Burge, Two Thought Experiments (Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic)
284-285
1. Burge gives the aluminum thought experiment.
Says, that on Earth Al
has true alum. thoughts, and false.
2. On Twin Earth, Al' has other thoughts, about that stuff.
Has only true
thoughts.
3. In sum, though the two are identical, nonintentionally described, they have
different thoughts.
Al has aluminum thoughts.
Twin Al, does not.
4. Burge notes his usual two reasons, that:
a. Twin Al has never been in contact with aluminum.
As
such,
aluminum with Earth ingredients.
b. No one has been around to tell him about such aluminum,
either.
5. In practice, he notes, 'despite physical similarity, we attribute different
thoughts.'
6. The two Als 'have different propositional attitudes.'
Note: I think that inferring that the two Als have different propositional
attitudes, actually, is a bit of a jump.
knowing them, different attitudes.
Sure we cannot ascribe them, not
But, what they actually have is a
different story.
Note: That is, if one is to insist upon this, then one must drop the
representational theory of mind, where beliefs are but representations,
symbols.
They two would have the same symbols. But, one could develop a
relational notion of belief itself.
certain truth conditions.
Thus, a belief is a relation to an object, with
This though, treats beliefs instrumentally.
7. Burge now goes into the arthritis case.
Here, Burt has many true views of
this, but one false view, that arthritis can occur in the thigh.
8. On Twin Earth, arthritis, the concept covers that false view. It is true
there.
9. So, Burge says only here does Burt have arthritis thoughts.
Burt has tharthritis thoughts.
And, there,
For, I assume the same two reasons.
286
1. The experiments show that 'intentional content cannot be accounted for in
physical, phenomenal, causal-functional, computational, synctactic, specified
nonintentionally...'
2. These, 'defined purely in isolation from the physical and social envirions.'
3. And, 'intentional concent is not supervenient on one's nonintentional
physical body...'
4. This all means that 'physicalist and functionalist theories of intentional
content fail in a systematic manner.'
Note: In a strong sense, this is the whole ball of wax.
So, if we make the
jump from nonindividual ascriptions to content I mentioned, then content is
nonindividualistic
too.
Thus,
no
physicalism,
functionalism,
or
local
supervenience.
5. Now, Burge says that this suggests that meaning is not a logical construct
out of individual propositional attitudes.
This was the Gricean assumption.
6. We cannot, thus, individuate attitudes independently of public meaning.
In other words the attitudes and public meaning are coordinate notions.
7. Burge thinks this is compatible with representationalism, insofar as 'there
are token represenations for each occurant attitude' as long as such tokens
'enter into causal relations because of their syntax,' not intentional features.
8. That is, as long as representations are just nonsemantic shapes.
Intentionality, must be left to the world.
287
1. Burge says, though, that he does doubt such a view.
In general, cognitive
science makes two claims about propositional attitudes:
a. ontological claim, what content is.
b. causal claim, how they cause things.
2. Though he does not distinguish these,Fodor seems concerned mainly with
the causal claim.
3. Burge notes that of course cogitive science makes use of intentional content
as variables.
4. He says, that this is no problem unless you want that content to be
individualistic.
5. Now, given the agreement on what psychology does, uses intentional
ascriptions and content, one can:
a. hold to an idealized psychology that is
is parasitic on ordinary practice
nonindividualistic; such
though.
b. hold to ideal psychology, that hopes to create an
type of content; this would be revision of
c.
hold
to
ideal,
elinative
individualistic
ordinary practice.
psychology,
that
does
away
with
intentionality.
Note: Though Fodor does not explicitly endorse the individualist line at this
point, he is inclined toward it.
And, seems committed really, in his pinning
of phenomenal content.
288
1. Burge notes that for the rest of the paper he shall defend against Fodor.
2. So, 'what de dicto belief is expressed by 'water2 is wet' or 'aluminum2 is
flexible' etc?
3. Burge says 'de dicto is confusing; lets say it means oblique, not transparent,
occurances in belief ascription.'
289
1. So, Burge says that this is answered by Fodor's first Gambit. 'Al' believes
that aluminum2 is flexible.'
2. No problem here, for since we lack a term for this new stuff, we can, in the
experiment, call it aluminum2.
3. Burge says 'one need only master the Twin's usage to know what belief
aluminum2 expresses.'
Note: Fodor's point, I thought, was that twin belief expression is 'unstable,' for
it is based on ours.
In other words, we can stipulate what twin expression is,
but we have not been there, we don't really know.
If I am right, this is
pretty silly.
4. The Second Gambit is that the Twins believe what we do, that, water is
wet, or that arthritis is in the thigh.
5. But, Burge notes, for familiar reasons, that no water is there, that no one
has told tales of water, this cannot be the case.
6. And, also, there is no ground for attributing to the twins many false beliefs.
290
1. Burge comments on Fodor's solution to the twin cases.
It is like the
indexical case, but, it treats beliefs as de re.
2. That is, people on twin earth would believe, of water, of arthritis, that it is
wet or hurts.
3. Burge notes that we would still be attributing them false beliefs.
4. And, in the arthritis case, the objects, res, do not change. Thus, one cannot
hope to explain the difference in the world is always in terms of the objects.
5. In this case, the difference is in the social envirions.
Still nonindividual.
6. The reason Fodor's 'pragmatic' view is similar, is that he hopes to fix a de re
thought, and a context, and get an individual content.
7. But, the problem is, I assume, that when one does this, on attributes false
beliefs, and explains in terms of objects, which is inadequate.
Note: I am not sure that Fodor's view really is about de re beliefs.
matter.
It does not
Burge's criticisms still apply.
291
1. Burge discusses gambit four, that water2 is wet means xyz is wet.
2. He says such a statement derives from a misreading of his contract
example.
3. The root of the problem 'is that Fodor says that I assume that
contracts
need not be written is constituative of our concept of contract.'
4. But, 'I assumed only that 'it is not constituative of our concept of contract
that contracts must be written.'
Burge says he disavows any notion of
concept construction.
5. The claim was:
a. person with idea that concepts must be written, mistake
b. counter person, with idea that concepts2 must be written,
no
mistake.
c. different beliefs.
6. Burge says that Fodor's idea that Jones holds explicitly contradictory
beliefs, the charity points, reliance on same language, etc all flow from this
misreading.
Though, Burge does not say why this is.
Note: By the way, it does seem that Burge owes us an explanation of his
notion of concept.
For otherwise, the above points are obscure.
7. Burge says he will close with saying what he thinks of the five assumptions
he is supposed to hold:
1. He says he does not assume that 'verbal contracts bind'
is
constituative of the concept 'contract.'
2. Burge says that he does not hold that 'meaning of a word'
is
a
'construct' out the concept it expresses.
3. He accepts this, that
Jones, even with
his mistake about
verbalness, expresses the same concept we do, about contract,
with many qualifications.
He is wary about sameness of content, and
notes that in general it is not true.
We will differ.
4. Burge accepts charity, but, says Jones is not
contradictory, as Fodor says.
Does not hold, contracts
contracts not verbal.
5. Burge rejects intersubstitution.
verbal,