greatly enriched
from his wealth of experience, intelligence, constructive criticism, suggestion and
remarks, I will always be grateful to him.
I also wish to acknowledge the support of my parents MR.AND
MRS.NELSON DOKUBO PETERS, most especially the’’ queen of my heart’’, my
mother, she has stood strongly by me come rain, come shine in all area of my life,
I will forever be grateful to her the ‘’sweet mother’ ’to whom I have dedicated
this work, she works relentlessly for the education and the up keeping of her
children. She has been very instrumental to my achievement through her
spiritual, moral and financial support. I owe her a lot!
I am also obliged to mention the assistance of my siblings who have stood
by me strongly throughout my course in the university, they have being a great
iv
support to my life, I always thank God Almighty for giving me such loving brothers
and sister, I honorably mention their names, Ibiso Peters, Ibiye Peters, Henry
Peters, Phillip Peters Phillip and lastly Ann Peters.
My acknowledgement will not be complete if I don’t acknowledge the
support of my colleagues and friends whose company, co-operation, sense of
humor and concern have variously contributed positively towards the
actualization on my main objective in this University; Chioma
Ruth Agbo,
Olarewaju Oluwatomi , Alagbile Anuoluwapo, Kelvin Ezennamaka and Damilola
Ibrahim and host of them all I cannot mention here, they are nice and caring
colleagues.
There are times in one’s life when everything seems so hard, there are some
people who are always there to share this times with you, I will like to
acknowledge the support of such people; they are: Eng.Tonye Warmate,
Raymond Osuoha, Oshoma Kanoba, and the last but the least my affectionate
greetings goes to you MRS PETERS thank you for been there always.
v
I want to say a very big thank you to my lecturers, the H.O.D Dr. Sam
Aghalino, Prof Bolade M. Eyinla, Mrs. M. A. Y. Lewu, Dr. A.S. Adebola, Dr. P. F.
Adebayo , Dr. R.A. Olaoye, Dr. K. D. Ayeidun, Dr. I.A. Jawando, Dr. S. Y. Omoiya,
Mr, Jide Ige, and lastly Mr. Ibrahim Bashir,who have find time to impact
knowledge into me and who has always stood by me throughout my education in
University of Ilorin, Mr. Odeh Lemuel who is like a father to me and the same time
my favorite lecturer even before he became my supervisor. I say thank you all.
Finally, I have believed that’’ success’’ does not come from ground scheme;
prosperity is not decreed .it percolates from the bottom up. Risk-by-risk and
profit-by-profit
GAD-PETERS
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page- -
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Certification-
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Dedication - -
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Acknowledgement-
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Table of Contents -
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CHAPTER ONE
ISSUES AND REASONS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATIONS
1.1 Introduction- -
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1.2 Aims and objectives- -
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1.3 Significance of the study-
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1.4 Scope of study-
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1.5 Problems of the study -
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1.6 Methodology- -
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1.7 Literature review-
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Notes and references -
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2.1 The historical origin of the Organisation of Africa Unity.-
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2.2 The aims and objectives of African Union (AU)--
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2.3 The economics achievement of OAU.- -
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2.4 The political achievement of OAU.-
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2.5 Socio-Cultural achievement of OAU.-
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CHAPTER TWO
Notes and reference-
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CHAPTER THREE
FROM ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO AFRICAN UNION
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3.2 Nigeria and Africa’s development-
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3.3 Nigeria and the African Union-
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3.4 The African Union and Political Stability in the continent-
3.5 The African Union and economics improvement and empowerment
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Note and references-
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
4.1 Summary-
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4.2 Conclusion-
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Bibliography-
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CHAPTER ONE
ISSUES AND REASONS FOR REGIONAL INTERGRATIONS
ix
1.1 Introduction
Regional integration is not a new idea or initiative in Africa. Along with the
creation of African common market it has been fueling division of African leaders
for the past 45 decade. In fact, the creation of the 0rganisation of African Unity
(OAU) in 1964 reflected the awareness, by the leaders of the day that Africans
strength was rooted in Pan-Africa cooperation.1 The Southern Rhodesia Custom
Union was established in 1949 and the East African community in 1967(Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania). 2 So far, United Africa has a long history and is the unique
product of social and cultural attitude of Africa, today, the African Union (AU) is
an entity that continues to work for the integration in the continent to enable it
plays its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multi-faceted socioeconomic and political problem. The advent of the Organization now known (AU)
is described as an advent of great magnitude in the institutional evolution of the
continent.3
In a 1959, speech from Kwame Nkrumah, Ideological father of the African
Union. He stated that in Ghana, we regard our independence as meaningless
x
unless we are able to use the freedom that goes with it to help other African
people to be free and independent, to liberate the entire continent of Africa from
foreign dehumanization and ultimately to establish a union of African state. 4”Of
all sins Africa can commit, the sins of despair will be most unforgivable……..unity
will not make us rich, but it can make it difficult for –Africa and the African people
to be disregarded and humiliated------My generation led Africa to political
freedom. The current generation of leadership and people of Africa must pick up
the flickering touch of African freedom to refuel it with their enthusiasm and
determination, and carry it forward”
5
(President Nyerere, former President of
Tanzania at the 40th anniversary of Ghana’s independent,1997)
The historical foundations of African Union originated in the union of
African States. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on May
25th 1963.
6
It remained the collective voice for the continent until 2002.The
intended purpose of the OAU was to promote the unity and solidarity of the
African States in a time of independent movements. The OAU also aimed to
ensure that all African States enjoy human right, raise the living standard of all
Africans and settle arguments and dispute between member states. 7
xi
In the charter of the Organization of African Unity adopted in 1963 in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, African States became committed to work together to
coordinate and intensify their cooperation and effort to achieve a better life for
the people of Africa. The OAU Struggle to enforce its decision and its lack of an
army made it difficult to intervene in civil wars and countries struggling with
colonialism. The policy of non-interference in the affairs of member states also
restricted the OAU in achieving its goals. Consensus was difficult to achieve within
the organization. The French colonies, the Pro-capitalist and the Pro-socialist
faction during the cold war, all had their agenda and made it very difficult to
reach an agreement on what had to be done. Through the difficulties and
struggles the OAU endured, it still provides a forum that enabled member states
to adopt coordinated positions on the matter of common concern. For example,
through the OAU coordinating committee for the liberation of Africa, the
organization worked and succeeded in forging a consensus in support of
liberation struggle and the fight against apartheid. 8
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
xii
The African Union was formed to cater for the needs and aspiration of
member states amongst the various set objectives
*Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the other
people of Africa
*Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member
states
*Accelerate the political and socio- economic integration of the continent
*Promote and defend African common position on issues of interest to the
continent and its people
*Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the charter of the
United Nation and the check of human rights.
*Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable
diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent
*To promote democratic principle and institutional popular participation and
good governance and also protect human and people’s right in accordance with
xiii
African charter on human and people right and other relevant human rights
instrument.
*Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful
role in the global economy and international negotiations.
*Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural level as
well as the integration of African economies
*Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standard of
African people
*Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. 9
The wish of the founders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was
largely informed by the desire of Pan-Africanist who believed that it is the only full
political unity that will end the Pan-African struggle. Apart from the of lack of a
common culture and language that divides African states there is more
fundamental problem of lack of effective leadership in the search for unity.
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
xiv
This research is very significant in the sense that it sought to look at the
peaceful transformation of the African Union from the Organization of African
Unity. The role of the Organization of African Unity in the socio-economic,
political and cultural well being of the African cannot be over emphasizes, so
therefore, any study that will encompass the organization of African Unity and her
transformation to this modern union in a shrinking globalized world where all
political and frontier barriers are being broken down is very significant, because it
will shed more light on the polemics of this union
1.4
SCOPE OF STUDY
This research work shall essentially be limited to the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), her aim and objective and factors that precipitated to her
transformation from Organization of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU) it
shall therefore pre-suppose that this study shall cover the period of 2003 when
the original idea of African Union was limited
1.5 PROBLEMS OF THE STUDY
xv
The problem this researcher encountered were basically was that of the
refusal of most competent scholars to discuss at length with the researcher.
Alongside this was also time constraints because this research work is being
embarked upon in conjunction with other academic work, and also the researcher
was faced the problems of funds because among areas visited was the Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs, V.I. Lagos, the Ministry of Foreign affairs, Abuja,
ECOWAS secretariat, Abuja and the A.U, Office also in Abuja. Be that it may be,
the challenges were quite interesting and the researcher believes that they were
worth the while.
1.6 METHODOLOGY
This research shall adopt a two way analysis. It shall be using the primary
and the secondary source of data collections and analysis. The primary source
shall rely heavily on materials of people in the diplomatic spheres and scholars in
foreign policy, while secondary source shall rely heavily on journals, books,
magazines, published work and other media materials of day to day research.
1.7
LITERATURE REVIEW
xvi
Books are the major important tool in any research work; it is therefore
interactive that literature pertaining the work shall be consulted. Conflict expert
agree that to completely resolve a conflict, its root cause have to be removed
first. It was in this regard that the African Union Partner with the United Nations
(UN), having recognized the link between war and poverty. As Africa has started
going into close cooperation with regional Organization of African Unity (OAU),
now the African Union (AU).A Nigerian diplomat to the African Union, Shinkaiye in
his book “Nigeria and the African Union, Role and Expectations in which the
situations that transpire before it was changed from Organization of African Unity
(OAU) to African Union (AU) discussed extensively the entire process of the
transformation. 10
Akinsanya
11
this book laid more emphasis on the importance of
transforming from Organization of African Unity to African Union In the year
2002.Another scholar Oyobaira in a book written by him “Political Stability and
African Union ”. 12 In another book, Nigeria, the AU and the Challenge of Regional
Integration by a renowned senior researcher, Oche in the division of International
xvii
law also contributed to the study of the transformation of Organization of African
Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU).13
The contribution of Olokun, an economist cannot be overlooked in the quest
of the Journey so far of the Organization of African Unity to African Union, his
contribution through a material.”The role of Nigeria in the New Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD) the material gives us an opportunity to
(1)Revisit AU/NEPAD perspective for effective knowledge.
