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www.toxicfreefuture.org
October 26, 2011
Mr. Timothy Frazier
Designated Federal Officer
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future
US Department of Energy
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, DC 20585
Re: The Draft Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission
Dear Mr. Frazier,
Citizens' Environmental Coalition represents a statewide coalition of groups and individuals
working on a variety of environmental issues, including energy, climate change, nuclear power
and nuclear waste, particularly at West Valley, NY.
We have enclosed our comments on the Report, including 9 recommendations for the
Commission's consideration.
Thank you for your attention.
Sincerely,
Barbara J. Warren
Executive Director
A Clean Environment* Green Purchasing* Pollution Prevention* Healthy People* Green Jobs* Zero Waste
A Healthy Economy* A Sustainable Future
When the President decided to form a Blue Ribbon Commission to address the problem of
nuclear waste, he was charging the Commission with “Mission Impossible”. There have been
no new scientific or technical developments or breakthroughs related to nuclear waste. In
addition to the lack of a waste solution, the President also wanted a Nuclear Future for the
nation, including plans for new nuclear reactors.
A key principle of Zero Waste approaches is to stop generating waste, therefore we must
acknowledge that "More Nukes= More Radioactive Waste." Nuclear waste or radioactive waste
is produced all through the nuclear life cycle from mining and milling to processing and
enrichment to use in nuclear reactors and storage at reactor sites. Some disposal is available for
certain categories of waste, but high level waste and transuranic waste are particularly
problematic. Despite federal government promises at least a half century ago that nuclear waste
would be a simple problem to solve technologically, the reality has proven far different. The
current handling of various types of nuclear waste includes abandonment, ignoring it, changes to
its real classification, promising to deal with it in the future, transferring responsibility to state
and local entities, irresponsibly allowing contamination to spread and threaten human
populations, drinking water and the environment., linguistically detoxifying it, treating waste as
an externality rather than using full cost accounting, and repeatedly delaying and not funding
responsible and proper management of dangerous radioactivity.
The Commission was not populated with scientists and other experts. Therefore Commission
members had to approach an impossible task with only political solutions—such as a new
approach, policies or strategies.
The Commission was faced with radioactive waste problems in every state of the nation at
numerous sites and a history of delay and dissatisfaction with site cleanup and remediation. The
development of a permanent repository involved decades of work which resulted in the only site
seriously studied, Yucca Mountain, being abandoned.
President Obama has been a strong supporter of nuclear energy, continuing to advance new
nuclear plants and substantial federal subsidies for them. Secretary Chu was responsible for
setting up the Commission and the members of the Commission. The President and the Secretary
both wanted to see a Future for Nuclear, with a significant expansion of nuclear power.
Right from the beginning we had a Commission populated with largely advocates of nuclear
power, who were supposed to tackle an enormous intractable problem – Nuclear Waste.
Ensuring a promising Nuclear Future guaranteed that the approach to nuclear waste would be
limited or carefully circumscribed. The Commission's rationale appears on p. 26, " the successful
management of SNF (Spent Nuclear Fuel) has long been viewed as necessary if nuclear power is
going to remain a viable energy option."
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ISSUE: The Legacy of Nuclear Waste & Its Management
The charge of the Commission was a primary focus on the back end of the fuel cycle, which
properly should have included a broad focus on the accumulated waste problem. The
Commission adopted a narrow focus on spent fuel. This narrower focus had significant impacts
on deliberations and the Draft report produced. As a result the report does not provide a full
discussion of the magnitude or seriousness of the radioactive waste problem and the
contaminated sites nationwide posing threats to the environment. For example, it does not
address the High Level Waste at West Valley, NY, that remains after the failed commercial
reprocessing venture. At this highly erodible site, wastes could be released and carried to the
Great Lakes impacting the drinking water for millions of people. Such problems nationwide
offered an important opportunity for the Commission to understand the hurdles the government
will have to overcome in siting new permanent repositories or interim storage sites.
The entire radioactive waste problem and the history of each individual site would have provided
an important reality check. The Commission needs this full understanding when it proposes a
new strategy and plan to negotiate with local communities and local and state governments. In
this age of expanded communications, not just the historical record is widely available, but the
day to day and up to the minute news regarding developments or lack of them, insufficient
funding, bungling, etc. that are occurring.
