Revealing Dogmatic Insularity by Visiting the Territory of Various Academic Disciplines
Don Ambrose
Rider University
(chapter 2 in- Ambrose, D. & Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.). (in press). How dogmatic beliefs harm creativity and higher-level thinking. New York: Routledge.
Bob:
This chapter is a revised version of the first half of the original chapter 2, which was designed to provide a very broad, interdisciplinary look at the topic of dogmatism before getting to the more specific contributions of our authors.
Note that it also includes the “creative intelligence questions” at the end of each subsection. You had trouble with these in the other chapter (the one on sociopolitical, cultural, ideological dogmatism). Originally, I thought it was important to include these to ground the ideas (drawn from “outside” disciplines) more firmly in the minds of those who navigate within creative studies and gifted education. I think the questions are important but your response to them in the other chapter is encouraging me to think of ways to revise the format somewhat so they don’t look like they are standing out on islands. I leave them as originally written here simply because
I don’t have time to do that revision right now.
1

2
Abstract
Dogmatism truly is a transdisciplinary phenomenon that exerts strong influences on academia and generates serious problems for young people who are attempting to develop their creative intelligence. This chapter sets the stage for the analyses in the rest of the volume by providing examples of dogmatism in the large-scale frameworks for scholarly inquiry and practical work in professions having to do with creative intelligence and giftedness. Some underlying bases for dogmatism are explored. These include the powerful, hidden influences of root-metaphorical philosophical frameworks on the thoughts and actions of scholars and practitioners; dogmatismgenerating effects from the structure and dynamics of various academic disciplines; disputes over the appropriate use of reductionism as a favored approach to scholarly inquiry; and some ways in which the aesthetic dimensions of science can trap creatively intelligent investigators within dogmatic investigative traditions. Questions are raised at the end of each subsection to illustrate some possible effects on creative intelligence and giftedness.

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Revealing Dogmatic Insularity by Visiting the Territory of Various Academic Disciplines
The problem of dogmatism has plagued humankind for millennia. Both before and after
Rokeach (1954, 1960) magnified its profile in psychology, as a transdisciplinary phenomenon it has received attention from philosophers, cognitive scientists, historians, economists, and a host of scholars in a variety of other fields. Much of this attention arose from its responsibility for some of the most egregious acts in the socioeconomic, political, and cultural dimensions of human experience. Various forms of dogmatism have led to unfair treatment of individuals and groups. In its worst forms, it has initiated wars and justified, in the minds of the perpetrators, some of the most horrendous atrocities.
In academia, dogmatic thinking has contributed to the perpetuation of paradigm wars and the ossification of theories. It also has sustained some unproductive inquiry agendas while inhibiting the invigoration of others with more promise.
In some discussions leading toward the inception of this book, we contemplated the extent to which dogmatism itself is a nuanced concept with multiple shades of gray. The construct seems to fit onto a continuum, with its most calcified, immovable, seemingly inescapable form at one end, its mildest form at the other, and various gradations between. The mildest form of dogmatism simply might be habit-bound thinking in which an individual or group seldom or never bothers to think about an issue or a problem in a new or different way. All that might be needed at this mild end of the continuum is for someone to suggest that they try something new or to see an issue from a slightly modified angle. Conversely, at the calcified, opposite end of the continuum dogmatism is so firmly entrenched that thinking beyond the prevailing conceptual frameworks is inconceivable. The explorations in this volume address a

4 surprising array of dogmatic thoughts and actions, which can emerge from most academic disciplines and professional fields.
Why Focus on Dogmatism When Contemplating Creativity?
After navigation through the terrain of multiple academic disciplines, it became increasingly evident to me that cognitive entrenchment plagues every field, some more than others. Moreover, it is the business of some academic disciplines to investigate the structure and dynamics of contexts for human thought and action, which often contain dogmatic thought frameworks. For example, economics entails the study of local and global transactions. History encompasses the study of changing socioeconomic, political, and cultural contexts over long time periods. Cultural anthropology highlights the unique variations of cultures from one local setting to another around the world.
All of these contexts are shaped by creative, gifted minds in different populations, and contextual influences can stunt or smother the gifts, talents, and intellectual capacities of the underprivileged when conditions are oppressive. In short, if dogmatism influences creatively intelligent, gifted leaders of various populations in various sociopolitical, economic, and cultural contexts, and if it plagues the academic disciplines themselves, we can surmise that it has a powerful, often hidden influence on the development and dynamics of creative intelligence. This book is devoted to illuminating some of these influences.
Examples of Dogmatism from Various Contexts That Influence the Development of
Creative Intelligence
Operating like a transdisciplinary shape shifter, dogmatism can take on a surprising variety of forms. It can influence the structure, dynamics, and evolution of academic disciplines.
It can bias our thinking at the implicit level, forcing us to abide by the tenets of one philosophical

