US-Latin American relations
AT: U.S.-Latin American relations
Low relations is a decision by the U.S. – the plan might make the U.S. palatable to
Latin America but it doesn’t change the indifference in U.S. policy
Cárdenas 11 – former assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International
Development (José R., “The U.S. is MIA in Latin America” , Foreign Policy, December 29 2011,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/29/the_us_is_mia_in_latin_america) //WNM
An end-of-the-year assessment of U.S. policy towards Latin America could possibly qualify for the
world's shortest blog. For a President who has clearly established that foreign policy is not something
that gets him up in the morning (or appears to keep him awake at night), Latin America must rank just
above Antarctica in descending areas of interest.
This uneven, sporadic focus on the region has led to only adverse consequences for U.S. interests. What
effort the administration does expend seems only directed toward placating a smattering of hostile
populist regimes, while ignoring the interests of our friends. Indeed, the predictable response is that we
have only emboldened our enemies and despaired those in the hemisphere who share the U.S. vision of
open political systems, free markets, and robust trade.
Radical populists in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have run roughshod over democratic institutions
and the best Washington can come up with is asking for the terms under which a U.S. ambassador
would be allowed to return to their capitals. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega is likely chuckling at the feeble
U.S. response to his recently rigged re-election.
It also appears that the administration has lulled itself into complacency over a cancer-stricken Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela, ground zero for regional instability, seemingly content to wait and see what
happens after Chávez passes from the scene. But even as his circus antics continue, he is leaving behind
what my colleague Roger Noriega calls a mountain of toxic waste that will take years to clean up.
Chávez's days may indeed be numbered, but his friends in Iran, Russia, China, and Cuba are certainly
taking the long-term view of things. All four have been great beneficiaries of Chávez's political solidarity
and oil-fueled largesse and can be counted on to want to maintain that access with or without him in
power. In other words, don't count on them to support a democratic transition away from Chavismo,
only a succession. Every day, the United States stands idly on the sidelines, the chances they will
succeed improve.
Improving relations is impossible without reforming the entire foreign policy
apparatus
Gvosdev, 12 - former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both
the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College (Nikolas, “To
Reset Latin America Policy, U.S. Must Think Big,” 4/20, World Politics Review,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/the-realist-prism-to-reset-latin-america-policy-u-smust-think-big)
More generally, Obama’s Latin America policy is suffering from a lack of what George H.W. Bush
famously called “the vision thing,” compounded by how the administration organizes the U.S. foreign
policy apparatus. The president had an initial opening at his first Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, in
2009, to reset what had become a very problematic relationship between the United States and most of
the rest of the hemisphere during the George W. Bush administration. Most regional leaders also made
it clear they understood that, given the global financial crisis and the challenges of winding down
America’s involvement in two Middle Eastern wars, Obama could not immediately pivot U.S. foreign
policy to the region.
But as I noted two years ago, “There was insufficient follow-up to take advantage of the momentum
generated by the Trinidad meeting.” Just as candidate George W. Bush’s rhetoric about the importance
of Latin America understandably evaporated after Sept. 11, the Obama administration, in continuing to
react to a series of crises elsewhere in the world, has also put the Western Hemisphere on the back
burner.
As a result, according to Sean Goforth, America’s relations with the region appear to be adrift. “Many
countries want and deserve a serious partnership with Washington. But President Obama is an
unconvincing partner. . . . He has stalled on trade treaties with Latin American countries that still want
preferred access to the U.S. market, and he’s made it clear that his strategic priority is a ‘pivot’ toward
Asia.”
Worse still, no senior official within the administration, starting with the president himself, has
articulated a clear, compelling and convincing vision for what a Western Hemispheric partnership
would look like, beyond the expected bromides about peace, democracy and prosperity. What is the
desired end state? There is no lack of compelling possibilities to choose from: free circulation for people,
goods and capital from the Yukon to Tierra del Fuego; a greater push for regional independence, in
terms of manufactured goods, services and energy; an arrangement that mimics the pre-Maastricht
European Community.
Many terminal alt causes to relations
Shifter, 8 – Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown (Micheal, “U.S.-Latin American Relations:
Recommendations for the New Administration”, Inter-American Dialogue, October 27, 2008,
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625)
As if any further proof were needed, the ongoing financial crisis highlights the already diminished
capacity of the United States to shape developments in the rest of the world. With its own house in
disorder, the United States will struggle to get back on track as a responsible member of the
international community.
Still, though the United States may be considerably chastened, it remains a superpower, whose
decisions and actions have a huge global impact. When it falls to the next US administration to deal with
the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, or even Africa, it will likely reassess US
interests and frame strategic choices in light of new realities.
But if the United States seriously undertakes such an effort for neighboring Latin America, it will mark
the first time it has done so. For reasons of geography, history and power disparity, Latin America has
typically been treated as a discrete compartment, separate from interest-based foreign relations.
Regardless of how one comes down on the issues of Cuba, immigration, drugs, and trade, the
paternalistic impulse on the part of the United States has been unmistakable. Latin Americans find this
tutorial attitude extremely irritating, and their objections have prompted a more collegial tone from the
United States in certain cases. Unfortunately, it is still manifest in a variety of ways, from the overall
diplomatic style to specific policies like drug cooperation decertification or suspending military training
for countries that do not sign agreements that exempt US soldiers from prosecution under the
International Criminal Court.
While domestic politics is never completely divorced from foreign policy, it has an inordinate and
particularly distorting influence on Latin American policy. Hardliners and liberals alike rarely consider the
effects policies and statements will have on US-Latin American relations or the ultimate impact for US
interests. The decision to build a “wall” along the US-Mexico border, for example, may have been
politically expedient but was deeply insulting, not only to Mexico, but to the entire region.
This ingrained reflex to dismiss Latin America as the “backyard” of the United States may have been
understandable in a distant era, but today the region is wildly varied and defies lazy, superficial
generalizations (e.g. “inflation is out of control” or “democracy is starting to take root”). Whether or not
the United States recognizes it, the fact is that different parts of Latin America are moving in markedly
different directions simultaneously.
Snowden could crush any chances at diplomacy and cooperation
Llorente, June 24, 2013 [Elizabeth, “Edward Snowden Scandal Could Create A Rift In U.S.-Latin American Relations”,
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/06/24/edward-snowden-could-be-political-weapon-for-ecuador-againstus/#ixzz2XMlCZFdq//cc]
What has become a nightmare for the U.S. government could be a godsend to nations, such as Ecuador, that welcome opportunities to shame
the superpower, experts said.
The foreign minister of Ecuador – a country that has cracked down on government critics and journalists under President Rafael Correa -said that the South American nation is
considering granting asylum to former U.S., National Security Agency contractor Edward
Snowden, wanted in the U.S. for revealing state secrets.
Snowden has been on the run since he revealed that the United States has collected data on the telephone calls and emails of its citizens. The
United States has filed espionage charges against the 29-year-old Snowden, and is demanding his extradition.
At a press conference on Monday, Ecuador Foreign Minister Ricardo Patiño said his nation’s decision to give consideration to Snowden’s asylum
request "has to do with freedom of expression and with the security of citizens around the world."
Patiño said weighing asylum for Snowden was more important than whatever ramifications it would face in U.S.-Ecuador relations. Ecuador has
allowed Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, to whom it granted political asylum, to remain at its embassy in London for months. “Ecuador puts
its principles above its economic interests,” Patiño said.
Experts on U.S.-Latin America relations said Ecuador is being opportunistic in taking a shot at the U.S.
“The chance to needle the United States is almost too irresistible,” said Michael Shifter, president of the InterAmerican Dialogue, a political think tank in Washington D.C.
“This is a tremendous temptation for countries like Ecuador, Cuba and Venezuela. It’s a way they can expose double standards, hypocrisy, a way
to say 'the U.S. criticizes us because of clamping down on the press, but look at what the U.S. is doing.’”
Various published reports said that Snowden, who had been in Hong Kong, then traveled to Russia, was to leave for Havana on Monday. But he
was not on the flight that was expected to take him to Cuba.
Reports said that he was going to go to Cuba, then Venezuela and possibly end up in Ecuador with hope of receiving asylum and being allowed
to live there. Now reports say Snowden may travel to Cuba on Tuesday.
Political leaders in Cuba and Venezuela routinely have harsh words for the United States; former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who died
earlier this year, bolstered his international standing among nations that are adversaries of the United States by condemning and often
mocking U.S. officials.
Chavez's successor, Nicolas Maduro, has continued the anti-U.S. barbs, even going so far as to accuse the United States of being somehow
involved in the death of Hugo Chavez.
Cuban leader Fidel Castro, whose brother Raul succeeded him as president after he fell ill, often assailed U.S. lawmakers and said the U.S.-Cuba
embargo amounted to terrorism.
Cuba has no diplomatic relations with the United States, and Havana airport officials often do not stamp traveling
documents of Americans who go there in violation of the U.S. embargo and travel restrictions.
Snowden's fate may rest with one of these countries willing to take the political risk and open their
doors to him.
“He [Snowden] doesn’t have a lot of choices,” said Robert Anello, a New York attorney who handles extradition cases and white collar crimes.
“He’s a political hot potato for other countries. My sense is that it wasn’t his decision to leave Hong Kong. He’s left with those countries that
see something to be gained from the political points he can offer them right now.”
And although Cuba and Venezuela may allow him in temporarily, and aid in his transport, they too
may not be willing to offer him refuge and deal with long-term consequences, experts said.
Officials of both nations have been in recent talks with U.S. officials about improving aspects of their relations.
Cuba and the United States have been discussing direct mail service, as well as their migration policies.
And U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, on his first trip to Latin America since taking office, met with Venezuela's foreign minister Elías José Jaua
earlier this month to discuss restoring ambassador-level relations and ending more than a decade of steadily deteriorating ties.
Kerry said he was hopeful that a rapprochement could be achieved. The meeting, which came at Venezuela's request, took place just hours
after Venezuela released from prison an American filmmaker who had been jailed on espionage charges, removing an immediate irritant in the
relationship.
“If
Snowden came to Venezuela, they would not hand him over to the United States, they would give
him safe haven,” said David Smilde, a researcher with the Washington Office on Latin America, a political think tank.
“But if they gave him [permanent] safe haven, that would seriously harm improved relations.”
Some U.S. lawmakers assailed Snowden for seeking refuge in countries that are sworn enemies of the United States.
“It would not be surprising if the NSA leaker finds safe haven in Cuba or Venezuela, two regimes that
have a longstanding history of giving refuge to fugitives from U.S. law," said U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in a
statement. "Let us not forget that Phillip Agee, former CIA agent, leaked classified information about CIA personnel and fled the U.S. to seek
refuge until he passed away in 2008 in Cuba."
"The cruel irony is that there are no press freedoms in either Cuba or Venezuela, yet Snowden who supposedly stands for transparency in
government seeks refuge in police states like these two countries," the congresswoman said. "Those who misrule over Cuba and Venezuela,
Raul Castro and Nicolas Maduro, do not allow independent free press, do not cooperate on terrorism related issues, disregard due process and
an independent judicial system."
Kerry, indeed, warned about serious consequences for any nation that gives Snowden asylum or aids in his transport and evasion of extradition.
Giving Snowden support, said Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue, would not do much to bolster the popularity of Raul Castro or Correa
inside their own nations.
Correa, in particular, already is very popular in his country, having won reelection by a landslide.
“It’s basically about taking on a cause that puts the United States, from their point of view, in a questionable light,” he said. “And it’s trying to
associated themselves with what they see as heroes, whistleblowers.”
That said, however, Smilde argued that the United States itself may not want to keep a bright spotlight on the Snowden saga for the long-run.
“Right now there’s a lot of bravado,” said Smilde in a telephone interview from Caracas, where he is
conducting research. “Once he gets safe passage, given asylum by some country, this will die down.”
Plus, one must remember that the U.S. State Department is also walking a political tightrope right now, considering the damaging information
Snowden revealed.
“This is not flattering to the United States,” said Smilde. “It defends democracy all over the world, and
here is someone who has revealed extensive surveillance by the U.S. government of its citizens.
They’ll want this to go away.”
--XT bureaucratic restructuring key
Lack of a high level policy coordinator for Latin America prevents improving relations
Gvosdev, 12 - former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both
the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College (Nikolas, “To
Reset Latin America Policy, U.S. Must Think Big,” 4/20, World Politics Review,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/the-realist-prism-to-reset-latin-america-policy-u-smust-think-big)
Nor has the administration been willing to empower a senior official to act as an overall coordinator
or special envoy for the region, with clear authority to begin the slow and tedious process of laying
the foundation for closer ties. As a result, the careful nurturing that it will take to solidify and expand
partnerships -- starting with Brazil, which is still skittish about U.S. regional influence -- is not taking
place. And while some progress occurred in the Obama-Rousseff summit, notably in the area of trade
and in creating a system for regular consultation between the two countries’ defense establishments,
there is no game-changing initiative -- the equivalent of the U.S.-India nuclear deal -- on the horizon for
U.S.-Brazilian relations.
Goforth argues that the president, despite his disappointing summit in Cartagena, should complement
his recently unveiled domestic energy plan with a call for a regional energy partnership. “The
geoeconomics are straightforward: Latin America is just beginning to tap into a fresh oil and natural-gas
bonanza. . . . The technology of U.S. energy companies is absolutely necessary if Brazil is to recover its
vast offshore oil reserves; U.S. industry will also be needed if Argentina and Mexico are to tap their
shale-gas reserves, estimated to be the third- and fourth-largest in the world, respectively.” According to
Goforth, such a regional energy partnership could allow the U.S. to eliminate Middle Eastern oil imports
over the next 10 years.
It is an ambitious plan, one that would require empowering a senior official to oversee and coordinate
the interagency process so as to navigate the inevitable roadblocks. Energy Secretary Steven Chu does
not seem interested, nor does he have the traction within the U.S. national security bureaucracy
required for moving forward. However, if Obama is elected to a second term, and if Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton steps down, the president could insist that a new appointee at State make this a top
priority for U.S. foreign policy. Alternatively, as I have advocated on several occasions, this could be a
project run through the vice president’s office.
--XT – alt causes
US domestic politics prevents greater engagement with Latin America
Gvosdev, 12 - former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both
the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College (Nikolas, “To
Reset Latin America Policy, U.S. Must Think Big,” 4/20, World Politics Review,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/the-realist-prism-to-reset-latin-america-policy-u-smust-think-big)
Part of the problem is that important U.S. domestic lobbies are opposed to key pieces of what would
be needed to promote greater regional integration -- from environmentalists concerned both about
Canada’s oil sands and new pipeline projects that would transport more of Alberta’s hydrocarbons to
U.S. refineries and markets to a formidable anti-immigration lobby that would be very hesitant to
support a freer flow of labor between the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Add post-Sept. 11
security concerns and a prevailing view among many U.S. voters that free trade agreements usually
come at the expense of the American worker, and it becomes more apparent why no U.S. politician
has emerged as a strong advocate for a Community of the Americas.
And while domestic politics are always going to be intertwined with foreign policy, U.S. messaging,
particularly in Cartagena, seemed to convey just how much a domestic U.S. agenda is driving interaction
with the rest of the region. Whether intended or not, Washington’s continued emphasis on framing
foreign engagement as a way to boost U.S. job numbers does not provide much incentive for other
states to embrace the U.S. agenda, as Obama similarly discovered during visits to India and other states
in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the unwillingness to alter the U.S. position on Cuba set the tone in
Cartagena, reinforcing the perception that U.S. strategy toward the region is seen through the prism of
domestic politics -- in this case Florida’s electoral votes.
U.S. neglect inevitable even after the plan
Llana 2011 [Sara Miller, “A year of drift in US-Latin American relations”, Dec 23, 2011, Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1223/A-year-of-drift-in-US-Latin-American-relations//cc]
In March, US President Barack Obama took his first trip to Latin America, stopping off in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. In October, the US
approved long-awaited free trade deals with Panama and Colombia. According to the 2011 Latinobarometro poll, carried out across 18
countries in the region, President Obama ranked as the most popular leader in the Americas.
This year should have been a stellar one for US-Latin America relations, a major step forward after years
of setback. But instead, despite the many positive developments, the relationship is characterized by, if not disdain,
then definite distance.
“I think it’s a curious moment,” says Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. “There
is no evidence of
great acrimony in US-Latin American relations as there was four or five years ago. But at the same time, there is this
sense of distancing and drift, especially between the US and South America.”
The greatest symbol of that is the regional body that was officially launched in December, called the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC), which includes 33 countries across the Americas but specifically excludes the US and Canada.
Many members of the body are strong allies of the US, but long-time foes such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have said they hope it
counters the other major regional body, the Organization of American States (OAS), based in Washington.
Such old-time arguments still flare. President Chavez, for example, has been weakened at home, as the country’s opposition
strengthens ahead of 2012 presidential elections. In theory, that is good for the US, and the rhetoric between the two has been low-key this
year. But it just flared
again, with Obama sharply criticizing the state of human rights in Venezuela and the
country’s relationship with Iran.
“We're concerned about the government's actions, which have restricted the universal rights of the
Venezuelan people, threatened basic democratic values, and failed to contribute to the security in the
region," Obama wrote in response to questions posed by the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal.
He added that he believes Venezuela’s relationship with Iran has not served the interest of Venezuelans. “Ultimately, it is up to the Venezuelan
people to determine what they gain from a relationship with a country that violates universal human rights and is isolated from much of the
world,” President Obama said. “Here in the Americas, we take Iranian activities, including in Venezuela, very seriously and we will continue to
monitor them closely.”
Chavez countered on state television: "Obama, take care of your own business, focus on governing your country, which you've turned into a
disaster. Leave us alone.”
Venezuela’s relationship with Iran is among the most contentious foreign policies issues within the US-Latin American dynamic but other
relationships rankle too. The Cuban government, for example, decreed three days of mourning this week in the wake of the death of North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il. They joined Venezuela and Nicaragua in expressing condolences.
But in general, the positive has outweighed the negative this year. Perhaps the US’s strongest ally in the region right now is Mexico, where its
strategy against organized crime, despite questionable success, is vociferously supported in Washington. The US continues to underline its
support.
The trade deal signed with Panama and Colombia strengthens US economic ties to both countries. And the US has restored relations with the
economic powerhouse in the region – Brazil. (Trouble had started to brew over former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s relationship
with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.)