The Commission to its credit did acknowledge the serious impasse, the broken promises and
unmet commitments regarding nuclear waste and management failures. It is into this historical
backdrop that the Commission suggests a new strategy of openness and negotiations to lead to a
successful outcome. However, ignoring the real world is a serious mistake. No new strategy or
plans, no new negotiations no matter how carefully crafted or how principled can overcome the
long record of broken promises and the case studies from other sites that will continue to serve
as large red flags for any community that entertains siting a permanent or interim facility.
Under the New Strategy, the First Step is a New Consent- based approach to siting future nuclear
waste management facilities. In other words the first step is Siting new facilities. We recommend
a different first step.
1. Recommendation: The First Step should be work to restore the Public Trust in
government through prompt action and funding to isolate nuclear waste, prevent
spreading contamination and public exposure.
As the BRC documented at p.74 of the Report, “the actions and behavior of the federal
government are key to restoring public trust.” The Commission describes the Nuclear Waste
Fund as having 25 billion dollars that are inaccessible to the federal waste management program.
As a result, annual waste program needs must be met by annual appropriations from the
discretionary budget. The defense side of waste management has been well funded, in contrast to
underfunding of the domestic waste budget.
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The First Step should include:
 The immediate establishment of a dedicated fund to deal with nuclear waste sites
and provide continuous funding to protect the public and the environment. Funding
must be commensurate with the magnitude of the problem and should no longer be
considered discretionary.
 A set of goals and standards to be achieved that will ensure that the public can begin
to gain confidence in the process and government promises.
 Provisions for funding the hiring of independent technical experts by the public, and
reporting to the public to ensure accountability and the adequacy of protection of
public health and safety.
This recommendation addresses the major root cause of the problem, beyond the unsolvable onenuclear waste.
In contrast, the BRC focused primarily on accumulating spent fuel at nuclear reactors and largely
the affected nuclear industry stakeholders. States, local and tribal governments and communities
are important stakeholders, already dealing with nuclear waste and should have received more
attention.
ISSUE: Fukushima Disaster and Spent Nuclear Fuel
During the course of the Blue Ribbon Commission, the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe occurred
and the magnitude of this disaster and its impacts have been felt worldwide, with continuing
radiation releases to the atmosphere and to oceans. Given the BRC’s narrowed focus on spent
fuel, this disaster should have resulted in significant recommendations from the Commission.
The BRC focused only on the inventory of spent fuel and long term plans, taking decades, to
move this material elsewhere for storage or disposal. There were no short term recommendations
for dealing with the critical safety issues associated with overcrowded spent fuel pools. Despite
the fact that the primary and only issue the Commission dealt with was spent nuclear fuel, on this
critically significant safety problem, the Commission punted to another body, NAS or NRC and
a future deliberation. This deferral is a particularly egregious action in relation to safety as so
many reports have documented and the Fukushima disaster confirmed. There have been
numerous reports documenting the potential of a spent fuel pool catastrophe. NAS
recommendations were made in 2005 and the BRC could have made use of them. We think
these issues are more urgent and need a sound recommendation now that can begin to be
implemented.
New York State’s spent fuel pools contain some of the highest concentration of radioactivity in
the country (Alvarez, 2011). In Oswego, NY, there are 3 aging reactors with significant safety
concerns-- two of the Mark I design and one that is a Mark II-- with spent fuel pools above the
core. GE Hitachi has identified two significant problems affecting these plants-- damaged control
rods that could fragment and more recently warped shafts into which the control rods are
inserted. Shutting down reactors is obviously a critically important function, and while GE
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Hitachi believes their so-called "friction problem" could only occur following an earthquake, we
are concerned that a shutdown could be hindered even without a preceding earthquake.
To its credit the Commission did highlight two significant safety issues. We believe they should
be addressed NOW:
 The Commission noted that water- filled pools at nuclear reactors in the US are storing
far more nuclear fuel rod assemblies than were stored above the cores of the Fukushima
reactors. Congressman Markey’s report (2011) has documented the magnitude of this
overcrowding at the Pilgrim nuclear reactor, originally designed to hold just 880 fuel
assemblies, but the NRC has allowed this to be increased to almost 4000. The NRC has
allowed this increasing congestion, however, there is a major question about the current
margin of safety, after increasing the quantity of fuel rods to 350% of original pool
design capacity.