5 framework while ignoring potentially fruitful alternatives. It can operate through powerful framing metaphors that distort our very assumptions about reality.
The remaining analyses in this chapter explore specific examples of dogmatic thought and action in these various dimensions of human experience. Of course, these examples certainly do not provide a comprehensive overview of dogmatism in all of its manifestations. Fortunately, in later chapters the contributors to this volume spin us outward into broader investigations of the phenomenon but even they take us only so far and there is much more beyond the scope of this project.
Root-Metaphorical World Views as Deep Philosophical Bases for Dogmatism
One particularly fruitful analytic framework comes from philosophical analyses of influential metaphors that can frame thinking in most if not all conceptual arenas. Taken together, four competing metaphorical world views represent a philosophical framework pertinent to dogmatic thought and action. Derived from Pepper's (1942) groundbreaking philosophical analysis of world hypotheses, the world views have provided scholars in various disciplines with large-scale conceptual lenses for investigation in cognitive science (Gillespie,
1992), organizational theory and leadership (Terry, 1995), developmental psychology (Overton,
1984, 1991), gifted education (Ambrose, 1996, 1998, 2000; Cohen & Ambrose, 1993), and the field of special education (Dombrowski, Ambrose, Clinton, & Kamphaus, 2007; Heshusius,
1989).
World views are broad-scope conceptual lenses that operate at the implicit level and shape the ways in which an individual or group perceives and interprets phenomena. Each of the four world views--mechanism, organicism, contextualism, and formism--is based on a root

6 metaphor that tacitly influences thinking. Each root metaphor carries with it basic tenets that shape epistemological, methodological, and ideological assumptions.
For example, the mechanistic world view is based on the root metaphor of a machine, which encourages us to assume that reality is machinelike. Thinkers dominated by the mechanistic world view tend to believe that phenomena can be broken down reductively into discrete component parts. They strongly believe in objectivity and strive for precision and detail in their analyses. Examples of mechanistic influence in academia include the reduction of intelligence to a precisely measurable IQ score, and the portrayal of educational success as proficiency with a narrow band of arguably superficial knowledge and skills that can be measured precisely through the use of standardized testing (see Apple, 2005, 2007; Berliner,
2006; Bracey, 2004; Meier & Wood, 2004; Nichols & Berliner, 2007).
In contrast, organicist thinkers are influenced strongly by the metaphor of an organism developing through stages toward a particular end. They assume that phenomena are holistic, so their thinking is dominated by pursuit of integrative connections and the coherence and totality of systems in which the whole transcends its parts. They also are open to teleological arguments.
An example of organicist thinking is the emphasis on the whole child in education (e.g., Rappolt-
Schlichtmann, Ayoub, & Gravel, 2009). Another is interdisciplinary work in which individuals or teams look for integrative patterns across disciplines (e.g., Ambrose, 2009; Ambrose & Cross,
2009; Boix Mansilla & Duraisingh, 2007; Boix Mansilla, Feller, & Gardner, 2006; Gardner,
2007).
Contextualist thinkers are guided by the metaphor of an ongoing event within its context.
They look for contextual influences on phenomena and the ways in which these influences can generate the unpredictable emergence of novelty. Examples of contextualists are cognitive

7 scientists who study the context-embedded mind, looking for ways in which contextual influences shape human thought and action (e.g., Brothers, 2001; Descombes, 2001; Gillespie,
1992; Spivey, 2008).
Finally, formists pursue metaphorical similarities and common patterns in diverse phenomena. The iconic Greek philosopher Plato was an early formist because he saw ideal forms as providing essence patterns for things in the real world (see Ross, 1951). For example, two horses can look very different but the ideal form of “horseness” makes them fit the same identifiable pattern. Modern formists include complexity theorists who study patterns of similarity in the dynamics of complex adaptive systems that are very different at first glance: complex systems such as human brains, national economic systems, and ecosystems in nature
(see Axelrod, 1997; Camazine, et al., 2001; Cowan, Pines, & Meltzer, 1999; Dai & Renzulli,
2008; Holland, 1995, 2006; Kauffman, 2002; Miller & Page, 2007; Morowitz, 2004; Prigogine &
Stengers, 1984; Richards, 2001; Schuldberg, 1999; Sexl, 1988; Thompson, 2007). Many ideas from complexity theory also fit the contextualist world view.
World views are value neutral; however, problems arise when individuals or groups become trapped within a single world view and suffer from thought confinement. Pepper (1942) used the term dogmatic insularity to highlight the difficulties subscribers to single world views encounter when they run up against perspectives that differ from their own. It is extremely difficult for someone locked within one world view to understand and appreciate perspectives that originate from differing philosophical frameworks because the world views are incommensurable and operate at the implicit level. Nevertheless,
Post-rational eclecticism is simply the recognition of equal or nearly equal adequacy of a number of world theories and a recommendation to not fall into the dogmatism of

