The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework: Coal Seam Gas
Submittor:
Address:
Email:
Confidentiality:
Ruth Borger
Owens Lane via Seaspray VIC 3850
ruthborger@yahoo.com.au
Happy to have submission published
Executive Summary
1. There cannot be co-existence where a power imbalance between parties exists.
2. The risks of CSG exploration and mining far outweigh any perceived benefits.
3. Continuing to foster fossil fuel use and development in the face of serious
climate change is unreasonably negligent.
1. Chapter One: Towards Sustainability and Co-existence
1.1 The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework: Coal Seam Gas (the
Draft Framework) outlines the following principles:
Shared Commitments to:
 multiple and sequential land use
 better informed public discourse on resource development
 the delivery of best possible outcomes for affected communities
Multiple Land Use Framework
 demonstrate a commitment to maximising the social, economic and
environmental value of land and marine environments.”1
1.2 Social Licence to Operate
“Australia cannot reap the benefits from CSG development if industry’s social licence
to operate and resulting community confidence have not been established.”2
‘To ensure that the needs of participants involved in CSG development are addressed,
it is necessary to determine what environment is required to best facilitate this
outcome. This environment needs to have a focus on the principle of co-existence,
where there is a shared commitment among the resources industry, other land users
and governments to: multiple and sequential land use; better informed public
discourse on resource development; merit based land access providing certainty for
industry and improved community confidence in land use decision-making; and
finally, the delivery of best possible outcomes for affected communities.’3
1
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p8
Ibid., p5
3
Ibid., p10
2
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2. Response to Chapter One
2.1 Without the consent of individual landowners and local communities, the CSG
industry lacks the social licence to operate. The Draft Framework downplays the
community anger at laws that allow miners access to private land. There are more
than “instances of resistance” to CSG mining,4 there is vehement and widespread
opposition.
2.2 In spite of existing mining law, the assumption of “multiple and sequential land
use” is strongly opposed by landowners. The concept of willing “Co-existence” is a
nonsense while a power imbalance exists between the parties and while Governments
facilitate the inequities.
2.3 The Draft Framework entrenches a mining company’s legal right to trample the
landowner’s right to the quiet enjoyment of his/her land, even to “steal” his/her land
via enforced “legal” occupation.
2.4 However, the idea that a landholder’s right to natural justice can be protected via
this proposed Framework is highly contestable. For example, in Victoria, a refusal to
consent to a mining company’s invasion of one’s land can be appealed at VCAT
(Victorian Civil Administrative Tribunal). This is an unelected body appointed by the
State Government whose decisions can only be appealed in the Supreme Court on an
error of law.
2.4.1 Should the Victorian State Government’s proposal to raise appeal fees from
$322 to $1000 to $2000 be implemented, the average landholder will generally lack
the financial and legal resources (even more than they do now) to contest a mining
company’s application for a licence over his/her land, let alone other legal costs. So,
the chances of a landowner appealing occupation of his/her land is significantly
reduced should the VCAT fees be raised (Submissions to this Draft policy closed 15
February 2013).
2.5 Human Rights Violations: The shared commitment to multiple and sequential
land use” contravenes Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights5,
which states:
“(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
In accordance with the UDHR, Liberty Victoria6, for example, interpret Article 17 to
entitle individuals to:




control and use of property
the right to any benefit from the property
a right to transfer or sell the property, and
a right to exclude others from the property.
4
Ibid., p72
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml
6
www.libertyvictoria.org [online] accessed 28 January 2013
5
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“In recognising these rights, Liberty Victoria acknowledges that such rights must be
exercised within the bounds of the law. Liberty Victoria further acknowledges the
government may apply the following limitations on the use of private property:


that a person’s right to private property not unreasonably interfere with the
property rights of another private party and their right of quiet enjoyment and
privacy, and
that the use of private property not unreasonably interfere with public
property rights, including uses required for public health, safety, peace or
convenience.