 The Commission expressed concern that in the event of a serious emergency at a nuclear
plant, there is no ability to move fuel rods out of the pools to another site.
2. Recommendation:
 Prompt movement of spent nuclear fuel rods out of pools at reactors into
hardened on-site storage. The first goal should be restoring Mark I & II reactor
pools to their original design capacity. The second goal should be to restore all
overcrowded spent fuel pools to closer to their original design capacity on a
phased schedule-- to no more than 200% of capacity and then to 150% of
capacity and finally 100% of capacity.
 To handle emergencies additional on-site capacity for spent fuel rods should be
available at every nuclear reactor in hardened on-site storage.
These recommendations would provide a real and immediate way to address the most important
issue associated with spent fuel—SAFETY. In contrast the BRC merely deferred decisions to
another body and recommended interim consolidated storage sites, which are years in the future
and extremely uncertain.
ISSUE: There Should be No Nuclear Future, Since The Waste Problem Remains Unsolved
The federal government represented to the public over a half century ago that the problem of
nuclear waste was an easy one to solve with modern technology. The BRC report documents that
if all reactors closed today we would be left with 75,000 tons of spent fuel and this would fill the
Yucca Mountain facility, which is no longer an option. If no new reactors come online by 2050,
we would have 150,000 tons of spent fuel, and we would need a minimum of 2 repositories. In
other words, More NUKES= More WASTE. With no solution in sight, the Commission should
be recommending the abandonment of a nuclear future.
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3. Recommendation: The nation should stop making more nuclear waste at nuclear
reactors including, in the near term future:
 No new nuclear reactors
 Closure of the oldest reactors & those with unsafe designs i.e., the Mark I and
IIs
 No relicensing.
ISSUE: The Definition of Disposal used by the BRC poses a significant barrier to the
achievement of a permanent repository.
" Disposal, intended as the final stage of waste management, is isolation that relies in the long
term only on the passive operation of natural environmental and man-made barriers, does not
permit easy human access to the waste after final emplacement, and does not require continued
human control and maintenance." BRC report.
These radioactive materials are dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. There are no
natural or man-made barriers that will not fail or undergo sufficient changes in that time period,
resulting in the release of radioactive materials to the environment. This definition of disposal
makes the concept of "safe disposal" an oxymoron. The BRC even cites the NAS
recommendations for a successful repository: waste placement with plans for reversability, long
term monitoring and control, capability for treating wastes and waste retrieval if necessary.
However the Commission never altered this definition and fails to recognize that their definition
of disposal is at odds with the NAS recommendations and could be a significant roadblock to
public acceptance of a disposal site.
4. Recommendation: Change the definition of disposal to be consistent with National
Academy of Sciences recommendations.
ISSUE: States, Local Governments and Tribal Nations MUST Be Partners with the
Federal Government on All Nuclear Issues
The BRC is recommending a consensus- based process for negotiating with states, local
governments, tribal nations and communities for future waste facilities. This recommendation
stands in sharp contrast to the limited role states have in relation to the nuclear reactors operating
in their midst. States, tribal nations and local governments are not partners and have almost no
say in critical decisions that have the potential for enormous impacts on life and health of nearby
populations, as well as economic impacts on businesses. No governments will take seriously
proposed negotiations around disposal and storage facilities, when they cannot object to
relicensing on safety grounds, when relicensing is allowed to proceed a decade or more before
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the expiration of the original license, when the lessons of Fukushima have not been fully
incorporated into design or safety changes at reactors. The NRC has demonstrated that it is more
about representing the interests of the nuclear industry, than of protecting the public from this
dangerous technology. Since Fukushima, there have been many terrible decisions-- ones that a
prudent person would not make. The only exception was the North Anna decision to inspect
more thoroughly after the recent earthquake, rather than allowing the reactor to go back online.
The BRC was correct when it said "all levels of government- local, state and tribal- must have at
a minimum, a meaningful consultative role in important decisions. In addition, states and tribes
should retain or be delegated direct authority over aspects of regulation, permitting and
operations in order to protect the interests of affected communities and citizens." p. xvi of the
Report. While the BRC was speaking about storage and disposal, we believe this should apply to
nuclear reactors as well.
