Lauren Caldwell
Poverty Reduction & Rural Development in China
December 4, 2013
Government Response to Pollution in Rural China (2003-2013):
Policy, Protest, and Conflicting Local-National Incentives
“Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages,” a joint report from the
World Bank and the Chinese government, was the most comprehensive survey of the impact of
air and water pollution ever published in a developing country. The 2007 report found that the
economic impact of air and water pollution, including both health and non-health costs, totaled
$US100 billion annually, or 5.8 percent of China’s gross domestic product. Significantly, China’s
poor and rural populations were most adversely impacted by pollution.
In this paper, I assess how the Chinese government has responded to pollution in rural
China over the past ten years, particularly following the publication of “Cost of Pollution,” which
illustrated the rural environmental and health crisis in unprecedented, quantitative terms. Has
the government addressed the environmental hazards in the report with national policies and
development plans? Do these policies prioritize the poor and rural populations that are most
impacted by pollution? Finally, how has the government responded to the political challenges
related to increased awareness of pollution in rural China, given the potential for social unrest or
declining confidence in the state?
First, I illustrate the extent of air and water pollution, as outlined in “Cost of Pollution,”
and specify the regions and populations most impacted by pollution. Second, I note recent
policies and programs that target environmental protection in rural China. Finally, I describe the
Chinese government’s response to rural pollution-related protests. I found that while the
government consistently announces plans and policies to improve pollution in rural areas, there
are conflicts between national and local policy-making, which have resulted in a continued
decline of the rural environment. Furthermore, the government is more likely to positively
respond to protest in populous urban areas, rather than rural areas, particularly when these cases
receive international media attention.
1
Evaluating the Impact of Air and Water Pollution on
Poor and Rural Populations (2003-2007)
Between 2000 and 2005, total energy consumption in China increased by 70 percent, including a
75 percent increase in coal consumption. This rapid industrialization had a dramatic impact on
China’s environment and public health, resulting in visibly inflated levels of disease and
pollution. However, the extent of this damage had never been measured quantitatively. Therefore,
in 2003, the Chinese government approached the World Bank and requested that they partner to
assess the environmental and health costs of China’s economic growth. In 2007, the World Bank
and the Chinese government – primarily the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and
Ministries of Health and Water Resources – jointly published a report: “Cost of Pollution in China:
Economic Estimates of Physical Damages.”i
“Cost of Pollution” was “the most comprehensive report on economic costs and human
health impacts of environmental pollution ever undertaken in China,” and the first of its kind in
a developing country. The report underwent extensive revision, with review from the Chinese
government, as well as independent Chinese and foreign scholars.ii The introduction to the report
notes: “Past policies and decisions have been made in the absence of concrete knowledge of the
environmental impacts and costs. By providing new, quantitative information based on Chinese
research under Chinese conditions, this study has aimed to reduce this information gap.”iii
The report estimated that the economic cost of air and water pollution, including health
and non-health costs, totaled $US100 billion annually, or 5.8 percent of China’s GDP. Air
pollution produced acid rain, which damaged crops, fisheries, drinking water and property. Air
pollution was also responsible for rising incidences of respiratory disease and lung cancer, as well
2
as work and school absenteeism. Water pollution caused infectious diseases and digestive cancers,
and aggravated water scarcity. At the time of the report’s publication, more than half of China’s
seven main rivers contained water that was not safe for drinking.iv
Significantly, the report found that the harmful effects of water pollution were most
concentrated among China’s poor and rural populations. Mortality rates from stomach, liver and
bladder cancers – which can result from drinking polluted water – were greatest in rural regions
of China. v A 2006 SEPA study found that more than half of China’s 21,000 chemical plants were
located along the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, and drinking water polluted with industrial waste
was associated with higher incidences of cancer. vi Additionally, two-thirds of China’s rural
population did not have access to piped water. Finally, a 2003 National Health Survey cited in
the report found that 75 percent of low-income households with young children did not have
access to piped water, compared to 47 percent of higher-income households.vii
Water pollution was less severe in populous urban areas, given greater access to piped
water. However, urban areas suffered the greatest degrees of air pollution, and China’s poorest
populations were most strongly impacted. The provinces most impacted by air pollution on a per
capita basis – Ningxia, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia – are classified as low-income provinces.