“This is consistent with Section 20 of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities which provides: A person may not be deprived of his or her property
other than in accordance with law.7 Private property rights are also implicitly
recognised in s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution, which confers power on the
Commonwealth Constitution to legislate for the acquisition of property, but only ‘on
just terms’. Property rights are not confined to rights to private property. They
include cultural and communal rights of the kind recognised as native title in
Australia. Such rights extend beyond interests in land to community-owned art,
folklore and traditional remedies. However there is currently no legal protection for
such rights.”8
2.6. The point is that property rights are extinguishable under the current mining laws.
2.7 In Australia, the right to the quiet enjoyment of one’s land can also be destroyed
or damaged by mining infrastructure and works on neighbouring properties. The
landowner has no right to prevent or even influence drilling and infrastructure works
not only on his/her land but also on neighbouring property where such works may
cause Nuisance to the landowner. This is very different to the law in the USA where
private individuals own much of the mineral rights across the country, not
governmental or state organizations.9
2.8 Notwithstanding any rights to the quiet enjoyment of land above ground, the
landowner cannot legally prevent underground mining works and infrastructure that
may be beneath his/her home or other buildings and land.
3. The Social Licence to Mine
3.1 Sec 51 (i) and (xx) of the Australian Constitution states that the “Parliament shall,
subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
 trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States”; and
 foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within
the limits of the Commonwealth;” 10
7
Of course, the law permits deprivation of private property rights
www.libertyvictoria.org [online] accessed 28 January 2013
9
Mineral rights ownership – what is it and why is it so unique in the USA? [online]
www.ieneurope.com/pdf/Mineral.pdf Accessed 21 February 2013
10
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act – Sec 51 (i): The Parliament shall, subject to this
Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
Commonwealth with respect to (i) trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States.
8
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3.2 The role of Government is to protect the rights of its citizens; to ensure that it acts
in the best interests of all and protects their health and happiness. Break this social
contract and what follows is either anarchy or totalitarianism. It seems inconsistent
with the legal precepts of the Australian Constitution that the Parliament could enact
laws that cede vastly greater rights to powerful [mainly foreign] corporations while
cancelling the rights of ordinary citizens in the process.
3.3 The principle of Co-existence is only meaningful where all parties have equal
rights in law. For the landowner these rights must extend not only to his/her own land,
including under the ground, but also to lands within a viable buffer radius.
4. Buffer Zones Compared
4.1 Wind Energy Facilities: The Victorian State Government’s policy on Wind
Energy Facilities (windfarms) which requires a 2 kilometre buffer between a turbine
and a dwelling11 withouth the owner’s consent. And turbines are prohibited in
specified Urban Growth Zones.12
4.2 Dog Kennels: The Victorian Code of Practice recommends a 500 metre buffer
between a residence and a dog kennels business.
4.3 In comparison, buffer zones (if any) between dwellings and a mining/drill site can
be as little as 100 metres.
4.4 There is no consistency between these buffers and no logical reason for the
discrepancy. CSG mines, especially when clustered, are far more intrusive than a
windfarm. So there should be a comparable buffer. Two kilometres is probably a
minimum.
5. Community Benefit
5.1 Given that the Draft Framework continues to validate mining companies’ rights
over individuals’ rights, there is no assurance whatsoever that “…the Framework will
benefit the community … by providing increased levels of consistency, certainty and
transparency in the management of CSG development in Australia.”13 In reality, it
will only benefit the mining industry.
6. Economic Aspects
6.1 “CSG operations can play a significant role in maximising equitable benefits to
all stakeholders, including the community, local businesses, shareholders and
government, through its contribution to Australia’s GDP, tax revenues and job
creation.”14
“Best use of resources: Governments should seek to maximise the economic and
social benefits of regulated land use for all Australians and future generations
11
Sec 2.2.6 Policy and Planning Guidelines for the Development of Wind Energy Facilities in
Victoria, www.dpcd.vic.gov.au [online] Accessed 31 January 2013.