(2)Take another look at the status of the integration in Africa in terms of progress
so far.
(3)Present some key challenges faced and explore possible solutions.
(4) Impact of relationship between the Europe and Africa Regional Organization
on rural livelihood on the continent.
(5) A call to Europe to write towards effective partnership with African especially
its regional bodies.14
xviii
Another review to be considered here is the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) in its two reports on assessing Regional Integration in
Africa (ARIA 1&2) issued in 2004 and 2006 15 respectively, provide a deep analysis
as well as a detailed picture of what constitutes the current situation of regional
integration in Africa.
Kusa is a political scientist who, in her book “Nigeria and the Challenges of
the Africa Peer Review Mechanism(APRM)
16
also talks about the importance of
(NEPAD) in the growing of the African Union(AU) and the mechanism for review
which provide the means of monitoring progress toward good economic,
cooperate and political government in Africa including challenges.
xix
Notes and References
1. Maitre Abdoulaye wade, “Francophone and Anglophone Divide Approach
to Sub-regional security and Development in the next decade”, being text
of lecture delivered at the inauguration ceremony of the 13th Regular
Course of the National War College of Nigeria, held at the College
Auditorium. See details in New Soja (Abuja, Directorate of Army, Public), 6th
issue, 2004, pp.94-96
2. Maitre Op. Cit
3. Brownson Dede, “The Evolution of the African Union”, in the African Union
in the African Union and the Challenges of Co-operation and integration:
Proceedings of the National Seminar (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited,
©Federal Ministry of Cooperation and integration in Africa, 2002)
4. UNDP, Africa: Human Development report, 2003
xx
5. Bola A. Akinterinwa ( ed.,) Nigeria’s national Interest in a Globalizing World:
Further Reflections on Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism (Ibadan:
Vantage Publishers, 2005), forthcoming
6. New Soja (Abuja), Sixth Issue, 2004, p.94
7. See AU Press Release, No. 062/2003, Addis Ababa, July 31, 2003
8. Akinjide Osuntokun “An Academic in Government: Reflection on my Service
in the Ministry of External Affairs, 1988-1995”, in Bola A. Akinterinwa (ed.),
Nigeria’s New Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of ,Ambassador
Oluyemi Adeniji, CON (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2004), p.42
9. Bola A. Akinterinwa, “Africa in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-2005: Beyond
Forty-Five Years of Unwavering Commitment” (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers,
2005)
10.J.K. Shinkaiye, “Nigeria’s Role in Shaping the African union” in the African
Union and the Challenges of Co-operation and Integration: Proceedings of
xxi
the National Seminar(Ibadan: Spectrum Books limited, © Federal Ministry
of Co-operation and integration in Africa, 2002), p.18
11.Olusegun Akinsaya, “Nigeria at the African Union” (Ibadan: Vantage
Publishers, 2005)
12.Sam Oyovbaire, “ Political Stability and the African Union: 2002-2005”
(Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2005)
13.Ogaba Oche, “Nigeria, The AU and the Challenge of Regional Integration”
(Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2005)
14.Isaac Aluko-Olokun, “The Role of Nigeria in the New partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD)”, (Ibadan, Vantage Publishers, 2005)
15.Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa, “Nigerian and the Challenge of the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM)”, (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2005)
16.Kusa op cit
xxii
CHAPTER TWO
2.1 THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICA UNITY.
The Pan-African movement and the search for continental unity has its
roots in the 1800s,and now has a new start with the inauguration of the African
union in July 2002.1 The struggle against racism and colonialism and then to
protect the fragile sovereignty of new states were succeeded by the search for
national development, regional cooperative and an African Economic Community
.Can the new Africa Union now working to get into operation, improve on this
record despite the impact of globalization and structural adjustment.
A prefecture observer who is well informed about the Organization of
African Unity(OAU)and rulers attended the inaugural meeting of the African
union(AU) in Durban in July 2002 compared the laundering of the two
organizations as follows. “The OAU was founded in an era of militancy and
confident
optimism.
African
believed
that
having
achieved
sovereign
independence, the world was at their feet, the leaders of that era, including
Nkrumah ,Nasser, Nyerere, Sekou Toure and others, had acquired the status of
xxiii
giants and visionaries. By contrast, the launch of the AU was sober and muted,
with little incendiary rhetoric or passion. Critics can point to the weakness of the
AU institutions and their inherited arrears. But much of the summit was
businesslike and realistic. “African has leaned much.” According to Mohammed, 2
what accounted for the difference between the two events is the brief answer
that African countries are worse of economically today than when OAU began in
1963 and admired in internal conflicts of various intensity. Most African leaders
can hardly claim to have policies therefore of the destinies of their countries.
Africans now understand that the main sources of their problem are Africa
position in their asymmetrical and powerful global system.3 However; many
believe that if the AU succeeds, it may ameliorate the enormous difficulties Africa
is facing. Hence the businesslike approach and the anxious but muted optimism.
The founding of the OAU was the culmination of a long struggle by the PanAfrican movement, which goes back to the 19th century. The movement was
essentially outside the continent, driven by black intellectuals of African descent
in the Diasporas-in the US, the Caribbean and Europe. At first, the movement was
essentially a protest of black people against their exploitation, against racism, and
xxiv
for the dignity and uplifting of the black people. The leaders were middle-class
intellectuals in the USA and the Caribbean, such as W.E.B, Du Bios (AfricanAmerican) and Padmore (Caribbean).4
The first Pan-African conference was held in London in 1900, followed by
others in Paris and New York. The most significant meeting and the Pinnacle of
the movement was the fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945 in Manchester,
England. It was different from previous meetings in three fundamental ways. A
large number of activists attended over 200 persons from the USA, Europe and
Africa. For the first time, leading African nationalist took active and prominent
parts, Such as Kenyatta and Nkrumah, who was secretary of the congress (W.E.B.
Du Bios was its chairman).The congress stressed “for the first time the necessity
for a well-organized, firmly knit movement as a primary condition for the success
of the national liberation struggle in Africa (Nkrumah).Pan-Africanism was no
longer simply a protest movement by people descent in the Caribbean and the
United States. It has increasingly become a weapon according to Lamelle with
which African nationalists could fight colonial rule.”5
xxv
The Pan-African movement was strengthened when Ghana become the first
black African country to gain independence and organized the All-Africa
conference in Accra in 1959.At that time most Africa countries were still
struggling against colonial rule. For the first time, the Accra meeting brought
together on African soil nationalists from all over Africa, with the central theme of
solidarity and unity in the struggle against colonialism.
According to the late Abdul Raliman Babu,
6
the Accra meeting provided an
important psychological, political and practical boost to nationalist movements
within the frame work of Pan-African unity which Nkrumah strongly advocated. It
also became apparent to all the nationalist leaders who came to Accra that an
African state (as exemplified by the Ghana government’s role in organizing the
conference) was key to the struggle against colonialism and toward economic
development and political unity after independence.
In 1963, four years after Accra, the organization of African Unity (OAU) was
formed in Addis Ababa by African countries 7 (except southern Africa) which had
achieved independence through nationalist struggle drives by Pan-Africanism. The
xxvi
struggle against the remaining colonialism in Southern Africa and for the
continental unity which until then was a mass movement of people was taken
over by independent state under the auspices of the OAU. Pan-Africanism thus
ceased to be a mass ideology driving a state-base continental organization.
2.2 THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF AFRICAN UNION (AU)
In assessing the aims and objectives of the OAU, it is necessary to take a
brief look at its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, and considerations
that necessitated its transformation. The OAU was established in 1963 based on
the premise that all independent African government should collaborate in
addressing common Africa problems. Indeed, the principle of collective selfreliance not only provides the basis for Africa’s endeavor in the realm of regional
integration but also provides the critical nexus between Nigeria’s foreign
policy(and those of all Africa states) and Africa’s regional integration efforts. The
principle of self-reliance in this regard should be understood within the ambit is a
“concerted effort to reduce third world countries over dependence on the
xxvii
developed world, and hereby increase their autonomy within the international
political and economic system”
The aims and objectives of the OAU included the following:
"To promote the unity and solidarity of African states, to coordinate and intensify
efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa, to defend their
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, to eradicate all forms of
colonialism from Africa, and to promote international cooperation, having due
regard to the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
Many analysts would argue, however, that besides symbolizing African unity in
organizational form, the major area of success of the OAU was in the eradication
of all forms of colonialism from Africa. The OAU recorded limited success in
resolving Africa's most salient conflicts. The only peace-keeping force that the
OAU established failed to keep peace in Chad in the early eighties. In addition to
this, a number of factors combined to render the OAU much less effective than its
founding fathers had wanted. Among these were:
*The existence of too many crises and conflicts in Africa;
xxviii
*The
very
toward
feeble
the
payment
of
OAU,
commitment
which
mandatory
on
was
dues,
the
part
manifested
and
closer
of
African
in
the
ties
states
irregular
with
former
colonial rulers than with other African states;
*The
existence
of
weak
institutions
which
could
not
implement
decision
*The
persistent
intervention
in
African
affairs
by
external
powers
which directly undermined African unity; and
*The
African
criticism
leaders
that
or
the
Head
OAU
of
was
more
States
of
than
an
an
organization
of
organization
of
African peoples 8
However, it is argued that the OAU endured largely because it served the
diplomatic needs of African states. It successfully mediated some small disputes,
e.g. Algeria-Morocco border dispute from 1964-65, and Kenya-Somalia border
disputes also from 1965-67, and it articulated a common position to the external
world on apartheid and economic development issues. It also provided a
xxix
framework for the generation of common economic strategies such as the Lagos
plan of Action. Without doubt, the African Union is a very ambitious continental
undertaking. This is highlighted by the fact that contemporary Africa has recorded
several attempts at development through the stimulus of sub-regional and
regional organizations with marginal degrees of success at best. In assessing the
viability of the A U as an approach to development and regional integration, one
must not lose sight of the fact that any international organization is only as
powerful and effective as its component states make it.