Several provinces in northern China – Beijing, Shanxi, Ningxia, Tianjin and Jiangsu – faced a
“double burden” of air and water pollution, as water scarcity is greatest in the north, and the
region contains much of the country’s factories and coal reserves.viii
3
Mortality rates associated with stomach, liver and bladder cancer – which can result from drinking
polluted water – are greatest in rural regions of China. In 2007, about two-thirds of China’s rural
population and 75 percent of low-income households did not have access to piped water.
Water scarcity is a major concern in northeast China, as a result of groundwater depletion and pollution.
In many rural provinces, annual per capita water availability is less than one-tenth the world average.
4
While “Cost of Pollution” provided an unprecedented perspective on the economic
impact of air and water pollution, it did not critique existing Chinese government policies or
propose alternative approaches. According to the report’s introduction, the objective of “Cost of
Pollution” was to “increase awareness of the economic impacts of air and water pollution in
China, to provide relevant policy information to decision makers, and to enable the Chinese
government to make optimal resource allocations for environmental protection.”ix Concurrently,
SEPA launched several independent environmental surveys, and issued similarly grave
conclusions.
Therefore, the next step required that China implement new environmental protection
policies and projects, with the assistance of domestic experts and the World Bank. Would the
government address the country’s environmental hazards with national policies and
development plans? Would these policies prioritize the poor and rural populations that were
most impacted by pollution? Finally, how would the government responded to the political
challenges related to increased awareness of pollution in rural China, given the potential for social
unrest or declining confidence in the state?
Central Government Response to Rural Pollution and
Local-National Disconnection
As scholar Jing Jun wrote in 2003, “The problems of air pollution, soil erosion, and fouled water
have become so grave that they are reported in the Chinese press practically every day, often
accompanied by announcements of government plans to combat one ecological problem after
another.” Indeed, the years following “Cost of Pollution” saw the introduction of numerous
national environmental policies and sweeping objectives.
5
The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) announced that environmental protection and
health care reform were priorities in the national reform agenda. The National Environmental
Protection Action Plan outlined the conditions in rural areas – water shortages, contaminated soil,
poor sanitation, and the relocation of factories to the countryside – and designated targets for
emissions and waste treatment. (“According to the requirement ‘Production growth, well-to-do
life, enjoyable social atmosphere, clean village with democratic management’ for the
development of social new countryside … China will take such measures as comprehensive
control of rural environment, strengthening of the prevention and control of soil pollution…”)x
Finally, the National Environmental Health Action Plan (2007-2015) called for greater
collaboration between SEPA and the Ministry of Health.
On a regional scale, the World Bank has continuously conducted projects focused on the
environment and water resources management in rural areas. For example, the World Bank
provides grants to the Chinese government for specific projects, like the reduction of pollution in
the Huai River Basin in Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui and Henan provinces. It also conducts
assessments of the impact of industrial activity, such as railway construction, on China’s rural
environment.
However, national objectives are rarely translated into policy action in rural areas, which
poses a barrier to both national and multilateral development projects. “China Water Quality
Management: Policy and Institutional Considerations,” an independent World Bank report
published in 2006, found that the numerous government institutions responsible for
environmental protection – including SEPA and the Ministry of Water Resources – had poor
inter-agency communication, inconsistent monitoring techniques, and duplicated responsibilities.
