Intervention Summary Title: Voluntary Core Funding Support to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 2011 – 2015 What support will the UK provide? 1. In 2011 DFID carried out an assessment of the effectiveness of 43 multilateral agencies that receive funding from the UK. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) showed that UNICEF performed very well against the review’s criteria and offered very good value for money for UK aid funds. However, it also identified a number of reforms which are needed to further strengthen the organisation. The Secretary of State has agreed that DFID should provide £40m in annual voluntary core funding to UNICEF for the next 2 years, after which decisions about funding will be based on progress against MAR reforms. 2. The provision of voluntary core funding allows UNICEF to operate globally and will cover the cost of administering its work as well as investing in specific programmes and projects at country level to deliver results for children. Providing voluntary core funds will also allow the UK, through its position on UNICEF’s Executive Board, to support organisation-wide reforms that need to occur at the same time as supporting UNICEF to deliver results in key UK policy priority areas. 3. This business case provisionally allocates £160 million of voluntary core funding support over the period of 2011- 2015 to UNICEF. For financial years (FYs) 2011/12 and 2012/13 voluntary core funding will be paid at £40m each year. In FY 2013/14 a mid-point review will be undertaken to assess progress against key reforms in areas identified as weak by the MAR, including UNICEF’s delivery in humanitarian emergencies and results reporting. The outcome of the mid-point review will allow DFID to decide if voluntary core funding should be maintained at £40 million per year, increased, decreased or whether voluntary non-core funding should instead be provided to specific programmes. In the meantime, indicative funding levels for FYs 2013/14 and 2014/15 remain at £40 million per year. 4. In addition to the voluntary core funding support that is covered in this business case, DFID country offices will provide voluntary non-core funding for specific projects. Country offices will prepare separate business cases but should take into account the organisational weaknesses that were identified by the MAR. DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department is also providing voluntary non-core funding support to UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Operations (EMOPS). In 2010 the UK provided a total of $225.5 million of voluntary non-core funding support through thematic or country level projects. Why is UK support required? 5. Multilateral organisations are an essential part of the international system for humanitarian and development aid. They have a global presence and the legitimacy to work even in politically sensitive contexts where national governments are not welcome. This is particularly true of UNICEF. It is the UN agency which is mandated to advocate for the protection and promotion of the rights of the child, to meet children’s basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. It has a strong poverty focus and plays a critical role in meeting UK and international development objectives, including delivery of the Millennium Development Goals. 6. UK core funding to UNICEF will contribute to the achievement of results which are important to the UK, including improving child and maternal health, better nutrition, access to water and sanitation, girls’ education, HIV / AIDS and child-sensitive social protection. It will allow UNICEF to provide vital support and coordination in humanitarian emergency situations where it is the cluster lead agency for nutrition, water and sanitation and hygiene, and education (co-lead). UNICEF also has a substantive role in the health and protection clusters. What are the expected results? Outputs 7. Through this voluntary core funding contribution DFID expects to see UNICEF continuing to deliver results for poor people on the ground and making progress against the key reform priorities identified through the MAR. In particular, the provision of this funding will support UNICEF to: Improve its leadership and delivery in rapid onset humanitarian emergencies and protracted crises; Strengthen its monitoring and reporting of results at the organisational level; Maintain its performance in areas where the MAR identified it was performing satisfactorily, particularly its programme delivery at a country level; Demonstrate how it is driving down costs, achieving value for money and increasing transparency. Outcomes and Impact 8. At the end of the 4 year period, DFID expects UNICEF to have achieved the outcome targets set out in its own Medium-Term Strategic Plan results framework and to show evidence of this. It is also expected that UNICEF will maintain its ‘very good’ MAR assessment and improve on those areas assessed as ‘weak’. At the impact level, we expect UNICEF to contribute towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 9. UNICEF’s organisational results framework and reporting is currently weak and cannot be used to assess how UNICEF is delivering on the ground. Addressing this issue is one of DFID’s top reform priorities. For the first two years, the project’s logical framework (logframe) will therefore principally track progress against MAR reform priorities. After the mid-point review has been undertaken in 2013/14 DFID will revisit the logframe and, where possible, update this to include more of UNICEF’s own indicators to monitor the development results supported by DFID’s voluntary core funding. Business Case for: United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Strategic Case A. Context and need for DFID intervention Summary of Need 10. The UK’s Multilateral Aid Review found that UNICEF was providing very good value for money for UK aid investment and that it has a critical role in making progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, especially those relating to child and maternal health, girls education and HIV / AIDS. UNICEF’s important role in ensuring children’s basic needs are met and its clear links to DFID’s priorities demonstrate the need for the UK to continue to provide voluntary core funding to support its essential work. However, there are a number of organisational reforms that need to be addressed in the short term and DFID will work closely with UNICEF to ensure that these are taken forward. Background and International Response 11. Globally the under-five mortality rate has decreased from 89 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 60 in 20091. Yet over 8 million children under the age of five still died in 20092. 22% of children in developing countries are moderately or severely underweight 3, only 82% of one year olds are immunised for DPT3 (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus)4, 68 million primary school aged children are not in school5 and an estimated 2.5m children (0-14 years) are living with HIV6. 12. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has a critical role within the multilateral system in addressing these challenging issues. It is the UN agency mandated to advocate for the protection and promotion of the rights of the child, to meet children’s basic needs and expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. Its work on issues such as improving child and maternal health (including through better nutrition and access to water and sanitation), girls’ education, HIV / AIDS and child protection including child-sensitive social protection are critical to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals overall. UK Priorities and UNICEF 13. UNICEF is a critical partner in achieving many of the UK’s development and humanitarian objectives. The UK government has placed particular emphasis on reducing the impact of malaria; improving reproductive, maternal and newborn health; and improving girls’ education and UNICEF has an important role to play: Malaria: The UK is committed to reducing the impact of malaria, as described in its ‘Framework for Results for Malaria in the Developing World’7. The framework highlights 1 http://www.childinfo.org/mortality.html http://www.childinfo.org/mortality.html 3 http://www.childinfo.org/undernutrition_status.html 4 http://www.childinfo.org/immunization.html 5 http://www.childinfo.org/education.html 6 http://www.childinfo.org/hiv_aids.html 7 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/prd/malaria-framework-for-results.pdf. Published in December 2010. 