2.3 THE ECONOMICS ACHIEVEMENT OF OAU.
Since the idea of an economic integration process was conceptualized in
Lagos, Nigeria, It was logical that Nigeria should host the OAU summit where the
Treaty establishing the Africa Economic Community was to be signed .Thus, from
3-5 June 1991 Nigeria again hosted the 27th ordinary session of the assemble of
heads of state and government of the OAU in Abuja where the treaty establishing
the African economic community was signed by fifty-one participating Heads of
state and Government. The new partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is
xxx
an integrated strategic policy framework for Africa's renewal and broad-based
sustainable economic and social development. 9 It is a pledge by African leaders to
eradicate poverty and place the continent on a path of sustainable growth and
development, as well as to participate in the world economy and body politic.
Thus, NEPAD intends to guide the continent through rapid economic recovery,
accelerated growth and sustained development.10
In discussing the role of Nigeria in the New Partnership of Africa's
Development (NEPAD), it is important to explain what NEPAD is, vis-a-vis its aims,
goals and objectives. NEPAD can aptly be described as the collective vision of
African leaders after largely unsuccessful efforts at development in the first four
decades of independence. Torn apart by fratricidal conflict with its populations
wallowing in misery and underdevelopment, Africa remained the laggard among
the regions of the world in tit-beginning of this century. NEPAD thus emerged as
the dream" the region's leaders for a better deal. Before NEPAD, there were-more
than 30 initiatives targeted at the development of Africa!" the first four decades
of independence.
xxxi
As the world leaders strategize for the new millenniums 2000, there was no
unifying philosophy, nor credible developing: programme in Africa. NEPAD thus
emerged and offered to restore peace and security; entrench good governance in
all ramifications; eradicate severe poverty and widespread underdevelopment
accelerate growth and sustainable development and put an end to the
marginalization of the region in the globalization process.
With no coherent alternative scenario in. sight, it was not difficult for the
Organization of African Unity (now African Union" to adopt NEPAD unanimously.
Thus, in July 2001, the OAU adopted NEPAD as the socio-economic agenda for
Africa. 11
The international community, already concerned about a state of
underdevelopment in Africa, heaved a sigh of relief and pledged to support the
new endeavour. The G8 leaders, in particular embraced NEPAD and set up a
group of personal representatives, who were experts to work with African leaders
and come up with how best to support the programme. This was the genesis of
xxxii
the Kananaskis Action Plan for NEPAD adopted by the G8 countries in their 2002
summit in Canada.12
NEPAD was conceived by its architects as a comprehensive, integrated and
holistic strategy. Its philosophical underpinnings derive largely from the African
heritage.
In achieving her aims and objective economically, the constitutive Act
provided the machinery in which achievement would come economically. Article
19 stated that the union shall have the following financial institution, whose rules
and regulation shall be defined in protocols relating thereto:
*The African Central Bank
*The African Monetary Fund
*The African Investment Bank
Also Article 22 of the constitutive act list out the following which has targeted
toward economic achievement of the organization:
xxxiii
*The economic, socio-cultural council shall be an advisory organ composed of
different social and professional group to the member state of the union.
*The functions, powers, composition and organization of the economic, social
and cultural shall be determined by the assembly
2.4 THE POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT OF OAU.
The literature on Nigeria’s role in regional peace-keeping, peace
enforcement, peace-building and peace-mediation is quite rich. So it is for
regional economic integration, especially at the level of West Africa. Rather than
going down the memory lane here, let us focus on the current effort of Nigeria
under President Olusegun Obasanjo.
At the 1999 Algiers OAU summit, President Obasanjo suggested that the year
2000 be made the year of Peace, security and solidarity in order to draw greater
attention to the need for peace, security and solidarity as basic requirement for
sustainable growth and development in Africa. The summit accepted the
proposal, similarly at the fourth Extraordinary OAU summit held in September
1999 in Sirte, Libya. President Obasanjo proposed the convening of a ministerial
xxxiv
conference on security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa
(CSSDCA).The proposal was again accepted and Nigeria played host to the
conference on 8 and 9 May 2000 in Abuja.13
When President Obasanjo was military Head of State in the late 1970s,
inter-Sudan peace talk were held in Lagos, Nigeria again in 2004.Nigeria also
offered to facilitate the Darfurian peace talks by hosting and funding it in Abuja. In
this regard, Nigeria settled all the costs of transportation, accommodation,
feeding, medical, conference venue, insurance etc, that were related to the peace
talks. President Obasanjo engaged in several peace shuttles in order to bring the
warning parties to table in Nigeria among other political crisis settled by the OAU
Chaired by President Olusegun Obasanjo
14
Other crisis settled within that time
frame include,
*The land crisis in Zimbabwe which almost tore apart the membership of the
commonwealth.
*The reversal of the coup d’état in Sao Tome and Principe in early 2003..
xxxv
*Nigeria again brokered peace in the Mano River Union comprising Liberia,
Guinea and Sierra Leone, Nigeria have a bilateral agreement on security,
protection for the Government of President Tejan Kabbah.It was on this basis of
this bilateral accord that Nigeria were in Sierra Leone to contain the violent
activities of the RUF before the arrival of ECOMOG II in Sierra Leone.15
2.5 SOCIO-CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENT OF OAU.
The major pillar of Nigeria’s African policy is important that the country’s
successive government has continued to attach to the objective of promoting
regional cooperation and integration in Africa. Nigeria has always shown
commitment to schemes designed for promoting cooperation among countries in
the continent. The country’s love for cultural cooperation and interaction among
countries in Africa is explanatory of her regionally prompt response to crisis
situation in the continent, since it is the belief of the OAU government, that war
or conflict is a bottleneck and an obstacle to peaceful cultural intercourse among
Africa countries. On 25 May 1963, getting the Heads of State and Government to
agree and sign the Charter establishing the Organization was a major
xxxvi
achievement, considering the deep division that existed amongst them before
arriving in Addis Ababa. There were two broad spectrum of opinions concerning
the shape and form that the Charter should take and they came to Addis Ababa
with various dissenting opinions.16 Thirty African Heads of State and Government
signed the Charter establishing the Organization of African Unity consisting of
Continental African states, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa at
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with their strong opinion as contained in the Charter for
the Union of African states, adopted in July 1961 and Lagos Charter, adopted in
January 1962, spelled out in detail the process for the establishment of a
continental organization, as well as the institutional structure and machinery of
the envisaged organization.17
On the one side was the position of the Casablanca Group, that is, the
radical bloc of African politics consisting of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the
United Arab Republic, and the Provisional Government of Algeria. The Group
stood for the immediate political union of all African states, the creation of a
continental capital at Bangui, Central Africa Republic, and the creation of an
African High Command to cater for the continental security needs and to
xxxvii
prosecute anti-colonial wars. The Group came to Addis Ababa with the Charter for
the Union of African States, which they hoped would form the basis of the OAU
Charter.18
On the opposite side was the Monrovia Group, consisting of member states
of the Brazzaville 12, that is, former French-speaking African states, dubbed the
conservative bloc of African politics, and uncommitted/moderate bloc of states,
including Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Togo and Tunisia. The Monrovia Group believed in a gradual and functional
approach to the issue of cooperation among African states and came to Addis,
bent on pushing for the adoption and ratification of Lagos Charter as the Charter
of the OAU.19
The divergence of opinion between the two blocs of African politics became
manifest during the meeting of African Foreign Ministers which opened on 15
May 1963 in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Ketema Yifru, chaired
the meeting and the task before them was to adopt the agenda for the meeting of
(Heads of State and to create a Charter for the proposed Organization of African
xxxviii
Unity. While it was not too difficult for them to agree on the agenda for the
Summit, they were however according to Ketema unable to reach a consensus on
the issue of a draft Charter for the proposed continental organization).20 This was
largely because the Foreign Ministers at the meeting had different views on what
the Charter should contain and what it should not contain.
While the views of the Foreign Minister of Ghana contained in the Charter
for the Union of African States represented the position of the Casablanca Group,
those of his Nigerian counterpart encapsulated in the Lagos Charter represented
the position of the Monrovia Group. Between these two extremes was the
Ethiopian draft charter, which was eventually chosen as basis for discussion at the
meeting since it contained the views of both the Casablanca and the Monrovia
Groups. The Ethiopian draft included the establishment of an Organization of
African States, with a Charter and a permanent secretariat; cooperation in areas
of economy and social welfare, education and culture, and collective defense;
final eradication of colonialism; combating racial discrimination and apartheid;
establishment of regional economic groupings; and disarmament.21
xxxix
Discussions on these draft charter provisions were still going on when the
Summit of African Heads of State got underway on 22 May 1963. In his speech to
the Summit, Emperor Selassie spoke with passion about the need to create a
single continental body through which Africa's single voice may be heard and
which will facilitate acceptable solutions to disputes among Africans and promote
the study and adoption of measures for common defense and cooperation in the
economic and social field. In the words of Brownell he concluded by challenging
the other African Heads of State thus:
“This Conference cannot close without adopting a single Charter. We
cannot leave here without having created a single African organization... If we fail
in this, we will have shirked our responsibility to Africa and to the people we lead.