Still, on balance, the
US is no closer to Latin America than it’s been since 9/11, when attention shifted to
terrorism and away from the issues most Latin Americans care about, especially immigration. The region’s
favorable view of the US has grown, from 58 percent in 2008 to 72 percent in 2011 (down slightly from a high of 74 percent in 2009), according to the 2011
Latinobarometro poll. The slight dip can be explained by a boost in expectations for Obama after former US President George W. Bush left office – he was widely
reviled in Latin America. But even
under Obama issues like immigration and drugs have been stuck. There is little
hope of them getting “unstuck” in the upcoming US election year.
More than anything, however, is the simple fact that the US is no longer the sole player for Latin America.
Obama's March trip was billed by the media as an effort to recapture US influence in Latin America. But Latin America has moved on.
Countries are looking amongst themselves and much farther, particularly to China, to bolster their
economies. They are forming their own relationships with countries, whether the US likes it or not. Of
course US foreign policy matters here, but it matters so much less than it used to.
“There is just a sense that Latin
America is pursuing its own agenda,” says Mr. Shifter.
The U.S. will stay self-absorbed – no improvement is possible without a change in
politics
Farnsworth 2011 – vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society [Eric, “U.S.-Latin
American Relations: From Here to Where?”, tApril 12, 2011, http://www.as-coa.org/articles/us-latin-american-relations-here-where//cc]
Washington will continue to be self-consumed and self-absorbed, limiting the ability and the desire of the
United States to project influence abroad or to take on additional priorities outside the immediate political
environment. Domestic politics will prevail. This has profound implications for U.S. relations with Latin America,
particularly a Latin America that is newly empowered through economic growth to determine a different future.
Of course, Latin America is not homogeneous. It makes little sense to discuss the region en toto given the differences between Argentina and
Guatemala or Haiti and Chile. The countries of the region are different, and therefore policies must be designed to take account of current
realties on the ground. U.S. relations with Brazil are fundamentally different from U.S. relations with Venezuela or Colombia.
What is similar is the way that U.S.
policies that are essentially domestic in nature affect the individual and diverse
countries of the region. For example, immigration reform is more directly related to U.S. relations with Mexico,
Central America, and the Caribbean; nonetheless, a lack of immigration reform also affects growing migrant
communities from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Trade relations, another sensitive political issue
domestically, also affect the region as a whole. The inability to pass and implement pending agreements
with Colombia and Panama or to abide by the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provisions on
cross-border trucking, as well as Buy America provisions in the stimulus package, a lack of progress to conclude the Doha Development
Round of the World Trade Organization, and the moribund Free Area of the Americas, affect all Latin American countries by
calling into question the ability of the United States to provide needed leadership on trade. Instead,
regional trade agreements with other partners have proliferated, arguably making the conduct of trade
relations in the hemisphere more complicated. Finally, security assistance is also at issue because of domestic priorities given
spending constraints that affect the continued implementation of the Merida Initiative and assistance for the Caribbean Basin, Plan Colombia,
and ongoing programs across the region.
Where do these issues stand? Given the November election results, comprehensive immigration reform will not occur
in the near term. Trade relations are uncertain, depending on whether the White House will seek to push the Colombia and
Panama agreements over the objections of its important labor constituency. Spending will be cut, affecting foreign aid and
the ability to promote the Administration’s social agenda in the hemisphere. At this point, the United States is not
in a position to “bear any burden” in the hemisphere, as says John F. Kennedy’s famous phrase.
As a result, Washington needs to take a step back and consider what its core interests are in the Americas
and how best to promote them. The region has advanced considerably in the past decade at the same time that the tools available
for use by the United States have diminished and interest in the region from nontraditional parties including China has increased exponentially.
The game is changing. The question now is, how should Washington react?
Structural and political barriers prevent stronger relations
Weisbrot 11, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research— (Mark, “Obama’s Latin
America Policy: Continuity Without Change” , Center for Economic and Policy Research, May 2011,
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/obamas-latin-america-policy-2011-05.pdf
Introduction)
In the articles in Foreign Affairs and other publications of the establishment there is little to indicate
that these analysts have grasped the historic significance of the transformation that has taken place
over the past decade. Latin America is now more independent of the United States than Europe is,
and its independence is growing. There are structural reasons for these changes, among them the
failure of neoliberalism, the collapse of the International Monetary Fund’s creditors’ cartel in the
region (which was the major avenue of U.S. influence), the rising relative importance of Asia as a
source of markets and investment funds, and the increasing multipolarity of world politics. Perhaps
most important, the people of the region have voted for left governments because they can: in the
past, as is sadly still the case in Honduras and Haiti today, the United States did not allow such
choices to be made peacefully.
Yet the foreign policy establishment here sees Latin America’s leftward shift as primarily just a swing
of the pendulum, something that will eventually swing back and allow the United States to regain its
lost influence without changing its policies. Needless to say, this is unlikely.
The capture of the House of Representatives by the Republicans will simply provide more pressure
for the continuation of the administration’s conservative policies toward Latin America.
Current crimes and drug problems hinder US-Latin American Relations
Barshefsky and Hill 08 (Charlene and James T., Chairs on The Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Latin
America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, PDF)//WNM
In short, public insecurity could undermine progress on a variety of other fronts if not addressed
urgently and adequately. As the vice president of Colombia, Francisco Santos, recently stated, ‘‘Crime is
the biggest problem of the next decade. It will hinder tourism, investment, and threaten democracy.’’21
It is also a challenge that weighs heavily on the region’s relationship with the United States. Drug
production and trafficking have long been among the defining issues of U.S.-Latin America relations.
More recently, given economic ties and continuing migratory flows, the threat represented by
transnational gangs has highlighted a deepening connection between the United States and Latin
American security.
Relations bad – economy
US-Latin American interdependence cause economic instability for Latin America
Petras 09 – a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University (James, “Rising Militarism: USLatin American Relations”, Palestine Chronicle, 14 May 2009,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/432417012?accountid=14667)
Latin America faces a rising tide of US protectionism as the Obama regime reacts to the domestic
economic depression by forcing Latin America to seek new trading partners, to protect their internal
markets and to seek new sources for trade and credit.
Latin America Faces the World Crisis
Throughout Latin America, the economic depression is wrecking havoc on the economy, the labor
market, trade, credit and investment. All the major countries in the region are headed toward negative
growth, and experiencing double digit unemployment, rising levels of poverty and mass protests. In
Brazil in late March and early April, a coalition of trade unions, urban social movements and the rural
landless workers movement convoked large scale demonstrations - including participation from the
union confederation, CUT, which is usually allied with Lula`s Workers Party.
Unemployment rates in Brazil have risen sharply, exceeding 10%, as massive lay-offs hit the auto and
other metallurgical industries. In Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, strikes and protests have
begun to spread in protest over rising unemployment, the increase of bankruptcies among exporters
facing world-wide decline in demand and unable to secure financing.
The more industrialized Latin American countries, whose economies are more integrated into world
markets and have followed an export growth strategy, are the ones most adversely affected by the
world depression. This includes Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico. In addition, countries
dependent on overseas remittances and tourism, like Ecuador, the Central American and Caribbean
countries and even Mexico, with their 'open' economies, are badly hit by world recession.
While the US financial collapse did not have a major and immediate impact on Latin America- largely
because the earlier financial crashes in Argentina, Mexico, Ecuador and Chile led their governments to
impose limits on speculation - the indirect results of the US crash, especially with regard to the credit
freeze and the decline of world trade, has brought down productive sectors across the board. By mid2009, manufacturing, mining, services and agriculture, in the private and public sector were firmly in the
grip of a recession.
The vulnerability of Latin America to the world crises is a direct result of the structure of production and
the development strategies adopted the region. Following the 'neo-liberal' or empire-centered
'restructuring' of the economies which took place between the mid-1970s through the 1990s, the
economic profile of Latin America was characterized by a weak state sector due to privatization of all
key productive sectors. The de-nationalization of strategic financial, credit, trading and mining sectors
increased vulnerability as did the highly concentrated income and property ownership held mainly by
small foreign and domestic elite. These characteristics were further exacerbated by the primary
commodity boom between early 2003 until the middle of 2008. The regimes' further shift toward an
export strategy relying on primary products set the stage for a crash. As a result of its economic
structure Latin America was extremely vulnerable to the decision taken by US and EU policy makers in
charge of key economic sectors. De-nationalization denied the state the necessary levers to meet the
crisis by reversing the direction of the economy.
Relations bad: multipolarity
Expanding US-Latin American relations undermines the transition to multipolarity
Latin American Perspectives 11 – position paper created by the LAP editorial board, LAP discusses and
debates the political economies of capitalism, imperialism, and socialism in the Americas. Latin
American Perspectives offers a vital multidisciplinary view (“Dangerous Complacencies: Obama, Latin
America, and the Misconceptions of Power”, Sage, 11 May 2011,
http://lap.sagepub.com/content/38/4/14
FORTRESS AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE
Over the past decade, Latin America has experienced dramatic change, with the rise of social democratic
and socialist governments in many countries. As a whole, these governments have challenged
traditional asymmetrical power relations with the United States by insisting on respect for sovereignty,
advancing the idea of a multipolar world, assuming a greater role on the international stage, promoting
regional integration, and developing alternative regional organizations that do not include Washington.
Moreover, most of the countries in the region have deepened commercial relations with China, South
Asia, Europe, and Africa and no longer depend exclusively upon the United States. Nearly absent two
decades ago, China today has become one of Latin America’s most important trading partners.5
Confronted by these important changes, the Bush administration responded to the challenges
represented most clearly by the anti-imperialist governments of Chávez and Morales with a policy of
hostility that denied their legitimacy and sought to create a cold-war-style “axis of evil” linking them to
the eternally demonized Cuba as a threat to democracy in the hemisphere and as inadequately
enthusiastic participants in the “war on drugs.” Furthermore, it attempted to drive a wedge between
them and the more acceptable “pink” governments such as Lula’s in Brazil. Upon taking office, the
Obama administration had two choices: establish a new framework for improved, more equitable
relations with Latin America or continue the right-wing counterattack in the region while exercising its
military power to reclaim its lost influence. It was not only leftists who recognized the benefits for the
United States of more enlightened policies. Influential Washington think tanks such as the Brookings
Institution (2008) wrote extensive policy recommendations for improving relations. Obama also
received a letter in October 2008, signed by leading U.S. academics on Latin America including most of
the past presidents of the Latin American Studies Association, suggesting policy changes (Rizvi, 2008).
Unfortunately, under Obama and a Democratic Congress the promise of change never materialized;
instead of withdrawing support for conservative and even antidemocratic forces and renouncing the
direct exercise of military power to reclaim U.S. influence, Washington appears still to consider Latin
America its “backyard” and prioritizes relations with compliant governments on the right. This myopic
view of Latin America seeks to counter regional resistance to U.S. efforts to solidify its hegemony.
Relations bad: imperialism
Trade and economic relations with Latin America threaten imperialism and
paternalistic action by the United States
Quiliconi 2005 – PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California
[Cintia, “US–Latin American Trade Relations: Path to the Future or Dead End Street?”, https://cps.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/cpsworking-paper-us-latin-american-trade-relations-2005.pdf//cc]
2. Hegemony through the Lens of Economic Relations
The theory of hegemonic stability as applied to international political economy defines hegemony as
the preponderance of material resources. According to Keohane (1988) hegemonic powers seek
control over raw materials, sources of capital, control of the markets and competitive advantages in
the production of value-added goods. In contrast, a Gramscian definition of hegemony considers that
this situation occurs when one class exercises leadership over the other classes by gaining their active
consent through ideological, moral or cultural values. Thus, hegemony as applied to the international
arena is not the domination of one nation by another, but the leadership of a transnational
dominating class sustaining a dominant core.
Foreign policy reflects the interests of a small elite that control the domestic political economy.
Civil society, which Gramsci defines as the complex of private organizations such as political parties,
trade unions and the mass media, has played a influential role in forming US foreign policy once the
capitalist mode of production has become consolidated. In this sense, the aim of promoting
democracy and a free market is to penetrate civil society in countries of US interest and not to
suppress but inculcate it with the understanding that democracy is a material force that orients and
sets limits on human behavior by establishing general codes of conduct that tend to strengthen free
market principles.
Ruggie (1998) points out that political authority represents a fusion of power with a legitimate
social purpose. In this sense, the way in which power and legitimate social purpose become fused to
project political authority into the international system, led the author to characterize the
international economic order by the term “embedded liberalism”. Economics is clearly the primary
force behind US foreign policy in Latin America; the role of the US became to institute and safeguard
the self-regulating market as its most important security concern. The liberal international economic
order is maintained by a hegemon that uses its resources and influence to establish and manage an
international economy based on free trade, monetary stability and the free movement of capital
(Gilpin, 2001). The US was a firm hegemonic power with imperial aspirations during the Cold War
and this situation forced Latin American countries to enter the international scene either in a passive
or American-friendly way. Nowadays the situation is completely different, as Latin American leaders
appear more ambivalent about the nature of US hegemony and its effect on their countries’ interests.
Latin America is a relatively important market for US exports and is the recipient of billions of
dollars in private and government US loans. At the same time, the region is a major source of raw
materials and other resources, and is also an expanding region for US foreign direct investment (FDI).
In the American foreign policy to the region there has been a shift from coercive mechanisms of social
control to consensual ones and that turning point corresponds with the development of initiatives for
globalization since the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s.
Since the end of the Cold War, it can be argued that the US has viewed Latin America as
important only in economic terms; what Tulchin (1997) has described as the “NAFTA-ization” of
inter-American relations. US policy seems to avoid getting involved in security issues except where
domestic politics put pressure on involvement. In this sense, inter-American relations in the postCold
War era are characterized by their focus on trade and economic issues. However, as mentioned
before, security and economic agendas are intertwined and it is difficult to disaggregate objectives in
these two different arenas.
Obama will only continue the imperialistic policies of the status quo – cooperation is
impossible
Gutiérrez 2008 [José Antonio, “Obama and Latin America: a friendly imperialism?”, June 22,
http://www.threepennytaproom.com/integralpsychosis/2008/06/22/obama-and-latin-america-a-friendly-imperialism//cc]
Obama go home!
It is only natural for Obama to increase the virulence of the imperialist politics towards Latin America;
after all, he knows that he will be in command of a sinking ship, of an empire stuck in a swamp of
political, economic and military troubles. The depth of the US crisis is not, this time, a result of the
hallucinating desires of a bunch of utopian leftists – tycoons such as Soros or economists such as Stiglitz
are turning into the main prophets of the new crisis. And every single empire in crisis has to resort to
higher levels of violence, in a similar fashion to a drowning man who tries to remain afloat by blindly
slapping the water’s surface. In the same way, Obama is already threatening Venezuela and Iran.
Every worn-out project needs to refresh its image, to display some renewal on its facade in order to
conceal its exhaustion. This wearing out of the “American Way” made it possible for something
unthinkable to happen… a black candidate! The perfect chief for this crisis, a cosmetic change for the
substance of the domination system to remain untouched: imperialism has never been an issue of
melanin.
The imperial politics of the US are not up to each US president to decide: it is a well ingrained element
in the Yankee State apparatus, in the social forces which shape the life of that nation, and the single
force that can alter this order of things is the grassroots, bottom-up, struggle of the people. For let us
remember something that we Latin Americans frequently forget: in the US there are also people. There
is also a working class. Change depends on them. A US president, at most, can decide what version of
imperialism he wants to apply, be it a Neanderthal version of imperialism, or a “forced consensus”
version.
Relations High
U.S. influence in Latin America is stronger than ever
Duddy and Mora 2013 – U.S. ambassador to Venezuela from 2007 until 2010 and is senior lecturer at
Duke University; director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International
University [Patrick and Frank, “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?”, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latinamerica-is-us-influence.html//cc]
Is U.S. influence in Latin America on the wane? It depends how you look at it.
As President Obama travels to Mexico and Costa Rica, it’s likely the pundits will once again underscore what some
perceive to be the eroding influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Some will point
to the decline in foreign aid or the absence of an overarching policy with an inspiring moniker like “Alliance for
Progress” or “Enterprise Area of the Americas” as evidence that the United States is failing to embrace the
opportunities of a region that is more important to this country than ever.
The reality is a lot more complicated. Forty-two percent of all U.S. exports flow to the Western
Hemisphere. In many ways, U.S. engagement in the Americas is more pervasive than ever, even if more
diffused. That is in part because the peoples of the Western Hemisphere are not waiting for
governments to choreograph their interactions.
A more-nuanced assessment inevitably will highlight the complex, multidimensional ties between the
United States and the rest of the hemisphere. In fact, it may be that we need to change the way we think and talk about the
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. We also need to resist the temptation to embrace overly reductive yardsticks for judging our
standing in the hemisphere.
As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there
has been an important change in power distribution
in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set of actors that are
dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships. In Latin America, many of the most
substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships
involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact through student exchanges and social media, travel and migration.
Trade and investment remain the most enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that our
economic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region. Many
observers who worry about declining U.S.
influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companies
and investors.
While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the
Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most important economic
partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have free
trade agreements.
An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook is the exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration. It is
commonplace to note the enormous presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International
Education, after Europe, Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S.
tourists travel every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs.
From 2006-2011 U.S. non-government organizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number of partnerships with
their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances
to Latin America and the Caribbean from the United States
totaled $64 billion in 2012. Particularly for the smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes
constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product.
US influence in Latin America is higher than ever – China and Russia are nowhere close
O’Neil 2012 – senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations [Shannon K, “U.S. is
still Latin America’s biggest trading partner”, November 16, http://www.voxxi.com/us-latin-americas-biggest-trading-partner//cc]
Many talk about the United States’ declining influence in Latin America, pointing to the rising role of
China or European companies, investors, and governments. Yet a closer look at the economic ties
between the United States and Latin America questions whether this part of the relationship has in
fact weakened.
The United States has been Latin America’s biggest trading partner throughout much of the region’s history,
and this trend continues today. In 2011 trade between the United States and Latin America topped $800
billion, more than three times the region’s exchanges with China. It is also growing faster than U.S. trade with nearly
any other region in the world—over 80 percent in the last decade. The lion’s share occurs between the United States and Mexico ($460 billion,
or some 58 percent of regional trade). U.S. commercial ties with Brazil and Venezuela follow, together totaling another 16 percent.
Latin America’s biggest trading partner
For Latin America’s seventeen countries, thirteen import more goods from the United States than
anywhere else. This includes Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Honduras, and Mexico. Most of these imports are manufactured
goods, including computers and computer accessories, telecommunication parts, cars, civilian aircraft, and machinery. For ten of the seventeen
countries, the United
products—to the north.