8 neglecting any one of them… Four good lights cast fewer shadows than one. (Pepper, p.
342)
Dogmatism can emerge when individuals or groups adhere to differing world views and then argue about interpretations of phenomena. For example, from a world-view standpoint, the following questions are relevant: Is a creative individual’s brain-mind a machine (mechanism); or an unpredictably evolving, novelty generating event (contextualism); or a purposefully developing integrated system (organicism); or a similarity seeking pattern-finder (formism)?
Each of these conceptions likely is partially right but inadequate as a complete explanation.
Moreover, the adherents to one conception of mind based on a single world view likely will have trouble appreciating and understanding a portrayal of mind from a different world view. For example, mechanistic mind theorists find little room for purposeful development and they have trouble accounting for subtle contextual influences (Cohen & Ambrose, 1993). Pepper’s (1942) metaphor of four good lights casting fewer shadows is relevant here. The mechanistic philosophical light can shine brilliantly on some aspects of mind while leaving dark shadows on other dimensions of cognition.
Another example of world-view dogmatism comes from conceptions of the purpose of education. Mechanistic assumptions can predispose instructors to reduce subject-matter content to the smallest possible fragments and to ignore the contexts from which this content comes, hence, rendering it meaningless (Ambrose, 2003b). In addition, the mechanistic predilection for decontextualized content fragmentation and for viewing students’ minds as machine-like, can generate a barren view of education–reductive transmission of decontextualized content information bits into passive-reactive, computational, cranial storage machines.

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In contrast, educators strongly influenced by a blend of organicist and contextualist assumptions have a much different view of education. Their world view influences can predispose them to integrate knowledge across disciplines, while perceiving students as purposeful, unpredictably evolving, context-embedded explorers. Nevertheless, organicistcontextualist conceptions of education lack the precision of mechanistic educational philosophies. Once again employing Pepper’s (1942) notion that four world-view lights cast fewer shadows, it is likely that a blend of mechanistic precision with organicist and contextualist sensitivity to systems and contexts would create a stronger, less dogmatic educational philosophy.
Additional examples of incommensurability and dogmatic insularity in education are common. One of the most informative examples comes from the paradigm wars waged in the field of literacy instruction between proponents of phonics, which is rooted in mechanism, and proponents of whole-language instruction, which is rooted in organicism and contextualism.
Proponents of phonics-based approaches assume that learning to read is built from reductive mastery of phonetic elements, which are the basic units of the language machine. In contrast, whole-language proponents assume that language learning emerges from the seamless interweaving (organicism) of reading, writing, and speaking processes in a literacy rich environment that generates unpredictable student creativity (contextualism). Literacy experts claim that a blending of the two approaches works best (Flippo, 1999; Glazer, 1997).
Creative-intelligence questions:

When a single world view dominates education in a school system, does it suppress the development of creatively intelligent young people whose minds are incompatible with the tenets of that world view?

10

If highly intelligent chemists undergo disciplinary training that encourages them to confine their thinking primarily to the tenets of the mechanistic world view, do they overgeneralize that philosophical preference by extending it into their personal lives (e.g., family and community relationships)? For example, are they inclined to view other people as discrete, atomistic individuals (mechanistic reduction)? Are they less able to appreciate integrative, social interconnections (organicist)? Or, can they compartmentalize their philosophical default patterns, confining them to the work environment only?

Are some of the cultural and political conflicts that plague the modern world rooted in conflicting, implicit world view assumptions? Are preferences for atomistic individualism in Western nations rooted in the reductionism of the mechanistic world view? Are collectivist preferences in eastern Asia (see Nisbett, 2003) rooted in the organicist world view?
Other Forms of Dogmatism in the Academic and Scientific Realms
Most if not all academic disciplines encompass some forms of dogmatism, which usually engender conflicts over epistemological, ontological, or methodological assumptions. In academia, dogmatic thinking can slow the progress of scholars. It can force large groups of investigators to follow unproductive research agendas into barren conceptual terrain. It can encourage them to use investigative methods and tools that unearth some discoveries while missing other findings that could be turned up through the use of alternative, possibly better tools. In the words of science historian James Burke (1985): “If you believe that the universe is made of omelette, you design instruments to find traces of intergalactic egg” (p. 309).

