Introduction to Epistemology
Introduction to Epistemology
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Introduction to Epistemology
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Area 1
What is Knowledge?
Epistemology is most simply defined as the theory of knowledge.
Epistemology is concerned with the structure and origin of knowledge, and whether claims
to have found knowledge are true or false.
What is a propositional knowledge claim?
The knowledge that the Higher Philosophy course is concerned with is ‘propositional’ or
factual knowledge. A ‘proposition’ is a statement that asserts or denies the truth about
something.eg. I know that Ghana is in Africa.
This is different from other types of knowledge such as knowledge of ‘how to’ do
something (I know how to get to Ghana) or, having a personal experience of something
which is known as knowledge by acquaintance (I know a lot about Ghana)
The definition knowledge: The Tripartite theory of knowledge
The standard definition of knowledge has been summarised into the phrase ‘justified, true
belief’.
The three conditions below form what is called the ‘ tripartite theory of knowledge, or
knowledge as justified, true, belief.
1.
The statement has to be true or correspond with a reality outside itself. The first mark
of knowledge must be that your propositional statement is true. You can never have
knowledge if what you think you know is actually false. For example, I cannot ‘know’
that Glasgow is the capital of Scotland, because it isn’t.
2.
The statement has to be believed. For someone to ‘know’ that something is true
he/she must have confidence in his/her knowledge claim. Knowledge requires a
feeling of confidence about being right. If someone hesit ates to offer an answer to a
question because they lack confidence, even though they have the right answer, it
seems reasonable that they don’t really know the answer at all.
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Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland … or is it
Falkirk … no it’s Edinburgh … no it’s …
3.
The statement has to be backed up or justified with evidence to support it. This means
that while I can occasionally stumble across a true statement, lucky guesses do not
count as knowledge. Plato and others after him wished to stress that knowledge is not
simply a matter of holding a true belief with some degree of confidence. Philosophers
think that in order to have knowledge, you must be able to justify what you claim to
know.
The tripartite theory of knowledge is, therefore, making the claim that the three
criteria (justified, true, belief) are individually necessary and jointly sufficient.
Individually necessary …
To say that the tripartite theory is individually necessary simply means that for us to
have knowledge, we must satisfy each condition. Any knowledge claim that cannot do
this cannot be a knowledge claim at all. We simply cannot do without any of the three
conditions.
Jointly sufficient …
This simply means that the three conditions are all that is needed. If it is true that the
tripartite theory is ‘jointly sufficient’ and we can show that we have satisfied all three
conditions then we can guarantee the success of a propositional knowledge claim. In
other words, if you have satisfied all three conditions then you can say with certainty
that you have knowledge.
Problems with the tripartite theory:
1. The Gettier problem (is the tripartite theory jointly sufficient?)
This is a problem with the definition itself. In the 1960s, a philosopher called Edmund
Gettier came up with some questions and examples that undermined the tripartite theory. In
1967 he published a paper simply entitled ‘Is Justified, True Belief knowledg e?’ His paper
was based around a number of examples in which he attempted to show that it is possible to
satisfy all the conditions and yet still be unable to say conclusively that you had
knowledge. Gettier was questioning whether the tripartite theory wa s jointly sufficient. The
examples he and others have subsequently used are known as Gettier -type counterexamples.
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Here are some Gettier-type examples:
Example 1
Your teacher has an identical twin. The twin enters the room and you form the justified,
true belief: ‘My teacher is in the room’. As it happens, she’s sitting at the back of the room
where you hadn’t seen her. But, do you have ‘knowledge’?
Example 2
What appears to be a window is really a TV screen relaying recorded images of the outside
from a week ago. You look, and form the justified belief: ‘It is raining’. As a matter of fact
this is also true. But, do you have ‘knowledge’?
These examples illustrate what Gettier called the problem of accidental correctness. The
connection between my justification and my belief being true is accidental. The worrying
thing about the Gettier examples is that every condition of the tripartite theory has been met
and yet we still wouldn’t want to count it as knowledge. What Gettier was getting at was
the possibility that the tripartite theory itself is wrong.
2. Scepticism (the infinite regress argument suggests that the justification clause
can never be satisfied).
This problem relates to one condition of the tripartite theory. Some philosophers have
argued that the ‘justification condition’ can never be fully satisfied. If they are right then
the whole idea of finding true knowledge isn’t possible. These philosophers are known as
sceptics.