States is the primary export destination. Most send raw materials—oil, minerals, and agricultural
U.S. foreign direct investment in Latin America remains high, totaling over $25 billion (or just under 20 percent
of all FDI in Latin America) in 2011. Though technically surpassed by the Netherlands (which sent closer to $32 billion) the 2011 ECLAC report finds that only 8
percent of FDI from the Netherlands comes from companies based there; it is instead largely a conduit for investments by companies in third countries. The United
States was the largest foreign investor in Mexico, as well as in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay. Most of this money concentrated on manufacturing,
especially the chemical and the automobile industries. U.S.
previous post, mostly
productive activities).
investments far surpass those made by China, which, as explained in a
head to the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands (suggesting tax considerations instead of
Where the United States’ economic heft perhaps comes up short is in the area of government-backed
development loans. Here the U.S. Export-Import Bank is much less active than China’s Development Bank and ExportImport Bank (which outpace the U.S. Export-Import bank, World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank loans combined).
Overall, the data suggests that the
United States is still by far the region’s largest and most important
economic partner. Over the last two decades, free trade agreements with Mexico (NAFTA), Central America (CAFTA), Peru,
Colombia, Chile, and Panama have strengthened these ties. During the 2012 campaign, both presidential candidates talked about
deepening these economic links in the future. With Obama’s win, the next economic step looks to be the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
which would bring together Chile, Peru, Mexico, the United States, and Canada in the Western Hemisphere with Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam in a comprehensive free trade area. If successful, the agreement would
likely increase
trade and foreign direct investment between the participants, bringing the United States and at least
these Latin American countries closer than ever.
U.S. Soft power is prevalent in status quo Latin America
Duddy and Mora 2013 – U.S. ambassador to Venezuela from 2007 until 2010 and is senior lecturer at
Duke University; director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International
University [Patrick and Frank, “Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?”, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latinamerica-is-us-influence.html//cc]
Finally, one
should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of
national reputation, popular culture,values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence
in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American
rhetoric during the Chávez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many
thousands of Chávez loyalists.
Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second
or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in
the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of
our ties to the region.
We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We don’t need a new template for
relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater
commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to
them would be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to
play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.
Relations growing now despite criticism
Latin American Herald Tribune 2013 (News for the English-reading public about Latin America, “U.S.
Reaffirms Commitment to Latin America Security, Development”, LAHT ,Jun 21, 2013
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=815509&CategoryId=12394)
WASHINGTON – The United States remains committed to Latin America’s security and development
through multiple bilateral cooperation accords and within the framework of a “pragmatic” and mutually
respectful relationship, a senior Obama administration official told Efe.
The remarks served to counter criticism from some sectors in the United States who contend that
Washington, despite its rhetoric and visits by top officials to the region, is not promoting closer ties with
Latin America through concrete measures.
“The most important message is that we view our relations in the hemisphere as a relationship of equal
partners. I think the president has made that very clear through his words and through his actions in the
region,” the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said.
Since 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama has traveled to Latin America a total of six times, while Vice
President Joe Biden has made four trips to the region, and over this period “our entire approach has
been based on equal partnership,” the official added.
Latin America has seen “a massive increase in its middle class and a reduction in severe poverty” and,
within the context of a “pragmatic” relationship, Washington is working jointly to respond to challenges
such as promoting economic development, reducing energy costs and increasing the competitiveness of
the region’s economies.
Economic ties high now – Latin America cooperation key to interdependence and free
trade
O’Neil 2012 – Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations [Shannon, “U.S.–
Latin America Economic Ties”, November 16, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/11/16/u-s-latin-america-economic-ties/cc]
Many talk about the United States’ declining influence in Latin America, pointing to the rising role of
China or European companies, investors, and governments. Yet a closer look at the economic ties
between the United States and Latin America questions whether this part of the relationship has in
fact weakened.
The United States has been Latin America’s biggest trading partner throughout much of the region’s
history, and this trend continues today. In 2011 trade between the United States and Latin America
topped $800 billion, more than three times the region’s exchanges with China. It is also growing faster
than U.S. trade with nearly any other region in the world—over 80 percent in the last decade. The lion’s
share occurs between the United States and Mexico ($460 billion, or some 58 percent of regional trade). U.S. commercial ties with Brazil and
Venezuela follow, together totaling another 16 percent.
For Latin
America’s seventeen countries, thirteen import more goods from the United States than anywhere
else. This includes Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Honduras, and Mexico. Most of these imports are manufactured goods, including
computers and computer accessories, telecommunication parts, cars, civilian aircraft, and machinery. For ten of the seventeen countries, the
United States is the primary export destination. Most send raw materials—oil, minerals, and agricultural products—to the
north.
U.S. foreign direct investment in Latin America remains high, totaling over $25 billion (or just under 20
percent of all FDI in Latin America) in 2011. Though technically surpassed by the Netherlands (which sent closer to $32 billion) the 2011 ECLAC
report finds that only 8 percent of FDI from the Netherlands comes from companies based there; it is instead largely a conduit for investments
by companies in third countries. The
United States was the largest foreign investor in Mexico, as well as in
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay. Most of this money concentrated on manufacturing, especially the
chemical and the automobile industries. U.S. investments far surpass those made by China, which, as explained in a
previous post, mostly head to the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands (suggesting tax considerations instead
of productive activities).
Where the United States’ economic heft perhaps comes up short is in the area of government-backed development loans. Here the U.S. ExportImport Bank is much less active than China’s Development Bank and Export-Import Bank (which outpace the U.S. Export-Import bank, World
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank loans combined).
Overall, the data suggests that the
United States is still by far the region’s largest and most important
economic partner. Over the last two decades, free trade agreements with Mexico (NAFTA), Central
America (CAFTA), Peru, Colombia, Chile, and Panama have strengthened these ties. During the 2012 campaign,
both presidential candidates talked about deepening these economic links in the future. With Obama’s win, the next economic step looks to be
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would bring together Chile, Peru, Mexico, the United States, and Canada in the Western Hemisphere with
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam in a comprehensive free trade area. If successful, the
agreement would likely increase trade and foreign direct investment between the participants,
bringing the United States and at least these Latin American countries closer than ever.
Immigration Reform key to relations
Immigration and counternarcotics undermines relations
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation . The
inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between
the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely refer to
immigration as a foreign policy issue . Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’
hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.
Another chronic irritant is US drug policy, which most Latin Americans now believe makes their drug and
crime problems worse . Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Mexico, acknowledged that US
anti-drug programs have not worked . Yet, despite growing calls and pressure from the region, the
United States has shown little interest in exploring alternative approaches . Similarly, Washington’s
more than half-century embargo on Cuba, as well as other elements of United States’ Cuba policy, is
strongly opposed by all other countries in the hemisphere . Indeed, the US position on these
troublesome issues—immigration, drug policy, and Cuba—has set Washington against the consensus
view of the hemisphere’s other 34 governments. These issues stand as obstacles to further cooperation
in the Americas. The United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean need to resolve
them in order to build more productive partnerships.
Immigration shreds cooperation
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Washington’s failure to repair the United States’ broken immigration system is breeding resentment
across the region, nowhere more so than in the principal points of origin and transit: Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean. Latin Americans find the idea of building a wall on the US-Mexico border
particularly offensive.
Despite bitter political battles over immigration in the United States, there is general agreement about
what sensible reform would include . It combines effective border and employer enforcement, the
adoption of a general worker program consistent with labor market needs in the United States, and a
path toward residence and citizenship for the estimated 12 million unauthorized residents living in the
country . This package is similar to the reform effort (unfortunately defeated in Congress) proposed
under President George W . Bush .
The complicated and divisive politics of the United States, compounded by the weakness of the US
economy, have so far blocked this comprehensive approach . But more limited measures such as the
Dream Act, allowing children brought to the United States without appropriate documentation an
opportunity to qualify for citizenship, would not only be welcomed in US Latino communities and in
Latin America, but it would demonstrate that the issue is being taken seriously and with a measure of
compassion in Washington .
Sensible US immigration policies promise to benefit the US economy . Migrants make up a significant
percentage of younger workers. Their presence would improve the labor demographic and increase the
US capacity for economic growth even while their contributions help sustain the US social security
system. Immigration reform would also recognize the growing “Latinoamericanization” of the United
States . Roughly one sixth of the population is currently of Latino descent . The cultural, demographic
and family ties of those 50 million people will continue to deepen. The United States’ inability to
respond to the policy challenge of immigration will have increasingly negative consequences, standing
in the way of a more productive relationship with Latin America.
Immigration turns the aff
Inter-American Dialogue 12 - the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis,
exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs(“Remaking the Relationship The
United States and Latin America”, April 2012,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Still another advance could come through US immigration reform. By better aligning the supply and
demand for workers in critical industries and opening new opportunities for millions of currently
unauthorized residents, a more pragmatic migration policy would significantly bolster the US economy .
No other single policy measure would more clearly demonstrate US commitment to cooperation with
Latin America. The comprehensive reform advocated by both the George W . Bush and the Obama
administrations represents the best approach. More modest changes, however, could still be helpful.
OAS advantage answers
OAS Cred I/L – 1NC
The OAS fails – credibility is inherently ineffective
AP 6/4 (Associated Press, “John Kerry seeks changes to OAS,” 6/4/13,
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/john-kerry-latin-america-oas-changes-92245.html)//SJF
Secretary of State John Kerry is demanding reforms in the 35-nation Organization of American States as
he visits Latin America for the first time since taking office.
Leading the U.S. delegation in Guatemala to the annual general assembly of the OAS — an organization
he has disparaged as ineffective, inefficient and nearly irrelevant — Kerry will try to convince fellow
members of the need for major changes in its bureaucracy and a return to its core mission of promoting
human rights, democracy and development.
Gutierrez dares GOP to vote down bill
Bill reduces benefits for lobbyists
Rhee's group tripled its budget
Balz book: Christie considered 2012
Udall brother 'hiked everywhere'
SEIU pushes House on immigration
Officials traveling with Kerry said he also would be making the case against legalization of marijuana at
the national level, lobbying for the election of the U.S. candidate for a hemispheric human rights panel
and trying to improve badly damaged relations with Venezuela.
Kerry arrived Tuesday at the Guatemalan mountain resort of Antigua and began his two-day program
with a meeting with Guatemala’s president.
Drugs, U.S. immigration reform and good governance were to top the agenda in those talks, the two
men told reporters.
The OAS often is criticized in the United States and Kerry wrote a scathing editorial about its failures and
need to reform three years ago while he was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
He then introduced legislation in Congress aimed at requiring significant budget reforms in the
organization.
Just last year, shortly before he was nominated to be secretary of state, Kerry penned a letter to the
OAS permanent council with three other senators bemoaning that the group “has been forfeiting its
effectiveness” with a lack of strategic focus and fiscal recklessness.
The State Department said Monday that Kerry believed the bloc was an organization of critical
importance to the Americas and that his participation in the general assembly was aimed at helping to
strengthen it.
“The fact that he is going to the OAS and he is spending two days there participating sends a clear signal
that he thinks this remains the premier multilateral organization in the hemisphere,” department
spokeswoman Jen Psaki said.
“In order to assure that the OAS retains that status, it must refocus on its core principles,” she said,
stressing democracy, human rights, development and regional security. “Strengthening it is of course
part of (Kerry’s) agenda and part of what he’ll be focused on in the next couple of days.”
As a senator in 2010, Kerry made similar, though not as subtle, points in an opinion piece he co-wrote
with Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), his successor as head of the Foreign Relations Committee.
“Sadly, its culture of consensus has often been the breeding ground of the ideas that reflect the
lowest common denominator, rather than the highest ambitions of diplomacy and cooperation,” they
wrote in The Miami Herald.
The pair excoriated the OAS for becoming “a pliable tool of inconsistent political agendas” and
suggested that they agreed with critics who called the organization “a grazing pasture for third-string
diplomats.”
Psaki played down the last comment, saying she “would hardly call the secretary of state a third-string
diplomat.” Kerry’s mere presence at the meeting demonstrates his and the Obama administration’s
commitment to improving the OAS, she said.
In November 2012, Kerry and Menendez, along with Republican Sens. Richard Lugar of Indiana and
Marco Rubio of Florida, wrote that OAS finances had become dangerously precarious and that it must
reform, pare back superfluous projects or risk losing support from its prime contributor, the United
States.
The United States has over the past decades found itself at growing odds with numerous Latin and
South American members of the OAS. Many of them, like Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, are
led by leftist or populist leaders who have balked at accepting the dominance of the U.S. in the Americas
and pursued policies that often run counter to Washington’s wishes.
Apart from Cuba, which has been suspended from the OAS for decades, the U.S. has most differences
with Venezuela, whose president, Hugo Chavez, reveled in tweaking Washington until his death last
year.
OAS Cred I/L – 2NC
OAS cred is unsustainable – distrust and rising alternatives
Lee 12 – Senior Production Editor (Brianna, “The Organization of American States,” 4/13/12,
http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945)//SJF
CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues facing
the hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission as a crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However, many
state leaders and policymakers have also heavily criticized the OAS for its institutional weakness.
Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, says the
OAS as a political entity "has declined precipitously in recent years."
However, analysts say, since the Democratic Charter was signed, the organization's consensus around
democracy promotion has atrophied.
One of the OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous
vote to make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has
made it difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American
states has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the
core mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes
(VOA) from what she called a "proliferation of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates
without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future.
Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also
restricted by its inability to send election observers without the invitation of state governments.
"They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's O'Neil says.
Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which
she says has been helpful.
Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of
Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are
widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to [Venezuelan President] Hugo
Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still
beholden to the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest."
Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in July 2011, the U.S. House
Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on
the charge that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America.
Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin
American leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an
organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have
expressed the desire for CELAC to eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is
"nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream."
Many consider another regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a
useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert
its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able to fulfill some duties that the OAS
has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador and Colombia during
their diplomatic crisis in 2008.
Despite the OAS's shortcomings and questions over its continued relevance in the region, there is a
strong call to reform the organization rather than eliminate it altogether.
The OAS is useless, it has zero regional cred
Isacson, 12 - senior associate for regional security at the Washington Office on Latin America (Adam,
“Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS” World Politics Review, 5/22,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-ofthe-oas)
What is going on here? The OAS, the world's oldest regional organization, has never been a diplomatic
powerhouse. Since the Pan-American Union's founding in 1910, it has rarely been the center of gravity
for the Western Hemisphere's politics or diplomacy. It has helped to resolve only a small fraction of the
region's armed conflicts or crises that threatened to deteriorate into conflicts.
Instead, the OAS has functioned as a multilateral sounding board, a place to build consensus around
broad policies, from anti-communism to counternarcotics to counterterrorism. The ability to discuss
issues at regular general assemblies and special sessions has reduced friction among its members. And
some OAS components -- the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, electoral observer missions
and efforts to verify postconflict demobilizations -- have made important contributions to regional
peace, security and democracy.
But the OAS has been hampered by its design, which keeps it deliberately weak. The organization
operates on a consensus model, in which a determined minority can prevent action. Its “one country,
one vote” system means that a tiny state like St. Lucia has as much voice as a large state like Brazil. The
OAS has no analogue to the U.N. Security Council and no dispute-resolution or peace-enforcement
mechanism to deal with breaches of the peace like that contemplated in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N.
Charter.
The OAS is also hampered by a perception, reinforced during the Cold War, that the Washington-based
body is dominated by the United States. This is perhaps inevitable given the asymmetry of wealth and
power between the United States and its regional neighbors. Still, the perception of an uneven playing
field has damaged the organization's "honest broker" status and made Latin American states reluctant
to take decisions that might require them to cede sovereignty to the OAS, even for the benefit of a
greater good.
US hegemony undermines the OAS
Isacson, 12 - senior associate for regional security at the Washington Office on Latin America (Adam,
“Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS” World Politics Review, 5/22,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-ofthe-oas)
Where these trends are headed, though, is not clear. Reduced U.S. hegemony, for instance, could mean
greater credibility for the OAS, which for so long was viewed as dominated by Washington. On the
other hand, the region's sharp ideological and political divisions could continue to render the
organization inoperable. The next big test for the OAS will be its ability to chart an independent path
on drug policy. In the face of increasing criticism of the U.S. approach, the region's leaders decided at
their April 2012 summit to charge the OAS with producing a document laying out the pros and cons of
alternative policies. For the OAS, the stakes are high: If its document ends up simply ratifying the status
quo under heavy U.S. pressure, the damage to the organization’s credibility will be significant.
US is incompatible with the OAS
Ellsworth 12 – Senior Correspondent, Brazil at Reuters (Brian, “Obama faces skeptical leaders at
Americas summit,” 4/10/12, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-americas-summit-obamaidUSBRE8390QK20120410)//SJF
BETTER THAN BUSH?
Obama can ill-afford to entertain changes to policy on Cuba or the drug war because they might alienate
him from middle-of-the-road voters who will be key for his re-election bid.
"This is the worst moment to be proposing issues to the Americans in the run-up to a difficult and
problematic election for President Obama," said Andres Rozental, former deputy foreign minister of
Mexico.
Republican critics have in the past said Obama's efforts at dialogue with Cuba and Venezuela
compromised national security.
A senior administration official said Washington had already eased travel restrictions to Cuba, and was
waiting for Havana to release political prisoners and improve political freedoms before taking further
steps to ease relations.
Obama is still popular among Latin Americans. A 2011 visit to a slum in Rio de Janeiro, for example,
brought throngs of screaming admirers.
That contrasts with the violent protests that met former President George W. Bush at a 2005 regional
summit in Argentina, where leftist leaders sank a hemisphere-wide free trade deal being pushed by the
United States.
"I think relations (with the United States) are better now, there is more dialogue between the
presidents, and Obama has been more accessible," said Jeremiah Barbosa, 66, filling pastry dough with
caramel in his small bakery in Bogota.
But that charm has worn a bit thin on policymakers.
Facing budget battles at home and what will likely be a decline in foreign aid to Latin America this
fiscal year, Obama heads to Cartagena with few favors to offer.
Brazil is frustrated with loose U.S. monetary policy that has pushed a flood of capital into Brazil,
driving up its currency and making its exports less competitive, and President Dilma Rousseff
complained to Obama about it in a meeting at the White House on Monday.
An overhaul of U.S. immigration rules has all but fallen off the agenda in the Washington, frustrating
Mexico and Central American countries as well as Latino voters in the United States.
Argentina and the United States are at loggerheads over trade restrictions and compensation
payments to American investors. And China is an increasingly active investor and economic power in
Latin America as U.S. influence wanes.
"The United States has historically wanted to be a policeman to the world, but in general it has struggled
to do so," said Rozental. "I think it's going to be difficult for the United States to give Latin America the
priority that it deserves."