6
Furthermore, the role of the public sector was overemphasized, rather than employing marketbased incentives to encourage the private sector to limit pollution. Finally, the government’s
regulatory system was incomplete and complicated, which prevented efficiency in
implementation and enforcement, especially when national policies conflicted with local
development plans.xi
A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies underscored the
disconnection between national objectives and local policy. In 2003, China introduced the
Environmental Impact Assessment Law. Under this law, SEPA was granted authority over largescale projects. However, local governments controlled local industrial planning, and their
decisions were largely driven by economic growth, rather than public health or the environment:
“A substantial disconnect clearly exists between central and local authorities in terms of
awareness and policy implementation in areas of environmental protection and health
care. Beijing’s efforts to establish an effective nationwide environmental policy have been
thwarted by local authorities at nearly every turn.”xii
In response to the difficulties in coordinating environmental policy, the Chinese
government disbanded SEPA, an agency of only two hundred employees with a small budget,
and founded the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008. This ministerial-level agency
seemed to demonstrate that China had prioritized environmental protection in its national reform
objectives. However, as the CSIS report notes, the National Development and Reform
Commission will likely continue setting the agenda. Additionally, environmental health
initiatives will continue to require coordination among many ministries – the Ministries of
Education, Land and Resources, Construction, Water Resources, and Agriculture – and the
authority and responsibilities attached to these agencies remains unclear.xiii
7
Six years after the publication of “Cost of Pollution,” the rural environment has only
experienced incremental improvements, and many sources suggest it has worsened overall. In its
2012 report, the Ministry of Environmental Protection noted, “With industrialization,
urbanization and the modernization of agriculture, the situation for the rural environment has
become grim.” Water quality improved slightly, as 68.9 percent of water samples were suitable
for consumption, compared to 61 percent the previous year; similarly, 10.2 percent of water was
unsuitable for industry or irrigation, compared to 13.7 percent in 2011.xiv However, in February
2013, the MEP elected not to release the findings of its multi-year nationwide soil-pollution
survey, which were deemed a “state secret.”xv
Today, the anecdotal evidence of hazardous rural conditions continues without abate. In
2012, more Chinese people lived in cities than outside, which has driven polluting industries into
the cheaper countryside and away from populous areas. Local officials either lack the capacity to
regulate these industries, compared to larger cities, or desire these industries for economic
growth. The Wall Street Journal and New York Times publish stories of ponds polluted with
fluorescent blue chemicals, farmers who have lost their livelihoods, and “cancer villages” and
birth defects along rivers polluted with industrial waste.xvi A 2013 study based on official Chinese
data collected between 1981 and 2001 found that southern Chinese live more than five years
longer than northern Chinese, as a result of widespread coal use and air pollution in the north.xvii
Pollution-Related Protest in Urban and Rural Areas
Several months after the publication of “Cost of Pollution,” the Financial Times reported that the
Chinese government pressured the World Bank to remove portions of the report, which estimated
8
that 760,000 people died prematurely every year as a result of air and water pollution. According
to an unnamed participant in the report, “The World Bank was told that it could not publish this
information. It was too sensitive and could cause social unrest.”xviii Other sources suggest that the
Chinese government requested that a third of the report’s findings be removed.
In response to visibly rising levels of pollution, as well as perceived government
corruption and dishonesty, environment-related petitions and protests have increased by 29
percent annually, with particularly rapid increases in rural areas. Government officials
euphemistically refer to these protests as “environmental mass incidents,” and respond to them
as if they are threats to national harmony and security. xix
One of the earliest mass environmental protests took place in rural Dongyang, Zhejiang
Province in April 2005. After two years of unsuccessful petitions to the local, provincial and
central governments, forty thousand villagers assembled outside nearby chemical plants, where
they destroyed property and assaulted government officials. In response, the government sent
ten thousand police officers to forcibly end the protest. Months later, following international
media coverage, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and provincial officials ordered the
polluting companies to shut down.xx
Yet the majority of rural protests are smaller in scale, and without international media or
scholarly coverage, they tend to be quickly suppressed by government officials. For example, in
Anhui Province in 2013, two thousand villagers destroyed government property and attacked
officials in protest of insufficient local government response to drought, including embezzlement
of relief funds. The Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China ordered media to
publish only official statements on the drought, and to report no further on the event.xxi
9
According to scholar Anna Lora-Wainwright, rural villagers have “a sophisticated
awareness” of the environmental hazards in their communities, but they are faced with
institutional opposition and economic conditions that limit opportunities for contestation:
[In] the majority of cases, they suffer in silence, are unsuccessful in their attempts to put
an end to pollution, or are co-opted by polluting enterprises into seeing it as inevitable.