2 UNICEF’s important role as an advocate for the health and well-being of children; its procurement of insecticide treated bednets (ITNs) and long-lasting insecticidal bednets (LLINs); and its support at the country level in implementing evidence-based malaria policy and strengthening the integrated delivery of malaria interventions within wider health care programmes. Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health (RMNH). The UK Government is committed to improving RMNH8. It is also important that multilateral agencies deliver results more efficiently and effectively in this area. The UK expects to see UNICEF provide strong technical and policy leadership on newborn health (especially at community level), girls and maternal under-nutrition and breastfeeding, and adolescent health more generally. UNICEF will also have an important role in developing and testing new approaches for scaling-up integrated programmes, working closely with other UN partners in the ‘H4+’9, and in championing a girl- and equity-focussed agenda at global and country levels. Girls’ Education. In March 2011, the UK set out ‘A New Strategic Vision for Girls and Women: Stopping Poverty Before it Starts’10. Getting girls through secondary school is one of the key aims identified and requires a focus on all girls completing primary education with good learning achievement so that they can progress to secondary level. UNICEF’s emphasis on improving gender equality in education and targeting the world’s most disadvantaged children will contribute to this aim. We would like to see UNICEF ensure that its technical expertise and coordinating role in girls’ education at the country level is consistently delivered across its programmes. 14. UNICEF also has a number of other critical roles in the international system, including in relation to wider UK policy priorities: UNICEF has a global presence, delivering programmes in more than 150 countries including those which the World Bank classifies as low income or lower middle income and all those which the UK considers to be fragile. This allows it to deliver aid on a large scale with the support of key NGO partners and national governments where appropriate. Its mandate allows it to deliver on international agreements in relation to the rights of the child in a way that individual countries cannot match. Its legitimacy, authority and universality are a key strength and its neutrality allows it to play a unique role in humanitarian crises. UNICEF is able to implement at scale packages of services aimed at maternal, newborn and child survival, including nutrition and water and sanitation. UNICEF delivers low-cost, low-technology and high impact interventions such as the provision of vaccines, antibiotics, micronutrient supplementation, insecticide-treated bednets, improved breastfeeding practices and the adoption of safe water, sanitation and hygiene practices. In 2010, UNICEF assisted an estimated: 293m children with 2 doses of vitamin A supplement; 42m people with bednets; 7,700 health centres with improved emergency obstetric care facilities; 3.8m households with access to improved drinking water; and 2.1m households with improved sanitation facilities11. 8 Choices for Women: Planned Pregnancies, Safe Births and Healthy Newborns: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/prd/RMNH-framework-for-results.pdf 9 H4+ refers to the UN Health 4 group (an intensified effort by WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF and World Bank to support countries in improving maternal and newborn health and saving the lives of mothers and babies) plus UNAIDS. 10 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/strategic-vision-girls-women.pdf 11 Source: Annual Report of the Executive Director 2011, UNICEF UNICEF has an essential role in humanitarian emergencies and 28% of its income was earmarked for this purpose in 2010. It is the cluster lead for nutrition, water and sanitation and hygiene, and education (co-lead). It also has a substantive role in the health and protection clusters. The scale of its operations cannot be delivered by other multilateral organisations although there are some concerns that it could be spread too thinly by taking a lead role in so many areas. The next two years are therefore a vital opportunity for UNICEF to demonstrate its leadership of humanitarian clusters and set a benchmark for others to follow. UNICEF has a unique role in advocating for children’s rights and protecting them from violence, exploitation and abuse (for example, contributing towards the elimination of female genital mutilation / cutting), including through social protection systems which it aims to make more child sensitive. It puts a child focus on other issues such as HIV / AIDS where it works to prevent mother to child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV, provide paediatric treatment, prevent HIV infection among adolescents and to protect and support affected children. UNICEF is pioneering an equity approach to achieving the MDGs, emphasising the need to identify the most vulnerable and poorest children and make them top priority. Multilateral Aid Review Findings 15. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) was commissioned by DFID’s Secretary of State to assess the value for money and impact provided by multilateral agencies that receive funding from the UK. Overall it found UNICEF to be providing very good value for money but also identified that UNICEF’s performance needs to improve in a number of areas. 16. The MAR found that UNICEF’s strengths included: its strong poverty focus and critical role in meeting UK and international development objectives; the good results it achieves at the country level through its development-focused programmes; its partnerships with governments and civil society in-country and emphasis on building the capacity of local partners; its good progress on gender, including its significant advocacy role for girls’ education and promoting sex-disaggregated data. 17. Areas where UNICEF’s performance needs to significantly improve are: Better humanitarian delivery. UNICEF has a vital operational and leadership role in delivering international humanitarian objectives but its performance has been chronically inconsistent, particularly in terms of its leadership of clusters (globally and on the ground). Concerns remain about UNICEF’s ability to recruit and deploy the right staff to lead clusters, cluster coordination, effectiveness in working with NGOs and its timeliness and predictability in transferring funds to implementing partners. Improve its monitoring and reporting of results. UNICEF was assessed as having weak strategic and performance management by the MAR. Its organisational development results framework contains limited information on outputs, its corporate reporting doesn’t systematically report against the framework, and there is too often a focus on activities rather than results. UNICEF needs to strengthen its monitoring and reporting of the expected and actual results (outputs and outcomes) of its interventions at the organisational level in order to build its organisational effectiveness and to demonstrate impact, attribution, and value for money. Greater leadership and more strategic partnerships in the UN system. The MAR identified concerns about UNICEF’s inconsistent approach to working effectively with other UN agencies. We would like to see UNICEF providing strong leadership to realise a more efficient, effective and coherent UN. Improvements in cost control and transparency. Whilst UNICEF has been taking positive steps to improve cost control, including reducing its administration to programme ratio, it does not comprehensively report on the cost efficiency of its operations. Although it publishes some programme information, its transparency does not yet meet the highest standards. 