12
Ibid., Sec 2.2.5
13
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p5
14
Ibid., p9
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through encouraging the multiple use of regulated land, while respecting and
protecting environmental, cultural and heritage values.”15
6.2 The proposition that “best use of resources” means that private land title rights
should be subsumed without question to allow mining companies to “use/abuse”
private property is immoral in the context of Australian democracy. This proposition
is presented as a “fact” when there is no valid basis for it, other than an government
endorsed inalienable right of mining companies to exploitation. It has been clearly
demonstrated that the impacts of mining on small communities exact a heavy social,
financial and personal toll.16 The proposition, therefore, that mining can co-exist with
other activities, especially agriculture, “while respecting and protecting
environmental, cultural and heritage values” is simply false. And, as global
experience of mining activities over time clearly demonstrates, is impossible.
6.3 Any financial benefits that mining (including exploration) may contribute must be
measured against the financial disbenefits suffered by individuals and communities
disadvantaged by CSG activities. Financial losses include declining property values
and the inability to sell property affected directly or indirectly by CSG exploration
and mining. The very identification of proposed mining sites is enough to cause real
estate prices to fall.17 Therefore, CSG contributions, if any, to GDP, tax revenues and
job creation must be counterbalanced by the real losses from other activities, e.g.
agriculture, the socioeconomic and health costs (including mental health) to
individuals and communities. The cost to local government of maintaining local road
infrastructure is just one example of a significant cost that must be borne by the local
community via local Council rates. The costs to the economy caused by extreme
weather events must also be included. Ironically, discounting the full economic
impact of the the financial costs to mining from the 2011 Queensland floods, the
financial losses to mining were in the billions of dollars.18
6.4 Environment Minister, Tony Burke’s conditional approval of Whitehaven’s
Maules Creek coal mine and Idemitsu’s Boggabri expansion (widely reported but
strongly criticised by Rob Oakeshott, MP and others) while this Draft Framework is
still at the submission stage is a truncation of the policy decision-making process and
implies that any new policy will not change the current state of play. In particular, the
approvals granted to Whitehaven are troubling from a governance perspective, given
its embroilment in the Eddie Obeid corruption investigation by ICAC.
7. Educating the Public
“Governments also play a significant role as educators by providing key messages
and information to assist the general public, the CSG sector and the media. In this
way, all parties will better understand and appreciate the importance of co-existence
in land use, what governments are doing to protect the public interest, and the
15
Ibid., p11
For example, Sharyn Munro’s Rich Land, Wasteland, Sydney, Macmillan, 2012 on the impacts of
coal and CSG mining on rural communities in Australia.
17
‘Landholders call for certainty on CSG’ Australian Financial Review, 24 February 2013
18
“Eighty-five per cent of Queensland coal mines had to either restrict production or close entirely. In
May 2011, Queensland’s coal mining sector had recovered to only 75 per cent of its pre-flood output.
The economic repercussions of these events were a loss of $5.7 billion (2.2 per cent)7 in Queensland’s
gross state product for the financial year ending June 2011, and a reduction in royalties received by the
Queensland Government.” www.floodcommission.qld.gov.au, Chapter 13 Mining, p350
16
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communities’ expectations of resource companies in working with land holders and
local community leaders.”19
7.1 This statement suggests that Governments are bent on a propaganda exercise that
conflates “the public interest” with “mining interests” and belittles the rights of other
interests be they those of farmers and other people or small communities. This has
little to do with communities’ expectations which clearly are at odds with
Governments’ objectives.
8. Application of Leading Practice
8.1 The list of Leading Practices omits the application of the Precautionary Principle,
a guiding principle of several international treaties to which Australia is a signatory. It
is included in various Federal and State legislation such as the National Strategy for
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD Steering Committee 1992) and the InterGovernmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE) (Australian Government 1992, para.
3.5.1).
The precautionary principle is designed to ensure that decision-making accounts for
uncertain but potentially serious and/or irreversible threats of harm.