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A comprehensive overview of intra- and interdisciplinary dogmatism would be far too broad to encompass in this chapter but the following illustrations provide a brief introduction.
Included here are examples from comparative analyses of disciplinary structure and dynamics, philosophy, history and English literature, and the history and philosophy of science, among others.
Excessively vigorous critical rationalism. Scholarly dogmatism can lead to premature rejection of promising investigative agendas and theories. For example, the esteemed philosopher of science Karl Popper (1959) fostered the well-accepted practice of critical rationalism, which requires scientists and other academic investigators to engage in energetic critiques of their own work and that of others, probing for weaknesses and tearing down dubious intellectual edifices, leaving only those that are strong enough to withstand the test of time.
Arguably, critical rationalism works against dogmatism by eradicating unworthy theories that would be unduly influential were it not for the undermining they suffer from the critical process.
The Darwinian process of critical rationalism has proven its worth over time by serving as a philosophical basis for peer-review procedures in most disciplines.
Nevertheless, Lakatos (1978), another eminent philosopher of science, saw more than a trace of dogmatism in critical rationalism and argued that the process of vigorous critique can be taken too far so that it demolishes promising but embryonic theories and research programs. Just as a violent storm can wash away a small seedling before it has a chance to root itself firmly in the terrain, overzealous application of critical rationalism can destroy a potentially productive theory that needs initial nurturing before it should be required to face the tempests of external attack. While there are far more obvious cases of dogmatism, Lakatos made us aware that even

12 insightfully conceived and well-intentioned scholarly procedures such as critical rationalism can lead to mild forms of short-range, narrow-minded thinking with counterproductive results.
Creative-intelligence questions:

To what extent do otherwise creatively intelligent researchers dogmatically cling to favored investigative tools while excessively denigrating alternative tools and methodologies?

Can imbalances in creatively intelligent minds incline some gifted scholars toward premature critical judgment while making others insufficiently critical?

Are there long-forgotten theories of creativity or intelligence that held great promise for shedding light on hidden human potential but were washed away by storms of critical rationalism before they could take root in psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, or education?
The structure and dynamics of academic disciplines as potential sources of dogmatism. Pulling together an interdisciplinary group of scholars, historians Bender and
Schorske (1997) initiated some interesting analyses of the structure and dynamics of four disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Overall, the contributing authors concluded that some disciplines (e.g., analytic philosophy and economics) are firmly bounded, well policed, and unified around a dominant theoretical or philosophical framework. They are firmly bounded because they resist invasion by constructs from foreign disciplines. They are well policed and unified because the primary gatekeepers of the literature firmly reject works that don’t conform to the dominant conceptual framework.
In contrast, other disciplines (e.g. English studies and political science) are porous, fragmented, internally contested, and inclusive of diverse ideas. They are porous because they

13 will not or cannot prevent invasion by ideas from outside disciplines. They are fragmented and internally contested because diverse theories or philosophical frameworks compete for attention and none attain a position of dominance for any significant length of time. Overall, their internal diversity and porosity make them open to diverse perspectives on phenomena. Cultural anthropologist, Clifford Geertz (2000) provided a similar analysis of his own discipline showing that it was by nature pluralized without a strong, dominant conceptual framework: “One of the advantages of anthropology as a scholarly enterprise is that no one, including its practitioners, quite knows exactly what it is” (p. 89).
Considering these stark differences in disciplinary structure and dynamics, it would seem that differing disciplines might offer differing opportunities for the emergence of dogmatic thought among academics and professional practitioners. The firmly bounded, well-policed, unified disciplines seem prone to generating dogmatism around entrenched, hegemonic conceptual frameworks and around their rejection of interdisciplinary borrowing. Neoclassical economic theory offers a marked example of this form of dogmatism (see Green & Ambrose, in press). In contrast, dogmatism in the porous, fragmented, internally contested disciplines can come from the formation of skirmishing theoretical camps in a chaotic, conceptual battlefield unguided by a single, unifying conceptual framework.
Creative-intelligence questions:

In interdisciplinary encounters, do otherwise open-minded, congenial scholars talk past one another or engage in conflict because they lack understanding of the differing frameworks for academic disciplines?

To what extent do creatively intelligent scholars assume that the structure and dynamics of the world conform to the structure and dynamics of their academic disciplines? If they

14 make such assumptions, do they unwittingly inject dogmatism into their thoughts about events and phenomena in the world beyond their disciplines?