This is especially the case when not only the local (and central) government depend on
industry, but people themselves rely on them for employment. Such reliance is at its
starkest in areas which have traditionally been poor and have few other sources of
income.xxii
In comparison, urban, white-collar environment-related protests tend to garner greater
foreign and domestic media attention. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that urban
protests are more likely to elicit a favorable government response, even though poor and rural
populations are most impacted by pollution. For example, in 2012, thousands of students and
middle class workers protested a factory in Dalian that produced paraxylene, a “mildly toxic
chemical used in plastics.” The protest was organized online, covered by domestic and foreign
media, and police assisted with event organization. In comparison, the Luliang Chemical factory
in rural Yunnan is known to release thousands of tons of a known carcinogen, chromium, into
the rivers and hills. When villagers protested that same year, they were ignored or arrested.xxiii
According to Jonathan Watts, Asia correspondent for The Guardian, “If there were ever
any doubts that there is one rule for the urban rich and another for the rural poor in China, they
should have been removed … by the vastly differing tales of two chemical plants. […] Far from
its roots, the Chinese Communist party is now clearly more concerned about creating a clean
urban environment for the middle class than it is about protecting the old rural environment for
the farming masses.”xxiv
10
Environment-related protests are rapidly increasing in China, particularly in rural regions.
However, rural protests are more often met with police suppression. (New York Times)
Conclusion: Prospects for Pollution Reduction in Rural China
In 2007, the World Bank and the government of China released “Cost of Pollution in China:
Economic Estimates of Physical Damages,” the most comprehensive survey of the impact of air
and water pollution ever published in a developing country. The report found that the economic
impact of air and water pollution, including both health and non-health costs, totaled $US100
11
billion annually, or 5.8 percent of China’s gross domestic product. China’s poor and rural
populations were most adversely impacted by pollution.
In the years following the report’s publication, the Chinese government announced that
rural health and environmental protection were priorities in the national reform agenda. The
government introduced numerous targets and sweeping objectives. However, national objectives
are rarely translated into policy action in rural areas, for several reasons: the lack of inter-agency
communication among China’s environmental protection bureaus; incomplete and complicated
regulatory systems; and legal frameworks that provide local governments authority over
industrial projects, in which economic growth tends to trump environmental concerns.
In response to the hazardous conditions in rural China, protests have been on the rise. Yet
rural protests are more likely to be ignored or suppressed with comparison to urban protests,
even though rural areas are most strongly impacted by pollution. According to scholar Ma Tianjie,
“China’s central government is increasingly viewing environmental mass incidents as a security
threat, which is a mindset that closes off opportunities for dialogue, transparency, and
institutional reforms.”xxv
Given clearly escalating pollution and readily accessible data, the Chinese government
has performed poorly in its response to pollution in rural China. The central government must
better coordinate national environmental protection policies, and strengthen its capacity to
enforce these policies in rural areas, so that short-term economic incentives do not overshadow
long-term environmental and health costs in local development plans. Furthermore, domestic
and foreign media should respond to rural protest with as much respect and understanding as
they do urban protest: If public awareness of the rural environmental and health crisis increases,
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then the national and local governments will be pressured to respond with effective pollutionreduction policies. However, given the national government’s incentives to prevent unrest and
maintain public confidence in the single-party system, the true extent of pollution and protest
may remain obscured to Chinese citizens, which will impede the success of rural pollutionreduction initiatives.
i
The World Bank. “Statement from World Bank China Country Directory on ‘Cost of Pollution in China’ Report.”
July 11, 2007. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2007/07/11/statement-world-bank-chinacountry-director-cost-pollution-china-report>
ii
The World Bank. “Statement from World Bank China Country Directory on ‘Cost of Pollution in China’ Report.”