9. A Rigorous Assessment Process
“A rigorous impact assessment will:
 ensure environmental and human health considerations are explicitly addressed
and incorporated into the development decision-making process
 anticipate and avoid, minimise or offset the adverse biophysical, social (including
human health) and other relevant effects of development proposals
 protect the environmental values of natural systems and the ecological processes
which maintain their functions
 promote development that is sustainable and optimises resource use and
management opportunities (IIIA 1999).”20
9.1 The term “sustainable” is not defined but assuming that compliance with the
objectives outlined in the first three dot points will contribute to sustainability, then
the fourth dot point is logically inconsistent because it is difficult to see how
development that “optimises resource use” can be sustainable, noting that the
Dictionary definition of “optimise” is to “make the best or most effective use of [a
situation or resource]” 21 From a mining company’s perspective, making the best use
would surely be to make the most profits possible.
10. Environmental Management Plan
“An environmental management plan is required to ensure that the potential
environmental impacts of each CSG activity are understood and strategies are put in
place to manage or remove those risks.”22
19
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p13
Ibid., p17
21
www.oxforddictionaries.com [online] Accessed 21 February 2013
22
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p18
20
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10.1 As the Draft Framework notes,23 it is impossible to eliminate risks. The problem
is that mitigation and minimisation strategies cannot protect against the many welldocumented environmental risks. No environmental management plan can guard
against human or technical errors (e.g. the Exxon Valdez Alaskan oil spill in 1989).
Even with the best intentions, no drilling process is absolutely fail safe (e.g. the 2010
BP Deepwater Horizon oil castrophe in the Gulf of Mexico). In another case closer to
home, the oil spill/leak off the Kimberley Coast in 2009, reportedly resulted from
“schedule and cost likely [being] put ahead of safety and the environment”.24 So, the
risks of a drill puncturing an aquifer and of chemical contamination where toxic
chemicals are employed in fracking cannot be legislated away. Neither human errors
nor technological failures can be eliminated absolutely. Hence the strong need to
invoke the Precautionary Principle when assessing the risks of mining.
10.2 I agree with the Draft Framework’s commitment to hazard assessment, which
include accidents and the risks from extreme weather events. Given that climate
change will increase wildfire events, hazard assessment needs to account for the
likelihood of bushfires caused by methane releases from mining and exploration
activities. The Draft Framework also refers to other impacts from methane in relation
to water security:
“Methane has been found to occur naturally in many Australian water bores
including prior to any development by the CSG industry. The situation is made more
complex by thousands of existing water bores and numerous exploration wells from
previous activities (legacy wells) throughout areas that could be subject to CSG
production. These existing wells and bores, particularly if they are of questionable
integrity, may already be facilitating methane migration into aquifers.”25
Why would any responsible government wish to exacerbate what is already a
dangerous situation with even more wells and bores? Could such a policy amount to
“Wednesbury unreasonableness”?26
11. Well Integrity and Compliance
11.1 The Draft Framework states:
“Leading practice in well integrity is a key strategy for managing impacts associated
with CSG activities as it ensures strong governance and rigorous practices and
standards in well development to prevent the uncontrolled release of fluids, solids and
gases into the environment over the full life cycle of the well.”27
Unfortunately, the existence of “well documented industry standards, codes of
practice, procedures, technical reports and industry experience that should be
23
Ibid., 3 Apply a hierarchy of risk control measures to all aspects of the CSG project, p19
‘Cause of WA Oil Spill Revealed’ 10 November 2009, www.watoday.com.au [online] Accessed 21
February 2013
25
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p36
26
“Wednesbury unreasonableness is a ground for review of administrative decisions, where the
exercise of an administrative power is so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so
exercised the power”. Associated Provincial Picture Theatre Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation
[1948] 1 KB 223 [in] Submission to the Law Council of Australia to the Negligence Review Panel on
The Review of the Law of Negligence 2 August 2002, p19
27
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p24
24
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considered in the design, construction, operation, maintenance and decommissioning
of CSG wells and associated facilities”28 are not mandatory. Practice shows that
conditional requirements are easy to circumvent and difficult to enforce.