Whatever evidence I bring forward to support a propositional knowledge claim is in as
much need of support as the proposition itself. I need a justification for my justification,
and then a further justification and so on and so on … This
endless search for justification is called the infinite regress argument. The point is that the
sceptic claims that since an infinite regress never comes to an end, the original
propositional knowledge claim can never be justified at all.
Summary: What is knowledge?
 Epistemology is the theory of knowledge.
 The conditions required to satisfy any knowledge claim are thought to be justified, true
belief (the tripartite theory of knowledge).
 The tripartite theory makes the claim that the three conditions are individually necessary
and jointly sufficient.
 Some philosophers have suggested that the tripartite theory of knowledge hasn’t
adequately defined knowledge. The two main problems you will need to know about are:
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– the Gettier problem (if it’s possible to satisfy all three conditions and still not have
knowledge then the tripartite theory is not jointly sufficient)
– the challenge of scepticism (i.e. if the justification condition cannot ever be satisfied
then for knowledge claims to be possible the tripartite theory is not individually
necessary).
Area 2
How is knowledge acquired?
Philosophy’s search for ‘certain knowledge’ has been dominated by two distinct groups of
philosophers. They are called the rationalists and the empir icists. Both are keen to find a
foundation of knowledge that we can know with certainty. Rationalists and empiricists are
known as foundational theories of knowledge. They argue that the infinite regress argument
can be defeated if we can find a foundation for all our knowledge claims. This foundation
will need to be self-evidently true so that it will make no sense for someone to ask you to
justify your foundation.
Rationalism
Truths of reason are the bedrock on which we build the whole of human knowledge 1
The term ‘rationalism’ comes from the Latin word ratio, which means reason. Rationalism
has its roots in ancient Greece with the writings of Plato. In the modern era it was largely a
continental philosophical movement, René Descartes (1596 –1650) and Gottfried Leibniz
(1646–1716) being two of the most influential rationalists.
Foundationalism
Rationalism is considered a foundationalist approach to knowledge. Rationalists say that
human reason is the key foundation of knowledge. According to ra tionalists, reason is the
primary source of justification. Human reason should therefore form the basis of any
attempt to satisfy the justification clause of the tripartite theory.
A priori truths
According to rationalists, truths can be known a priori. A priori truths are known to be true
without any reference to experience. We can check the truth of a claim just by thinking
about it.
For example:
 All bachelors are unmarried males.
1
Cardinal, Hayward and Jones, p41
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 A cat is a feline creature.
 2 + 2 = 4.
 A straight line is the shortest distance between two points.
These types of truths are said to be necessarily true. This term is used to describe all those
statements which, when you think about it, cannot be anything other than true.
Necessary, a priori truth
2+2=4
Empiricism
We are born knowing nothing and that everything we know must come from our senses 2
The term ‘empiricism’ comes from the Latin word experientia, which means experience.
Empiricism can be traced back to the early Greek philosopher Aristotle. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the main empiricists were three British philosophers John Locke
(1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753) and David Hume (1711–1776).
Foundationalism
Empiricism, like rationalism, is also considered to be a foundationalist approach to
knowledge. This means that empiricists have come to think of sense experience as the key
foundation of knowledge. According to the empiricists, experience, as opposed to reason, is
the primary source of justification. At its simplest, empiricism is the view that everything
that we can call knowledge is sourced in our sense experiences. Sense experience should
therefore form the basis of any attempt to satisfy the justification clause of the tripartite
theory.
A posteriori truths
If experience and not reason is the primary source of any knowledge claim then empiricism
will focus its attention on a posteriori rather than a priori truths. A posteriori statements
are known to be true (or false) as a result of experience. For example, I know, a posteriori,
that the cat is black. After my experience of looking at the cat I can say confidently what
colour it is. Unlike a priori truths, the a posteriori truth that the cat is black is not
necessarily true. A posteriori truths are only contingently true. A contingent truth is a truth
‘that could have been otherwise’, or a truth ‘that might not have been true and only happens
to be true’.
Contingent, a posteriori truth
2
Cardinal, Hayward and Jones, p51
The cat is black.
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Innate ideas
The debate concerning the existence of innate ideas is sometimes thought of as the key
belief that distinguishes rationalism from empiricism (traditionally, rationalists being the
philosophers who supported the belief in innate ideas).
Innate truths are ideas believed to be natural to the human mind, ideas that humans have
within them from birth. In other words we are born knowing certain things.
A common mistake people often make is to confuse innate ideas with instincts. The instinct
that a baby has to cry when it’s hungry is not an innate idea.
