Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency! Our mandate is to
prevent the spread of nuclear materials to non-nuclear weapons states and maintain
safety in existing nuclearized countries. We are the watchdogs of global nuclear
proliferation, supplying scientists and inspectors to make sure all facilities follow our
protocols for stability of materials and safeguards, contingency plans, and security.
Allow me to introduce myself as your chair. My name is Kerry Lanzo and I am a
sophomore at the GWU Elliott School of International Affairs, pursuing majors in
International Affairs with two concentrations in Europe & Eurasia and in International
Politics and History. I am a proud delegate on the GWU Model United Nations team and
have participated in Model UN for over five years, now. I suppose you could say I am a
“seasoned” delegate. I enjoy baking, boxing, art, and I love living in Washington, D.C.,
though I originally hail from Baltimore, Maryland. I have discussed nuclear issues for
many years now and follow the news on the subjects very closely. In the weeks leading
up to the conference, I encourage you all to do the same as a small part of your
research. I prefer BBC World News: http://www.bbc.com/news/. When running low
on time, I especially like the BBC One-Minute World News videos:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/video_and_audio/.
I understand that many of you are at an MUN conference for the first time, many of you
may be just getting the hang of them, and some of you may be more experienced. I
would like to proceed through this committee as adherent to parliamentary procedure
as possible, but I am very open to helping out answering questions, explaining the
process, etc. to help you learn how to be fantastic, polite, experienced delegates who
will share my passion for MUN! Given the large size of the committee and short amount
of time, I will answer some general questions as delegates raise their placards, but if
you have very specific questions please approach the dais and ask the vice chairs.
Today we convene to discuss recommendations for the 2015 Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Since its entrance into force in 1970,
the NPT has mandated that committees have met every five years to discuss the
effectiveness of, enforcement of, and possible changes to the NPT. We will begin these
discussions here, in November of 2012, by producing resolutions containing
suggestions on our particular topic: how to maintain the safety of nuclear facilities and
materials in non-NPT signatory states, specifically India and Pakistan. Both countries
have consented to be present today as observers, thus they will be available for
negotiation to the other delegates (though, as non-signatories, they will not be able to
vote).
This topic booklet will not contain all research you will need to operate effectively in
committee, though it will provide some sources you may use to read up on the issue.
This guide will provide a short history of the NPT (pg. 3), information on the confirmed
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Pakistani and Indian nuclear programs (pg. 4), and a list of questions for you to
consider in your research (pg. 6). In your position paper, please write about your
country’s policy towards nuclear proliferation (a good term to know! See footnote)1,
your own nuclear program safety measures (if your country has a nuclear program),
and how you think the IAEA, United Nations, and international community at large
should handle programs of non-signatories. It is a good idea to know a bit about your
country’s history, but please do not write your country’s history as the bulk of the
position paper .
Also in this background guide is the text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(Appendix I). Please come to committee familiar with it, prepared with questions if you
need, and willing to use this text while writing resolutions to change certain policy.
Research well, come prepared with creative and practical ideas, and do not hesitate to
ask questions to help you learn! I look forward to working with you on November 3!
Kerry Lanzo, Chair, IAEA
Nuclear Proliferation: The spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and
information, to nations which are not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT.
(USLegal.com)
Non-Proliferation: The opposite practice in operation in much of international policy that represents
efforts to stop spread of nuclear weapons to NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapons States).
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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A History
In the years immediately following World War II, the United States was the only
country to have nuclear weapons technology. The United States remains to this day the
only country to have used a nuclear bomb, as it did in Japan in August 1945 to end the
Pacific front of World War II. The Soviet Union quickly followed suit and obtained the
bomb in 1949, beginning the forty years we know as the Cold War. The world fell in
line behind these two nuclear powers in their ‘arms race’, despite efforts from
countries like China, India, and Pakistan who developed nuclear weapons programs as
matters of defense and possibly as efforts to break the bipolarism that was the Cold
War World Order.
The People’s Republic of China successfully created a nuclear weapon for the first time
in 1964, for fear of being marginalized by the two Great Powers and thus disrupting
the world balance and adding a new danger to possibility of nuclear warfare. At the
time, Chinese-Soviet relations had turned sour and the United States did not consider
Chairman Mao and his Communist China an ally during that time.