OAS forfeits foreign policy influence
AP 6/4 (Associated Press, “Kerry calling for major changes in 35-nation OAS,” 6/4/13,
http://www.vcstar.com/news/2013/jun/04/kerry-makes-first-latin-america-trip-in-office/)//SJF
GUATEMALA CITY (AP) - U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is demanding reforms in the 35-nation
Organization of American States as he visits Latin America for the first time since taking office.
Leading the U.S. delegation to the annual general assembly of the OAS - an organization he has
disparaged as ineffective, inefficient and nearly irrelevant - Kerry will try to convince fellow members
of the need for major changes in its bureaucracy and a return to its core mission of promoting human
rights, democracy and development.
Officials traveling with Kerry said he also would be making the case against legalization of marijuana at
the national level, lobbying for the election of the U.S. candidate for a hemispheric human rights panel
and trying to improve badly damaged relations with Venezuela.
Kerry arrived Tuesday at the Guatemalan mountain resort of Antigua and began his two-day program
with a meeting with Guatemala's president.
Drugs, U.S. immigration reform and good governance were to top the agenda in those talks, the two
men told reporters.
The OAS often is criticized in the United States and Kerry wrote a scathing editorial about its failures
and need to reform three years ago while he was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He then introduced legislation in Congress aimed at requiring significant budget reforms in
the organization.
Just last year, shortly before he was nominated to be secretary of state, Kerry penned a letter to the
OAS permanent council with three other senators bemoaning that the group "has been forfeiting its
effectiveness" with a lack of strategic focus and fiscal recklessness.
The State Department said Monday that Kerry believed the bloc was an organization of critical
importance to the Americas and that his participation in the general assembly was aimed at helping to
strengthen it.
"The fact that he is going to the OAS and he is spending two days there participating sends a clear
signal that he thinks this remains the premier multilateral organization in the hemisphere,"
department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said.
"In order to assure that the OAS retains that status, it must refocus on its core principles," she said,
stressing democracy, human rights, development and regional security. "Strengthening it is of course
part of (Kerry's) agenda and part of what he'll be focused on in the next couple of days."
As a senator in 2010, Kerry made similar, though not as subtle, points in an opinion piece he co-wrote
with Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., his successor as head of the Foreign Relations Committee.
"Sadly, its culture of consensus has often been the breeding ground of the ideas that reflect the lowest
common denominator, rather than the highest ambitions of diplomacy and cooperation," they wrote in
The Miami Herald.
The pair excoriated the OAS for becoming "a pliable tool of inconsistent political agendas" and
suggested that they agreed with critics who called the organization "a grazing pasture for third-string
diplomats."
Psaki played down the last comment, saying she "would hardly call the secretary of state a third-string
diplomat." Kerry's mere presence at the meeting demonstrates his and the Obama administration's
commitment to improving the OAS, she said.
In November 2012, Kerry and Menendez, along with Republican Sens. Richard Lugar of Indiana and
Marco Rubio of Florida, wrote that OAS finances had become dangerously precarious and that it must
reform, pare back superfluous projects or risk losing support from its prime contributor, the United
States.
The United States has over the past decades found itself at growing odds with numerous Latin and
South American members of the OAS. Many of them, like Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador,
are led by leftist or populist leaders who have balked at accepting the dominance of the U.S. in the
Americas and pursued policies that often run counter to Washington's wishes.
Apart from Cuba, which has been suspended from the OAS for decades, the U.S. has most differences
with Venezuela, whose president, Hugo Chavez, reveled in tweaking Washington until his death last
March.
At Venezuela's request, Kerry was to meet Wednesday with the Venezuelan foreign minister to discuss
possibilities for improving relations, a U.S. official said.
Kerry was expected to raise human rights and democracy concerns in the country, where the opposition
was still disputing the narrow results of the election that brought Chavez's successor to power.
Since becoming the top U.S. diplomat in February, Kerry already has traveled more than 100,000 miles
to visit 23 countries, but the trip to Guatemala was his first in the Western Hemisphere.
Cybersecurity ! D – 1NC
Democratic governance response to cyber terror fails
Buckland, Schreier, and Winkler 9 – (Benjamin, Fred, Theodor, “Democratic Governance
Challenges of Cyber Security,” DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER, Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of
security sector reform and security sector governance, http://genevasecurityforum.org/files/DCAF-GSFcyber-Paper.pdf)//SJF
2.3 Deterrence and Responding to Cyber War
One consequence of the problem described above—that the origin of the threat is hard to identify—is
that traditional deterrence and response policies have been undermined. Because it is extremely
difficult to pinpoint the origin of attacks, it is hard to deter further damage by threatening
retaliation.29
Scholars of cyber war have thus concluded that there is little or no defensive benefit to be gained from
having great offensive capabilities. James A. Lewis, of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
notes that, “the US is widely recognised to have pre-eminent offensive cyber capabilities but it obtains
little or no deterrent effect from this.”30 It is, of course, possible that credible deterrents will yet be
identified but, for the moment, recent cyber battles have outpaced efforts to find one. As Joseph Nye
remarked in the New York Times, “we are now in the phase that we found ourselves in during the early
1950s, after the Soviets got the bomb […] it won’t have the same shape as nuclear deterrence, but […]
we can create some high costs for attackers.”31
A further problem is that, even if an attacker is properly identified, it may be difficult to adequately
respond. In part, this is due to the extreme difficulty of differentiating reliably between vandalism,
commercial theft, or state-sponsored cyber-war.32 And, just as cyber war has blurred distinctions
between categories of attacker, it has also blurred civil and military categories of target. Thus, a cyber
attack can effectively cripple a country by, for example, attacking its financial industry, without ever
targeting a military or government asset.33
This fact raises serious problems for those seeking to respond. The UN Charter, in article 2(4), states
that: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.” This principle, which now forms part of customary international
law, bans the use of force in all but two carefully defined situations: first, the Security Council may
authorize collective action to maintain or enforce international peace and security and, second, states
may act in “individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a state.” Speaking
about the Estonian cyber war (see Box 3.), Jaak Aaviksoo, the then Estonian defence minister, remarked:
At present, NATO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This means that the provisions
of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other words collective self-defence, will not automatically
be extended to the attacked country […] Not a single NATO defence minister would define a cyberattack as a clear military action at present. However, this matter needs to be resolved in the near
future.34
Meanwhile, debate continues about what states are able to credibly threaten—diplomatic demarche,
formal protest, economic retaliation, criminal prosecution, pre-emptive attack, or military strike.35
The creation of a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, with a
mandate to improve cyber defence, suggests that the alliance expects the Estonian cyber war to be
only the beginning. Indeed, the centre’s website argues that: “Modern militaries are preparing to use
cyberspace as a parallel battleground in future conflicts […] Even when a purely network-based attack
is unlikely, cyber attacks employed in concert with conventional weapons will become the standard
operating procedure in future conflicts.”36 And while many states rush to gain the technical capabilities
required for participation in this “revolution in military affairs”, relevant norms and structures regarding
transparency, accountability and oversight, struggle to keep pace.
A number of further issues hinder democratic governance with regards to responses to cyber war. The
first of these is a dispersal of responsibility. In short, it is often extremely difficult to work out who is
in charge of a relevant area because of the huge convergence of many previously distinct sectors.
There is thus a need to bridge previously distinct roles, ministries, and threat-response mechanisms.
This is particularly the case with regards to the increasingly artificial distinction between national
security and other government networks and different roles and responsibilities. The same is true in the
legal domain, where a patchwork of laws exists that evolved to cover what were originally very distinct
fields of activity. More than ever, there is a need for clearly identified roles and responsibilities, both
within and between public and private actors.38
Secondly, actors are often highly reluctant to share information, something that is of growing concern
for policymakers given the large number of players who have time-critical information. To take just one
example, firms have incentives to keep security measures secret until they are deployed, in order to
protect valuable proprietary information. The consequence of which is that the flaws in such measures
only become apparent after they have been deployed.39 Unless they are the explicit target,
governments also often have no way of knowing if an attack has taken place.
Referring to the recent attack on Google, for example, one senior intelligence official said, “unless
Google had told us about the attack on it and other companies, we probably never would have seen it.
When you think about that, it’s really scary.”40 A parallel problem, of course, is that governments may
be unaware that people or firms may be using their territory to launch attacks.
Possible solutions to this problem include proposed “cyber incident thresholds” after which reporting
becomes mandatory, although given that there are a huge number of low level events that together
have a large impact, it is unclear how effective this would be overall. In a similar vein, the United
Kingdom has developed a system to encourage information sharing in which data ownership never
changes hands. Instead, it is passed to vetted “information security providers” who act as a nexus for
combining data rather than the government.41 Trust and transparency are key issues for private actors,
many of whom are fearful, both of losing market share should they become forced to divulge too much
information (on clients, and so forth) to governments, as well as of malicious attacks by hackers. There
are also scores of unresolved legal issues related to aggregation of authorities, what authorities are
available for the government to protect privately owned critical infrastructure, placement of monitoring
software, automated attack detection and warning sensors, data sharing with third parties and liability
protection for the private sector.
Cybersecurity threat is exaggerated – expert consensus
Shiels 11 – Technology reporter, BBC News, Silicon Valley (Maggie, “Cyber war threat exaggerated
claims security expert,” 2/16/11, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12473809)//SJF
The threat of cyber warfare is greatly exaggerated, according to a leading security expert.
Bruce Schneier claims that emotive rhetoric around the term does not match the reality.
He warned that using sensational phrases such as "cyber armageddon" only inflames the situation.
Mr Schneier, who is chief security officer for BT, is due to address the RSA security conference in San
Francisco this week
Speaking ahead of the event, he told BBC News that there was a power struggle going on, involving a
"battle of metaphors".
He suggested that the notion of a cyber war was based on several high-profile incidents from recent
years.
They include blackouts in Brazil in 1998, attacks by China on Google in 2009 and the Stuxnet virus that
attacked Iran's nuclear facilities.
He also pointed to the fallout from Wikileaks and the hacking of Republican vice-presidential candidate
Sarah Palin's e-mail.
"What we are seeing is not cyber war but an increasing use of war-like tactics and that is what is
confusing us.
"We don't have good definitions of what cyber war is, what it looks like and how to fight it," said Mr
Schneier.
Casualty of war? Attacks such as Sarah Palin's e-mail hack have been lumped into the debate
His point of view was backed by Howard Schmidt, cyber security co-ordinator for the White House.
"We really need to define this word because words do matter," said Mr Schmidt.
"Cyber war is a turbo metaphor that does not address the issues we are looking at like cyber espionage,
cyber crime, identity theft, credit card fraud.
"When you look at the conflict environment - military to military - command and control is always
part of the thing.
"Don't make it something that it is not," Mr Schmidt told a small group of reporters on the opening day
of the conference.
A report last month by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development also concluded
that the vast majority of hi-tech attacks, described as acts of cyber war, do not deserve the name.
Tanks and bombs
The issue is likely to receive a lot of attention at RSA this week as a number of panels seek to define
what is and what is not cyber warfare.
"Stuxnet and the Google infiltration are not cyber war - who died?" asked Mr Schneier.
"We know what war looks like and it involves tanks and bombs.
"However all wars in the future will have a cyber space component.
"Just like we saw in the Iraqi war we [the US] used an air attack to soften up the country for a ground
offensive.
"It is probably reasonable you will see a cyber attack to soften up the country for an air attack or
ground offensive," he added.
Mr Schneier claimed that the heated rhetoric is driving policy in ways that might not be appropriate.
"The fear is that we are going to see an increased militarisation of the internet," he said.
Recently the FBI and Department of Defence squared off over who got to control defence in cyber space
and the multimillion dollar budget that goes with the job.
Mr Schneier said that battle was won by the defence department.
He also claimed there was a worrying trend of politicians who try to introduce legislation as a way to
deal with the issue as nothing short of knee-jerk politics.
“Stuxnet and the Google infiltration are not cyber war - who died?”
Last week the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act was introduced in the Senate, following confirmation by
oil companies and Nasdaq officials that their computer systems were repeatedly hacked by outsiders
Cybersecurity ! D – 2NC
No solvency – oversight challenges
(This probably implicates their ability to solve the multilat stuff too)
Buckland, Schneier, and Winkler 9 – (Benjamin, Fred, Theodor, “Democratic Governance
Challenges of Cyber Security,” DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER, Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of
security sector reform and security sector governance, http://genevasecurityforum.org/files/DCAF-GSFcyber-Paper.pdf)//SJF
2.1 Oversight
When faced with both traditional and non-traditional security challenges, states, acting alone, are
poorly equipped. Ad hoc security governance networks and, in particular, public private cooperation,
has increasingly been the response. It may be tempting to call this process “privatisation” but that
would be, as Alyson Bailes argues, to miss the nuances and complexities of a situation in which functions
are delegated or shared on a case-by-case basis without the “full transfer or property […] that might
occur in industrial ‘privatization’.”9
The term “governance network” is more appropriate to the case of cyber security given that the
delegation or transfer of responsibility is occurring in two directions. As well as states reaching down
to firms, companies are also reaching up to the state. An example of this is the recent cooperation
agreement between Google and the US National Security Agency (NSA) (discussed in more detail
below), apparently to help the firm secure its network after a recent attack by Chinese hackers.
Such networks involve cooperation between governments, the private sector, non-governmental and
international organisations and enable actors to take advantage of geographical, technological, and
knowledge resources they would be unable to muster alone. This emergence of new governance
networks poses both theoretical and practical challenges that have, thus far, been massively underexamined.
At the theoretical level, there are gaps in our understanding of complex governance networks. At the
practical level, there are, as yet, unanswered questions about the transparency, oversight,
accountability and cost (broadly defined) of new governance networks, as well as about ways in
which, on the positive side, they can contribute to improved security.
These gaps and problems are particularly acute with regards to public private cooperation. Such
cooperation is, by its very nature, often opaque and the activities of a network’s constituent parts are
often complex and hidden from the gaze of oversight bodies and institutions of democratic governance.
In addition, as Bailes points out: the balance of control in the public-private relationship is shifting in the
realm of security […] there are few, if any, instances in which government nowadays can simply force
businesses to
do what it wants; and even the more obvious methods of indirect control—ranging from national and
international legal regulation through to ‘fixing’ the play of economic incentives are becoming trickier to
apply in an environment increasingly shaped by non-traditional, nonstate, multinational or transnational forces and actors.10
The use of private military and security companies has clearly garnered the most attention in this
regard. However, cyber security offers us another, no less pertinent, illustration of this problematique. A
number of factors exacerbate the oversight challenges presented by cyber security and related public
private cooperation. Below is a list of these challenges, followed by some examples from state practice
in the UK, US and Australia.
First, oversight challenges are exacerbated by network complexity. As is illustrated below, a large and
diverse number of state, private, international and other non-state actors are involved in cyber
security. Similarly, a huge diversity of actors participate in what we might broadly term cyber attacks.
Network complexity makes it difficult for oversight bodies, such as parliamentary committees (with
often limited capacity), to keep track of relevant actors, to gain knowledge of their existence and
activities or even to acquire a legal mandate to do so.
Second, oversight challenges are exacerbated by technical complexity. Because of the highly technical
nature of cyber security challenges and responses, oversight bodies often lack the required expertise
to understand and adequately oversee them. Public private cooperation exacerbates the problem by
creating a divide between the highly paid and sophisticated technical experts involved in implementing a
directive and the (often) poorly paid and less well informed government actors charged with their
oversight.
Third, oversight challenges are exacerbated by legal complexity. Cyber security poses complex legal
questions related (among others) to the right to privacy and freedom of expression. This complexity is
then magnified by public private cooperation and associated legal questions regarding responsibility and
control.
Fourth, oversight challenges are exacerbated by the heterogeneity of actors involved. In most
instances, oversight institutions are organised along agency or functional lines. For example, a
parliamentary committee may oversee intelligence services and activities, the armed forces, or justice.
The public private cooperation involved in cyber security, however, cut across agency boundaries and
thus across areas of oversight mandate. The result is a large number of areas in which there is no or
inadequate oversight.
Fifth, oversight challenges are exacerbated by mandate perceptions. In general, government oversight
bodies are concerned with the government agencies over which they have direct responsibility. This
leaves the private partners of such agencies out of the reach of oversight, even in cases where they are
directly funded by, or work in close collaboration with such agencies.
Sixth, oversight challenges are exacerbated by the breaking of principal/agent bonds. The actions of
every government agent are connected in a chain of responsibility from principal to agent. For
example, a Paris police officer is linked via his or her superiors to the prevote (the senior officer in the
force), to the prefect (the politically appointed head of the force) and, ultimately, to the interior ministry
and the executive. There is thus a link of responsibility and oversight between instruments of
democratic governance (such as the parliament) and individuals or agencies carrying out government
directives. These links are severed by the introduction of private actors and the creation of public
private cooperation mechanisms. While a publicly contracted IT firm may seem to act as a simple agent
of the state (the principal), the relationship is generally much more complex and clouded by numerous
information asymmetries that reduce transparency and prevent oversight mechanisms from operating
effectively.
Because online security is, in many states, a relatively new issue for security actors, democratic
oversight, in the form of ombudsmen, parliamentary committees and other specialised bodies, has
been slow to catch up. In the UK, for example, oversight of government cyber security efforts is by
interdepartmental oversight boards, the cabinet committee for national security, international
relations and development and its sub-committee on protective security and resilience. By
considering the issue alongside more traditional defence questions, the effectiveness of oversight in
the UK may be vulnerable to the problems of technical complexity, mandate perceptions, and legal
complexity that were discussed above.
No cyberwar threat
Schneier 10 – internationally renowned security technologist and author, described by The Economist
as a "security guru"(Bruce, “The Threat of Cyberwar Has Been Grossly Exaggerated,” 7/7/10,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/07/the_threat_of_c.html)//SJF
Googling those names and terms -- as well as "cyber Pearl Harbor," "cyber Katrina," and even "cyber
Armageddon" -- gives some idea how pervasive these memes are. Prefix "cyber" to something scary,
and you end up with something really scary.
Cyberspace has all sorts of threats, day in and day out. Cybercrime is by far the largest: fraud, through
identity theft and other means, extortion, and so on. Cyber-espionage is another, both government- and
corporate-sponsored. Traditional hacking, without a profit motive, is still a threat. So is cyber-activism:
people, most often kids, playing politics by attacking government and corporate websites and networks.
These threats cover a wide variety of perpetrators, motivations, tactics, and goals. You can see this
variety in what the media has mislabeled as "cyberwar." The attacks against Estonian websites in 2007
were simple hacking attacks by ethnic Russians angry at anti-Russian policies; these were denial-ofservice attacks, a normal risk in cyberspace and hardly unprecedented.