If we succeed, then, and only then, will we have justified our presence here.” 22
Moved by this plea, the Summit mandated the Foreign Ministers
Conference to come up with an acceptable Charter that could be signed by them
before the adjournment of the Summit. Ketema Yifru presented the final result of
the Ministers deliberation to the Summit, and stated thus:
xl
“...I wish to repeat that all the documents before you were worked out by long
discussions and compromise. All our meetings were conducted in a spirit of
brotherhood and there was complete agreement on all decisions. If there were
differences, these were limited to questions of procedure, approach of tactic, but
never on substance or the destiny of our peoples. It is therefore my bounden duty
to express my appreciation for the wisdom of the Foreign Ministers and to ask
this august body, in the name of all our peoples, to adopt these measures
formally and to sign your name in history.”23
After some discussion and deliberations, 302 African Heads of State and
Government (Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso (formerly known as Upper
Volta), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, CongoLeopoldville, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya,
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda) signed the OAU Charter in Addis
Ababa, on 25 May 1963.
24
Undoubtedly, the Charter was a compromise of the
various approaches to African unity, which had manifested themselves on the eve
of the Addis Ababa Summit. Although it made some concessions to the
xli
Casablanca Group by setting up a Liberation Committee charged with the
responsibility of assisting colonial African states in their struggle for
independence, the Charter was mostly a reflection of the views and opinion of the
Monrovia Group. As rightly pointed out by Teslim Elias,
25
the Nigerian Attorney-
General at the time, “the Charter of the OAU was a triumph for the moderate,
gradual and functional approach to political and economic integration in Africa. It
contained many of the principles advocated by the Monrovia Group such as the
inalienable rights of African states as then constituted, commitment to sovereign
legal equality and self-determination, as well as guarantee against interference in
their internal affairs.”
OAU countries have always been prepared to commit men and resources for
the realization of regional cooperation and integration. In the 1960s the
country(Nigeria)played prominent role in the establishment of OAU and in its
eventual transformation into Africa Union in 2000.In the early 1990s,Nigeria was
one of the principal initiator of ECOWAS ,Expatiating on the rationale for
promoting regional cooperation and integration as a central pillar of Africa’s
development strategy.
xlii
xliii
Notes and Reference
1. Creation of OAU; Yifru. From peace-keeping to complex emergenciespeace support mission in Africa, edited buy Jackie colliers and Girea Mills,
July 1999
2. Ibid
3. Alako Olokun, “The African Union and new partnership for Africa’s
development” paper presented at foreign policy retreat, Abuja, 1993.
4. Ibid
5. Awolowo. O. Path to Nigerian freedom. ( London 1946)
6. Ibid
7. See Dede, B.N., “ THE EVOLUTION OF THE African Union”, in the African
Union
and the challenges of cooperation and integration (Ibadan;
spectrum books, 2002)
8. Ibid
xliv
9. Extracted from the Au charter.
10. Africa Union press release available on the internet at http://www.AfricaUnion.org/home/welcome.htm.
11.Brownson Dede, "The Evolution of the African Union", in The African Union
and the Challenges of Cooperation and Integration: Proceedings of the
National Seminar (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, ©Federal Ministry of
Cooperation and Integration in Africa, 2002), p.8.
12.Ibid
13.Ibid
14.African Contemporary Record, 1971-1972, P.C 38; and Bola A. Akinterinwa,
Nigeria and France, 1960-1995: The Dilemma of Thirty-five Years of
Relationship (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 1999), p.32.
15.Nigerian News Bulletin, No.10, 1982; pp. 15-16.
16.ibid
17.Brownson Dede, "The Evolution of the African Union", op. cit., pp. 5-6.
xlv
18.See "The Road to an African Union", in The Final Call: On-line Edition,
19.Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,
20.Comoros, Cote d'lvoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe.
21.Benin, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda and South Africa.
22.Angola, Algeria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, and Swaziland.
23.See AU Press Release, No. 062/2003, Addis Ababa, July 31, 2003.
24.Ibid
xlvi
CHAPTER THREE
FROM ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO AFRICAN UNION
3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIAN’S FOREIGN POLICY
The nexus between Nigeria's policy on Africa and Nigeria's
development policy is thin. Nigeria's honest brokerage of crises and conflicts in
Africa, her good neighborly attitude to and relationship with African States and
most importantly, Nigeria's declared and de facto commitment to the
development of Africa, as epitomized in her policy of Afro-centrism is legendary.
Although, not well appreciated by the larger international community and even
some African States who see Nigeria from an overbearing posture. If the
international community had objectively appreciated Nigeria's contributions to
the political emancipation and development of Africa, it has not really come to
grips with its burden and implications at the domestic level. The international
community is yet to understand that Nigeria's contribution to the political
emancipation and development of Africa has been more of a sacrifice and
burden-sharing in the spirit of African solidarity.
xlvii
Indeed, Nigeria sees the AU as a new instrument for economic
emancipation and political integration in Africa and therefore considers how to
use her foreign policy to promote and sustain the African Union, especially in
terms of how to build African capacity and how to respond to the challenges of
globalization and attain the aims and objectives of the AU. Additionally, Nigeria's
assistance has generally been without strings and has, more often than not, also
been offered, rather than requested for, on humanitarian basis. However, this
policy posture does not seem to have been internationally well appreciated.
For instance, several countries, including some African States and for
political reasons, have raised a contradiction between Nigeria's quest for a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council, on the one hand, and Nigeria's high
level of indebtedness and Inability to put her domestic situation in order, on the
other. In other words, how can Nigeria fund the maintenance of regional or
international peace and security operations with her level of financial insolvency
and much dependence on the developed world for assistance?1
xlviii
This observation is logically tenable. However, there is still the need to ask
further questions here. Nigeria has, until now, been very instrumental to the
maintenance of peace and security in Africa. She has, since 1960, been actively
participating in various UN peacekeeping operations world over, in spite of
Nigeria's dwindling resources and in spite of the fact that the situation in Nigeria
has not been good. In fact, for the greater part of Nigeria's post-independence
existence, she was under military dictatorship. There was no political stability per
se. The Human Development Index (HDI) was not high. In terms of HDI ranking,
Nigeria is placed in the 152nd position amongst the 175 countries ranked in the
world in the year 2003, thus coming after Libya (61st position), South Africa (111th
position), Egypt (120th position), Algeria (107th position), Cape Verde (103rd
position), and Sao Tome and Principe (122nd position). 2 Nigeria was and still is a
primary producer. Given this situation, how did Nigeria still manage to impact
positively on the decolonization of the continent? Can the history of regional
integration and cooperation be completely told without considering the factor of
Nigeria as a catalytic agent? When Nigeria, in an attempt to defend African
xlix
interests, challenged, the big powers in the past, was the situation of Nigeria by
then, any better than what it is now? 3
Whatever is the case, this researcher observes that the place of Africa in
Nigeria's foreign policy calculations is very important and strategic; that the
consideration of Africa as a special priority in Nigeria's foreign policy calculations,
especially as a priority-operational area of Nigeria's foreign policy, is less a
reflection of the domestic situation but more of an expression of a conscious
policy and determination to protect Africa at all costs; and more significantly,
that, if the various Governments of Nigeria could fight for Africa, in spite of the
alleged disorderly and contradictory-situation in Nigeria and still succeeded, it can
be safely argued that Nigeria will have the potential to record a greater feat
whenever the domestic contradictions are removed. Consequently, the nature of
the Nigerian State and the alleged contradictions in the polity cannot logically be
an obstacle to Nigeria's quest for a UN Security Council seat. In other words, the
prospects of increased Nigerian contributions to African development cannot but
be bright in the long run. The implication of this is obvious: if Nigeria is actively
seized with African problems, in particular, and other world questions, in general,
l
in an environment of socio-economic and political contradictions, the factor of
environmental conditionings has to be explained in two different ways. First, it
does not allow the achievement of maximum gains in the pursuit of development
goals; and secondly, if the environmental conditionings are made more conducive
to the attainment of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives in Africa, Nigeria cannot
but be better prepared, stronger and solvent in her African development efforts.
In this regard, whatever is required to defend and protect the continent, as well
as responding to the challenges of a globalizing world, can be a foreign policy
focus and has to be subsequently addressed.4
Thus, in explaining the dynamics of Nigeria's contributions to the political
emancipation of Africa, particularly decolonization and de-apartheidisation of
South Africa, the problem is not a priority of the domestic situation of Nigeria, but
essentially that of determination, that of political will of the Government of
Nigeria to promote African interests. It was not because Nigeria's economy was
healthy that the various Nigerian governments opted to give unconditional
assistance to other countries. The goodness of the domestic situation and the
factor of oil boom only enhanced Nigeria's political determination, while the lack
li
of goodness of the domestic situation could only weaken the implementation of a
given political determination. At the centre of all domestic factors and
considerations is determination to do or not to do. As for Africa, Nigeria's
determination is to do. For instance, if, after Nigeria's oil boom came the oil doom
and Nigeria's role in the development of Africa has not been adversely affected,
how do we then explain this situation?