In 1968, 189 countries convened and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It
stipulated several main points:2
1) Countries who did not possess nuclear weapons technology prior to January 1,
1967 were disbarred from developing their own programs or receiving nuclear
weapons from Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). These countries were
henceforth labeled Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS);
2) The NPT stated that all countries have an “inalienable right” to develop peaceful
nuclear technology for the purposes of civilian energy3 and use. There are ways
to use nuclear technology to create clean power, but many are cautious about
this stipulation because it then provides countries with the basic science to then
turn that civilian energy into weaponry;
3) Encouragement for NWS to provide peaceful nuclear energy technology to
NNWS so all may share in the benefits of clean energy;
4) The NPT requires that NWS adhere to safeguards, inspections, and regulation
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (proposed by US President Dwight
Eisenhower in 1953 to the United Nations, enacted in 1957)
5) Maintains the right of regions to declare Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones
(NWFZ);4
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Appendix I text.
Civilian energy is defined as nuclear energy used only to provide electrical power to civilians, rather
than using it to create weaponry. Civilian nuclear energy is highly desirable because it is cleaner and
more eco-friendly than fossil fuels (oil, coal, etc.), far more efficient than hydro energy (water and
dams), wind energy (turbines), and more plausible to provide on a large scale than hydrogen energy or
solar energy.
4 Current NWFZ: Africa; Antarctica; Mexico and Central/South America; Australia; almost all Pacific
Islands; the region north of Iran/Iraq/Pakistan up to the Russian-Kazakhstani border; Mongolia; and
Southeast Asia. See Figure 1 below.
2
3
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6) States that all countries may sign and accede to the treaty, but requires that if a
state should need to leave the treaty for purposes of supreme, mortal national
security, the state must give three months notice for the succession to be legal.
This has become complicated with the case of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (North Korea), the lawfulness of whose succession from the treaty in
1993/2003 is hotly debated.
Figure 1: An illustration of nuclear power distribution and NWFZ. Source: Wikimedia
Figure 2: NPT Status of all countries. Source: Wikimedia Commons
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Cases: India and Pakistan
For the purposes of focusing debate, we will not be discussing regulation of nuclear
materials in Iran, Israel, or North Korea. Please leave these topics to be discussed at
another conference, though they are very interesting and involved!
India
India tested its first nuclear weapon on May 18, 1974 in what they called a peaceful
nuclear explosion. The term peaceful nuclear explosion, or PNE, is used to express
any sort of explosion that is conducted not for nuclear purposes, but for economic or
development purposes, such as for civilian energy (defined by the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty). Currently, it is estimated that India has a stockpile of 80-100
weapons (compared to the several thousand possessed still by each Russia and the
US). India has not tested a weapon since 1998.
India was never a signatory to the NPT. They have stated that the NPT “entrenches the
status quo of the existing nuclear weapons states whilst preventing general nuclear
disarmament”.5 In other words, countries that did not have nuclear programs prior to
the cutoff date of Jan. 1, 1967 are put at a permanent power disadvantage and thus
subordinated to the great powers that had nuclear technology at that point (US, USSR,
UK, and Germany). As the Treaty stipulates, NWS are encouraged to supply the benefits
of nuclear civilian energy to NNWS, but that puts the NNWS completely at the mercy of
the NWS where nuclear energy is concerned. Nuclear energy is highly desirable
because it is cleaner and more eco-friendly than fossil fuels (oil, coal, etc.), and once
distributed, allows for very far-reaching energy.
At the time of the NPT, India-China relations were strained for many reasons and
theorists believe India coveted the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a way of
deterring an attack from China.
India is currently the world’s most populous democracy, but suffers from inefficient
bureaucracy and governmental structure. India-US ties have been strained by India’s
lack of cooperation in allowing inspections or observing regulation as a non-signatory
to the NPT.6 The United States has been pushing India to at least sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to commit India further to halting testing even
after the 1999 moratorium agreement with Pakistan. The trouble with the CTBT for
India is that it requires them to adhere to an eventual disarmament roadmap.
“US wants India to sign NPT,” Business Standard, 7 May 2009, accessed 9/23/12,
(http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/us-wants-india-to-sign-npt/357348/).
