PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
Lecturer: Simon Skempton
Class teachers: Simon Skempton, Stefan Firth
Course description
Philosophy and Methodology of the Natural and Social Sciences is a one semester course for
second year ICEF students. The course provides a broad introduction to the main themes and issues
in the philosophy of science in general and the philosophy of social science in particular. It is
principally concerned with the epistemological, logical, metaphysical and ethical underpinnings of
scientific methodology. Fundamental philosophical questions are presented with a view to
demonstrating how they are relevant to and how they inform scientific inquiry. The course explores
topics such as, among others, the possibility of knowledge, the distinctiveness of science, the logic
of scientific method, scientific explanation, whether science describes reality or not, whether social
science should be based on the methods of natural science, the nature of practical rationality, the
place of ethical values in relation to science, and critiques of scientific rationality. All topics are
presented as problems and areas of dispute.
Course objectives
Aside from providing an introduction to the principal questions explored by the philosophy of
science and social science, the course aims to cultivate in students a critical awareness of the
assumptions and conditions that lie behind scientific theories and arguments. Upon successful
completion of the course, students should be able to analyse and judge the validity of an argument,
construct extended coherent arguments that engage critically with the existing philosophical
literature, apply and connect philosophical arguments to pertinent issues in the sciences
(particularly in those disciplines that they are currently studying) and use the conceptual resource
provided by the course to think logically, critically and independently. The particular content of the
course is relevant to scientific study in general and the skills that the course develops are
transferable and widely applicable in academic and professional life. The educational ethos of the
course is to contribute to the development of the students’ faculty of autonomous critical reasoning
rather than the robotic repetition of given information.
Teaching methods
The methods and forms of study used on this course include lectures, seminars, teachers’
consultations and students’ own self-study. There is one weekly lecture and one weekly seminar.
Each seminar is based on the contents of the preceding lecture. Seminar discussions encourage
students to actively engage with the ideas presented in the lectures, a process that should clarify and
deepen their understanding of the issues. Students must do a set preparatory reading before
participating in a seminar.
The forms of assessment used on the course include a two thousand-word essay, a five-minute
presentation, a mark for seminar participation, and an end-of-course exam (a three-hour written
exam in which students are to answer four exam essay questions).
Main reading
1.
Godfrey-Smith, P., Theory and Reality: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Science,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).
2.
Hollis, M., The Philosophy of Social Science: an Introduction, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
3.
Ladyman, J., Understanding the Philosophy of Science, (London: Routledge, 2002).
4.
Turner, S. P. and Roth, P. A. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Social
Science, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
Additional reading
i.
Losee, J., A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
ii.
Machamer, P. and Silberstein, M. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science,
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
iii.
Psillos, S., Philosophy of Science A – Z, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
iv.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Philosophy of Science, (London: Routledge, 1998).
Internet resources

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP): http://plato.stanford.edu/

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP): http://www.iep.utm.edu/
Grade determination
The final grade consists of the following four components:

