DROIT PÉNAL
Thierry Nadon – Hiver 2013
CHAPTER ONE: SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW (3-44).................................................................. 5
I. DEFINITION ........................................................................................................................................................5
II. THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION (6) ...........................................................................................5
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (6) ..........................................................................................5
The Criminal Law and the Division of Powers (8)...........................................................................................5
III. CODIFICATION : THE CRIMINAL LAW AS A STATUTE (16) ..............................................................................6
Common Law offences and defences (18) .......................................................................................................6
Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Certainty in the Criminal Law (26) ..................................................................6
Nova Scotia Pharmaceuticals, 1992 (26) .....................................................................................................6
R v Heywood, 1994 (28) ...............................................................................................................................6
Construction or Interpretation of the Criminal Code (37) ................................................................................6
R v Pare, 1987 (37) ......................................................................................................................................7
CHAPTER TWO: LIMITS ON CRIMINAL LAW (45-110)................................................................. 7
I. THE LIMITS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW: DEBATING THE HARM PRINCIPLE (45)...................................................7
Malmo-Levine, 2003 (57) .............................................................................................................................7
R v Labaye, 2005 (70)...................................................................................................................................8
II. PROSTITUTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (83) .................................................................................................8
Standing Committing on Justice and Human Rights, 2006 (90)...................................................................9
III. HATE SPEECH (96)...........................................................................................................................................9
R v Keegstra, 1990 (97) ................................................................................................................................9
R v Zundel, 1992 (102) .................................................................................................................................9
CHAPTER THREE : POLICE POWERS (111-199) .............................................................................. 9
I. MODELS OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (111)....................................................................................................10
S. 7 & 10 Charter .......................................................................................................................................10
R. v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46 (external) ............................................................................................................10
II. QUESTIONING SUSPECTS (116) ......................................................................................................................10
The Common Law Governing Confessions (116) ..........................................................................................10
Confessions and the Right to Counsel (118) ..................................................................................................11
R v Sinclair, 2010 (external).......................................................................................................................11
Confessions and the Right to Silence (129)....................................................................................................12
R v Singh, 2007 (133) .................................................................................................................................13
III. ENTRAPMENT OU PROVOCATION POLICIÈRE (141) .......................................................................................14
R v Mack, 1988 (151) .................................................................................................................................14
IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE (151) .........................................................................................................................15
S. 8 Charter ................................................................................................................................................15
Hunter v Southam, 1984 (151) ...................................................................................................................15
R v Collins, 1987 (165) ...............................................................................................................................16
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (155) ......................................................................................................16
S. 24(2) .......................................................................................................................................................16
R v Wong, 1990 (155) .................................................................................................................................16
R v Tessling, 2004 (161) .............................................................................................................................17
V. DETENTION AND ARREST (168) .....................................................................................................................18
S. 9 Charter ................................................................................................................................................18
Constitutional protection (170) .......................................................................................................................19
R v Grant, 2009 (171) .................................................................................................................................19
Detention powers (178) ..................................................................................................................................20
R v Mann, 2004 (179) .................................................................................................................................20
Arrest Powers (184) and Powers Incident to Arrest (186)..............................................................................21
Cloutier v Langlois, 2004 (186) .................................................................................................................21
R v Golden, 2001 (187)...............................................................................................................................22
VI. SOURCES OF POLICE POWERS AND THE ANCILLARY POWERS DEBATE (191)..............................................22
CHAPTER FOUR : THE TRIAL PROCESS (199-300)....................................................................... 22
II. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL (248)....................................................................22
Crown Counsel (248) and Disclosure (250) ...................................................................................................22
Plea Bargaining (254) .....................................................................................................................................23
Defense Counsel (254) and Disclosure (250) .................................................................................................23
III. PRE-TRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL (259)...........................................................................................................23
IV. THE JURY (271).............................................................................................................................................23
Requiring Trial by Jury (271) .........................................................................................................................23
Selecting Jury (272) ........................................................................................................................................23
Challenges for Cause (273) ............................................................................................................................23
Jury Unanimity (278)......................................................................................................................................23
V. QUANTUM AND BURDEN OF PROOF (279) .....................................................................................................24
Burden of Proof (279).....................................................................................................................................24
Woolmington v DPP, 1935 (279) ...............................................................................................................24
R v Oakes, 1986 (284) ................................................................................................................................24
R v Whyte, 1988 (289) ................................................................................................................................25
R v Keegstra, 1990 (290) ............................................................................................................................25
R v Downey, 1992 (291) .............................................................................................................................25
Quantum of proof (292) ..................................................................................................................................26
R v Lifchus, 1997 (292)...............................................................................................................................26
R v Starr, 2000 (294) ..................................................................................................................................26
CHAPTER SIX : RESPONSABILITÉ ABSOLUE ET STRICTE (377-418) ..................................... 27
I. INTERET PUBLIC OU INFRACTIONS CRIMINELLES REELLES (378) ....................................................................27
Beaver v The Queen, 1957 (378) ................................................................................................................27
R v Pierce Fisheries, 1971 (384) ................................................................................................................28
R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc., 1991 (385) ............................................................................................28
II. ÉMERGENCE DE LA RESPONSABILITE STRICTE (388)......................................................................................28
R v City of Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 (388) .....................................................................................................29
III. CONSIDÉRATIONS CONSTITUTIONNELLES (395) ...........................................................................................29
Reference re Section 94(2) of the BC Motor Vehicle Act, 1985 (395)........................................................29
R v 1260448 Ontario (William Cameron Trucking), 2003 ; R v Transport Robert, 2003 (401) ................30
R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc., 1991 (406) ............................................................................................31
CHAPTER FIVE: CONDUCT OR ACTUS REUS (301-375) ............................................................. 32
I. CONTEMPORANEITY (302) ...............................................................................................................................32
Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, 1969 (302) ......................................................................32
R v Miller (CA), 1982 (305)........................................................................................................................33
R v Miller (HoL), 1983 (306)......................................................................................................................33
*R v Cooper, 1993 (307) ............................................................................................................................33
R v Williams, 2003 (309) ............................................................................................................................33
II. VOLUNTARINESS (310)...................................................................................................................................34
R v Larsonneur, 1933 (311)........................................................................................................................34
Kilbride v Lake, 1962 (311)........................................................................................................................34
R v King, 1962 (313)...................................................................................................................................34
R v Ruzic, 2001 (315) .................................................................................................................................35
III. ACTION, OMISSIONS AND STATUS (316).......................................................................................................35
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R v Browne, 1997 (319) ..............................................................................................................................35
R v Thornton, 1991 (323) ...........................................................................................................................36
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES (333) .................................................................................................................................36
V. CONSEQUENCES AND CAUSATION (337) ........................................................................................................36
Factual cause ..................................................................................................................................................37
R v Winning, 1973 (338) .............................................................................................................................37
Legal cause .....................................................................................................................................................37
Smithers v The Queen, 1978 (339) .............................................................................................................37
R v Cribbin, 1994 (344) ..............................................................................................................................38
Multiple causes ...............................................................................................................................................38
Pagett v The Queen, 1983 (349) .................................................................................................................38
R v SR(J), 2008 ...........................................................................................................................................38
R v Reid & Stratton, 2003 (353) .................................................................................................................39
R v Harbottle, 1993 (358) ...........................................................................................................................39
*R v Nette, 2001 (363) ................................................................................................................................40
*R c Bouchard, (2007 QCCQ 1882) ..........................................................................................................41
CHAPTER SEVEN: FAULT OR MENS REA (419-499)..................................................................... 44
I. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITIONS OF FAULT (421)....................................................................................................44
II. SUBJECTIVE STATES OF FAULT (426).............................................................................................................44
R v Buzzanga and Durocher, 1979 (427) ...................................................................................................44
R v Tennant and Naccarato, 1975 (427) ....................................................................................................45
A. Intention/Wilful conduct (427) ..................................................................................................................45
R v Steane, 1947 (429)................................................................................................................................45
R v Hibbert, 1995 (432) ..............................................................................................................................47
R v Buzzanga and Durocher, 1979 (436) ...................................................................................................47
B. Actual Knowledge (442) ............................................................................................................................48
R v Théroux, 1993 (442) .............................................................................................................................48
C. Recklessness and Wilful Blindness (446) ..................................................................................................49
R v Sansregret, 1985 (447) .........................................................................................................................49
R v Briscoe, 2010 (448) ..............................................................................................................................50
III. OBJECTIVE STANDARDS OF FAULT (449) .....................................................................................................51
Criminal Negligence (450) .............................................................................................................................51
R v Tutton and Tutton, 1989 (450) .............................................................................................................51
R v Waite, 1989 (454) .................................................................................................................................52
R v Gingrich and McLean, 1991 (455) .......................................................................................................53
R v Hundal, 1995 (456) ..............................................................................................................................53
Unlawful act manslaughter (457) ...................................................................................................................54
R v Creighton, 1993 (457) ..........................................................................................................................54
R v Beatty, 2008) (471) ...............................................................................................................................56
R v Roy, 2012 SCC 26 (external source) ....................................................................................................57
R. c. Bélanger, 2013 CSC 7 (external source) ............................................................................................57
Salame v R, 2010 QCCA 64 (external source) ...........................................................................................58
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (482) ..................................................................................................58
Vaillancourt v The Queen, 1987 (703) .......................................................................................................58
R v Martineau, 1990 (711) .........................................................................................................................59
V. MISTAKE OF FACT (491) ................................................................................................................................60
Beaver v The Queen, 1957 (491) ................................................................................................................61
Pappajohn v The Queen, 1980 (498) ..........................................................................................................61
R v Bailey, 2006 ABPC 47 (external source) .............................................................................................62
CHAPTER EIGHT : IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (501-524) ........................................................... 62
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S. 19 CC ......................................................................................................................................................63
I. MISTAKEN BELIEFS ABOUT THE LAW AND PARTICULAR FAULT ELEMENTS (502) ........................................63
R v Howson, 1966 (502) .............................................................................................................................63
R v Docherty, 1989 (503) ...........................................................................................................................63
Jones and Pamajewon v The Queen, 1991 (504) .......................................................................................63
II. ERREUR DE FAIT ET ERREUR DE DROIT (505) .................................................................................................64
R v Prue and Baril, 1979 (505) ..................................................................................................................64
R v MacDougall, 1982 (504) ......................................................................................................................64
III. THE DEFENCE OF OFFICIALY INDUCED ERROR (506) ...................................................................................64
Molis v The Queen, 1980 (506) ..................................................................................................................65
Forster v The Queen, 1992 (506) ...............................................................................................................65
R v Jorgensen, 1995 (508) ..........................................................................................................................66
Lévis (Ville de) v Tétreault, 2006 (514) ......................................................................................................67
IV. MISTAKE OF LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (516) .............................................................67
R v Pontes, 1995 (516) ...............................................................................................................................67
CHAPTER NINE: PARTICIPATION (525-570) .................................................................................. 68
S. 21(1) CC .................................................................................................................................................69
S. 21(2) CC .................................................................................................................................................69
R. c. Bilodeau, 2011 QCCQ 9380 ..............................................................................................................69
S. 22 CC ......................................................................................................................................................70
I. PRINCIPALS: S. 21(1)(A) (526) .........................................................................................................................70
R v Thatcher, 1987 (526) ............................................................................................................................70
II. AIDING AND ABETTING: S. 21(1)(B) & (C) (531) ............................................................................................70
R v Greyeyes, 1997 (531) ...........................................................................................................................71
***Dunlop and Sylvester v The Queen, 1979 (537) ...................................................................................71
R v Jackson, 2007 (542) .............................................................................................................................72
R v Helsdon, 2007 (545) .............................................................................................................................72
R v Palombi, 2007 (550) .............................................................................................................................73
III. COMMON INTENTION: S. 21(2) (553) ............................................................................................................73
*R v. Kirkness 1990, (553) .........................................................................................................................74
R v Logan, 1990 (561) ................................................................................................................................74
IV. COUNSELLING AS FORM OF PARTICIPATION: S. 22(1) (564) .........................................................................75
R v O’Brien, 2007 (564) .............................................................................................................................75
V. ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT: S. 23(1) (566)................................................................................................75
S. 240 CC ....................................................................................................................................................76
S. 23(1) CC .................................................................................................................................................76
R v Duong, 1998, (566) ..............................................................................................................................76
CHAPTER TEN: INCHOATE OFFENCES (571-606) ........................................................................ 77
I. ATTEMPT (572) ................................................................................................................................................77
Actus Reus (572) ............................................................................................................................................77
R v Cline, 1956 (572)..................................................................................................................................77
***Deutsch v The Queen, 1986 (573) ........................................................................................................77
Mens rea (574) ................................................................................................................................................78
R v Ancio, 1984 (574) .................................................................................................................................78
R v Logan, 1990 (576) ................................................................................................................................78
R v Sorrell and Bondett, 1978 (578) ...........................................................................................................79
Impossibilité (579)..........................................................................................................................................79
*US v Dynar, 1997 (579)............................................................................................................................79
II. INCITEMENT (588) ..........................................................................................................................................81
R v Hamilton. 2005 (588) ...........................................................................................................................81
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St-Jacques c R, 2008 QCCS 6631 ..............................................................................................................82
III. CONSPIRACY (594)........................................................................................................................................84
465 CC ........................................................................................................................................................84
United States v Dynar, 1997 (595) .............................................................................................................85
IV. COMBINING INCHOATE FORMS OF LIABILITY (600) ......................................................................................86
R v Déry, 2006 (600) ..................................................................................................................................86
V. COMPLETE OFFENCES BASED ON INCHOATE LIABILTY (602).........................................................................86
R v Legare, 2009 (603) ...............................................................................................................................86
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: PROVOCATION (737-766) ........................................................................ 87
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CHAPTER ONE: SOURCES OF CRIMINAL LAW (3-44)
I. Definition


« Droit criminel » : mala in se (wrong in itself);
« Droit pénal » : malum prohibitum (wrong because prohibited).
II. The Criminal Law and the Constitution (6)
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (6)

The Charter infuses almost every aspect of Canadian criminal law, as it applies to the activities of Canadian
legislatures and government officials (ss. 7 to 14).
The Criminal Law and the Division of Powers (8)






The CA 1867, at s. 91(27), vests in the federal Parliament the exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal law,
which was given a broad meaning by the Privy Council in Russell v The Queen (1882), and to establish and
maintain penitentiaries under s. 91(28).
The provinces have jurisdiction over the constitution of courts of criminal jurisdiction (s. 91(27)), the
imposition of penalties in order to enforce provincial laws (s. 92(15)), the administration of justice (s.
92(14)), the establishment of prisons for inmates serving two years less a day, and asylums (s. 92(7)), as well
as property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).
The federal government appoints judges to higher superior trial courts under s. 96 of the CA 1867; as well as
appeal court and SCC judges, while the provinces appoint judges to provincial courts where criminal trials
are held.
Rarely provincial regulation overlaping slightly with Canadian Criminal Law will be held anticonstitutional
as showed by a trio of cases in the 1960’s (O’grady v Sparling, Stephens v The Queen and Smith v The
Queen) and recent cases (Dupond, McNeil, Schneider).
Dickson, dissenting in R v Hauser, said: “While the criminal law was to be enacted by the federal
Parliament, its administration was to be left in th hands of local and provincial authorities ‘where it could be
more flexibly administered’ ” (13).
Prior to the enactment of the Charter, federal jurisdiction over criminal law was one of the only ways to
strike down provincial legislation in the provinces, as illustrated in Switzman v Elbing (1957), in which the
SCC deemed that a ban on communist activity through the “Padlock Act” was criminal in nature, and ultra
vires provincial jurisdiction.
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
The restriction on the provinces enacting laws that could be classified as criminal continued post-Charter, as
illustrated by cases such as R v Morgentaler (1993), in which a Nova Scotia law making it an offence to
perform an offence outside of a hospital was deemed an unconstitutional provincial invasion of the federal
criminal law power; and in cases such as Reference re Firearms Act (Can.) (2000), in which the SCC
discuss the division of powers regarding firearms legislation and the Canadian Firearms Registry, holding
unanimously that the federal Firearms Act was constitutionally valid under the federal criminal law power.
III. Codification : the Criminal Law as a Statute (16)
Common Law offences and defences (18)


Frey v Fedoruk rejected common law offences as punishable in 1950, even before s. 9(a) of the CC made
this explicit after a reform in 1953.
Yet, Amato v The Queen specifies that common law defences (e.g. entrapment), excuses or justifications can
be used.
Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Certainty in the Criminal Law (26)


Two reason why the law should be unambigous:
1. Citizens should plan their behavior accordingly;
2. Government shouldn’t have unlimited power.
Codification advances three fundamental values of the criminal law:
1. Predetermined law: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege meaning “there must be no crime
or punishment except in accordance with fixed, predetermined law”.
2. Forecast: Crimes cannot be created or punished on a retroactive basis.
3. Certainty: Criminal law should be certain. Two aspects :
a. “Void for vagueness” doctrine: can be raised under s. 7 of the Charter, as it is a principle of
fundamental justice that laws should not be too vague…
Nova Scotia Pharmaceuticals, 1992 (26)
Ratio : The SCC affirmed the doctrine of vagueness. However, it unanimously held that s. 32(1)(c) of the then
Combines Investigation Act was not impermissibly vague. Many cases challenging s. 7 of the Charter on the
basis of vagueness have failed, as the courts have emphasized that they are nonetheless able to limit the
interpretation of legislation that is too broadly worded.
b. Overbreadth: means chosen by the state for its purpose are too broad…
R v Heywood, 1994 (28)
Ratio : A criminal previously convicted for a sexual offence was, by law, prohibited from being in a park. He
was found there, obviously taking inappropriate pictures. It was found that the prohibition was nonetheless
overly broad, in violation of s. 7. The Court stated “overbreadth and vagueness are related in that both are the
result of a lack of sufficient precision by a legislature in the means used to accomplish an objective. In the case
of vagueness, the means are not clearly defined. In the case of overbreadth the means are too sweeping in
relation to the objective. »
Comment : see also Canadian Foundation for Children v Canada [2004] (31).
Construction or Interpretation of the Criminal Code (37)
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

Historically the CC has been interpreted “strictly,” so that the accused is given the benefit of the doubt
concerning any textual ambiguity – i.e. that a court, in interpreting an ambiguity, adopts the interpretation
most favourable to the accused (R v Paré).
Currently, the resort to the doctrine of strict construction is reserved to where the statute is ambiguous, only
after it has been given a purposive interpretation designed to achieve its objectives. Two versions :
o Driedger’s Constuction of Statutes, 1983: “The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context
and in their grammatical and ordinary sens harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament”.
o Interpretation Act, s. 12, 1985: “Every enactment is deemed remedial and shall be given such fair,
large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”
R v Pare, 1987 (37)
Facts: A 17 year old was accused of sexually assaulting and then killing a seven year old boy when he
threatened to tell his mother.
History :
 The trial judge found the accused guilty of first degree murder because it was done “while committing” an
indecent assault (s. 214(5) of the CC).
 The Court of Appeal for Quebec substituted the charge with one of second degree, stating that the words
“while committing” in s. 214(5) should be interpreted restrictively, and the accused had only killed the
accused after sexually assaulting him.
Issue : Did he killed him “while commiting” an indecent assault and sould be convicted for a first degree
murder? YES & YES.
Reasoning: The SCC rejected this doctrine of strict interpretation, because it was difficult to determine the
beginning and end of the indecent assault, and because the exactly simultaneous (or exact coincidence)
approach leads to distinctions that are arbitrary and irrational (only a temporal and causal link is necessary).
CHAPTER TWO: LIMITS ON CRIMINAL LAW (45-110)
« Every criminal offence is a statement in matters of determining the principles and the limits, the ingredients of
particular offence are. »
I. The Limits on the Criminal Law: Debating the Harm Principle (45)



Interrogation : Wheter the criminal law should respond only to harm or whether it also has a role in
proclaming and enforcing the values or moral views of the community ».
The purpose of the criminal law:
o Mill’s « On liberty » : The “harm principle” opposes the use of government power to achieve moral
ends, which Mill’s view as illegetimate, and the use of such coercive power to prevent harm to
others – the only permissible use of such force ».
o Devlin’s “The Enforcement of Morals”: CL shouldn’t separate completely crime and sin, because it
should preserve order and decency in this community of idea that is a society. The test to decide
whether a practice should be enforce of prohibited is the “real feeling of reprobation”.
o Hart’s “Immorality and Treason”: law should not invade the private sphere of morality, because it is
difficult to define a rational and universal view on morality.
The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the harm principle as a principle of fundamental justice in Canada,
within the meaning of s. 7 of the Charter in…
Malmo-Levine, 2003 (57)
Ratio : The majority rejected all the arguments for the requirements of harm under section 91(27) of the CA
1867 and s. 7 of the Charter. Accordingly, it is constitutionally open to Parliament to legislate on the basis of
morality alone.
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Reasoning (Gonthier and Binnie):
 Provisions of the CC sought to protect vulnerable groups, chronic users, adolescents, and those in the
broder society from the protential harm associated with the use of marijuana.
 “The state may sometimes be justified in criminalizing conduct that it either not harmful (in the sense
contemplated by the harm principle), or that causes harm only to the accused” (para 115)(i.e. cannibalism,
bestiality and cruelty to animals)
 « Canada continues to have paternalistic laws. Requirement that people wear their seatbelts and motocycle
helmets are design to ‘save people from them-selves’ (para 124). »
Dissent (Arbour) : There must be a minimum harm to others as an essential part of the offence.


Harm-based rationales can help in prosecuting a given crime, as it is easier to prove than a community
standard, but it’s not always clear how to precisely apply the harm test in a given case.
The SCC developed a (working) theory of harm in…
R v Labaye, 2005 (70)
Ratio : In R v Labaye, the SCC ruled that a consensual, private swingers” club was not a bawdy house, in
contravention of s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code, since no money was exchanged for sexual acts, they were
done at a private club, and people were informed of what membership in the club entailed. Thus, there was no
harm.
Issue : Whether what went on at the swingers club constituted “acts of indecency” eithin the meaning of the
CL? NO.
Reasoning: How judge can avoid value judgement?
1. Awarness of difficulty to separate moral and legal issue;
2. Objective decision based on evidence + factual and legal context;
3. Carefulness not to do value judgement.
Test : Conduct will be established where the Crown proves beyond reasonable doubt the following two
requirements:
1. That, by its nature, the conduct at issue causes harm or presents a significant risk of harm to individuals or
society in a way that undermines or threatens to undermine a value reflected in, and thus formally endorsed
through, the Constitution or similar fundamental laws by, for example:
a. Confronting members of the public with conduct that significantly interferes with their autonomy
and liberty; or
b. Predisposing others to anti-social behaviour; or
c. Physically or psychologically harming persons involved in the conduct, and
2. That the harm or risk of harm is of a degree that is incompatible with the proper functioning of society.
II. Prostitution and the Criminal Law (83)



The CC does not directly prohibit prostitution, but only activities related to it, such as communicating for the
purposes of engaging in prostitution (s. 213(1)(c)), living on the avails of a prostitute (s. 212(1)(j)), or
keeping a “common bawdy-house” (s. 210(1)) (at 83).
The Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution in Canada (1985) recommended a reworking
of the CC prohibition in the area of prostitution, to create offences based not on concepts of sexual
immorality but rather on the offences to equality, dignity and physical integrity. The emphasis of the
recommendation is to provide strong protection against exploitation (84).
In Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the CC [1990], the Supreme Court upheld several CC provisions
related to prostitution, arguing that the prohibition on communication infringed section 2(b), but that this
was justified under s. 1, because it was “aimed at the social nuisance of street solicitation”, and the bawdy
house provisions did not violate s. 7 because (a) they were not overly broad, and (b) although they infringed
liberty, they did so in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.
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Standing Committing on Justice and Human Rights, 2006 (90)
Ratio : There are negative effects of criminalizing prostitution, given that those most marginalized in this
domain are the ones most likely to be criminalized, suggested that prostitution was more of a public health issue
than a criminal law one, and recommended several reforms to these provisions of the CC.
Negative effects: The following article jeopardizes their safety, health and access to social services, because they
isolate prostitutes from the protection of pimps, the help of other prostitutes, the access to police investigation
relating to violence.
 Section 213 of the CC: Prohibition of Communication in Public Places for the Purpose of Prostitution
 Section 210 of the CC: Prohibition of Bawdy-Houses…no security.
 Section 212 of the CC: Procuring a Person to Engage in Prostitution
Positive effects: CL should discourage prostitution, because
 Persons who engage in it are victims of an inherently violent, alineating activity that makes up part of the
oppression of women by men.
 Prostitution leads to drugs, abuses from pimps and dangers.
III. Hate speech (96)
R v Keegstra, 1990 (97)
Facts: Keegstra was a public school teacher who describe Jews as a people of profound evil who had "created
the Holocaust to gain sympathy." As well, he tested his students in exams on his theories and opinion of Jews.
Ratio : The now art. 319(2) of the CC prohibiting the wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group
is constitutional.
Reasoning (Dickson for the majority - SCC):
 He finds that the high school teacher’s Holocaust denying was protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter, as
virtually all forms of speech are protected.
 However, disallowing such speech was allowed under s. 1, as a reasonable limit, since (i) the speech serves
no “useful” purpose, and (ii) it incites violence.
R v Zundel, 1992 (102)
Ratio :
 McLachlin, writing for the majority, found that Zundel violate s. 181 of the CC, which stated "[e]very one
who wilfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and causes or is likely to cause injury
or mischief to a public interest is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment . . ." The court
concluded that the book published by Zundel "misrepresented the work of historians, misquoted witnesses,
fabricated evidence, and cited non-existent authorities."
 However, s. 181 violated section 2(b) of the Charter. She noted that section 2(b) protects all expression of
a non-violent form, and as such, the content itself is irrelevant (section 2(b) is content neutral). The
protection provided by the Charter includes expression of minority beliefs even where the majority may find
it false. The imposition of imprisonment for expression has a severely limiting effect on freedom, beyond
reason.
 McLachlin further found that it could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter as the restriction on all
expressions "likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest" was far too broad.
CHAPTER THREE : POLICE POWERS (111-199)
Source
Standard de preuve
Caractéristiques
Confessions
- Cml
- Ω + HTDR
-À une personne en autorité
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
Droit à l’avocat
- Art 10(b) de la Charte.
- D + PDP
-Détenu et arrêté
Droit au silence
- Art 7 de la Charte
- D + PDP
- Droit de parler ou de ne pas
9
-Libre + volontaire
-Dans un bon climat
-Esprit conscient : (1) tu
comprends ce que tu dis et
(2) tu sais a qui tu le dit
(Whittle)
-Questionné par la police
-Droit d’être informé sans
délai (hold off avant la
rencontre avec l’avocat)
-Exposer la présence d’aide
juridique
parler
-Si un accusé invique son
droit au silence, un policier
n’a pas de droit d’aller lui
soutirer une déclaration
(Hébert)
I. Models of the Criminal Process (111)


Packer’s Two Concepts of Justice (111):
1. Crime-control model: a high-speed “assembly-line conveyor belt” operated by police and
prosecutors that end with a guilty plea. Focus on efficiency.
2. Due-process: a “obstacle course” in which defense lawyers argue before judges that the prosecution
should be rejected because the accused’s right have been violated.” Focus on fairness.
Application to the Canadian system (112):
1. In the pre-Charter era, R v Wray, 1970 determined that almost any evidence was relevant, regardless
of what rights were violated to obtain it; the rule concerned relevance, not rights. “The crime control
model did not cessarily condone police misconduct, but instead that it be adressed outside of the
accused trial through civil suits, disciplinary hearing and criminal prosecution against the police”.
2. In a post-Charter era, Canada tries to strike a balance between the repression/control of crime, and
the fundamental rights of the accused.
S. 7 & 10 Charter
s. 7 : Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
s. 10 : Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
a. to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
b. to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and
c. to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention
is not lawful.
R. v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46 (external)
 La femme, qui a reconnu avoir tué son conjoint, ne subira pas de procès, car ses droits ont été violés par les
policiers et la preuve est inadmissible.
 Les agents sont entrés sans droit chez elle et ont mené des fouilles illégales sur les lieux. Mme Côté a par
ailleurs été détenue sans raison précise et privée du droit d'avoir recours à un avocat. C'est ainsi que les
policiers auraient obtenu des aveux non volontaires de la part d'Armande Côté, estime la Cour suprême.
II. Questioning Suspects (116)
The Common Law Governing Confessions (116)


Pour que la règle des confessions s’applique :
o Toutes les choses qu’un individu dit (e.g. faits, admissions, etc.)
o À une personne qu’il sait être en autorité (e.g. policier en fonction et en uniforme, procureur de la
couronne, gardien de prison). Cela est moins clair dans le cas d’un médecin ou d’un proche de la
victime.
The fundamental question relating to the admissibility of a confession made to a person in authority (e.g. a
police officer) is whether it is voluntary (Boudreau v The King, 1949). Since this case, the SCC has
determined that voluntariness could be undermined by ways beyond actual violence, threats, or promises
(e.g. shock, hypnosis, emotional disintegration), generally based on treating the suspect fairly.
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10





*For a confession to be admissible, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (hors de tout doute
raisonnable) that a confession was obtained:
1. Freely/Librement (i.e. no physical abuse)
2. Voluntarily/Volontairement (i.e. no threats, the confessor must have an “esprit de coeur ouvert”),
and
Police technique questioning subjects :
o Les ruses : les policiers ont le droit d’utiliser des ruses, de mentir, pour faire parler l’accusé, à
condition que cela respecte les conditions plus haut;
o The Reid technique: non-accusatory interview combining both investigative and behavior-provoking
questions.
o Video taping: CA judgement encourrage officier to record the interrogation.
Fruit of the poisonous tree: the source of the evidence (the "tree") is tainted, then anything gained from it
(the "fruit") is tainted as well
*In Oickle, the SCC stated accepted a conceptual approach stating that confessions can be rendered
involuntary for three reasons:
1. Libre et volontaire : Because of threats or promises that induce the confession (i.e. promettre d’avoir
une meilleure sentence); and
2. Climat: Due to an atmosphere of oppression that compels a suspect to speak (i.e. can’t go to
bathroom, is in a room with too much air conditioning); and
3. Esprit conscient: Where a suspect lacked an “operating mind” when speaking (i.e. under influence,
psychological shock, etc.).
*Determining whether a statement made by an accused person should be rendered inadmissible due to
intoxication involves asking:
1. Was the accused aware of what he was saying? and
2. Was he aware of the consequences of making the statement on the particular occasion in question
(Clarkson v The Queen, 1986) (118). E.g. tu dois connaître les tenants et aboutissants de du droit à
l’avocat et y renoncer en pleine connaissance de cause pour que la confession soit jugée avoir été
faite dans un esprit conscient.
3. Fondement: it would be unreliable to admit it.
Confessions and the Right to Counsel (118)





As soon as a suspect is DETAINED, police must inform the accused that he has the right to counsel.
*In R v Manninen (1987), the SCC found that an accused’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) imposed the three
following duties on police officers (hold off):
1. Upon detention, to inform the accused of his right to counsel;
2. They must provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to retain and
instruct counsel without delay;
3. To cease questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit evidence from the detainee until he has had a
reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel.
Le droit a l’avocat est le droit de
1. Choisir son avocat et
2. De lui parler en privé, mais
Il doit être utilisé diligemment.
A detainee may, implicitly or explicitly, waive his right to retain and instruct counsel, but this standard will
be very high where the alleged waiver is implicit (R v Brydges, 1990).
However, once counsel has been retained, s. 10(b) does not give an accused the right for counsel to be
present throughout the course of the interrogation (i.e. so-called Miranda rights, as in the US) (R v Sinclair).
R v Sinclair, 2010 (external)
Ratio : « Section 10(b) of the Charter does not mandate the presence of defence counsel throughout a
custodial interrogation. Precedent is against this interpretation and the language of s. 10(b) does not appear to
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
11
contemplate this requirement. Moreover, the purpose of s. 10(b) does not demand the continued presence of
counsel throughout the interview process. In most cases, an initial warning, coupled with a reasonable
opportunity to consult counsel when the detainee invokes the right, satisfies s. 10(b). However, the police must
give the detainee an additional opportunity to receive advice from counsel where developments in the course of
the investigation make this necessary to serve the purpose underlying s. 10(b). »
Confessions and the Right to Silence (129)
Général :





Définition simple : c’est le droit de refuser de parler. Ce n’est pas d’arrêter un interrogatoire ou de d’avoir
son avocat lors d’un interrogatoire (comme Miranda v Arizona, 1966 au USA). Aussi, les policiers ont le
droit de parler aux accusés tant qu’ils le veulent et de l’encourrager, en respectant ses droits, à changer
d’idée et à parler.
The Charter contains no explicit guarantee of a right to silence, but relying on s. 7, the SCC has recognized
such a right.
However, this right to silence is subject to significant limitations sets in R v Hébert, 1990 at p 131:
o Nothing prohibits the police from questioning the accused without counsel’s presence once he has
retained counsel;
o It applies only after detention;
o It does not affect voluntary statements made to fellow cell mates (only his right to choose whether or
not to speak with the police);
o In the absence of eliciting behaviour by the police, if the accused chooses to speak freely, whoever
he speaks to may inform the police (i.e. if an accused refuses to speak to the police, he cannot be
tricked into doing so through undercover police officers).
However, in R v Liew (1999), the SCC found that an accused’s right to silence was not violated where an
undercover police officer did not initiate the conversation with an accused who had asserted his right to
silence.
In other words, there are limits on the right to silence, but to be admissible in court, a confession must be
« libre et volontaire ». Police can still obtain a confession, even if the accused has already asserted his right
to silence.
Droit au silence vs règle des confessions :