A real-world comparison might be if an army invaded a country, then all got in line in front of people at
the DMV so they couldn't renew their licenses. If that's what war looks like in the 21st century, we
have little to fear.
Similar attacks against Georgia, which accompanied an actual Russian invasion, were also probably the
responsibility of citizen activists or organized crime. A series of power blackouts in Brazil was caused by
criminal extortionists -- or was it sooty insulators? China is engaging in espionage, not war, in
cyberspace. And so on.
One problem is that there's no clear definition of "cyberwar." What does it look like? How does it start?
When is it over? Even cybersecurity experts don't know the answers to these questions, and it's
dangerous to broadly apply the term "war" unless we know a war is going on.
Yet recent news articles have claimed that China declared cyberwar on Google, that Germany attacked
China, and that a group of young hackers declared cyberwar on Australia. (Yes, cyberwar is so easy
that even kids can do it.) Clearly we're not talking about real war here, but a rhetorical war: like the war
on terror.
We have a variety of institutions that can defend us when attacked: the police, the military, the
Department of Homeland Security, various commercial products and services, and our own personal
or corporate lawyers. The legal framework for any particular attack depends on two things: the attacker
and the motive. Those are precisely the two things you don't know when you're being attacked on the
Internet. We saw this on July 4 last year, when U.S. and South Korean websites were attacked by
unknown perpetrators from North Korea -- or perhaps England. Or was it Florida?
We surely need to improve our cybersecurity. But words have meaning, and metaphors matter. There's
a power struggle going on for control of our nation's cybersecurity strategy, and the NSA and DoD are
winning. If we frame the debate in terms of war, if we accept the military's expansive cyberspace
definition of "war," we feed our fears.
We reinforce the notion that we're helpless -- what person or organization can defend itself in a war? -and others need to protect us. We invite the military to take over security, and to ignore the limits on
power that often get jettisoned during wartime.
If, on the other hand, we use the more measured language of cybercrime, we change the debate.
Crime fighting requires both resolve and resources, but it's done within the context of normal life. We
willingly give our police extraordinary powers of investigation and arrest, but we temper these powers
with a judicial system and legal protections for citizens.
We need to be prepared for war, and a Cyber Command is just as vital as an Army or a Strategic Air
Command. And because kid hackers and cyber-warriors use the same tactics, the defenses we build
against crime and espionage will also protect us from more concerted attacks. But we're not fighting a
cyberwar now, and the risks of a cyberwar are no greater than the risks of a ground invasion. We need
peacetime cyber-security, administered within the myriad structure of public and private security
institutions we already have.
Doesn’t escalate
HSNW 11 (Homeland Security News Wire, “Fears of cyberwar exaggerated: report” 1/18/11,
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/fears-cyberwar-exaggerated-report)//SJF
New report says that analysis of cyber-security issues has been weakened by the lack of agreement on
terminology and the use of exaggerated language; the report says online attacks are unlikely ever to
have global significance on the scale of, say, a disease pandemic or a run on the banks; the authors
say, though, that “localized misery and loss” could be caused by a successful attack on the Internet’s
routing structure, which governments must ensure are defended with investment in cyber-security
training
When the writer of a notorious book for hackers says we should stop panicking about cyberwar, it is
probably time to sit up and take notice.
“Governments should take a calm, disciplined approach and evaluate the risks of each type of attack
very carefully rather than be swayed by scare stories,” says Peter Sommer of the London School of
Economics.
Under the pseudonym “Hugo Cornwall,” Sommer published the Hacker’s Handbook in 1985. Since then
he has become a noted security researcher and expert witness. Now he has co-authored a report for the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which warns governments against
swallowing wholesale stories about “cyberwar” and “cyberweapons”.
New Scientist reports that in Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk, published yesterday, Sommer says
that a true cyberwar would have the destructive effects of conventional war but be fought exclusively
in cyberspace — and as such is a “highly unlikely” occurrence.
“Analysis of cyber-security issues has been weakened by the lack of agreement on terminology and
the use of exaggerated language,” the report says. “Cyber-espionage is not a few keystrokes away from
cyberwar, it is a method of spying.”
Controversially, the OECD advises nations against adopting the Pentagon’s idea of setting up a military
division — as it has under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force’s Space Command — to fight cyber-security
threats. While vested interests may want to see taxpayers’ money spent on such ventures, says
Sommer, the military can only defend its own networks, not the private-sector critical networks we all
depend on for gas, water, electricity, and banking.
Co-authored with computer scientist Ian Brown of the Oxford Internet Institute in the United Kingdom,
the report says online attacks are unlikely ever to have global significance on the scale of, say, a disease
pandemic or a run on the banks. They say, though, that “localized misery and loss” could be caused by
a successful attack on the Internet’s routing structure, which governments must ensure are defended
with investment in cyber-security training.
Cyber Mil Turn – 1NC
OAS cyber terror response plans threaten Latin American militarization
Chillier and Freeman 5 – WOLA Senior Associate, Human Rights, and Security; WOLA Associate for
Mexico, Security, and Drug Policy (Gaston, Laurie, “Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of
Hemispheric Security,” July 2005,
http://www.umass.edu/legal/Benavides/Fall2005/397U/Readings%20Legal%20397U/9%20Security%20
OAS.pdf)//SJF
Concept in Context
In October 2003, the OAS adopted a new concept of hemispheric security through the passage of the
Declaration on Security in the Americas. According to the declaration, “the security threats, concerns,
and other challenges in the hemispheric context are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, and
the traditional concept and approach must be expanded to encompass new and nontraditional
threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects.”35 In other words,
the new definition broadens the traditional concept of security, incorporating new and nontraditional threats. This declaration considers the following practices as threats, concerns, or other
challenges to security:
[T]errorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit
trafficking in weapons, and the connections among them; extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad
sectors of the population, which also affect[s] stability and democracy…, erodes social cohesion and
undermines the security of states; natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other
health risks, and environmental degradation; trafficking in persons; attacks to cyber security ; the
potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of
potentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and the
possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
by terrorists.36
The declaration recognizes the prerogative of sovereign States to identify their own priorities with
respect to security and flexibility when choosing mechanisms to confront threats. It incorporates
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law, and multilateralism as
shared values of the hemisphere’s states. Finally, the declaration incorporates the concept of human
security to reaffirm that the fundamental reason for being of security for democratic States of the
hemisphere is the protection of human life.37
This new security system has been called “multidimensional” and possessing a “flexible architecture.”
The multidimensionality resides in the broadening of the traditional concept of regional security,
linked to defense and the security of States, starting from the incorporation of new threats, concerns,
and challenges. The flexibility of the architecture is related to the diversity of mechanisms which the
States can use to respond to these threats.
The adoption of a new system of security for the region generated various reactions. Some officials
involved in the negotiations emphasized that the Declaration updated the obsolete Cold War-era
security scheme and reflected the region’s new securityrelated needs.38 But others felt that the
Declaration’s content, as seen by the long list of threats, is not an agreement of consensus, but a
reflection of the impossibility of creating a common agenda for security in the region.39 Instead of
clearly establishing a common agenda to confront the security challenges of the region, the new scheme
seems more like a long list of the diverse problems facing each county, sub-region, or region.
The transformation of the security system of the Americas responds to a clear necessity to update a
system that prevailed under the logic of the Cold War and that had stopped responding to the reality of
the region.40 Nevertheless, given the current context of the region and the concept of terrorism
promoted by the United States, the implementation of this new multidimensional concept constitutes a
risk of increasing the securitization of the region’s problems and, consequently, militarization as a
response to confront them.
By our criteria, the OAS’s new concept of multidimensional security of the OAS suffers from two main
problems:
First, it views common problems in the region, such as extreme poverty, social exclusion, HIV and
other illnesses, and natural disasters, through the lens of national security, conceiving them as
threats. In this sense, the declaration creates conditions for the securitization of problems of a political,
economic, social, or environmental nature that, in principle, should not be part of an agenda of
hemispheric security. As a result, everything is now a security problem.
Second, the declaration dilutes the historic difference between the concepts of defense and public (or
citizen) security that has existed in the region until now by failing to distinguish traditional security
threats from new threats. The armed forces play a central role in defense of the country, understood
as the protection of the integrity of the State—both politically and geographically—from external
threats and, in exceptional circumstances clearly defined by law, of grave instances of internal
commotion that threaten the integrity of the State. Public security, as it is traditionally conceived, is
related to the maintenance of public order, for which it employs police forces to promote compliance
with the law. The concept of citizen security emerged in Latin America as a broader conception of public
security emphasizing the protection of the citizen and his or her rights as a central part of police
function.
In the context of the Declaration, the securitization of political, social, or economic problems on the one
hand, and militarized responses on the other, are two sides of the same coin. A meeting of experts
about the multidimensional aspect of security concluded: “The principle risk is that development
problems are associated with “threats” to security, with which military strategies can be
alternatives.”41
As we mentioned before, it is important to emphasize that securitization and militarization are not
practices that were created by this new concept of multidimensional security. On the contrary, these
types of practices, above all the use of armed forces in internal affairs, already existed in various
countries before the adoption of the Declaration. Nevertheless, the implementation of the declaration
in these circumstances creates certain risks that the current tendencies towards militarization of
domestic affairs , particularly public security matters, will increase in the region, because the
Declaration’s new definition of security—in which almost everything can be considered a security
threat—reinforces and legitimizes these tendencies.
Furthermore, the incorporation of a series of diverse problems—like public security, development,
environment, and health—into the concept of security is an obstacle for the Declaration’s operational
implementation, turning a new multidimensional concept of security into an empty concept. For that
reason, it seems unlikely to be an effective tool for protecting the States and citizens of the Americas.
Escalates and destabilizes the region
Pravda 11 – Russian News outlet (“U.S. militarization in Latin America condemned,” 8/6/11,
http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/08-06-2011/118151U_S_militarization_in_Latin_America_condemned-0/)//SJF
Intellectuals, representatives of social movements and political forces gathered in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, last Wednesday (1st) to discuss the process of re-militarization of Latin America by the
United States. The Continental Conference on Imperialist Militarization was attended by the writer,
journalist and member of the Advisory Council of Mopassol, Estella Calloni, who warned about the U.S.
military bases installed in Latin America.
It is now necessary to consider the military bases, the actions of paramilitaries in Colombia, the different
forms of state terrorism employed, the presence of U.S. troops in Haiti and the situation of Mexico,
facing a war between drug trafficking cartels, which has left over 37,000 dead since December 2006.
Estella Calloni positively assessed the realization of the Council of Defence meeting of UNASUL (Union of
South American Nations) and the creation of the Center for Strategic Studies of Defense in Buenos Aires.
"The CEED was created from the need to consolidate a South American identity on the subject of
defense. It aims to build a vision of its own, oriented from the specific needs and common interests of
the countries in the region. "
Another participant at the meeting, an anthropologist at the University of Washington, Adrienne Pine,
denounced the U.S. role in the coup against the President of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya. Almost two
years ago - on June 28, 2009 - Zelaya was deposed from office and sent into exile. In late May, the
former Honduran president returned home and was greeted by demonstrations, banners and posters of
the Honduran Resistance movement.
Latin American integration
To discuss issues such as national defense, sovereignty and Latin American integration, the
Paraguayan general, member of the Center for National and International Studies and the former
Defense Minister of Paraguay, Luis Bareiro Spaini, pointed out the geostrategic importance of UNASUL.
"The international scenario is dynamic and is composed of the simultaneous familiarity and the
transformation of a bipolar to a multipolar state of affairs, able to include and discuss, unlike the old
proposals that had been in favor of a bilateral mechanism, exclusive and clearly hegemonic," he
emphasized.
Also during his speech, Spaini quoted a passage from contemporary thinker, Noam Chomsky, to support
the values of the sovereignty of countries and peoples. "Sovereignty is no value in itself. It can only be
regarded as a value when it is linked to freedom and rights. When you talk about these values, we must
bear in mind human beings, not political constructions, such as corporations, states and capital."
For Spaini, the integration must be understood as the sum of national identities, not as the dissolution
of the particular characteristics in a single uniform entity. The general also stressed that the issue of the
sovereignty of the nation-state in the framework of regional integration in different continents is a
constantly updating process.
Alternatives for demilitarization
The president of Mopassol (Argentine entity that integrates the World Peace Council), Rina Bertaccini,
presented during a speech a few alternatives to imperialist militarization and disclosed the information
that in recent years the number of U.S. military bases and members of NATO in Latin American countries
have doubled.
Rina recalled the experience of Mopassol and called the struggle of Vietnamese people during the
Vietnam War "unforgettable." For the current situation, Rina said that the need is to minimize and to
interrupt U.S. influence in Latin America's regional integration in all spheres - economic, political and
cultural. Rina cites the creation of the South American Defense Council, created by UNASUL, and the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean initiatives as relevant to the ongoing struggle.
Besides these, other more specific measures were noted by the president. "The determination of the
Ecuadorian government to get rid of the U.S. base at Manta, and the Argentine government's decision
to renationalise the Military Aircraft Factory in the city of Cordoba are part of this transformation
process.
Cebrapaz against U.S. war
To analyze the world situation and the role of NATO, the United States and the European Union in
Middle East conflicts, the director of Cebrapaz (Brazilian Center for Solidarity and Struggle for Peace),
José Reinaldo Carvalho, issued a statement noting that the War against Libya is the "first of the Obama
administration, but the third to be conducted, since he inherited the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
from the Bush administration."
"As in all the recent wars of U.S. imperialism and its allies against other nations, a war started under
false pretenses and has the complicity of a huge and powerful machine of lies - the media, which
prepares the land with arguments concerning alleged violations of human rights, the perpetration of
crimes against the civilian population and disobedience to international treaties," he emphasized.
According to Jose Reinaldo, the NATO bombings in Libya are part of an overall global strategy of the
imperialist powers to turn to their advantage the events that have shaken the Arab world and all the
Middle East, from the victorious demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt.
The director recalls and explains how Cebrapaz has been fighting for peace and harmony between
peoples. "When NATO turned 60, the World Peace Council, along with other peace organizations in
Europe, participated in two major acts. One of them, in Belgrade, in the course of the 10th anniversary
of NATO bombing against Yugoslavia, the Kosovo War. The second act took place in Strasbourg to
protest against a NATO summit."
José Reinaldo points out that since its introduction in 1949, NATO has had an aggressive character. He
recalls that the alliance was the main instrument of U.S. imperialism with its European allies in the
fight against the socialist countries and in their actions to impose the neo-colonial system in the world
in the period after the Second World War.
During his speech, José Reinaldo pointed out the historical aspects that helped the geographic
expansion of the Alliance and the negative dimension that it has taken over the years. "NATO is
responsible and guilty for crimes against peace and humanity. It violated international law, tore up the
UN Charter, and has destroyed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and the former
Yugoslavia under false pretenses. They are crimes that cannot go unpunished."
To conclude, the director of Cebrapaz ended the speech by highlighting the common goal between
NATO and the United States. "This war machine, which serves imperialism, remains with the same goal
over the years, plundering the resources of nations and peoples, to control markets and exercise
political domination," he reflected.
Cyber Mil Turn – 2NC
Causes accidental launch – extinction
Clarke and Andreasen 6/14 – the chairman of Good Harbor Security Risk Management, was special
adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration; a consultant to the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, was the National Security Council’s staff director for defense policy and arms
control (Richard A, Steve, “Cyberwar’s threat does not justify a new policy of nuclear deterrence,”
6/14/13, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-14/opinions/39977598_1_nuclear-weaponscyber-attack-cyberattacks)//SJF
As the board noted, cyberattacks can occur very quickly and without warning, requiring rapid decisionmaking by those responsible for protecting our country. Integrating the nuclear threat into the
equation means making clear to any potential adversary that the United States is prepared to use
nuclear weapons very early in response to a major cyberattack — and is maintaining nuclear forces on
“prompt launch” status to do so.
Russia and China would certainly take note — and presumably follow suit. Moreover, if the United
States, Russia and China adopted policies threatening an early nuclear response to cyber-attacks,
more countries would surely take the same approach.
It’s hard to see how this cyber-nuclear action-reaction dynamic would improve U.S. or global security.
It’s more likely to lead to a new focus by Pentagon planners on generating an expanding list of cyberrelated targets and the operational deployment of nuclear forces to strike those targets in minutes.
Against that backdrop, maintaining momentum toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the
United States’ national security strategy (and that of other nations) — a general policy course pursued
by the past five presidents — would become far more difficult. Further reductions in nuclear forces
and changes in “hair-trigger” postures, designed to lessen the risk of an accidental or unauthorized
nuclear launch, would also probably stall.
Fortunately, Obama has both the authority and the opportunity to make clear that he meant what he
said when he laid out his nuclear policy in Prague in 2009. For decades, presidential decision directives
have made clear the purpose of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and provided broad
guidance for military planners who prepare the operations and targeting plans for our nuclear forces. An
update to existing presidential guidance is one of the homework items tasked by the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review.
Cyberthreats are very real, and there is much we need to do to defend our military and critical civilian
infrastructure against what former defense secretary Leon E. Panetta referred to as a “cyber Pearl
Harbor” — including enhancing the ability to take action, when directed by the president, against
those who would attack us. We also need more diplomacy such as that practiced by Obama with his
Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, at their recent summit. Multinational cooperation centers could
ultimately lead to shared approaches to cybersecurity, including agreements related to limiting
cyberwar.
U.S. cyber-vulnerabilities are serious, but equating the impact of nuclear war and cyberwar to justify a
new nuclear deterrence policy and excessive Cold War-era nuclear capabilities goes too far. It
diminishes the unique threat of national devastation and global extinction that nuclear weapons
represent , undermines the credibility of nuclear deterrence by threatening use for lesser
contingencies and reduces the urgency for focused action to lessen nuclear dangers. Excessive rhetoric
on the threat of cyberwar from the United States and blurring the distinction between cyber and
nuclear attacks just makes progress toward cyber-peace more difficult.
With a stroke of his pen and his speech in Berlin, Obama can keep the United States from uploading the
cyber-nuclear link.
Falklands ! D – 1NC
No chance of militarization
Darling 10 – International military markets analyst with Forecast International Inc., an aerospace and
defense research company (Daniel, “Another Falklands War? Not Bloody Likely,” 2/25/10,
http://www.thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2010/02/25/another-falkland-war-not-bloodylikely/)//SJF
Such particulars aside, it should be emphasized that the Falkland Islands are better defended today
than they were prior to the 1982 Argentine invasion. And while today’s Royal Navy and British Army
(many of whose elite troops are currently deployed to Afghanistan) would inarguably have great
difficulty in assembling another task force to retake the islands, with seven amphibious warfare ships
in Royal Navy service there remains sufficient capability to relieve the islands in case of a military
stalemate despite a minimal supply of escort ships.