11.2 The Draft Framework states:
“Successful application of leading practice in well integrity depends not only on this
comprehensive regulatory regime, but also on consistent compliance by industry and
thorough and effective enforcement by qualified regulators.”
The problem with this statement is that experience shows that consistent compliance
is difficult to achieve when enforcement processes are weak. For example, the Royal
Commission into the ESSO Longford, Gippsland 1999 gas explosion that killed two
men found that a “major contributing factor was the fact that Esso had not carried
out a critical hazard identification process, standard in the industry, know as a
HAZOP (short for hazard and operability study, see Bahr, 1997)”… The Royal
Commission severely criticized Esso’s safety management system (OIMS) and the
auditing of that system… The failure of audits to identify problems revealed in postdisaster inquiries is unfortunately commonplace.29 (my emphasis).
11.2 The National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 1992
(NSESD), Mining Part 2, Sectoral Issues, Chapter 5 already lists a number of
environmental and social objectives.30 Mining and exploration activities must also be
assessed under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC
Act) and various Environmental Effects Statement processes. The problem is that
regulations are often weakly applied and final approvals, resting as they do with the
relevant Minister, are often influenced by political motives rather than environmental
concerns.
12. Water Management and Monitoring
12.1 Nothing is more critical to Australia’s economic, social and environmental
prosperity and wellbeing than water (as the Draft Framework acknowledges). 31 The
Draft Framework also notes that the National Water Initiative recognises that “water
productivity and efficiency of Australia’s water use, the need to service rural and
urban communities, and to ensure the health of river and groundwater systems by
establishing clear pathways to return all systems to environmentally sustainable
levels of extraction” is a “continuing national imperative”.32 The Draft Framework
outlines numerous risks from CSG exploration and mining to water security.
Logically, such threats to water security should be prohibited as a matter of national
interest.
12.2 As the Draft Framework notes, CSG mining uses huge amounts of water:
“The annual recharge of the Great Artesian Basin has been estimated to be 1000 GL
per year (CSIRO, 2008). However recharge rates are highly variable and difficult to
measure. The current total water production for the CSG industry in the Great
28
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p28
Andrew Hopkins PhD, Australian National University, Lessons from Esso’s Gas Plant Explosion at
Longford, www.sirfrt.com.au [online] Accessed 21 February 2013
30
www.environment.gov.au [online] Accessed 20 February 2013
31
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p40
32
Ibid., p46
29
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Artesian Basin is estimated to be 18 000 ML per year. However, the CSG industry is
still in early development and this figure is expected to increase to 95 000 ML per
year over the life of the industry. In the Surat basin, which is part of the Great
Artesian Basin, some 21 000 water bores are located within the designated Surat
cumulative management area. According to the Queensland Water Commission, these
bores extract approximately 215 000 ML per year (QWC, 2011), generally for
agriculture and stock and domestic uses.” 33
This enormous water consumption puts at risk supply for other activities, especially
food production. The Draft Framework acknowledges that CSG exploration and
mining directly competes with agriculture for land and water resources,34 but
agriculture is already being destroyed by mining activities even in areas of prime
agricultural land.
12.3 Recycling and reinjection of water will generally not be feasible given that the
water will inevitably be contaminated whatever measures are taken. Although the
Draft Framework suggests that restrictions on water reuse dams are being
implemented, the concept of “maximising the potential beneficial use of co-produced
water” does not seem practicable if “ensuring that CSG activities do not impact on
other water users in the short and long term” is to be the objective.35 Such technical
barriers perhaps explain why the “issue has not been widely addressed” in
Australia.36
12.4 Evaporation Dams
12. 4. 1 As the Draft Framework notes elsewhere, under predicted Climate Change
scenarios, extreme flood events such those experienced in Queensland and NSW in
2011 and 2013 are likely to be more frequent and more severe. It is fanciful to think
that any evaporation dam under current design standards will withstand such flooding.