La règle des confessions et le droit au silence sont similaires, mais la première est plus large.
La ligne entre une confession libre/volontaire et une confession involontaire est très mince. E.g. Un policier
qui parle pendant 10 heures au détenu avant que le détenu confesse sa culpabilité. Est-ce que la confession
est volontaire ou non?
R v Singh explores the intersections between the Charter right to silence as defined by R v Hebert and the
common law voluntary confessions rule, which involves a balancing between the rights of the accused and
society’s interests in the adjudication of the case on its merits
o The case holds that there’s always been a common law right to silence, but that once an accused has
contacted his lawyer and been advised (presumably) of his right to silence, there’s no obligation for
his counsel to have a lawyer present during the interrogation.
o Once you’ve been told about your right to silence, the police are under no obligation to remind you
of this right.
o Note : This can be compared with the US, where Miranda rights mean that an accused can have his
lawyer present throughout questioning : “the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination” (140).
R c Magella-Laroche
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12
o
o
La couronne : les policiers laissent à M. Laroche l’opportunité de parler à son avocat. C’est lui qui
débute toujours le dialogue.
La défense : les policiers lui disent qu’une confession va l’aider. Toutefois, qu’est-ce que ça veut
dire (e.g. avec sa sentence-promesse, au niveau moral, etc.). Comme on ne sait pas ce que cela veut
dire, la couronne est dans l’impossibilité de prouver hors de toute doute que la confession a été faite
d’une manière « libre et volontaire ».
R v Singh, 2007 (133)
Facts :
1. A man was killed by a stray bullet in a bar fight between three men and employees of the club. The weapon
was never found and no forensic evidence linked Singh, so that identification was the main issue at trial. A
witness and a police officer both identified Singh as the shooter.
2. Singh, upon questioning, admitted to being in the pub on the night of the shooting, but claimed to have left
before it happened, and identified himself on videotape footage, admissions which later became probative of
his identification at trial. The admissions were made following proper Charter warnings, and after Singh had
spoken with counsel via telephone.
3. In questioning, he denied his involvement in the crime, and asserted his right to silence 18 times, to which
the interrogating officer responded that he need not say anything.
4. Mr. Singh was convicted, after trial judge found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the statements were voluntarily made [common law confessions rule], and that Singh had not
established on a balance of probabilities that they were obtained in a manner that violated his s. 7 Charter
right to silence.
Issue : Was the way in which these statements were obtained in violation of Singh’s s. 7 right to silence, as
distinct from the common law confessions rule?
Holding : No; in an assessment of the voluntariness of a confession, courts must consider both the common law
confessions rule and whether the accused’s right to silence was respected.
Reasoning (Charron - SCC) :
 In the context of police interrogation, by a person with obvious authority, the test for admissibility of
statements under the common law confessions rule will be the same as for the s. 7 right to silence, and there
is no need for a distinct s. 7 inquiry.
 To determine voluntariness, as with a s. 7 review based on an alleged breach of the right to silence, the focus
is the conduct of the police and its affect on the suspect’s ability to exercise his/her free will. The test is an
objective one, although the individual characteristics of the accused may come into play.
 In other words, voluntariness must include an analysis of whether the accused was denied his or her right to
silence.
 If the Crown proves voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, there can be no finding that the accused’s s. 7
right to silence was violated; likewise, if the accused shows on a balance of probabilities that his s. 7 right to
silence was breached, there can be no finding of voluntariness
 Hebert sets out some of the limits on the s. 7 right to silence, including:
1. That the police can question an accused in the absence of counsel once he/she has retained counsel
(“Police persuasion, short of denying the suspect the right to choose or depriving him of an
operating mind, does not breach the right to silence,” 136); and
2. The right to silence arises only after detention.
 In analyzing what constitutes a “legitimate means of persuasion” by the police, the court must balance
individual and societal interests, and police cannot simply ignore an accused’s decision to stay silent. « It is
all a matter of degree ».
 These situations are “highly fact-specific,” and trial judges must take into account all the relevant factors in
determining whether the suspect’s confession is voluntary.
Ratio : « The ultimate question is whether the accused exercised free will by choosing to make a statement »
(138).
Dissent (Fish) :
 Mr. Singh asked that his right to silence be respected 18 times and, by ignoring that, the police interrogator
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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
violated his s. 7 right to silence
“Where continued resistance has been made to appear futile to one person under the dominance or control of
another ... ultimate submission proves neither true consent nor valid waiver. It proves the failure, not the
success, of the disregarded assertions of the right of the powerless and the vulnerable to say “no.” » (139).
III. Entrapment ou Provocation policière (141)



Generally arises in the investigation of “consensual crimes,” which are not normally detected, because the
participants are complicit in them and do not complain to the police: “many crimes are committed in secret
and it is difficult to obtain evidence of their commission after the fact” (R v Mack, 142). E.g. prostitution.
*Entrapment can only be used as a defence if the crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the result is a
stay of proceedings.
In R v Mack, the SCC makes the distinction between “the police or their agents—acting on reasonable
suspicion or in the course of a bona fide inquiry – providing an opportunity to a person to commit a crime,
and the state actually creating a crime for the purpose of prosecution. » Test :
1. Was there a reasonable suspicion of the accused?
2. Was the crime uncovered following a bona fide inquiry?
3. Did the police actually create a crime, or merely provide an opportunity for someone to commit one?
R v Mack, 1988 (151)
Facts :
 A former drug user with several drug convictions was asked by a police informer repeatedly over a 6-month
period to supply drugs. He consistently refused.
 At one point, the police officer took the accused into the woods to shoot a shotgun, suggesting that “a person
could get lost” in the woods, which the accused interpreted as a threat, and later showed the accused $50,000
in cash from a “drug purchaser” (another undercover cop).
 He was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking when he
delivered 12 ounces of cocaine to the informer. At trial and on appeal, the accused was found guilty.
Issue : Did the conduct of the police officers in this case constitute entrapment?
Holding : Yes! Although the police did act on reasonable suspicion that the appellant was involved in criminal
activity, they went too far to attract the appellant to commit an offence, actually inducing that offence, by being
overly persistent in their demands and by threatening the accused with a gun.
Reasoning (Lamer J - SCC) :
 There is a crucial distinction between the police/agents, acting on reasonable suspicion or in the course of a
bona fide inquiry, providing an opportunity to a person to commit a crime, and the state actually creating a
crime for the purpose of prosecution.
 It is deeply ingrained in our democratic system that the ends do not justify the means.
 Estey J in Amato : « the basis upon which entrapment is recognized lies in the need to preserve the purity of
administration of justice » (145), and not to discipline the police.
 For entrapment to have occurred, the criminal act must be done by the accused voluntarily, intentionally,
with the requisite mens rea, so the focus is not on the conduct of the accused, but that of the police
(objectively assessed).
 The proper approach to the doctrine of entrapment was established in R v Amato, 1982:
1. The authorities provide a person with an opportunity to commit an offence without acting on a
reasonable suspicion that this person is already engaged in criminal activity pursuant to a bona fide
inquiry;
2. Although having such a reasonable suspicion or acting in the course of a bona fide inquiry, they go
beyond providing an opportunity and induce the commission of an offence.
 Entrapment is to be determined by the trial judge, with the proper remedy being a stay of proceedings, but
only once he is satisfied that the Crown has discharged its obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused committed all of the essential elements of the offence (i.e. so that the accused could be
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
14
acquitted if warranted).
 The burden of proof is on the accused to show that, on the balance of probabilities, the conduct of the state
is an abuse of process because of entrapment.
 « The guilt or innocence of the accused is not in issue. The accused has done nothing that entitles him or her
to an acquittal; the Crown has engaged in conduct, however, that disentitles it to a conviction... » (148).
Comment :
 Les cas subsequents, R v Showman (1988) et R v Barnes (1991), montrent que les policiers doivent avoir
des soupçons raisonnables OU une enquête en bonne et due forme (i.e. aller dans un quartier reconnu pour la
vente de drogue et demander des stupéfiants constitue une enquête) avant de faciliter la réalisation du crime,
et non le créer.
 The June 1993 Federal proposals to Amend the General Principles of the CC poposed to codify Mack
subject to the following: “Emtrapment is not a basis for stay of proceedings in respect of an offence the
commission of which requires the intentional or reckless causing of death or serious bodily harm”.
IV. Search and Seizure (151)
S. 8 Charter
« Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. »
S. 8 analysis
1. Was it a search or seizure?
2. If so, what is the level of expectation of privacy?
3. If at least as great as in Hunter v Southam, was there legal authority for the search or seizure?
4. Does that legal authority for the search require prior authorization and was it feasible to obtain prior
authorization in the circumstances?
5. Is the required legal authorization constitutional?
6. If the warrant provision is constitutional, were the statutory requirements met?
7. If the search was warrantless, is it nonetheless justifiable?
Hunter v Southam, 1984 (151)
Facts : S. 10(1) of the Combines Investigation Act allowed the Director of Investigations to enter premises and
examine or take away materials on his belief that the evidence was relevant to an investigation, after having
obtained a certificate of authorization from a member of the Restrictive Trades Practices Commission.
Issue : Does this statute authorizing a search and seizure violate s. 8 of the Charter, the right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure?
Holding : Yes, due to the lack of a neutral and detached arbiter; subs. 10(1) and 10(3) of the Combines
Investigation Act are inconsistent with the Charter and are of no force or effect.
Reasoning (Dickson - SCC):
1. According to a purposive interpretation of the Charter, s. 8 is meant to protect a citizen’s right to privacy,
but more braodly to be free from unreasonable search and seizure (although this is subject to some
limitations for state interests).
2. The constitutional minimum standard for a search is that, where it is feasible to obtain prior authorization,
such authorization is a precondition for a valid search and seizure; and a search conducted without prior
authorization is presumptively unreasonable:
a. Person authorizing must be capable of acting judicially (member of the Commission couldn’t be
impartial arbiter); so that there can be an assessment prior to the search of the balancing between
individual and state interests.
b. Minimum constitutional standard for search and seizure is objective reasonable and probable
grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that evidence to
be found at place of search.
Comment : Pour que une loi soit conforme à la s. 8, il faut qu’un tiers indépendant vérifie les informations
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
15
récoltées par les enquêteurs pour recevoir de l’autorisation avant que les recherches soient entamées.
R v Collins, 1987 (165)
Trois critères pour qu’une fouille respecte l’art. 8 :
1. Est-ce qu’il y a une expectative raisonnable de vie privée?
o Il faut l’évaluer objectivement (position de la société) et subjectivement (position de la personne
elle-même).
o Trois aspects de l’expectative raisonnable de vie privée à évaluer dans le contexte :
 Personne : ADN (+++), Sang (++), Empreinte digitale (+)
 Territoire : Maison (+++), Voiture (++), Travail (+)
 Information : Ordinateur (+++), Consammation d’électricité (+)
o L’expectative de vie privée peut être réduite (e.g. une fois arrêtée, à la douane et prison).
2. Est-ce que la fouille est autorisée par la loi? Si oui, est-ce que la loi doit être raisonnable?
o La loi demande-t-elle des motifs raisonnables, crédibles avec la probabilité, une autorisation au
préalable par un tiers?
o La loi demande-t-elle une décision/autorisation d’un juge?
3. Il faut que la fouille soit menée de manière raisonnable.
SUMMARY
S. 8 analysis
 Was it a search or seizure?
 If so, what is the level of expectation of privacy?
 If at least as great as in Hunter v Southam, was there legal authority for the search or seizure?
 Does that legal authority for the search require prior authorization and was it feasible to obtain prior
authorization in the circumstances?
 Is the required legal authorization constitutional?
 If the warrant provision is constitutional, were the statutory requirements met?
 If the search was warrantless, is it nonetheless justifiable?
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (155)
S. 24(2)
Irrecevabilité d'éléments de preuve qui risqueraient de déconsidérer l'administration de la justice.
(2) Lorsque, dans une instance visée au paragraphe (1), le tribunal a conclu que des éléments de preuve ont été
obtenus dans des conditions qui portent atteinte aux droits ou libertés garantis par la présente charte, ces
éléments de preuve sont écartés s'il est établi, eu égard aux circonstances, que leur utilisation est susceptible de
déconsidérer l'administration de la justice.


The minimum constitutional standards demanded by s. 8 of the Charter, as laid out in Hunter v Southam,
are only required if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
But, the SCC has not provided clear/consistent guidance for when such an intrusion takes place.
R v Wong, 1990 (155)
Facts: Accused charged with keeping a common gaming house; the Crown sought to show a videotape of
gambling in a Toronto hotel room as evidence. Trial judge held that videotape had been obtained in violation of
s. 8 (no prior authorization was obtained) and should be excluded under s. 24(2). Decision reversed by Ontario
Court of Appeal, arguing that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, since
members of the public were invited into the hotel room to gamble.
Issue : Did the accused have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room? YES. Should the evidence
be admissible nonetheless? YES.
Reasoning (Laforest J - SCC):
 The analysis
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a. The “risk analysis” sets that is insufficient to determine whether there is an expectation of privacy. It
was used by the Court of Appeal, but wrongly, because the SCC rejected it R v Duarte.
b. Instead, there must be an attempt “to assess whether, by the standards of privacy that persons can
expect to enjoy in a free and democratic society, the agents of the state were bound to conform to the
requirements of the Charter when effecting the intrusion in question,” i.e. whether allowing the
form of unauthorized surveillance in question would diminish the privacy and freedoms of citizens
in a free and democratic society.
 In a free and open society, agents of the state should not be able to record the words of whomever they
choose without prior authorization.
 « While there are societies in which persons have learned, to their cost, to expect that a microphone may be
hidden in every wall, it is the hallmark of a society such as ours that its members hold to the belief that
they are free to go about their daily business without running the risk that their words will be recorded at the
sole discretion of agents of the state…
 To justify a search only after the fact, once illegal activity has been uncovered, was precisely what was
discouraged in Hunter v Southam; rather, the question must be “framed in broad and neutral terms,” in
order to determine whether, in our society, someone entering their hotel room and closing the door would
have a reasonable expectation of privacy – he answers that they would.
 The accused’s s. 8 rights were violated because the police didn’t obtain a warrant to videotape.
 However, the admission of the videotape evidence would not bring the administration of justice into
disrepute under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith, and no CC provision existed at the time that
would have allowed them to get the warrant.
Concurring (McLachlin - SCC): “The nature of the place in which the surveillance occurs will always be an
important factor to consider in determining wheter the target has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
circumstances. It is not, however, determinative.” Here, he passed out numerous notice in public restaurants and
bars. Thus, no privacy.




“The normative approach employed in Durate and Wong for assessing wheter a particular investigative
technique employed by the state enroaches upon a reasonable expectation of privacy has since been
supplemented by a variety of other approaches developed by the SCC in different context.”
In Plant (1993), there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for hydro-consumption records that are
publicly available.
In R v Edwards (1986), the SCC emphasized that whether or not a reasonable expectation of privacy exists
will depend on the “totality of the circumstances,” including:
o Presence at the time of the search
o Possession or control of the property or place searched;
o Ownership of the property or place;
o Historical use of the property or item;
o The ability to regulate access;
o The existence of a subjective expectation of privacy; and
o The objective reasonableness of the expectation.
These facts applied in R v Edwards found that there was no expectation of privacy for a guy in his
girlfirend’s appartment, even if he had a key, and in R v Belnavis (1997), the court found that a passenger in
a car that was not their own did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
R v Tessling, 2004 (161)
Facts : Police use thermal imaging device to take a “heat” picture of the respondent’s home from an overhead
aircraft. The camera recorded the relative distribution of heat over the surface of the building. No warrant was
obtained prior to overflight. The FLIR image, with other evidence, allowed police to infer a grow “op”. The
accused claimed that the FLIR was an unwarranted search of his home, in violation of s. 8 of the Charter. The
Ontario court of Appeal found that this was the case.
Issue : Did the FLIR imaging constitute an unwarranted search of the accused’s home? NO. Were his s. 8 rights
violated? NO.
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Reasoning (Binnie J - SCC):
 The distinction must be made btw informational and territorial privacy: the “reasonableness line” in this
case should be determined according to the informational capacity of the FLIR imaging, and its effect on the
privacy interests of the accused.
 The totality of the circumstances:
o It must be assessed in determining whether there was a s. 8 violation.
o [Binnie gives an overview of the criteria set out in Edwards, geared towards the case at hand, all of
which tend towards a finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy].
o However, since FLIR technology can only sense heat, and not differentiate one heat source or another,
the inferences that can be drawn from it are extremely limited, so that the surface images are
“meaningless” on their own and unable to provide sufficient evidence for a search warrant, without
further evidence, and the FLIR’s usefulness therefore depends on what other information the police
have.
 Lack of intrusiveness: The FLIR gathers only “externally obtained information about the home”, and its
current capability does not allow it to encroach sufficiently into a home to constitute a search, and s. 8
cannot be triggered by FLIR imaging.
Comment : Prior to the Tesslin case, what the “totality of the circumstances” to be considered for the
reasonableness test was more or less clear:
 Situations involving the state’s use of surveillance technologies  normative test in Duarte and Wong.
 Informational privacy claims  factors identified in Plant.
 Territorial or spatial privacy claims  factors identified in Edwards.
However, after Tesslin, this dichotomy no longer seems to apply!
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In R v Kang Brown (2008) and R v A.M. (2008), the SCC found that the police intrude on a reasonable
expectation of privacy when they use a drug-sniffing dog to detect the odour of narcotics coming from a
person or their belongings. A distinction was made between the “meaningless” information gleaned from
FLIR technology, and the meaningful information obtained from a dog sniff (i.e. that a narcotic is likely on
the person in question).
In R v Collins (1987), the SCC held, in a permissible departures from Hunter, that in order to be reasonable
under s. 8 of the Charter a search or seizure must satisfy 3 essential preconditions:
1. It must be authorized by law, and if it is not it is necessarily unreasonable:
 Some search powers can be authorized by the common law, others by statute.
 One of the most important search powers found in the CC is the authority to search pursuant
to a warrant.
 For more information on search warrants, see pp 167-8.
2. The law itself must be reasonable, and
3. It must be carried out in a reasonable manner.
Accordingly, Collins seems to sketch out a broader framework than Hunter v Southam for assessing
reasonableness under s. 8 of the Charter.
Hunter only applies in a criminal or quasi-criminal context, but the SCC has approved certain deviations
from it, such as “pat down” searches incidental to investigation detentions (R v Mann) and the use of drugsniffing dogs (R v Kang Brown; R v AM), that can be done on the basis of “reasonable suspicion”, without
the need for prior judicial authorization, given the less intrusive nature of these searches, and the difficulty in
obtaining search warrants in these cases.
V. Detention and Arrest (168)
S. 9 Charter
« Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. »
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Purpose of s. 9 is put forward in R v Grant: “to protect individual liberty from unjustified state interference.”
This protection is done in two ways:
1. By providing a constitutional mechanism for scrutinizing the decision to detain or arrest (i.e. there
must be adequate grounds for doing so). It is illegal for someone to be arrested based on biases of
the police officer against a person “of a different race, nationality or colour” (R v Storrey, 1990).
2. By providing a means for scrutinizing legislation that authorizes detention or imprisonment. It
prescribes minimum constitutional standards that must be met by any law authorizing state officials
to interfere with individual liberty.
The protection afforded under s. 9 of the Charter is, however, contingent on detention (which is not always
clear) or imprisonment (which is clearer).
Constitutional protection (170)
Lorsqu’une preuve est obtenue en violation du droit à l’avocat, du droit à la vie privé ou du droit au silence, par
exemple, il faut trouver le remèdre dans le test de la s. 24(2) de la Charte selon R v Grant : disrepute of justice.
Critères à considérer:
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Gravité de la conduite policière : est-ce que l’acte est fait sur une base arbitraire?
Impacts de la violation des droits de l’accusé
o Quel droit à été violé
o Ampleur
Intérêt de la société à ce que la cause soit jugée au fond
o Importance de la preuve : déterminante ou essentielle pour prouver le crime?
o Importance du crime : sentence longue au pénitencier?
Pondération ou la mise en balance des trois questions précédentes (discrétion du juge pour évaluer les
facteurs) : est-ce que l’admission ou l’exclusion de la preuve devrait être fait en considérant l’administration
de la justice?
R v Grant, 2009 (171)
Facts : Mr. Grant, a young black man, was walking down a street in Toronto, and his manner and clothing
attracted the attention of two plainsclothes police officers. They then requested that a nearby uniformed cop
“have a chat” with him. The uniformed officer then stood in his path and asked him what was going on,
requesting his name and address. Grant gave a provincial health card, but was acting nervous and adjusted his
jacket, to which the officer told him to “keep his hands in front of him.” The two other police then flashed their
badges and stood behind the uniformed police officer, and proceeded to question Mr. Grant, who eventually
admitted that he was in the possession of marijuana and a firearm, after which point he was arrested.
Issue : Was Mr. Grant detained, and were his s. 9 Charter rights violated? YES. Should the evidence be
admissible? YES.
Reasoning (McLachlin and Charron - SCC):
 Detention under ss. 9 and 10 refers to the suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant
physical or psychological restraint.
 Psychological detention is when an individual has a legal obligation to comply with the restrictive request or
demand, or a reasonable person would think so.
 It is not clear whether someone is detained in such cases, where no physical/legal restraints exist, so to
determine this, the court can consider:
1. The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as reasonably perceived by the individual;
2. The nature of the police conduct;
3. The particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual;
The initial questioning was not sufficient to constitute detention, but as soon as he was told to “keep his
hands in front of him,” along with the inherently intimidating nature of the situation (e.g. two other police
officers, their positioning), he became detained.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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Since there were no legal grounds for this, it necessarily violated Grant’s s. 9 rights.
The judges’ then undergo a s. 24.2 analysis to determine whether the handgun should still be admissible (i.e.
whether this would bring the administration of justice into disrepute):
1. Seriousness of Charter infringement ;
2. Impact on Charter-protected interests of the accused;
3. Society’s interest in an adjudication of the case on its merits.
They decided that the significant impact of the breach on accused pointed towards inadmissibility, whereas
the reliability of the gun as evidence and society’s interest in adjudication of the case pointed towards
admissibility.
In the end, given this and the legal uncertainty the officers were operating in, the gun was admissible.
To be constitutional, detention or arrest must be premised on legal authority.
But, an Ontario Court of Appeal case, R v Simpson (1993), recognized police powers at common law to
briefly detain an individual where they have “articulable cause” that the person is engaged in criminal
activity. This issue is discussed in the SCC decision R v Mann.
Detention powers (178)
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
Déf. Détention ou suspension de la liberté : la personne se reçoit une ordre légal de rester ou elle se sentait
objectivement détenu au plan psychologique.
Standard de preuve : soupçons raisonnables de la part des policiers – il est possible que la personne ait
commis le crime/infraction ou alors elle en a tout simplement commis un selon la loi.
Objectif de la recherche : seulement pour leur sécurité, mais pas pour découvrir de la preuve.
R v Mann, 2004 (179)
Facts: Two police officers were called about a break and enter in progress in downtown Winnipeg, with the
suspect being described as a 21 year old aboriginal man, five foot 8 and weighing 165 pounds, in a black jacket
with white sleeves, thought to be “Zachary Parisienne.” Officers approached scene of the crime and saw an
individual walking on sidewalk; they testified he matched the description of suspect; he was stopped and asked
to identify himself. He stated his name, Phillip Mann, and complied with a pat-down search. At this point the
officers found marijuana and Valium, at which point he was arrested for possession.
Issue : Was the man reasonably detained? YES. Was his right to privacy violated when his pocket was searched?
YES.
Reasoning (Iacobucci J - SCC):
 Cases over the years have recognized a limited power of officers to detain for investigative purposes.
 The test for whether the officer has acted within his powers where the detention is prima facie an unlawful
interference into individual’s liberty or property (Waterfield test):
1. Did the officer’s behaviour fall within general scope of any duty imposed on officer by common law
or statute (i.e. reasonable cause to detain)? « At the first stage of the Waterfield test, police powers
are recognized as deriving from the nature and scope of police duties, including, at common law,
« the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life and property » .
2. If so, did the conduct nonetheless involve an unjustifiable use of power? « The second stage of the
test requires a balance b/t the competing interest of the police duty and of the liberty interests at
stake. At this stage, must consider whether an invasion of individual right is necessary in order for
peace officers to perform their duty, and whether such invasion is reasonable in light of the public
purposes served by effective control of criminal acts on the one hand and on the other respect for
liberty and fundamental dignity of individuals.
 Based on the Waterfield test, the court recognizes a certain limited power at common law for police officers
to search incidentally to investigative detention, but there must be reasonable grounds for the officers to
believe that the individual is connection to a crime and the detention is reasonably necessary.
 Investigative detention should be brief and not impose obligation on detained person to answer questions, as
distinguished from arrest.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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
The initial detention was justifiable, given that the accused matched the description of the suspect and was
close by to the scene.
 However, when the officer reached into the person’s pockets after feeling something soft after a pat-down,
this violated the reasonable expectation of privacy of the accused over his pockets (s. 7).
 The evidence should not be admissible under s. 24(2).
Comments :
 Widely criticized for creating more questions than a’s re: police detention powers.
 The court failed to address racial dimensions of police detention practices.
 *In R v Suberu (2009), the SCC (finally) made clear that the police have a duty to inform an individual
subject to investigative detention regarding his or her right to retain and instruct counsel, and a duty to
facilitate that right, immediately on detention.
Arrest Powers (184) and Powers Incident to Arrest (186)
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Une arrestation c’est plus qu’une détention, car ce n’est pas aussi bref. La police a des motifs raisonnables
(reasonable and probable grounds), rather than just a reasonable suspicion, de croire qu’une infraction a
été commise par la personne que les policiers arrêtent. (Gars sort d’un pawn shop avec une cagoule et un
pistolet)
o Droit au silence;
o Droit à l’avocat, 10b)
Standard de la prevue : motifs raisonnables et probables que la personne ait commis le crime/infraction ou
alors elle en a tout simplement commis un selon la loi.
Objectif de la fouille :
o Sécuriser la preuve
o Découvrir la preuve
o Prévenir la fuite
R v Storrey (1990) : Ce n’est pas assez de croire qu’on a des motifs raisonnables pour faire une arrestation.
Les motifs raisonnables doivent être établis d’une manière objective…c.-à.-d. qu’une personne raisonnable,
à la place du policier, aurait cru que des motifs raisonnables existaient pour procéder à une arrestation.
The general rule is that police can’t arrest people for less serious offences without a warrant, unless there is a
public interest in establishing the identity and securing that persons’ attendance in court, securing evidence
of the offence, or preventing repetition of offences, and these goals cannot be met with a simple summons or
appearance notice.
An arrest warrant can also be obtained, based on reasonable and probable grounds, objective standard.
Cloutier v Langlois, 2004 (186)
Facts: Lawyer charged two police officers with assault when he was frisked and put in a police car following his
arrest for unpaid parking tickets. Court held that the search was justified because the lawyer was being verbally
abusive, so it was for police safety and was not done with excessive force or constraint.
Issue : Was the frisk search unreasonable/unjustifiable by law? NO.
Reasoning (L’Heureux-Dubé - SCC) :
 A frisk search incidental to a lawful arrest reconciled public interest in effective/safe enforcement of law,
and individuals’ right to freedom and dignity.
 There need not be reasonable and probable grounds prior to such a search, but this power is limited by the
following:
1. The power does not impose a duty; there is discretion.
2. Search must be for a valid objective in light of criminal justice ends.
3. Search must not be conducted in abusive fashion.
 Search not meeting these objectives would be unreasonable and unjustified [Not the case here].
Comments :
 Hair and saliva samples for DNA testing without the accused’s consent and without a warrant infringes s. 7
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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
and 8 of Charter (R v Stillman, 1997).
See also source of police powers and ancillary powers debate (193-7).
R v Golden, 2001 (187)
Facts: When can police officers conduct a strip search as part of a search incident to arrest?
Ratio (Iacobucci/Arbour - SCC) :
 Strip searches are inherently humiliating and degrading, and the fact that police have reasonable and
probable grounds for arrest does not automatically lead to the right for strip searches  additional grounds
relevant to strip search required.
 They are only constitutionally valid at common law when conducted incident to lawful arrest to discover
weapons in detainee’s possession or evidence related to reason for arrest (reasonable probably grounds must
be established for this).
 [Lays out guidelines for when and how a strip search can be conducted].
 Generally, strip searches should only be conducted at police stations.
VI. Sources of Police Powers and the Ancillary Powers Debate (191)


Def.: the ancillary powers doctrine allows for the recognition of police powers by deploying what is
essentially a cost-benefit analysis (Dedman). Two steps analysis:
o Determining if the impugned actions of police officer fall within the scope of his or her broad duties.
o Weithing of the apparent benefits, usually for law enforcement and public safety, as against any
resulting interference with individual liberty interest.
It was criticize by commentators:
o Pros - Justice Binnie: “The use of ancillary powers doctrine to create new police powers is part of a
long tradition of ‘incremental’ expansion of the common law. That doctrine simply provided courts
with a methodology, like many judge-created methodologies used by cml courts overt time, to
develop the law in a particular area.
o Cons – Stribopoulos: “use to create power out of whole cloth” and uncertainty.
CHAPTER FOUR : THE TRIAL PROCESS (199-300)
II. The role of the Prosecutor and Defense Counsel (248)
Crown Counsel (248) and Disclosure (250)
Quel est le rôle du procureur?
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Crown Counsel are represent the Crown and act as prosecutor in proceedings under the Charter. Although
criminal law is under Federal jurisdiction, the prosecution of most CC offences is delegated to the provincial
Attorneys General and their lawful deputies. As a result, the vast majority of Crown Attorneys are employed
by Canada's ten provinces.
Est-il un adversaire dans la défense? Non, car il doit divulguer toute la preuve et pas seulement celle qui fait
son affaire. Il doit collaborer avec l’avocat de la défense. Oui, car il n’a pas à aider la défense.
Il n’a pas de cause à gagner (car ça deviendrait personnel…parce que tu n’aime pas l’accusé ou les gestes
qu’il a fait). Mais il n’a pas de cause à perdre. Il doit seulement rendre la justice et la vérité.
S’il y a un témoin qui avantage l’adversiare, a-t-il le devoir de le faire témoigner. Non, car il peut gérer sa
cause. Mais, il a une obligation de divulgation constante (donner au fur et à mesure) et rapide (tout de suite).
Deux exceptions : si ce n’est pas pertinent (très rare) ou si c’est privilégié (secret parce que la personne est
en danger).
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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Plea Bargaining (254)
In many cases, an agreement between the prosecutor and the defense to a plea is an important and even a
determinative factor, because it permit a more flexible handling of procedure, save costs and facilitate the
processus of justice.
Defense Counsel (254) and Disclosure (250)
Quel est le rôle de l’avocat de défense?