The crucial question is less what the British could muster should war again break out, but whether
Argentina could mount another such invasion. With the HMS Clyde patrol ship and Type 42 HMS
Gloucester frigate both patrolling Falkland waters and the Type 42 HMS York reportedly deployed to the
area as well, a robust Royal Navy component is patrolling the area. The British also have four moderngeneration Eurofighter Typhoons based at Mount Pleasant air base and 1,076 military personnel
stationed on the islands.
In contrast, the Argentine armed forces offer up little offensive capability. Once a formidable service,
the Argentine Air Force today comprises an aging combination of A-4 Skyhawk and Mirage attack
fighters, while the Navy can muster a few Super Entendard strike aircraft and six P-3B Orions. In terms
of surface combatants the Argentine Navy has four destroyers that are each nearly thirty years old, and
nine frigates only two of which were commissioned after 1990. More importantly, Argentina has retired
its only landing craft (the Cabo San Antonio) and no longer has an aircraft carrier, so despite its
proximity to the Falklands (300 miles) it would be a difficult hurdle for the country to forcefully retake
the islands.
Simply looking at the most recent defense expenditures – $2.2 billion in 2009 for Argentina versus
$60+ billion for the U.K. – reveals the discrepancy in training, manpower and equipment commitment
provided each nation’s armed forces by their respective governments. That the British armed forces
have suffered from years of conducting overseas operations on peacetime budgets is of little dispute.
But despite their stretched capabilities and the logistical challenge of reinforcing an island group in the
South Atlantic that lay 8,000 miles from their home base, if war were to break out they could still bring
more modern capability to bear than their Argentine counterpart.
One aside to the territorial dispute is that the big winner amidst all the public posturing between
Buenos Aires and London may prove to be the British Royal Navy. As recently as a month ago the
service was bracing itself for program cuts believed to be all but inevitable under the looming Strategic
Defense Review. Supporters of maintaining a robust, full-spectrum British defense component are using
recent events to lament what they describe as “a state of decay” in the British armed forces, lambasting
the Labor government’s defense policies in the process.
While the Falkland territorial dispute will continue to retain its political dimension, the possibility that
another war erupts would more likely be the result of an incidental trigger – Argentine warships
halting British oil ships, for instance – than another planned invasion of the islands by Buenos Aires.
Keeping the fire lit on the issue may provide Ms. Kirchner with a boost heading into the 2011
presidential election, but advocating open warfare to resolve her country’s claim to the island serves no
one, least of all Argentina.
With Buenos Aires’ diplomatic envoys going into overdrive to downplay the prospect of war over the
islands, the Argentine president no doubt understands this, much as she probably grasps that another
such war might very well end for Buenos Aires in the same manner as the last affair – with its armed
forces defeated and the sitting government given the boot by an angry public.
Falklands ! D – 2NC
Cooperation outweighs tensions
Sanchez 2/20 – Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs where he focuses on
geopolitics and security issues (Alejandro, “Improving UK-Argentina relations over the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands,” 2/20/13, http://www.voxxi.com/uk-argentina-relations-falklands-malvinas/2/)//SJF
The aforementioned examples may give the reader the impression that the historical relationship
between the United Kingdom and Argentina has always been one of tension. This is not the case. In
fact, British business interests have been involved in Argentina for centuries. In the 19th century, they
helped build railroads in the South American nation. In addition, there has been cooperation between
London, Buenos Aires and the regional government of the Falklands as recently as the mid/late 1990s.
At the time, a number of cooperation agreements were signed, including the search for hydrocarbons
as well as promising agreements over oil and fishing. Unfortunately, some of these agreements have
since been cancelled as a result of the Kirchner administration coming to power. As an example, in 2007,
Buenos Aires retreated from a 1995 deal over oil and gas exploration.
While we all wish for tensions not to be blown out of proportion, the Kirchner government’s continuous
belligerent and nationalistic statements make it hard for any diplomatic reproach with London and the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, as this might erode whatever little popular support Kirchner has as Argentina
enters yet another cycle of economic crisis.
Likewise, Prime Minister Cameron is in an uncomfortable position himself and may not want to appear
weak before the British electorate, especially as he has some tough years ahead. Issues that he will
have to deal with include the unpopular restructuring of the British military, a British referendum over
membership in the European Union, and Scotland’s 2014 referendum regarding its future in the UK.
With that said, the Argentine government’s successive aggressive statements and postures have made it
particularly difficult to achieve some type of constructive dialogue with the UK.
The recent incident in which Timerman refused to meet with Falkland Islands officials stands out as a
poor decision made by the highest ranking diplomat of the Argentine government . Also unhelpful were
Timerman’s declarations in London that he foresaw Argentine control of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
in 20 years.
As is often the case in international affairs, the actions and decisions by governments regarding a
particular issue are affected by other unrelated issues. In the case of the British/Argentine dispute over
the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, debates and claims over them will continue, but this does not mean
that cooperation between London, Buenos Aires and Stanley (the capital of the islands) cannot occur
at the same time. It already happened in the late 1990s, and it could and should happen again.
No opportunity for escalation
Borsani 12 – Apprentice historian of intl relations at the Catholic University of Milan (Davide, “Thirty
years after: Argentina and the United Kingdom towards a new Falklands war?,” 3/5/12,
http://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/thirty-years-after-argentina-and-united-kingdom-towardsnew-falklands-war-0)//SJF
The rhetoric on the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (or Malvinas), an Overseas Territory of the
United Kingdom disputed by Argentina since the XIXth century, has recently grown up as the 30th
anniversary of the war of 1982 approaches. In February, the Argentinean Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Hector Timerman, asserted that the defence of British sovereignty is «the last refuge of a declining
power». Last year, the President at Casa Rosada, Christina Fernandez de Kirchner, stated that Britain
«continues to be a crude colonial power in decline». David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, responded that Argentinean claims are «actually far more like colonialism». Fernandez de
Kirchner found these words expression of «mediocrity and stupidity». The Falklands dispute – and its
related sub-issues – is the only, but influential, source of disagreement which affects the relationship
between the two countries.
The United Kingdom supports its stance on the principle of self-determination, sanctioned by the
Article I of the United Nations Charter. William Hague, the British Foreign Minister, recently wrote on
«The Times»: «only the Islanders can be the masters of their future». In other words, the Islands will
remain a British Overseas Territory until their inhabitants will wish to be so. This firm belief embodies a
strong historical continuity along Her Majesty’s Governments. With an own legislative assembly and a
local government, Falklanders recognise themselves as British citizens. On the contrary, Buenos Aires’
claims are rooted mostly on two ideas. Firstly, when Argentina obtained its independence from Spain in
1816, it would have inherited the Islands, at the time under the (already contested) Spanish colonial
control. However, this principle, known judicially as uti possidetis, is rarely applied by international law,
and only in presence of incontrovertible evidence (e.g. soldiers holding the military occupation of the
territory). This was not the case. Secondly, the Falkland Islands are 300 km away from the Argentinean
coast, and for Buenos Aires this territorial contiguity is determinant. Beyond its idealistic rhetoric, the
control over the Islands would allow Argentina to exploit their natural resources, especially since
rumours on rich hydrocarbon deposits in the South Atlantic waters are growing. Ambassador Sir Mark
Lyall Grant, the British representative to the United Nations, has sarcastically replied that on the basis of
territorial contiguity «Canada could claim sovereignty over Alaska».
In 1982, the Argentinean government, squeezed by internal pressures and in search of internal
legitimation, suddenly invaded the Falklands in order to satisfy the long-standing appetites of its public
opinion. British troops allotted on the Islands were unprepared to fight, and the invaders easily seized
them. Margaret Thatcher, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, responded vigorously, and
Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, supported by a powerful nationalist commitment, were able to re-establish
the status quo ante.
Thirty years later, Britain has implemented the lessons learned. History demonstrated that Argentina is
not a reliable and peaceful counterpart to debate the Falklands issue with. Notably, when amending the
Constitution in 1994, the Argentinean Parliament included a clause claiming the sovereignty over the
Islands: «the recovery of these territories and the full exercise of sovereignty […] are a permanent and
unrelinquished goal of the Argentinean people». London was forced to change its reactive posture into a
deterrent one. In the aftermath of the war of 1982, a notable garrison of naval, air and land elements
was deployed in the Mount Pleasant Complex, roughly 50 km from the capital, Stanley. Nowadays the
mission consists of an infantry unit, four Eurofighter Typhoons, support helicopters, Rapier surface-to-air
missiles and a standing naval commitment, which provide a support vessel and a destroyer (or a frigate).
At times, a nuclear-powered submarine navigates in international and territorial waters around the
Islands.
This February, Buenos Aires has denounced the British «militarization» of the South Atlantic, visibly
trying to take political advantage from the routine replacement of the frigate HMS Montrose, assigned
to patrol the Islands, by the destroyer HMS Dauntless, a ship of a higher class. Adopting a similar
perspective, Fernandez de Kirchner and her Government labelled as «conqueror» the Duke of
Cambridge, Prince William, who has begun a six-week training tour in the Islands. Argentinean
allegations exaggerate. They suggest, though, an important reflexion about British military posture
down there. On the one hand, the Strategic Defence and Security Review, endorsed by the
Government of David Cameron in 2010, decreed considerable cuts to the defence budget. Many
analysts questioned whether these cuts are compatible with the maintaining of expeditionary
capabilities, potentially necessary to protect Falklanders. On the other hand, over the previous five fiscal
years, the military expenditure for preserving the deterrent posture increased from 65 to 75 million
pounds. Would this trend be sustainable in an age of austerity? The Ministry of Defence suggests that
the security of the Islands will not be endangered, and that there is no reason to revise the current
deployment. But in a letter sent to «Daily Telegraph», Admiral Sir John Woodward, former chief of naval
task force during the war of 1982, noticed that in this situation Britain risks to do «precisely nothing» to
prevent Buenos Aires re-taking the Falklands.
Probably, 2012 will not test the security of the Islands. It is hard to predict a renewal of armed
hostilities. Does Buenos Aires really have an interest in transforming a war of words in a war of arms?
Christina Fernandez de Kirchner enjoys a strong popular support. In last October, she won the
Presidential election with 54% of the votes casted; in February, «The Guardian» has reported that,
according to the latest polls, she can count on a 70% support. The Argentinean economy, characterized
by a heavy visible hand of the State, is growing steadily by 9% per-year. Fernandez de Kirchner does not
need any new source of legitimation and she does not have to face any immediate internal pressure to
settle recurring to a diversionary aggressive external activity. National military expenditure is stable
since 1997, at a very low 1% GDP (or less), and up to now there is no sign of mobilization. On a quality
level, the Armed Forces are weak as they were in 1982, and the current posture of Britain should be
enough to prevent any aggression.
As already said, Great Britain is cutting its military spending. It has converted the sole remaining
Invincible-class aircraft carrier, the HMS Illustrious, into a helicopter one. The first aircraft carrier of
the new Queen Elizabeth-class will enter into service only in 2020. It is a priority, therefore, to avoid
any military operations very far from home, especially meanwhile the expensive mission in
Afghanistan is reaching an end. Indeed the Libyan crisis has signalled a great risk of overstretching for
British Armed Forces, raising deep contrasts between the military and the Government about the
limited resources employed. No one in London has an interest to fuel the Falklands dispute. David
Cameron has no interest: he has recently re-taken the lead in the polls in the wake of the veto about a
new European treaty and has other foreign policy priorities (such as the Middle East or North Africa).
And, once again, British military assets currently deployed at the Falklands guarantee a sufficient
deterrence against Buenos Aires’ ambitions.
In sum, it is extremely unlikely that Argentina would be able (and willing) to exploit concretely the
“window of opportunity” opened by the strategic reorganization of the United Kingdom. Beyond the
rhetoric, the 30th anniversary of the Falklands war of 1982 should not reserve military surprises. Let
alone a new armed conflict.
Oil answers
AT: Oil spills
No risk of a spill – safety coop now, emergency authority and there is so little
recoverable oil there won’t be much drilling
Cardenas, 12 – former senior official at the U.S. State Department (Jose, “The phony Cuba embargo
debate”, Foreign Policy, March 21, 2012,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/21/the_phony_cuba_embargo_debate)//eek
In recent weeks, an unholy alliance of political activists and economic opportunists have been trying to
convince anyone who will listen that the U.S. embargo of Cuba is inviting "catastrophic" damage to
Florida by preventing the U.S. from responding to a potential oil spill from a newly launched Cuban rig
just outside U.S. waters. The claim is without merit.
The impetus for this contrived argument is that in late January, the Spanish oil company Repsol began
exploratory drilling in Cuban waters -- 80 nautical miles from the Florida Keys -- using a Chinese-made rig
owned by an Italian company.
The fact is, under current U.S. policy, any U.S. President has broad authorities to ensure all U.S.
resources and expertise can be deployed in case of a disaster off the southeastern U.S. coast. And all
indications are the administration has moved expeditiously -- with lessons learned from the Deepwater
Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico -- to plan a U.S. response -- with no changes needed in U.S. law.
Yet, that has not stopped the doomsday scenarios. For example, according to one alarmist analysis, in
case of an accident:
"The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed
booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would
also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital
technologies."
The arguments, frankly, are a hash of half-truths and erroneous and contradictory statements about
the U.S. embargo. For example, we are told the U.S. embargo prevents interaction between the U.S.
and Cuban officials to discuss response scenarios, only to learn that they already are interacting.
Meetings between U.S. and Cuban officials (and those from Bahamas, Jamaica, and Mexico) have
already taken place under the auspices of the U.N. International Maritime Organization.
Then there is the ludicrous scenario posited of vintage Cuban crop dusters being forced into action
because the embargo allegedly would prevent U.S. aircraft from dropping oil dispersants. Nonsense.
In addition, there is the de rigueur clumsy caricature of pro-embargo Cuban Americans, who "might
protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in
Cuban territory." This seems not to be aware that most Cuban Americans live in South Florida and would
have a decided interest in any despoiling of the state's environment. They would hardly be averse to any
U.S. mobilization to counter a spill. What they do justifiably object to is any exploitation of the situation
for political ends.
Indeed, a particularly egregious example of the politicization of the issue has been the involvement of
the Environmental Defense Fund, which has been positively sanguine about Cuban oil drilling. A
powerful lobby able to mobilize hundreds of activists to oppose U.S. offshore drilling, they have been
leading advocates of across-the-board U.S. cooperation with Cuba on offshore oil drilling, despite the
latter's woeful inexperience and dearth of capabilities in offshore oil drilling. In this, they have been
aided and abetted by assorted U.S. oil services companies who have been misrepresenting U.S. policy
in a misguided attempt to create economic opportunity.
In the end, the likelihood that Cuba possesses any commercially viable oil reserves off its shores is
dubious. And, in the unlikely event that it does discover any, it's probable that they will be exploitable
only after the Castro regime passes into the dustbin of history. In the meantime, however, allowing
Cuba anywhere near a deepwater platform is akin to handing a hand-grenade to a monkey. The Obama
administration could have done better by strong-arming foreign companies from partnering with the
Castro brothers on this project. But they appear to have a handle on cleaning up any attendant mess -without any superfluous changes to U.S. policy towards the Castro dictatorship.
Spills are globally inevitable
NOAA, 5 – (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association, “FAQ: Oil Spills in History”, 7-5,
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/topic_subtopic_entry.php?RECORD_KEY(entry_subtopic_topic)=e
ntry_id,subtopic_id,topic_id&entry_id(entry_subtopic_topic)=325&subtopic_id
(entry_subtopic_topic)=2&topic_id(entry_subtopic_topic)=1) //SP
Q. Where do most oil spills happen in the world? A. Oil spills happen all around the world. Analysts for
the Oil Spill Intelligence Report, who track oil spills of at least 10,000 gallons (34 tons), reported that
spills in that size range have occurred in the waters of 112 nations since 1960. But they also reported
(Etkin 1997) that oil spills happen more frequently in certain parts of the world. They identified the
following "hot spots" for oil spills from vessels: --the Gulf of Mexico (267 spills) --the northeastern U.S.
(140 spills) --the Mediterranean Sea (127 spills) --the Persian Gulf (108 spills) --the (75 spills) --Japan (60
spills) --the Baltic Sea (52 spills) --the United Kingdom and English Channel (49 spills) --Malaysia and
North Sea Singapore (39 spills) --the west coast of France and north and west coasts of Spain (33 spills) -Korea (32 spills)
Oil spills have very minimal effects
Craig, 5 – Associate Professor of Law and dean’s Fellow, Indiana University School of Law (Robert,
Spring, 20 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law 333, Lexis) //SP
Despite the obviousness of oil spills, however, they are a relatively small ocean pollution problem.