18. The MAR also identified weaknesses in other areas of UNICEF’s performance, including climate change and environmental sustainability. The UK is clear that it does not want to see UNICEF broadening its mandate. However, we do want to see UNICEF addressing environmental sustainability issues in its programming and mainstreaming climate change within its projects where appropriate. Examples could be utilising its education programmes to increase awareness about the value of environmental and natural resources to society, planning for climate resilience and environmental sustainability in its water and sanitation programmes, or disposal of project supplies following humanitarian emergencies. Likelihood of Positive Change 19. UNICEF’s Executive Director and senior management have committed to reform. The Executive Director has also specifically acknowledged the reform priorities that were highlighted in the Multilateral Aid Review. Previously the pace of change within UNICEF has been slow and it is hoped that the Executive Director, who has only been in post for just over a year, will be able to push reform throughout the organisation at a faster pace. Support from UNICEF’s Executive Board will also be essential to achieving reform. However, in the past there appears to have been some resistance from the Board to major reforms around humanitarian issues and UN reform. The UK must therefore undertake ongoing engagement with members around our priorities. Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) Findings 20. The findings of the HERR, an independent review into how the UK responds to humanitarian emergencies, were released in March 2011. The UK Government’s detailed response was presented by the Secretary of State in June 2011. The HERR gave as an example UNICEF’s successful role in supplying infant nutrition in Niger but identified failures of leadership and response in other cases, notably Haiti, as vital areas of concern. This chimes with the findings of the MAR and highlights that in recent large scale disasters shortcomings have been identified in the international systems’ humanitarian response. The review highlights leadership as one of seven key themes to be addressed. 21. The UK Government in its response to the HERR makes a key commitment to work with other donors to support the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC, the main mechanism for coordination of humanitarian assistance) and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) in their efforts to improve humanitarian leadership at an operational and humanitarian level, including in relation to humanitarian clusters. The UK, with Norway, USA, Sweden and Japan, has already written (in early 2011) to the IASC to set out some key issues for improving leadership and management of clusters12. In response, IASC principals13, including UNICEF’s Executive Director, have highlighted their commitment to making the changes necessary to deliver quantifiable improvements in humanitarian outcomes. 22. The actions agreed by the IASC principals include: Leverage the Humanitarian Coordination Pool better and increase support to Humanitarian Coordinators on Country Team management and strategy development. Form a high-level task team to make recommendations to refocus the responsibilities of cluster leads and partners on coordinating the response for results, address issues of mutual accountability, define minimum criteria for cluster participation and clarify the definition of provider of last resort. Provide guidelines for improving cluster coordination within national structures. Pilot a peer review system to enhance accountability for performance. 23. It is essential that UNICEF delivers against these actions and focuses not only on strengthening performance in rapid onset emergencies but also in complex humanitarian emergencies and protracted crises14. It is also important that UNICEF contributes to developing appropriate measures for assessing humanitarian cluster performance. UNICEF’s Funding Table 1: Income (millions of US$)15 Voluntary core income Voluntary non-core income (regular) Voluntary non-core income (emergency) Total % voluntary core 2007 1,106 1,379 528 3,013 37% 2008 1,085 1,570 735 3,390 32% 2009 1,066 1,527 663 3,256 33% 2010 965 1,694 1,023 3,682 26% 24. In 2010, UNICEF’s total expenditure was $3,651m of which $3,355m was used for programme assistance and $276m (8%) covered administrative costs16. The UK’s voluntary core funding represented 3% of UNICEF’s total voluntary core funding income and 13% of total UK Government support to the agency. UNICEF’s voluntary core funding income has declined in recent years, falling from $1,106m (37% of total income) in 2007 to $965m (26%) in 2010. 12 Identified through Cluster Approach Evaluation 2 Synthesis Report (April 2010). The Heads of IASC member agencies. 14 Rapid onset disasters are humanitarian crises such as tsunamis, floods, earthquakes or hurricanes where immediate intervention is required for up to 3-6 months. Complex emergencies are humanitarian crises where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict which may require a humanitarian international response. A protracted crisis may cover situations such as long-term displacement or chronic food insecurity. A slow onset emergency occurs gradually over time, often based on a confluence of different events such as drought or deterioration of political stability. 15 Source: Annual Report of the Executive Director 2011 and Report on Regular Resources 2009, UNICEF 16 The remaining $22m (less than 1%) was spent on write-offs ($3m, primarily related to uncollectible receivables from old expired contributions) and support budget transfers ($19m, income taxes paid by UNICEF on behalf of the citizens of a government that contributes to UNICEF regular resources). 13 Table 2: Top 10 donors in 2010 (millions of US$, rounded to one decimal place)17 Country Donor Type Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Total Core ($) Core Non-Core Non-Core (% total) ($) (% total) USA Government 132.3 13.7% 208.4 7.7% 340.7 UK Government 32.6 3.4% 225.5 8.3% 258.1 Norway Government 70.2 7.3% 134.7 5.0% 205.0 Japan National 148.2 15.4% 45.4 1.7% 193.6 Committee Japan Government 15.2 1.6% 159.9 5.9% 175.0 Netherlands Government 42.7 4.4% 116.0 4.3% 158.8 European Inter145.6 5.4% 145.7 Commission Governmental Canada Government 17.4 1.8% 117.2 4.3% 134.6 US Fund for National 12.7 1.3% 116.0 4.3% 128.8 UNICEF Committee Spain Government 29.2 3.0% 98.2 3.6% 127.5 B. Impact and Outcome Impact 25. At the impact level DFID expects its core funding to support UNICEF to contribute towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly those relating to education, gender equality, child and maternal health, combating HIV / AIDS and malaria, and water and sanitation. UNICEF's Medium Term Strategic Plan states that 'the Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals provide a set of shared international priorities with worldwide consensus and a 2015 horizon. Their commitments and targets are directly supported by UNICEF as a matter of priority.' Outcome 26. At the outcome level, DFID expects to see a more efficient and effective UNICEF in the delivery of its development and humanitarian programmes. UNICEF should be delivering results for poor people in development and humanitarian contexts and achieving its own outcome level targets, as set out in the Results Framework for its Strategic Plan. In particular, we would like to see results in the policy areas of greatest importance to the UK. UNICEF should also strengthen its organisational effectiveness for delivering these results. We would like UNICEF to maintain its ‘very good’ overall rating in the MAR and improve its score against key areas of the MAR assessment where it was found to be weak (Strategic and Performance Management) and against areas where it was found to be satisfactory but within which there were particular issues of concern (Contribution to Results in humanitarian situations and Partnership Behaviour with other UN agencies). Outputs 27. At the output level the UK focus is on achieving specific reform priorities identified by the MAR and ensuring that UNICEF continues to deliver development results on the ground: 28. Output 1. UNICEF improves its leadership and delivery in rapid onset humanitarian emergencies and protracted crises. We want to see UNICEF: 17 UNICEF Compendium of Contributions by Main Donors, 2010. strengthen its leadership and strategic management of clusters (globally and on the ground), including by ensuring that better qualified and experienced personnel are rapidly deployed at the outset of an emergency; clearly delineating responsibilities with partners based on comparative advantage; and adhering to the terms of reference for cluster leads. deliver the key activities to which it has committed in order to achieve the IASC commitment of quantifiable improvements in humanitarian outcomes; mainstream its humanitarian work in its new Strategic Plan (to be implemented from 2014) and allocate to it an appropriate package of funding from regular resources; make timely, predictable disbursements of funding to its implementing partners in emergencies. These reforms would enable UNICEF to significantly improve its delivery of life saving interventions and protection and to work in support of a more strategic, accountable humanitarian system. 