Sa seule obligation est de représenter son client. Il n’a pas le devoir d’aider l’État, n’empêche qu’il ne peut
entraver la justice (devoir déontologique). Peut-il soulever les erreurs, faciliter le processus judiciaire, à la
Couronne ? Oui, car parfois il est dans l’intérêt du client.
Soulever les doutes sur les accusations.
Il n’a aucune obligation de donner sa preuve. Exception : défense de l’alibi (il faut donner du temps au
policier pour faire les recherches)
III. Pre-Trial Release and Bail (259)
Persons charged with a criminal offence have a constitutional right to reasonable bail (s. 11 of the Charter)
unless there is some compelling reason to deny it (CC s. 515 (10)).
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according
to law;
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice
IV. The Jury (271)


Le juge décide le droit et le jury décide les faits.
Deux critères pour déterminer une sentence
o Quel crime a été commis
o Qui a commis le crime (i.e. facteurs atténuants et aggravants).
Requiring Trial by Jury (271)
L’accusé peut demander un jugement devant jury, mais cela se fait rarement. Cependant, les crimes les plus
graves sont obligatoirement devant jury.
Selecting Jury (272)
Souvent les avocats choisissent en se basant sur le métier des gens, mais ils doivent respecter les facteurs
suivant :
 18 ans et plus
 Pas procureur de la couronne ou autre fonction publique en droit
 Pas de conflit d’intérêt
Challenges for Cause (273)
Request that a prospective juror be dismissed because there is a specific and forceful reason to believe the person
cannot be fair, unbiased or capable of serving as a juror.
Jury Unanimity (278)
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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The jury deliberates in secret and must give an unanimous judgment. If it is really impossible, then the judge sets
another whole trial.
V. Quantum and Burden of Proof (279)
Burden of Proof (279)
Woolmington v DPP, 1935 (279)
Facts: Appelant et sa femme ne vivent plus ensemble. Appelant veut qu’elle revienne vivre avec lui et la
menace de se suicider si elle ne le fait pas. En lui montrant son fusil, il la tue. Appelant maintient que c’était un
accident tandis que la Couronne croit plutôt à la meurtre cause par la jalousie. La tante de l’épouse vivait dans la
maison voisine. Elle a entendu le coup de feu et a vu Woolmington sortir de la maison.
Issue : Appelant Woolmington a été déclaré coupable du meurtre de sa femme en CPI et écope d’une sentence
de peine de mort. Appel a été rejeté. Appelant soutient toujours que les instances inférieures ont eu tort d’exiger
qu’il prouve selon la prépondérance des probabilités qu’il n’avait pas l’intention de tuer.
Holding : Appel admis/conviction quashed. CPI a mal dirigé le jury en exigeant une preuve d’innocence par
l’accusé.
Reasoning (Viscount Sankey – HoL) : Présomption d’innocence est quasi-absolue en droit criminel.
 S’il y a preuve que l’acte conscient de l’accusé a tué la victime et que rien d’autre n’apparaît dans le cas, le
jury peut utiliser la preuve pour déterminer si l’accusé est coupable de meurtre.
 Ce n’est pas avant la fin de la présentation de la preuve qu’un verdict est énoncé.
 Ce n’est pas l’accusé qui prouve son innocence, mais plutôt la Couronne qui prouve la culpabilité.
 L’accusé n’a pas le même fardeau que la Couronne pour prouver son innocence. Il lui suffit de soulever un
doute quant à sa culpabilité.
 Si un doute relatif (concerning) à l’intention de tuer est maintenu jusqu’à la fin, la Couronne n’a pas réussi
sa preuve et l’accusé est acquitté.
Comments : In articulating the ruling, Viscount Sankey made his famous “Golden thread” speech: « Throughout
the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution
to prove the prisoner’s guilty subject to what I have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to
any statutory exception. If, at the end of an on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the
evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a
malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No
matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is
part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle down can be entertained. »
R v Oakes, 1986 (284)
Facts : Oakes a été intercepté avec des stupéfiants et a été automatiquement accusé de possession à des fins de
trafic. Selon la loi sur le contrôle des stupéfiants, la preuve de possession de stupéfiants conclut à une
présomption impérative de trafic, qu’importe la possession. La loi exige que l’accusé se décharge de cette
présomption en prouvant par prépondérance de probabilités que la possession, était à des fins personnelles.
Holding : Invalidation de cette portion de la loi qui est inconstitutionnelle puisqu’elle ne respecte pas le droit à la
présomption d’innocence. En l’espèce, la limitation de ce droit n’est pas justifiée.
Reasoning (Dickson - SCC) : Présomption d’innocence protégée à l’art. 11 Charte se réfère au droit général de
protection de la vie, sécurité et liberté de la personne. En droit criminel, une sentence peut avoir des effets
personnels et sociaux importants. La présomption d’innocence est alors essentielle pour protéger notre ‘’foi en
l’être humain’’.
 « In general, one must, I think, conclude that a provision which requires an accused to disprove on a balance
of probabilities the existence of a presumed fact, which is an important element of the offence in question,
violates the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) » (286).
 Le fardeau imposé par la Loi risque que l’accusé soit trouvé coupable sans preuve ‘hors de tout doute
raisonnable’ s’il ne peut prouver son innocence selon la prépondérance des probabilités. Les risques
sentences injustes sont accrus.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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Quoique le droit à la présomption d’innocence n’est pas absolu et puisse être limité selon l’art 1 de la
Charte, celui qui tente de le diminuer doit pouvoir le justifier. La cour doit prendre en compte qu’on tente de
limiter un droit constitutionnel et que les valeurs et principes essentiels à une société libre et démocratique
doivent tout de même être respectés.
Test :
1. The objective which the measures responsible for a limit on Charter right/freedom are designed to serve,
must be « of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom »; high
standard; must be pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society.
2. Proportionality test: the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified (depending on
circumstances).
a. Measures adopted rationally connected to the objective;
b. Minimal impact on the Charter rights of the accused;
c. Proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter
right or freedom, and the objective identified as of “sufficient importance”.
R v Whyte, 1988 (289)
Ratio (Dickson, SCC) :
 While a reasonable doubt exists, an accused cannot be convicted!
 « If an accused is required to prove some fact on the balance of probabilities to avoid conviction, the
provision violates the presumption of innocence because it permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the guilt of the accused » (289).
Comment : Soulever un doute est suffisant pour la défense. Lors de l’utilisation d’une défense, la Couronne doit
prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable qu’il n’y a pas eu de telle défense dans les faits.
R v Keegstra, 1990 (290)
Ratio : Reverse onus for truth defence to hate speech saved under s. 1.
Issue : Analyse de la constitutionalité de l’art. 319(3)(a) CC concernant des déclarations publiques susceptibles
d’inciter à la haine contre un groupe identifiable et susceptible de troubler la paix : « Nul ne peut être déclaré
coupable d’une infraction prévue au paragraphe (2) dans les cas suivants (a) s’il établit que les déclarations
communiquées étaient vraies. » (i.e. the « truth defence »).
Majority (Dickson - SCC):
 Held for the court that s. 319(3)(a) infringed the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter, but
that the infringement was a reasonable limit on the presumption of innocence that was justified by the truth
defence
 “The reverse onus in the truth defense operates so as to make it more difficult to avoid conviction where the
willful promotion of hatred has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As the willful promotion of hatred
is hostile to Parliament’s aims, placing such a burden upon the accused is rationally connected to a valid s. 1
objective… » p 290
 The reverse onus of proving truthfulness once the wilful promotion of hatred through speech has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt “is an understandable and valued precaution against too easily justifying
such harm” and hence is a minimal impairment on presumption of innocence p 291
 Violation de la présomption d’innocence à 319(3)(a) est justifiée selon les objectifs de l’art. 1 Charte.
Minority (McLachlin): It is argued that without the reverse onus, it would be difficult if not impossible to obtain
convictions for much speech promoting hate”—this does not constitute a rational connection nor minimal
impairment (p.291)
R v Downey, 1992 (291)
Ratio : s. 11(d) key points.
Majority (L'Heureux-Dubé - SCC):
 The presumption of innocence is infringed whenever the accused is liable to be convicted despite the existence of
a reasonable doubt.
 If by the provisions of a statutory presumption, an accused is required to establish (prove/disprove), on a balance
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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of probabilities, either an element of the offence or an excuse, then it contravenes s. 11(d), because such a
provision would permit conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt.
Even if a rational connection exists between established fact and the fact to be presumed, this is insufficient to
make valid a presumption requiring the accused to disprove an element of the offence.
Statutory presumption that substitutes proof of one element for proof of an essential element, will be valid if
the proof of the substituted fact leads inexorably to the proof of the other, but the statutory presumption will
infringe s. 11(d) if it requires the trier of fact to convict in spite of a reasonable doubt.
A permissive assumption from which a trier of fact may but not must draw an inference of guilt will not
infringe s. 11(d).
A provision intended to provide relief from conviction for accused will contravene Charter if the provision
must be established by the accused (e.g. Keegstra).
Statutory presumptions violating s. 11(d) may still be justified under s. 1 (Keegstra).
Quantum of proof (292)
L’expression « doute raisonnable » cannot be used in its « ordinary, natural every day sense. »
R v Lifchus, 1997 (292)
Ratio : Standard of brd.
Issue : Qu’est-ce que le fardeau « hors de tout doute raisonnable »?
Holding : It’s not on a balance of probabilities – it’s not based on absolute certainty (but it’s almost there).
Reasoning (Cory - SCC):
1. Standard of proof inextricably linked to presumption of innocence.
2. Burden of proof rests on Crown throughout trial, and never shifts to accused.
3. Reasonable doubt is not based on sympathy or prejudice, but on reason and common sense, logically
connected to the evidence or absence thereof.
4. It does not involve proof towards absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor an imaginary/
frivolous doubt.
5. More is required than proof that the accused is probably guilty  if this is the case, jury must acquit.
6. The term reasonable doubt should not be described in ordinary expressions, but must be confined to terms in
the criminal law context.
7. Proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” should not be equated with “to a moral certainty”.
8. The word “doubt” shouldn’t be qualified with words other than reasonable, and the word “certainty/sure”
should not be used when instructing the jury.
9. Cory finit en donnant un ex. de ce qui peut être dit à un jury au sujet de « hors de tout doute raisonnable »
(293).
R v Starr, 2000 (294)
Ratio : Cannot deviate from ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’.
Facts : Le juge de première instance a informé le jury que l’énoncé « doute raisonnable » n’a aucune connotation
spéciale et que la preuve ne devait pas être d’une certitude absolue.
Majority (Iacobucci - SCC):
 Juge CPI doit préciser au jury que « hors de tout doute raisonnable » a un sens légal unique et que le
fardeau de preuve est plus élevé que la balance des probabilités. Sans cela, les instructions sont erronées.
 “A jury must be instructed that the standard of proof in a criminal trial is higher that the probability standard
used in making everyday decisions and civil trials” (Rule from Lifchus, 295).
 « A trial judge is required to explain that something less than absolute certainty is required, and that
something more than probable guilt is required, in order for the jury to convict » (295).
Dissent (L’Heureux-Dubé - SCC) :
 Lifchus ne présente pas un ‘’check list’’ d’instructions au jury.
 Le jury doit comprendre les critères essentiels selon l’ensemble des instructions données.
 En l’espèce, le fait que le juge ait mentionné que « doute raisonnable » avait un sens ordinaire n’a pas eu un
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
26

impact significatif sur la compréhension des directives.
On présume qu’un jury regroupe des personnes « sophistiquées », capables de comprendre l’enjeu.
CHAPTER SIX : RESPONSABILITÉ ABSOLUE ET STRICTE (377-418)
Source
True
criminal
offences
Public
welfare
offences
Catégories
d'infractions
criminelles
Réelle
Respo stricte
Respo
absolue
Signe distinctif
Mens rea
Actus reus
Prison & 7 Charte
«volontairement», «avec
l’intention de», «sciemment»,
«intentionnellement»
Prima facie
Ω HTDR
Ω HTDR
Oui
Présumée
Oui
Intention claire du législateur
Non
D PDP
diligeance
Pas de
défense
Non, imp peines $
OK
I. Intérêt public ou infractions criminelles réelles (378)
Beaver v The Queen, 1957 (378)
Ratio : Possession requires subjective intent.
Facts :
 Louis Beaver et Max Beaver ont vendu drogue à un agent secret sans permis et contrairement à 4(1)(f) du
Opium and Narcotic Drug Act. On les trouve également coupable de possession selon 4(1)(d). The trial
judge advised the jury that if they were satisfied that the accused had in his possession a package and sold it,
then if it contained an illegal substance, he would be guilty of both counts, regardless of (1) whether he had
any knowledge of what the substance was, and (2) whether he had an honest/mistaken belief that it was a
harmless substance.
 CPI donne sentence de 7 ans emprisonnement. Appelant était partie à la vente et bien qu’il n’avait pas le
paquet sur lui, il a agit conjointement. Appelant croyait que la substance était un substitut de sucre.
 Articles 4(1)(d) and (f) confèrent une responsabilité absolue.
Issue : Est-ce que la possession et vente peuvent être reconnus quoique l’accusé croit que le contenu soit autre
chose (i.e. is the charge of the trial judge to the jury correct)?
Holding : Pas de possession (no mens rea proven), mais approuve l’infraction de vente, since the accused
claimed to be selling drugs.
Majorité (Cartwright - CSC) : Le mens rea est requis pour reconnaître une offense selon la s. 4(1) pour deux
raisons :
 Infraction de nature d’intérêt publique : the Act deals with “public welfare offence cases” similar to Hobbs v
Winchester Corp) ;
 Sens de l’article 17 de la loi (“one is prima facie presumed to be guilty but can exculpate himself by proving
lack of knowledge”): For the latter, since such words are not in s. 4(1)(d) then “Parliament intended that lack
of knowledge should be no defense”. Le langage de l’article 17 ne devrait pas permettre à la cour de
conclure que le mens rea n’est pas requis. It was not explicit in this effect, and the court is not willing to
impute such an intention to Parliament.
Disidence en partie (Fauteux - CSC) :
- Discute le principe sous-tendant la loi voulant que la possession de drogue soit illégale et les exceptions
contrôlées (policy). Le Parlement a jugé essentiel de faire un contrôle très ferme et vigilant des drogues.
- L’article 4 devrait être interprété en harmonie avec l’article 17. Puisqu’il établit la présomption d’infraction
et que la preuve de mens rea n’est requise, l’article 17 devrait en faire autant.
Rule : Dans Beaver, même si ces gestes sont prohibés par une loi hors du CC, la vente et la possession de drogue
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
27
est criminel. Par conséquent, la mens rea est nécessaire.
R v Pierce Fisheries, 1971 (384)
Ratio : Regulatory offences without mens rea requirements can be created. Reconnaissance d’infractions de
nature criminelle et de nature réglementaire, car les participants à l’activité acceptent ses règles.
Facts : Charges initiales contre l’accusé puisqu’il était en possession de quelques homards trop petits selon le
Fisheries Act sur un énorme quantité.
Holding : La CSC admet le pourvoi contre l’acquittement préalable.
Majorité (Ritchie - CSC) :
 Le règlement vise la protection des homards et la conservation de cette source de nourriture (policy).
 The offence against possessing undersized lobsters does not create a separate criminal offence, as the Beaver
case does, and the law should be interpreted as a regulatory offence, without any presumptions as to the
requirement of a mens rea.
 En l’espèce, la loi ne renferme aucun mot référant au mens rea (ex. “knowingly”, “willfully”, “with intent” ou
“without lawful excuse”).
 Quoique le mens rea soit nécessaire en droit criminel, il existe des crimes réglementaires qui peuvent
reconnaître la culpabilité sans s’interroger quant au mens rea.
Disidence (Cartwright - CSC) :
 Beaver: “there is in law no possession without knowledge of the character of the forbidden substance”.
 Puisque l’appelant ne savait pas, il ne peut être coupable.
 Si le Parlement voulait ignorer le mens rea, il devrait l’indiquer expressément.
R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc., 1991 (385)
Ratio : True criminal offences or regulatory offences.
Raisonnement (Cory – CSC) :
 Distinction between truly criminal conduct (mala in se) and conduct, otherwise lawful, prohibited in the
public interest (mala prohibita).
 R v Pierce : there exists “a wide category of offences created by statutes enacted for the regulation of
individual conduct in the interests of health, convenience, safety, and the general welfare of the public”
which are not subject to the common law presumption of mens rea as an essential element to be proven by
the Crown. » As recognized in Sault Ste Marie.
 ***Strict liability is a middle ground between full mens rea and absolute liability, so that the Crown must
prove neither mens rea nor negligence, but the defendant can avoid liability by proving on a balance of
probabilities that all due care was taken  the defence of due diligence.
 Sault Ste Marie sub-divided public welfare offences into categories of strict and absolute liability.
 Les infractions de nature réglementaire visent à protéger des individus vulnérables.
o Pas besoin de prouver le mens rea.
o « While the mens rea presumption applied to true crimes because of the fault and moral culpability
which they imply, that same presumption did not apply to offences ‘’which… are not criminal in
any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty.’’ » (Sherras v
De Rutzen).
 L’infraction réglementaire s’attaque à l’effet de l’acte plutôt qu’à l’acte lui-même comme l’infraction
criminelle.
 Laisser certaines activités se dérouler sans réglementation pourrait créer des conditions dangereuses pour la
société pour des actes qui, eux-mêmes, ne sont pas criminels.
 Le concept de la faute de l’infraction réglementaire est fondé sur le devoir de diligence raisonnable et
n’entraîne pas une sanction morale ou un stigmate comme en droit criminel.
II. Émergence de la responsabilité stricte (388)
Deux niveaux d’infractions réglementaires : responsabilité stricte et absolue.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
28
R v City of Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 (388)
Ratio : 3 types of infraction (true crimes, strict/absolute liability).
Facts : Ville est accusée d’avoir déversé ou d’avoir permis de déverser des substances polluantes dans des eaux
publiques. Infraction au Ontario Water Resources Act, une loi provinciale de droit pénal.
Issue : L’infraction requière-t-elle une preuve de la faute. Une défense de diligence raisonnable est-elle possible?
Holding : La formulation de la loi « cause »/”permit » porte à conclure à un crime de responsabilité stricte.
Nouveau procès ordonné.
Raisonnement (Dickson - CSC) :
 Distinction entre l’infraction criminelle et réglementaire (d’intérêt publique) est fondamentale.
o Criminelle : Couronne prouve l’élément mental  l’accusé a commis l’acte intentionnellement,
avec insouciance en connaissance les faits ou en choisissant de les ignorer. Négligence exclue.
o Responsabilité absolue : Seule la preuve de l’actus reus est importante. Le mens rea n’est pas
requis. « It is not defence that the accused was entirely without fault. He may be morally innocent in
every sense, yet be branded as a malefactor and punished as such. »
 Arguments POUR la responsabilité absolue :
o Protection de l’intérêt publique demande un haut standard d’obligation de diligence. Les gens
doivent sentir que leur ignorance et erreurs ne les excuseront pas. Incitatif à prendre des mesures de
précaution.
o Efficacité administrative : Prouver le mens rea est un trop grand fardeau pour toutes les infractions
présentées en justice quotidiennement. Permettrait à trop d’accusés de se libérer.
 Arguments CONTRE la responsabilité absolue :
o Violation des principes fondamentaux de la responsabilité criminelle.
o No evidence that absolute liability results in people tacking a higher standard of care.
 Tendance montante : plusieurs cours du pays acceptent (1) que la Couronne n’ait pas à prouver la mens rea
pour des infractions réglementaires, mais (2) rejettent la possibilité que la responsabilité soit reconnue
essentiellement après la preuve de l’actus reus sans donner la possibilité de défense (392) : “…there is a
generally held revulsion against punishment of the morally innocent” (388).
 Rejet de la responsabilité absolue en faveur de la responsabilité stricte. La Couronne prouve l’acte hors
de tout doute raisonnable, mais n’a pas à prouver la négligence. Le défendeur doit prouver qu’il a rempli son
devoir de diligence selon la prépondérance des probabilités.
Test : ***Trois catérories d’infractions à déterminer selon la précision du langage:
 Infractions requérant la preuve du mens rea; “vrais” crimes. E.g. “wilfully”, “with intent”, “knowingly” or
intentionnaly”.
 Infractions de responsabilité stricte : pas besoin de prouver le mens rea. L’infraction est reconnue prima
facie suite à la preuve de l’actus reus. Le défendeur conserve une défense : il tente de prouver
l’accomplissement de son devoir de diligence selon l’homme raisonnable. E.g. public welfare offences.
 Infraction de responsabilité absolue : Le défendeur n’a pas de défense une fois l’actus reus prouvé. E.g. guilt
follow proof in regard to the over-all regulatory pattern, the subject-matter and the importance of the
penalty.
Comment : Lévis (City) v Tétreault tells two things:
 Sault St. Marie is the clear analytical frame work and classification approach;
 “absolute liability offences still exist…they have become an exception requiring clear proof of legislative
intent”.
III. Considérations constitutionnelles (395)
Reference re Section 94(2) of the BC Motor Vehicle Act, 1985 (395)
Ratio : Un crime de responsabilité absolue ne peut mener directement à l’emprisonnement.
Facts : Le Motor Vehicle Act ne prévoit pas de défense pour celui qui est arrêté lorsqu’il conduit sans avoir
l’autorisation de conduire ou lorsque son permis est suspendu. La faute mène directement à l’emprisonnement.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
29
La culpabilité est établie du seul fait d’une preuve de conduite, que le défendeur, savait ou non, qu’il s’exposait
à tel risque ou qu’il enfreignait la loi.
Issue : La loi porte-t-elle atteinte au principes de justice fondamentale, droit à la liberté, prévus par l’art. 7 de la
Charte? OUI.
Raisonnement (Lamer - CSC) :
 Principes de justice fondamentale
o Une loi qui pourrait condamner un innocent brime les principes de justice fondamentale. Si
l’emprisonnement est une conséquence, il y a violation du droit de la personne à la liberté (7
Charte). « In other words, absolute liability and imprisonment cannot be combined.
o Les principes de justice fondamentale qualifient les droits de ne pas être privés de la vie, de la
sécurité et de la liberté. Leur fonction consiste à délimiter les paramètres de ces droits (396). Ils ne
concernent pas seulement le droit procédural, mais le droit substantiel également.
 Responsabilité absolue et justice fondamentale
o On ne peut enlever la liberté de celui qui n’a rien fait de mal, moralement (rappel de Dickson dans
Sault Ste. Marie).
o Les cours présupposent que le Législateur n’a pas cherché à créer des infractions de responsabilité
absolue à moins qu’il ne l’exprime clairement.
o “A law enacting an absolute liability offense will violate s. 7 of the Charter only if and to the extent
that it has the potential of depriving life, liberty, or security of the person”.
o “…no imprisonment may be imposed for an absolute liability offence, and, consequently, given the
question put to us, an offence punishable by imprisonment cannot be an absolute liability offence”
(398).
o Une infraction de responsabilité absolue menant à l’emprisonnement viole les principes de justice
fondamentale protégés par la Charte et ne peut se justifier que si la Couronne peut prouver que cette
limitation est raisonnable dans une société libre et démocratique (art. 1)
o La CSC reconnaît que certaines infractions d’intérêt public justifient que la responsabilité absolue
soit encourue (e.g. Pollution de l’eau et de l’air).
R v 1260448 Ontario (William Cameron Trucking), 2003 ; R v Transport Robert, 2003 (401)
Ratio : Legislature can create absolute liability offences with no imprisonment attached.
Facts : Pourvoi contre l’art. 84.1(1) du Ontario Highway Traffic Act (HTA). Défendeur prétend que la pénalité
monétaire viole ses droits à la sécurité (art. 7 Charte) et à la présomption d’innocence (11d). Deux entreprises
ont été trouvées coupables d’être les propriétaires de véhicules qui ont “perdu” des roues lorsqu’ils étaient sur
l’autoroute. Les défendeurs clament qu’ils ont droit à une défense s’ils prouvent qu’ils ont pris les précautions
raisonnables.
Issue : Is it free to the legislature to create an absolute liability offence where there is no possibility of
imprisonment or probation if the defednant is convicted ?
Holding : OUI. L’article 84.1(1) ne viole pas l’art. 7 de la Charte.
Raisonnement (… - CSC) :
 Présomption d’innocence 11(d) : Interdit le renversement du fardeau de la preuve pour que l’accusé prouve
un élément de l’infraction, mais ne prévoit pas que le législateur ne puisse créer une infraction qui
n’implique pas un certain élément (dans ce cas la mens rea) .
 S. 7 Charte- Sécurité et responsabilité absolue :
o Défendeurs prétendent qu’il y a violation de leur droit à la sécurité : stigma rattaché à la culpabilité
+ amende élevée, (la + onéreuse de la loi).
o R v Pontes, 1995 : Cory de la CSC trouve que l’absence d’un risque d’emprisonnement ne peut
entraîner une violation de la sécurité.
o L’art. 84.1(1) ne concerne que les véhicules commerciaux et s’applique à certaines circonstances.
Certaines défenses seront disponibles dans d’autres cas, comme la collision avec un tiers.
o “Not all forms of psychological prejudice caused by government will lead to automatic s. 7
violations” – Blencoe v BC (Human Rights Commission), there is no “right to be free from
stigma”.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
30
o
o
“[W]e are not convinced that a prosecution for the s. 84.1 offence engages the kind of exceptional
state-induced psychological stress … that would trigger the security of the person guarantee in s. 7”
p 405 “focuses on harmful consequences of otherwise lawful conduct rather than any moral
turpitude”.
It causes a “diminished stigma” that does not trigger security interest protected by s. 7 not serious
state-imposed psychological stress covered by “security of the person”.
R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc., 1991 (406)
Ratio : Result 5:4 reverse onus provision upheld constitutional—strict liability constitutionally valid in Canada.
Only human being can enjoy the right to life, liberty and security of the person guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.
Facts: Accused corporation charged with false and misleading advertisements, that its travel packages were
‘wholesale’, contrary to s. 36(1)(a) of federal Competition Act. Offence, prosecuted by way of indictment or
summary conviction, respectively punishable by up to five years’ or one year imprisonment. At trial, judge held
s. 36 and s. 37.3 (at p 406), which creates statutory due diligence defense, were inconsistent with ss. 7 and 11(d).
Note : This is a “true crime” under Dickson definition in Sault Ste. Marie.
Raisonnement : SCC unanimously strikes down sections (c) and (d)—absolute liability unconstitutional in
Canada. But, differ in regard to…
 Majority (Lamer)
o S. 7 violations?
 “… it is a principle of fundamental justice that the penalty imposed on an accused and the
stigma which attaches to that penalty and/or to the conviction itself, necessitate a level of fault
which reflects the particular nature of the crime” (408).
 Sub-sections (c) and (d) of s. 37.3(2) violate s. 7 of Charter as the timely retraction
requirement is an absolute liability offence that could punish innocent corporation who
realized too late that representation in question was false, words of sub-section (d) “taken
forthwith after the representation was made or the testimonial published” (406, 408).
o Justified under s. 1
 “Not necessary to convict of false/misleading those who did not undertake corrective
advertising because they did not realize (and ought not to have realized) that the advertisement
was false/misleading”(409)
 In order to promote corrective advertising—Parliament could have undertaken one of two
alternatives (409). Parliament could also have changed the penalty to something other than
imprisonment.
o Mens rea requirement
 In R v Vaillancourt Court held that “the principles of fundamental justice dictate that
negligence is the minimum fault requirement where an accused faces possible imprisonment
upon conviction except for certain offences such as murder” (10)
 The legislature should decide if a higher fault requirement than this constitutional minimum
should be adopted where an accused faces possible imprisonment—it is not for the courts to
decide this as this is a question of public policy.
 Concurring (La Forest J):
o In case of regulatory offences and some criminal offences, requirement of due diligence is sufficient
for Charter.
o For most criminal offences should be reluctant to accept a lower level of mens rea than criminal
negligence (410).
 Concurring (Cory ):
o Does section 7 require in all cases that the Crown prove mens rea as an essential element of the
offence? Certainly there can be no doubt that s. 7 requires some degree of fault—proof of negligence
satisfies this requirement.
o Strong sanctions such as imprisonment should be available to be effective enforcement of regulatory
measure—“The potential for serious harm flowing from the breach of regulatory measures is too
great for it to be said that imprisonment can never be imposed as a sanction” (411).
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
31
o Regulatory offences deal with compliance obligations.
Raisonnement :
 Majority (Lamer + 3) : Provision violates s. 11(d) because of persuasive burden requirement and cannot be
saved under s. 1…
o Real concern is that an accused may be convicted even if reasonable doubt exists—accused must
establish that (406) he has taken all precautions listed in (a)-(d), “and” connects the four subsections.
o Suggests introducing a mandatory presumption of negligence in s. 37.3(2) as this would violate s.
11(d) but would be a justifiable limit under s. 1.
 Concurring (Iacobucci + 2): provision violates s. 11(d) but is saved under s. 1…
o False/misleading advertisement is a public welfare offence and prohibition of offence is fundamental
to society.
o Disagrees with Lamer C.J. with regards to persuasive burden passing the 3 rd step of Oakes test, the
minimal impairment requirement.
o For reasons given by Cory J. it is a reasonable violation of the presumption of innocence.
 Concurring (Cory + 1): provision does not violate s. 11(d).
CHAPTER FIVE: CONDUCT OR ACTUS REUS (301-375)




Foundational principle of criminal liability : « actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea » …
There can be no criminal liability unless a guilty mind expresses itself in the performance of prohibited
conduct. Why? Because we don’t want to have a police of the mind.
Actus reus requires a (1) physically voluntary (2) act or omission, (3) sometimes in certain prescribed
circumstances, and (4) sometimes causing certain consequences.
En interprétant les infractions du CC, il est important pour la Couronne (Ω) de prouver non seulement
l’actus reus (le geste) et la mens rea (l’intention subjective ou l’objective), mais aussi tout les éléments
essentiels de l’article (la personne visée, les circonstances, etc.).
I. Contemporaneity (302)
1.
2.
This principle holds that, with regards to all offences that require proof of fault, the offence cannot be
proved unless the element of fault, the mens rea, and actus reus coincide.
There must be a temporal overlap between the mental fault and the prohibited conduct.
Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, 1969 (302)
Ratio : Contemporaneity of AR and MR.
Facts: The appellant Fagan was convicted of assaulting a police constable. Fagan was reversing a motor vehicle
when the police officer asked him to drive the car forward to the kerbside so that he could ask the appellant to
produce documents relating to his driving. Fagan initially parked too far from the kerb and the officer asked him
to move closer. This time, the appellant drove forward onto the officer’s foot. When the police officer told Fagan
to get off his foot, he initially refused but then reluctantly reversed the car off the officer’s foot.
Issue : Were the mens rea and actus reus contemporaneous in this case (concomitance)? YES.
Raisonnement (James - CA England): Court finds no difference between the action of stepping on to a person’s
toe and maintaining that position and the action of driving a car on to a person’s foot and sitting in the car whilst
its position on the foot is maintained.
 Mens rea should be present at the inception of the actus reus. It can be superimposed upon an existing act
but the subsequent inception of mens rea cannot convert an act which has been completed without mens rea
into an assault.
 Judges were right in finding that though the act may initially have been unintentional, but when the appellant
became aware that he was on the officer’s foot, he (1) remained seated in the car so that car stayed on
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
32
constable’s foot, (2) switched off ignition in the car, (3) maintained the wheel of the car on the foot, and (4)
used words indicating the intention of keeping the wheel in that position. This is not mere omission or
inactivity.
Dissent (Bridge J - CA England) : Appellant’s fault is that he omitted to manipulate the controls to set the car in
motion again. Fagan did nothing that amounted to assault.
R v Miller (CA), 1982 (305)
Ratio : Unintentional act, intentional omission sufficient = AR/MR coincide.
Facts: Appellant was squatting in someone else’s house. He lit a cigarette and then lay down on a mattress in one
of the rooms. He fell asleep and the lit cigarette dropped onto the mattress. He later woke up and saw that the
mattress was smouldering. He did nothing and simply moved to another room and went back to sleep. The house
caught fire and the appellant was rescued and subsequently charged with arson.
Issue : Are the mens rea and the actus reus sufficiently contemporaneous? YES.
Raisonnement (May - CA England): An unintentional act followed by an intentional omission to rectify that act
or its consequences, or a reckless omission to do so when recklessness is a sufficient mens rea for the particular
case, should only be regarded as intentional or reckless where reality and common sense so require.
 Important to consider whether or not there was an adoption on the part of the accused of what he has done
earlier by what he deliberately or recklessly fails to do later.
 The whole of the appellant’s conduct from the moment he lay on the mattress with the cigarette to the time
he left it smouldering and moved to another room should be regarded as one act. His failure to extinguish the
fire constitutes an adoption of what he had unintentionally done earlier.
R v Miller (HoL), 1983 (306)
Ratio (Diplock) : No rational ground for excluding from conduct capable of giving rise to liability conduct
which consists of failing to take measures that lie within one’s power to counteract a danger that one has oneself
created, if at that time one’s state of mind is such as constitutes a necessary ingredient of the offence.
*R v Cooper, 1993 (307)
Ratio : At some point, the requisite mens rea (1) coincied with the (2) continuing series of wrongful acts that
constituted the transaction.
Facts: Case of murder by manual strangulation. Accused said he was angry with the victim and grabbed her by
the throat but cannot remember causing her death. Evidence that accused had consumed a lot of alcohol.
History: Trial judge instructed the jury that once the accused had formed necessary intention to cause the victim
bodily harm which he knew was likely to cause her death, he need not be aware of what he was doing at the
moment she actually died. CA ordered a new trial but SCC restored the conviction.
Reasoning (Cory – SCC): Death occurred between 30 seconds and 2 minutes after accused grabbed victim by
the neck. Jury could reasonably infer that when the accused grabbed the victim and shook her, there was the
necessary coincidence of the wrongful act and the requisite intent to do bodily harm that accused knew was
likely to cause death.
R v Williams, 2003 (309)
Facts: Accused Williams was in a relationship with victim for 18 months and they had unprotected sex for about
5 months when he found out he was HIV positive. Despite being counselled about the risk of transmission,
Williams continued to have unprotected sex with the victim for over a year. She then tested positive for HIV and
Williams was charged with aggravated assault. Although the sex was consensual, law says that failure to
disclose information that changes the nature and quality of an act vitiates consent.
Reasoning (Binnie): There is at least a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s knowledge of his HIV-status when he
infected the victim. Found guilty of assault but not aggravated assault.
Ratio: Pas de concomitance, parce qu’il était impossible de savoir quand elle a eu le VIH, avant ou après qu’il le
saches.
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33
II. Voluntariness (310)




Voluntariness is a requirement of every offence, whether it be a true crime or a quasi-criminal/regulatory
offence.
It is best to think of this as a demand that the prohibited conduct be a product of the will of the accused.
The voluntariness of a person’s conduct will be established if his or her conduct is the product of conscious
choice. Exemple de situation sans volonté :
o Maldie: une personne qui fait une crise d’épilepsie fait mal à une autre dans ce contexe. Aussi, King
a fait un geste involontaire, car il était sur des médicaments.
o Force majeur: une personne a un fusil sur la tête.
It is difficult to distinguish voluntariness with mens rea.
R v Larsonneur, 1933 (311)
Facts : Appellant was a French citizen but was allowed in England on condition that she not become employed
while in the UK. Days later, she was ordered to leave the UK and she went to the Irish Free State who then
ordered her deportation. The Irish authorities brought her back to England and handed her over to the police
there. She was later convicted of « being an alien to whom leave to land in the United Kingdom has been refused
who was found in the United Kingdom. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty through circumstances beyond her
own control.”
Issue : Was there a voluntary act of which the appellant can be found criminally liable? YES (EVEN IF IT
SHOULD BE NO).
Reasoning (Hewart - CA England): There is no reason to interfere with the findings of the jury. She was found
in the UK and was deemed to be of the class of persons whose landing was prohibited by the Secretary of State.
Comment : This case is now viewed as a case that improperly ignored the voluntariness component of actus
reus.
Kilbride v Lake, 1962 (311)
Facts : Appellant drove wife’s car and parked it. He got a ticket for not displaying a warrant of fitness. The
warrant had been in the right place when he left but it could not be found when he returned (it was lost, had been
detached, etc.). It was proven that the appellant did have a current warrant of fitness. Appellant was still
convicted.
Issue : Was the requirement of voluntariness fulfulled in this case? NO.
Reasoning (NZ Supreme Court):
 If there is an absolute prohibition, and the prohibited action is done by the defendant, then the absence of
mens rea affords no defence. However, this is not the issue in this case, rather we must determine whether or
not the physical element of the offence (actus reus) was committed by the appellant.
 Apart from the mental element of intention, “a person cannot be made criminally responsible for an act or
omission unless it was done or omitted in circumstances where there was some other course open to him.”
 This is entirely distinct from the mental element contained in the concept of mens rea. Mens rea is the
intention or the knowledge behind or accompanying the exercise of will, while the mental element in actus
reus is simply the spark without which the actus reus cannot be produced at all.
 In this case, the second factual ingredient was not satisfied until the warrant disappeared during his absence.
The resulting omission to carry the warrant was not within his conduct, knowledge, or control.
R v King, 1962 (313)
Facts: Accused was charged with impaired driving having been injected with sodium pentathol by his dentist
while having two teeth extracted. When he woke up, the dentist told him not to drive but he claims not to have
heard the warning. He remembered getting into his car and, while driving, he fell unconscious. He then ran into
the rear of a parked car. Medical evidence demonstrated that his condition at the time was consistent with the
after-effects of sodium pentathol.
History: He was convicted of impaired driving but the CA quashed the appeal.
Holding : SCC dismissed the appeal stating that there can be no actus reus unless it is the result of a willing
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
34
mind at liberty to make deliberate choices. Here, not voluntary.
Quote: “There can be no actus reus unless it is the result of a willing mind at liberty to make a definite choice or
decision, or in other words, there must be a willpower to do an act whether the accused knew or not that it was
prohibited by law”
R v Ruzic, 2001 (315)
Ratio (LeBel - SCC) :
 Principle of voluntariness was given constitutional status in Daviault, where it was determined that it would
infringe s.7 of the Charter to convict someone who was not acting voluntarily as a fundamental aspect of
actus reus would be absent.
 Voluntariness is of critical importance in determining enough autonomy to be able to attribute criminal
liability. Important to treat criminal offenders as rational, autonomous, and choosing agents.
III. Action, Omissions and Status (316)
Action

Most offences require proof of some positive act. Offences premised on some positive action is the norm and
poses no particular problems for criminal law.
Inaction (Omissions)