6 Ibid.
5
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Pakistan
Pakistan begun shaping its nuclear program by recruiting scientists, affirmation, and
governmental funding in 1972 following the progress India had been making towards
their first bomb test. India and Pakistan have long been at odds because of territorial
disputes, and Pakistan likely considered India’s possession of a nuclear weapon to be a
huge threat to their national security. Given that India began its program before the
NPT (1968) though it did not have a bomb test until six years after, Pakistan likely
knew about the Indian program and thus chose not to sign the NPT. Pakistan had its
first and last bomb tests in May 1998. It is estimated that their stockpile is around 100110 weapons with a 2,500 km (about 1500 mi) range.
In 1999, officials from Pakistan and India signed a bilateral, mutual moratorium on
nuclear testing (the countries agreed to halt nuclear testing), though both have
maintained their weapons.
Pakistan has very unstable power politics. The Pakistani Taliban, a coalescence of over
one dozen smaller Islamic militant factions, controls much of the territory in the
northwest region of Pakistan, near the border with Afghanistan.
Figure 3 to the right is from the
BBC. The BBC, in 2009, estimated
that only 38% of territorial
Pakistan was under control of
what the international community
considers the legitimate Pakistani
government.
The rest of the red and yellow
areas are either controlled or
influenced by the Taliban.
The government controls the
green regions, supposedly, but
much of the northwest is war torn
and control can change daily.
The lack of a unified, legitimate government in Pakistan proposes several problems.
1) Security-wise, nuclear materials could be in danger if unregulated and left to
the weak Pakistani government to protect. These non-governmental groups,
often labeled as terrorists, of the Taliban could pose a real danger if they
obtained nuclear technology.
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2) Negotiation with the Pakistani government is very difficult. Given that the
country is constantly war-torn and the government corrupt or untrustworthy,
Pakistan is unlikely to open itself to international regulation. If it did,
inspectors, scientists, and IAEA officials could be in danger once they obtain
information about nuclear materials. Once that information is released, the
nuclear materials could be even more vulnerable to theft or sabotage.
Questions to Consider for your Research





What contact has your country had with the IAEA, if any? What regulations does
the IAEA exercise in your country?
What should the IAEA be able to regulate in India and Pakistan? How? What
safeguards should all countries have to follow, and how should they be
enforced?
Would it be fair for the NPT to make exceptions to allow India and Pakistan to
keep their programs but sign the NPT so the IAEA can regulate them? How
would other countries react if this exception were made? Would they even
allow it to happen? Remember, changes to the NPT must be made by consensus
at these Review Conferences. Our resolutions will be suggestions, so ours must
just pass by majority (>50% vote)
Should India/Pakistan sign the CTBT? If the US and Russia continue to disarm,
should the UN expect India/Pakistan to?
What middle ground could we find and perhaps put into a new treaty that India
and/or Pakistan would accept?
Sources to consider:
Great ideas, but could be difficult reads!
 “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”,
Section 9: Strengthening the NPT.
(http://icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-iii-9.html)
 “The NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future”, Nonproliferation Review”
(http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf)
 “Gauging the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty”, Robert
Siegel for NPR,
(http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4627776)
 “The NPT Review Conference: Redo the Regime”, South Asia Analysis Group,
(http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers14%5Cpaper1367.html)
 “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, Arms Control Association,
(http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt)
o A good website – look for related articles to the text
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Appendix I. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Text
Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate March 13, 1969
Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5, 1970
Proclaimed by U.S. President March 5, 1970
Entered into force March 5, 1970
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to
safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an
agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within
the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of
safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and
other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any
technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of
nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with
other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race
and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance
of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in
order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their
existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of
their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
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Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,
and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted
with the least diversion for armaments of the worlds human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control
over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance
with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencys safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a
view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect
to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal
nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to
all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such
State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source
or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with
article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the
Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international
exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material
for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding
set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International
Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other
States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such
agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States
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depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into
force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing
alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V
Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with
this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international
procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made
available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the
charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge
for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain
such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate
international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this
subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to
assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to
the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the
Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the
Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the
Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which,
on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument
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of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all
the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and
all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon
the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years
thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to
the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing
the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before
its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which
are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are
designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of
their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which
has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,
1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into
force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification
or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of
each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry
into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other
notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter
of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it
decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide
whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed
period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
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Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall
be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand
nine hundred sixty-eight.
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