Evolution and Philosophy
Spring 2015
Lecturer and Convenor: Robert Northcott (r.northcott@bbk.ac.uk)
BA seminar tutors: Dan Adams (danferdud@hotmail.com), Jonathan Nassim
(jonathannassim@hotmail.com)
Lectures will be on Fridays 6-7pm, in Malet 153
MA Seminars 7-8pm, in Malet 153
BA Seminars 7-8pm, in 401, 30 Russell Square (Adams), and in 404, 30 Russell Square
(Nassim)
My office hour: Wednesdays 4.30-5.30pm, Room 312, 30 Russell Square – or else get in
touch by email, or just come to see me at the beginning or end of the lecture
This module will focus on Darwin's theory of evolution. After getting straight on the
basics of the science, we will take a critical look at a whole range of fascinating
philosophical and scientific issues and their bearing on each other.
Assessment
BA: One essay, of around 3,000 words (and a maximum of 3200).
MA: One essay, of around 3500 words (and a maximum of 3700).
Course textbook
Philosophy of Biology, by Elliott Sober (Westview Press, 2000)
1
Lecture Schedule
I have included basic readings and a summary of each week’s content. All these basic
readings are on Moodle. For further readings, see the essay questions at the end.
Week 1) The basics of evolution
-- Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (2000), pp7-14
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (2nd edition, 1989), pp13, 22-7, 36-9
-- Steve Jones, Darwin’s Ghost (2000), pp 2-15
Primer on the basic structure of Darwinian theory. We’ll use the example of the evolution
of HIV as an illustration. It’s also a chance to consider other core conceptual issues, such
as: Is there ‘progress’ in evolution? What is the role of chance in evolution? Is ‘survival
of the fittest’ merely a tautology?
Week 2) The design argument
-- Sober, sections 2.2 and 2.4-2.8 except for the start of 2.7 (pp30-33, 36-46, 507). I.e. all of chapter 2 except: sections 2.1, 2.3 and pp46-50 of section 2.7.
Is the often exquisite design of living things an argument in favor of an intelligent
designer, e.g. God? Would this be a good argument even in the absence of evolution? Do
similar arguments apply to the ‘anthropic principle’? The issue is well suited to
philosophy, since close analysis of the logic of these arguments is crucial.
Week 3) What is adaptationism, and how can we test it?
-- Sober, sections 5.1-5.5 (pp121-38)
Is every trait in living organisms an optimal adaptation? Can every trait always be
explained by reference to some evolutionary story or other? Must they be? Or is it all too
easy to dream up fanciful ‘just-so’ stories? What are the alternatives to such
adaptationism? We’ll tackle these controversial and important debates, and uncover their
nuances. We’ll also focus on the vital issue of how best to test adaptationist hypotheses.
Week 4) The example of female orgasm
-- extract from introduction to Lloyd, The Case of the Female Orgasm
-- edited extracts from Elisabeth Lloyd’s website
http://mypage.iu.edu/%7Eealloyd/Reviews.html#HowCanYouKnowThat
Here’s an application of the ideas from the preceding class – is human female orgasm an
adaptation? How could we tell? We’ll examine the significance of existing sexological
research, such as heritability scores derived from twin studies. As well as being a good
case study, you also learn plenty of interesting facts along the way…
Week 5) Evolutionary psychology
-- Buss, The Evolution of Happiness
-- Sober, sections 7.2-7.3 (pp198-206)
The burgeoning but controversial programme of understanding the human mind as a
collection of evolutionary adaptations. Its picture of human psychology is of a ‘Stone
Age mind in a modern skull’. The emphasis is on explaining human behavior through
biology rather than culture. Buss is a very readable example of this. Again, we’ll also be
2
keeping in mind the issue of how the relevant hypotheses might be tested. In addition,
this will be a chance to get straight on human prehistory (in so far as it is known).
Week 6) Altruism
-- Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (pp125-31, 171-9)
Altruistic behavior is frequently observed in nature, but underneath it all are we still
seeing just the action of ‘selfish genes’? Dawkins explains how family life can indeed be
seen in this way and then outlines a great triumph for selfish gene theory, namely the
fascinating story of social insects such as ants and bees. We’ll also think about possible
alternative explanations of altruistic behavior.
Week 7) Human moral sentiments
-- Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (pp132-47)
-- optional: Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, chapter 12 (pp202-33)
Where does our moral sense come from? There are plenty of intriguing adaptationist
models of this too, and of co-operation more generally. Ridley outlines one of the main
ones. In these theories, human moral sentiments are seen merely as evolved mechanisms
for navigating complex social interactions. The Dawkins chapter is a non-technical
primer on some relevant evolutionary game theory.
Week 8) The fact-value distinction
-- a short handout from me
-- Sober, section 7.4 (pp206-13)
What are the possible implications – if any – of evolutionary theory for our understanding
of ethics? Should moral philosophy be transformed? Classic philosophical notions rear
their heads here, such as the fact-value distinction and the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.
Week 9) Nature versus nurture
-- Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (pp51-5)
-- Sober, section 7.1 (pp189-98)
-- Jones, Language of the Genes (pp182-9)
Are we prisoners of our genes? What does it mean to say that something is caused by
genes or by environment? Can nature and nurture ever be disentangled? What does it
mean if somebody discovers a ‘gene for’ something? These three readings help navigate
an area that’s widely misunderstood.