Put interrogatively, is Nigeria's current situation that of an El Dorado? If it is
not, how do we explain Nigeria's commitment to the resolution of the current
conflict in Darfur, in Western Sudan? Since the inception of Nigeria's Fourth
Republic, President Olusegun Obasanjo has nipped in the bud several crises in
many parts of Africa. The military uprisings in Sao Tome and Principe and in
Guinea Bissau are some of the examples,5 the question now is how do we explain
the fact that Nigeria's situation was not good and yet, Nigeria was still able to help
maintain peace in neighbouring countries? Many questions can be raised here,
but one answer will suffice and that is that there is a sort of umbilical cord
between Nigeria and Africa that makes Nigeria behave like the chief advocate,
chief defender, if not the special policeman of Africa and this is traceable to the
lii
conception of Africa as the cornerstone, centre piece and epicentre of Nigeria's
foreign policy.6
We have argued elsewhere that no African country has done more than
what Nigeria had already done for Africa, in terms of total commitment to the
defence and promotion of African interests, maintenance of regional peace and
security, as well as promotion of regional cooperation and integration. In this
research, the cardinal purpose is two-fold. The first is to illustrate Nigeria's
commitment to the attainment of the objectives of the OAU and AU beyond every
reasonable doubt, to suggest how Nigeria could further respond to the challenges
of African development and globalization, as well as argue that, if the United
Nations Security Council is to be expanded and a seat has to be given to an
African country, Nigeria is the primus inter pares that objectively and naturally
deserves the seat. Nigeria undeniably is a regional influence on her own right. This
research therefore agrees with the Senegalese Foreign Minister, His Excellency, Dr
Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, who, in a lecture delivered in New Delhi in September
2004, said Nigeria and South Africa are the "only two legitimate candidates" for
the United Nations Security Council seat.7
liii
As much as this observation is valid, Nigeria and South Africa are not at all
at the same pedestal in terms of contributions to international peace-keeping,
maintenance of regional peace and security. In fact, while Nigeria has been
actively engaged in this since 1960, South Africa's efforts, strictly speaking, began
in the post-apartheid era.
The second objective is to respond to the concerns of the Coordinating
Committee of the OAU Summit, held in Lome on 9th July 2000, which requested
the Senegalese President, Maitre Abdoulaye Wade, to organize a Pan African
Conference of Intellectuals and Men of Culture from Africa and Diaspora that
would examine "The Role of Intellectuals in the Building of the African Union".
The Conference, which took place in Dakar, Senegal, from 6th to 9th October 2004,
wanted Africa to keep with the spirit of the conventions and treaties aimed at
freeing Africa from crises and conflicts, and therefore proposed a Decade of Peace
in Africa, beginning from 2005 to 2015.8
Without doubt, a conflict-free environment cannot but enhance
development. However, what role have the scholars been playing in bringing
liv
about a conflict-free environment and sustaining the African Union? What role
should they be playing in bringing the African Union to the doorsteps of the
generality of the people? To what extent do Africans know the roles played by
their Governments in the development of Africa? Scholars' roles are best
understood through their analyses on African problems and how to resolving
them and it is in this context that the writing of this chapter and this research
should be situated. Nigeria's efforts to the development of the AU are immense
but the efforts are not well known. Intellectuals and scholars therefore owe the
world, particularly the African people, the responsibility of harnessing existing
knowledge and bringing it to the knowledge of the people.
In this research, attempt is made to show that Nigeria has always been the
chief advocate and leading defender of African interests, as well as a catalytic
agent of development of the continent.
3.2 NIGERIA AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT
Nigeria has continued to show immense concern for issues bordering on the
development of Africa since periods preceding her attainment of sovereign
lv
statehood. The country's focus on Africa could be explained in part as a conscious
resolve by both the nationalists and post-independence leadership to shoulder
the burden of the black man based on the awareness that Nigeria is the abode of
the black race, having a population of 140 million (approx,),9 with the possibility
of one out of every 10 black men being a Nigerian, and an economy of the size
and potentials capable of providing solid basis for the economic transformation of
the entire continent. The popular strand in the argument of Nigerian nationalists
in the course of their struggle for the de-colonization of Africa was the belief that
de-colonization of the entire continent was desirable, not because it would end
the rule of one race over another and by extension, put an end to all the
humiliation and exploitation of that rule, but also would pave the way for the
internal social revolution that was required in each country of a de-colonized
Africa for the establishment of a people-centric development agenda.
The zeal, with which Nigerian nationalists prosecuted the struggle for
political autonomy of the countries of Africa from colonial bondage, has
continued to reproduce itself in the policies and programmes of the successive
post-colonial Governments of Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria's consistency in her
lvi
concern for Africa is evident in the adoption of Africa as the cornerstone of the
country's foreign policy. The country's African diplomacy centers around five
broad strands, namely;
*Support for the institutional machinery for the articulation of African interests,
aggregation of African demands, harmonization of African policies and conduct of
African diplomacy. In this regard, Nigeria was instrumental in the evolution of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) between 1960 and 1963, and its
transformation, between 1999 and 2002, to African Union (AU).
*Anti-colonial preoccupation; Nigeria pursues the objectives of de-colonization in
Africa by deploying material resources in support of liberation movements against
the colonial and racist regimes.
*Total support for Anti-Apartheid struggles in Southern Africa.
*Promotion of Intra-African economic cooperation
*Deep commitment to peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes and conflicts.10
lvii
In the pursuit of these five strands of Nigeria's African policy, the country has had
to stand against die interest of external powers in the international arena,
particularly, in periods preceding the 1980's, when the country's economy was
buoyant enough to sustain Nigeria's ambitious African policy. The driving force of
the country's foreign policy was articulated in June 1976 by the Head of State,
General Olusegun Obasanjo, as consisting of the following objectives:
*the
defenses
of
the
sovereignty,
independence,
and
territorial integrity of the country;
*the
creation
conditions
facilitate
in
of
the
Africa
and
the
defence
necessary
the
of
rest
the
political
of
the
independence
and
world
and
economic
which
will
territorial
integrity of All African Countries, while at the same time, fostering national selfreliance
and
rapid
economic
development;
*the
promotion
of
equality
and
the rest of the developing world;
lviii
self-reliance
in
Africa
and
*the
promotion
and
defence
of
justice
and
respect
for
human dignity especially the dignity of the Blackman; and
*the defence and promotion of world peace.11
It is noteworthy that, although these objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy
have been criticized variously as overly ambitious, un-representative of the
country's core-National interests, and limited in focus, they have continued to
influence successive Nigerian Governments. The focus of this chapter is to
articulate the vital role Nigeria has been playing in championing Africa's quest for
development and in facilitating development in Africa. This can be seen in the
institution of programmes like the; Nigeria's active support for regional
integration process, the Technical Aid Programme as an instrument of foreign
relations, and last Nigeria's belief in the establishment of partnership between
development partners and African Governments, and lastly the imperative of
peace through good governance.12
3.3 NIGERIA AND THE AFRICAN UNION
lix
When African leaders met in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, the 38th
Ordinary Session of the OAU, and it’s very last, led to the birth of the African
Union. There, African leaders launched the African Union to replace the OAU as
Africa's premier intergovernmental organization. The historic event marked the
culmination of a process, which started in Sirte, Libya, on 9th September 1999, by
the adoption of what has become known as the Sirte Declaration.
13
In the
Declaration, African leaders decided to:
“establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the
Charter of our continental organization and the provisions of the Treaty
Establishing the African Economic Community.”14
Before the Durban Summit, the Constitutive Act had been adopted by
Africa's Heads of State and Government during the 36th Ordinary Session of the
OAU in Lome, Togo, while the Lusaka Summit, in the following year, set out the
details of what needed to be done before the Union was to take off in Durban.
With the launching of the African Union, great hopes and optimism were
engendered that the new organization would be a force for positive change in
lx
Africa and an effective instrument for addressing Africa's multifaceted challenges
in the new Millennium. Yet, there were also, and still are, fears and doubts that
the optimism might well be misplaced, given the numerous serious challenges
and obstacles which the new organization would inevitably have to contend with,
and which for the past several years, have hindered Africa's development
aspirations.
In what follows, this research will attempt to review the performance of the
OAU, its successes and failures and the necessity for a new vision and a new
organization. It will also make a critical assessment of the African Union within
the context of its prospects and challenges, and then, consider Nigeria's role in
the establishment of the African Union, although in an abridged form and what
expectations are viewed of the new organization.
3.4 THE AFRICAN UNION AND OPLITICAL STARBILITY IN THE CONTINENT
By 26th May 2005, the African Union (AU) will formally have been in
existence for three years. Nigeria ratified the Constitutive Act which established
the AU in April 2001, and in having done so, the Act was ratified by the required
lxi
two-thirds of member states of the now defunct Organization of African Unity
(OAU). It was agreed by member states that the transition from the OAU to AU
would take one year. This period was duly completed by May 2002, and the AU
thus became the successor to the OAU and the African continental legal entity.15
For
its
take-off,
the
Nigerian
government
empanelled
an
important seminar which was held in Abuja in 2001. This seminar undertook a
comprehensive review of the historical evolution and experiential difficulties of
the OAU, and the steps taken towards the emergence of the AU. There was also
very fruitful review of the various institutions and structures, finances and
performance of the OAU. The justification for undertaking a transformation of
the OAU to AU was equally dealt with. As correctly stated by the Nigerian
President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, "the African Union is the final goal of African
unity, that African leaders (and peoples) have been pursuing for more than forty
years."16
Three years are certainly not long enough for a proper appreciation of how
well the AU has been positioned to affect positively the African condition. Yet, for
lxii
reasons of its pivotal role in the transformation of the continent, the African
peoples are earnestly "waiting for the African Union" to manifest its will and fulfill
the yearnings of the African peoples. There is therefore value in a brief review of
the AU in its three years of existence. This is what the research attempt to do
here with particular reference to certain factors of political instability and the
observed trends in the AU's experience in grappling with these factors
In the earlier work, attention was drawn to the fact that, "the relationship
between political stability and sustenance of the African Union is complex,
fundamental and dialectical. There is a critical sense in which political stability
could lead to the sustenance of the African Union and there is equally such a
sense in which the existence of the African Union could lead to the achievement
of political stability in the continent."17
There is hardly political stability in the continent, yet, there are justifiable
expectations that the African Union would provide or induce the necessary
conditions of stability. The researcher has explored some strategic forces or
factors which the AU should grapple with so as to achieve the environment of
lxiii
stability, believing that the emergence of the AU is a most appropriate response
to the challenges of globalization, continued underdevelopment, poverty and
economic marginalization.18
Attention was also drawn on in our earlier presentation to the large and
critical forces which constrained the OAU for over four decades in efforts to
propel and foster political stability in the continent.