Exam 50%

Essay 30%

Presentation 10%

Seminar participation 10%
Course outline
1.
Knowledge as such
What is knowledge? The challenge of scepticism. Rationalist, empiricist and constructivist
approaches to epistemology. The problem of the criterion and responses to it. The relationship
between philosophy and science; Quine’s epistemological naturalism and objections to it.
(1, pp.149-155; 2, pp.23-93; 3, pp.5-14)
2.
What is specific about science?
The emergence of science. The shift from the Aristotelian teleological worldview to a mechanical
one. Methodological distinctions between science and pre-science.
The demarcation question between science and pseudo-science. Science and ideology. Popper on
falsifiability.
(1, pp.13-17, 57-74; 3, pp.62-6; i, pp.46-71)
3. The logic of scientific method in general: deduction and induction
Deductive and inductive logical validity. The inductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods.
The use of observations, theories, models and axioms. Attempts to develop a logic of induction.
Inductive and abductive inference.
(1, pp.19-46; 3, pp.14-30; i, pp.132-142)
4. The problem of induction and methodological alternatives
Hume’s inductive scepticism. Paradoxes of confirmation: Hempel’s ‘raven’s paradox’;
Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’. Justifications of induction (meta-inductive, pragmatic).
The falsificationist alternative and problems with it. Quine’s confirmation holism.
(1, pp.30-34, 46-56, 57-74; 2, pp.71-83; 3, pp.31-91)
5. Bayesian confirmation theory
Evidence and probability. Subjectivist probability. How Bayesianism relates to the problem of
induction. Objections to Bayesian epistemology.
(1, pp.202-217; i, pp.220-227; ii, pp.149-172)
6. Scientific explanation
Theories of explanation in science: Hempel’s covering law theory (both deductive-nomological
and inductive-statistical versions); Salmon on statistical relevance and causation; Kitcher on
unificationism.
(1, pp.190-201; 3, pp.196-228; i, pp.210-21; ii, pp.37-54)
7. Laws of nature
The place of ‘laws of nature’ in science. What is a law? Necessity versus regularity. The status of
statistical laws.
(iv, pp.211-215; IEP, SEP)
8. Realism and anti-realism
Does science describe reality? Appearance and reality: the place of unobservables in science.
Arguments in favour of realism. Forms of anti-realism: phenomenalism, instrumentalism,
constructivism. The theory-ladenness of observation. The underdetermination of theory (Quine).
Kuhn on the incommensurability of paradigms.
(1, pp.173-189; 2, pp.50-59, 77-90; 3, pp.129-194; i, pp.252-263)
9. Scientific change and progress
Cumulative continuity versus discontinuity in theories of scientific change. Bachelard and Kuhn
on epistemological breaks and paradigm shifts. Kuhn on normal and revolutionary science. Lakatos
on research programmes. Laudan on problem-solving.
(1, pp.75-110; 2, pp.84-90; 3, pp.93-123; i, pp.197-209)
10.
The specificities of social science
Positivism, social scientific naturalism and the unity of science. Dilthey and Weber on
meaningfulness and social ‘understanding’. Interpretivism: causes and reasons, explaining and
understanding.
(2, pp.142-162, 183-201; 4, pp.311-333)
11.
Rational agency
Social action as rational behaviour. What is rationality? Instrumental reason: rational choice
theory; game theory; decision theory.
Alternatives to the instrumental conception of rationality, e.g. Habermas’s communicative
reason.
(2, pp.115-141; 4, pp.110-165)
12.
Methodological individualism versus holism
Individuals versus structures: conflicting social ontologies and their methodological
consequences. Functional explanations and specifically social facts. Self and roles, social and
personal identity. Ideological assumptions and implications involved in the methodological debates
on the issue.
(2, pp.94-114, pp.163-182; SEP)
13.
Science and normativity
The distinction between facts and values (Hume, Moore). The questioning of this (Dewey,
Laudan). The possibility of a value-neutral social science. Weber on value-freedom and valuerelevance. Critiques of the supposed value-neutrality of the social and human sciences (the
Frankfurt School, Foucault).
The norms of science and the scientific community (Merton).
(1, pp.122-125; 2, pp.202-223; IEP)
14.
The limits of scientific rationality
Heidegger on scientific objectification and the forgetting of being. Adorno and Horkheimer on
the dialectic of Enlightenment. Derrida on logocentrism. Lyotard on meta-narratives and
incommensurable language-games. Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism. Paradoxes and
paraconsistent logic.
(1, pp.110-117; iv, pp.172-175; SEP; IEP)
Distribution of hours for topics and types of work
No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
No
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Topic
Total
Knowledge as such
8
What is specific about science?
8
The logic of scientific method in general:
8
deduction and induction
The problem of induction and methodological 16
alternatives
Bayesian confirmation theory
8
Topic
Total
Scientific explanation
8
Laws of nature
8
Realism and anti-realism
8
Scientific change and progress
8
The specificities of social science
8
Rational agency
8
Methodological individualism versus holism
8
Science and normativity
8
The limits of scientific rationality
16
Total
128
Lectures
2
2
2
4
2
Lectures
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
32
Classes
2
2
2
4
2
Classes
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
32
Self-study
4
4
4
8
4
Self-study
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
8
64