While the world's oceans receive about 3.25 million tons of oil each year, the majority of that oil
comes from street runoff instead of tanker spills. 82 Accidental spills and shipping are responsible for
only about 12 percent of all marine pollution, while offshore oil and gas drilling and mining are
responsible for another 1 percent. 83 Instead, 77 percent of all marine pollution comes from land-based
sources - 44 percent from land-based water pollutant and 33 percent from land-based air pollution. 84
As Nancy Knowlton at the Center for Marine Biodiversity at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography has
summarized: The most obvious problems stem from our propensity to view dilution as the solution to
pollution. Human numbers continue to grow, as do per capita amounts of waste, and much of this waste
ultimately finds its way into the ocean. Some waste is toxic, some carries human pathogens, and some
alters marine food chains in ways detrimental to human well-being. 85 Land-based air pollution can
arise from both natural events, such as desert sand storms and dust storms, and human-caused
events, such as forest fires and industrial air pollution. This pollution can acidify ocean waters, increase
the concentration of heavy metals and other toxic pollutants in the oceans, and increase sedimentation
of the oceans, blocking sunlight, interfering with photosynthesis, and smothering coastal ecosystems
such as coral reef. 86 Land-based water pollution can also carry toxics and sediment into the seas,
causing similar problems. 87 In addition, toxic pollutants, in combination with rising sea temperature,
"are lowering the natural resistance of marine organisms to infections." 88 Thus, for example,
organochloride pollution has been linked to "the mass mortality of Mediterranean monk seals off the
coast of Mauritania, which died after becoming infected with a distemper virus of dolphins." 89
--XT – safety coop
Cardenas says their ‘US tech key’ arg is propaganda passed from US oil companies to
think tanks
Foreign safety tech collaboration is sufficient
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental threats because of the proximity to the
United States and the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are overblown. Cuba has at least as
much incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices as does the United States, and reports indicate that
Cuba is taking safety seriously.64 Lee Hunt, President of the Houston-based International Association
of Drilling Contractors, said, "[t]he Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought into
what will be required to safely drill," and that "they are very knowledgeable of international industry
practices and have incorporated many of these principles into their safety and regulatory planning and
requirements." 65 Thus, while the economic embargo of Cuba restricts American technology from
being utilized, foreign sources have provided supplemental alternatives.66 Further, spill response
planning can be implemented before drilling begins. The United States currently has oil spill response
agreements with Mexico 67 and Canada,68 but not with Cuba.69
Training and international regulations solve
TC, 11 (Television Camaguey, “Cuban Specialists Receive Training on Safe Oil Drilling “, 6/8/11,
http://www.tvcamaguey.co.cu/english/index.php/science-and-technology/35-science/92-cubanspecialists-receive-training-on-safe-oil-drilling-.html) //SP
Cuban specialists who are going to participate in the drilling of deep-water exploratory wells in Cuban
waters in the Gulf of Mexico recently participated in courses on safety and environment protection as
part of preparations for such activities. A total of 120 Cubans including executives, officials and
technicians of enterprises involved in the oil industry participated in three seminars on the topic taught
by Norwegian experts. Manuel Marrero, chief oil and gas specialist of the Basic Industry Ministry, told
ACN the several-day training is vital to undertake the deep- and ultra-deep-water drillings scheduled
to begin in a few months. Current international regulations for this kind of operations are very
rigorous in an effort to protect the environment and avoid accidents such as the one that recently
occurred in the British Pretroleum platform.
US inspections prove no risk
Gentile and Mira, 12 – Reporters for Platts News Service (Gary and Leslie, “US finds no red flags in
inspection of oil rig set to drill offshore Cuba”, “January 16, 2012”,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/)//eek
With Cuba gearing up to drill its first-ever deepwater oil well just 60 miles from Florida's beaches, the
US government has been keenly interested in helping the communist nation to prevent a blowout or
some other catastrophic accident that could send oil spewing into American waters.
Two US agencies made a big stride on that front last week, as they were allowed to conduct a rare onboard inspection of the Chinese-made drilling rig that the Spanish company Repsol will use to spud the
deepwater well in the coming months.
The inspection, which was completed Monday, was good news for the spill-wary Obama administration,
which was heavily criticized two years ago for its handling of BP's massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
In a joint statement, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and the Coast Guard said
they found the rig "to generally comply with existing international and US standards by which Repsol
has pledged to abide."
"The review is consistent with US efforts to minimize the possibility of a major oil spill, which would hurt
US economic and environmental interests," BSEE and the Coast Guard said.
Personnel from the two agencies boarded the rig, dubbed Scarabeo 9, off the coast of Trinidad and
Tobago. The inspection was done at the invitation of the Spanish firm Repsol, which will be the first
company to use the rig to explore in Cuba's deepwater. After the rig finishes the Repsol well, it will go on
to spud deepwater wells for Petronas and Gazprom. The rig itself is owned by Saipem, a division of the
Italian firm Eni.
The inspectors reviewed the vessel's construction, its drilling equipment and its safety systems, BSEE
and the Coast Guard said in their joint statement. The safety equipment that was inspected included
lifesaving and firefighting equipment, emergency generators and dynamic positioning systems, the
agencies said.
US inspectors also looked at the rig's critical blowout preventer, a massive series of valves that is
supposed to cap the well in the event of a blowout. In the 2010 Gulf of Mexico disaster, the blowout
preventer did not function as designed, allowing oil to spew from BP's blown-out Macondo well for
nearly three months.
No risk of spills – Cuba is well prepared
Radio Cadena Agramonte, 11 – a Cuban radio station (“Cuba to Study Oil Spill Risks and
Prevention”, Jan. 29, 2011,
http://www.cadenagramonte.cu/english/index.php/show/articles/4151:cuba-to-study-oil-spill-risksand-prevention)//eek
The Cuban office of the Pan-American Institute of Naval Engineering will hold a workshop in March on
oil spill safety and risk agreements, including a debate on the latest software used in this field,
organizers said Friday.
A second workshop in June will study oil spill risks related to naval engineering, ports and maritime
transport, and other general issues of these types of accidents.
The institute's 2011 program in Cuba concludes with an annual techical workshop in November to
prepare for the 2nd Symposium on Security and Risks, set to be held in Cienfuegos in 2012.
These events bring together experts, academics, universities and research centers, shipbuilders,
shipping companies, port terminals, fishing companies, port authorities, classification societies, and
manufacturers of equipment and marine systems.
Drilling is safe
Nerurkar and Sullivan, 11 – Publishers at the United States Congressional Research Service
(Neelesh, Mark P., “Cuba's Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations”,
United States Congressional Research Service, 28 November 2011, http://www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4f1ea6af2) //SP
Risks of a Spill in Cuban Waters
The U.S. agency in charge of enforcing safety and environmental regulations on the U.S. Outer
Continental Shelf, including oil spill response, is the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). In addition, several statutes, including the Clean Water Act and the
Oil Pollution Act, establish a liability regime for oil spills. Offshore exploration
and production operations in non-U.S. waters may not be governed by analogous regulations or fall
under a liability structure that creates an incentive to minimize oil spills. Since the Repsol project is only
the second deepwater well to be drilled in Cuba’s EEZ, Cuban officials are in the process of developing
and implementing up-to-date regulations to prevent offshore drilling accidents and contingency plans
to address accidents if they do occur.31 They have pledged to follow the highest international
environmental and safety standards, and have expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with the
United States and other countries on safety measures.32However, as the recent U.S. experience in the
Gulf of Mexico illustrates, even the long-time
existence of regulations and regulator may not always prevent an oil spill.
According to a 2008 American Petroleum Institute study of U.S. offshore oil spills, the largest cause of
spilled oil is loss of well control or “blowouts” at offshore platforms.33 Currently, only exploration
wells are planned in Cuba. Their results will be analyzed before production wells and transportation
infrastructure is considered. However, there have been major oil spills from exploratory wells in the
past. Two of the largest accidental oil spills in world history resulted from blowouts at exploratory
wells in the Gulf of Mexico – the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and the 1979
Ixtoc oil spill in Mexico’s section of the Gulf of Mexico.
It is difficult to assess the likelihood of a spill. According to Saipem, Scarabeo-9 is built to Norwegian
standards, including extra equipment to shut off blown-out wells beyond what is required in the United
States.34 Repsol has significant offshore experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. It has
had issues with oil spills, which is not abnormal for an oil
company.35 (See “Oil Spill Preparedness and Response” below.) Among other Cuban lease holders,
Statoil has extensive offshore experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, and are
generally seen as accomplished offshore operators. Petronas, ONGC, and PetroVietnam also have
offshore experience. PdVSA does not, but its offshore project appears the furthest from
seeing drilling activity among existing licenses. Cuban officials claim they are taking necessary
regulatory precautions, including incorporating safety practices from the United Kingdom and the
United States.36
Risks that Oil Spilled in Cuban Waters Reaches the United States If an oil spill were to occur in the
waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry that oil to U.S. waters and coastal
areas in southern and south eastern Florida.37 However, any environmental impact to Florida would
depend on many factors at the time of a spill, including size and location of the oil spill, ocean conditions
in the area, prevailing wind direction and velocity, temperature of the water and the air, the type of oil
spilled, and effectiveness of any cleanup efforts. The wide variety of factors render impossible a precise
description of the environmental impact were an oil spill to occur in Cuban waters.
AT: Cuban oil drilling inevitable
The embargo discourages private sector investment in Cuban oil
Soligo & Jaffe, 10– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 83-84)//NG
The pursuit of deepwater offshore deposits may not unfold as rapidly as the news releases
suggest. Exploration in these areas has been limited in the past because the technology needed to
explore and develop deepwater deposits was owned by international oil companies that were severely
constrained by U.S. sanctions. Today, other companies, such as Petrobras and Norsk Hydro, have the
technology, but they are still reluctant to challenge U.S. sanctions. In addition, under U.S. law, ships
that visit Cuban ports are barred from U.S. ports for a period of six months. If this policy is applied to
drill ships, as is most likely, it will impose higher costs on oil companies. Drill ships can earn several
hundred thousand dollars a day, so each day used to move them from one location to another is
costly. By denying immediate access to the U.S. Gulf, the policy forces companies to move their
drilling vessels to more distant locations driving up the cost of using them in Cuba. The absence of
markets for services, equipment, and supplies in Cuba itself adds to the difficulty and cost of
mounting a serious exploration and production effort, because oil firms must plan and bring all
equipment and other necessary materials to Cuba rather than rely on local suppliers. Jonathan
Benjamin-Alvarado estimates that the absence of these suppliers adds up to 30 percent to a project’s
cost.
The US embargo adds significant cost to drilling.
Franks 13-staff writer for Reuters
(Jeff, “Cuban oil hopes sputter as Russians give up for now on well” Reuters, May 30, 2013,
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/cuba-oil-idINL2N0EA00W20130529)//HA
The embargo makes it difficult to find rigs that do not violate its limitations on the use of U.S.
technology in Cuba and, according to experts, adds an estimated 20 percent to costs because
everything in the project has to be shipped in from distant, non-U.S. sources.
There is also Cuba's history of failed wells, which makes it hard to compete for the oil industry's interest
in a world where there are many other areas with proven oil reserves.
"It is very difficult today with other opportunities out there for a major oil company to justify going to
Cuba and spending what will certainly be over $100 million in areas where it is yet to be proven they
have recoverable reserves," said Jorge Pinon, an expert on Cuban oil at the Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy at the University of Texas in Austin.
"It is going to be extremely challenging (for Cuba)," he said.
No Cuban oil
No profitable oil – it is too deep and other countries are better
Goodhue, 13 – reporter (DAVID, “Last Cuban offshore oil project ending for now”, June 06, 2013,
http://www.keysnet.com/2013/06/06/487368/last-cuban-offshore-oil-project.html)//eek
Cuba suffered a major disappointment when several countries were unsuccessful in finding oil in the
deep waters of the Florida Straits last year. The area — about 70 miles from Key West — might contain
large amounts of oil, but it is in very deep water, the crude is difficult to find and working in the area
is highly expensive.
Operations in the Straits cost companies about $100 million each in exploratory missions alone, said
Jorge Piñon, associate director of the Latin America and Caribbean Energy Program at the University of
Texas at Austin.
“I have been told that the oil is there, but the traps/structures are very difficult. So oil companies are
probably likely to spend their limited capital dollars in other more promising, less risky areas (not only
technical but also politically) than Cuba,” Piñon said in an e-mail. “They would rather go to Brazil,
Angola, Alaska, U.S. Gulf of Mexico or the new growing market of shale in Argentina.”
The Straits exploration — conducted by four international companies on a giant Chinese-built, Italianowned semi-submersible oil rig — worried both environmentalists and critics of Cuba’s Castro regime.
But the operation was largely a bust and only two of the participating companies are still in the
region: Malaysia’s Petronas and Gazprom, from Russia. They’re operating in a partnership and are now
only conducting “some seismic work,” Piñon said.
There’s not even oil exploration for the next five years at least
Krauss and Cave, 12 – correspondents for the New York Times (Clifford and Damien, “Cuba’s
Prospects for an Oil-Fueled Economic Jolt Falter With Departure of Rig”, November 9, 2012,
HOUSTON — Cuba’s hopes of reviving its economy with an oil boom have produced little more than
three dry holes, persuading foreign oil companies to remove the one deepwater rig able to work in
Cuban waters so it could be used for more lucrative prospects elsewhere.
The rig, which was built in China to get around the United States trade embargo, is expected to depart in
the next few weeks. With no other rigs available for deepwater exploration, that means Cuba must
now postpone what had become an abiding dream: a windfall that would save Cuba’s economy and
lead to a uniquely Cuban utopia where the island’s socialist system was paid for by oil sales to its
capitalist neighbors.
“The Cuban oil dream is over and done with, at least for the next five years ,” said Jorge Piñon, a
former BP and Amoco executive who fled Cuba as a child but continues to brief foreign oil companies on
Cuban oil prospects. “The companies have better prospects by going to Brazil, Angola and the U.S.
Gulf.”
--XT – no recoverable oil
Cuba has no oil – it is massively unprofitable
Coronel, 13 – petroleum geologist and former member of the PDSVA board of directors (Gustavo,
“Cuban Oil Prospects Revisited”, June 18, 2013,
http://www.futurodecuba.org/cuban_oil_prospects_revisited_th.htm)//eek
During the last 3 years, four exploratory wells were drilled by different oil companies, including Spain’s
Repsol, the Malaysian oil company PETRONAS, Petroleos de Venezuela and the Russian company
Zarubezhneft. The four wells have been unsuccessful, although we have little or no details of the
results. Whatever oil was found proved to be of low quality and the rocks found by the drill had poor
reservoir characteristics . This scarcity of information is not uncommon when dealing with exploratory
wells, since the initial data obtained from an area has to be analyzed carefully in order to see what the
real prospects of that area might be and to decide if further efforts are justified.
Oil experts in the region such as a former head of Amoco Latin America, Jorge Piñon, currently at the
University of Texas, correctly pointed out that this first effort is just the initial chapter of a story that will
likely continue. However, the initial results do not bode well for the Cuban oil industry. International
oil companies will not be eager to spend great sums of money to develop oil resources that could only
be significant enough to satisfy the Cuban domestic market. The results obtained by the four wells
drilled definitely tend to lower the expectations of major findings.
SPAIN’S REPSOL
Repsol’s president, Antonio Brufau, has recently announced that they will probably stop prospecting
for oil in Cuban territory after its unsuccessful, costly, dry well. They had drilled another dry hole in the
area in 2010.
MALAYSIA’S PETRONAS
Petronas drilled its exploratory well in association with Russia’s Gazprom. The terse information given
out about the results of this well came from the official Cuban newspaper Granma, which read, “Analysis
of the findings revealed an “active petroleum system that could extend to other parts of the four blocks
contracted by PC Gulf [Petronas] and Gazpromneft, and even beyond their limits … Nevertheless, at that
point the rocks are very compact and do not have the capacity to deliver significant quantities of
petroleum and gas… so it cannot be qualified as a commercial discovery.”" This confirms the rocks
lacked sufficient porosity and permeability to allow oil production.
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA
The third unsuccessful well was drilled by the Venezuelan state-owned company, Petroleos de
Venezuela. Again, scant information was provided by Granma, as follows: “The technical information
obtained is very valuable and will allow PDVSA to continue its efforts later on.” It is believed that the oil
found was of poor quality and reservoir rocks had poor permeability. The original budget for this well
was $40 million but its final cost was probably much higher. This was the last well in which the
Chinese-built drilling rig Scarabeo 9 participated. The rig, owned by the Italian company Saipem SpA, has
now moved to Western Africa.
ZARUBEZHNEFT
The fourth dry well offshore Cuba was drilled by this Russian company using a smaller rig, the Songa
Mercur, owned by Songa Offshore. The well was drilled to a depth of some 21,000 feet and was
interrupted after five months or so, due to “geological problems” of an unspecified nature. The rig has
since been moved outside of Cuban territorial waters.
Will oil exploration continue in Cuban waters?
The poor results of these four wells, in which the companies invested an estimated $250 million, if not
more, strongly suggest that there will be a long intermission in the search for offshore oil in Cuba.
Repsol has practically stated that it will not return. Politics could have played a role in this decision,
since Cuba endorsed the action of the Argentinian government to expropriate Repsol’s shares in YPF,
the oil company Repsol owned jointly with the government.
The oil company from Malaysia, PETRONAS, is managed with a well-developed commercial sense and
has probably decided not to return to Cuba, in order to concentrate efforts in other, more promising
areas worldwide. In line with this assumption, the company has recently entered into an exploration
agreement with the state oil company of Suriname.
Petroleos de Venezuela will have strong political incentives to continue Cuban offshore exploration, due
to the close alliance existing between the two regimes. However, the main obstacle faced by PDVSA is
lack of money. Due to poor management practices and political pressure from the central
government, the Venezuelan company has embarked on an almost suicidal policy of borrowing money
from China, Russia and some companies such as ChevronTexaco and Schlumberger. Currently, its
direct debt is estimated at some $60 billion, dangerously close to the total value of its assets. Other,
indirect, financial commitments such as the large $30 billion loan the central government received from
China, to be paid back in oil, probably place its total debt well above its assets.
The Russian companies could return to Cuba but probably not in the short term, due to lack of
suitable equipment for deepwater drilling.
Even if Cuba has oil, they don’t have profitable oil – there are better countries and
there is only one rig that can possibly drill there
Tamayo, 12 – Miami Herald staff writer (Juan, “Repsol's move raises questions about Cuba offshore oil
drilling”, May 30, 2012, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/30/150508/repsols-move-raisesquestions.html#storylink=cpy)//eek
Spain’s Repsol oil company announced Tuesday it was “almost certain” to withdraw from exploration
in Cuba, after spending an estimated $150 million on a dry well and seeing far more profitable
prospects in other countries such as Brazil and Angola.
The announcement was a blow to Cuba’s hopes to strike it rich quickly, jump-start its stagnant economy
and trim its dependence on Venezuelan subsidies, although another foreign company is currently drilling
a separate test well and others have options to follow.
“We won’t do another well” in Cuba, Repsol Chairman Antonio Brufau said in presenting the company’s
2012-16 business strategy at a news conference in Madrid on Tuesday. “The well we drilled turned out
dry and it’s almost certain that we won’t do any more activity there.”
Repsol spent about $150 million since 2000 exploring off Cuba’s northern coast near Havana, with one
well in 2004 that did not find oil “in commercial quantities” and one this year that was dry, said Jorge
Piñón, a longtime Cuba oil analyst with the University of Texas.
Its combine with Statoil of Norway and ONGC of India also has an option to drill a third well later this
year but clearly felt its money would be better spent in other countries with more profitable
opportunities, Piñón told El Nuevo Herald.
“If you had $100 in your pocket, and I offer you Cuba, Brazil or Angola, which one would you take?” he
said. “There are many other places around the world much more attractive to exploration.”
Piñón said the two bad wells are not realistic indications of whether Cuba in fact has crude deposits off
its northern coast. The U.S. Geological Service has estimated the area has five billion barrels of crude,
while Cuban officials have put the figure at 20 billion barrels.