29. Output 2. UNICEF strengthens its monitoring and reporting of results at the organisational level. We want to see UNICEF develop a robust results framework for its next Strategic Plan (to be implemented from 2014) which demonstrates a clear results chain from inputs to outputs to outcomes to impact and contains measurable monitoring indicators with baselines, milestones and targets which can be reported against annually. UNICEF should also be able to demonstrate a clear link between its budget and development results. In addition we expect to see UNICEF strengthen its annual reporting to the Executive Board, systematically demonstrating the results it has achieved against the targets contained in its strategic plan. To achieve these reforms, it will be important to ensure appropriate internal results based management processes are in place. For example, UNICEF is currently rolling out a new ‘Enterprise Resource Planning’ system (VISION) which is expected to drive improvements in its results monitoring and reporting. 30. Output 3. UNICEF maintains its performance in areas identified as satisfactory or strong in the MAR, particularly its development programme delivery at a country level. It will be important that we find no evidence of slippage in the areas where UNICEF is currently doing well. UNICEF is critical to the achievement of many of the UK’s development objectives and the MAR found evidence of it delivering good results at the country level. We will therefore review UNICEF’s own reporting documents to assess delivery at the output level in the key UK policy areas of child and maternal health, nutrition, girls’ education, HIV / AIDS, malaria, water and sanitation and social protection. We expect UNICEF to continue providing strong technical and policy leadership in these areas and to continue to demonstrate effective delivery of results on the ground. We will also seek evidence of UNICEF’s progress in supporting measures to reduce female genital mutilation / cutting. In addition to UNICEF’s own reporting, we will seek feedback on delivery at a country level, including on the effectiveness of UNICEF’s partnerships with other UN agencies. 31. Output 4. UNICEF demonstrates how it is driving down costs, achieving value for money and increasing transparency. We would like to see UNICEF demonstrate how it is continuing to reduce its administrative costs in its Biennial Support Budgets and more systematically report on the cost efficiency of its operations and the value of savings achieved. DFID will encourage UNICEF to achieve the highest standards of transparency (e.g. by joining the International Aid Transparency Initiative) including publishing in full project information on its website. Appraisal Case A. Determining Critical Success Criteria (CSC) Each CSC is weighted 1 to 5, where 1 is least important and 5 most important based on the relative importance of each criteria to the success of the intervention. CSC Description for Results / Reform Executive Board backing for reform priorities. 1 UNICEF Executive Director and senior management team support and 2 3 4 5 implement reforms identified in the MAR UNICEF is able to recruit and deploy the right staff to cluster leadership positions and to undertake key cluster tasks, including common needs assessments, strategies, information management, accountability / reporting and inter-cluster coordination. Organisational reforms (particularly strengthened results frameworks) are enacted to allow UNICEF to be seen as an effective organisation. UNICEF delivers the results set out in its Strategic Plan, particularly in key UK policy areas (child and maternal health, nutrition, girls’ education, HIV / AIDS, social protection, water and sanitation). Weighting (1-5) 3 4 5 5 5 B. Feasible options 32. The MAR has identified key areas in which UNICEF delivers effectively as well as other areas where it is operationally and organisationally weak. This has defined our reform agenda. Whilst there are other areas which need reform and on which the UK could engage, the selected areas have been prioritised as those which we judge would result in the greatest improvements in organisational effectiveness and delivery on the ground. 33. DFID should use its funding to maximise the delivery of results and to support reform. Two financing options for achieving this are discussed below. Option 1 - Voluntary Core Funding 34. This type of funding is allocated to an institution (such as UNICEF) but is not tied to a particular theme or project. It can be spent against any activity that relates to UNICEF’s mandate as well as on UNICEF’s administration costs. Option 2: Voluntary Non-Core / Thematic Funding 35. This type of funding can be allocated against specific projects in country (for example, a nutrition project in Sierra Leone) or by a particular theme (such as young child survival and development). Once allocated it can not be spent on other issues beyond the scope of the original project or theme. For example, the UK has been providing voluntary noncore funding support to UNICEF’s Office of Emergency Programmes (£4m in 2011/12) in order to build capacity to improve the effectiveness of its humanitarian response since 2000. DFID has recently announced a further package of £18m over the period 2012/13 to 2014/15. C. Appraisal of options Option 1: Voluntary Core Funding 36. The benefits of this option are: It will enhance UNICEF’s ability to deliver results across its full mandate including in areas of importance to UK development objectives: child and maternal health, gender equality, education, HIV / AIDS and humanitarian emergencies (CSC 5). The UK’s role on UNICEF’s Executive Board will be strengthened, allowing us to continue to have leverage with the agency and Board members on key reforms. In 2010 the UK was the second largest donor to UNICEF. Overall, voluntary core funding to UNICEF is declining, now representing 26% of total resources compared to 33% the previous year. UNICEF needs to achieve an optimal balance between voluntary core funding and voluntary non-core funding resources to be organisationally effective. Reductions in voluntary core funding resources could affect UNICEF’s operations. The provision of UK voluntary core funding at a time when others’ contributions are decreasing therefore puts us in a strong position to leverage reform (CSC 1 and 2). UNICEF can use DFID’s funding to make organisational changes to address MAR reforms, building up its operational capacity to enable it to become more efficient and effective (CSC 3 and 4). It will allow UNICEF to remain financially viable and maintain a global presence, working in countries where DFID cannot but which still have a high need for support (CSC 5). UNICEF’s programme work will be more sustainable as UNICEF country offices can use voluntary core funding resources to ensure programme priorities are funded. It will also allow UNICEF to react quickly to changing circumstances without having to wait to raise voluntary non-core funds (CSC 5). DFID’s voluntary core funding to UNICEF represented 13% of total UK government support to the organisation in 2010. This demonstrates that supporting UNICEF’s organisational effectiveness by providing voluntary core funding allows UNICEF to be an important partner for other types of DFID support (CSC 5). 