These forces include the following:
*globalization and the acceleration of dependence on "European controlled
market forces", and the continuing underdevelopment of the continent;
*absence
or
inadequacy
of
intra-African
trade,
transportation,
communication and telecommunication;
*externally-induced developmental policy profiles and orientation of African
states and governments;
*expansion
and
deepening
of
of the African states;
lxiv
the
export-oriented
economies
*externally-induced
consumer,
consumption
immediate
governments,
the
and
political
patterns
capital
and
goods
and
and
business
tastes
services
classes,
and
for
by
African
the
peoples
generally;
*penchant
for
export-import
businesses
rather
than
industrial
manufactures and agriculture as modes of economic activities;
*the
debt
trap
and
debt
overhang
and
the
growing
incapability
of African states to stem the vicious cycle of indebtedness;
*the
crises
of
state-formation
and
nation-building;
and
problems
of the collapsed or failed states in Africa;
*difficulties
among
of
institution-building;
component
nationalities
and
low
integration
social
processes
classes
in
African
states;
*problems
of
governance
paradigms
or
state-crafts
between decadent dictatorship and fraudulent: democracy;
lxv
-
oscillation
*intra-state
displaced
conflicts
and
persons,
the
the
tragedy
refugee
of
civil
wars
pandemic
-
and
burden
of
upsurge
in
factors
of
human casualties;
*low
or
alienation
negative
and
leadership
anomie
in
performance
Africa's
and
political
the
processes
and
economy;
*increase in primary diseases, and decrease in health care facilities;
*increase in birth rate and negative population profiles of African nations;
*enlargement of the gap between social classes - acceleration o£ mass poverty
vis-a-vis acceleration of affluence of the classes;
*low or negative investment in production and manufacturing, and the flight of
capital away from the continent to Africa's Advanced industrialized trading
partners;
*weakness of market forces and the difficulty of sustaining viable markets for
modern goods and services in the continent;
lxvi
*gross absence of security of life and property and the increase and complexity of
crime and criminality including politically-state-induced crimes.19
3.5
THE
AFRICAN
UNION
AND
ECONOMICS
IMPROVEMENT
AND
EMPOWERMENT IN THE CONTINENT
According to Donaldson the trade relations between the developed
countries of the North and the ex-colonial and developing countries of the South
is one between "highly unequal partners."
20
Available statistics point to the
economic gulf between the North and South as reflected in the discrepant levels
of production in agriculture, levels of calorific intake per capita, per capita energy
consumption for industrial and domestic use, consumption of minerals, literacy
rates, per capita incomes, etc. A comparison of statistics on these parameters
reveal staggering differences in the standards of living and levels of economic
activities between the developed and the developing countries.
For one thing, the study of the political economy of most developing
countries often starts with their colonial past. Here emphasis has been on the
influent of colonialism in determining the pattern of modern economic activities
lxvii
within former colonial enclaves. In this regard, reference is made to the fact that,
in pursuit of their colonial policy, the Europeans who colonized many third world
countries were guided by enlightened self-interest. Their interest lay in the
political and economic control of their colonial enclaves. Thus, many analysts of
the political economy of developing countries have always pointed to the fact
that colonialists' expansion of their political sphere of influence to Africa, Asia and
Latin America was Western capitalist economic interest. This interest was
effectuated through the expansion of the "mother-country's" markets to the
colonies. In this respect, the international division of labour argument as invoked
by Williams is as a “rationalization for colonial expansion.”
21
It was also further
argued by Donaldson that “free trade would bring about the maximization of
international exchange of goods in the best interest of both the European
manufacturers and the colonial peoples.”22
However, with the passage of time, former colonial territories began to
visualize these justifications as a thin disguise of the real intentions of the
colonialists, viz the exploitation of the resources of the colonies to the greater
advantage of the "mother countries." It is pertinent to note that, within the ambit
lxviii
of the theory of comparative cost advantage, each player in the international
trade game is ideally expected to embrace specialization and to benefit from it
through exchange. This is the essence of free trade. The reality is, however, that
there exists a great, divide between the developed countries as manufacturers
and the developing countries as producers of large volumes of cheap primary
goods and raw materials to feed the industrial machines of the West.
It has been pointed out, for example, by Rodney that cloth manufacturing
which was carried on in Africa up till the sixteenth century was stifled by the
dumping of cheap European products.
23
The end-result of this was that the
capacity for self-sustaining growth in cloth manufacture in Africa was lost. As a
result, the impetus no longer existed for Africa to continue to register further
advances in cloth manufacture, which should have provided a basis for long-term
progress in this line of business.
Prior to independence, most colonial investments were channeled to areas
in which the colonialists had the greatest prospects of making profits. Such profits
were repatriated and not reinvested except where reinvestment was expected to
lxix
generate even greater returns. Thus, as Donaldson rightly observed, "The spread
effects of such investments were negligible,... there was little demand generated
for local products and there was only limited learning effect from the use of
superior techniques."24
The period from the 1950s witnessed spirited attempts at decolonization by
peoples of Africa and other third world countries. With the attainment of
independence, nationalist leaders in former colonial enclaves realized that, in the
face of the gloomy long-run demand prospects for primary products, it would be
precarious for their countries to rely predominantly on primary products. For, as
Mieir
25
aptly observed, an economy based on primary production relies heavily
on economic growth induced from outside through an expansion of world
demand for its primary commodities. With advancements in science and
technology, the western economies have continued to witness higher levels of
economic growth. In contrast, the developing countries of Africa are attempting
to build an industrial base using borrowed technology. Even at that, success has
remained minimal. The result has been the continuing threats of hunger, disease,
misery and frustration.
lxx
The "North" has increasingly come to see these blights as a threat to its
own privileged existence. In this regard, Hensman
26
drew attention to the
statement made in Canada on 18 May 1966 by Robert McNamara to the
American Society of Newspaper Editors,
27
to the effect that there was a
correlation between growing poverty and growing violence. This idea was
corroborated by Thant in 1968 to the effect that failure to assist the poor nations
to bridge the gap separating them from the rich countries was an invitation to
violence. He therefore opined that people in the developed countries need to be
persuaded to accept the fact that "their future prosperity and security, and that
of their children and grandchildren, is inextricably linked with the well-being of
people in the developing countries."
28
This is partly the rationalization for aid-
giving by the West.
With regard to the humanitarian dimension of aid-giving, Hensman
29
argued that humanitarian considerations, have persuaded many people in Britain,
the United States, the western European countries and perhaps Japan that the
suffering caused by increasing hunger and world poverty must be brought to an
end, not merely for reasons of preserving the privileged position of the 'highlxxi
income' countries, but for the sake of the men, women and children of the 'lowincome' countries.
In the light of the above view point, the flow of official aid from the
industrialized countries with the highest per capita incomes to the developing
countries in the form of loans, grants, technical assistance has been justified.
Bhagwati,
30
therefore reasoned that the UNCTAD conferences provided the
forum for the developing countries to "appeal to the developed countries on a
purely moral plain for the provision of technical assistance and foreign aid for
development programmes." He was however quick to observe that the aid
obligations were not often met. He attributed this to "the steady thaw in
superpower relations." He therefore concluded that the major motivating factor
behind the aid programmes of the 1950s was the political necessities of the Cold
War rather than humanitarian motives.31
The paradox is, however, that on the basis of mere verbal commitment to
aid giving by the developed countries, many developing countries anchored their
development plan on anticipated assistance from the West. Thus, for instance,
lxxii
Nigeria's 1962-68 National Development Plan was anchored on the expectation
that fifty per cent of expected revenue would come from foreign aid. By
implication, Nigeria's development goals were tied to the apron string of donor
agencies and governments. Yet as Dean,
31
rightly observed, donor countries
"were concerned to tie their aid to the import of goods and services from their
own countries and donor agencies apparently believed that this was most feasible
if specific import requirements were aided." This reinforces the fact that serfinterest
rather
than
humanitarian
consideration
was
the
paramount
consideration of the donors. In the final analysis, therefore, it could be argued
that aid was an instrument for infiltrating and influencing political and economic
policies in recipient countries. It was not necessarily targeted at bridging the
economic gap between donors and recipients. To buttress this point of view as it
relates to Nigeria, Dean had argued that;
“Agencies of foreign governments had goals other than assisting Nigeria's
Plan execution: they also aimed at influencing the economic and political policies
of recipient countries; obtaining information on the economies of recipient
countries as well as other types of confidential information; promoting their
lxxiii
exports; obtaining favourable publicity for their aid efforts; influencing the choice
of projects; and securing the employment of their own nationals in plan
projects.”32
Note and References
1.
Sirte Declaration, 9th September 1999.
2.
See Dede, B.N., "The Evolution of the African Union", in The
African
Union
and
the
Challenges
of
Cooperation
and
Integration
(Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2002).
3.
Sirte Declaration, 9th September 1999.
4.
Salim Ahmed Salim (1993):
Past
and
Prospects
for
the
"OAU at 30: Reflections on the
Future".
25, 1993, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p.l.
lxxiv
Lecture
delivered
on
May
5.
Salim Ahmed Salim, ibid., p.l.
6.
Salim Ahmed Salim, ibid., p.l.
7.
Salim Ahmed Salim, ibid.
8.
Onuoha
Prospects",
Jonah,
"Nigeria
Lecture
and
delivered
the
at
African
the
Union:
NIPSS,
Kuru,
Roles
and
1st
July
2004", p. 15.
9.
Sirte Declaration, 9th September 1999.
10.
Dede, B.N. (2002): "The Evolution of the African Union", op.
cit., note no. 2, p. 9.
11.
Shinkaiye
African
(Amb),
Union",
Cooperation
and.
Seminar
the
by
in
J.K.