5. Recommendation: States, tribal and local governments must be involved in a
meaningful and constructive way in regulating the nuclear industry, as a partner with
the federal government.
ISSUE: A Severe Nuclear Event Could Leave An Extraordinary, and Unacceptable Burden
on States, Tribal Nations and Local Governments.
The BRC raised some significant issues related to severe nuclear events and emergency
planning, when it concluded that there might be a need to remove fuel from spent fuel pools in
an emergency. States have reason to be even more concerned given the status of emergency
planning at the federal level. According to a recent issue of Inside EPA, there are unanswered
questions regarding which agency would handle such an event and the long term cleanup. FEMA
only has authority for natural disasters. In addition, the majority of funds under the Price –
Anderson Act may not be accessible, if federal property is not involved. This translates to a
situation where a state and its local affected governments or a tribal nation would have to
shoulder an extraordinary financial burden, besides the technical and logistical ones. NRC is
talking about handing over long term cleanup to EPA. Ordinarily it is desirable to have the
understanding of the full consequences of a disaster provide the motivation for prevention
activities. NRC’s performance has been seriously lacking, however, separating safety and
prevention of catastrophic events completely from responsibility for post- event cleanup could
worsen the situation, further reducing NRC accountability for safety.
6. Recommendation: The federal government must resolve the serious problems related to
emergency planning for severe nuclear events in this country and long term cleanup. There
should be a national discussion of these issues and States, Tribal and Local governments
must play a major role, not just in emergency response, but in prevention.
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ISSUE: Reprocessing
The BRC has not recommended reprocessing, however it seems to leave the door open for a
revival of this option. New York has considerable experience with the failure of reprocessing,
having served as the host for the only commercial reprocessing site in the nation at West Valley.
Reprocessing generates increased quantities of radioactive wastes. Extensive contamination is
associated with the process as demonstrated at West Valley and in other countries that do
reprocessing. Thus even ignoring the problem of nuclear proliferation, which is not wise given
terrorism concerns, reprocessing has proven to be a failure.
7. Recommendation: The BRC should make no recommendation to the President for
further study or research into reprocessing.
ISSUE: The New Waste Management Organization
The Commission suggests a corporate structure for addressing nuclear waste. Corporations are
designed to evade responsibility and accountability for their directors. Nuclear waste demands
both responsibility and accountability and while the federal government has failed to properly
handle the waste program, privatizing this function would inevitably be far worse. At West
Valley, a private company operated for six short years, before deciding that adequate safeguards
would be too costly, leaving a very contaminated site for federal and state governments to
handle.
It should also be noted that the BRC provided no analysis of various options or a reasonable
rationale for suggesting privatization and a corporate structure.
8. Recommendation: The BRC should recommend a new Governmental waste
management organization with authority and adequate resources, including nondiscretionary funding.
ISSUE: Subsidies to a Dying Industry
Our national leaders frequently express devotion to a so-called "Free Market", while
simultaneously providing subsidies to industries, which demonstrates their doubts that the
Market can function effectively. Nowhere has this been more clearly demonstrated than in the
case of the nuclear industry.
While the nuclear industry was moribund before March of 2011, since Fukushima corporations
have been fleeing the nuclear field and cancelling nuclear projects. Moody's indicates that even
guaranteed upfront funding while reactors are under construction, does not relieve the substantial
financial risks of these investments.
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The financial risks of nuclear power have largely been borne, not by the industry but by
taxpayers and ratepayers. We have paid extraordinary subsidies for R &D, for insurance, for
shareholder bailouts, for construction subsidies, etc. Besides financial risks, the public also bears
the burden of environmental contamination and public health risks. In a democracy the public
ought to be able to choose nuclear power or reject it, not forced to bear the majority of the risks.
The Free Market has spoken pretty clearly and companies are moving away from nuclear. It is
time for the government to honor their belief in the free market and stop the continuing subsidies
to this dying industry. This means that the Commission should not ask Ratepayers to foot the bill
for addressing nuclear waste. Some percentage of industry profits should be required to
adequately support the new waste organization.
9. Recommendation: The Commission should not recommend future subsidies to the
nuclear industry, and further inequities to the public. The industry should be required to
pay the full costs of the entire nuclear lifecycle. Federal support for nuclear R& D should
be reduced significantly, while prioritizing safety issues.
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