37. The costs of this option are: in the absence of a robust organisational result framework, DFID’s funding cannot be directly attributed to progress against specific development results (CSC 5). DFID will need to maintain significant policy engagement with UNICEF to ensure the funds are well spent. Option 2 – Voluntary Non-Core funding 38. The benefits of this option are: DFID can control more precisely where and how its funding is used by targeting specific programmes or themes which are important to UK development objectives and more robustly measure results (CSC 5). It would potentially allow DFID to reduce its central engagement with UNICEF and focus only on specific funded priorities (CSC 5). 39. The costs are: DFID would lose influence in the governing board of UNICEF and have reduced leverage over the key reforms that we need to see (CSC 1 and 4). Voluntary non-core funding is less flexible than voluntary core funding. It would only allow UNICEF to operate in those sectors or locations where donors provide adequate support. UNICEF would not be able to use the resources for programmes in other sectors or other countries which need support. This would reduce the effectiveness of UNICEF in reaching those most in need (CSC 5). Each grant would generate its own administrative burden for both DFID and UNICEF and impact on efficiency. None of this funding could be used to support administrative changes to address the areas identified as weak by the MAR (CSC 4). Consequences of Decreasing or Not Funding 40. Based on 2010 data, it is expected that UK voluntary core funding of £40 million will provide 6% of UNICEF’s total voluntary core resources in 2011. Significantly reducing or stopping DFID’s voluntary core funding would result in UNICEF reducing the number of programmes it was able to carry out on the ground. This would affect the achievement of UK development objectives, particularly where UNICEF has a critical role. 41. UNICEF would also have fewer resources to allocate flexibly to deliver organisational reforms. In addition, DFID’s influence with UNICEF and the Executive Board would be lessened, particularly on areas which speak to MAR priorities. On the other hand if DFID and other donors sharply reduced voluntary core funding this could create a strong momentum for change. DFID should assess progress on our reform agenda in two years’ time and then adjust its voluntary core funding levels accordingly. D. Comparison of options The same weighting is used as for CSC above. The score ranges from 1-5, where 1 is low contribution and 5 is high contribution, based on the relative contribution to the success of the intervention. Analysis of options against Critical Success Criteria Option 1 CSC Weight (1-5) Score (1-5) Weighted Score 1 3 5 15 2 4 5 20 3 5 3 15 4 5 5 25 5 5 3 15 Totals 90 Option 2 Score 2 2 5 1 5 - Weighted Score 6 8 25 5 25 69 Conclusion on options 42. DFID’s overall funding to UNICEF has traditionally included voluntary core funding (13% in 2010) combined with significant voluntary non-core funding by DFID country offices and DFID HQ policy teams. This combination of approaches represents a good balance. The voluntary core funding helps UNICEF to deliver development results across its mandate whilst the voluntary non-core funding ensures a clear line of sight between UK development priorities and UNICEF results. Without voluntary core funding support the UK would have significantly less influence over organisational reforms and UNICEF would therefore be a less attractive partner for other types of UK support. UNICEF needs voluntary core funds to support its global network and Headquarters policy staff, for the flexibility it provides in programming and to support reforms. 43. UNICEF is an important partner for many of the UK’s development objectives and its role in achieving the MDGs is critical. Its global reach on children’s issues and very good assessment by the MAR mean that continuing the UK’s voluntary core funding relationship for the next two years is the best way of supporting reforms. We will review progress against the reform priorities in 2 years time and could decrease or change our method of funding if progress has been too slow. 44. Funding option 1 is therefore preferred, supported by targeted engagement. Theory of Change for Option 1 45. The theory of change linking DFID funding and activities to the achievement of UK development objectives is set out below. 46. To deliver better results for children on the ground and contribute towards achievement of the MDGs, UNICEF needs to improve its organisational effectiveness through making the necessary reforms identified in the MAR. UN reform can be slow and difficult and the change we’d like to see can only be achieved through strong engagement by the UK with key stakeholders. Implementing real reform will also require strong leadership from UNICEF and the support of the Board’s membership. 47. Voluntary core funding is the mechanism which will best support this approach. It will allow UNICEF the flexibility to use its funding to cover both administrative costs and programme work to adapt to emerging priorities and to reform. It will also give the UK leverage with the agency and other members of the Executive Board. 48. DFID is not prepared to accept lower levels of performance from the UN than from other multilaterals. DFID will therefore need to do more to ensure we maximise our influence and create new partnerships to support change. We will be explicit with UNICEF on the reforms we need to see and will use our funding and influence to encourage performance improvements and to help sustain the reform process. The UK is well-placed to support UNICEF on this reform agenda due to our strong technical focus on results, humanitarian issues, value for money and transparency. 49. As a result of stronger UK engagement and strengthened support we expect key MAR reforms to be achieved and, in turn, UNICEF’s overall efficiency and effectiveness to improve. In particular, if the priority reforms identified here are taken forward, UNICEF will be better placed to make evidence based decisions about its own programming and to deliver effective outcomes on the ground (both in the development and humanitarian context) in the areas of its mandate which are important to the UK (child and maternal health, nutrition, girls education, HIV / AIDS, malaria, water and sanitation and social protection). E. Measures to be used or developed to assess value for money 50. DFID will use the same criteria to assess the value for money of its voluntary core funding contribution to UNICEF in two years time that were used in the MAR. In financial year 2013/14 a further review will be undertaken to assess progress against key reform areas identified as weak by the MAR, which included weak reporting on results, inconsistent humanitarian delivery and weak leadership and partnerships across the UN. As a result of the outcome of the mid-point review, DFID will decide if voluntary core funding should remain at £40m per year, or be increased, decreased or earmarked for specific programmes through voluntary non-core funding. In the meantime, indicative funding levels for UNICEF for 2013/14 and 2014/15 have been set at £40m per year. This approach will deliver maximum value for money for UK funding. 51. UNICEF publishes the average unit costs for its procurement of vaccines and we will take account of this, and any other available unit cost data, at the mid-point review. Commercial Case A. Value for money through Procurement 52. The MAR assessed UNICEF as ‘satisfactory’ in terms of cost and value consciousness. It has clear procurement guidelines in place but did not, at the time of the MAR, routinely report on unit costs and pricing achieved (savings) from its procurement activities. However in May 2011 UNICEF published details of the prices it pays for vaccines for the first time and this is expected to continue and be extended to a wider range of commodities. 