Contamination is inevitable. As evidence, the Queensland Floods Commission of
Inquiry 2012 is most instructive—devoting pages to the problem—on the impacts of
the 2011 flooding on mining infrastructure:
“Prolonged rainfall over Queensland’s mining regions during the 2010/2011 wet
season severely affected the industry. Huge volumes of water poured into pits and
leaked into underground areas. Following years of drought, some mines had been
designed to catch as much runoff as possible. Storage facilities and dams became so
full that operators were forced to pump excess water into pits. Access to equipment,
storage facilities and monitoring sites was cut. Gigantic mining equipment was
swamped by floodwaters.”37
12.4.2 The Queensland Flood Commission warns:
“Whatever
role it plays, water used in, or resulting from, mining operations is likely to
come into contact with contaminants, such as salts and metals. As a result, it will
often be of lower quality than fresh water in rivers and creeks. In light of water’s
33
Ibid., p68
Ibid., p72
35
Ibid., p46
36
Ibid., p47
37
www.floodcommission.qld.gov.au, Chapter 13 Mining, p350 [online] Accessed 25 February 2013.
34
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status as a tool used in mining operations and a product of such activities, most mines
have facilities to store both fresh water and contaminated, or mine-affected, water.
During times of flood, storage facilities of this type may be overwhelmed by the influx
of water.”38
The Commission further reports that releases of contaminated water were authorised
to prevent flooding of mines and other infrastructure and, in one case, to prevent a
“dam from collapsing”39 And, in one case, “a non-compliant discharge of
contaminated water occurred on 15 March 2011”,40 proving conclusively that one
way or another contamination will occur. This fact is supported by the Commission’s
Recommendation 13.8 that unless discharges are prohibited (which seems unlikely, if
not impossible), discharges during times of heavy rainfall and flood will need to be
authorised as part of the emergency response,41 the key concern becoming how to
minimise environmental harm both during and after floods.42
12.5 Interestingly, the CSIRO, which the Draft Framework mentions, warns:
“Australia must plan for a variable water future” and “the delivery of sustainable
water supplies in Australia will require water managers and engineers to factor in a
range of predicted variations in climate and long-term demand for water resources”43
Incredibly, any reference to climate change impacts is absent from the Draft
Framework.
14 Hydraulic Fracturing
14.1 The scientific evidence is that hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” is not safe.
Aside from chemical toxicity there is also the impacts on seismic activity, even, as the
Draft Framework notes, the “[p]otential for seismic events of sufficient magnitude to
cause damage at the surface”.44 Many areas of Australia are subject to seismic
activity and it would be stupid and unreasonable to add to the earthquake risk by
allowing fracking in these areas.
15 Chemical Use
15.1 Risks from chemicals are exacerbated when the consequences of using a cocktail
of chemicals is unquantifiable and, in many cases, unknown because chemicals used
are often “commercial in confidence”.45
15.2 Hazard assessment protocols are largely aspirational because rigorous scientific
analysis has not be done with, reportedly: “
38
Ibid., p352
Ibid., 13.2 Flooding at mine sites, p354 to 355
40
Ibid., p356
41
Ibid., p361 Recommendations
42
Ibid., 13.5.2 The need for timely approvals, p363; 13.5.5 Adequacy of DERM’s response to flooding,
p366; 13.6 A third way – emergency directions?, p367
43
www.csiro.au [online] Accessed 21 February 2013
44
The Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas 2012, p37
45
Submissions to the 2012 Review of the National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment
Scheme - Doctors for the Environment Australia Inc. (DEA), www.health.gov.au [online] Accessed 21
February 2013; see also Draft Framework, p63.