How do the minds of high-potential young scholars develop or transform when they become immersed in unified, insular, firmly policed academic disciplines? Do they become more acute, or more stagnant? Conversely, how does immersion in a fragmented, porous, contested academic discipline shape the minds of creatively intelligent young initiates? Are they enriched by the cognitive diversity that bombardment by dissimilar interdisciplinary constructs can generate; or, do they become more prone to entrenchment because they cannot tolerate the extreme ambiguity a fragmented discipline can produce?
These questions may be particularly relevant to the fields of gifted education and creative studies, which seem to follow the fragmented, porous, contested pattern (see Ambrose,
2006; Ambrose, VanTassel-Baska, Coleman, & Cross, 2010).
Philosophical battles: modernism vs. postmodernism. The venerable discipline of philosophy encompasses considerable work on dogmatism because it revolves around deep probing and meticulous clarification of human thought. Philosophy includes arguments over metaphysics (the nature and structure of reality), epistemology (the nature of knowledge), and ethics, along with other arenas of inquiry. These dimensions of philosophy are so broad in scope and resistant to consensus that they naturally generate opposing, dogmatic thought frameworks.
Possibly the largest opportunity for dogmatism comes from a major rift between analytic and continental philosophers, which has caused proponents of each framework to view colleagues in the other as misguided at best and sometimes even pigheaded (see Levy, 2003).
Along similar lines, philosophers describe the presence of considerable intellectual tension between modern and postmodern philosophers. It doesn’t help matters that the

15 terminology suffers from some ambiguity. Cahoone (1996) clarified the concept of modernism somewhat, describing it as encompassing the emphases on objectivity and rationality that arose from the 18 th
-century Enlightenment. Modernism magnifies the value of scientific knowledge, rational-logical thought, freedom, and progress.
Postmodernism arose to challenge the possible overgeneralizations of modernist thinking.
According to postmodernists, excessive modernist thinking has led to some undesirable outcomes including anthropocentrism and the exploitation of the natural world, the undermining of traditions and community cohesion in various cultures, the spread of alienation and nihilism in the face of impersonal bureaucracy, European imperialism, and the hegemony and inadequacy of grand narratives. Cahoone (1996) illustrated the dogmatism in the debate between modernists and postmodernists:
For some, postmodernism connotes the final escape from the stultifying legacy of modern
European theology, metaphysics, authoritarianism, colonialism, racism, and domination.
To others it represents the attempt by disgruntled left-wing intellectuals to destroy Western civilization. To yet others it labels a goofy collection of hermetically obscure writers who are really talking about nothing at all. (p. 1)
In short, the debate between modernists and postmodernists represents a fundamental schism between conceptions of history, investigative methodology, and values. As with any conflict over highly complex bodies of knowledge, this philosophical argument makes plenty of room for dogmatic thought and action.
Creative-intelligence questions:

Analytic philosophers strive for precision in their scrutiny of concepts and terminology.
Could it be that the cognitive styles of creative, philosophically inclined young people

16 push some of them toward analytic philosophy because they favor reductionisticmechanistic precision? Might others be attracted to postmodernism because their cognitive styles establish favoritism for the somewhat ambiguous context sensitivity of that philosophical paradigm? Can differing cognitive styles among creatively intelligent philosophers explain some of the dogmatic, vitriolic conflict between postmodernists and modernists?
Paradigms and the lure of completeness. Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) landmark work on scientific paradigms established some important perspectives on dogmatism in scientific disciplines. According to Kuhn, research paradigms emerge when investigative trajectories in the sciences coalesce into orthodoxies. These paradigms are remarkably resilient and often accommodate anomalous findings by force fitting them into the predominant conceptual framework. Only when the anomalies become too burdensome, and one or more genius catalysts appear on the scene, can a paradigm be overturned. After this, another paradigm emerges and comes to dominate scientific thinking. When paradigms petrify they can generate considerable dogmatism.
On the very large scale, some analysts have claimed that science itself either is opening up to seemingly infinite new possibilities, or the exact opposite–shutting down because everything of importance has been discovered. For example, Horgan (1996), a popular-science analyst, generated a volume exploring quantum theory, string theory, cosmology, chaos theory, sociobiology, neuroscience, and other dimensions of modern science. He concluded that the scientific enterprise has run itself into barren territory and is left with not much more than to clean up and refine past findings.

