DAVIDSON, RADICAL INTERPRETATION
125
1. Given a theory that would make communication possible, what evidence
would support such a theory?
2. Even locally, though speakers assume (without theory) that for them their
expressions are to be interpreted in the same way they interpret them? But
this does not justify such an assumption.
3. All understanding involves radical interpretation.
126
1. Knowledge of meanings it would seem, are required for interpretation.
2. To do this we must introduce ‘a machinery of words and expressions,’ as in
the Tractatus, for example.
3. But this does not tell us what meaning is.
Note: Davidson, though the above suggestion sounds like the Tractatus,
disowns this, saying ‘there is a hint that corresponding to each word and
expression is an entry,’ but then, ‘this just hypostatises the problem.’
4. And he says, eliminating meanings, reducing them to mouth and nonlinguistic body movements etc, does not tell us how to interpret.
127
1. On the surface of things looking towards meanings seems fruitless.
Causal theorists (Ogden and Richards) reconstruct meanings one sentence at
a time on the basis of behavioristic data.
2. But this does not touch theoretical sentences.
3. Other causal theories reconstruct in similar manner, reconstructing only
words, and work up.
4. But this does not reach the evidence; for, as Davidson says: the phenomena
to which we must turn are the extra linguistic interests and activities of
agents... and ‘these are served by words only insofar as the words are
incorporated in sentences.’
5. Now, for different reasons, radical interpretation cannot take intentions
one at a time, as evidence of meaning. For ‘interpreting an agent’s
intentions, beliefs, words, are part of a single project, no part of which can be
assume to be complete before the rest is.‘
Note: Of course I think Davidson wrong about foundationalism. But his view
is that word meaning only makes sense in sentences; so words themselves are
not foundational. Sentences only make sense because of theories. Theories
are not directly constructed out of sentences, causally or logically. Sentences
are neither foundational.
Note: And, his view on using intentions as evidence for meaning is that all
the attitudes and what they mean come as a package. One cannot interpret
belief without meaning, meaning without belief, etc. Thus, they all must be
interpreted simultaneously.
128
1. What the interpreter must know for interpretation is that he must be able
to understand any of the infinity of sentences the speaker might utter.
2. This is only possible if we state this finitely.
3. And, also required, is that the interpreter must be able to have evidence to
verify his interpretation.
4. This cannot be any sort of already interpreted stuff; rather, it must be
stated without recourse to intention, meaning, interpretation, etc.
129
1. When we translate, there is:
a. object language
b. subject language
c. metalanguage
2. This translation can be done without knowledge of anything, when you use
a manual and all you know is a metalanguage.
2. In interpretation, usually b. and c. are the same. The means: that the
interpreter brings with him: a knowledge that the subject language is his,
and the fact that he knows how to interpret his own language.
130.
1. Now, the interpretation must ‘reveal semantic structure.’ Davidson means
compositionality.
2. So this is done by:
a. a translation manual churning out sentences of own language
b. theory of interpretation then interprets these.
3. But the reference to own language is unneeded, says Davidson.
4. So, it follows that, all that is left is ‘a structurally revealing theory of
interpretation of the object language.’
5. Davidson says that we have such theories, and they are theories of truth,
ala Tarski.
131
1. In such theories we get:
a. s is true (in object language) iff p.
And, here a and p, are
b. s is a ‘description of s.’
b. p is a translation of s.
2. Satisfaction relates sentences, (e. g. s) to ‘infinite sequences of objects,
which...belong to a range of variables of’ the object language.’
3. And the axioms (e. g. p) either: give conditions of satisfaction on the basis
of simpler sentences, or conditions of satisfaction of simplest sentences.
4. Truth is defined then in terms of satisfaction, and this can work as an
explicit definition.
5. As for indexicals and demonstratives, one must relativize such a theory to
time and speaker.
Note: Davidson says he will answer three questions: if Tarski truth theory
can be given for natural language, if an interpreter would know if it were
correct, and can it be used for interpretation.
132
1. First question, about extension to natural language. Convention T says
that a theory should entail all the T sentences (for the object language)
2. This requires quantification.
3. Still, ‘a T sentence states the truth conditions of a sentence using resources
no richer than, because the same as, those of the sentence itself.’