39
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“Only two of the twenty-three most commonly used fraccing chemicals [having] been
assessed by the national regulator (NICNAS), and neither of these has been
specifically assessed for use in fraccing.”46
Moreover, Government authorities have generally been very dismissive of reports of a
range of strange illnesses, both mental and physical, from people living close to
mines. Warnings of a public health catastrophe47 generally go unheeded, although the
NSW Health has recently called for a ''comprehensive assessment of potential risks to
human health'' following plans to drill for coal seam gas in western Sydney.48
15.3 Setting aside but not forgetting the substantial personal costs, the increasing
public burden of providing health services means that public health and safety must
be central to decision-making on CSG exploration and mining. Doctors for the
Environment have presented submissions to two parliamentary committees stating
that “the assessment, monitoring and regulation of CSG exploration and mining
activities are inadequate to protect the health of current and future generations of
Australians”.49 In the absence of full and proper scientific testing, people living near
coal seam gas operations are being treated as guinea pigs for the study of
environmental toxicology,50 yet another example where the Precautionary Principle is
not being enacted.
15.4 In view of these concerns, the key ethical and financial questions must be: Are
the perceived benefits of CSG exploration and mining superior to good health? Is it
ethical for a few mining magnates to maximise their wealth at the expense of the good
health of ordinary people, including children, and future generations? In the absence
of settled science are governments inviting yet another toxic time bomb similar to the
asbestos, tobacco, mercury, lead, and chemical sprays crises. Is it reasonable—is it
ethical, is it democratic even—for Governments to use taxpayer dollars to fund this
inequitable transfer of wealth and wellbeing from the many to the few and cause
untold misery in the process?
16 Conclusion
The biggest flaw in the Draft National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal
Seam Gas is that it is premised only on a very narrow range of “micro” issues. Not
even the impacts on public health are considered. It ignores the broader issue of the
impacts our fossil fuel industries have on greenhouse gas emissions. It is impossible
to assess the real impacts of coal seam gas exploration and mining in a contextual
policy vacuum that ignores the macro impacts of 4 to 6 degrees of global temperature
rises by this century’s end.51 In the face of that knowledge, it seems idiotic to spend
time looking at local impacts of CSG exploration and mining when the planet is
confronting a climate catastrophe. It is irrational, even unconscionable, for the Federal
46
Dr. Marion Carey, Coal Seam Gas: future bonanza or toxic legacy? [in] Viewpointmagazine.com.au
[online] Accessed 17 February 2013, p28. See also: www.nicnas.gov.au, Accelerated assessment of
industrial chemicals in Australia [online] Accessed 24 February 2013.
47
Ibid., p28
48
Ben Cubby, Full Coal Seam Gas Health Check ‘Essential’, Illawarra Mercury, 13 January 2013
[online] www.illawarramercury.com.au
49
http://dea.org.au [online] Accessed 21 February 2013
50
Dr. Marion Carey, Coal Seam Gas: future bonanza or toxic legacy? [in] Viewpointmagazine.com.au
[online] Accessed 17 February 2013
51
The Global Carbon Project, www.globalcarbonproject.org. Widely reported in Australia’s media in
December 2012.
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Government to implement a Carbon price (tax) on the one hand, while supporting and
even subsidising with taxpayers’ money, the expansion of fossil fuel dependence.
The “bottom line” is that more CSG exploration and mining will further increase
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. We are already the world’s highest per capita
greenhouse polluter. The Federal Government is subsidising electricity generators to
the tune of some five billion dollars per annum.52 Yet, the impacts of extreme fires,
floods and storms are already crippling our economy, demoralising communities and
taking lives. On top of this, our Governments intend to wreak even more misery on
their citizens by facilitating widespread CSG exploration and mining even to the back
doors of people’s homes, destroying their wealth, health, happiness and even their
lives! I respectfully implore you to reconsider this disastrous policy direction.
52
Bruce Mountain, director,Carbon and energy markets (CME): Transitional assistance or windfall
profits? The financial impact of the carbon price and compensation payments on Victoria’s brown coal
generators. A report for Environment Victoria, February 2013, www.carbonmarkets.com.au [online
pdf]
Hildebrant
Draft Framework CSG/28 February 2013
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