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Interestingly, both this argument and its polar opposite also emerged from highly credentialed scientists themselves. The eminent biologist Bentley Glass, once claimed that,
[scientists] are like the explorers of a great continent who have penetrated to its margins in most points of the compass and have mapped the major mountain chains and rivers. There are still innumerable details to fill in, but the endless horizon no longer exists” (cited in
Gott, 1972, p. 216).
In contrast, the eminent physicist, John Wheeler, expressed a diametrically opposing position:
“As the island of our knowledge grows, so does the shore of our ignorance” (cited in Horgan,
1996, p. 83). The juxtaposition of these starkly opposing positions on the promise of the scientific enterprise suggests some form of dogmatism might be at play. Proponents of these viewpoints seem to be trapped within dogmatic frameworks to the extent that they firmly believe science is at a dead end, or conversely, that it is gazing out at limitless new vistas.
Kragh (2002) illustrated ways in which late-19 th
-century physicists fell prey to the same firm beliefs that the map of science had been completed and the only remaining tasks were to fill in details. Nevertheless, 20 th
-century science revealed a stunning array of new inquiry trajectories including research on subatomic particles, string theory, laser technology, genetic engineering, and much more. Physicist Hermann Bondi (1977) used the term lure of completeness to illustrate many scientists’ craving for certainty and their need to assume that the conceptual maps of their disciplines are virtually finished.
Creative-intelligence questions:

Do the talents of some creatively intelligent scientists go to waste when most of the powerful minds in scientific fields fall prey to the lure of completeness, and to rigidifying paradigms that confine them to barren conceptual terrain? Do these conditions

18 marginalize creative thinkers while favoring incisive, gifted minds that excel at criticalthinking?

Are scientists prone to pessimism, or overconfidence, or a blend of both when they think that the major mountain chains and rivers in their disciplines have been fully mapped and the job of science is mostly complete? Are scientists who see limitless horizons at the current edges of their disciplines unbridled optimists, or are they pessimists who see little chance for mastery of the unexplained phenomena beyond those horizons? What forms of science education can make creatively intelligent young people more realistic about the long-range prospects of the scientific enterprise?

Do paradigm wars in the field of gifted education inhibit or invigorate the discovery of constructs and dynamics relevant to high ability? See Coleman, Sanders, and Cross
(1997) for analyses of the dynamics of the positivist and postpositivist paradigms in gifted education.
Sharpening or blunting Occam’s razor: Battles over reductionism.
Consistent with the earlier analyses of conflicting root-metaphorical world views, specifically mechanism versus organicism/contextualism, other diametrically opposing positions in the natural sciences occur over reductionist and holistic investigative preferences. Similar battles occur in the social sciences and humanities but the analyses employed here are drawn primarily from cognitive science and the natural sciences for illustrative purposes. Reductionists prefer to analyze phenomena incisively by breaking them down to their smallest component parts in search of precise cause-effect principles and laws. In contrast, more holistic investigators look for broad, integrative patterns. The following examples illustrate this tension.

19
On the mechanistic side of the argument, Patricia and Paul Churchland (see P. M.
Churchland, 1984, 1995; P. M. Churchland & P. S. Churchland, 1995; P. S. Churchland, 1986,
2002, 2008; P. S. Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992) are reductionist scholars of mind whose conceptions of cognition align with psychophysiological parallelism (see Wang, 1995), which portrays precise one-to-one correlations between mental and physiological phenomena. The assumption is that cognition arises from nothing more than intracranial electrochemical mechanisms. Gross and Levitt (1994), also strong reductionists, attacked postmodernists, feminists, and other academic-left scholars who challenged the primacy of reductive-mechanistic science. Physicist Steven Weinberg (2001) made a similar case favoring the near-exclusive primacy of mechanistic reduction in the conduct of scientific inquiry.
In an edited volume bringing together analysts of the scientific enterprise, Atkins (1995), a chemist, provided several statements lauding extreme reductionism, among them the claim that, “Reductionist science is omnicompetent. . . .We should acknowledge that its not-yetstopped reductionist razor is slicing through the fabric of the heavens” (p. 129). This and other enthusiastic claims Atkins made about the omniscient power of reductionism can be interpreted as strongly influenced by emotion, which would clash with the highly rational, objective tenets of his own investigative paradigm and possibly reveal at least some measure of dogmatism.
Other prominent scholars have taken very different approaches, arguing that exclusively reductive paradigms can be counterproductive (Edelman, 1995; Horst, 2007). For example,
Edelman, himself a reductionist and prominent neuroscientist, argued that the reduction of mind all the way down to microlevels of matter is silly reductionism.
Along similar lines, physicist
Freeman Dyson (1995) claimed that,