53. UNICEF Supply Division (SD) oversees UNICEF’s global supply and logistics operation. The organisation procured a total value of $1.9 billion in 2010, 90% of which was for goods (although the value of services being procured is increasing). UNICEF buys about 5,000 different products annually, focused on emergency response and development. 54. UNICEF is largely decentralised and in principle the Country Office has primacy in procurement. However, since the purchase of certain specialised goods (those which require specific technical expertise to procure or where it is considered strategically important to influence the supply market) is centralised, in effect a lot of procurement is carried out centrally. Given UNICEF’s responsibilities for MDGs 4, 5 and 6, around 80% of its spend is on health and requires technical experts (e.g. pharmacists) and strong quality assurance for procurement. By undertaking this procurement centrally UNICEF is able to use its buying power to influence the market and achieve better prices for certain products. UNICEF’s Supply Division is also sometimes asked to support country offices to undertake local procurement. 55. HQ and Supply Division procurements are subject to international competition. Local buying is subject to national tendering, but country offices can tender regionally where appropriate. UNICEF has developed strategies for buying major individual products, such as bed nets or key pharmaceutical commodities; it is making greater use of category management approaches; it places achievement of best value for money as an overriding objective; and it does try actively to reduce the unit costs of products. Winning tenders are usually selected on the basis of the lowest priced acceptable offer, unless it is considered more efficient to work with one supplier. However, there is no overall procurement strategy or system for setting procurement savings targets. 56. UNICEF leads the work on reviewing procurement practices in One UN country offices as part of wider work on establishing a Common Scheme for Vendors to the UN system. 80% of its procurement is done in collaboration with other UN organisations and UNICEF works with UN partners, NGOs and others to avoid duplication and ensure that joint procurement takes place where possible. UNICEF’s aim is to transfer procurement capacity to partner governments. 57. We will discuss with UNICEF the possibility of asking DFID’s Procurement Division to undertake an in-depth review of UNICEF’s procurement capability. This would provide us with better knowledge of its systems and benefit UNICEF by identifying where further improvements could be made to enable better value for money. We will also engage with UNICEF on procurement issues through the Board. Financial Case A. How much it will cost 58. DFID will provide funding of up to £160m over the four year period 2011-2015. For 2011 and 2012, UNICEF will receive £40m per year. Depending on the results of our mid-term assessment in 2012 funding may increase or decrease in the outer 2 years. B. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin 59. The funding will be paid from DFID’s programme budget. C. How funds will be paid out 60. The annual £40m allocations will be released in two payments of £20 million during UNICEF’s financial year (January to December) to reduce the possibility of payment in advance of need. For 2011 DFID will make the two £20 million payments in August and October. In 2012 the payments will spread more evenly across UNICEF’s financial year and will be made in April and September. By September 2013 the mid-point review will have been completed and DFID will release funding for 2013 by October. For 2014 payments will be made in April and September. The timing of payments will be set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between DFID and UNICEF. 61. To ensure no payment in advance of need DFID will monitor UNICEF’s balance of voluntary core funding. In 2010 UNICEF’s unspent cash balance from voluntary core funding resources was $422m, a reduction from a high of $652m in 2008. The general practice of non-profit organisations, including the UN community, is to maintain a level of liquidity equivalent to 3-6 months expenditure. In UNICEF’s case this would be in the range $270m to $540m. The UK commits to being a good donor and to meeting the schedule of payments set out in our MoU, helping UNICEF to manage its reserves. We will continue to monitor UNICEF’s cash balance annually. D. How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for 62. UNICEF’s expenditure is monitored through the UK’s engagement at Executive Board meetings and bilaterally with UNICEF as required. These functions are carried out by both officials in the UK and also at the UK’s Mission to the UN in New York. 63. UNICEF provides a range of reports to the Executive Board that DFID uses to monitor its performance and account for DFID’s voluntary core funding contribution. The main reports are: Annual Report of the Executive Director (EDAR) and its Data Companion. This provides an overview of the results UNICEF has achieved over the year as well as measures of its organisational performance. It also presents details of expenditure by each of the 5 focus areas of UNICEF’s mandate and humanitarian expenditure. Biannual Financial Report and Audited Statements. These provide details of all income and expenditure in the biennium, including details of fund balances and reserves held at the end of the financial year; expenditure on programmes and on administration / management; and expenditure by region and country. These statements are audited by UN’s Board of Auditors and the last financial statement for the biennium ending 31 March 2009 received an unmodified audit opinion (i.e. there are no substantial issues to address). An interim financial report and statements are provided in the intermediate years. Annual Report on the Evaluation Function and Major Evaluations in UNICEF; Annual Report on Internal Audit Activities; Audit Advisory Committee Annual Report. These provide an overview of UNICEF’s programmatic performance, the risks facing the organisation and the steps needed to address any weaknesses. Management Case A. Oversight 64. UNICEF is managed by the Executive Director, Mr Anthony Lake, and his senior management team. It is governed by 36 member states of the UN, representing 5 regional groups. Composition of the board is African states (8 seats), Asian states (7 seats), Eastern European states (4 seats), Latin American and Caribbean states (5 seats) and Western European and Other states (12 seats). Each member has equal voice and voting rights. Non-board members can also participate in board sessions to express their views but do not have the right to vote. 65. Membership is rotational and the UK is currently a member of the governing board for 2010 to 2012. The Executive Board is subject to the authority of the UN Economic and Social Council and it meets three times a year to set policy direction and provide oversight. Its functions include: giving guidance to the Executive Director on the work of the organisation; monitoring the performance of UNICEF; approving programmes; and deciding on administrative and financial plans and budgets. 66. The work of the Executive Board is coordinated by a Bureau, comprising the President and four Vice-Presidents, each officer representing one of the five regional groups. The Board aims to take decisions by consensus. Meetings are held in public, unless the Board determines otherwise. It can invite states and participants who have an interest in any agenda items to participate in deliberations without the right to vote. If countries have serious concerns with UNICEF’s operations these are usually initially raised through bilateral contacts with the UNICEF Executive Director and senior management. 67. The MAR concluded that UNICEF has a satisfactory accountability framework in operation. An Audit Advisory Committee has been in operation since 2008 with the primary role of advising the Executive Director and informing the Executive Board on the functioning of the UNICEF oversight system. It assesses the programme of work of the Office of Internal Audit and the resources required to implement the programme of work and makes recommendations accordingly. It submits its annual report to the Executive Director which is then included in the annual report of the Office of Internal Audit and presented to the Executive Board. The five members of the Audit Advisory Committee are external to UNICEF and are appointed by the Executive Director who also designates a chairperson. The chairperson is invited to attend the Executive Board when the annual report is presented. 