(2002):
The
African
Integration,
Ministry
of
"Nigeria's
Role
Union
and
proceedings
of
Cooperation
and
Africa, 14-15 May 2001, pp.11-29.
lxxv
in
Shaping
the
Challenges
in
the
National
Integration
in
12.
Lamido,
OAU
Sule:
Council
of
Intervention
Ministers,
during
Tripoli,
Extra-Ordinary
Libya
May
Session
2000,
of
quoted
in ibid., p.19.
13.
Lamido, Sule, ibid., p.19.
14.
Wachukwu Jaja, in Dede, ibid., p.8.
15.
K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (6th ed.),
(Englcwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p.9.
16.
Ibid. pp. 83-114.
17.
Olu Adeniji, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Governance and
International Security (Ibadan: Dokun Publishers, 2000), p.6.
18.
Ibid., pp.7-8.
19.
G.
Policy"
Aforka
in
Nweke,
Nigerian
"Nigeria's
Journal
National
of
Lagos), Vol.11, No.l, 1985, pp.1-32.
lxxvi
Interest
International
and
Foreign
Affairs
(NIIA,
20.
Ibrahim
Making:
A.
Gambari,
Nigeria
After
Theory
the
and
Second
Reality
in
Republic
Foreign
(Atlantic
Policy
-
Highlands,
New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1989), p.21.
21.
"Beyond
in
Nigeria:
by
of
organized
29th
Ecology
Towards
presented
Minister
the
a
Framework
Constructive
Ambassador
Foreign
by
and
the
September
2003,
at
for
at
Foreign
the
Advanced
Confluence
Policy-Making
Concentricism",
Oluyemi
Affairs,
Centre
of
Adeniji,
CASS
Hotel,
Honourable
Policy
Social
paper
Dialogue,
Sciences,
Lokoja,
Kogi
26thState,
pp.1-3.
22.
Bola
Policy",
Policy
A.
in
Thrust:
Akinterinwa
Bola
A.
Essays
"Concentricism
Akinterinwa
in
Honour
(ed.),
of
Nigeria's
Nigeria's
Ambassador
CONL (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2004), p.454.
lxxvii
in
Foreign
New
Foreign
Oluycnii
Adeniji,
23.
Victor A.O. Adetula "Nigeria and the African Union". Paper presented at the
international conference on "Nigeria and the World After Forty Years: Policy
Perspectives for a New Century," p.7.
24.
Article 3(f), of The Constitutive Act of the African Union.
25.
Numerous works have been done on the problems of democracy in Africa.
However, for a realistic assessment of current global trends, see UNDP Human
Development Report ""002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (New
York:
26. Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.63-83. See also M. Ade
27. Ibid
28. Ibid
29. Ibid
30. Adejugbe (ed.), Perspectives on Nigeria's Fledgling Fourth Republic (Lagos:
Malthouse Press, 2002); also Jibrin Ibrahim, "Whither the Dividends of Democracy
in Nigeria?," in NEWS from the Nordic Africa Institute, No.3, 2001, pp.2-5.
lxxviii
31. ibid
32. ibid
CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
4.1 SUMMARY
From the above analysis, there is no disputing the fact that Nigeria is
unreservedly committed to the development of Africa. Nigeria's commitment has
been expressed in various forms: provision of technical assistance; grant of
concessionary oil prices to African State; the ECOWAS, not just by promptly
paying Nigeria’s assessed dues and assuming responsibility for about one-third of
the ECOWAS budget, but, at times, also accepting to pay the salaries of the
ECOWAS staff; granting soft loans to needy African States; active engagement in
conflict resolution and peace-building in Africa; ensuring that all Nigerian
diplomats accredited to the AU actively participate in the activities and
development of the AU; proactive assistance in the elaboration and codification
lxxix
of AU principles, rules of procedure and acts; popularizing the AU aim high
support for conferences and workshops on AU activities; and perhaps more
importantly, through the personal involvement of Nigerian leaders, especially,
President Olusegun Obasanjo.
As much as Nigeria's unwavering commitment is noteworthy and
commendable, it may not be sufficient in the long run if other countries do not
also show the same commitment. Besides, it may be difficult to fast track the
development of the Union for a number of obvious factors.
First, Africans and the academic communities, in particular, hardly pay close
attention to OAU and AU agreements that are in force. For instance, what is the
conceptual definition of a region, and a sub-region in the context of the OAU and
the AU? As clearly provided in Article 1(d) and 1(e) of the 1991, Abuja Treaty
Establishing The African Economic Community, there are five regions in Africa:
West, North, East, Central and Southern, as distinct from the UN definition which
sees the whole of Africa as a region. The AEC Treaty also provides that a subregion is constituted in any of the regions when there is an association of, at least,
lxxx
two countries in each of the five regions of Africa. A sub-region can also be
constituted by more than one region. For instance, Nigeria and her immediate
neighbours naturally constitute a sub-region, membership of which is drawn from
the West and Central African regions.
The problem in this regard is that, even though the Treaty Establishing the
African Economic Community is a major component and instrument of the AU
and has even entered into force, virtually everyone still refers to the five different
regions as a sub-region. Rather than promote the African conception of a region,
confusion is created when some government and scholars refer to them as subregions and some others call them regions. There is the need for the AU to be
consistent and for scholars, as well as media practitioners to educate the general
public on this development.
Secondly, there is the problem of non-sustaining membership of the Union.
Some countries adopt the policy of 'open chair'. Some African leaders, for various
reasons, do not attend regularly OAU/AU Summits but are delighted to attend
when the sharing of cake and positions are to be discussed. In fact, some
lxxxi
countries do not settle their assessed dues to the AU but want to host AU
meetings. This is unnecessarily taking other committed members for granted. It is
also a contradiction that is not helpful to 'fast tracking' of the AU. The Union
should be taken more seriously and should be a Union of sustaining members.
Thirdly, there is a related problem of funding and donor dependency at the
African and extra-African levels. At the African level, the Chairman of the AU
Commission, Professor Alphar Oumar Konare, has come up with a new vision and
mission, meant to put the Union at a greater pedestal but which also implied
increased funding. The issue of how to pay, in terms of principles of financial
burden sharing, is now raised. What percentage of the GDP should be allocated
for the purposes of the AU? Some countries want the UN approach of 'weighted'
and 'capacity to pay' principles. Some countries raised the burden of their
domestic problems and have even asked that their arrearages be written off.
Some countries even rightly requested for the application of the principle of
sovereign equality.
lxxxii
The truth is that, when it comes to payments, the issue of insolvency and
incapacity to pay as a result of domestic problems is often raised. When it comes
to the issue of sharing office positions, the principle of sovereign equality is not
raised. A Union like the AU, cannot survive on the basis of a deliberate policy of
double standard. All countries have teething problems. Payment of assessed dues
to any supranational Union or organisation must be a deliberate choice and of
priority. It is necessary for all AU member States to define when the rule of
sovereign equality applies and when it does not. It is also not in the interest of the
AU in the long run, to allow non-paying members to participate in the activities of
the Union.
Fourthly, the African Union, as it is today, still largely remains a
government-to-government business. The majorities of the African people are still
alienated and are completely ignorant about the essence of the Union and the
roles expected of them. In fact, as provided in Article 17(1) of the Constitutive Act
of the AU, "in order to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the
development and economic integration of the continent, a Pan-African Parliament
lxxxiii
shall be established." Thus, the parliament is designed to be a catalyst in the
development processes.
When will the Parliament of representatives elected on the basis of
universal suffrage actually take off? To what extent are the people of Africa
educated on this? Are there political parties with transnational character in
Africa? Although Article 17(2) provides that the composition of the Parliament will
be defined in an additional Protocol to the Constitutive Act, are African politicians
and people bearing their minds on this?
The African people need to be more educated on this. The AU needs to be
more popularized and better understood. Consequently, there has to be a general
public enlightenment, introduction of African Union Studies in all secondary
schools in Africa, as well as, organization of regular conferences and seminars on
every development initiative of the AU. These conferences are to be organised in
member States by the various academic communities. The African Union should a
priori be built on the basis of a bottom-up approach and not top-bottom. It is by
so doing that the people of Africa can play active parts in the development of the
lxxxiv
Union and the continent. The AU will then be owned by the people and the
people will have a legitimate basis to support the AU Assembly in all its
undertakings.
Before concluding, it was shown in the above analyses that Nigeria's
commitment to the development of Africa is as a result of a deliberate choice that
it is altruistic in objective, that it is a burden for all Nigerians by implication and
choice that this is done in the long term interest of the African Union by design.
As also indicated above, Nigeria's Human Developing Index (HDI) was poor by the
time the country was showing concerns for other African countries. In fact,
Nigeria's HDI ranking in 2003 was 152nd position out of 175 countries ranked in
the world. Smaller countries like the Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, etc.
which Nigeria decided to assist, are in better positions. Nigeria's decision to help
develop Africa, using her human and material resources cannot therefore be as a
result of Nigeria's riches or socio-economic and political contradictions but a
resultant factor of a deliberate policy of African solidarity, good neighborliness
and altruism.
lxxxv
4.2 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in the pursuit of AU goals and objectives, cooperation and
solidarity should not be unidirectional or based on 'give and take' only. It must
also be based on 'take and give'. This is the correct interpretation of the meaning
of cooperation. Every Member State of the AU should pay its assessed due as at
when due and should be promptly sanctioned when such payments are delayed.
Nigeria's commitment to the AU is unwavering but it has to be also
unreservedly complemented by other countries if the AU is to be put on a fast
track of development. Nigeria’s foreign policy has also played a central role in
Africa's respective efforts at regional integration and the formation of the AU
largely on the basis of her commitment and support for multilateralism and
collective self-reliance among African states. Having gone through the objectives,
structure and constitutional provisions of the African Union, it is clear without any
doubt that the new-organization displays greater structural differentiation and
focus, especially with respect to development issues, than the OAU. The AU is still
officially in a state of institutional development, yet the expectations are high and
lxxxvi
the challenges of integration and development that it faces are indeed daunting.