20
A reductionist philosophy, arbitrarily proclaiming that the growth of understanding must go only in one direction, makes no scientific sense…. If we try to squeeze science into a single philosophical viewpoint such as reductionism, we are like Procrustes chopping off the feet of his guests when they do not fit onto his bed. (p. 11)
Thagard (2008) appeared to combat dogmatism on both sides of the issue, arguing that neither reductionism nor anti-reductionism generate an adequate picture in and of themselves.
This especially is the case when the phenomena under study entail human interactions viewed through the lenses of cognitive science:
It is hard to see how anything about quarks or strings is relevant to understanding how
Romeo and Juliet fell in love. Similarly, although the fact that Romeo’s dopamine levels spiked when he first saw Juliet is certainly relevant to understanding his falling in love with her, the molecular occurrences in his and Juliet’s brains tell only part of the story about what was going on when they met at the party. Hence a reductionism claiming that there is a fundamental level of explanation is impossible in cognitive science. But antireductionism is impossible too, as it would be folly to try to give a purely sociological account of Romeo and Juliet falling in love. (p. 535)
Overall, Thagard posited that an adequate explanation would be partly reductionistic because it would account for physiological, material explanations but it also would be partially antireductionistic because it wouldn’t attempt to force reduction artificially to the lowest levels of analysis.
In a broad analysis of scientific inquiry processes, Derry (1999) worked against dogmatic adherence to a favored investigative approach, ultimately making the case that, “science is too wide ranging, multifaceted, and far too interesting for any single answer to suffice. No simple

21 method of discovery is available for looking up in a recipe book” (p.11). Arguing that science strongly benefits from the reductive, hypothetico-deductive method, he also promoted the virtues of some other methodologies including (a) the context-embracing observations of naturalists such as Alexander von Humboldt and Charles Darwin whose works generated large-scale descriptions and classifications instead of proven, precise conclusions; (b) serendipitous insights such as Roentgen’s somewhat accidental discovery of x-rays; and (c) the use of idealized conceptual models that generate mathematical patterns such as those used in work on semiconductors.
Sorensen (1998), a philosopher, came to similar conclusions while promoting an eclectic approach to science. One of his arguments was that necessarily imprecise thought experiments have value even though they might lead us astray at times. They should be used as part of a diversified collection of investigative strategies, which will serve overall to cross-check one another over the long term and generate more accuracy in the scientific enterprise. Shapiro
(2005) lamented excessive reliance on reductive theorizing and statistical modeling in the social sciences, especially in fields that rely heavily on mechanistic notions of human thought and action. Still others have advocated for multiple approaches to investigation because insights can be found at different levels of analysis through multiple methodologies, all of which have value
(see Ambrose, 2005b; Ambrose, VanTassel-Baska, Coleman, & Cross, 2010; Arecchi, 1996;
Dai, 2005; Martin, 2003; Midgley, 1998; Nicolescu, 1996, 2002; Rose, 1998; Sternberg, 1990).
These few examples among many in the philosophy and history of science and in related areas of scholarship show that prominent investigators can differ sharply over the fundamental tools and approaches taken in scholarly enterprises. All of them cannot be right when they claim exclusive supremacy for favored methodologies, so at least some must be misguided at the very

22 least and possibly dogmatic at worst. Consequently, it is likely that dogmatism hinders progress in scholarly pursuits.
Creative-intelligence questions:

To what extent does physics envy force the fields of creative studies and gifted education to favor hypothetico-deductive research methods excessively over qualitative methods in the pursuit of insights about creativity, giftedness, and talent development? Have the lessmeasurable aspects of high ability (e.g., emotion, intuition) been marginalized in the field of gifted education for extended periods of time because they are resistant to discovery through reductive inquiry methods?
Aesthetic influences generating dogmatism in the sciences. Some of this methodological entrenchment could come from the strong influence of aesthetics on scientific theory and research (see Holton, 1996; Kosso, 2002; Levine, 2006; Rothman & Sudarshan, 1998;
Weschler, 1988). Those enamored of the beauty of integrative patterns may be inclined to adhere excessively to holistic, pattern-type investigative methods whereas those in love with the clockwork precision of Newton’s stable, predictable, mechanistic universe might be trapped within a very different, reductive form of aesthetically induced dogmatism.
As specified earlier, the ubiquity and power of metaphor, especially the influence of the root-metaphorical world views, can generate dogmatism by framing cognition at the implicit level in various dimensions of human experience. Metaphors also serve as more specific conceptual tools in the sciences, and they could contribute to the potential problem of excessive aesthetic entrapment within a conceptual framework. They play important roles in generating conceptions of difficult-to-grasp phenomena in the sciences (Holton, 1996) and can lead