Possible candidates for innate ideas have included:
 mathematical and geometrical truths, eg Plato’s view that knowledge is remembered
 religious truths, eg the existence of a perfect being ‘God’ (Descartes)
 moral truths, eg St Augustine believed that ideas like ‘murder is wrong’ must be innate
 language, eg the contemporary American linguist Noam Chomsky argued t hat humans
are born with an innate capacity to learn to communicate through the use of words.
An argument against innate ideas (John Locke)
An empiricist will argue that all knowledge comes after experience. This
means that empiricists reject any belief in innate ideas. They argue
that our minds contain no knowledge at all when we are born and that
everything we know comes after experience.
John Locke (1632–1704) is often portrayed as the founder of modern
empiricism. He believed strongly that when babies are born there is no
knowledge innate in their minds. Our minds at birth should be
considered completely empty of any concepts and beliefs. Locke said
that we should think of a newborn baby’s mind as being like a bla nk piece of paper. The
mind at birth is a tabula rasa or blank slate. As our lives develop the mind is stimulated by
sensations and experiences which, therefore, form the basis of our knowledge claims.
An argument for innate ideas (Gottfried Leibniz)
Leibniz presented a famous argument for the existence of innate ideas.
Leibniz was attempting to make the point that innate ideas require work to
uncover them. Leibniz used an analogy of the mind being like a veined
block of marble. A piece of marble has veins that indicate shapes that a
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skilful sculptor can draw out. 3 Without these ‘veins’ it would be impossible to draw out any
clear shape. Leibniz explained that a block of marble may be veined in such a way as to
have a sculpture of Hercules ready to be shaped from it. Where the block of marble has the
potential to be carved into a particular shape, the mind has a ‘special affinity’ for grasping
necessary truths. Leibniz was arguing that ideas and truths are therefore innate in us as a
natural potentiality. If our minds did not have the potential to understand mathematics, for
example, then all the sense experience in the world could not bring us to the truth that 1 + 1
always equals 2. Leibniz believed that the senses can explain the source of conting ent
truths. However, they can’t explain the origin of necessary truths. These necessary truths
can only be explained if there are ideas that are innate in us from birth.
Coherentism
The justification of a belief consists of the way it fits or coheres with the rest of the
beliefs that one holds 4
Coherentism is in many ways a response to and rejection of the foundationalist approach to
epistemology.
Non-foundationalism
Foundationalism is the belief that our knowledge claims depend on some basic supp ort or
foundation. Coherentists reject this idea. They would argue that this search for certain
foundational truths is impossible. Rather than try to find a certain foundational truth,
coherentists accept that the search for a complete justification is imp ossible. However, the
coherentist argues that this apparent need for certainty (a full justification) is not actually
necessary. The proper response to the infinite regress argument is to look for a set of
beliefs that cohere with the rest of your firmly held beliefs.
A coherent set of beliefs is a set of ideas that do not contradict or conflict with each
other. If our knowledge claim doesn’t fit well with our other knowledge claims then we can
say that it is not knowledge at all. If, however, it does fit well then it is reasonable to
conclude that it is knowledge. This means that coherentists are not looking for certain
knowledge. Rather, they say we should be satisfied with highly probable knowledge claims.
Where foundationalists look for a set of cert ain beliefs that are built upon a certain
foundation, coherentists look for a web of interlocking beliefs. Coherentists expect this
coherent web will need to be adjusted as new beliefs are added to it. The new beliefs are
only added or old ones removed if there is strong evidence that the web needs adjusting.

3
4
A priori beliefs will therefore play an important part in the building of the web. The
belief that the Sun is the centre of the solar system didn’t appear to cohere with
many other knowledge claims that existed in the fifteenth century. However, as
G. W. Leibniz, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2009.
Cardinal, Hayward and Jones, p73
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more knowledge was acquired, particularly the mathematical a priori understanding
of how the solar system worked, this radical view could be accepted as other beliefs
were rejected.

A posteriori beliefs also play an important part in the building of the web . Brand
Blanshard argues strongly that a coherent set of beliefs should be grounded
primarily in empirical data. The coherentist, according to Blanshard, is trying to
form a systematic ordering of our experience.
Summary: How is knowledge acquired?
 Rationalists attempt to overcome the problem of the justification clause by suggesting
that the foundation of all certain knowledge claims lies in human reason.
– Rationalists often focus their attention on a priori truths, truths that are necessarily
true and discovered just by thinking.
– Traditionally, rationalists believe in innate ideas (eg Leibniz’s metaphor of the mind
being like a veined block of marble).
