NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 109,452
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
YOEL VALDES-SANTANA,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; JOHN J. MCNALLY, judge. Opinion filed June 6, 2014.
Affirmed.
Jeffrey Leiker, of Leiker Law Office, P.A., of Overland Park, for appellant.
Christopher L. Schneider, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and
Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MCANANY, P.J., GREEN and POWELL, JJ.
Per Curiam: Yoel Valdes-Santana was convicted of rape and sentenced to a
prison term of 155 months. After Valdes-Santana's direct appeal was denied, he filed a
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Valdes-Santana's 60-1507 motion was denied by the trial court after an
evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Valdes-Santana contends that his conviction should be
reversed because he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
1
We note that Valdes-Santana had 1 year from when his conviction became final to
file a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. See K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)"A defendant who files a
motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 outside the 1-year time limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507(f) and
fails to assert manifest injustice is procedurally barred from maintaining the action." State
v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, Syl. ¶ 3, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013). Although the trial court decided
Valdes-Santana's contentions on the merits, we adopt an alternate reasoning for affirming
the trial court. Here, the State's brief raised the statute of limitations as an alternate—and
unaddressed, not rejected—rationale for affirming the trial court's holding. See Cooke v.
Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, Syl. ¶ 4, 176 P.3d 144 (2008) ("While an appellee must present
adverse rulings to the appellate court through a cross-appeal, it may present through its
appellee brief any matters for affirming the judgment that were raised before, but
unaddressed by, the district court.").
As a result, we conclude that Valdes-Santana's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was
untimely. Moreover, we determine that he failed to establish manifest injustice to bring
the motion outside the 1-year time limitation of K.S.A. 60-1507(f). See K.S.A. 601507(f)(2). Accordingly, we affirm.
Was Valdes-Santana's K.S.A. 60-1507 Motion Timely?
The State contends that this court should refrain from addressing the merits of
Valdes-Santana's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because Valdes-Santana's
motion was untimely under K.S.A. 60-1507(f). We agree. A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must
be brought within 1-year of (1) The final order of the last Kansas appellate court to
exercise jurisdiction on direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction, or
(2) denial of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court or
issuance of such court's final order following the granting of such petition.
2
The State contested the timeliness of Valdes-Santana's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion
below by raising that issue in its response to his motion. For whatever reason, the trial
court did not address the 1-year time limitation under K.S.A. 60-1507(f) when it issued
its memorandum decision. Nevertheless, we may address the timeliness issue: "[T]he
issue of whether the statute of limitations had expired on [a claim] presents an issue of
law requiring the interpretation of statutes. These matters present questions of law subject
to our de novo review." Kelly v. VinZant, 287 Kan. 509, 514-15, 197 P.3d 803 (2008).
Because the State raised the timeliness of Valdes-Santana's 60-1507 motion below, this
issue is properly before us, and our review is unlimited.
A review of the record indicates that Valdes-Santana's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was
untimely. Generally, a defendant has 1 year from the date his or her conviction becomes
final or the termination of appellate jurisdiction to file a motion under 60-1507. K.S.A.
60-1507(f)(1). Valdes-Santana was sentenced on July, 25, 2008, and his conviction and
sentence became a final judgment when our Supreme Court denied his petition for review
on September 8, 2010. Thus, Valdes-Santana's 60-1507 motion, filed September 29,
2011, was untimely under K.S.A. 60-1507(f). Although the 1-year time limitation for
bringing an action under 60-1507 may be extended to prevent a manifest injustice,
Valdes-Santana has made no effort to show that manifest injustice applies to his untimely
motion. See K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). Because Valdes-Santana's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was
untimely filed and he has failed to establish manifest injustice, his motion is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
Affirmed.
3