68. UNICEF’s Office of Internal Audit (OIA) undertakes audits, provides advice and carries out investigations. Its annual audit plan and the annual office work plan for internal improvement measures are reviewed and endorsed by the UNICEF Audit Advisory Committee, and OIA reports to that Committee on progress made. The audit plan is coordinated with the Evaluation Office and the external United Nations Board of Auditors. The Audit Advisory Committee Annual Report in 2009 noted that the quality assessment conducted by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) found the OIA to generally conform to their ‘Standards’ and their ‘Code of Ethics’. This provided the Committee, and the Executive Board, with a strong assurance on the high quality of the office’s work. 69. UNICEF also has an Ethics Office and policy in place since 2007 including whistle blower protection and a financial disclosure policy. 70. The UN Board of Auditors is UNICEF’s external auditor and is responsible for certifying UNICEF’s financial statements. Their report to the Board covers compliance and the proper use of resources as well as their economic, efficient and effective use. 71. Reports from all parts of UNICEF’s oversight machinery are presented to the Executive Board with management responses from the Executive Director. These provide an update on the implementation of any audit recommendations and an overview of the risks facing the organisation. All of the reports are available on UNICEF’s website. Executive Board members can comment on the reports and make suggestions to UNICEF which help to improve and strengthen its audit functions. 72. These functions allow the UK to exercise appropriate oversight of its funding. The UK actively participates in the Executive Board meetings and raises issues of concern through the Board and bilaterally as required. B. Management DFID Staffing / Resourcing 73. DFID has adequate staff resources to provide proportionate management and oversight of UK taxpayers’ funds. An A2 Results Adviser will dedicate 40% of her time to act as the institutional lead for UNICEF, including providing financial oversight, in addition to providing results advice across the UNCD portfolio. She will be supported by a B1 Deputy Programme Manager (DPM) who will be responsible for programme management, including Blue Book compliance, project reviews, briefings and payments. All programme management activities will be carried out in accordance with DFID procedures and oversight requirements. The A2 Results Adviser and B1 Deputy Programme Manager will support UKMis in representing the UK on the Executive Board of the agency during formal meetings in New York. 74. The UK Mission to the UN (UKMis) in New York is the focal point for face to face engagement with UNICEF, with guidance on policy being provided from HQ. UKMis will take the lead on issues where discussions are sensitive and a face to face meeting is required to ensure appropriate oversight. UKMis and UNCD will work closely on engagement with UNICEF and other stakeholders. 75. A Senior Humanitarian Adviser in CHASE will provide technical advice on the key reform priority of improved humanitarian leadership and delivery. His link to a network of humanitarian advisers in DFID country offices will assist us in establishing stronger engagement on country level humanitarian performance. Feedback from a small number of focus country offices will also provide an opportunity for engagement on wider performance and DFID will actively work to strengthen this dimension. 76. Policy Division (PD) will provide technical inputs and advice as co-ordinated by their designated lead for UNICEF. PD will also assist when information is gathered from country offices through providing guidance on technical questions to be used to draw out the most relevant information for further assessment purposes. 77. DFID’s Internal Audit Department will provide advice on key financial papers that are presented to UNICEF’s governing body. Board documents and reports will be scrutinised to ensure that funds are spent efficiently and effectively to maximise the potential impacts of UNICEF’s work. Procurement department will also provide advice and guidance on procurement issues as necessary. 78. The team will also draw on the expertise of other UNCD advisers as required. Engagement / Influencing 79. Given the complexities of creating change in the UN and the criticality of UNICEF to UK objectives, low engagement with UNICEF is not viewed as a viable approach since it is high risk, could result in limited progress and would not fulfil our responsibilities to the UK taxpayer. UNICEF was a strong performer in the MAR and we are proposing to provide £40m of voluntary core funding per year for the next two years. This necessitates a strong engagement with UNICEF, focussed on UK policy and reform priorities, to ensure that DFID’s funding delivers maximum value for money and results. 80. In order to manage DFID’s voluntary core funds, make progress on the MAR reform agenda and deliver results for children, DFID will increase its engagement with UNICEF over the next two years. We will seek to build stronger relations with UNICEF and other Executive Board members. We will develop a comprehensive stakeholder and institutional analysis to map the levers for and barriers to change and achieve maximum leverage from UNCD’s staff resources. DFID will also strengthen our engagement at a country level to understand UNICEF’s delivery of results on the ground. C. Conditionality 81. Funding for the first 2 years has been agreed by Ministers. The level of funding for 2013/14 and 2014/15 will be dependent on progress being made against the reform agenda which was set out in the MAR. If there is little or no progress further consideration will be required as to whether funding should be decreased or earmarked to specific programmes through voluntary non-core funding. D. Monitoring and Evaluation 82. As part of this business case DFID has developed a logical framework (logframe) which will be used to monitor progress annually. The logframe sets out the impact, outcome and outputs described in the Strategic Case alongside indicators which describe how these will be measured, baselines, milestones and targets for tracking progress. The baseline for our reforms in the logframe will be the MAR and for results will be information from UNICEF’s own development results framework. Given that improving results is a reform priority for UNICEF, DFID will only utilise indicators from its results frameworks where they are sufficiently robust and include both baselines and targets. 83. The logframe will be reviewed and scored annually to monitor what progress is being made. The logframe also clearly sets out the weights to be applied to each outcome indicator and output to calculate the annual score. Given that UNICEF’s own results framework and reporting is weak, greater weight will initially be given to reform progress (including on improving results management). 84. Annual reviews will assess progress through information provided by UNICEF in a range of different reports to the Executive Board (e.g. its Annual Report of the Executive Director and audit reports) and information it provides directly to DFID. This data is of sufficient quality to use as evidence for annual reviews. We will also seek feedback on UNICEF’s performance in a range of countries and from DFID humanitarian advisers who work with UNICEF in the field. Further information on humanitarian performance will be obtained from DFID response team country office monitoring (RIOT reports) and independently commissioned evaluations (e.g. on cluster coordination) as well as from internal monitoring processes being set up within CHASE. 85. The first annual review will assess UNICEF’s progress against the milestones set out in the logframe. At the mid-point review a more holistic review will be undertaken against the MAR reform priorities resulting in a decision about funding levels for 2013/14 and 2014/15. 