The starting point is that criminal law will not punish for a mere failure to act.
But, the law could find someone criminally responsible for an omission only where that person was subject
to a legal duty to act.
o Type:
 Specific omission offences
 General omission offences
o Source:
 Federal statutes (Browne)
 Common law (Thornton).
R v Browne, 1997 (319)
Ratio : Need for an undertaking for legal duty to exist.
Facts: Browne was charged with criminal negligence causing the death of another drug dealer when he did not
take her directly to the hospital after she swallowed a bag of crack to avoid detection by police. He was
convicted and the question is whether the trial judge erred in holding that the appellant caused the victim’s death
by breaching his legal duty arising from an « undertaking » within the meaning of s. 217 of the CC. The trial
judge held that Browne undertook to take care of her after he knew she had ingested crack. He thus had an
obligation to take her directly to the hospital.
Issue : Did the appellant have a legal duty under s. 217 of the CC (s. 217 – “Every one who undertakes to do an
act is under a legal duty to do it if an omission to do the act is or may be dangerous to life”)? NO, HE DID NOT
UNDERTOOK TO DO.
Raisonnement (Smith - Ont CA) :
 Under s. 217, there is no pre-existing relationship or situation that creates a legal duty. Rather, there must be
an ‘undertaking’ before a legal duty can be found.
 The evidence does not disclose any undertaking of a binding nature. The two were drug dealers and one
swallowed a bag of crack to avoid detection by police. The appellant did not know the victim’s life was in
danger until 2 AM when he immediately called a taxi. The words « I’ll take you to the hospital » hardly
constitute an undertaking which would give rise to a legal obligation under s. 217 of the CC. An
undertaking cannot be implied; it must be clearly made, with binding intent, most likely with someone
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
35
relying on it.
R v Thornton, 1991 (323)
Ratio : Omitting to discharge common law duty.
Facts: Appellant knew he was infected with HIV, that he was part of a high-risk group, and was aware of all the
risks associated with this. He also knew that the Canadian Red Cross would not knowingly accept donations of
blood from people who had tested positive for HIV or who were members of this high-risk group. Despite all
this, the appellant donated blood. The Red Cross screened the contaminated blood and it was set aside. The
appellant was charged with committing a common nuisance endangering the lives or health of the public.
Issue : Did the appellant commit an offence that is known to law (avait-il un devoir légal) ? YES IN CML
Raisonnement (Galligan - Ont CA):
 If the appellant’s act of donating blood which he knew was HIV contaminated was neither unlawlul nor a
failure to discharge a legal duty, then the indictment does not allege an offence known to law.
 The court in unable to find any disposition in the CC or any other statute which specifically imposies a legal
duty upon a person to refrain from donating contaminated blood.
 It had previously been held that a « duty imposed by law » in s. 219 of the CC includes a common law duty.
The words « legal duty » used in s. 180(2) mean the same thing and as such, a common law duty is sufficient
to satisfy this provision.
 Donating blood which one knows to be HIV contaminated to an organization whose purpose is to make
blood available for transfusion to other persons, clearly constitutes a breach of the common law duty to
refrain from conduct which one foresees could cause serious harm to another person. Therefore, charges do
allege an offence known to law.
 Appellant had the requisite mens rea to be found criminally liable for this offence. Trial judge found that
appellant had personal knowledge of the consequences of his blood being passed to others. The trial judge
did not apply an objective mens rea test.
Status
These offences appear to punish when there has been neither an act nor an omission. « Status offences » would
effectively punish a state of being. Pure status offences are hard to find in Canadian criminal law. Some point to
possession offences, such as being a keeper of a gaming or bawdy house, but in these examples, one can easily
identify acts and/or omissions that underlie these offences. It is not a crime to be part of a terrorist organisation,
but it is one to help them or to be part of activities.
IV. Circumstances (333)


When interpreting offences, one must always identify the circumstances that are the essential ingredients of
the actus reus.
Eg : Impaired operation of a motor vehicle : Operating a motor vehicle –the voluntary action component of
the actus reus– is not a crime. It is only when a circumstance is added (here, that the accused was impaired at
the time) that the conduct becomes criminal.
V. Consequences and causation (337)
Source
Situation
Standard
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
Smithers et Nette
Homicides 1er, 2e et
involontaire + presque
tous les autres crimes
Cause appréciable
CC
Harbottle
231(5): « détournement d’aéronef, Autres crimes
agression sexuelle, enlèvement,
prise d’otage »
Cause “substantial and integral”
Causalité déterminée
dans le CC
36
Certain crimes require that the act cause a certain effect. For example, murder requires that the act causes death.
In those cases, we need to establish causation. Causation can comprise two elements:
1. Factual cause: whether some logical link can be drawn between the accused’s conduct and the prohibited
consequence (R v Winning).
2. Legal cause: whether the causal connection between the accused’s conduct and the prohibited consequence
is sufficiently strong to support criminal liability.
Préméditation: penser à ton geste + soupeser les conséquences de ton geste. Cependant, cela peut se penser dans
un court laps de temps (R c Winton).
Factual cause
R v Winning, 1973 (338)
Facts: Winning is accused of obtaining credit by false pretences. She filled out an application where she made
false statements. Eaton did not rely upon the information in the application, save for the name and address.
Issue: Can one be convicted of obtaining credit by false pretences if the false information was not relied upon to
make the decision of granting credit? NO, NOT GUILTY.
Raisonnement (Ont CA): The fact that Eaton did not rely on the false information Winning gave means that
causation is not established.
Legal cause


Question of whether the factual causal connection is sufficiently strong to support criminal liability.
Generally determined by common law (although in some cases the Criminal Code deals with certain
causation problems).
Smithers v The Queen, 1978 (339)
Ratio: Thin skull rule in criminal law.
Facts: Accused was subjected to racial taunts by victim at hockey game. Accused repeatedly made threats that
he was going to “get” victim. Victim tried to leave arena, accused punched him in the head, and kicked him in
the stomach a few minutes later. Victim fell and died. Victim died of aspiration of foreign materials present from
vomiting. That kind of death is rare and unusual in a healthy teenager. Accused charged with manslaughter.
Issue: Did trial judge give correct instructions to jury regarding causation (i.e. that the act of assault must cause
the death of the victim)? Was there evidence for the jury to find that causation was proved beyond reasonable
doubt? GUILTY.
Raisonnement (Dickson - SCC): Causation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 It is important to distinguish factual causation from legal causation. Factual causation can only come from
witness evidence. It has nothing to do with intention, foresight or risk. Expert evidence can help establish
factual cause.
 All that the Crown needed to establish for causation was that the kick was at least a contributing cause of
death, more than de minimis.
 There was evidence to conclude that there was causation between the kick and the death. It is immaterial that
the death was in part caused by a malfunctioning epiglottis.
 Here, the only intention that needed to be proved was the intention to kick, not the intention to cause death
(given that this was a manslaughter conviction, rather than murder/attempted murder).
 The Crown did not need to prove that the kick caused both the vomiting and the aspiration. Death may have
been unexpected and the physical reactions of the victim unforeseen, but that does not relieve the accused :
one who assaults another must take his victim as he finds him (thin skull rule can apply in criminal as well
as civil law).
 The act need not be the only cause.
Ratio - Standard for causation: contributing cause, more than de minimis (cause significative ou
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
37
appréciable). On a charge of manslaughter, all the Crown has to establish is that the assault inflicted upon the
victim “was at least a contrubting cause of death, outside the de minimis range.” Very low threshold for
causation in the criminal law!
R v Cribbin, 1994 (344)
Ratio: Constitutionality of Smithers causation test - de minimis test is constitutional.
Facts: Beating leading to non-life-threatening injuries and unconsciousness. Victim left on the side of the road
and drowned in his blood. Assailant accused of manslaughter.
Issue: Is the Smithers causation test constitutional? YES. Is the threshold so low that it violate s. 7? NO,
GUILTY!
Raisonnement (Ont CA): Causation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 The test from Smithers must be understood in conjunction with the degree of fault expressed in the
requirement of objective foreseeability of death (or bodily harm, given thin skull rule).
 The meaning of the de minimis test:
o Issues of causation rarely arise in murder cases (because of high threshold to prove intent)
o Causation is central to manslaughter: the difference between a conviction for assault versus
homicide
 The constitutionality of the de minimis test:
o Both causation and the fault element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the
prosecution can succeed. Combined in that fashion, both requirements satisfy the principles of
fundamental justice – even if there is a risk that the de minimis test allowed to engage the criminal
responsibility of innocents, the requirement of objective foresight would remove that risk.
o “If a person commits an unlawful dangerous act, in circumstances where a reasonable person would
have foreseen the risk of bodily harm which is neither trivial nor transitory, and the unlawful act is
at least a contributing cause of the victim’s death, outside the de minimis range, then the person is
guilty of manslaughter.”
Multiple causes
Pagett v The Queen, 1983 (349)
Ratio: Multiple causes and novus actus interveniens.
Facts: Accused was shooting at police officers. He used the body of his pregnant girlfriend as a shield. Police
opened fire and the girl was killed.
Issue: Can a person be held guilty of homicide if the immediate cause of death is the act of another person?
YES, GUILTY.
Raisonnement (England): A reasonable act performed for self-preservation does not operate as a novus actus
interveniens (e.g. victim trying to escape and dying as a result). This applies to acts of self-defence as well as
execution of a legal duty.
R v SR(J), 2008
Ratio: Participation and multiple causes
Facts: Gunfight, one participant misses and kills an innocent bystander.
Issue: Can the other participant in the gunfight be convicted? YES. GULTY.
Raisonnement (Ont CA):
 The accused's conduct can constitute a contributing cause of the bystander's death (just like car racing
accidents, where both participants in the race can be held responsible for the injury or death) (R v Menezes).
 There is one danger, both participants bearing equal responsibility.
 But for the decision to engage in a gun fight on a crowded street, the victim would not have died.
Comments: See also…
 R v Menezes: joint drag-racing (same as R v SR(J)).
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
38

R v Blaue: victim of knife wound is Jehovah's witness, refused blood transfusion. The stab wounds were
still an operative or substantial cause of death. Must take victim as you find her.
R v Reid & Stratton, 2003 (353)
Ratio: Multiple causes and innocent intervening act - In case of an intervening act, the question for the jury is
whether the initial injury can still be viewed as a significant contributing cause of the victim's death, and whether
the chain of causation was broken.
Facts: Fight, victim becomes unconscious. Another person present attempted CPR. Cause of death: asphyxiation
on vomit – the CPR was the sole cause of death.
Issue: Were the instructions of the judge correct? NO (VERDIC SET ASIDE AND NEW TRIAL ORDER
BECAUSE JUDGE DID DID NOT GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY ON INTERVENING ACTS).
Raisonnement (NSCA):
 The failed attempt at CPR clearly interrupted and separated acts of Stratton and Reid from the victim's death.
 Cases dealing with doctors and causation don't apply here – the persons doing CPR were young
inexperienced intoxicated bystanders.
 Evidence indicated that if the victim had been left alone after becoming unconscious, he may well have
returned to consciousness on his own.
 In case of an intervening act, the question for the jury is whether the initial injury can still be viewed as a
significant contributing cause of the victim's death, and whether the chain of causation was broken.
Comment:
 Le juge dirige mal le jury en droit.
 CA : Peut-être que le jury aurait trouvé la culpabilité pareil, mais il aurait dû se prononcer sur la question.
R v Harbottle, 1993 (358)
Ratio: A different test for causation applies to 214(5) (first degree murder): substantial and integral cause of
death.
Facts: Appellant holds the victim's legs while another person strangles her. Charged under 214(5) (first degree
murder if death is caused by a person while committing or attempting to commit sexual assault, kidnapping,
forcible confinement).
Issue: Is the appellant's participation such that he can be found guilty of first degree murder? GUILTY.
Raisonnement (Cory - SCC):
 “Caused” is broad enough to include the perpetrator and those who assist in the murder.
 We are unable to distinguish between the blameworthiness of an accused who holds the victim's legs thus
allowing his co-accused to strangle her and the accused who performs the act of strangulation
 Object of the section: the gravity of the crime and the severity of the sentence both indicate that a substantial
and high degree of blameworthiness, above and beyond that of murder, must be established in order to
convict an accused of first degree murder
 Test: restrictive test of substantial cause.
o *The test of causation for s. 214(5) must be strict: the Crown must establish that the accused has
committed an act or series of acts which are of such a nature that they must be regarded as a
substantial and integral cause of death
o The test requires that the accused play a very active role in the killing, usually a physical role
o The requirement is much higher than the Smithers (above de minimis) requirement
Test: Guilty if Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (the curent case meets the test):
1. Accused was guilty of underlying crime of domination or of attempting to commit the crime
2. Accused was guilty of the murder of the victim
3. Accused participated in murder in such a manner that he was a substantial cause of death to the victim
4. There was no intervening act of another which resulted in the accused no longer being substantially
connected to the death of the victim; and
5. Crimes of domination and murder were part of the transaction, i.e. the death was caused while committing
the offense of domination as part of the same series of events
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
39
Comment:
 This case established a higher threshold of legal causation than in Smithers, linked to certain words in a
provision condemning a particular form of first degree murder.
 231(5): dans tous les éléments de cet article, même s’il n’y a pas de préméditation, le meurtre sera au
premier degré et non au deuxième degré comme normalement. Ici, le test est la cause substantielle et
intégrale de la mort (plus élevé que cause significative selon (Smithers).
*R v Nette, 2001 (363)
Ratio: Degree of causation for 2nd degree murder still Smithers and “significant contributing cause”. Smithers
remains good law, yet the jury is properly instructed if told to apply a test of “significant contributing cause”.
Facts: Accused robbed victim's house and left victim tied up on her bed. The accused tied up her head and neck,
but did not obstruct mouth or nose. At some point, victim fell and died of asphyxiation. A number of factors
were found to contribute to the asphyxiation process (hog-tied position, ligature around neck, age, lack of
muscle tone). Charge of first-degree murder (murder while committing offence of unlawfully confining), jury
returned verdict of second-degree murder.
Issue: What is the standard of causation for second-degree murder? SMITHERS. YET THE JURY IS
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED IF TOLD TO APPLY A TEST OF “SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING CAUSE”.
Raisonnement (Arbour - SCC):
 Standard of causation for homicide
o We should not confuse the question of what the standard of causation is with how the standard of
causation should be expressed.
o After establishing factual causation, we must establish legal causation. Legal causation is concerned
with whether the accused should be held responsible in law for the death. How to establish causation
will be informed by the wording of the section (some offenses clarify whether an act would be too
remote or not to cause the result, ex. s. 225)
o In many cases, the mens rea requirement will solve concerns about causation -> if the person
intended the result, it will be difficult to say that they did not cause the result
o Civil law of causation not applicable or helpful in criminal law: no contributory negligence, etc.
o To determine whether there was first or second degree murder, the trier of fact must first determine
whether there was murder, and then determine whether the person's participation was so direct and
substantial that a conviction of first degree murder is appropriate.
 Did Harbottle raise the standard of causation? NO. “substantial cause” expresses the increased degree of
moral culpability required under s. 231(5) (first degree murder), but should not be the terminology used to
describe the requisite degree of causation for all homicide offences, which remains that of Smithers,
“significant contributing cause”
 Explaining the standard of causation to the jury
o There is only one standard of causation for all homicide offences.
o The causation standard in Smithers is still valid and applicable to all forms of homicide. The
problem is not its substance, it is its articulation. It may be preferable to state it in positive terms as
“significant contributing cause” rather than negative (“not insignificant”) or in latin terms (“de
minimis”).
o For s. 231(5), the jury should be instructed as to “substantial cause” to understand that something
different is conveyed in respect to the requisite degree of participation.
Dissent (L'Heureux-Dubé - SCC):
Agrees with result, but disagrees with suggestion to rephrase the standard of causation set out in Smithers: “a
contributing cause that is not trivial or insignificant”. Changing the terminology would change the substance of
the test – there is a difference between “significant” and “not insignificant”.
Comment:
 Parliament can legislate causation requirements, and often does so in the CC.
 Still, all causation laws must be consistent with the Charter, especially s. 7, which ensures that “principles of
fundamental justice” will be respected whenever a person’s life, liberty or security of the person are
infringed.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
40
*R c Bouchard, (2007 QCCQ 1882)
Ratio: Question d’examen.
Faits:
[1] Il est reproché à l'accusé d'avoir le 22 novembre 2005, à St-Henri de Lévis, causé la mort de Patrick Larrivée,
commettant ainsi un homicide involontaire coupable, contrairement à l'article 236(b) du Code criminel.
[2] À l'exception de quelques contradictions pour la plupart mineures et sans incidence sur la question en litige,
la preuve présentée par le poursuivant n'a pas été contredite puisque l'accusé n'a pas offert de défense.
[3] Il a plutôt présenté une motion de non-lieu et plaidé que le poursuivant n'avait pas établi hors de tout doute
raisonnable la culpabilité de l'accusé sous l'un des éléments constitutifs de cette infraction, soit l'absence du lien
de causalité entre les actes sous-jacents posés par celui-ci et le décès de la victime.
[4] Cette requête est rejetée car elle n'est fondée ni en faits ni en droit ainsi qu'il sera démontré plus loin.
[5] La question en litige posée dans ce dossier est de déterminer si l'événement dans lequel a été impliqué
l'accusé est visé par l'une des dispositions du Code criminel applicable en matière de causalité, plus
particulièrement l'article 222 du Code criminel. Dans la négative, il faudra alors s'en remettre aux principes
généraux de common law régissant le droit en matière de causalité.
[6] La preuve révèle qu'un coffret contenant des stupéfiants et de l'argent a été dérobé à l'été 2005. Ses
propriétaires, Kevin Bizier, Éric Bernard et Guillaume Pelletier sont informés par l'accusé que l'auteur du vol est
Patrick Larrivée et que celui-ci se trouvera chez lui le 22 novembre 2005 en fin d'avant-midi.
[7] Ils se rendent le rencontrer chez l'accusé et lui font part de leurs soupçons à son endroit. Six à sept
personnes, dont un individu prénommé Maxime, participent à cette discussion. Patrick Larrivée nie être l'auteur
de ce vol et il accuse "Patou" (Patrick Parent). Kevin Bizier et l'accusé se rendent chez Patou et le ramènent à
l'appartement de l'accusé. Ils y apprennent qu'en leur absence, Maxime a frappé Patrick Larrivée d'un coup de
poing au visage lui occasionnant une coupure à la lèvre.
[8] D'autres individus s'étant joints au groupe, il est suggéré par Guillaume Pelletier d'aller poursuivre
l'interrogatoire dans un endroit plus calme.
[9] Vers 17:00, le groupe se sépare et monte dans deux véhicules. Guillaume Pelletier conduit un vieux Cadillac
dans lequel prennent place son frère Éric Pelletier, la victime, Patrick Larrivée, Patou et Éric Bernard. Le reste
du groupe dont l'accusé montent dans un véhicule Golf, propriété de Francis Deblois, et suivent le Cadillac
jusqu'à un cul-de-sac sur la rue Mgr Bourget, près d'une voie ferrée. L'endroit est isolé.
[10] Kevin Bizier déclare que Patrick Larrivée ne voulait pas se rendre à cet endroit. Il n'a pas été battu, mais
était craintif et il est monté dans le véhicule devant leur insistance.
[11] Francis Deblois déclare que la victime n'a pas eu le choix de monter dans le véhicule parce qu'ils auraient
couru après lui s'il s'était enfui. Seul Guillaume Pelletier prétend que la victime pouvait refuser de monter dans
le Cadillac et qu'il n'y a pas été « vraiment forcé ». Cette affirmation ne peut être retenue car elle est
incompatible avec la preuve présentée. Les parties l'ont d'ailleurs convenu lors des plaidoiries.
[12] Sur les lieux, il pleut abondamment et la température est froide. Les soupçons du groupe se portent par la
suite sur Steven Parent-Boutin. Guillaume Pelletier, son frère Éric et Patou (Patrick Parent) vont le chercher à
son tour. La discussion se poursuit et l'accusé y participe activement en accusant Patrick Larrivée d'être l'auteur
du vol. Celui-ci a les larmes aux yeux et semble ne pas comprendre l'acharnement de l'accusé à son endroit alors
qu'ils sont pourtant amis… Patou et Steven se bousculent et s'accusent mutuellement. Personne, à l'exception de
l'accusé, n'est en mesure d'identifier l'auteur du vol.
[13] L'accusé demande aux membres du groupe si Patrick Larrivée doit être « cogné ». Sans attendre la réponse,
il se retourne et lui assène deux à trois coups de poing au visage. Celui-ci tombe au sol et l'accusé lui saute
dessus à pieds joints. Patrick Larrivée l'esquive en roulant sur lui-même et tombe dans un fossé rempli d'eau
pour en sortir rapidement et s'enfuir effrayé en courant sur la voie ferrée vers un boisé.
[14] Les membres du groupe sont fâchés contre l'accusé qui n'en démord pas. Il ne tient pas en place et se lance
à la poursuite de Patrick Larrivée. Certains d'entre eux se lancent à sa recherche parce qu'il fait froid et qu'il est
trempé. La preuve n'indique pas la durée de cette recherche. Cependant, il est établi selon certains témoins que
la neige a débuté, certains d'entre eux parlant même d'une tempête de neige. De plus, ils se doutent bien qu'il ne
reviendra pas car il craint d'être battu à nouveau.
[15] Le groupe attendra entre 30 à 60 minutes sur les lieux le retour de la victime.
[16] À Guillaume Pelletier qui lui demande pourquoi l'avoir frappé, qu'il est trempé et qu'il risque de geler,
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
41
l'accusé rétorque qu'il ne faut pas avoir pitié.
[17] Avant de quitter les lieux, les membres du groupe, conscients du danger encouru par la victime, s'entendent
pour dire qu'ils n'étaient pas sur les lieux et ne sont au courant de rien advenant qu'il arrive quelque malheur à
cette dernière.
[18] Le lendemain matin, vers 9:30, un marcheur découvre le corps de la victime gelé et à demi vêtu sur la rue
Mgr Bourget. Il est étendu dans la neige, pieds nus…
[19] Enfin, un relevé météorologique pour la journée du 22 novembre 2005 au 23 novembre 2005 établit qu'à
18:00 la température maximale et minimale était de 4º C à 0,5º C. Les précipitations de pluie ont été de 10 mm.
Jusqu'au lendemain matin 8:00, la température maximale a varié de 0,5º C à un minimum de -7º C. Il est tombé
16 cm de neige pendant la nuit. Il est permis de conclure que la victime a survécu au froid et à la neige pendant
quelques heures puisque son corps n'était pas couvert de neige lors de sa découverte.
[20] Les principales constatations d'autopsie sont les suivantes:
[21] Les vêtements, jeans bleu, une culotte de basket-ball, un caleçon gris sont mouillés. Il y a des engelures à
l'extrémité du pénis, aux deux genoux, aux deux tibias et aux deux pieds. À la face interne de la lèvre supérieure
et de la lèvre inférieure droite, il y a une ecchymose et érosion de la muqueuse. Il s'agit d'une lésion traumatique
secondaire à un impact avec un objet ou une surface contondante, mais d'importance minime et non contributive
au décès et insuffisante pour avoir entraîné l'inconscience de la victime. L'hypothermie a causé la mort.
[22] Le pathologiste judiciaire conclut qu'il est possible que la victime ait enlevé une partie de ses vêtements
parce qu'ils étaient mouillés; toutefois, dans le cas d'hypothermie, il peut arriver qu'en raison de la baisse de
température corporelle, les victimes se déshabillent à cause de la paralysie de leurs mécanismes de régulation
thermique qui leur amène une sensation de chaleur tellement intense qu'elles se déshabillent.
[23] L'analyse de la preuve permet de tirer les conclusions suivantes:
➢ L'accusé a dénoncé la victime comme étant l'auteur du vol du coffret. Il a de plus informé les propriétaires
du coffret de la présence de celle-ci chez lui.
➢ L'accusé a participé à la séquestration de la victime lorsqu'il s'est rendu en compagnie des autres membres
du groupe dans le cul-de-sac de la rue Mgr Bourget pour y poursuivre la discussion ou l'interrogatoire.
➢ À cet endroit, l'accusé s'est acharné à dénoncer la victime.
➢ L'accusé a suggéré au groupe de « cogner » la victime.
➢ Il l'a frappé à deux ou trois reprises de coups de poing au visage.
➢ Il a tenté de sauter dessus alors qu'elle est au sol.
➢
Pour l'éviter, la victime a roulé sur elle-même et est tombée dans un fossé rempli d'eau. Paniquée, elle a
pris la fuite sur la voie ferrée.
➢ L'accusé s'est lancé à sa poursuite et lorsque ses amis lui ont reproché sa conduite et rappelé que la victime
était mouillée, qu'il faisait froid, il a rétorqué qu'il ne fallait pas avoir pitié.
➢
Lorsque l'altercation s'est produite, il pleuvait ou neigeait selon des témoins, dont deux ont déclaré que la
tempête débutait. Il faisait tellement froid que deux individus sont demeurés à l'intérieur de leur véhicule parce
qu'ils n'étaient pas suffisamment vêtus.
➢
L'accusé a convenu avec les autres membres du groupe ne pas être au courant de l'événement survenu ni
d'avoir été présent à cet endroit advenant qu'il arrive malheur à la victime. Il connaissait donc le risque encouru
par la victime.
➢
Comme tous les autres membres du groupe, il a omis d'aviser les autorités policières ou civiles du péril
encouru par la victime.
Questions en litige:
Dispositif:
Raisonnement:
[24] L'homicide est défini comme suit au Code criminel:
222. (1) Homicide – Commet un homicide quiconque, directement ou indirectement, par quelque moyen, cause
la mort d'un être humain.
(2) Sortes d'homicides – L'homicide est coupable ou non coupable.
(3) Homicide non coupable – L'homicide non coupable ne constitue par une infraction.
(4) Homicide coupable – L'homicide coupable est le meurtre, l'homicide involontaire coupable ou l'infanticide.
(5) Idem – Une personne commet un homicide coupable lorsqu'elle cause la mort d'un être humain:
a) soit au moyen d'un acte illégal;
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
42
b)
soit par négligence criminelle;
c)
soit en portant cet être humain, par des menaces ou la crainte de quelque violence, ou par la supercherie, à
faire quelque chose qui cause sa mort;
d)
soit en effrayant volontairement cet être humain, dans le cas d'un enfant ou d'une personne malade.
[25]
Dans l'arrêt R. c. Nette[1], madame la juge Arbour, s'exprimant pour la majorité, rappelle les
principes établis par les tribunaux quant au critère de causalité applicable aux infractions d'homicide.
[26]
Ils se résument ainsi:
1e
Pour établir la causalité factuelle, il faut examiner comment la victime est morte sur le plan médical,
technique ou physique et comment l'accusé a contribué à ce résultat. (par. 44)
2e
Pour établir la causalité juridique, il faut se demander si le décès de la victime est imputable en droit au
défendeur selon le libellé de l'article créant l'infraction et les principes d'interprétation. (par. 45)
3e La question de la causalité se pose rarement lorsqu'il est établi que l'accusé a prévu subjectivement la mort
ou des lésions corporelles graves de nature à causer la mort, laquelle prévision subjective est requise pour
justifier une déclaration de culpabilité de meurtre, au lieu de l'exigence moindre de la prévisibilité objective des
lésions corporelles qui s'applique à l'homicide involontaire coupable. (par. 47)
4e Les règles de droit applicables en matière de causalité sont en grande partie établies par les tribunaux, mais
elles se dégagent aussi, directement ou indirectement, des dispositions du Code criminel. Par exemple, l'article
225 du Code prévoit que, lorsqu'une personne cause une blessure corporelle qui est en elle-même de nature
dangereuse et dont résulte la mort, elle cause la mort peu importe que la cause immédiate de la mort soit un
traitement convenable ou impropre. (par. 48)
5e Le critère de causalité formulé dans l'arrêt Smithers est encore valide et applicable à toutes les formes
d'homicide mais il peut-être préférable de le formuler de façon affirmative en parlant d'une cause ayant contribué
de façon appréciable au lieu de recourir à une formule négative comme celle de la cause ayant contribué d'une
façon qui n'est pas négligeable ou insignifiante. (par. 71)
[27] L'application des principes établis par les tribunaux, et plus particulièrement le paragraphe 48 de l'arrêt
Nette, permet de conclure que le sous-paragraphe (5)c) de l'article 222 du Code criminel s'applique précisément
à la situation factuelle de ce dossier. En effet, cette disposition prévoit qu'une personne commet un homicide
coupable lorsqu'elle cause la mort d'une autre personne en portant cette dernière, par des menaces ou la crainte
de quelque violence, ou par la supercherie, à faire quelque chose qui cause sa mort, La juge Arbour précise que:
Ces dispositions législatives et d'autres dispositions semblables du Code empêchent de conjecturer sur la
question de savoir si l'acte de l'accusé serait considéré comme étant trop éloigné pour avoir causé le résultat
allégué, ou si la suite d'événements a été interrompue par une cause subséquente qui permet de dégager l'accusé
de toute responsabilité relative aux conséquences.[2]
[28] En effet, le rôle joué par l'accusé est prédominant. Il a informé les propriétaires du coffret que la victime
était l'auteur du vol et les a avisés de la présence de celle-ci chez lui le 22 novembre 2005. Il a permis que son
appartement soit utilisé pour l'interroger. Il a également participé avec les autres membres du groupe à la
séquestration de cette dernière.
[29] Son comportement ultérieur a été menaçant et violent à l'endroit de la victime provoquant ainsi sa fuite
alors que ses vêtements sont trempés au moment où les conditions météorologiques se détériorent rapidement.
[30] Malgré le péril encouru par celle-ci dans ces circonstances, il a déclaré qu'il ne fallait pas éprouver de pitié
et a préparé avec les autres membres du groupe un alibi sommaire dans l'éventualité où il arrive malheur au
fuyard. Fait aggravant, il a omis d'informer les autorités policières ou civiles de l'abandon de la victime dans les
circonstances exposées plus haut.
[31] Juridiquement, l'accusé est criminellement responsable des conséquences ayant résulté de sa participation
aux activités du groupe concerné. Il ne fait aucun doute que le décès de la victime lui est imputable car il y avait
une prévisibilité objective dans ce cas non seulement de risques d'engelures mais aussi de mort considérant la
détérioration soudaine des conditions météorologiques. Certains individus de ce groupe l'ont d'ailleurs prévenu
du risque encouru par la victime. Malgré cela, il n'a pas avisé les autorités de sa disparition. Il a ainsi contribué
de façon appréciable au décès de la victime.
[32] EN CONSÉQUENCE, le Tribunal conclut que la preuve établit hors de tout doute raisonnable que l'accusé
a causé la mort de Patrick Larrivée en le portant, par des menaces et la crainte de violence, à s'enfuir dans les
bois et à se cacher pendant de longues heures, alors que ces vêtements sont mouillés et que de mauvaises
conditions météorologiques, la pluie et la neige sévissent. Enfin, il a omis d'aviser les autorités de la situation
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
43
périlleuse dans laquelle se trouve la victime. Il est donc déclaré coupable de l'acte criminel reproché.
CHAPTER SEVEN: FAULT OR MENS REA (419-499)
Summary (Nadon)
S
u
b
j
Catégories
Intention ou purpose/intent: pourquoi le geste à été causé.
Connaissance ou knowledge/knowingly: connaître une situation et persister
Insouciance ou recklessness: accusé savait le risque et a continué (remplace
l’intention, mais pourrait possiblement remplacer la connaissance)
Aveuglement volontaire ou wilful blindness: savait qu’ils devaient poser des
questions et volontairement il a refuser d’agir (remplace la connaissance)
Négligence (negligence): écart entre les actions de l’accusé et ce que la
personne raisonnable aurait fait.
Sub-cat
Général et
spécifique
Général
Général et
spécifique
Général
Prouver
Très difficile
Difficile
Moyen
Facile
O m
Difficile à
B o
cause du
J d
stigma
- Il y a souvent plusieurs mens rea dans un crime et elles ne sont pas toujours liées directement à l’actus reus,
mais parfois à un autre élément essentiel de l’infraction.
- Mobile ou motive jamais un élément essentiel de l’infraction: pas à prouver sa présence, mais on peut en
inférer la mens rea.
0. General comments (419)


To determine the fault requirement for a “true” criminal offence, one must interpret the wording of the
relevant enactment along with the principles developed by courts over time and:
1. …find all the mental element of fault;
2. …identity the appropiate level of fault;
3. …describe the relationship with the different elements of the actus reus or of the essential element of
the infractions.
Example of words: “intention”, “knowledge”, “willful”, “purpose” or “criminal negligence”…
I. Legislative Definitions of Fault (421)




In Canada, there is no uniform definition of the fault requirements that apply to offences.
The CC does not include a general part that provides definitions of the mens rea.
The definitional entreprise is left largely to the courts to interpret terms on an offence-by-offence, term-byterm basis.
Thi gives rise to a lack of clarity and inconsistency between offences.
II. Subjective States of Fault (426)


Def. of subjective fault : formal requirement for an offense - fault must be concerned with what the accused
subjetively intented or thought.
Connection with objective fault : what a reasonable person would have realized or known may be of some
value in the determination of what the accused person actually thought: use objective foresability of
consequence merely as evidence + reliable subjective testimony as evidence (Buzzanga and Durocher and
Tennant and Naccarato).
R v Buzzanga and Durocher, 1979 (427)
Ratio: subjective mens rea.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
44
The Law:
 Since people are usually able to foresee the consequences of their acts, if a person does an act likely to
produce certain consequences, it is, in general, reasonable to assume that the accused also foresaw the
probable consequences of his act and if he, nevertheless, acted so as to produce those consequences, that he
intended them.
 The purpose of this process, however is to determine what the particular accused intended, not to fix him
with the intention that a reasonable person might be assumed to have in the circumstances, where doubt
exists as to the actual intention of the accused.
 The accused’s testimony, if he gives evidence as to what was in his mind, is important material to be
weighed with the other evidence in determining whether the necessary intent has been established.
Application to facts:
 The two accused are charged with the crime of hatred, under the s. 281 of the CC.
 The difficulty with this case is with the use of the term “wilfully” in the s. 281(2).
 The Court said that in this specific context of this section of the CC, the term “wilfully” means something
more than “recklessly” or “accidentally” (because under those terms the accused could be convicted). In this
context, there must be a conscious purpose to promote hater.
 Identical words can be used in really different contexts.
R v Tennant and Naccarato, 1975 (427)
Ratio: difference between subjective/objective MR.
Raisonnement :
 Subjective: where liability is imposed on a subjective basis, what a reasonable man ought to have anticipated
is merely evidence from which a conclusion may be drawn that the accused anticipated the same
consequences.
 Where the test is objective, what a reasonable man should have anticipated constitutes the basis of liability.
A. Intention/Wilful conduct (427)