 Empiricists attempt to overcome the problem of the justification clause by suggesting
that the foundation of all certain knowledge claims lies in sense experience.
– Empiricists have focused their attention on a posteriori truths, truths that are
contingent.
– Empiricists reject the idea of innate ideas (eg Locke’s metaphor of the mind being
tabula rasa and his arguments against innate ideas).
 Coherentists attempt to overcome the problem of the justification clause by presenting a
non-foundationalist approach to knowledge claims.
– Knowledge only needs to be ‘highly probable’.
– A statement can be called knowledge if it can fit within a coherent body of accepted
beliefs.
– A priori and a posteriori knowledge claims are thought to play an important part in
any claim to have a coherent set of beliefs.
– All current knowledge claims could potentially be revised if new information comes
to light.
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Area 3
Can knowledge claims be justified?
Foundational Approaches (rationalism & empiricism)
The foundational approaches tried to find self -evident truths that make the demand for
further justification unnecessary. If someone asked you ‘How do you know that a bachelor
is an unmarried male?’ or ‘How do you know that 2 + 2 = 4?’ you would probably ignore
the question or at best think of it as being silly. These a priori truths are necessarily true so
the need for further justification isn’t required. In the same way if someone asked you
‘How do you know the cat is black?’ you would probably also want to ignore the question
as your senses clearly can confirm the truth of this self-evident proposition.
But are these approaches successful?
Problems with rationalism
Problem 1: How can we know that there are innate ideas?
The belief that humans are born with certain innate ideas in their minds has been a
traditional mark of rationalism, but how can you really know with certainty that there are
innate ideas? Does Leibniz’s argument prove beyond doubt that innate ideas exist? Locke’s
presentation of his famous arguments against innate ideas at least suggests that it is
difficult to say with certainty that innate ideas exist.
Problem 2: A priori truths tell us nothing important
Rationalists have traditionally also focused their attention on a priori rather than a
posteriori truths. The certainty provided by a priori truths is clearly very appealing.
However, a simple response to this approach is to point out that they may provide certainty
but when you take a moment to think about it, they don’t provide you with much else. The
a priori truth that a cat is indeed a feline creature is hardly ground -breaking knowledge.
‘Nothing is bigger than itself’ is also clearly true a priori, but it is really a useless and
trivial piece of knowledge
Many philosophers would wish to point out that a posteriori truths, although less certain,
are clearly much more useful in the real world.
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Problem 3: A priori truths can only ever give us indirect knowledge about the
world
Even mathematical a priori concepts aren’t safe from problems.
If there are no innate ideas of mathematical concepts then maths is simply a human
invention, full of symbols that are invented to represent what we see going on in the
universe. Mathematics, therefore, can be anything we want it to be. We have agreed at some
point in history that the symbol ‘5’ represents I I I I I or * * * * *. If we had decided that
the symbol ‘5’ represents I I I I or * * * * then it would act ually be true to say that 2 + 2 =
5. So it could be argued that mathematical a priori truths only ever give us indirect or
symbolic knowledge of the world.
Problems with empiricism
If empiricists are right then everything in your mind ultimately comes from moments of
sense experience. Although this sounds like a sensible, justified belief, philosophers have
presented many problems with this idea.
Problem 1: The difference between appearance and reality
Most of the time, people take a commonsense realist view that things are, in reality, what
their appearance suggests them to be. This view assumes that because we have mental
pictures of books, chairs, desks, stairs and tables, then there necessarily exists a physical
world where these objects exist apart from our own mental pictures of them. The
commonsense realist view also assumes that the physical world continues to exist when we
stop directly perceiving the world through our senses, for example when we are asleep or
unconscious. It also assumes that this world is knowable to us through our five senses –
sight, touch, hearing, taste and smell.
But the distinction between the way things are in reality and the way things appear to be is
one of the first things philosophers will want to insist upon. Consequently, we have to ask:
is the commonsense realist view of the world reliable? Can we trust the evidence of our five
senses? Is there a difference between appearance and reality?
The key problem for empiricists to consider, then, is:
How can we know for certain that the mental representations produced by our senses and
interpreted by our brain, do in fact correspond to reality?
Problem 2: Are some ideas innate?
There are many beliefs that dominate human thought, beliefs like justice, beauty, goodness
etc. If empiricism is right then it is difficult to explain where these concepts come from.