23 investigators toward productive new discoveries. But they also can ensnare investigators, encouraging them to believe too strongly in the applicability of the metaphors themselves.
The use of metaphor to frame conceptions of phenomena is omnipresent in cognitive science (see Sternberg, 1990). The computer metaphor of mind has been evolving for several decades and has led to important discoveries about cognition; however, some scholars arguably have taken it too far into dogmatic territory. The eminent cognitive scientist Marvin Minsky, for example, made the controversial claim that the human brain is a meat machine (paraphrased in
Clark, 2001, p. 7). Another leading cognitive scientist, Joseph Weizenbaum (1995) took umbrage at this statement, arguing that Minsky had ignored the contextual influences on mind while demeaning humanity with the meat-machine metaphor because meat is dead and can be burned and eaten. Weizenbaum asked us to consider how we can value ourselves and have high expectations for human ethical behavior if we view our minds as nothing but mechanized chunks of meat. Here again, prominent scholars were diametrically opposed. It’s doubtful that both could be correct so either self-deception, or dogmatism, or both may have been at work in this interchange.
Finally, misinterpretation of scientific inquiry by nonscientists also generates dogmatism capable of poisoning socioeconomic contexts. For example, primatologist Frans de Waal (2009) described how Jeffrey Skilling, while a top executive of Enron, was an enthusiastic advocate of
Richard Dawkins’s notion of the selfish gene. Skilling misinterpreted and overgeneralized the selfish-gene metaphor, using it to establish and justify a cutthroat, draconian organizational culture in the Enron Corporation. The result was “a corporate atmosphere marked by appalling dishonesty within and ruthless exploitation outside the company” (de Waal, p. 39). Skilling’s dogmatic misinterpretation of the selfish-gene metaphor led to disastrous psychopathic behavior,

24 which was inconsistent with de Waal’s discovery that nature tends to blend competition with benevolent cooperation.
Creative-intelligence questions:

With what frequency do highly intelligent, creative individuals become enamored of aesthetically pleasing metaphors that oversimplify highly complex, nuanced phenomena in their fields?

Is it possible that scholars in the fields of creative studies and gifted education have fallen prey to aesthetically confined conceptions of the creative, gifted, or talented mind?
History, literature, and the Western canon. Dogmatism is likely to arise wherever there are arguments over cultural identity and heritage. According to Brundage (2005), those who have the most political power in a society tend to shape perceptions of history, and in the worst cases they become historical revisionists. For example, Cheney (1996) disseminated an extremely conservative, Eurocentric version of reality aimed at influencing education in the
United States. Along similar lines, H. Bloom (1994) and A. Bloom (1987) fervently advocated for education to align strongly with Western cultural perspectives. H. Bloom argued for the preeminence of the Western canon by criticizing postmodern viewpoints, claiming that multiculturalism, feminism, Afrocentrism, and other strands of thought critical of Eurocentric dominance were leading the Western culture astray. Consequently, he maintained that a set of writings based on Western traditions should form the core of a common education for students in the United States.
A. Bloom (1987) based his similar argument on the notion that the quality of higher education was eroding throughout the mid-late 20 th
Century. A number of trends in this era including feminist activism, drug abuse, rock music, and excessive concern for socioeconomic

25 equality, supposedly were diminishing the quality of thinking among students, and universities reinforced this cognitive erosion by acquiescing to demands for more diversity in the curriculum.
A. Bloom thought that the study of great works of Western civilization, particularly those derived from the Greek tradition, would help institutions of higher learning resist the forces of intellectual erosion. Taken to the extreme, these arguments over the canon represent a potentially insular form of education that could make students more prone to dogmatic, either-or thinking and less inclined to appreciate nuance.
Creative-intelligence questions:

When some clever, influential individuals succeed in establishing a favored set of readings as the sacred core of a nation’s education, how much cultural dogmatism does this establish in the minds of the gifted young people who move through the educational system?
 How able are today’s creatively intelligent young people to see through the dogmatism embedded in the history or literature curricula?
Concluding Thoughts
While this flight over dogmatic terrain has covered a great deal of interdisciplinary territory there is much more beyond this limited flight plan. Many more examples can be drawn from the disciplines addressed here as well as disciplines and professional fields left untouched in this chapter. Each of the other chapters in this book addresses additional dimensions and nuances of this complex, nettlesome phenomenon. Collectively, the contributions in this volume suggest some ways in which creative intelligence might be confined and distorted, as well as some ideas for resisting the ill effects of dogmatic thought and behavior.

26
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