Intention:
o Defines the exercice of a free will to use particular means to achieve particular result.
o Employed to determine subjective mens rea.
o Refers to consequences.
Motives:
o Precede and induce the exercice of the will.
o Are no part of the crime and are legally irrelevant to criminal reponsability, but could be relevant to
determine intention when the evidence is purely circumstantial.
o Can be confused with intent like in R v Steane, where Lord Goddard fails to that the actor did have
the intention to make the broadcast and to assist the enemy, but that his acts were induced by duress.
Purpose :
 Ordinary meaning: “immediate intention” or “desire” (R v Hibbert).
 Legal meaning: word is employed in vary different sections of the CC and in a number of distinct
context. “For the purpose of aiding” in s. 21(1)(b) does not requires that the accused actively view
the commission of the offence he is aiding as desirable in itselt. As a result, the mens rea for aiding
under s. 21(1)(b) is not susceptible of being “negated” by duress (R v Hibbert).
Willfuly:
o Judge erred in holding that “willfully” means only “intentional as opposed to accidental” and as
such, caused him to focus on the intentional nature of the conduct…
o …Rather than questioning whether they intended to produce the consequence of promoting hatred
(Buzzanga and Durocher).
R v Steane, 1947 (429)
Ratio: Intention as distinct from motive - The guilty intent cannot be presumed on the basis of the act being
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
45
committed in circumstances that show the act was done in subjection to power. The jury should only convict if
satisfied by the evidence that the act done was done with the intent to assist the enemy.
Facts:
 “Steane, a British subject, was an actor who had been employed in Germany prior to the outbreak of
WWII. He was in Germany with his wife and two sons when the war commenced”
 July 5, 1945: Steane gave a statement to an officer of British Intelligence Service “in which he admitted to
working for the Germany broadcasting service during the war. He had apparently read “the news” on
German radio and assisted with the production of films at the behest of the Nazi regime” (429).
 Steane was charged with doing acts “likely to assist the enemy, with intent to assist the enemy, contrary to
regulation 2A: “if with intent to assist the enemy, any person does any act which is likely to assist the enemy
… then, without prejudice to the law relating to treason, he shall be guilty of an offence against this
regulation and shall, on conviction on indictment, be liable to penal servitude for life” (430) (Bien que le
mobile ne soit pas pertinent généralement, il est ici mélangé avec son intention. Il voulait les aider (ainsi il y
a intention), mais c’était pour sauver sa famille alors il y a une défense de contrainte).
 Steane testified at trial that he was “threatened to cooperate” (430).
 Steane read the news until April 1940 until he refused to cooperate any further – then members of the
Gestapo visited him and said that if he didn’t obey him his wife and children would be put in a concentration
camp. “This was followed by a savage beating in May 1940, which resulted in one of his ears being partly
torn off. As a result, he agreed to work with his old employers and helped in producing some films” (430).
 Steane insisted in his evidence that the only reason he aided the Germans because he was in fear for his wife
and children.
 “Steane was tried before Henn-Collins J. and a jury. He was convicted and sentenced to 3 years’ penal
servitude. Steane appealed” (430).
Issue: Were these acts done with the intention of assisting the enemy? NO.
Raisonnement (Lord Goddard - Court of Criminal Appeal of England):
 How the case opened and was put to the jury: “A man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts;
if, therefore, he does an act which is likely to assist the enemy, it must be assumed that he did it with the
intention of assisting the enemy.” (430)
 The intent must be proved by the Crown and he must do it with the intent specified in the legislation.
 “While no doubt the motive of a man’s act and his intention in doing the act are, in law, different things …”
(430).
 Confusion about question of intent & subject of duress:
o Duress: “a matter of defence where a prisoner is forced by fear of violence or imprisonment to do an
act which in itself is criminal” (430-1).
o But “before any question of duress arises, a jury must be satisfied that the prisoner had the intention
which is laid in the indictment” (431).
 In opinion of the court: impossible to infer that where an act was done at the subjection to the power of
others the person intended the natural consequences of his act. “The guilty intent cannot be presumed and
must be proved” (431).
 Proper direction to the jury in this case: “it was for the prosecution to prove the criminal intent, and that
while the jury would be entitled to presume the intent if they thought that the act was done as a result of the
free uncontrolled action of the accused, they would not be entitled to presume it, if the circumstances
showed that the act was done in subjection to the power of the enemy, or was as consistent with an innocent
intent as with a criminal intent, for example, the innocent intent of a desire to save his wife and children
from a concentration camp. They should only convict if satisfied by the evidence that the act complained of
was in fact done to assist the enemy, and if there was doubt about the matter, the prisoner was entitled to be
acquitted” (431).
 In lower court, the judge did not remind the jury of the threats to which the prisoner had been exposed: “We
do not think that the summing-up contained anything like a full enough direction as to the prisoner’s
defence. The defence must be fully put to the jury and we think they ought to have been reminded of
various matters upon which the accused relied as negativing the intent” (431).
Comment:
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
46





*The problem is that Steane did have the intent to make the broadcast, knowing it would help the enemy,
even if, as Lord Goddard puts it, he did so with the intent to protect his family (that's his motive).
Question about the jury – what does the phrase “with the intent to assist the enemy” mean? In buckling to
the German authorities he willingly broadcast –
o Intention – not only intention to broadcast but intention to broadcast with the intent to assist the
enemy.
o If assault requires proof of intention to apply force. In case of assault causing bodily harm – would
you use same explanation in Steane... has to be his intent to apply harm on the victim? Alternative
view: all crown would need to prove is the application of force.
Steane – illustration of intent being equated with desire and purpose – in respect of not only the act
(Broadcasting) – but it has to go to the ultimate result.
In Steane notion of intent that should be at work – is that it has to be assimilated to some desire in attaining a
certain objective – to providing assistance to the enemy. It begins to look like motive – but motive and
intent are not the same thing.
Conclusion: jury not properly instructed on intent. Jury not adequately instructed to consider whether they
had a reasonable doubt as to intention.
R v Hibbert, 1995 (432)
Ratio: Duress does not negate MR of s. 21(1); purpose is not desire.
Facts: The accused was convicted for attempted murder. He relied on the defense of duress by saying that he
was forced by the principal offender to accompany him to the victim’s apartment building and to lure the victim
down to the lobby. The accused stood by while the principal offender then shot the victim.
Issue: had the accused the requisite intention to be convicted for the crime of attempted murder? Or does Duress
allow the accused to escape the accusation since he did not have the intention to commit or to assist in the
crime? NEW TRIAL ORDERED.
Raisonnement (Lamer - SCC):
 Threats of death or serious bodily harm can have an affect on a person’s state of mind.
 A person who carries out the actus reus of a criminal offence in response to threats or bodily harm will not
necessarily lack the mens rea for that offence.
 A person who performs an action in response to a threat will know what he or she is doing, and will be
aware of the probable consequences of his or her actions. Whether or not he desires the occurrence of these
consequences will depend on the particular circumstances.
 The mens rea for aiding under s. 21(1)(b) is not susceptible of being “negated” by duress (such situations are
rare).
Comment:
 Under threats, the accused brought the victim to the lobby of a building so that the author of the threats can
kill the victim.
 The argument of the accused was that purpose means desire, and thus is negated under the circumstances of
duress.
 *But the SCC said that duress does not negate the mens rea because in the concept of the s. 21(1) of the
Criminal Code, the term purpose is not used in the sense of desire.
 *The court is not saying that “purpose” can never mean desire, but that in this particular context it does not
carry this meaning.
R v Buzzanga and Durocher, 1979 (436)
Ratio: Definitions of willfully for MR. Discussion on what the various definitions of “willfully” are and which
may be rightly applied to this case.
Facts: The two were accused of willfully promoting hatred towards Francophones. They prepared a pamphlet
that contained strongly worded suggestive passages. The distribution of this pamphlet of which is the charge.
They are active members of the Francophone community and appeal on the grounds that they had no intention of
promoting hatred (as it would be against themselves).
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
47
Issue: A) Did the accused need to “willfully” promote hatred? YES. B) Did the judge misdirect himself as to the
meaning of willfully? YES. NEW TRIAL ORDERED.
Raisonnement A (SCC - Martin):
1. Decide if proof of an intention to promote hatred is essential to constitute the offence under s. 281.2(2)
 The insertion of the word “willfully” in s. 282.2(1) was not necessary to import mens rea since that
requirement would be implied in any event because of the serious nature of the crime.
 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Parliament intended to limit the offence under s. 281.2(2) to the
intentional promotion of hatred.
2. Consider the mental attitude that must be established to constitute an intention to promote hatred.
 Conscious purpose was to promote hatred or it was foreseeable that hatred against a group was
certain to result from the actions.
Raisonnement B (SCC - Martin): Judge erred in holding that “willfully” means only “intentional as opposed to
accidental” and as such, caused him to focus on the intentional nature of the conduct, rather than questioning
whether they intended to produce the consequence of promoting hatred.
B. Actual Knowledge (442)


Refers to the circumstances, but may form intention (Buzzanga and Durocher), as it is a slightly lesser form
of subjective fault.
In certain cases, subjective awareness of the consequences can be inferred from the act itself, barring some
explanation casting doubt on such inference. If the actus reus of an offence is established, beyond that for
the mens rea, it need only be determined that an accused knowingly undertook the acts in question, aware
that deprivation, or risk of deprivation, could follow as a likely consequence (R v Theroux for fraud. 442),
R v Théroux, 1993 (442)
Ratio: Fraud MR = subj knowledge of prohibited act/possible consequence.
Facts: The accused was convicted of fraud for accepting deposits from investors in a building project having told
them that he had purchased deposit when he in fact had not.
Issue: Does the fact that the accused honestly believed that the project would be completed negates the mens rea
of the offence of fraud? NO, MENS REA ESTABLISHED. GULTY OF FRAUD.
Raisonnement (SCC - McLachlin):
 Leaving aside offences where the actus reus is negligence or inadvertence and offences of absolute liability,
the test for mens rea is subjective (whether the accused subjectively appreciated the consequence of his
actions at least as a possibility).
 In the concept of fraud, the prohibited act is deceit, falsehood, or some other dishonest act. The prohibited
consequence is depriving another of what is or should be his, which may consist in merely placing another’s
property at risk.
 The mens rea would then consist in the (1) subjective awareness that one was undertaking a prohibited act
(the deceit, falsehood or other dishonest act) (2) which could cause deprivation in the sense of depriving
another of property or putting that property at risk.
 The personal feeling of the accused about the morality or honesty of the act or its consequences is no more
relevant to the analysis than is the accused’s awareness that the particular acts undertaken constitute a
criminal offence.
 Recklessness presupposes knowledge of the likelihood of the prohibited consequences. It is established
when it is shown that the accused, with such knowledge, commits acts which may bring about these
prohibited consequences, while being reckless as to whether or not they ensue.
*Test:
1. The actus reus of the offence of fraud will be established by proof of:
a. The prohibited act, be it an act of deceit, a falsehood or some other fraudulent means; and
b. Deprivation caused by the prohibited act, which may consist in actual loss or the placing of the
victim’s pecuniary interests at risk.
2. The mens rea of a fraud is established by proof of:
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
48
a. Subjective knowledge that one was undertaking a prohibited act; and
b. Subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another
(which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim’s pecuniary interests are put at risk).
C. Recklessness and Wilful Blindness (446)
1. Recklessness:
a. An extension of intention;
b. Found in the attitude of one who, aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring about the
result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk – i.e. one who sees the
risk and takes the chance (R v Sansregret, 447).
2. Wilful blindness or deliberate ignorance:
o An extension of knowledge;
o “Consciousness of the risk and proceeding in the face of it”;
o Arises where a person who has become aware of the need for some inquiry declines to make the
inquiry because he does not wish to know the truth – i.e. he would prefer to remain ignorant (R v
Sansregret).
o “The doctrine of wilful blindness imputes knowledge to an accused whose suspicion is aroused to
the point where he or she sees the need for further inquiries” (R v Briscoe).
R v Sansregret, 1985 (447)
Ratio: Distinguishes negligence, recklessness and wilful blindness.
Facts:
 Appelant was charged with rape with complainant’s consent extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm under
s. 143(b)(i) of the Criminal Code. The victim had been living with the accused for a year, but broke up with
him, after which point he broke into her house twice and threatened her and acted violently. To calm him
down and protect herself, she consented to intercourse.
 She reported both incidents to the police and complained of rape, no proceedings were taken because the
accused’s probation officer asked her not to press the matter. Following the second incident the appellant
was arrested and charged.
 At trial, the judge found that the woman consented to intercourse only out of fear for her safety, but also that
the appellant honestly believed that the consent to intercourse was freely and genuinely given, and acquitted
the accused based on mistake of fact.
Issue: Was the accused reckless or willfully blind to the risks of his behavior? WILLFULLY BLIND.
Raisonnement (McIntyre - SCC):
 Recklessness and negligence, which comes from the civil law, as bases for criminal liability are the subject
of much discussion.
 Negligence is tested by the objective standard of the reasonable man, and a departure from this which is less
than reasonable care, which leads to civil liability but no criminal sanctions.
 For recklessness to form a part of the criminal mens rea, an element of the subjective must be considered.
 Recklessness is found “in the attitude of one who, aware that there is danger that his conduct could bring
about the result prohibited by criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk … the conduct of one who
sees the risk and who takes the chance” (447).
 Concepts of willful blindness and recklessness should be kept separate.
 Recklessness in this case could not override the defence of mistake of fact since, as held in Pappajohn, the
mere honest of the belief will support the “mistake of fact” defence, even where it is unreasonable, and
despite the reckless conduct of the accused.
 However, a finding of willful blindness as to the facts about which the honest belief is now asserted would
leave no room for a defence of mistake of fact, because knowledge would be then presumed on the part of
the accused; i.e. that consent was induced by threats.
 While recklessness involves knowledge of a danger or risk and persistence in a course of conduct which
creates a risk that the prohibited result will occur, willful blindness arises where a person who has become
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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

aware of the need for some inquiry declines to make the inquiry because he does not wish to know the truth.
The culpability in recklessness comes from consciousness of the risk and proceeding in the face of it; for
wilfull blindness, it is justified by the accused’s fault in deliberately failing to inquire when he knows there
is reason to inquire.
Wilfull blindness applies in this case.
R v Briscoe, 2010 (448)
Ratio: “To be guilty of aiding in the commission of a crime, the accused must have knowledge that the principal
offender intended to commit a crime. Alongside the actus reus of the actual aiding in the commission, that is
enough for a conviction”.
Facts:
 C, a 13-year-old girl, and a young friend were lured into a car on the false promise of being taken to a party.
B drove the group, which included L and three youths, to a secluded golf course. Unbeknownst to C or her
friend, L had said earlier in the day that he would like to find someone to kill. It would appear that the idea
had been generally well received and C was chosen by L and some of the others as the victim.
 On their arrival, B opened the trunk and, at L's request, handed him some pliers. B stayed behind the car as
the others went onto the golf course under the guise of seeking the party. B rejoined the group around the
time that one of the youths hit C from behind with a wrench. For a moment, B held on to C and angrily told
her to be quiet or shut up. B then stood by and watched as C was brutally raped and murdered. All five
persons involved were charged with kidnapping, aggravated assault and first degree murder and the two
adults, B and L, were jointly tried by a judge alone. B was acquitted.
History: The trial judge found that the actus reus for being a party to the offences was proven, but not the mens
rea because B did not have the requisite knowledge that L intended to commit the crimes. The Court of Appeal
overturned the acquittals and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider
wilful blindness.
Issue: Did the trial judge err in failing to consider wilful blindness? YES, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.
Raisonnement (Charron - SCC):
 The mens rea requirement reflected in the word “purpose” under s. 21(1)(b) of the CC has two components:
intent and knowledge.
o For the intent component, the Crown must prove that the accused intended to assist the principal in
the commission of the offence. It is not required that the accused desired that the offence be
successfully committed.
o As for knowledge, in order to have the intention to assist in the commission of an offence, the aider
must know that the principal intends to commit the crime, although he or she need not know
precisely how it will be committed. Even in the case of murder, the principal's intention to commit
the crime must be known to the aider or abettor, but it need not be shared. It is sufficient that he or
she, armed with knowledge of the principal's intention to commit the crime, acts with the intention
of assisting the principal in its commission.
 The doctrine of wilful blindness, correctly delineated, is distinct from recklessness and involves no
departure from the subjective inquiry into the accused's state of mind which must be undertaken to establish
an aider or abettor's knowledge. Wilful blindness does not define the mens rea required for particular
offences. Rather, it can substitute for actual knowledge whenever knowledge is a component of
the mens rea. Wilful blindness imputes knowledge to an accused whose suspicion is aroused to the point
where he or she sees the need for further inquiries, but deliberately chooses not to make those inquiries.
 In this case, the evidence cried out for an analysis on wilful blindness. Even B's own statements to the
police, on which the trial judge relied heavily, suggest that he had a strong, well-founded suspicion that
someone would be killed at the golf course and that he may have been wilfully blind to the kidnapping and
prospect of sexual assault. His statements also show that he deliberately chose not to inquire about what
the members of the group intended to do because he did not want to know. The trial judge's failure to
consider B's knowledge from that perspective constitutes a legal error which necessitates a new trial on all
charges.
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III. Objective Standards of Fault (449)





Def. Focus on what the accused ought to have thought or contemplated about his or her actions.
Test: écart marqué entre ce que la personne raisonnable aurait fait (le CC précise le degré à prouver) et ce
que la personne a fait dans la présente.
Test objectif modifié: en principe, la personne raisonnable ne doit pas être nuancée par les caractéristiques
de la personne (âge, sexe, connaissance sur un sujet spécifique), sauf si elles le rendaient incapable, car le
test deviendrait subjectif dans ce cas. Mais, elle est placée dans les mêmes circonstances.
But: on punit la conduite de l’accusé et le résultat produit.
Trois catégories:
o Négligence criminelle (Tutton): insouciance téméraire et déréglée envers la vie d’autrui (reckless or
wanted disregard);
o Homicide involontaire (Ceighton): objective foresseability of bodily harm;
o Conduite téméraire (Waite, Gingrich and McLean, Hundal, Beatty) : geste en écart marqué avec le
conducteur prudent.
Criminal Negligence (450)
1. Objective standard often focuses on criminal negligence.
2. Negligence as a standard for criminal liability is controversial and much debate has taken place regarding to
what extent the subjective considerations ought to be taken into account.
R v Tutton and Tutton, 1989 (450)
Ratio: Criminal negligence and objective standard (considering accused’s perception of facts).
Facts: Respondents were parents of a five year old diabetic. They believed in faith healing but their religious
convictions did not prevent them from seeking and acting on medical advice or from taking medicines. As the
result of the intentional withholding of prescribed insulin upon the belief that the child had been miraculously
cured, the child died.
History: Respondents were convicted of manslaughter under s. 205 (now s. 222) of the CC through criminal
negligence (then s. 202, now s. 219) in that they denied him the necessaries of life without lawful excuse and
thereby committed manslaughter. They raised the defence of an honest although mistaken belief in the existence
of a circumstance which would render their conduct non culpable. Respondents were convicted of manslaughter
and appealed to the CA which set aside the convictions and directed new trials, stating that the objective test
applies for criminal negligence, but that a distinction should be made, and a subjective standard applied, in the
case of omissions. This appeal was taken by leave.
Issue: Is the test for criminal negligence one that is subjective (i.e. whether it was reasonable for these parents to
act this way) or objective (i.e. would reasonable parents have acted this way)? OBJECTIVE.
Holding: Order for a new trial upheld, but because of an error respecting the burden of proof.
Majority (McIntyre - SCC) :
 S. 202 (now s. 219) makes it clear that one is criminally negligent who in doing anything or in omitting
to do anything that is his duty to do, show wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other
persons.
 [The SCC rejected the Ont CA’s distinction between omissions and commissions regarding
subjective/objective standards].
 The objective test must be employed where criminal negligence is considered because it is the conduct and
not the intention or mental state of the accused which is examined in this type of inquiry.
 “Negligence connotes the opposite of thought-directed action,” and thus precludes the element of positive
intent to achieve a given result. S. 202 thus attempts to restrain via punishment mindless actions rather than
a state of mind (exceptional case in the criminal law).
 What makes negligence criminal is “wanton or reckless” disregard. S. 202 does not use the term “reckless”
as an extended definition of intention or malice (mental state), but rather employs the term as part of a
definition of conduct which amounts to “negligence”.
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
Usually, in criminal cases, the act (actus reus) together with the mental state (subjective intention) is
punished. In criminal negligence, it is only the act which exhibits the requisite degree of negligence which is
punished. If the distinction between the two is not clearly made, the traditional mens rea and the the offence
of criminal negligence will become blurred (example, the difference between manslaughter and murder will
become blurred).
 The test is that of reasonableness, and proof of conduct which reveals a marked and significant
departure from the standard which could be expected of a reasonably prudent person in the
circumstances will justify a conviction of criminal negligence.
 However, events occur within the framework of other events. When deciding on the nature of the
conduct, the decision must be made on a consideration of the facts existing at the time and in relation
to the accused’s perception of those facts. Since the test is objective, the accused’s perception of the
facts is considered not for the purpose of assessing malice or intention of the accused but only to form a
basis for a conclusion as to whether or not the accused’s conduct, in view of his perception of the facts,
was reasonable. STANDARD = Modified OBJECTIVE.
 *For criminal negligence, the necessary mens rea may be inferred on an objective basis from the acts of the
accused.*
Concurring judgment (SCC - Lamer): He states that when applying s. 202 (now s. 219), a “generous
allowance” must be made for factors which are particular to the accused (e.g. youth, mental development,
education). He also finds that s. 202 only defines the expression “criminal negligence” when used in the CC.
Parliament did not intend to define its nature.
Concurring judgment (SCC - Wilson, with whom Dickson & La Forest concurred, dissenting on standard to
apply):
 Wilson agrees with Lamer and McIntyre JJ. that the appeal should be dismissed. However, she does not
agree that criminal negligence under s. 202 consists of only conduct in breach of an objective standard and
does not require the Crown to prove that the accused had any degree of guilty knowledge. She also disagrees
with the approach that they suggest (taking into account circumstances particular to the accused).
 In her eyes, s. 202 is ambiguous. When faced with such fundamental ambiguity, it is her view that the court
should give the provision the interpretation most consonant, not only with the text and purpose of the
provision, but also, where possible, with the broader concepts and principles of law.
 She believes that s. 202 in stating that “reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons” and read
with criminal jurisprudence requires the Crown to prove advertence or awareness of the risk that the
prohibited consequences will arise. The Court has adopted a subjective approach to recklessness
(Pappajohn) and has reaffirmed it time and time again. The Court has thus implicitly rejected the view that
failure to give any thought to whether or not there is a risk can be substituted for the mental state of
recklessness. i.e. there must be a blameworthy state of mind.
 Wilson believes that the minimal nature of the requirement of a blameworthy state of mind and the
relevance of the objective standard as a rebuttable mode of proof suggests that a holding that s. 202 requires
proof of a mental element of advertence to risk or willful blindness will not undermine policy objectives of
the provision. The loss of deterrence / social protection would be negligible and at the same time would
offer protection to those who accidently commit conduct which, although it may seem wanton or reckless,
can be explained as inconsistent with any degree of awareness of or willful blindness to such a risk
 Parliament may impose an objective standard for criminal negligence, but it should not fall to the Courts to
do this.
Comments:
 How can Wilson’s judgment requiring a blameworthy state of mind be reconciled with the objective
standard claimed by McIntyre and Lamer JJ? Is a new standard created here … a qualified objective
standard?
 The court was split 3-3 on this issue!
R v Waite, 1989 (454)
Ratio: Dangerous Driving and Criminal Negligence – subjective vs objective standard.
Facts: The accused was driving a car at high speeds while intoxicated and killed four people.
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History: The trial judge instructed the jury, explaining to them what he considered to the difference between
dangerous driving and criminal negligence. The case was appealed to the SCC.
Issue: Did the trial judge err in law when instructing the jury that when considering criminal negligence they
should assess the objective element (the driving) and the subjective element (what is in the mind of the accused),
as compared to dangerous driving, in which the state of the mind of the accused in unimportant? YES.
Raisonnement (McIntyre, L’Heureux-Dubé, Lamer): Yes, the trial judge’s instructions to the jury amounted to
an error in law. He should have set forth the objective test articulated in Tutton. → New trial.
Concurring (Wilson, Dickson, La Forest): Agreed that there needed to be a new trial but disagreed regarding the
objective test. They stated that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury amounted to an error as to the degree of
mens rea required under s. 202. When asked about the difference b/t dangerous driving and criminal negligence,
the trial judge stated that criminal negligence required “a deliberate and wilful assumption of the risk involved in
driving in the manner in which he was driving,” and later that the subjective element in criminal negligence was
“assumption and deliberate assumption of the risk.” They find that as such the trial judge placed a too high onus
on the subjective element, and on the Crown to prove deliberation and wilfulness. They instead believe that the
mental element in criminal negligence is the minimal intent of awareness of the prohibited risk or wilful
blindness to the risk.
Comments: Another 3-3 division of the Court of the subjective vs objective standard for criminal negligence.
R v Gingrich and McLean, 1991 (455)
Ratio: Objective standard maintained for Criminal Negligence.
Facts: McLean, the president of a trucking company, and Gingrich, the driver of a truck, were charged with
criminal negligence causing death after a fatal motor accident when the breaks failed. Gingrich had experienced
increasing problems with the brakes over several days.
History: At trial, both were convicted and appealed to the ON CA. Gingrich’s conviction was upheld but
McLean’s conviction was quashed. Reasons – see below.
Issue: Does the law now allow for a subjective intent to be imported into the crime of criminal negligence?
Raisonnement (ONT CA):
 The decisions of the SCC in Waite and Tutton do not stand for the proposition that the objective test (from
Waite and Sharpe) is incorrect, since the court was split 3-3 on this issue. Therefore, until the SCC holds
that the objective standard is to be rejected, this standard should be upheld.
 Counsel for the appellants argue that the SCC’s decisions in R v Logan and R v Martineau demonstrate that
subjective intent now must be proven to charge someone with criminal negligence. The CA disagrees.
 The crime of “negligence” is well recognized in tort of civil negligence which has been elevated to a crime
by their magnitude of wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others. There’s no need to
import the concept of a subjective intent in order to obtain a conviction.
 Nevertheless, in order to find Mclean guilty of criminal negligence, the Crown must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that McLean had the same or similar knowledge as Gingrich. It did not  McLean’s
conviction is overturned.
Comments: *Most courts now follow Gingrich and McLean as interpreting criminal negligence as an objective
form of fault (especially in light of R v Hundal and R v Creighton).
R v Hundal, 1995 (456)
Ratio: Difficult case to understand, but the ratio is that for dangerous driving there is a modified negligence test.
The objective person would be placed in the same circumstances of the accused (weather, location, etc), but
without his specific personal qualities (i.e. age, sex, ability to drive).
Facts: The accused, while driving an overloaded dump truck, proceeded into an intersection against a red light
and killed the driver of a car, which had moved into the intersection on a green light.
History: At trial, the accused was charged with dangerous driving. The trial judge rejected the accused’s
explanation that he was only a short distance from the intersection when the light turned amber and because it
was too dangerous to try and stop he decided to go through the amber light. Appealed to the SCC – accused
contends that the sentence under s. 233 (now s. 249) cannot be imposed without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of a subjective mental element of an intention to drive dangerously.
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Issue: Can the accused be sentenced under s. 233 (now s. 249) even though dangerous driving does not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a subjective mental element? YES.
Raisonnement (Cory - SCC):
 Every crime requires proof of an act or failure to act, coupled with an element of fault (mens rea). However,
to require a subjective mental element in connection with driving offenses would be to deny reality. The
operation of a motor vehicle is often so very automatic and requires very little conscious thought that to
apply a subjective test would be inappropriate. As a general rule, therefore, personal factors need not be
taken into account.
 Modified Objective Test
o Although the objective test must be applied to dangerous driving, the defendant may still raise a
reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would have been aware of the risks of the accused’s
conduct. The objective test must thus be applied with flexibility, taking into account the context of
the events surrounding the incident. That said, personal factors (physical/mental health, capability
and knowledge) need not be taken into account as the licensing requirement for driving assures that
those who receive license are fit to drive.
o A trier of fact may convict if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, viewed objectively, the
accused was, in the words of the section, driving in a manner that was “dangerous to the public,
having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of such place and the
amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonable be expected to be on such place. In making
the assessment, the trier of fact should be satisfied that the conduct would amount to a marked
departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s
situation.
o If an explanation is offered by the accused, then to convict, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person in similar circumstances ought to have been aware of
the risk. These same instructions should be given to a jury if they are the ones deciding.
o The modified objective test was applied properly at trial. Appeal dismissed.
Unlawful act manslaughter (457)
R v Creighton, 1993 (457)
Ratio: Constitutionality of unlawful act manslaughter & objective test for criminal negligence.
 Majority: S. 222(5)(a) does not expressly require foreseeability of bodily harm. Since De Sousa it must be
interpreted as requiring such foreseeability. The test of mens rea for unlawful act manslaughter: mens rea of
underlying offence + OBJECTIVE FORESEEABILITY OF THE RISK OF BODILY HARM which
is neither trivial nor transitory, in the context of a dangerous act. Foreseeability of risk of death is not
required.
 Dissent: Lamer found the test to be unconstitutional for two primary reasons: (1) gravity of the offence and
stigma that attaches; (2) considerations of symmetry bteween the element of fault and the consequences of
the offence. Majority challenges both of these.
Facts:
 Accused injected cocaine into his friend's vein. She died.
 Note that "drug trafficking" includes drug "use". Thus, the unlawful act in Q here is drug trafficking (M/R =
knowledge [Beaver], thus must show BRD that accused knew that he was injecting a drug (and not
something else into her veins).
Issue: Does a constitutionally valid test for unlawful act M/S require reasonable foresight of death or merely
reasonable foresight of bodily harm?
Holding (5/4): Requires reasonable foresight of bodily harm.
Raisonnement (SCC - McLachlin, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, Corry JJ): The Objective Standard…
 “An accused can only be held to the standard of a reasonable person if the accused was capable, in the
circumstances of the offence, of attaining that standard” (460).
 Cannot hold every person to reasonable person standard – must pay attention to human frailties.
 The reasonable person will be seen to have enhanced foresight based on certain experience or knowledge or
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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membership in a certain group.
 I.e.: in this case the reasonable person should be “deemed to possess Mr. Creighton’s considerable
experience in drug use” (460).
 Human frailties only included that relate to an accused’s “capacity to appreciate the risk in question that
maybe considered in this inquiry” (460).
 What is NOT in human frailty: intoxication or impairment “through drug use which occurs as a result of
voluntary consumption cannot serve to vitiate liability for the risks created by the negligent conduct of an
accused”. Also, a “sudden and temporary incapacity to appreciate risk due to exigent circumstances is not
properly considered under the third part of this test” (460).
 “Human frailties encompass personal characteristics habitually affecting an accused’s awareness of the
circumstances which create risk. Such characteristics must be relevant to the ability to perceive the
particular risk” (461).
 The relevant characteristic must be traits which the accused could not have otherwise controlled in the
circumstances. “The reasonable person is expected to compensate for his or her frailties, to the extent he or
she is conscious of them and able to do so” (461).
Concurring (Lamer):
 Gravity of the Offence
o Stigma: The stigma attached to M/S is an appropriate one. Stigma is not one of intentional killer.
"The most important feature of the stigma of manslaughter is the stigma which is not attached to it"
o Punishment: No minimum sentence for M/S therefore punishment can be tailored to the degree of
fault (flexibility of punishment).
 Symmetry bteween fault and consequences of offence. Criminal law has traditionally aimed at symmetry
between the mens rea and the prohibited consequences of the offence. The majority argues that the M/S
offence cannot be deemed unconstitutional on this basis. Give two reasons for this:
1. Rests on the proposition that the risk of bodily harm is appreciably different from the risk of death in
the context of M/S - To say that they are different is tantamount to abrogating the thin skull rule.
Requiring only foreseeability of bodily harm is consistent w/ this rule - take your victim as you find
him. Wherever there is a risk of harm, there is also a practical risk that some victims may die as a
result of the harm. This suggests that the mens rea and the consequence are not very disparate.
2. Rests on the proposition that the principle of absolute symmetry is not just a general rule but a
principle of fundamental justice. BUT criminal law has exceptions to the ideal of perfect symmetry.
Impt to distinguish btwn criminal law theory, which seeks the ideal of absolute symmetry, and the
constitutional requirements of the Charter - "the Constitution does not always guarantee the ideal".
To satisfy the principles of fundamental justice requires only that an element of moral culpability is
present AND that it is proportionate to the seriousness and consequences of the offence charged.
Test for unlawful act manslaughter :mens rea of underlying offence PLUS objective foreseeability of the risk of
bodily harm which is neither trivial nor transitory, in the context of a dangerous act. Foreseeability of risk of
death is not required. Objective foreseeability of bodily harm = Would a reasonable person in the position of the
accused have been aware of the risk of bodily harm? (Creighton #2: don't tailor the reasonable person standard).
Comments:
 *Unlawful act manslaughter requires a mental element in relation to the consequence established and at a
minimum, “objective foresight of the risk of death in order for the offence to comply with s.7 of the
Charter” (459).
 Note that Creighton involves a non-violent act - that passes muster under DeSousa b/c court says that will in
"most cases" involve an act of violence…but not in all.
 Note that Dickson in Smithers held that need no objective foreseeability of bodily harm (that mere trivial
harm would be enough). Trivial harm is no longer enough! Shanks would probably be decided differently
today - b/c no objective foreseeability of non-trivial harm.
 Many people thought that offences without requirement of subjective foreseeability of harm would be held
to be unconstitutional - nope!
 Note the general rule (it was in B v D)  normally, the M/R of the offence should relate to the consequence
of the prohibited A/R (death in this case). M/S was seen to be an exception to this general rule.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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R v Beatty, 2008) (471)
Ratio: Dangerous driving – AR is dangerous driving; MR is marked departure. Difficult to understand the
distinction between accident and dangerous driving.
Facts: Accused charged with three counts of dangerous driving causing death after his pickup truck, for no
apparent reason, crossed the centre line into the path of an oncoming vehicle, killing all three occupants,
although witnesses said the vehicle was being driven normally prior to this instant. There were no mechanical
failures and no evidence of intoxicants. The accused said he was not sure what happened, and that he must have
lost consciousness or fallen asleep before colliding with the other vehicle. The trial judge acquitted the accused
of dangerous driving, whereas the BC Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the Crown.
Issue: Does s. 249 require a marked departure or simple negligence standard? Marked departure
Majority (Charron - SCC):
 Generality
o Conduct which departs from the norm expected of reasonably prudent people forms the basis of
both penal and civil negligence, but these two standards should not be conflated.
o Civil negligence is concerned with the apportionment of the loss, whereas penal negligence is aimed
at punishing blameworthy conduct.
o Fundamental principles of criminal justice require that penal negligence concern itself both with
conduct that deviates from the norm (actus reus) and with the offender’s mental state, the onus
being on the Crown to prove both  constitutional dimension to this where liability for penal neg
includes potential imprisonment.
o Modified objective test still appropriate for negligence-based criminal offences, requiring (1)
marked departure from the civil norm in the circumstances of the case (as opposed to a mere
departure in civil law – question of degree); (2) contextualized analysis of whether a reasonable
person in the position of the accused would have acted in the same way, proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
o Personal attributes (e.g. age, experience, education), except the incapacity to appreciate risk or avoid
creating it, are irrelevant.
o Conduct is measure on the reasonable person standard, put in the circumstances the accused found
himself in when the events took place; “the test is not personalized and ... remains that of a
reasonably prudent driver, but it is appropriately contextualized” (claimes to clarify Hundal).
 Actus Reus
o Measured against the wording of the statute in question
o Trier of fact must be satisfied BRD that, viewed objectively, the accused was (as the section states)
driving in a manner that was “dangerous to the public ... [in] all the circumstances.”
 Mens Rea
o Determined based on a totality of the evidence, including evidence (if any) about the accused’s state
of mind, to determine whether the conduct constitutes a “marked departure” from the standard
expected of the RP.
o Trier of fact must be satisfied BRD that the accused’s objectively dangerous conduct was
accompanied by the required mens rea, based on an objective assessment, considering all of the
evidence, that the conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable
person would take in the circumstances.
o If an explanation is offered, trier of fact must be satisfied that RP in similar circumstances ought to
have been aware of risk/danger involved in accused’s conduct.
 Application to the Case
o CA erred in finding that the trial judge falsely addressed her attention to Mr. Beatty’s “momentary
lack of attention”, since she was appropriately considering all of the circumstances, noting that there
was no evidence of improper driving prior to the crash, and finding that a momentary loss of
awareness was “insufficient evidence to support a finding of a marked departure from the standard
of care of a prudent driver.
o CA concluded too quickly that, simply because the accident occurred, the requisite mens rea existed.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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Concurring (McLachlin - SCC):
 Different view of the test for offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and different impact on
cases of momentary lapse of attention.
 Marked departure from the standard of care should be included in the actus reus (i.e. not just dangerous
operation of a vehicle, as majority suggests), as well as the mens rea of the offence
 Correct statement of the law: (1) AR requires marked departure from normal manner of driving; (2) MR
inferred from marked departure in nature of driving, based on this finding, inferred that accused lacked
requisite mental state of care of RP; (3) evidence in a particular case may negate or cast a reasonable doubt
on the inference drawn from this marked departure
 In this case, there is insufficient evidence to establish that anything more than momentary lapse of attention
occurred
 “A momentary lapse of attention without more cannot establish the actus reus and mens rea of the
offence of dangerous driving  if this is all the evidence indicates, no further inquiry into state of mind of
the accused is needed
 All that was established in this case was moentary lapse of attention, so no actus reus  acquittal.
Concurring (Fish - SCC):
 Fault element of offence is not marked departure from norms of reasonably prudent driver, but the fact that
a reasonably prudent person in the same circusmatnces would have been aware of the risk of conduct, and if
able to , acted to avert this risk.
 MR can only be inferred where impugned conduct represents marked dpeatrue from the norm, not from the
mere fact that a motor vehicle was operated dangerously (as the maj suggests).
 No marked depature here  acquittal.
Test: The “modified objective” standard test for dangerous driving can be re-stated as follows:
1. AR of the offence of dangerous driving requires dangerous operation of a motor vehicle;
2. MR requires that the dangerous driving amounted to conduct that amounted to a marked departure from the
standard of care that reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances.
Comments:
 Does away with the supposed uncertainty of majority opinions in Hundal and Creighton which outlined the
requirements of objective fault.
 A sharply divided SCC(5-3) reconsidered the mens rea for dangerous driving causing death (i.e. the same
offence discussed in Hundal).
 Nadon says that this is effectively a subjective doesn’t test, but the court go so far as admitting that it is...
R v Roy, 2012 SCC 26 (external source)
 L’actus reus réside dans le fait de conduire un véhicule d’une façon dangereuse pour le public, eu égard aux
circonstances, y compris la nature et l’état du lieu, l’utilisation qui en est faite ainsi que l’intensité de la
circulation à ce moment ou raisonnablement prévisible dans ce lieu : al. 249(1)a) du Code criminel.
 La mens rea réside dans le fait que le degré de diligence de l’accusé constitue un écart marqué par rapport à
la norme de diligence que respecterait une personne raisonnable dans la même situation (Beatty, par. 43). Le
degré de diligence que manifeste l’accusé est apprécié par rapport à la norme de diligence que respecterait
un conducteur raisonnablement prudent dans la même situation. L’infraction ne sera établie que si le degré
de diligence dont a fait preuve l’accusé constitue un écart marqué par rapport à cette norme. Bien que la
distinction entre un simple écart par rapport à la norme pouvant engager la responsabilité civile et un écart
marqué justifiant une sanction pénale soit une affaire de degré, le manque de diligence doit être
suffisamment grave pour mériter d’être puni (par. 48).
R. c. Bélanger, 2013 CSC 7 (external source)
Historique : le ministère public se pourvoit à l’encontre d’un arrêt de la CAQ qui a infirmé le jugement de
première instance et acquitté l’intimé de l’infraction d’avoir conduit son véhicule à moteur de façon dangereuse
et d’avoir causé ainsi des lésions corporelles à Michel Bisson et la mort de Michel Rostand, le tout en
contravention de l’art 249 du CC.
Raisonnement (CSC – Wagner):
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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
Il est acquis que le dépassement sur une ligne double ne suffit pas en soi pour établir la responsabilité
criminelle de l’intimé sans appréciation de toutes les circonstances de l’espèce.
 La juge de première instance n’a commis aucune erreur déterminante en concluant à la culpabilité de
l’intimé. Elle a tenu compte des facteurs pertinents et de toutes les circonstances.
 En conséquence, la CA n’était pas justifiée d’intervenir.
Décision: Pour ces motifs, l’appel est accueilli. L’arrêt de la CAQ est infirmé, le jugement de la CQ est rétabli et
le dossier est renvoyé à la CQ pour les plaidoiries sur la peine.
Salame v R, 2010 QCCA 64 (external source)
Mauvaise application du test.
IV. Constitutional Considerations (482)