86. The logframe itself will be re-assessed at each Annual Review and indicators, milestones and targets will be updated as appropriate to reflect, for example, the mid-term review in 2013 which may result in revised reform priorities. UNICEF will also be developing a new Strategic Plan for implementation from 2014 and this will mean that targets for indicators in its own results framework will need to be updated at that stage. UNICEF has also indicated that it is doing some internal thinking about how to monitor the UK’s reform priorities and we will, where possible, look to use its own monitoring evidence in the logframe when it is available. Evaluation 87. UNICEF operates a decentralised evaluation function with a central Evaluation Office (EO) performing a coordination role as well as undertaking global evaluations. UNICEF Country Representatives are responsible for in-country evaluations in accordance with norms established by the EO; Regional Directors are responsible for regional evaluations; and HQ Directors are responsible for evaluations of global policies and initiatives for which they are accountable. The EO fosters the professionalisation of the evaluation function, develops approaches and methodologies for evaluation, and maintains the institutional database of evaluations. UNICEF has also initiated a ‘Global Evaluation Quality Oversight’ system under which UNICEF’s evaluations are independently reviewed and rated against UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) / UNICEF Evaluation Report Standards. Reports meeting the satisfactory rating are made available in UNICEF’s Global Evaluation Database (GED). 88. The MAR recognised that UNICEF had made progress on evaluation, for example by taking forward recommendations to establish a predictable evaluation budget, provide additional interventions to strengthen and support field offices and to improve RBM throughout the organisation. However, further work is required to increase the independence of evaluations, maintain the proportion of the overall budget spent on evaluation and mitigate the impact of staff turnover. In particular, there remain concerns about the inconsistency of management responses to evaluations and more consistent use of evaluation materials in guiding strategic decisions is needed. 89. DFID will not conduct an in-depth evaluation of UNICEF’s work. However we will take opportunities, as they arise, to share our expertise and support UNICEF in its mission to strengthen its evaluation function. Our focus in the first two years of this intervention will be on engaging with UNICEF to improve its results frameworks and results based management as this is an important part of a strong evaluation function. However, we will also engage over this period on evaluations presented to the Board and provide statements or decisions as required on their quality and on the recommendations for follow-up. DFID will also seek to work with other likeminded donors on evaluation issues. Our future engagement with UNICEF will be guided by the development (by October 2011) of UNCD’s overarching evaluation strategy and on advice from DFID’s Evaluation Department. E. Risk Assessment 90. DFID’s voluntary core funding to UNICEF is judged to be medium risk overall. We have set out the four key risks to this intervention and our intended mitigation strategy below. Whilst these could have a high impact on the successful delivery of this intervention, we consider that they can be lessened through continued dialogue and engagement with other Board members and with UNICEF itself. These risks will be reviewed on an annual basis as part of the overall project review. Risks to this intervention 91. Other Executive Board members block reforms (likelihood: medium; impact: high). DFID will manage this risk by increasing our engagement with UNICEF and its Board. Senior officials from DFID, including the Head of UNCD, will engage more regularly with other likeminded donors to build support our reforms. UKMis will also engage with other influential Board members in New York. DFID will seek to build new relationships with emerging powers and will identify opportunities for top management and Ministerial engagement with key donor partners. 92. UNICEF management and staff fail to implement reforms (likelihood: medium; impact: high). To mitigate this risk, DFID will engage with UNICEF staff in middle, senior and high level grades to support its reform efforts. The UK should also be prepared to cut voluntary core funding if reform progress is too slow by the 2013 mid-point review. . 93. UNICEF’s perception of the importance of the UK’s reform agenda (likelihood: medium; impact: medium). The UK will increase its voluntary core funding to £40m at the same time as identifying key areas of reform which we would like the organisation to take forward. To mitigate the risk that increased funding could have a negative impact on UNICEF’s perceptions of the importance of reform, we will continue to emphasise the criticality of reform progress to future funding decisions in our dialogue with the agency and in statements and contributions to decisions delivered at the Executive Board. Any concerns raised through annual reviews of this intervention will be clearly communicated to UNICEF in terms of the potential implications for funding. 94. UNICEF’s internal systems do not support improvement in reporting on results (likelihood: medium; impact: high). In February 2011, UNICEF presented its latest Report of the Board of Auditors to the Executive Board. UNICEF received an unmodified audit opinion. However, a number of recommendations were made to address potential risks to the organisation and two were of particular relevance to this intervention. The auditors identified that IPSAS implementation could be affected by outdated communication and training plans impacting on UNICEF’s ability to report on results and that UNICEF’s forthcoming results based budget may be weak in terms of the quality of results which are specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound. To mitigate these risks, the Executive Board has requested UNICEF to update its IPSAS communication and training plan and to develop training courses for staff in respect of results-based budgeting methodology. The UK will continue to engage through the Executive Board on these issues. F. Results and Benefits Management 95. The logical framework sets out the impact, outcomes and outputs for this business case. It is based on UNICEF’s delivery of results on the ground (as set out in its own Strategic Plan, Results Framework and reporting) and achievement of reforms in the areas identified as weak by the MAR. If these are delivered this should lead to better, more efficient performance by the agency. Milestones have been included where possible to assess if progress is on track. 96. We will revisit the logframe at each annual review and, particularly, after the mid-point review in 2013 to ensure that the chosen indicators are still appropriate and to seek to introduce more targets which relate to UNICEF’s delivery of results and MAR reform areas. 97. At annual review, the logframe will be assessed as outlined in section E. This will require an assessment of whether milestones have been achieved as expected or whether there has been over- or under- achievement. In this context: Overachievement would constitute UNICEF demonstrating that it had achieved the milestones set out in the logframe and that it had either been judged a strong performer against the MAR reform areas with no slippage at all in all other areas by the mid-point review in 2013; or delivered greater than expected results in the UK’s key policy areas; or both. Underachievement would constitute UNICEF being judged to have made no, or limited, progress against the MAR reform areas; making some progress on MAR reforms but slipping on others; or concerns about the level of UNICEF’s delivery of development results by the mid-point review in 2013. 98. DFID will increase its engagement with DFID country offices and other non-focus countries to gather more feedback on UNICEF’s performance in country. 99. The logframe is annexed.