July 11, 2007. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2007/07/11/statement-world-bank-chinacountry-director-cost-pollution-china-report>
iii
The World Bank and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic
Estimates of Physical Damages (Conference Edition).” February 2007.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf>
iv
The World Bank and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic
Estimates of Physical Damages (Conference Edition).” February 2007.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf>
v
The World Bank and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic
Estimates of Physical Damages (Conference Edition).” February 2007.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf>
vi
Dan Griffiths. “China’s ‘Cancer Villages’ Pay Price.” BBC News. January 17, 2007.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6271103.stm>
vii
The World Bank and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic
Estimates of Physical Damages (Conference Edition).” February 2007.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf>
viii
The World Bank and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic
Estimates of Physical Damages (Conference Edition).” February 2007.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf>
ix
The World Bank and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic
Estimates of Physical Damages (Conference Edition).” February, 2007.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf>
x
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. “China National Environment Protection Plan in the Eleventh
Five-Years (2006-2010).”
<http://english.mep.gov.cn/down_load/Documents/200803/P020080306440313293094.pdf>
xi
The World Bank. “China: Water Quality Management – Policy and Institutional Considerations.” September 2006.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/China_WPM_final_lo_res.pdf>
xii
Charles W. Freeman III and Xiaoqing Lu. “Assessing Chinese Government Response to the Challenge of
Environment and Health.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 2008.
<http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080707_freemanchinesegov_web.pdf>
xiii
Charles W. Freeman III and Xiaoqing Lu. “Assessing Chinese Government Response to the Challenge of
Environment and Health.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 2008.
<http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080707_freemanchinesegov_web.pdf>
13
xiv
Reuters. “Rural Environment Worsened in 2012, China Says.” Voice of America. June 4, 2013.
<http://www.voanews.com/content/rural-environment-worsened-in-2012-china-says/1674887.html>
xv
Josh Chin and Brian Spegele. “China’s Bad Earth.” Wall Street Journal. July 27, 2013.
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323829104578624010648228142>
xvi
Josh Chin and Brian Spegele. “China’s Bad Earth.” Wall Street Journal. July 27, 2013.
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323829104578624010648228142>
xvii
Edward Wong. “Pollution Leads to Drop in Life Span in Northern China, Research Finds.” New York Times. July 8,
2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/world/asia/pollution-leads-to-drop-in-life-span-in-northern-chinastudy-finds.html?_r=0>
xviii
“China ‘Buried Smog Death Finding.’” BBC News. July 3, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/6265098.stm>
xix
Ma Tianjie. “Environmental Mass Incidents in Rural China: Examining Large-Scale Unrest in Dongyang, Zhejiang.”
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: China Environment Series 2008/2009.
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CES%2010%20Feature%20Article,%20pp.%2033-56.pdf>
xx
Ma Tianjie. “Environmental Mass Incidents in Rural China: Examining Large-Scale Unrest in Dongyang, Zhejiang.”
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: China Environment Series 2008/2009.
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CES%2010%20Feature%20Article,%20pp.%2033-56.pdf>
xxi
Tyler Roney. “Why is China so Afraid of a Small Protest?” The Diplomat. August 21, 2013.
<http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/why-is-china-so-afraid-of-a-small-protest/>
xxii
Anna Lora-Wainwright. “Social and Environmental Injustice in Rural China.” Politics in Spires. June 12, 2013.
<http://politicsinspires.org/small-details-make-for-big-injustices-re-education-through-labour-and-administrativelitigation/>
xxiii
Jonathan Watts. “Chemical plant protest highlights China’s class divide.” The Guardian. August 18, 2011.
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/aug/18/chemical-plant-protest-china-middle-class>
xxiv
Jonathan Watts. “Chemical plant protest highlights China’s class divide.” The Guardian. August 18, 2011.
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2011/aug/18/chemical-plant-protest-china-middle-class>
xxv
Ma Tianjie. “Environmental Mass Incidents in Rural China: Examining Large-Scale Unrest in Dongyang, Zhejiang.”
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: China Environment Series 2008/2009.
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CES%2010%20Feature%20Article,%20pp.%2033-56.pdf>
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