4. Davidson notes this is a heavy restriction; Convention T has no way to deal
with attitudes, modalities, causal statements, counterfactuals, attributive
adjectives, modal quantifiers like ‘most,’ etc.
133.
1. But, he says, there has been much advancing. Given this, truth will be
applied to natural language in two parts:
a. it will be characterised for part of the language. This will contain
infinity of sentences which will exhaust the expressive power of the
whole language.
b. this will match each remaining sentence to one for which truth has
been characterised.
2. Second question, about how truth will be verified before interpretation.
Davidson says Convention T must produce the T sentences of the object
language.
3. He acknowledges that a theory must treat sentences of more than
sentences length as concatenations, use satisfaction and reference, and have
ordered sequences.
4. In using these things, though, it is enough (he thinks) just that we have ‘an
adequate sample,’ which will ‘confirm the theory to a reasonable degree.’
This evidence is entirely the ‘attitudes and behaviour of speakers in relation
to sentences.’
5. The hope, conclusion, is to, by doing all this, have the theory show the
structure in sentence; and test the theory only by sentences.
134
1. Davidson notes that he cannot, like Tarski, take translation as a given.
He says rather, he wants to use the theory of truth, and to extract a theory of
interpretation.
2. We must rephrase Convention T without appeal to translation. Hence T
sentences are ‘simply true’ or not. Hopefully individual truths will yield
interpretations.
3. As noted, evidence of this simple truth cannot consist in meaning, belief,
intention, and the like. Because all such notions come at once, radical
interpretation must recognize truth in some other way.
135
1. Davidson begins with mere ‘holding true.’ He says though a belief, ‘it is
something that applies to all beliefs,’ and ‘does not ask us to discriminate
between them.’
2. An interpreter may be able to say, via contextual hints that an agent gives
such as using irony or commands even, that an agent hold before he can
interpret what he holds true.
3. The evidence then is just that ‘speakers of the language to be interpreted
hold various sentences to be true at certain times under certain
circumstances.’
4. Davidson says what this would look like:
T. ‘Es regnet’ is true in German iff at time t, spoken by x it is raining
And:
E. x belongs to a German speech community, and holds ‘Es regnet’ true at
time t, when it is raining around him.
Davidson says that we should use E as evidence for T.
136
1. The objection to this is that x might be wrong, and so ‘Es regnet’ would be
false. This would then not confirm any theory of truth, but rather seem to
falsify it.
2. But, Davidson says ‘the method is rather of betting a best fit...we want a
theory of truth that satisfies formal constraints and maximizes agreement, or
gets people right...most of the time.’
3. Now, the way this works to give truths to another language is: we ‘look for
the best way to fit our logic, to the extent required to get a theory satisfying
Convention T, onto a new language.’
4. This fitting shall mean:
a. reading first order quantification in
b. not taking logical constants one by one
c. so, treating logic as a grid.
5. Now, as a process, we shall first have to identify connectives, quantifiers,
then predicates, singular terms, etc.
6. Then, on the more messy side, we shall have to identify indexical
sentences, sentences with rapidly changing truth values, etc.
7. Identify remaining sentences, such as moral ones.
137.
1. This is intended to ‘solve the problem of the interdependence of meaning
an belief, by holding belief constant, while solving for meaning.’
2. This is done, he says, by giving truth conditions to alien sentences.
Assuming massive agreement of course.
3. The more sentences we provide these conditions for, the better we
understand the rest.
4. Of course, charity is not an option; we must attribute it, in order to make
sense of the aliens.
5. Davidson recaps this, saying that ‘at the center is a notion of truth and
satisfaction.’
6. This imposes a ‘complex structure’ on sentences.
7. This is applied because of the ‘nature of the theory,’ plus, ‘the evidence.’
8. The result is a ‘partially interpreted theory.’
9. Davidson concludes: ‘by knowing only the conditions under which speakers
hold sentences true, we can come out, given a satisfactory theory, with an
interpretation of each sentence.’
138-139
1. Third question, about can the theory be used. Now, a T sentence gives
truth conditions. Davidson says ‘it is tempting to say a T sentence gives the
meaning.’
2. But, it does not give the meaning. But, what does, is ‘the totality of T
sentences should optimally fit evidence about sentences held true by native
speakers.’ So what Tarski elicited outright, Davidson says, ‘can be indirectly
elicited by the holistic constraint.’