Rationalists often argue that without innate ideas there can be no real e xplanation for where
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these strongly held beliefs come from. As mentioned earlier, Plato pointed out that we can
never perceive ‘beauty’. So, if empiricism is right, we have a problem of trying to explain
where this idea came from. The same could be said fo r our strongly held convictions about
morality. If empiricism is right then does this mean that there can be no knowledge of
morality? We can’t perceive ‘goodness’ so if empiricism is right then maybe we can’t ever
say that we know that an action is good. Many people are uncomfortable with these
conclusions.
Problem 3: The trap of solipsism
If empiricism is right then all my knowledge claims are based on sense experience.
However, if we take this to its natural ending then what we’re actually saying is a ll my
knowledge claims are based on my sense experience. Knowledge claims become essentially
subjective. I know what my senses tell me and I know how my mind interprets that sense
data, but I cannot know what you are experiencing. The idea that all we can really be
certain of is the content of our own mind is called solipsism. Empiricism is an attempt to
overcome sceptical arguments like the infinite regress argument. However, it could be
argued that if we adopt empiricism then we are actually going to end up with the frustrating
and radically sceptical conclusion that we can’t know anything beyond our own subjective
experiences.
Problems with coherentism
One of the advantages of a non-foundational approach to knowledge is that the difficult
search for ‘certainty’ is replaced with a search for ‘highly probable’ knowledge. This makes
knowledge a more realistic goal and something that is a bit more workable in the real
world.
Problem 1: Some beliefs do appear ‘foundational’
Coherentism suggests that knowledge claims need only be ‘highly probable’. This means
that we should, in theory, be open to the idea of revising any of our knowledge claims if
new evidence arises. However, many people suggest that the rationalist claim that the
certainty of a priori truths like mathematics is beyond doubt. If this is the case then the
need to potentially revise all beliefs seems unnecessary. Whether or not mathematical
concepts are only ‘symbols’ of reality, they are nevertheless certain and necessarily true.
The empiricists may also want to argue that some a posteriori truths are also beyond
dispute. For example, I can know with certainty that my hand hurts when I put it into a fire.
It could easily be argued that I simply don’t need any other beliefs to confirm these
foundational knowledge claims.
Problem 2: How can I know that my current set of coherent knowledge claims
are actually true?
If knowledge can only ever be ‘highly probable’ then is it really knowledge at all? A few
hundred years ago people had a coherent knowledge claim that the Earth was the centre of
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the solar system. The knowledge claim was revised and today your science teacher will tell
you that we know that the Sun is the centre of the solar system. But, if we need to be open
to the claim that knowledge may need to be revised at some point then can we ever really
say that we know that the Sun is the centre of the solar system? After all, you only really
know this because people have told you it at various points in your life.
Summary: Can knowledge claims be justified?
 Problems with the rationalist’s approach to finding a foundation of knowledge.
– Can we know that there are such things as innate ideas?
– A priori truths may well be certain, but do they tell us anything important?
– A priori truths can only give us indirect knowledge.
 Problems with the empiricist’s approach to finding a foundation of knowledge.
– Is there a difference between how things appear in our senses and how they are in
reality?
– Is there some evidence for the existence of innate ideas?
– If empiricism is the foundation of knowledge then do we fall into the trap of
solipsism?
 Problems with the coherentist’s approach to knowledge.
– It is hard to deny the foundational quality of some beliefs, eg a priori truths.
– If I cannot know with certainty that my current set of coherent beliefs are true then
can I really say that I have knowledge?
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Examples of Exam Questions (Higher)
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KU /
AE
5KU
YEAR
1.
Describe what rationalists mean by “innate ideas”.
Illustrate your answer with appropriate examples.
2.
What reasons do the empiricists give for rejecting
“innate ideas”?
5KU
2007
3.
Give an example of a knowledge claim and state how
it satisfies the “tripartite theory of knowledge”
4KU
2008
4.
What difficulty does the problem of accidental
correctness pose for the tripartite theory of
knowledge? Give an example to support your answer.
6KU
2008
5.
In what way does propositional knowledge differ from
other kinds of knowledge?
2KU
2009
6.
What is the distinction between necessary truth and
contingent truth? Give examples to illustrate your
answer.
4KU
2009
7.
What are the key features of empiricism?
4KU
2009
8.
In what ways might experience be limited as a source
of knowledge?
3KU
2010
9.
In what ways might reason be limited as a source of
knowledge?
3KU
2010
10.
Explain the infinite regress argument as used by
sceptics.
4KU
2010
11.
How do Locke and Leibniz differ in their approach to
innate ideas?
5KU
2011
12.
How successful is the claim that there are innate
ideas?
5AE
2011
2007