S. 7 of the Charter established that some level of fault is require prior to the loss of liberty by an accused
person (Re B.C. Motor Vehicule and Pontes, 482).
But, the Court has only held that murder, attempted murder and war crime have enough stigma to
constitutionnaly require proof of subjective fault in relation to all aspects of the prohibited act (Roach, 489)”
Vaillancourt v The Queen, 1987 (703)
Ratio: Since it would be possible for a conviction of murder to occur under s. 213, despite the jury having a
reasonable doubt as to whether the accused ought to have known that the death was likely to ensue – s. 7 and s.
11(d) of the Charter are violated. Must then look to whether could be saved by s.1.
Facts:
 Vaillancourt was convicted of 2nd degree murder following a trial before a Session Court judge and jury in
Mtl. He appealed and his appeal was dismissed and conviction affirmed. Before SCC – he has challenged the
const validity of s. 213(d) alone and in combination with s. 21(2) under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
o Appellant and accomplice – armed robbery in a pool hall
o Appellant armed with a knife and his accomplice with a gun.
o Struggle btn client and accomplice. A shot was fired and accomplice was killed.
o Appellant testified that, at the time of the robbery, he was certain that the gun was unloaded.
 S.213 (now s.230) of the CC (constructive murder) made it possible for an individual to be convicted of
murder who did not necessarily foresee the subjective likelihood of death.
Issue:
1. “Is s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code inconsistent with the provisions of either s.7 or s. 11(d) of the Charter, and
therefore, of no force or effect?” (703)
2. “If not, is the combination of s. 21 and s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code inconsistent with the provisions of
either s.7 or s. 11(d) of the Charter and is s. 21 of the Criminal Code therefore of no force or effect in the case
of a charge under s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code?” (703)
Holding: S. 213(d) is struck out and not saved by s.1 of the Charter.
Raisonnement (Lamer - SCC):
 Does not find it necessary or advisable to deal with s. 21(2) in this appeal.
 Since BC Motor Vehicle Reference – s.7 is not just limited to the procedural
 Many crimes that rely on an objective standard of fault, or even causal link between action and result
o *Whatever the minimum mens rea for the act or result may be, there are, though very few in number,
certain crimes where, because of the special nature of the stigma attached to a conviction… the
principles of fundamental justice require a mens rea reflecting the particular nature of the crime. For
murder, we need a subjective mental element.
o “S. 213 has substituted for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of obj foreseeability, if that is the
essential element, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of certain forms of intentional dangerous conduct
causing death. The question is therefore, can Parliament make this substitution without violating ss. 7
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
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and 11(d)” (706).
Acid test: would it be possible for a conviction for murder to occur under s.213 despite the jury
having a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused ought to have known that death was likely to
ensure? If yes then it violates s.7 and 11(d). If the answer were no then it would be necessary to
decide whether objective foreseeability is sufficient for murder conviction.
o FOR THAT REASON: s. 213 prima facie violates ss. 7 and 11(d).
 Not saved under s.1.: Test for whether it is saved by s.1?
1. Is the obj sufficiently important? YES. Parliament intended to deter the use or carrying of a weapon
in the commission of certain offences, because of the increased risk of death.
2. Rationally connected to the obj? YES. “Indiscriminately punishing for murder all those who cause a
death by using or carrying a weapon, whether the death was intentional or accidental, might well be
thought to discourage use and the carrying of weapons” (707).
3. Minimally impairing? NO. Unnecessarily impairs the charter right. It unduly impair the rights and
freedoms in question; it is not necessary to convict of murder persons who did not intend or foresee
the death and who could not have foreseen the death. If Parliament wants to discourage use of
weapons during dangerous acts, then legislate on that instead.
Dissidence (La Forest) :
 Would dispose of appeal in way proposed by Lamer J.
 In agreement with Lamer J that “because of the stigma attached to a conviction for murder, the rpciniples of
fundamental justice require a mens rea reflecting the particular nature of that crime, namely one referable to
causing death” (708)
 S. 213(d): “all it requires is an intention to commit another crime and to possess a weapon while carrying out
this intention or in fleeing afterwards. The provision is so broad that under it a person may be found guilty of
murder even though the death was the result of an accident” (708)
 Like Lamer J argues: “the obj of discouraging the use of weapons in the commission of crimes can be
achieved by means other than attaching the stigma of a conviction for murder to a person who has caused
death in the circumstances like those described in the provision” (708).
Concurring (Beetz):
 Agrees with Lamer and La Forest that “s. 213(d) of Code does not conform to principles of fund justice in the
Charter and cannot be saved by s. 1. Also agree that the provision violates s. 11(d) and cannot be justified by
s. 1” (708).
 “Given these conclusions, I do not find it necessary to decide whether there exists a principle of fundamental
justice that a conviction for murder cannot rest on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
subjective foresight” (708).
Dissenting (McIntyre):
 The issue is not that the accused should not have been convicted of a serious crime deserving of severe
punishment, but simply that Parliament should not have chosen to call that crime “murder”. This would have
been constitutional if it was classified as manslaughter.
 While it may be illogical to characterize an unintentional killing as murder, no principle of justice is offended.
R. v. Munro and Munro: Martin J.A. said “This legislation has frequently been criticized as being harsh, but
that is a matter for parliament and not for the courts” (CB 709).
 Would dismiss the appeal and answer the 2 constitutional questions in the negative.
o
R v Martineau, 1990 (711)
Ratio: Proof of subjective foresight of death is necessary in order to sustain a conviction for murder and that s.
213(a) “of the Criminal Code violated the Charter since it did not embrace this requirement” (714).
Facts: The accused and a companion robbed a trailer. After the robbery, the companion killed the occupants of the
trailer contrary to what the accused had intended.
Issue: : Is s. 230(a) [another felony-murder provision] unconstitutional?
Holding: Yes, with dissent. Court struck down s.213(a). The deceased were deliberately shot by Martineau during
a robbery. Cannot be saved by s.1. – violates ss. 7 and 11(d).
Majority (Lamer + 4 - SCC)
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
S. 213 (now s. 230) – “expressly removes from the Crown the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused had subjective foresight of death. This section stands as an anomaly as regards the other
murder provisions, especially in light of the cml presumption against convicting a person of a true crime w/o
proof of intent or recklessness” (711).
 The effect of s. 213: “to violate the principle that punishment must be proportionate to the moral
blameworthiness of the offender, --- the fundamental principle of a morally based system of law that those
causing harm intentionally be punished more severely than those causing harm unintentionally” (711).
 “The rationale underlying the principle that subj foresight of death is required before a person is labeled and
punished as a murderer is linked to the more general principle that crim liability for a particular result is not
justified except where the actor possesses a culpable mental state in respect of that result” (711).
 Murder carries with it the most sever stigma and punishment of any crime in our society.
 In a free and democratic society that values the autonomy and free will of the individual, the stigma and
punishment attaching to the most serious crimes, murder, should be reserved for those who choose to
intentionally cause death or who choose to inflict bodily harm that they know is likely to cause death.
 It cannot be saved under s. 1 – it unduly impairs charter rights.
 “To label and punish a person as a murderer who did not intend or foresee death unnecessarily stigmatizes and
punishes those whose moral blameworthiness is not that of a murderer, and thereby, unnecessarily impairs the
rights guaranteed by ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In my view then, s. 213(a), indeed all of s. 213, cannot be
saved by s. 1 of the Charter” (712).
Dissidence (L’Heureux-Dubé):
 Vaillancourt not good because all that stuff that was said about “subjective mental element” is obiter that was
endorsed only by 4/8 judges
 When determining fault, we have to look at both the AR and MR – otherwise, everything devolves into
exclusive examination of the accused’s own asserted intentions.
 Concentration on social “stigma” is in many cases completely inapplicable – it is a case of misplaced
compassion. “If the apprehension is that the offenders in question will suffer from their “murder” label, I
suspect they will fare little better tagged as “manslaughters”. Accidental killings cannot, after Vaillancourt,
result in murder prosecutions. Only killings resulting from circumstances in which death is, at a minimum,
objectively foreseeable will be prosecuted under s. 213(a)” (713). Vaillancourt – we need at least objective
foreseeability
 There is objective foreseeability here – so this does not violate s.7 or s.11(d) of the Charter. The objective
foreseeability of death test is consgtitutionally valid.
 “Striking down the legislation simply because some other scheme may be preferable would be an unwarranted
intrusion into Parliament’s prerogative, and would undermine the means it has chosen to protect its citizens”
(713).
Dissidence (Sophinka J): Also struck down the section but on the basis that it does not even require objective
foreseeability of death – would have wanted to limit the court’s decision to a narrower holding: “overbroad
statements of principle are inimical to the tradition of incremental development of the cml. Likewise, the
development of law under the Charter is best served by deciding cases before the courts, not by anticipating the
results of future cases” (713).
Comments: Parliament has responded to a certain extent to the Court’s decisions in this area “by enacting a
number of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.” (714) – i.e. s. 236 – establishes a min sentence of 4 years
imprisonment for manslaughter committed with the use of a firearm.
V. Mistake of Fact (491)


In criminal law, mistake of facts is a difficult concept to categorize. It is a defense, but unlike most, it is not
affirmative in nature. Rather, successfully raising this defence of mistake of fact involves a negation of mens
rea.
There is no need for the accused belief to be “reasonable” as there was before the creation of subjective mens
rea offences.
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
Cases in which possession is an essential ingredient of the charge are fertile ground for a mistake-of-fact
defence. This is because such cases require subjective mens rea; knowledge as to the illicit nature of the
thing possessed, be it a narcotic or stolen property (491).
Beaver v The Queen, 1957 (491)
Ratio: Mistake of fact in possession charges – In a criminal case there is no possession of a forbidden substance
unless the accused has the knowledge of the character of the forbidden substance.
Facts: “The accused was convicted of 2 counts: possession of morphine and trafficking in morphine, contrary to
the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act.” (491)
Issue: Did Beaver have knowledge of the possession of an illegal drug?
Holding: NO. The conviction for possession is quashed. but conviction for selling is affirmed.
Reasoning (Cartwright - Rand and Locke concurring):
 Cartwright J. acquitted an accused found in possession of an illegal drug because the accused thought that
the substance was harmless sugar of milk.
 “The essence of the crime is the possession of the forbidden substance and in a criminal case there is in law
no possession without knowledge of the character of the forbidden substance” (492).
 The conviction for having possession is quashed, but conviction for selling is affirmed.
Dissent (Fauteuxwith Abott J) :
 Two dissenting judges said that Parliament wanted it to be an absolute liability.
 “Concluded that the offences charged did not require proof of knowledge of the nature of the substance
possessed and therefore did not address mistake of fact” (493).
Comments: Limit of mistake of fact: Where the accused is mistaken as to the drug but it is still a forbidden
substance. If this is the case can still be convicted (493) (Kundeus + Blondin).
Pappajohn v The Queen, 1980 (498)
Facts: The accused was convicted of rape. The majority “concluded that, given the diametrically opposing
accounts offered by the accused and the complainant – the defence of mistake of fact did not arise”. However
the court agreed that the defence of mistake of fact could work on the right facts, regardless of reasonable
grounds for the mistake.
Reviewed mistake of fact historically (Dickson - SCC):
 Mistake is a defence: “where it prevents an accused from having the mens rea which the law requires for the
very crime with which he is charged.” (494).
 Mistake of fact: more accurately seen as a negation of guilty intention than as the affirmation of a positive
defence. “It avails an accused who acts innocently, pursuant to a flawed perception of the facts, and
nonetheless commits the actus reus of an offence. Mistake is a defence though in the sense that it is raised
as an issue by an accused” (494).
 The SCC agreed on the conceptual nature of the defence, by holding that it does not have to be reasonable,
only that it is honest (which was later corrected legislatively by requiring judges to instruct the jury on the
reasonableness of the belief). The SCC also disagreed on the application of the defence.
Dissidence: Jury should have been instructed to consider the defence.
Majority: There should be something more than the accused’s assertion that he believed the complainant
consented to justify instructing the jury on the mistaken belief defence.
Comments:
 Papajohn became instrumental when the SCC later struck down rape-shield restrictions on the
complainant’s prior sexual activity because it hindered an accused to make full answer and defence,
especially when it came to the mistake of facts defence (R v Seaboyer, 1992).
 Mistake of fact defence then legislatively narrowed in s. 273.2, which made it unavailable when there is
“self-induced intoxication” or “recklessness or wilful blindness”, or “the accused did not take reasonable
steps… to ascertain that the complainant was consenting”.
 This was later narrowed further in Sansregret by holding that an accused is presumed to have guilty
knowledge of the absence of consent when, knowing the need for inquiry as to consent, he remained
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







ignorant  wilful blindness!.
Honest (and reasonable?) mistake: it must not be reasonable as a general proposition. The honest belief
std is what was set out in Beaver.
Morgan: four Law Lords agreed that “having accepted the mental element of knowledge as to consent, it is
inconsistent to attach a std of reasonableness to a defence of honest belief” (496).
Case of Rape: Look to the mind of the accused not to the mind of the reasonable man. Practically the
defence of mistake will likely only be believed if the mistake is reasonable.
Reasonableness is important in determining the weight of the defence: “although ‘reasonable grounds’ is not
a precondition to the availability of a plea of honest belief in consent, those grounds determine the weight to
be given the defence. The reasonableness, or otherwise, of the accused’s belief is only evidence for, or
against, the view that the belief was actually held and the intent was therefore lacking” (498)
It is a rare day that a jury is satisfied to the existence of an unreasonable belief: “If the claim of mistake does
not raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt, and all other elements of the crime have been proved, then the trier
of fact will not give effect to the defence. But, if there is any evidence that there was such an honest belief,
regardless of whether it is reasonable, the jury must be entrusted with the task of assessing the credibility of
the plea” (498).
Parliament: “ultimately intervened and legislated a requirement that in order to rely on a mistaken belief in
consent an accused person must have taken “reasonable steps in the circumstances known to the accused at
the time, to ascertain that the complaint was consenting” (s.273.2(b)) (498) – this type of legislative
provision serves to combine subj and obj fault elements.
Sault Ste Marie, 1978: an offence based on negligence would afford a defence of mistake of fact, but
subject to a reasonableness requirement.
Dickson J: “the defence will be available if the accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts
which, if true, would render the act or omission innocent, if he took all reasonable steps to avoid the
particular event” (498).
R v Bailey, 2006 ABPC 47 (external source)
Résumé de l’erreur de fait.
[87] In view of the complex analysis I will summarize my findings and analysis in point form:
 An accused can be convicted of any offence charged or an included offence arising out of the same
transaction. In this transaction the accused allegedly assaulted the complainant with a hammer. In addition
he allegedly punched the complainant while the latter was on the ground. The possible verdicts are: guilty of
assault with a weapon, guilty of assault, or not guilty.
 The Crown is relying upon the definition of assault found in s. 265(1)(a) to prove the offence or included
offence. Thus, the Crown must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of
the offence is that the assault took place "without the consent" of the person assaulted. In this instance the
Crown has failed to prove that the assault happened "without the consent" of the complainant.
 In addition, the Crown must prove that the accused did not have an honest but mistaken belief in
consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
 Consent of the complainant or an honest but mistaken belief in such consent will not provide a defence
where consent is vitiated on public policy grounds. Here, the consent was not vitiated on public policy
grounds.
 Since the Crown has failed to prove an element of assault the accused cannot be found guilty of the offence
charged of assault with a weapon, or the included offence of assault.
 The Crown has not proven that the accused was not acting in self defence pursuant to s. 34(1) when he
wielded the hammer. Hence he must be acquitted of assault with a weapon because he was justified in using
the hammer as he did.
 The accused was not justified by s. 34(1) in punching the complainant. However, he still is not guilty
because of failure of Crown to prove an assault as explained above.
CHAPTER EIGHT : IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (501-524)
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
62
S. 19 CC
Ignorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that offence.
I. Mistaken Beliefs about the Law and Particular Fault Elements (502)


La distinction entre l’erreur de fait et l’erreur de droit est très mince.
On ne peut pas plaider l’ignorance, mais dans cetrtaines circonstances cela peut faire partie des faits.
R v Howson, 1966 (502)
Ratio: Exceptions to s. 19 – no MR.
Facts: L’employé d’un service de remorquage a été accusé de vol alors qu’il refusait de rendre le véhicule
remorqué à son propriétaire tant que celui-ci n’aurait pas payé certains frais.
History: Appelant Howson a été reconnu coupable au procès et fait appel de la décision.
Issue: L’accusé a-t-il commis une erreur sincère et honnête en croyant pouvoir retenir le véhicule? Oui, acquitté.
Raisonnement (Ontario Court of Appeal):
 Absence de mens rea : l’accusé agissait dans le cadre de l’entreprise familiale et avait donc une apparence
de droit sur le véhicule.
 Il est reconnu qu’il n’avait aucunement l’intention de voler le véhicule.
R v Docherty, 1989 (503)
Ratio: Exceptions to s. 19 – no MR.
Facts: Accusation de bris des conditions de libération conditionnelle. Il a plaidé coupable aux accusations de
conduite en état d’ébriété. L’ordonnance de libération conditionnelle indiquait qu’il devait « garder la paix et se
comporter convenablement ». L’accusé a témoigné qu’il ne savait pas qu’il violait la loi dépassant 80mg
d’alcool pour 100ml de sang. Il a été trouvé dans un parking et le véhicule ne pouvait être démarré.
Issue: L’accusé a-t-il commis une erreur sincère et honnête en croyant qu’il ne contrevenait pas aux conditions
de sa libération ? Oui, acquitté.
Raisonnement (SCC):
 Le crime consistant à contrevenir à une ordonnance doit être volontaire au moment de la décision 
exception au s. 19.
 Absence de mens rea : l’accusé qui ne sait pas qu’il commet un crime en contrevenant à l’ordonnance de
libération conditionnelle ne peut pas avoir l’intention de commettre ce crime
 L’actus reus (le fait d’être en contrôle d’un véhicule sous l’influence de l’alcool) ne permet pas d’inférer
l’une intention de contrevenir à l’ordonnance de libération.
 Lorsque la connaissance est une composante de la mens rea, l’absence de connaissance constitue une
défense.
Comments: Le Parlement a changé l’article de contr.
Jones and Pamajewon v The Queen, 1991 (504)
Ratio: Ignorance of the law is no defence. Erreur honnête et raisonnable?
Facts: Accusation d’administration d’un bingo illégal en contravention de l’art 206 CC. Les accusés sont
membres d’une bande Amérindienne, et étaient informée par la police de la nécessité d’avoir une licence
provinciale. Ils ont cependant déclaré avoir renoncé aux juridictions fédérales et provinciales sur le jeu et avoir
émis leurs propres licences.
History: Condamné au procès, appel rejeté, appel auprès de la CSC.
Issue: Les accusés ont-ils commis une erreur sincère et honnête en croyant que le CC ne s’appliquait pas sur leur
réserve?
Holding: Appel rejeté. L'accusé est coupable.
Raisonnement (CSC):
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
63


L’art 19 CC dispose que l’ignorance de la loi n’est pas une excuse.
La défense d’erreur de fait ne s’applique pas aux accusations émies; s’il y a eu erreur, c’est une erreur de
droit et non de fait.
 Même si la Charte reconnaissait l’erreur de fait comme défense, l’erreur consistant à croire que les lois
fédérales ne s’appliquent pas sur les réserves est une erreur de droit.
 La jurisprudence soumise ne s’applique pas et concerne des erreurs pour apparence de droit.
Commentaire : Après Pamajewon, on dit que l’erreur n’avait pas à être raisonnable. Mais on a réformé le CC
depuis.
II. Erreur de fait et erreur de droit (505)
R v Prue and Baril, 1979 (505)
Ratio: Knowledge of licence suspension = mistake of fact, not law
Résumé: La majorité de la CS décide que l’absence de connaissance chez l’accusé du fait que son permis a été
automatiquement suspendu par l’effet de la loi provinciale suite à une contravention routière constitue une
« erreur de fait » et pas de droit, sous le rapport de l’art 238 (conduite sans permis, maintenant 259(4)).
Raisonnement (SCC): Qu’il y ait eu notification ou pas, la question de savoir si un permis est suspendu est une
question de fait.
Dissidence (Ritchie et Pigeon): la question est est celle des mesures de notification qui ont été prises. Ici,
l’ignorance est due non pas à une erreur de fait. mais à une ignorance de la loi sur les véhicules motorisés (s.
86D) emportant suspension automatique du permis.
R v MacDougall, 1982 (504)
Ratio: Pre-Charter – Knowledge of licence suspension – mistake of law.
Facts: Accusation de conduite d’un véhicule motorisé alors que le permis a été annulé relativement à l’art 258(2)
de la loi sur les véhicules motorisés. L’accusé a reçu un « ordre de révocation du permis », puis, après avoir
appelé de cette décision, une « note of reinstatement » . L’appel a par la suite été rejeté et l’accusé en était
informé par son avocat. L’accusé a témoigné qu’il pensait pouvoir conduire jusqu’à réception de la révocation
finale.
History: Acquitté au procès, appel rejeté, appel auprès de la Cour Suprême de Nouvelle Ecosse.
Holding: Appel admis. Nouveau procès.
Raisonnement (Jugement unanime - SCC): Il s’agit d’une erreur de droit :
 La suspension du permis est une question de fait relativement à l’application du CC (Prue et Baril).
 Cependant, une distinction peut être faite entre l’application du CC et l’application des règlements
provinciaux.
 L’ignorance de ce que la loi provinciale a pour effet de suspendre le permis, y compris lors des procédures
d’appel, est une erreur de droit (!).
Comments:
 The SCC in R v Pontes disapproved of MacDougall, stressing that it was decided pre-Charter, but they still
didn’t follow Prue and Baril, as they characterized the accused’s lack of knowledge of a licence suspension
as a mistake of law, not fact!
 Difficult to determine how courts will distinguish between mistake of law/fact...
III. The Defence of Officialy Induced Error (506)
La défense peut seulement être soulevée lorsque la personne est déjà trouvé coupable. La défenser doit prouver
selon la prépondérance des probabilités qu’elle ne s’applique pas.