Week 10) What is life?
-- Sagan, ‘Life’, Encyclopedia Britannica (1970 edn), pp985-1002
Mildly updated version: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/340003/life
-- Mullen, ‘Forming a definition for life: interview with Gerald Joyce’,
Astrobiology Magazine, 25th July 2013 [tinyurl.com/pux3kyt]
What life is proves a surprisingly intricate question, with as yet no universally agreed
answer. Nor is the question purely ‘academic’ – rather, it really does matter to biologists
looking for the origin of life, extraterrestrial life, artificial life or synthetic life.
3
Essay Questions
-- All books mentioned are available in the Birkbeck library.
-- All articles/excerpts mentioned are available either on the course Moodle page or else
for free at the given URLs.
-- I have added annotations in double brackets for those readings that are in addition to
those mentioned in lectures.
1) Is the intelligent design hypothesis testable? If yes, has it passed those tests? If
not, could it be made testable?
-- Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (2000), sections 2.2 and 2.4-2.8 except for the
start of 2.7 (pp30-33, 36-46, 50-7). I.e. all of chapter 2 except: sections 2.1, 2.3 and pp4650 of section 2.7.
-- Neil Manson (ed), God and Design: The teleological argument and modern science
(Routledge 2003)
((contains a selection of articles from all viewpoints))
2) How might we test whether a uniquely human trait is an adaptation? Use an
example to illustrate your arguments.
-- Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (2000), sections 5.1-5.5 (pp121-38)
-- David Buss, The Evolution of Happiness
-- Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (2000), sections 7.2-7.3 (pp198-206)
-- Kevin Laland and Gillian Brown, Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on
Human Behaviour (Oxford, 2002)
((a balanced survey of the main controversies and methods surrounding evolutionary
theorizing, written by a biologist and a psychologist))
-- Steven J. Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979), ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the
panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme’, Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London, Series B, vol. 205, no. 1161, pp581-598.
Available online at: http://faculty.washington.edu/lynnhank/GouldLewontin.pdf
((perhaps the single most famous anti-adaptationist paper, written by two famous
biologists))
-- Jeremy Fox, ‘Why ‘The Spandrels of San Marco’ isn’t a good paper’,
http://oikosjournal.wordpress.com/2011/08/26/why-the-spandrels-of-san-marco-isnt-agood-paper/
((a critique of the Gould and Lewontin paper, written by an ecologist on an academic
journal’s blog))
3) Explain why Lloyd thinks the evidence tells against human female orgasm being
an adaptation. What, if any, arguments could an adaptationist offer in response?
-- Elisabeth Lloyd, The Case of the Female Orgasm (Harvard, 2005)
-- See also: http://mypage.iu.edu/~ealloyd/Reviews.html#HowCanYouKnowThat
See especially the ‘Replies to Critics’ section for links to some hostile reviews, and to
Lloyd’s replies to them.
EITHER: 4a) “Evolutionary theory can explain in purely natural terms why we
have the moral beliefs that we do. This tells against moral realism.”
4
Do you agree?
OR: 4b) Suppose evolutionary theory shows that it is adaptive for humans to behave
in a certain way in certain circumstances. Could that be used to argue that this
behaviour in those circumstances is therefore not morally bad, or less bad than we
had thought?
-- Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (2000), section 7.4 (pp206-13)
-- Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (pp132-47)
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (pp125-31, 171-9)
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, chapter 12 (pp202-33)
-- Sharon Street (2006), ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’,
Philosophical Studies
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/CourseMats7-8/street.pdf
((argues that evolutionary theory does indeed tell against moral realism))
-- Russ Shafer-Landau (2012), ‘Evolutionary debunking, moral realism, and moral
knowledge’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7
((a leading moral realist’s response to the evolutionary challenge))
-- See also http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-biology/#EvoMet for general
discussion, including critical discussion of the Street article.
5) ‘Men are naturally better than women at maths’. Given the entanglement of
genes and environment throughout development, in what way – if any – could a
claim like this make sense? How could we test it?
-- Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (pp51-5)
-- Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (2000), section 7.1 (pp189-98)
-- Steve Jones, Language of the Genes (pp182-9)
-- Paul Griffiths (2001), ‘What is innateness?’ The Monist
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/108/1/What_is_innateness.pdf
((criticizes the very notion of innateness as confusing because it conflates several distinct
biological notions))
-- Steven Pinker (2004), ‘Why nature and nurture won’t go away’, Daedalus
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3600799/Pinker_WhyNature.pdf?sequence=2
((defends the categories of nature and nurture))
-- Robert Northcott (2012), ‘Genetic traits and causal explanation’, in Kathryn Plaisance
and Thomas Reydon (eds) Philosophy of Behavioral Biology, pp65-82 – see especially
sections 1-5. http://www.bbk.ac.uk/philosophy/our-staff/academics/northcottfiles/BEBbook.pdf
((my own take on these issues, arguing that explanations that appeal to nature or nurture
can make sense and be informative – but only in a contextualized way))
5