These challenges, which are adequately captured in the objectives of the A U as
stated in its Constitutive Act, are numerous; indeed more than what has been
discussed, and touch upon the very crux of the development process.
In assessing the ability of the AU to face these challenges, the reiteration of
a familiar truism has to be made. This is to the effect that the strength and
institutional viability of international organizations are reflections of the collective
strength of their member states. African states are, generally speaking, weak
states; indeed, the weakest grouping of states in the international state system. In
this respect Nigeria's continued support for the AU, its principles and
developmental pursuits remain critical for African regional integration.
In realistic terms, therefore, the ability of the AU to face Africa's integration
and development challenges will first of all hinge upon the willingness of African
states to empower it with the kind of supranational authority which its
Constitutive Act prescribes. This will have to be coupled with the much needed
financial wherewithal that will give it the necessary credibility and effectiveness
lxxxvii
to pursue its stated objectives. If in the short to medium term, African states have
the ability to develop and strengthen the institutional capacity of the AU, the
organization should thereafter lay emphasis upon self-reliance and endogenous
efforts as paths to lasting development. In this respect, continental hegemons like
Nigeria have very critical roles to play.
To all intents and purposes, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, when
compared with the Charter of the OAU, can be regarded as a more progressive
political and legal document in pursuing and meeting the challenges of greater
unity and solidarity, democracy, good governance and respect for human rights,
conflict management and resolution and socio-economic development in Africa.
This is provided that a pro-active and dynamic position is taken in the
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Act as they relate to the
problem of limited governance, policy design, monitoring and implementation,
conflict management and peace building, which are at the core of securing
political stability in Africa and socio-economic development and human security
for its peoples.
lxxxviii
Nevertheless, pursuing and realizing the principles and objectives of the
African Union can only be assured in conditions of peace and security and in an
environment where democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law are
respected. Unfortunately, there are not enough pointers in the provisions of the
Constitutive Act to conclude that African leaders can summon the required
political will to move away from the emphasis in the OAU Charter on national
sovereignty and independence towards collective continental responsibility and
building a supranational organisation envisaged in the AU Constitutive Act. For
example, while Article 4g of the Act confirms the OAU diktat of noninterference in
the internal affairs of member states, Article 4(h) and 4(j) permits such
intervention under grave circumstances on the recommendation of the Peace and
Security Council and pursuant to a decision of the Assembly.
Yet, decisions in both organs are to be taken by consensus or, failing by
two-thirds majority on the basis of sovereign equality of member states and
irrespective of political and economic clout and population of each member state.
This immediately creates a situation of tyranny of the majority in terms of number
and potential inability to implement resolutions aimed at resolving particular
lxxxix
political, economic and social problems in which a collective number of states are
interested parties. It is also instructive to note that such provisions as, putting an
end to the scourge of conflict and their devastating consequences, respect for
individual right and collective freedom, holding of regular free elections,
tolerance, mutual understanding and respect for minority rights, accountability
and transparency in governance and combating corruption are conspicuously
absent in the Act (Melber, 2001).
It will also be interesting to see how the Assembly will apply the provisions
of Article 23 relating to sanctioning defaulters to the budget. If there was
anything that greatly incapacitated the ability of the OAU to function optimally, it
was lack of adequate financial resources. Most times, less than 40% of the
member states pay their annual assessed contributions to the regular budget
either in full or in part. As a result, not only is the OAU Secretariat exposed to
financial risk and ridicule and the operation of the Organisation's specialised
commissions mostly grounded (Legum, 1974), the Organisation itself was
sometimes made to rely heavily on external funding with the immediate dangers
of the possibility of external direction and even control in executing its activities.
xc
As rightly observed by Djinnit Said (2002), an Organisation can only achieve its
goals if it is provided with requisite human and financial resources. It is therefore
imperative for member states of the AU to ensure that the highest caliber of
personnel is made available to work in the Commission and to mobilize and
provide prompt and adequate financial resources to the Union so that it can be
viable and credible.
A report of the New York based International Peace Academy (IPA, 1980)
called for the transformation of the OAU "from a sporadic club of Presidents,
operating by consensus, into an Organisation which would really have clout,
backed by an effective administrative apparatus and Secretariat". The challenge
before Africa and its peoples is to ensure that the transformation of the UAU into
the AU meets this hope and aspiration. It is then and Hilly then that the criticism,
disillusionment, bitterness and anger of the seeming impotence of the OAU can
be channeled to meet the high hope and expectation that the African Union can
achieve the Pan-Africanist dream of true political and socio-economic Integration
of the continent and assure the well-being of its people.
xci
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Maitre Abdoulaye Wade, "Francophone and Anglophone Divide Approach to Subregional Security and Development in the Next Decade", being text of lecture
delivered at the inauguration ceremony of the 13th Regular Course of the
National War College of Nigeria, held at the College Auditorium. See details in
New Sofa (Abuja, Directorate of Army, Public), 6th issue, 2004, pp.94-96.
UNDP, Africa: Human Development Report, 2003.
xcii
Bola A. Akinterinwa, ed.,Nigeria's National Interests in a Globalizing World:
Further Reflections on Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism (Ibadan:
Vantage Publishers, 2005), forthcoming.
See text of his lecture entitled, "NEPAD Team 9: Relations Between India and
Africa", delivered on Friday, 10 September 2004 at the invitation of the Indian
Council of World Affairs in New Delhi, India.
The Africa Nuclear-weapon-free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). For details of this
treaty, see Oluyemi Adeniji, The Treaty of Pelindaba on the African NuclearWeapon-Free Zone (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR), 2002), 348 pp; The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their
Destruction; and the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and
the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous wastes
within Africa.
Brownson Dede, "The Evolution of the African Union", in The African Union and
the Challenges of Cooperation and Integration: Proceedings of the National
xciii
Seminar (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, ©Federal Ministry of Cooperation and
Integration in Africa, 2002), p.8.
African Contemporary Record, 1971-1972, P.C 38; and Bola A. Akinterinwa,
Nigeria and France, 1960-1995: The Dilemma of Thirty-five Years of Relationship
(Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 1999), p.32.
Nigerian News Bulletin, No.10, 1982; pp. 15-16.
Brownson Dede, "The Evolution of the African Union", op. cit., pp. 5-6.
See "The Road to an African Union", in The Final Call: On-line Edition,
http://www.finalcall.com.international/ africa_union06-19 2001.htm.
See "Documents and Speeches : Transition from the OAU to the
African Union", http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/ background/o au_to_au .htm.
It is equally symbolic that Nigeria under General Sani Abacha was
suspended from the Commonwealth as a result of South Africa's anti-military
dictatorship and human rights violations in Nigeria.
xciv
See Okoi Arikpo, "Les pays africains ne veulent pasetre reduits au role
de fournisseurs de matieres premieres, Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), Mars
1974, p.19. For more details, see Bola A. Akinterinwa, Nigeria and France, 19601995: The Dilemma of Thirty-Five Years of Relationship (Ibadan: Vantage
Publishers, 1999), pp. 25-39.
See
Nigeria's
Item:
Contributions
Africa's
External
to
"Africa's
Debt
Burden:
Position
Issues
on
the
and
Agenda
Challenges"
at the Sixth Bi-Regional Group Meeting on the Africa-EU Summit
Process, Dublin, Republic of Ireland, 16-18 February 2004.
There was the Venice Terms, introduced in 1987, to assist the poorest
countries undergoing Structural Adjustment Programmes by then. In
1988, the Toronto Terms adopted introduced to assist the low-income
heavily indebted IDA- only countries. The Houston Terms succeeded it in July
1990
but
was
meant
for
middle-income
countries.
The
Houston
Terms enabled deferred payments and not at all debt reduction. In 1991, there
xcv
were the Enhanced Toronto Terms that allowed for 50% debt service reduction,
and in December 1994, the Naples Terms, which allowed for up to 67% on NPV of
debt for the poorest and most-indebted countries.
The HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) initiatives were adopted in
1996 and later replaced with an 'Enhanced' version in 1999. The initiative is
meant to.
The SDRM was proposed in 2001 to allow for restructuring of debt in
the event of insolvency of a sovereign debtor. It seeks the alleviation of debts of
foreign private creditors and did not apply to indebtedness.
The Evian Approach took its name from the 2003 G8 Summit, held in
Evian, France. The summit agreed that relief would not be based on pre-defined
terms but would be adapted to meet a country's individual circumstances. It only
concerns official debts.
Quoted in Brownson Dede, op. cit., p. 7.
New Soja (Abuja), Sixth Issue, 2004, p.94.
xcvi
J. K. Shinkaiye, "Nigeria's Role in Shaping the African Union", in The
African Union and the Challenges of Cooperation and Integration: Proceedings of
the National Seminar (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, ©Federal Ministry of
Cooperation .md Integration in Africa, 2002), p. 18.
Ibid.
Villascope (Official Newsmagazine of the State House, Abuja, Nigeria),
Vol. 4, No. 3, October 2004, pp. 24-25.
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Cote d'lvoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Benin, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda and South Africa.
Angola, Algeria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Democratic Republic
xcvii
of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, and Swaziland.
See AU Press Release, No. 062/2003, Addis Ababa, July 31, 2003.
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Nigerian Technical Aid. Corps
Scheme (Abuja: Directorate of TAC, 2004), pp. 5 & 8.
Ibid. pp. 9 and 10.
See Akinjide Osuntokun, "An Academic in Government: Reflection on
my Service in the Ministry of External Affairs, 1988-1995", in Bola A. Akinterinwa
(ed.), Nigeria's New Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour of Ambassador
Oluyemi Adeniji, CON. (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2004), p. 42.
xcviii