S’applique autant aux infractions pénales qu’aux infractions criminelles (Jorgensen), même si cela est plus
rare dans le deuxième cas.
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C’est une question d’équité, car il ne serait pas juste que l’état vous suggère de faire une chose et vous
réprime pour cela de l’autre côté.
Cette défense ne permet pas d’être acquitté, mais mène seulement à un arrêt des procédures.
Elle arrive seulement si la personne serait reconnu coupable. Donc, elle est évaluée à la fin du procès.
Six critères, même s’il doivent être consédérés globalement, que l’accusé doit prouver selon la
prépondérance des preuves (Lévis v Tétrault):
1. Erreur de droit
2. La personne doit avoir considéré les conséquences de ses gestes
3. L’opinion juridique doit avoir été donnée par un fonctionnaire responsable (il n’y a pas la même
force si c’est une secrétaire que si c’est un cadre)
4. L’avis juridique doit être raisonnable
5. L’avis doit être erroné
6. La personne doit avori agis selon l’avis juridique
La Cour suprême a pris du temps pour reconnaître cette défense, car elle ne veut pas qu’il y ait des abus.
The defence of « officially induced error » is available as a defence to an alleged violation of a regulatory
statute where an accused has reasonably relied upon the erroneous legal opinion or advice of an official who
is responsible for the administration or enforcement of the particular law.
Must be demonstrated that the accused relied on the erroneous legal opinion of the official and that this
reliance was reasonable (i.e. as based on what he did to ascertain the proper law, complexity or obscurity of
the law, position of official who gave advice, clarity, definitiveness and reasonableness of advice given) (R v
Cancoil Thermal Corporation and Parkinson, 507).
Molis v The Queen, 1980 (506)
Ratio: Defence of due diligence inapplicable for mistake of law.
Facts: Accusation de trafic de stupéfiants (MDMA) en contravention du Food and Drugs Act. La MDMA n’était
pas interdite lorsque l’accusé a entrepris la fabrication, mais son interdiction a fait l’objet d’une publication dans
la Gazette Canada. L’accusé soumet qu’il a fait preuve de diligence pour se renseigner sur l’état du droit et qu’il
n’était pas au courant.
History: Le juge a refusé de laisser cette défense au jury et l’a condamné. La CS a maintenu le jugement.
Holding: Condamné.
Raisonnement (Lamer - SCC): Le standard de diligence ne s’applique pas quant à l’ignorance de la loi mais
seulement à propos de l’exécution d’un devoir imposé par la loi.
Comments: Cela ferait-il une différence si Mollis a lu le droit lui-même ou s’est renseigné auprès d’un avocat?
Forster v The Queen, 1992 (506)
Holding: Lamer se réaffirme lui-même Molis.
Raisonnement (SCC):
 Une erreur sincère et honnête quant aux conséquences juridiques d’un acte délibéré n’est pas une défense.
 La connaissance des conséquences juridiques d’un acte délibéré ne fait pas partie des éléments nécessaires
de la mens rea et l’absence de connaissance ne constitue donc pas une défense.
R v Cancoil Thermal Corporation and Parkinson, 1986 (507)
Ratio: Approval of defence of officially induced error
Facts: Un inspecteur a examiné, avec approbation apparente, une pièce de machine nouvelle mais défectueuse
dans une usine.
History: La CA Ont a autorisé la défense d’erreur induite par un fonctionnaire.
Raisonnement (Ont CA):
 Citant MacDougall, tant que l’erreur de droit n’est pas reconnue comme une défense en droit criminel, la
défense d’erreur induite par un fonctionnaire devrait être reconnue; yet, there was no proof of error induced
by an official in that case
 *L’erreur de droit induite par un fonctionnaire constitue une défense lorsque l’accusé s’est appuyé de façon
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raisonnable sur une opinion ou un conseil juridique erroné émis par un représentant responsable de
l’administration ou de l’application de la loi en question.
The accused must demonstrate :
o Qu’il s’est appuyé sur l’opinion émise (reliance),
o Et que cet appui était raisonnable…ce qui dépend de…
 Les mesures prises pour vérifier le droit;
 La complexité et l’obscurité de la loi;
 La position du représentant ayant émis l’opinion;
 La clarté, le caractère définitif, et le caractère raisonnable de l’opinion émise.
o Le fardeau repose sur l’accusé, à la prépondérance des probabilités.
En l’espèce, l’erreur induite par un fonctionnaire a été démontrée.
L’erreur induite par un fonctionnaire est reconnue en droit criminel canadien.
R v Jorgensen, 1995 (508)
Ratio: Suspension of proceedings for defence of officially induced error (as opposed to due diligence).
Facts: Accusation sous art 163(2), vente de pornographie juvénile.
Holding: Suspension des procédures judiciaires - “(h)ad the appellants had the requisite mens rea for this
offence, they would be entitled to a judicial stay of proceedings as a result of officially induced error (513).
Raisonnement (SCC – Lamer):
1. L’accusé vendait-il « knowingly/sciemment » de la pornographie obscène/juvénile?
o La Couronne doit prouver que le vendeur accusé connaissait les actes ou faits pouvant conduire la Cour à
conclure à vente de matériel obscène.
o La preuve de cette connaissance ne doit pas aller jusqu’à une connaissance « en droit », et ne
requière pas que le vendeur ait visionné le matériel – il y a d’autres façons de savoir s’il s’agit de
matériel obscène.
o L’approbation du Ontario Film Review Board n’annule pas la mens rea pour ce crime.
2. Le faisait-il « sans justification ou excuse »?
a. En revanche, l’approbation par l’OFRB permet de soulever une excuse d’erreur de droit induite par
un fonctionnaire (i.e. there was an offence, with actus reus and mens rea, but a defence of mistake
of fact can be raised).
b. *Cela n’annule pas la mens rea, mais la confiance raisonnable placée dans ce type d’opinion
officielle est suffisante pour suspendre les procédures judiciaires. L’ORFB est un représentant
officiel adéquat.
3. Due diligence versus Officially Induced Error:
o Defence of officially induced error different from defence of due diligence; showing due diligence
in ascertainting the law does not excuse, whereas reasonable reliance on erroneous official advice
will excuse an accuse, but not negative culpability.
o In appropriate circumstances, due diligence is a full defence, which means that elements of the
offence were not completed.
o On the other hand, officially induced error means that there was culpability, but it functions like
entrapment, as an excuse for an accused whom the Crown has proven to have committed an offence.
o Diligence may be required for a defence of officially induced error, but does not turn it into a
defence of due diligence.
o Officially induced error will often come into play for regulatory offences, but can also be used for
“true crimes” with a full mens rea component (although the chance of success of this defence for
some crimes is unlikely)
*Test:
1. Was the error one of law or of mixed law and fact? If it’s an error of law, no need for defence, as this can be
excused based on mistake of fact (e.g. Beaver v The Queen);
2. If it’s determined to be an error of law, must demonstrate that an accused considered the legal consequences
of her actions, i.e. considering whether conduct may be illegal and seeking advice accordingly.
3. Demonstrate that the advice obtained came from appropriate official – e.g. those involved in the
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administration of the law in question—someone who in the position of accused would reasonable consider
responsible for particular law in question (but no closed list given), determined on the circumstances of the
case, and on common sense.
4. Demonstrate that the advice was reasonable in the circumstances, and erroneous (but this doens’t need to be
demonstrated by accused).
5. Demonstrate reliance on this official, erroneous advice.
Comments: Officially induced error is an EXCUSE and NOT a full defence! It can be raised only after the
Crown has proven all of the elements of an offence  the remedy is a halt of proceedings, rather than acquittal!
Lévis (Ville de) v Tétreault, 2006 (514)
Ratio: Approval of defence of officially induced error.
Facts: [La CS reconnaît pour la première fois, à l’unanimité, que l’erreur de droit induite par un fonctionnaire
constitue une défense en droit criminel.] Une compagnie enregistrée est accusée d’avoir opéré un véhicule pour
lequel les frais d’enregistrement n’avaient pas été payés, en contravention de l’art. 31.1 de la loi québécoise sur
la sécurité des autoroutes. La compagnie s’est basée sur la défense d’erreur de droit induite par un fonctionnaire,
plaidant qu’elle avait été avisée par un employé de la SAAQ qu’une demande de renouvèlement serait envoyée
par courrier 30 jours avant l’expiration de la licence – qui n’est jamais arrivée.
History: Acquittée en Cour municipale, où le crime était de responsabilité stricte et la compagnie avait fait
preuve de diligence. La Cour supérieure a rejeté l’appel de la Couronne et admis la défense d’erreur induite par
un fonctionnaire. La Cour d’Appel a rejeté la demande d’appel. La Couronne fait appel auprès de la CSC.
Holding: Appel admis. Condamnée.
Raisonnement (SCC):
 Cites the test for officially induced error in Jorgensen with approval, and outlines it as requiring six
elements:
1. That an error of law or of mixed law and fact was made;
2. That the person who committed the act considered the legal consequences of his or her actions;
3. That the advice obtained came from an appropriate official;
4. That the advice was reasonable;
5. That the advice was erroneous; and
6. That the person relied on the advice in committing the act
 La compagnie n’a pas fait preuve de diligence; elle savait quelle était la date d’expiration de
l’enregistrement et elle n’a pris aucune mesure pour vérifier l’état de l’enregistrement.
 Utilisant le test de Jorgensen, la compagnie n’a pas établi deux éléments essentiels :
1. La compagnie n’a pas considéré les conséquences juridiques de ses actes en cherchant conseil
auprès d’une autorité adéquate.
2. Elle n’a donc pas pu agir sur la base de l’opinion émise par un fonctionnaire.
Deux questions sur Jorgensen et Lévis :
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Est-il pertinent de comparer l’erreur de droit induite par un fonctionnaire et le entrapment pour conclure que
la sanction est l’arrêt des procédures (plutôt qu’un acquittement)?
L’accusé devrait-il avoir le fardeau d’établir la défense d’erreur induite par un fonctionnaire à la
prépondérance des probabilités? En ce qui a trait aux questions de responsabilité stricte, cela se comprend
car l’erreur induite par un fonctionnaire est liée à la diligence de l’accusé; mais lorsqu’il s’agit d’accusations
criminelles, avec une présomption de mens rea subjective, comme dans Jorgensen, pourquoi le standard
habituel de doute raisonnable ne s’appliquerait-il pas?
IV. Mistake of law and Constitutional Considerations (516)
R v Pontes, 1995 (516)
Ratio: Knowledge of licence suspension as mistake of law. The two cases are contradictory.
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Facts: Concerne les implications vis-à-vis des excuses à la suite de Re : Motor Vehicle Act et la déclaration
d’inconstitutionalité d’une peine assortie d’une possibilité d’emprisonnement basée sur une responsabilité
stricte.
Holding: Was accused’s lack of knowledge of a licence suspension characterized as a mistake of law? Yes.
Raisonnement (SCC – Cory à 5):
 Le Motor Vehicle Act a été modifié pour retirer la disposition concernant la possibilité d’emprisonnement
« automatique ».
 Cependant, l’art 92 dispose que le conducteur se verra interdit de conduire automatiquement et sans
avertissement pour une période de 12 mois, l’empêchant de soulever une défense de diligence.
 La question est de savoir si une défense de diligence est disponible pour les fins d’application de cet article.
 Avec Molis, le fait de se renseigner sur l’état du droit ne constitue pas une excuse.
 Dans MacDougall, un crime de responsabilité stricte ne peut être excusé par la diligence dont l’accusé a fait
preuve. Cependant, MacDougall entre en conflit avec Prue et Baril; de plus, c’est une décision pré-Charte.
o Prue : l’accusation ne visait pas l’application de la loi provincial mais l’art 238 du CC; du coup, la
mens rea était requise; cependant, l’ignorance de la suspension du permis était une erreur de loi
lorsque cette suspension se fait sans avertissement, ce qui constitue une défense.
o Cela entre en conflit avec MacDougall, où la seule différence est qu’il s’agit d’appliquer la loi
provinciale plutôt que le CC; dans tous les cas, l’ignorance qu’un permis est suspendu
automatiquement et sans avertissement constitue une erreur de fait.
 La Charte a pour effet d’introduire en droit criminel la notion de faute non-contributoire; lorsqu’un standard
de responsabilité est strict, la seule défense possible est celle de diligence; si l’erreur de droit n’est pas
reconnue comme défense lorsqu’un accusé ne sait pas que son permis est suspendu et que cette ignorance
est qualifiée d’erreur de droit, cela a pour effet d’annuler la possibilité même d’une défense, et cela
contrevient à l’idée même de responsabilité stricte.
 Importance de l’avertissement: il peut être donné facilement et par plusieurs moyens.
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Dissidence (SCC – Gonthier à 4) :
 Reconnaître la défense de diligence pour les crimes de responsabilité stricte revient à vider de sa substance
la règle de l’ignorance de la loi (art 19). L’art 7 de la Charte ne requière pas que cette défense soit
disponible; cela contredit également l’arrêt Molis, où le standard de diligence s’applique à l’exécution d’un
devoir légal mais pas au fait de se renseigner sur l’état du droit.
 De plus, si l’ignorance de la loi n’excuse pas, elle peut cependant être plaidée pour atténuer la sentence.
 Enfin, d’autres défenses existent et ne rendent donc pas la provision inconstitutionnelle; par exemple,
l’erreur de droit induire par un fonctionnaire.
Analyse:
 Due diligence does not serve as a defense, since as per the offence, it is issued “automatically and without
notice”. Therefore, the only excuse is Mistake of Fact BUT here that means Mistake of Law and that is no
excuse under s. 19 of the CC. A strict liability offence requires that a defense of due dil be allowed, but to
allow it here (because of the wording of the offence) is to allow ignorance of the law as an excuse.
 Therefore, the offence should be characterized as absolute liability, and imprisonment cannot be imposed as
part of the offense.
 However, because there is no threat of imprisonment as per Offences Act ss. 41 and 72, there is no conflict
here with the Charter.
CHAPTER NINE: PARTICIPATION (525-570)
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Participation concerns situations in which more than one person commits a crime.
There are four modes of participation:
o Actual commission  s. 21(1)(a).
o Aiding and abetting  s. 21(1)(b) & (c).
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o Common intention  s. 21(2).
o Counselling  s. 22.
*La personne n’est pas accusé en vertu en vertu de s. 21, mais cet article permet de l’accusé du crime auquel
elle a participé.
A person guilty of any one of these is a party to the substantive offence.
An accessory after the fact, however, is not a party to the offence but is nonetheless liable for facilitating a
party’s escape.
S. 21(1) CC
Parties to offence
(1) Every one is a party to an offence who
(a) actually commits it;
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or
(c) abets any person in committing it.
S. 21(2) CC
Article: Common intention
(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist
each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them
who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of
carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.
Comment:
1. Lorsque deux personnes ont un intérêt en commun…
a. Dans un but illégal; et
b. De s’assister dans ce but,
2. Les autres crimes commis par un des membres peuvent mené à la condamnation de l’autre si
a. Il savait que ce crime pourrait être commis
b. Il aurait du savoir que ce crime pourrait être commis
3. Et que cela était une conséquence probable
R. c. Bilodeau, 2011 QCCQ 9380
Faits:
 Le 26 janvier 2011, il y a eu perpétration d'une infraction chez Rodrigue Piquette Inc. ; des fils électriques et
fils de cuivre ont été volés ; il y a également eu sectionnement de fils de fibre optique ;
 Quant à Gaétan Bilodeau, il n'était pas sur les lieux immédiats du crime ; c'est cependant lui qui
conduisait la motoneige munie d'une remorque qui a servi à transporter la marchandise volée ;
 Le but de l'opération criminelle était le vol de cuivre ; c'est dans la recherche de cette précieuse marchandise
que les bris aux rouleaux de fibre optique furent faits.
Législation: ;e Tribunal doit appliquer l'article 21 du CC qui se lit ainsi :
 Participants à une infraction. – Participent à une infraction :
a) quiconque la commet réellement ;
b) quiconque accomplit ou omet d'accomplir quelque chose en vue d'aider quelqu'un à la commettre ;
c) quiconque encourage quelqu'un à la commettre.
 Intention commune. – Quand deux ou plusieurs personnes forment ensemble le projet de poursuivre une fin
illégale et de s'y entraider et que l'une d'entre elles commet une infraction en réalisant cette fin commune,
chacune d'elles qui savait ou devait savoir que la réalisation de l'intention commune aurait pour conséquence
probable la perpétration de l'infraction, participe à cette infraction.
Question: est-ce que Gaétan Bilodeau a participé à l’infraction? OUI, L’ACCUSÉ EST COUPABLE.
 Dans le présent dossier, la preuve a été faite hors de tout doute raisonnable que l'intention commune était de
poursuivre une fin illégale et de s'entraider pour y arriver (art. 21 (2) C.cr.), et cela même si Gaétan Bilodeau
n'a pas pénétré sur les lieux du crime. Le sectionnement des fils de fibre optique découlait directement de
l'acte principal prévu, soit le vol de cuivre.
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
L'accusé Gaétan Bilodeau était par conséquent partie au méfait commis même s'il ne l'a pas commis luimême. Il s'agissait de la poursuite d'une fin commune.
S. 22 CC
Person counselling offence
(1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offence and that other person is afterwards
a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party to that offence, notwithstanding that the offence
was committed in a way different from that which was counselled.
(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offence is a party to every offence that the other
commits in consequence of the counselling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known was
likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling.
Definition of “counsel”
(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure, solicit or incite
I. Principals: s. 21(1)(a) (526)
R v Thatcher, 1987 (526)
Ratio: Actual Commission vs. Aiding and Abetting – The jurors do not have to all agree as to whether the
accused personally committed the offence or aided and abetted the person who did; the distinction between the
two is legally irrelevant when both leads to the same consequence.
Facts: Mr. Thatcher and his wife went through an ugly and drawn-out divorce. His wife was shot at through the
window of her home during this mess, and sustained a serious injury – never found out who did it, but she gave
up custody rights to Regan after it happened. Two years later, she was found beaten and shot to death in her
garage. An eyewitness saw a man leaving the garage after hearing a woman scream, although he did not think it
was Mr. Thatcher (whom he knew). Mr. Thatcher is accused of either murdering his wife or having someone
else do it for him.
History: The trial judge did not charge the jury separately on the Crown’s two theories (personal commission by
T, or hired thug).
Issue: Does the jury have to be unanimous as to the way in which the victim was killed? NO”
Raisonnement (Dickson C.J.C): s. 21(1) CCC is designed to make the difference between aiding and
abetting and personally committing an offence legally irrelevant:
 Either mode of committing the offence is equally culpable
 Whether a person personally commits or only aids and abets, he is still guilty of that particular
offence (in this case, murder), and not some separate offence
 This contrasts with CCC provisions relating to accessories after the fact or conspirators, which create
distinct offences for involvement falling short of personal commission of the crime
 The jurors had three decisions: 1) he committed the crime himself, 2) he aided and abetted someone else to
do it, or 3) he is innocent. Both (1) and (2) have the SAME legal result, so it is not necessary to require
jurors to agree on only one option. No disagreement here as to material facts; thus, no reason to overturn
conviction.
Comment:
 Do the jurors have to be unanimous as to whether T is a principal or a participant? No. Either way, T is
guilty of the crime of first-degree murder, because if he got someone else to do it, he shared their intent
 How problematic is this conclusion at the stage of sentencing? If there is no decision as to how the accused
participated, then how can the court decide the appropriate sentence?
II. Aiding and Abetting: s. 21(1)(b) & (c) (531)
(1) la connaissance du crime commis (2) l’intention d’aider le crime (3) geste ou ommission pour aider le crime.
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Greyeyes devrait-il être être trouvé coupable de traffic? L’acheteur ne peut être accusé de traffic, mais seulement
de possession. Alors, une personne seule une personne qui aide un vendeur, et non l’acheteur, ne peut être trouvé
coupable de traffic.
R v Greyeyes, 1997 (531)
Ratio: Aiding and abetting in trafficking vs possession - It is intention, not motivation, to aid and abet in a crime
that satisfies s.21(b).
Facts: The accused Greyeyes sold marijuana to an undercover RCMP who then asked if Greyeyes knew where
he could get cocaine. G drove him to another location and coordinated the sale of $40 of cocaine. He is charged
per s. 21 as aiding and abetting the crime of drug trafficking.
Issue: Is G guilty of aiding and abetting drug trafficking?
Holding: Yes  He had culpable intention to aid and abet in the sale of illegal narcotics.
Raisonnement (L’Heureux-Dubé):
 To aid under s.21(b) means to assist the actor; to abet under s.21(c) includes encouraging, instigating,
promoting, or procuring the crime to be committed. Both require proof from the Crown that the accused had
the intent for these actions to result in a crime being committed.
 Providing crucial assistance for the completion of a sale alone is not enough to be guilty of drug trafficking,
which is a serious charge with considerable stigma. The proper charge in those circumstances is aiding and
abetting possession. It is clear that a person whose acts aid a purchaser (even if it incidentally benefits the
seller), has assisted more in the purchase rather than the sale of narcotics.
 In this case, however, the appellant located the seller, brought the buyer to the site and introduced the
parties.
o Without his assistance, the purchase never would have taken place. These are not the acts of a mere
purchase, but assistance in the traffic of narcotics.
o Contrast this to a hypothetical scenario: Ms. A wants to buy drugs, and tells her husband Mr. B that
she will have to walk through a dangerous neighbourhood unless he drives her. If he does, he is
guilty of aiding possession, but not trafficking.
 As per mens rea, there can be no doubt that the appellant knew he was assisting in the illegal sale of
narcotics and that he intended to do so. He may have been motivated solely out a desire to help the buyer
possess the drugs, but what he intended to do was facilitate the sale of narcotics.  Thus, he has capable
intention.
Le simple fait d’être présent sur la scène du crime ne peut pas dire que les accusés aidaient ou encourrageaient.
***Dunlop and Sylvester v The Queen, 1979 (537)
Ratio: Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not amount to aiding and abetting. A person cannot be
convicted as an aid or abetter in the commission of acts which he does not know may be or are intended.
Facts: A 16-year-old was gang-raped by a motorcycle gang of which the accused are members. They were
present at the scene of the crime, delivering beer. They claimed they did not rape her. They did not help her
either.
Issue: Are the two accused guilty of aiding and abetting? NO.
Raisonnement (Dickson - SCC):
 A person is not guilty because he is present at the scene of a crime and does nothing to prevent it; something
more is necessary: encouragement of the principal offender; an act which facilitates the commission of the
offence, or an act which tends to prevent or hinder interference with accomplishment of the criminal act...
 If there is no evidence of encouragement by him, a man’s presence at the scene of a crime will not
suffice to render him liable as an aider and abettor.
 Presence at the commission of an offence can be evidence of aiding and abetting if accompanied by other
factors, such as…
o Prior knowledge of the principal offender’s intention to commit the offence;
o Attendance for the purpose of encouragement.
 The crown elicited no evidence to demonstrate that the accused knew what was or would be going on. Here,
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there was no evidence of any positive action or omission to facilitate the unlawful purpose.
Commentary:
 Cf. R v Salajko: accused witnessed a gang-rape but stood by with his pants down. He was acquitted of
aiding and abetting. SCC in Kirkness said it was wrongly decided – this is encouragement, which amounts to
a substantial contribution to the crime.
 R v Popen: when the accused has a right to control the actions of another and deliberately refrains from
exercising it, his inactivity may be positive encouragement to the other to perform an illegal act and qualify
for aiding and abetting.


There is a distinction between encouragement as aiding and abetting and encouragement as counselling:
o Counselling happens before the crime, and the counsellor is generally not present when the crime is
being committed  as the accused is therefore more removed from the scene of the crime, there is a
higher standard of persuasion/encouragement necessary for a conviction as a counsellor.
o Encouragement as aiding and abetting happens at the scene of the crime  there is more proximity
to the crime itself, so the standard for what constitutes “encouragement” attracting criminal liability
is lower.
What happens when a person is charged with actual participation but claims he or she is an innocent
bystander?
R v Jackson, 2007 (542)
Ratio: Defence of mere presence inapplicable in light of contradictory evidence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for illegally producing marijuana. Police found him sleeping in a tent at a
remote marijuana farm where there was no other obvious activity, along with four others.
Issue: Is he guilty of producing marijuana? YES.
Raisonnement (Fish - SCC):
o Mere presence at a crime scene in circumstances consistent with innocence will not support a conviction.
o Here, however, the cornerstone (but not the entirety) of evidence suggests that the accused’s prolonged and
unexplained presence on the marijuana plantation negates this defence.
Comments:
 In R v Nixon, a senior officer in charge of Vancouver police lockup was convicted with aggravated assault
when a prisoner was beaten by guards after giving a fasle name, because he failed to discharge his duty to
act to prevent the beating, on the basis of more than the “mere presence” noted in Dunlop and Sylvester.
 In R v Popen the father was charged with manslaughter after the beating of the wife caused the death of the
child. The jury convicted, but the CA of Ontario sent it back to trial, saying that therew as no evidence that
the appellant had done or omitted to do anything for the purpose of aiding his wife to inflict injuries on the
child. Although, it did know that he could on the evidence potentially be convicted of criminal negligence
because was evidence of a long history of mistreatment, which he did nothing about, despite his “legal duty
at common law to take reasonable steps to protect his child from illegal violence.”  failure to act
constituted more than “mere presence”  Independently guilt of manslaughter, distinct from wife’s offence.
R v Helsdon, 2007 (545)
Ratio: Mens rea of aiding and abetting - The accused must have a subjective knowledge of the existence of the
crime being committed in order to be guilty of aiding and abetting its commission.
Facts: Helsdon, a newspaper reporter, was charged with aiding a publisher (Annex) in breaching a publication
ban by publishing the name of a complainant in a sexual assault case.
Issue: Did Helsdon have the mens rea to be guilty of aiding in violating the publication ban? NO.
Raisonnement (O’Connor - ONCA):
 S. 21(b) requires that an accused do or omit to do something for the purpose of aiding another to commit an
offence. This creates a high subjective standard, as it requires the accused to know that the action or omission
would lead to the commission of an offence. (this is an essential element of the offence)
 The Crown argued that if the accused must have a subjective level of mens rea that it would effectively leave
all members of the media exempt from liability for breaching the ban. This does not matter. The legislature
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


wrote the CC carefully and narrowly on purpose, requiring that an accused do or omit to do something for
the purpose of aiding another to commit an offence notion of objective mental element is inconsistent with
the expressed requirement of “purpose”
The normal meeting of “purpose” or “intention” suggests that a person must subjectively advert to a specific
objective and that he or she, therefore, must have knowledge of the facts that constitute that objective (the
crime).
Here, the accused didn’t know about the ban, and thus cannot have had the mens rea to intentionally aid the
publisher to commit the offence.
The mens rea requirement for the aider is higher than for the principal. The principal is held to an objective
standard, and rightfully so. (This is appropriate, since the aider and abettor didn’t actually commit the
offence)
R v Palombi, 2007 (550)
Ratio: MR of aiding and abetting is more than knowledge of crime; must be done with intent of aiding/abetting Knowledge of a crime alone is not enough to be a party to it; there must be sufficient mens rea that the accused
had the intent of aiding or assisting in the crime’s commission.
Facts: Ten days after the appellant and her partner brought their infant son home from the hospital, physicians
discovered evidence of abuse. Evidence suggested that the injuries must have come from one of the partners, as
no one else had an opportunity to be with the child. The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and
failing to provide necessities of life. It is unknown whether she was charged as a principal or a party.
Issue: Did the mother have the requisite mens rea for the crime of abuse?
Holding: No. Appeal allowed and new trial ordered
Raisonnement (Cory & Iacobucci - ON Court of Appeal):
 Given the evidence, it is clear that the actus reus was easily found. At the very least, the appellant did
something by not protecting her child that had the effect of encouraging or assisting her co-accused in the
assault of the child.
 The jury needed to understand that it was not enough that she knew about the abuse, but that she encouraged
or assisted it by failing to act.
 The instructions given to the jury would not have clearly required this mens rea requirement. They would
have only had the belief that they could find the appellant guilty as a party of she knew her acts were likely
to encourage or assist her partner or if she intended to aid or abet him. But knowledge alone cannot
constitute the mens rea needed.
 Once the jury decided that the child had been abused, the real question was whether the appellant or her
partner had the requisite intent for party liability.
 There is not enough evidence to suggest that the jury would have inevitably found that the appellant had the
mens rea for party liability if the instructions had been more clear; therefore, there must be a new trial.
Il faut prouver que la mère qui a laissée la père maltraiter l’enfant doit avoir l’intention de l’aider ou de
l’encourager.
III. Common Intention: s. 21(2) (553)
Question potentielle d’exmen.




Test: (1) l’intention de participer au crime principal (3) acte ou ommission pour encourager le crime
principal (3) la connaissance/aveuglement volontaire du crime secondaire
This provision is for crimes that occur in the course of other crimes:
o The common intention refers to the main crime;
o The participation is imputed with respect to the secondary crime.
Meurtre: ce n’est pas « aurait du savoir » mais « savait ».
Défense: puisque la couronne doit prouver hors de tout doute raisonnable, l’accusé peux utiliser la défense
de l’abandon pour soulever un doute raisonnable. Le degré nécessaire pour prouver l’abandon dépend de
l’implication de l’accusé dans le crime :
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o
o
o
Dire au complice qu’il abandonne; ou
Dire au complice qu’il abandonne et se retirer du geste; ou
Dire au complice qu’il abandonne, se retirer du geste et empêcher qu’il soit commis.
*R v. Kirkness 1990, (553)
Ratio: Test for common intention.
Facts: Kirkness and his friend Snowbird were out drinking, when his friend suggested that they break into an
elderly woman’s house. Snowbird then sexually assaulted her while K remained outside and put a chair against
the front door, and stole objects from the house. Snowbird then put the woman in the hall, starting strangling her,
and then put a plastic bag over her head in the bathtub and ran the hot water.
Issue: Is the accused guilty of either murder or manslaughter, as having a common intention for the crimes of
sexual assault and murder that followed the initial break and enter?
Holding: Jury misadvised. New trial ordered.
Raisonnement (Wilson - SCC):
o To establish liability under s. 21(2) “common intention”:
1. The first step in establishing liability under s. 21(2) is to show that the accused formed an intention
in common with others to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist them in achieving that
purpose  need SHARED INTENTION and some form of ASSISTANCE
 It is sufficient that such intention arise just prior to or at the time of the commission of
offence
 Common intention is usually implied from the facts, not explicit.
 (This was clearly the case here, since the two committed the shared offence of breaking in)
2. Section 21(2) of the CC deems a party criminally liable for the acts of the principal offender when
the accused knew or ought to have known of the probable commission of the acts which constitute
the offence. There are two elements to this branch:
 The commission of the ultimate offence has to be probable;
 The accused must know or ought to have known of this probability.
o ***The defence available to people accused of common intention is “abandonment”…
o The accused may absolve himself of criminal liability for the acts of the principal if he can show
that he abandoned his purpose to assist in the commission of a criminal offence.
o Need something more than a mere mental change of intention, or a physical change of place by
those who wish to dissociate themselves from the crime.
o There must be timely communication of the intention to abandon the common purpose from
those who wish to dissociate themselves from the contemplated crime to those who desire to
continue in it.
 Such communication (verbal or otherwise) must serve unequivocal notice on the other party
to the common unlawful cause that if he proceeds, he does so on his own.
 The issue is always the quality of the withdrawal.
o The difference between s. 21(1) and s. 21(2) is as follows:
o S. 21(1) makes parties to the offence those who commit it or aid and abet in its commission.
o S. 21(2) covers the case where, in the absence of aiding/abetting, a person becomes party to an
offence committed by another that he knew or ought to have known would be the probable
consequence of carrying out their common unlawful intention. Provides for liability in cases of
consequential offences which resulted from the perpetration of the original offence
R v Logan, 1990 (561)
Ratio: MR for attempted murder is subjective - The objective part of s. 21(2) (“ought to have known”) does
not apply to people accused of being parties to offences of murder (Nadon), attempted murder under the
common intention rule – although it applies to people accused of being parties to lesser offences by the
operation of common intent. Mais on peut utiliser l’aveuglement volontaire pour remplacer la
connaissance.
Facts: L & others were accused of robbing a Becker’s, and number of other offences relating to the robbery,
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specifically wounding the cashier badly. L charged with attempted murder under s. 21(2).
Issue: Does the objective arm (“ought to have known”) of s. 21(2) apply to attempted murder? NO.
Raisonnement (Lamer - SCC):
o Ontario Court of Appeal: if s. 21(2) were to permit a conviction of a party for attempted murder on the basis
of objective foreseeability, that would be a conviction obtained on a lesser degree of mens rea than is
required for the principal. Contrary to the principles of fundamental justice  a subjective standard is
required
o The objective of this section is to deter joint criminal enterprises and to encourage people who do
participate to discourage their associates from going beyond the original offence. This is a legislative
objective of sufficient importance to override the rights of the accused under s. 7 of the Charter.
o But infringes those rights too much when it operates with respect to an offence which carries severe stigma
and there is a constitutionally required minimum degree of mens rea. Cannot be justified under s. 1 with
respect to these few offences (the Vaillancourt offences).
Raisonnement (Lamer - SCC): “I would, therefore, declare inoperative the words ‘or ought to have been’ when
considering under s. 21(2) whether a person is a party to any offence where it is a constitutional requirement for
a conviction that foresight of the consequences be subjective, which is the case for attempted murder. Once these
words are deleted, the remaining section requires, in the context of attempted murder, that the party to the
common venture know that is is probable that his accomplice would do something with the intent to kill in
carrying out the common purpose.”
 To be found guilty of murder; knowledge of the act alone is not the same for participation
 You have to have knowledge AND intention to cause the death of the person, by encouraging or helping (au
courant, aide, intention d’aider/d’encourager).
 If this doesn’t exist, you could still be accused of manslaughter, if you should have known that such a
criminal act was going to be committed.
IV. Counselling as Form of Participation: s. 22(1) (564)
A person guilty under this provision is a party to the offence (if it is committed).
R v O’Brien, 2007 (564)
Ratio: Counselling to commit a crime makes one a party to it (s.22(1)) - Clear encouragement and reassurance in
furtherance of an intention to convince another to commit a crime is sufficient to be charged as a counsellor
under s. 22(1).
Facts: The appellant, Marty O’Brien, was convicted of counselling Ms. Richard – a drug addict who had
purchased drugs from Mr. O’Brien in the past - to rob a store, including suggesting that she paint her face and
assuring her that it would be easy. He was charged under s. 22 of the CC.
Issue: Did Mr. O’Brien counsel Ms. Richard with the intention for her to commit robbery? YES.
Raisonnement (Hamilton - NS Court of Appeal):
 It is clear that Mr. O’Brien was there and offering words of encouragement and reassurance all in
furtherance of his intention to convince Ms. Richard to rob the store.
 Mr. O’Brien’s encouragement suggests that Ms. Richard had not made up her mind to rob the store.
 While motive is not an element of counselling, it may be taken into account by the trier of fact in making
findings with respect to the element of intent.
 Counselling:
o Is more than a recommendation – is it active encouragement of the other to commit a crime.
o Must have an intention to influence the other, to convince them – it’s the element of persuasion that
makes this head of criminal liability different from common intention.
V. Accessory After the Fact: s. 23(1) (566)
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
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
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Def.: savoir le crime + aider à se cacher la personne ou le crime = coupable d’être complice après le fait.
Being charged with being an accessory after the fact is different from the other forms of participation,
because the crime has already been committed.
The accessory is not a party to the offence, but a principal party in a distinct offence that consists of
facilitating the escape of another person who was a party to the offence.
Conviction of an accessory is not contingent upon conviction (or even finding) of a party to the actual
offence.
S. 240 CC
Every one who is an accessory after the fact to murder is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
imprisonment for life.
S. 23(1) CC
An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has been a party to the offence (not
any offence but this offence), receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that person to
escape.
R v Duong, 1998, (566)
Ratio: Test for accessory after the act in murder case. Wilful blindness is tantamount to having actual
knowledge of a crime for accessory after the fact.
Facts: Duong let his friend Lam, who was wanted for murder, hide in his apartment. Duong knew of allegations
but did not pursue Lam for details. Police found Lam in Duong’s apartment. Duong charged as an accessory
after the fact. Duong said that he knew he would be in trouble if he asked Lam why he needed to hide, so chose
not to.
Issue: Does Duong have the sufficient mens rea to be an accessory after the fact?
Holding: Yes.  Wilful blindness fulfills mens rea requirement.
Raisonnement (Docherty - ON Court of Appeal)):
 Both sides agree that the appellant could only be convicted if he knew Lam had been a party to murder, but
wilful blindness of that fact will suffice.
 Wilful blindness arises where a person who knows he should inquire further about the truth declines to do so
because he doesn’t want to know the truth.
 Liability for wilful blindness is subjective, since it referfrs to a state of mind  “deliberate ignorance”
 Deliberately choosing not to know something when given reason to believe further inquiry is necessary can
satisfy the mental element of the offence. > “Actual suspicion, combined with a conscious decision not to
make inquiries which could confirm that suspicion, is equated in the eyes of the criminal law with actual
knowledge. Both are subjective and both are sufficiently blameworthy to justify the imposition of criminal
liability” (569).
 To prove someone was an accessory after the fact, Crown must show:
o Actus reus:
 Conduct on the part of the accused which had the effect of receiving, comforting, or
assisting a person
 That person must have been party to the offence with respect to which the accessoryship is
alleged
o Mens rea:
 Intention with respect to the conduct alleged
 Knowledge by the accused that the person committed the offence
 Ulterior purpose/desire/intention to help the person escape (?)
*Test: 3 conditions
1. Crime committed.
2. You’re aware that the specific crime was committed (connaissance)
3. You help the criminal after the fact, in the context of this crime (distinction: you help out until after the fact
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CHAPTER TEN: INCHOATE OFFENCES (571-606)
Sera à l’examen
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*Def. Inchoate offence: “A preparatory crime that captures otherwise legal conduct meant to culminate in
the commission of a completed crime” (603).
Criminal liability for « incomplete » offences : attempt, incitement, and conspiracy.
Guiding question: How does the law mark the boundary between innocent behaviour and preliminary
conduct that attracts the legitimate imposition of the criminal sanction?
The combination of an act with the intent to commit the completed offence can cause sufficient harm to
warrant criminal charges.
I. Attempt (572)
FRA: Tentative: aller très près du but mais ne pas réussir.




A person who tries to commit a criminal offence but does not succeed.
24(1) Attempts: Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do anything for the
purpose of carrying out his intention is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence whether or not it was
possible under the circumstances to commit the offence.
24(2) Questions of Law: The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit
an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to
commit the offence, is a question of law.
Pourquoi poursuivre quelqu’un qui tente? Pour dissuader de faire le crime, car souvent celui qui est accusé
de tentative est seulement une personne malchanceuse qui n’a pas réussi, par exemple, à tuer alors qu’il en
avait l’intention.
Actus Reus (572)
The actus reus requires that an act beyond mere preparation has been committed; the boundaries of this are
defined by the case such as:
R v Cline, 1956 (572)
Ratio: Doctrine of criminal attempt in CML.
Summary:
 Outlines the emergence of the doctrine of criminal attempt in the common law;
 Once the preparation for a crime is fully completed and the next step in the commission of the crime is to
carry out the crime itself, there is a proximate connection between the preparation and the crime.
Test (Ontario Court of Appeal): 6 Steps…
1. There must be mens rea and an actus reus to constitute a criminal attempt, but the criminality of misconduct
lies mainly in the intention of the accused;
2. Evidence of similar acts done by the accused before offence and subsequent to it, if not too remote in time,
can be used as evidence to show a pattern of conduct by the accused to prove mens rea;
3. This evidence can be raised by the Crown, without the defence raising a specific issue;
4. The actus reus need not be a tort or crime or moral wrong;
5. The actus reus must be more than mere preparation to commit a crime; and
6. When the preparation to commit a crime is in fact fully complete and ended, the next step done by the
accused for the purpose and with the intention of committing a specific crime constitutes an actus reus
sufficient in law to establish a criminal attempt to commit a crime” (573).
Comments: intoxication can be a defence for specific intention to kill (murder, attempted murder).
***Deutsch v The Queen, 1986 (573)
Ratio: AR for attempted crimes.
Facts: A man was charged with attempting to procure female persons to have illicit sexual intercourse with
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another, as he put out an ad for a secretary, and in three separate interviews told women that they may have to
perform sexual acts with a client in order to “seal deals.” He promised up to $100,000 a year for this.
History: He was acquitted at trial because he had not offered a job to the women, but an appeal from the
acquittal was allowed at the Court of Appeal.
Issue: Was the requirement of an actus reus for an attempt to procure satisfied here?
Holding: Yes, but since the trial judge did not determine whether there was the necessary intent on the part of
the accused, a new trial was ordered. Appeal dismissed.
Raisonnement (Le Dain - SCC):
 The distinction between preparation and attempt is “essentially a qualitative one,” based on the
relationship of the act in question, and the completion of the offence.
 Mens rea: l’annonce formelle dans les journaux prouve l’intention d’engager une secrétaire ; l’entrevue
prouve l’intention d’induire cette personne à avoir des relations sexuelles contre de larges sommes d’argent.
 If the accused had the necessary intent to induce a woman to perform sexual acts with another, then his offer
of $100,000 could constitute the requisite actus reus of an attempt to procure.
 *Placing the ad and holding the interviews were essentially the last steps in the preparation for committing
the act, so that even though a formal job offer was not made, the actus reus of an attempt to procure was
nevertheless committed.
Si on prouve l’intention par les fait, les gestes qui ont été commis n’ont pas besoin d’être tous illégaux. Par
exemple, si une personne veut en tuer une autre, elle va acheter des gants pour camoufler ses empreintes, apporte
un oreiller chez la persone pour l’étouffer et centre chez elle avec ses clés, l’actus reus n’est pas illégal, mais les
gestes sont plus que de la simple préparation. Donc, elle peut être condamner.
Mens rea (574)
R v Ancio, 1984 (574)
Ratio: MR for attempted murder.
Facts: Ancio broke into his estranged wife’s apartment building with a sawed-off shotgun, attempting to see her.
The man with whom she was living saw him and threw a chair at Ancio who was climbing the stairs,
discharging the gun, after which point a fight ensued. At trial the judge found that Ancio had broken into the
apartment with the intent to use the weapon to force his wife to leave, convicting him of attempted murder. The
Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial.
Issue: Did the accused have the requisite mens rea to be guilty of attempted murder?
Holding: No. The mens rea for attempted murder is the specific intent to murder, and the evidence does not
show that the accused had that intention here. Appeal dismissed, new trial ordered.
Raisonnement (McIntyre – SCC):
 The intent to commit the desired offence is a basic element of the offence of attempt (see: s. 24 of the CC).
 Since the offence of murder involves a killing, the intention to commit the complete offence of murder must
therefore also include the intention to kill.
 Therefore, the mens rea for an attempted murder cannot be less than the specific intent to kill.
 S. 24 is a general section, into which certain offences must be “read in”.
Commentaire: Pour le meurtre, il faut prouver soit l’intention de tuer ou de causer des blessures qui peuvent
causer la mort. Mais, dans Ancio, ont dit que pour un etentative de meurtre, seul le critère de l’intention de tuer
peut mener à une condamnation.
R v Logan, 1990 (576)
Ratio: Minimum constitutional standard for attempted murder MR. Pas tellement important.
Facts: The accused were charged with offences related to the robbery of a Becker’s store and the wounding of
the cashier. Two of the accused were convicted of attempted murder, convictions set aside by the Ontario Court
of Appeal. In this appeal, the SCC addresses the issue of the mens rea required for attempted murder.
Issue: Must there be a minimum, constitutionally-protected degree of mens rea for a conviction of attempted
murder?
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Holding: Yes. The principles of fundamental justice require the same minimum degree of mens rea as murder,
i.e. subjective foresight to consequences
Raisonnement (Lamer - SCC):
 Ancio established that the specific intent to kill is the mens rea required for a principal on the charge of
attempted murder, but did not clarify whether that requisite mens rea was a constitutional requirement.
 In Martineau, this case found that it the minimal constitutional requirement for a murder conviction requires
the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had subjective foresight of the fact that the
death of the victim was likely to ensue from their acts.
 The mens rea for attempted murder must be the same as that of murder – the specific intent to kill, with the
only difference being the “consequences” component of the actus reus.
 Because of the stigma associated with a charge of attempted murder, the mens rea associated with it cannot
be less of a mental element than what is required for murder, as protected by s. 7 of the Charter, in other
words there must be subjective foresight of the consequences; objective foresight (i.e. reasonable person
standard) cannot be included.
Dissidence (L’Heureux-Dubé): Puisque dans toute tentative de commettre un crime, les actes posés n’ont pas
entrainé leurs pleines conséquences, l’actus reus joue un rôle mineur et la mens rea joue un rôle prédominant.
Ce n’est pas en raison du stigmate social ou de la gravité des peines que la prévisibilité subjective doit être
invoquée pour déterminer s’il y a tentative de commettre un crime, mais en raison de la prédominance de
l’intention par rapport aux actes posés.
R v Sorrell and Bondett, 1978 (578)
Ratio: Equivocal acts insufficient to prove attempt.
Facts: Restaurant de poulet frit, le gérant ferme 15 minutes plus tôt ; un individu encagoulé frappe à la porte, un
autre individu a un pistolet sur lui, le gérant appelle la police et les individus ont été arrêtés plus tard, l’un d’eux
en possession d’une arme de poing chargée.
Issue: Les actes posés sont-ils plus que de la simple préparation ?
Holding: Appel rejeté.
Raisonnement (Ont. Ca):
 Le jugement du procès ne démontre pas une intention de voler le restaurant, donc les actes ne dépassent pas
la simple préparation, donc le jugement doit être maintenu.
 Si l’intention de voler avait été prouvée, alors le juge du procès aurait erré en droit en affirmant que les
gestes posés ne dépassent pas la simple préparation. Mais à l’inverse…
 Lorsqu’il n’y a pas de preuve extrinsèque de l’intention qui accompagne les actes de l’accusé, les actes
équivoques ne suffisent pas pour prouver l’intention nécessaire pour qualifier ces actes de tentative de
commettre un crime.
 Autrement dit : on ne peut pas déduire la mens rea à partir d’actes équivoques seulement; more external
evidence would be required.
Comment : il manque quelques éléments de preuve, mais c’est proche.
Impossibilité (579)
*US v Dynar, 1997 (579)
Ratio: Impossibility is no defence for inchoate offences.
Facts: Problème de double peine US et Canada et transfert d’un prisonnier. Dynar a été le sujet d’une infiltration
ratée du FBI. Les EU accusent Dynar et son complice Cohen de blanchiment d’argent et de complot. Les EU
exigent leur extradition. A l’initiative de l’agent Matthews, un tiers-intervenant, Anthony, a tenté d’obtenir de
Dynar qu’il blanchisse d’importantes sommes d’argent. De nombreuses conversations ont été enregistrées
pendant 6 mois, Dynar demeurant au Canada. De l’argent a été confié à Dynar par A. lors d’une première
rencontre et a spécifié que cet argent provenait du trafic de drogue. Par la suite, Dynar a refusé d’aller aux EU,
croyant être sous mandat d’arrestation pour blanchiment d’argent, et a donc envoyé Cohen pour transporter de
l’argent de Buffalo à Toronto. Lors de la rencontre, Cohen a affirmé travailler pour Dynar et assuré rapporter
l’argent à Toronto. L’opération s’est arrêtée avant que le transfert d’argent n’ait eu lieu et Cohen fut autorisé à
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rentrer au Canada.
Holding: Appel rejeté. Extradition.
Raisonnement (Lamer - SCC): La tentative requière l’intention de commettre un crime ET des actes dépassant la
simple préparation de ce crime.
 Ces deux points sont amplement prouvés.
 Toutefois, la défense soumet que la « tentative » ne peut pas être une tentative de commettre un acte qu’il
est juridiquement impossible de commettre.
 Cependant. la Cour est d’avis que l’impossibilité juridique n’existe pas au Canada
 Trois types d’impos,ibilité :
1. Le crime est impossible parce que les moyens pris sont insuffisants : une dose trop faible de poison,
tirer de trop loin et manquer sa cible
2. Le crime est impossible parce que les éléments de l’actus reus ne sont pas des actes criminels : tirer
sur une personne dans son lit alors qu’elle était déjà décédée, voler de l’argent d’un coffre déjà vide
3. Le crime est impossible parce qu’il manque un élément d’actus reus : je pense voler un bien alors
qu’il m’appartient déjà ; passer une substance aux douanes en pensant que c’est de la drogue, alors
que c’est du sucre [« impossibilité juridique »]
 Il n’y a pas de différence de mens rea entre 2 et 3, dans les deux cas, l’intention est criminelle et les gestes
posés sont plus que de la simple préparation : « The only difference between an attempt to do the possible
and an attempt to do the impossible is chance ». (588)
 Lorsque la non réalisation du crime dépend de circonstances hors du contrôle de l’accusé, la mens rea
demeure criminelle et l’impossibilité n’est pas une défense.
 Autrement dit, les croyances même erronées sont partie prenante de l’intention de l’accusé : « Intention is
one thing, and the truth is another ». « Intention has to do with how one sees the world and not necessarily
with the reality of the world ». (p.584)
 La seule différence est celle avec les « crimes imaginaires ». Si j’importe du sucre au Canada en pensant que
c’est un crime, j’ai la mens rea de commettre ce que je crois être un crime mais qui n’en est pas un du point
de vue du droit criminel canadien ; j’imagine que mon intention est criminelle mais le droit ne la reconnaît
pas comme telle.
 Sous 24(1), il faut avoir l’intention de commettre une infraction, c’est-à-dire d’enfreindre le CC, une
infraction, non pas dans l’abstrait, mais une infraction au CC. Seuls les crimes imaginaires sont
juridiquement impossibles ; l’impossibilité factuelle (ou ciconstancielle) n’est pas une défense valable pour
les autres cas (1, 2, 3).
 Problème : La mens rea ne repose pas sur la connaissance du crime, donc il faut plus que la simple
connaissance du crime pour prouver une tentative :
o La connaissance d’un crime se divise entre ce qui se passe dans la réalité et ce qui est une croyance ;
seule la croyance est subjective et par conséquent seule la croyance fait partie de la mens rea.
o La réalisation d’un crime suppose toujours certaines circonstances, mais ces circonstances ne font
pas partie de la mens rea. Dès lors l’absence d’une circonstance ou une autre est impertinente pour
établir l’intention.
 Le fait que Dynar n’ait pas posé l’actus reus de blanchiment d’argent n’est pas un problème ; il avait la
mens rea et a posé des actes dépassant la simple préparation du crime.
 Le mobile ou la motivation ne sont pas pertinents pour établir s’il y a eu tentative de commettre une
infraction ; seule l’intention de commettre l’infraction importe du point de vue de la mens rea.
 NB : Distinction entre tentative et complot : pour qu’il y ait complot, il faut qu’il y ait meeting of the
minds ; lors d’un entrapment, seul le suspect a l’intention de commettre le crime, pas les autorités.
Dissent (Cory and Iacobucci - SCC):
 Artificial distinction between the factually impossible and the legally impossible.
 Impossibility is not a defence for attempt, because “the truth of the accused’s belief is not part of the mens
rea of s. 24(1)”; i.e. what’s important is that the accused thought he was/intended to commit a crime,
regardless of the truth of this belief.
 The absence of an attendant circumstance is irrelevant for the law of attempt, as it is engaged only when the
accused had the intention of committing the offence, but it was not actually completed.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
80

“The mens rea of the completed offence is present entirely and the actus reus of it is present in an
incomplete but more-than-merely-preparatory way” (586).
 “Society imposes criminal sanctions in order to punish and deter undesirable conduct. It does not matter to
society, in its efforts to secure social peace and order, what an accused’s motive was, but only what the
accused intended to do” (587).
Comment:
 Pour une extradition, il faut un double crime: autant dans le pays de natalité que dans celui où les faits
allégués ont eu lieu. Ici, au Canada et ou États-Unis.
 L’impossibilité factuelle n’est pas une défense, car la personne avait l’intention et c’est souvent seulement le
hasard qui fait en sorte que la personne n’a pas commis le crime. Uniquement les crimes imaginaires (i.e.
ceux où la personne croit que c’est un crime alors que ce ne l’est pas) peuvent conceptuellement représenté
cette défense. Cependant, ces cas sont rares, car ils ne vont pas jusqu’au procureur, puisque le policier
n’arrêtera pas une personne, par exemple, qui rentre du sucre au Canada et ce, même si celle-ci croit
subjectivement que l’importantion est illégale.
II. Incitement (588)
FRA : Le conseil.






Si vous conseillez à une personne de faire un crime et qu’elle le commet, vous serait accusé du crime luimême en vertu de 22 CC. Par exemple, vous dites à une personne de voler une banque et elle la vole, vous
serez accusé de vol.
Si vous conseillez à une personne de faire un crime et mais qu’elle ne le commet pas, vous serez accusé par
l’art 464 CC.
Différence entre une incitation à commettre une infraction qui a effectivement été commise (art. 22) et une
infraction qui n’a pas été commise (art. 464). Sous l’article 22, l’infraction doit être traitée comme une
participation à un crime. Sous l’art 464, il s’agit d’un crime partiellement réalisé (inchoate).
Two types:
1. Incitement of an offence that is actually committed (s. 22), which falls under participation (Chapter
9); and…
2. Incitement of an offence that is not committed (s. 464), which falls under inchoate offences.
Based on the theory that, by inciting another, the inciter has taken steps towards the completion of the
offence; R v Hamilton sets out the mens rea required for the offence of inciting to commit a crime that was
never committed.
*To be accused, you must actively induce/attempt to convince someone to commit a crime; but you also
must have the intention that the crime is to be committed, and/or a recklessness with regards to whether the
crime will be committed.
R v Hamilton. 2005 (588)
Ratio: MR for counselling a crime.
Facts: Respondent accused of offering for sale via the internet “credit card number generators,” bomb recipes
and information on committing burglaries. He was charged under s. 464(a) of the CC with counselling the
commission of indictable offences that were not actually committed. The trial judge did not find that Hamilton
had the sufficient mens rea for the offence and was acquitted, and the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed the
Crown’s appeal.
Issue: Did the accused have the sufficient mens rea for the crime of counselling a crime?
Holding: Appeal allowed on count of counselling fraud and new trial ordered.
Raisonnement (Fish - SCC):
 The Crown contends that the trial judge erred in confounding “motive” and “intent”; this court agrees.
 The actus reus for counselling is established where the materials or statements made or transmitted by the
accused actively induce or advocate—and do not merely describe—the commission of an offence (R v
Sharpe, 2001); this is a “secondary liability”, which is justified because if society doesn’t want to complete
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
81




act to be done, they won’t even want people to attempt to do it.
Another way of putting the actus reus for counselling is “the deliberate encouragement or active inducement
of the commission of a criminal offence” (59).
The mens rea consists in not less than an accompanying intent or conscious disregard of the substantial and
unjustified risk inherent in the counselling—i.e. the Crown must prove that the accused intended that the
offence counselled be actually committed, or counselled the commission of the offence while aware of the
unjustified risk that the offence may actually be committed
The trial judge erred by confusing the accused’s motivation with his intent, a distinction which is clearly
made in United States of America v Dynar, and she did not apply the proper mens rea for the offence of
counselling a crime
Due to this error, a new trial must be ordered.
St-Jacques c R, 2008 QCCS 6631
A.
INTRODUCTION
[1] Au terme d'une enquête préliminaire, le requérant fut cité à subir son procès sur trois chefs d'accusation :
1.
Le ou vers le 12 juillet 2007, à Saint-Hyacinthe, district de Saint-Hyacinthe, a causé la mort de Jacques
Cléroux, commettant ainsi un meurtre au premier degré, l'acte criminel prévu à l'article 235 du Code criminel.
2.
Entre le 12 et le 18 juillet 2007, à Saint-Hyacinthe, district de Saint-Hyacinthe, Eugène-René Saint-Jacques
a volontairement tenté d'entraver, de détourner ou de contrecarrer le cours de la justice en menaçant de mort C…
B… afin que cette dernière le couvre, commettant ainsi l'acte criminel prévu à l'article 139(2) du Code criminel.
3.
Le ou vers le 13 juillet 2007, à Saint-Hyacinthe, district de Saint-Hyacinthe, Eugène-René Saint-Jacques a
conseillé à C... B... de commettre un acte criminel, soit : en incitant C... B... à l'aider à commettre un meurtre,
laquelle infraction n'a pas été commise commettant ainsi l'acte criminel prévu à l'article 464(a) C.cr.
[2]
Il a présenté une requête en certiorari qui recherchait l'annulation de la citation à procès sur les chefs
1 et 3. Lors de l'argumentation, il s'est désisté de son attaque sur la citation sur le chef 1.
B.
LES FAITS
[3]
Les faits pertinents pour la considération de la requête sont les suivants.
[4]
Le requérant et madame C... B... étaient des collègues de travail. Le 13 juillet 2007, alors qu'ils sont
au travail, le requérant informe madame B... que la veille, il a assassiné monsieur Jacques Cléroux. Monsieur
Cléroux travaillait également avec le requérant et madame B.... Le meurtre aurait eu lieu à l'usine où ils
travaillaient.
[5]
Le requérant insiste auprès de madame B... pour qu'elle lui amène à son entrepôt, à 6 heures
précises, un autre collègue de travail qui s'appelait Léo. Le requérant a informé madame B... qu'il avait
l'intention de tuer Léo à ce moment.
[6]
Selon le témoignage de madame B..., vers 6 h 02, elle se rend seule à l'entrepôt du requérant. Elle
frappe à la porte et aperçoit le prévenu avec des gants et une masse au bout de ses bras, prêt à frapper le
dénommé Léo et à l'envelopper dans une couverture.
C.
POSITION DU REQUÉRANT
[7]
Selon le requérant, le juge de première instance a excédé sa juridiction en le citant à procès sur le
chef 3 puisqu'il s'agit d'une infraction inexistante en droit canadien. Plus particulièrement, le crime de conseiller
une infraction qui n'est pas commise (art. 464 C.cr.) est réservé uniquement au cas où il est prévu que c'est celui
ou celle qui est conseillé qui va commettre l'infraction.
[8]
Si, comme dans le présent cas, on conseille uniquement à une personne d'aider ou d'encourager une
autre à commettre l'infraction, le recours à l'article 464 C.cr. n'est pas disponible.
D.
ANALYSE (JAMES L. BRUNTON, J.C.S.)
[9]
Pour bien saisir la position avancée par le requérant, la Cour choisit de reproduire la partie pertinente
des articles 464, 22, 21 et 17 C.cr. :
a. 464. Sauf disposition expressément contraire de la loi, les dispositions suivantes s'appliquent à l'égard des
personnes qui conseillent à d'autres personnes de commettre des infractions :
a) quiconque conseille à une autre personne de commettre un acte criminel est, si l'infraction n'est pas commise,
coupable d'un acte criminel et passible de la même peine que celui qui tente de commettre cette infraction.
a. 22. (1) Lorsqu'une personne conseille à une autre personne de participer à une infraction et que cette dernière
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
82
y participe subséquemment, la personne qui a conseillé participe à cette infraction, même si l'infraction a été
commise d'une manière différente de celle qui avait été conseillée.
(3) Pour l'application de la présente loi, «conseiller» s'entend d'amener et d'inciter, et «conseil» s'entend de
l'encouragement visant à amener ou à inciter.
a. 21. (1) Participent à une infraction :
a)
quiconque la commet réellement;
b)
quiconque accomplit ou omet d'accomplir quelque chose en vue d'aider quelqu'un à la commettre;
c)
quiconque encourage quelqu'un à la commettre.
a. 17. Une personne qui commet une infraction sous l'effet de la contrainte exercée par des menaces de mort
immédiate ou de lésions corporelles de la part d'une personne présente lorsque l'infraction est commise, est
excusée d'avoir commis l'infraction si elle croit que les menaces seront mises à exécution et si elle ne participe à
aucun complot ou aucune association par laquelle elle est soumise à la contrainte. Toutefois, …
[10]
Le requérant, citant l'arrêt Paquette c. R., 1976 CanLII 24 (CSC), [1977] 2 R.C.S. 189, argumente
que la présence de la phrase «… de commettre un acte criminel…» au paragraphe 464(a) C.cr., exclut la
possibilité qu'une personne puisse être accusée d'avoir conseillé à une autre d'aider ou d'encourager la
commission d'une infraction par celui qui conseille ou par une tierce personne. Pour engager la responsabilité
criminelle dans telle situation, il aurait fallu que la phrase citée soit remplacée par la phrase suivante : «… de
participer à un acte criminel…».
[11]
Dans Paquette, la Cour suprême a décidé, entre autres, que la défense statutaire de contrainte qu'on
retrouve à l'article 17 C.cr. était disponible uniquement à celui qui avait réellement commis l'offense. La défense
statutaire n'était pas disponible à celui ou celle qui avait aidé ou encouragé la commission de l'offense :
À mon avis, l'art. 17 ne s'applique que lorsque la personne qui l'invoque a elle-même perpétré une infraction.[1]
…
L'article vise expressément «une personne qui commet une infraction». Il ne parle pas d'«une personne qui est
partie à une infraction». Cette nuance est importante car aux termes de l'al. a) de l'art. 21(1), est partie à une
infraction quiconque «la commet réellement». Les alinéas (b) et (c) de ce paragraphe traitent des cas où une
personne aide ou encourage quelqu'un à commettre une infraction. À mon avis, l'art. 17 codifie le droit en
matière d'excuses fondées sur la contrainte dans les seuls cas de perpétration réelle d'un crime mais, compte tenu
de son libellé, il ne va pas plus loin.[2]
[12]
Quoique intéressant, cette Cour ne peut pas adopter le raisonnement du requérant.
[13]
Dans un premier temps, une phrase peut se retrouver à différents endroits dans une loi. Dépendant du
contexte, la phrase peut se prêter à des interprétations différentes[3] :
… quand le législateur rédige une loi dans des termes qui, à première vue, peuvent avoir plusieurs sens, il
convient que la cour détermine lequel de ceux-ci est le plus compatible avec l'intention du législateur.[4]
[14]
L'actus reus de l'infraction consistant à conseiller un crime est presque le même dans les articles 22 et
464 C.cr. La seule différence consiste en la présence d'un élément essentiel additionnel à l'article 22 – le fait que
le crime ait été commis. La Cour suprême a décrit l'actus reus de la façon suivante :
… l'actus reus de l'infraction consistant à conseiller un crime réside dans le fait d'encourager délibérément ou
d'inciter activement la perpétration d'une infraction criminelle.[5]
[15]
Rien dans cette définition n'exige que l'infraction criminelle soit commise par celui ou celle qui est
encouragé ou incité.
[16]
Dans l'arrêt Hamilton (voir note 5), la Cour suprême cite avec approbation un passage du Document
de travail 45 de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada. La Commission note que le fondement de la
criminalisation de conseiller la perpétration d'une infraction criminelle est le suivant :
… si le fait principal (par exemple le meurtre) est condamnable, la société souhaitera que personne ne le
commette. Elle souhaitera également que personne ne tente de le commettre, ne conseille à autrui de le faire ou
ne l'y incite. Car si le fait principal crée en soi un préjudice concret, la tentative, l'incitation, les conseils
entraînent également un risque. Ils augmentent en effet la probabilité que le préjudice en question soit causé.[6]
(soulignements dans l'original)
[17]
Cette Cour considère qu'il est aussi moralement blâmable de conseiller à une personne de commettre
une infraction elle-même que de conseiller à cette personne d'aider ou encourager une tierce personne à le
commettre.
[18]
Si le requérant avait raison, la présence de la phrase «… conseille à une autre personne de participer
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
83
à une infraction…» à l'article 22 C.cr. couvrirait toutes les façons d'engendrer sa responsabilité criminelle prévue
à l'article 21 C.cr. Donc, si le crime conseillé est commis, celui ou celle qui a conseillé à quelqu'un d'aider ou
d'encourager la commission sera tenu criminellement responsable. Avec égards, aucun argument logique ne
pourrait expliquer pourquoi le législateur voudrait envisager une responsabilité criminelle plus restreinte si le
crime conseillé n'était pas commis.
[19]
C'est pourquoi la Cour croit que la phrase «… de commettre un acte criminel…» au paragraphe
464(a) ne devrait pas recevoir l'interprétation restreinte avancée par le requérant. Les seuls cas que la Cour a pu
retracer sur cette question partagent cette opinion.[7]
[20]
EN CONSÉQUENCE, LA COUR :
[21]
REJETTE la requête.
III. Conspiracy (594)
FRA: Le complot.

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




Le crime est l’entente. Par exemple, si deux personnes s’entendent pour ramener de la cocaïne du Mexique,
c’est un crime. C’est un autre crime de la ramener par la suite.
Il y a aussi l’aide au complot, si tu facilites les liens entre les personnes (voir le cas récent de la cour
suprême).
Dans les cas de complot, souvent l’intention ou la mens rea se déduit de l’actus reus.
Dans tous les crimes où plusieurs personnes sont arrêtées, théoriquement le procureur devrait aussi plaider le
complot. Dans le faits, cependant, ils ne le font pas toujours même s’ils le devraient.
Distinction entre complot et intention commune :
o Complot: seulement à prouver l’intention de s’entendre;
o Intention commune: la participation est plus large; tous les crimes dans la poursuite du but commun
rendront la personne coupable si elle savait ou aurait dû savoir ce qui serait commis.
A conspiracy exists when two or more people agree to commit a criminal offence; the offence is complete
upon their agreement.
Often quite difficult to understand the facts of a conspiracy case (*keep an eye on this for exam).
465 CC
(1) Sauf disposition expressément contraire de la loi, les dispositions suivantes s’appliquent à l’égard des
complots :
a) quiconque complote avec quelqu’un de commettre un meurtre ou de faire assassiner une autre personne, au
Canada ou à l’étranger, est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité;
b) quiconque complote avec quelqu’un de poursuivre une personne pour une infraction présumée, sachant
qu’elle n’a pas commis cette infraction, est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible :
(i) d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, si la prétendue infraction en est une pour laquelle, sur déclaration
de culpabilité, cette personne serait passible de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité ou d’un emprisonnement maximal
de quatorze ans,
(ii) d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans, si la prétendue infraction en est une pour laquelle, sur
déclaration de culpabilité, cette personne serait passible d’un emprisonnement de moins de quatorze ans;
c) quiconque complote avec quelqu’un de commettre un acte criminel que ne vise pas l’alinéa a) ou b) est
coupable d’un acte criminel et passible de la même peine que celle dont serait passible, sur déclaration de
culpabilité, un prévenu coupable de cette infraction;
d) quiconque complote avec quelqu’un de commettre une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par
procédure sommaire est coupable d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure
sommaire.
(2) [Abrogé, L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 61]
Note marginale :Complot en vue de commettre une infraction
(3) Les personnes qui, au Canada, complotent de commettre, à l’étranger, des infractions visées au paragraphe
(1) et également punissables dans ce pays sont réputées l’avoir fait en vue de les commettre au Canada.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
84
Note marginale :Idem
(4) Les personnes qui, à l’étranger, complotent de commettre, au Canada, les infractions visées au paragraphe (1)
sont réputées avoir comploté au Canada.
Note marginale :Compétence
(5) Lorsqu’il est allégué qu’une personne a comploté de faire quelque chose qui est une infraction en vertu des
paragraphes (3) ou (4), des procédures peuvent être engagées à l’égard de cette infraction dans toute
circonscription territoriale du Canada, que l’accusé soit ou non présent au Canada et il peut subir son procès et
être puni à l’égard de cette infraction comme si elle avait été commise dans cette circonscription territoriale.
Note marginale :Comparution de l’accusé lors du procès
(6) Il est entendu que s’appliquent aux procédures engagées dans une circonscription territoriale en conformité
avec le paragraphe (5) les dispositions de la présente loi concernant :
a) l’obligation pour un accusé d’être présent et de demeurer présent lors des procédures;
b) les exceptions à cette obligation.
Note marginale :Cas d’un jugement antérieur rendu à l’étranger
(7) Lorsqu’il est allégué qu’une personne a comploté de faire quelque chose qui est une infraction en vertu des
paragraphes (3) ou (4) et que cette personne a subi son procès et a été traitée à l’étranger à l’égard de l’infraction
de manière que, si elle avait subi son procès ou avait été traitée au Canada, elle pourrait invoquer les moyens de
défense d’autrefois acquit, d’autrefois convict ou de pardon, elle est réputée avoir subi son procès et avoir été
traitée au Canada.
United States v Dynar, 1997 (595)
Ratio: Test for conspiracy.
 Actus reus → les individus s’entendent pour commettre un crime.
 Mens rea → intention d’atteindre le but de l’entente (crime).
 L’impossibilité n’est pas une défense au crime de complot.
Facts: Cas de blanchiment d’argent. FBI incite Dynar à blanchir de l’argent qui serait les fruits de trafic de
drogues aux Etats-Unis.
Issue: Y a-t-il eu complot? NON
Raisonnement (SCC):
 Qu’est-ce que le complot criminel?
o A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or
more to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in
intention only, it is not indictable (R v O’Brien).
o Il doit y avoir l’intention d’accepter, la complétion d’une entente et un ‘’design’’ commun
[infraction].
o Les personnes impliquées peuvent changer ou encore, les moyens d’arriver au crime.
o Bien que le complot requière l’implication d’au moins 2 personnes, certaines parties peuvent être
non identifiables, impossible à déclarer coupables.
o Complot est un crime préliminaire.
o BUT : empêcher que l’objet de l’entente soit atteint.
 En l’espèce, il n’y a pas de complot. Le policier informateur n’a jamais eu l’intention de s’entendre avec
Dynar. Il n’y a pas eu de meeting of the minds, donc d’actus reus. Un simple échange de mots ne peut être
un complot.
 L’impossibilité peut-elle être une défense au crime de complot?
o « should conspirators escape liability because, owing to matters entirely outside their control, they
are mistaken with regard to an attendant circumstance that must exist for their plan to be
successful? » (597)
o Le complot est un crime d’intention. La Couronne doit prouver la connaissance d’une
circonstance particulière – la croyance subjective que telle circonstance existe.
o Il n’est pas important qu’objectivement, le crime soit impossible à commettre.
o Et ce, puisque le complot est reconnu par l’intention de commettre le crime, pas la
matérialisation du crime.
Jonathan Brosseau-Rioux
85
o
o
En droit canadien, l’impossibilité factuelle ou en droit ne sont qu’un – il n’ont pas d’effet sur la
reconnaissance du complot.
Les crimes imaginaires, eux, ne sont pas des crimes, donc ne peuvent entraîner la culpabilité. (Un
individu fait quelque chose qu’il croit être un crime, mais qui ne l’est pas selon la loi.)
IV. Combining inchoate forms of liability (600)
You cannot combine inchoate offences; in R v Dery (SCC, 2006), it was found that although a group had
discussed stealing a loaded SAQ truck, no steps had been taken to prepare for this offence, and no agreement
was actually made, so the trial judge convicted the accused of attempted conspiracy, something which he
thought was part of the offence, but the Supreme Court was not willing to recognize the crime of “attempting to
conspire to commit a substantive offence,” since here there is only a “risk that a risk will materialize” (602).
R v Déry, 2006 (600)
Ratio: Cannot combine inchoate forms of liability. Il ne peut y avoir de tentative de complot: ici, les deux
personnes avaient parlé du complot mais étaient dans des discussions préliminaires. Mais, les gens qui tente de
s’entendre pourraient être accusé de conseiller un crime (22 ou 464 CC).
Facts: Déry accusé de tentative de complot en vue de commettre un vol et de tentative de complot pour en
posséder les fruits. (For planning to rob SAQ trucks).
Holding: Appel rejeté. La tentative de complot n’existe pas en droit canadien.
Raisonnement (SCC): Comment distinguer entre le conseil et la tentative de complot ?
 Hamilton : l’actus reus pour l’incitation est l’encouragement délibéré ou l’induction active de la
commission d’une infraction.
 Le crime de complot « unilatéral » ne devrait pas être reconnu car déjà couvert par « incitation, conseil,
etc ».
 De plus il n’y a jamais eu de meeting of the minds ici ; la question est de savoir s’il faut criminaliser une
discussion infructueuse consistant à contempler un crime réel qui n’a jamais été commis ni tenté.
 Le crime de complot est un crime d’intention mais le droit criminel ne doit pas patrouiller dans les
pensées des citoyens ; le but du droit criminel n’est pas d’empêcher les crimes « dans l’œuf » .
 L’accord des parties est nécessaire et démontre l’intention des parties ; sans accord, pas d’intention
criminelle de complot. Le droit criminel intervient dès lors qu’il y a accord en cas de complot, ce qui est plus
tôt que lorsque quelqu’un agit seul, où l’intention criminelle peut être prouvée par les mesures que prend
l’accusé dans le but de commettre une infraction.
 Le fait qu’il y ait accord entre des parties augmente les chances qu’une infraction ait lieu.
 Le droit criminel ne punit pas les « mauvaises pensées ».
V. Complete offences based on inchoate liabilty (602)
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There can also be complete offences (financing of terrorism, participation in terrorist groups) that are based
on inchoate liability, insofar as they criminalize preliminary acts.
It was determined in R v Legare that the actus reus and mens rea of these offences cannot be usefully
divided, but that they require (a) the essential elements of the impugned act, and (b) the specific
purpose/subjective intent to commit an eventual crime.
In this case, in which a man is accused of communicating with a minor for the purpose of facilitating a
secondary sexual offence, the important thing is “whether the evidence as a whole established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused communicated by computer with an underage victim for the purpose of
facilitating the commission of the specified secondary offence with respect to that victim” (605).
R v Legare, 2009 (603)
Ratio: Complete offences based on inchoate liability. Le crime ici est les communications avec l’enfant dans des
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buts sexuel et non pas les gestes sexuelles eux-mêmes: le crime ultime n’est pas commis, mais s’en est déjà un
de se rendre.
Facts: Accusation sous 172 .1(c) [auj. : 172.1(b)] d’utilisation d’un ordinateur pour communiquer avec un enfant
de moins de 16 ans dans le but de faciliter une agression sexuelle, incluant contact sexuel et attouchements.
L’accusé croyait que l’enfant avait 13 ans d’après les informations sur l’ordinateur ; elle en avait 12. Il lui a
téléphoné pour « talk dirty » et s’est engagé dans une conversation à caractère sexuelle jusqu’à ce que l’enfant
raccroche. L’accusé n’a jamais recontacté la jeune fille et n’a pas reconnu avoir eu l’intention de faciliter des
rapports sexuels.
History: Acquitté au procès parce que les crimes reprochés n’ont pas été commis et que la Couronne a manqué
de prouver l’intention pour l’une des accusations. La CA admet l’appel de la Couronne.
Holding: Appel rejeté. Nouveau procès.
Raisonnement (SCC): La preuve dans son ensemble établit-elle hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé
communiquait avec une jeune victime dans le but de faciliter une infraction d’ordre sexuel ?
 172.1(c) [(b)] crée un crime naissant, qui capture des gestes par ailleurs licites mais qui culminent dans la
commission d’une infraction ; cet article criminalise les actes qui précèdent le crime et ceux qui précèdent la
tentative de commettre le crime, qui sont encore plus éloignés de l’infraction que ne peuvent l’être la
tentative ou l’incitation/conseil.
 L’article vise la communication via ordinateur dans le but de faciliter, aider ou produire, par exemple en
attirant ou en entrainant l’enfant dans la commission d’une infraction, en défaisant certaines inhibitions ou
en tenant un discours visant à exploiter la curiosité, l’immaturité ou la précocité d’une jeune personne.
 Un discours sexuellement explicite ne fait pas partie de l’élément matériel de 171.1(b).
 L’intention doit être subjective ; c’est-à-dire une intention visant spécifiquement les infractions soulevées.
 Il est inutile de compartimenter la mens rea et l’actus reus : Le troisième élément du test ci-bas n’a pas été
prouvé hors de tout doute.
*Test: Les 3 éléments doivent être hors de tout doute:
1. Communication intentionelle par ordinateur.
2. Avec un enfant dont l’accusé sait qu’il a moins de 14 ans (auj 16 ans).
3. Dans le but spécifique de faciliter la commission d’une agression sexuelle, un enlèvement, etc, sur cette
personne.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: PROVOCATION (737-766)
Voir l’arrêt Buzizi.
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Application: seulement dans les cas de meurtre.
Deux étapes:
1. Test objectif: est-ce que l’insulte est de nature à te faire perdre le sang froid de la personne
raisonnable?; et
2. Test subjectif: l’accusé a tué parce qu’il a été provoqué?
Deux exceptions:
1. Quand l’accusé avait un droit légal de se défendre (e.g. légitime défense);
2. Quand l’accusé engendre lui-même la situation où il est provoqué (e.g. l’accusé ne peut plaider la
provocation s’il met la victime dans un coffre que, après avoir reçu un coup de sa part, la tue).
Critère – vraisemblance: est-ce qu’un jury raisonnablement informé pourrait permettre un acquittement?
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