But Repsol’s withdrawal raised the critical question of how offshore exploration in Cuba can continue
when only one platform in the world, Scarabeo-9, can operate there. The platform was built in Asia
with less than 10 percent of U.S. equipment to sidestep Washington’s embargo on the communist
government.
“As someone once said, Cuba’s problem is that Scarabeo-9 is the only shovel with which Cuba can dig for
its possible oil treasures,” Piñón said.
Repsol confirmed earlier this month that it hit a dry hole with its first use of the semi-submersible
Scarabeo-9 platform. Just days later, it took two more blows when the Argentine government seized its
YPF branch — and Cuba applauded the nationalization.
Cuba did not receive any of the money spent by Repsol on exploration for its two wells, other than
perhaps some Havana office costs, Piñón noted. Companies that carry out such explorations bear the
costs, in hopes of making their back if they hit oil and develop production fields.
Scarabeo-9 started drilling a new well about 110 miles to the west of Repsol’s under contract to a
combine made up of Petronas of Malaysia and Gazprom-Neft of Russia. That well is expected to take
four to five months and if it hits oil it could quickly brighten Cuba’s oil future.
If not, Piñón added, further exploration in Cuban waters could suffer some significant delays.
Repsol has an option to use Scarabeo-9 to drill another well after the Petronas-Gazprom exploration.
Its decision to leave Cuba means it will drop that option, and raises the question of which company
would then lease the platform, at a cost of about $150,000 a day.
There have been unconfirmed reports that Venezuela’s PDVSA and Angol of Angola have options to hire
the platform after Repsol to drill in Cuban waters, Piñón noted. Any other company also can step in, or
the platform’s Italian owners could drill in Cuba for themselves.
But a Petronas-Gazprom failure to find oil now could mean a long delay in future explorations because
Scarabeo-9 could be leased to drill in more profitable areas like Brazil or the Gulf of Mexico, Piñón
added. Brazil’s Petrobras oil company surrendered its contract to explore in Cuba last year after massive
reserves were found off its own Atlantic coast.
No drilling – everyone has left for more profitable regions
O’GRADY, 13 – editor at the Wall Street Journal (Mary, “Cuba’s Oil Bust”, April 25th, 2013,
http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/cubas-oil-bust/)//eek
Last week, Florida’s Sun Sentinel reported that “after spending nearly $700 million during a decade,
energy companies from around the world have all but abandoned their search for oil in deep waters
off the north coast of Cuba near Florida.” Separately, CubaStandard.com reported on Friday that “the
shallow-water drilling platform used by Russian oil company OAO Zarubezhneft will leave Cuban
waters June 1, to be redeployed to Asia.”
According to the Sun Sentinel story, Jorge Piñon, an oil-industry guru who had been cheering Cuba’s
exploration attempts, said “Companies are saying, ‘We cannot spend any more capital on this high-risk
exploration. We’d rather go to Brazil; we’d rather go to Angola; we’d rather go to other places in the
world where the technological and geological challenges are less.’”
No oil in Cuba --- companies are backing out
Gibson, 4/14 – Washington Bureau (William, “Companies abandon search for oil in Cuba's deep
waters”, 4/4/2013, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-04-14/news/fl-cuban-oil-drilling-retreat20130414_1_jorge-pi-north-coast-cuban-officials) //SP
After spending nearly $700 million during a decade, energy companies from around the world have all
but abandoned their search for oil in deep waters off the north coast of Cuba near Florida, a blow to
the Castro regime but a relief to environmentalists worried about a major oil spill. Decisions by Spainbased Repsol and other companies to drill elsewhere greatly reduce the chances that a giant slick along
the Cuban coast would ride ocean currents to South Florida, threatening its beaches, inlets,
mangroves, reefs and multibillion-dollar tourism industry. The Coast Guard remains prepared to
contain, skim, burn or disperse a potential slick. And Cuban officials still yearn for a lucrative strike that
would prop up its economy. A Russian company, Zarubezhneft, is drilling an exploratory well in
shallower waters hugging the Cuban shoreline south of the Bahamas. But though some oil has been
found offshore, exploratory drilling in deep waters near currents that rush toward Florida has failed to
reveal big deposits that would be commercially viable to extract, discouraging companies from pouring
more money into the search. "Those companies are saying, 'We cannot spend any more capital on this
high-risk exploration. We'd rather go to Brazil; we'd rather go to Angola; we'd rather go to other places
in the world where the technological and geological challenges are less,'" said Jorge Piñon, an oilindustry analyst at the University of Texas who consults with U.S. and Cuban officials as well as energy
companies. "I don't foresee any time in the future exploration in Cuba's deep-water north coast. It is,
for all practical purposes, over."
Prefer our evidence – theirs is mostly based on Cuban propaganda and even if oil
exists, it’s not profitable to recover it
Claver-Carone, 11 – Executive Director of the Cuba Democracy Advocates (“GULF COAST OIL SPILL
INVESTIGATION REPORT; COMMITTEE: HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES”, November 2, 2011, lexis)//eek
Now, allow me to focus on some of the specifics of the Cuban regime's offshore exploration plans, which
unfortunately tend to get overlooked. Despite the Cuban regime's highly publicized efforts over the
last 20 years, there have been no commercially viable discoveries or extraction of oil in waters off
Cuba's shores. Moreover, there is currently no drilling taking place in waters off Cuba's shores.
The Cuban regime first began using offshore-drilling rights to extract political concessions from various
nations of the world soon after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which ended that country's hefty
subsidies to Cuba. According to recently declassified documents by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, in
1993 the Cuban regime first offered the government of then President Itamar Franco the "most
promising" blocks for oil exploration to Brazil's national oil company, Petrobras, in exchange for their
shunning of Cuban dissidents on the island and cancelling a meeting with Cuban exiles at the Brazilian
Embassy in Washington, D.C. The Brazilian government complied with both, only to exit from Cuba
empty-handed years later.
The Cuban regime found a new "partner" when Hugo Chavez rose to the presidency of oil-rich
Venezuela in 1998. With the backing of Chavez and Venezuela's state-oil company PdVSA, the Cuban
regime resumed its diplomatic offensive signing highly publicized oil- leases with Spain's Repsol,
Norway's Statoil, Russia's Gazprom, India's ONGC Videsh, Malaysia's Petronas, Canada's Sherritt,
Angola's Sonangol, Vietnam's PetroVietnam and China's CNPC . Only one company, however, has
actually conducted any exploratory drilling -- Spain's Repsol in 2004. It found some oil, but not in any
commercially viable quantities. It then pulled out of Cuba.
Similarly, after much initial fanfare, Canada's Sherritt and Brazil's Petrobras -- perhaps the most credible
and respected of the region's oil companies outside the United States -- publicly abandoned their efforts
in 2008 and 2011, respectively, stating that Cuba offshore drilling was "not commercially viable" and
citing "poor prospects." Much of this can be attributed to U.S. sanctions, which dramatically drive up
costs of production. The Cuban regime has itself admitted that U.S. sanctions make it commercially
impractical to produce oil in its territorial waters. Keep in mind that even the largest neighboring foreign
oil companies, Mexico's Pemex and Venezuela's PdVSA, refine the majority of their oil in the U.S. and
then repatriate it, for they lack the domestic infrastructure to process their own heavy crude and the
U.S.'s geographical proximity enhances profitability.
As long as U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba's regime are in place, producing and refining any oil found
in Cuban waters in the United States isn't an option. That leads to a question: If off-shore drilling in
Cuban waters is not commercially viable for the most respectable regional oil companies, which are
located relatively close to Cuba and have the most experience in dealing with Cubans, is such drilling
really viable for the Angolans, Malaysians or the Chinese? The answer is no.
Initially, we learned this in 2006, when the Cuban regime seemingly had convinced public policymakers
in Washington -- including many here in Congress -- that the Chinese were ready to drill off Cuba's
shores. The threat never materialized, but it served the Cuban regime's political interests. As Reuters
reported from Cuba at the time: "Havana is eager to see American oil companies join forces with the
anti-embargo lobby led by U.S. farmers who have been selling food to Cuba for four years."
Last year's oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico by BP and the justifiable public outrage that ensued has given
the Cuban regime a new and strategic opportunity to use the threat of offshore drilling as a means of
forcing the U.S. to unilaterally ease sanctions. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez has confirmed
this on various occasions and relayed as much to former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, who recently
traveled to Havana in an unsuccessful effort to secure the release of American hostage Alan Gross;
Gross has been held for nearly two years in a Cuban prison for helping the island's Jewish community
connect to the Internet.
In a flashback to 2004, Spain's Repsol is back in Cuba preparing to drill another exploratory well early
next year. This time, the Cuban regime is "threatening" that if Repsol is pressured into abandoning
drilling, India's ONGC Videsh or Malaysia's Petronas will step forward.
Curiously, this peculiar corporate trio was granted extensive oil- rights last year by Hugo Chavez to
develop a block with 235 billion barrels of reserves in Venezuela's oil-rich Orinoco belt. Reserves in that
one Venezuelan block alone are believed to be 50 times greater than the best estimates in all of
Cuba's territorial waters. Some geo-political foul play can surely be deduced from the particularity and
timing of this arrangement.
Despite the fact that Repsol still faces exploratory hurdles (and gargantuan production costs if oil is
ever found), the United States is erring on the side of caution and licensing specialty oil spill mitigation
firms to respond quickly in the case of an accident. This is also not a new phenomenon. The U.S. has
been licensing such firms since at least 2001. Moreover, current U.S. law provides all of the necessary
flexibility to do so.
After extensive exploration no recoverable oil has been found.
Maffei 12- Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
(Elena,“The Lure of Cuban Energy Independence: One Twist After” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, June
25, 2012,http://www.coha.org/the-lure-of-cuban-energy-independence-one-twist-after-another/)//HA
On May 29 during a press conference presenting Repsol’s four-year strategic plan, the company’s
president, Antonio Bufrau, announced that the Spanish oil giant will almost certainly stop prospecting
for oil in Cuban territory after a costly well it drilled turned out to be dry. This recent disappointment
parallels the 2004 finding by Repsol that established that its explorations on the northwest coast of the
country would not yield commercially viable quantities of oil. After spending $150 USD million in
explorations throughout the country, Repsol is likely to turn its attention to more profitable fields in
countries such as Brazil and Angola.
No commercially viable oil --- recent efforts prove
Offshore Magazine, 12 – Offshore Magainze (“Another Cuban oil well turns up dry”, Offshore
Magazine, 11/25/12, http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2012/11/another-cuban-oil.html) //SP
The Venezuelan government-owned company PDVSA reported that it found no commercially viable
oil in Cuban waters in the Gulf of Mexico, making their exploration well the third unsuccessful search
for oil in recent months, reported the Havana Times. Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and CUPET closed
their exploratory well last week in Cabo de San Antonio, off the far western end of the island, having
found no “potential for commercial exploitation,” the Cuban state-run enterprise Cubapetroleo (CUPET)
explained. Nevertheless, PDVSA will continue to operate in Cuba, according to a statement by the
company. “The technical expertise and valuable geological information obtained have contributed to
reaffirming PDVSA’s decision to continue its participation in the exploration campaign in Cuban
waters,” read the statement. This finding is another setback for the Cuban government. The present
effort was the third failed attempt to find oil in the Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In late May, the
Spanish energy company Repsol announced it was shutting down its oil exploration effort off the coast
of Cuba after failing to find oil on its first bore.
Err negative --- US surveys show that Cuba has a high probability of low oil
Portela, 12 – A contributor to CubaNews (Armando, “Third dry well dashes Cuba’s hopes for oil
independence”, Cuba News, 8/22/12, http://www.cubanews.com/sections/third-dry-well-dashes-cubashopes-for-oil-independence/) //SP
Not all specialists, however, are that enthused. The U.S. Geological Survey assesses Cuba’s potential
petroleum reserves at just under 4.6 billion barrels, with a range of one billion barrels at 95%
probability, and nine billion barrels at 5% probability. In private, since they refuse to discuss their
opinions publicly, Cuban geologists admit there’s a lack of information. They also say analogies
between Cuba’s offshore zones and other promising oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico are misleading. At
least some are downright skeptical when confronted with Cupet’s estimates of “giant” offshore oil
and gas fields.
--AT: 20 billion barrels
That’s Cuban propaganda
Padgett 08-staff writer for Time Magazine
(Tim, “How Cuba's Oil Find Could Change the US Embargo” Time, 8/23/08,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html)//HA
But is the Cuban calculation really on the level? Skeptics ask if the 20-billion-bbl. estimate is just a ploy
to rekindle investor interest, at a time when falling oil prices could make the maritime find less
attractive to the potential international partners Cuba needs to extract the oil. The effort is all the
more urgent, they add, because reduced oil revenues could also make friends like left-wing Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez less able to aid Cuba with cut-rate crude shipments and capital to improve the
island's aged refineries. "The Cuba numbers from my point of view are not valid," says Jorge Pinon, an
energy fellow at the University of Miami and an expert on Cuba's oil business. "I think they're feeling a
lot of pressure right now to accelerate the development of their own oil resources." BenjaminAlvarado gives Cuba's geologists more benefit of the doubt; but he calls the 20-billion-bbl. estimate
"off the charts." "I trust them as oil people, and their seismic readings might be right," he says, "but
until we see secondary, outside analysis, this is going to be suspect."
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), a government agency, made the initial estimate of 5 billion bbl.to 10
billion bbl. for Cuba's northwest offshore sector (known as the Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ) in 2004.
Tenreyro says Cupet's analysis is based on what he calls a more accurate comparison of similar
maritime oil fields like those off Mexico's Gulf Coast. "We're talking about that magnitude," he argued
last week. "We have more data" than the USGS. But Cupet, an arm of Cuba's ultra-secret communist
government, hasn't offered much more evidence than that. Chris Schenk, who as USGS coordinator in
the Caribbean led the 2004 survey, agrees that Cuban geologists "are very good." But he adds, "We
would like to see more data." Still, Schenk notes, because of the embargo and Havana's insular
information policies, "we can't converse with the Cubans."
The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet
and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms,
including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led
consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has
little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling
in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own
multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore
drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.
Perez over exaggerates – reliable studies prove
Energy Compass, 9 – an intelligence service for the energy sector (“Cuba: Rethinking the Embargo”,
May 8, 2009, lexis)//eek
State Cupet's exploration manager, Rafael Tenreyro Perez, boasted in October of 20 billion barrels of
oil equivalent of recoverable offshore reserves. But independent analysts say the figure, based on
comparison with similar geological structures in the US and Mexican areas of the Gulf of Mexico, is
wildly exaggerated. The US Geological Survey has estimated Cuba's potential reserves at up to 9
billion bbl of oil and 10 trillion cubic feet of gas.
AT: Energy security
Domestic oil drilling solves energy security
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
THE UNITED STATES SHOULD FIRST UTILIZE U.S. OIL RESOURCES
The United States' thirst for oil should first be quenched with local resources before resorting to end
the embargo. Allowing U.S. companies access to Cuban offshore oil fields would effectively allow those
companies to drill for oil in waters closer to the U.S. coast than laws currently allow.75 J. Larry Nichols,
Chairman of Devon Energy, an independent U.S. oil and natural gas producer, opined that "[w]hen U.S.
companies are not even allowed to drill in the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico, we have a long way to
go before we can think about international waters off the coast of Cuba." 76 If access to oil is indeed
the main U.S. rationale behind lifting the embargo, this need is best met by first allowing companies
to drill more extensively in U.S. waters.77
Moreover, dependence on other countries for oil is not a responsible option.78 Because the United
States has the best oil safety standards in the world, it is most environmentally competent to tap
America's own natural resources.79 Furthermore, because drilling has yet to start, there is time yet for
Cuban political change to occur.8 o Not only is there simply no pressing need for Cuban oil, as
portrayed by U.S. oil lobbyists, but U.S. resources offer a more attractive alternative.81
Leadership advantage answers
Kashmir ! D – 1NC
Aggression is all talk – diplomacy outweighs posturing
The Economist 11 (“A rivalry that threatens the world,” 5/19/11,
http://www.economist.com/node/18712274)//SJF
Talking, not shooting
Trouble on the border is not a theoretical problem; it is commonplace. Exchanges of fire between
Pakistanis and Indians over the border in Kashmir killed an Indian soldier this weekend. This time it
did not escalate, in part because the two countries are in the midst of diplomatic efforts. But India's
prime minister, Mr Singh, ordered a review by his security chiefs.
Some in India have been trying to ease tensions with Pakistan. Mr Singh, born before partition in
territory that is now Pakistan, is personally eager to do so (though others in his government, and
hawkish opposition parties, disagree). He tried “cricket diplomacy” this year, inviting his counterpart,
Yusuf Raza Gilani, to watch India play Pakistan in the cricket World Cup. He is the driving force on
bilateral talks on trade, water and counter-terrorism, which should culminate in the next few months
in a meeting of foreign ministers.
Encouragingly, on Pakistan's side, civilians also seem open to talks. It helps, too, that Kashmir has fallen
quiet in recent months, though that may be merely seasonal. Nawaz Sharif, the main opposition leader,
who as prime minister in 1999 came close to striking a peace deal with India, dared to suggest on May
16th that Pakistan would make progress only when it stopped treating India as its “biggest enemy”. As
controversially, he called for a cut in public funds for the army.
Yet suspicion lingers. General Kayani told a diplomat in Islamabad recently that he backs peace efforts
with India, but he has done little about it. And the army has an interest in maintaining at least the
illusion of an Indian threat to protect its bloated budget and special privileges.
In private, too, many remain gloomy. Talks, let alone a deal, may simply spur the terrorists to another
atrocity. General Mahmud Ali Durrani, a former ambassador to America who supports peace talks, feels
that the army's insecurity is too big a problem. “I don't think we are flying. The security elements are
not so enamoured by the idea. They feel India never accepted Pakistan, and given half a chance [the
Indians] would undo it.”
Kashmir ! D – 2NC
Water stress is exaggerated
Shaukat 1/15 – A reporter at The Express Tribune who has a Textile Engineering degree from the
National Textile University in Faisalabad (Aroosa, “Indus basin teaty: ‘Pakistan-India water issues
exaggerated’,” 1/15/13, http://tribune.com.pk/story/494013/indus-basin-teaty-pakistan-india-waterissues-exaggerated/)//SJF
LAHORE:
“Pakistan’s stance is simply that it just doesn’t trust India regarding the water issue,” said Feisal Naqvi.
He was speaking about the Indus Water Treaty, signed in 1960, at a roundtable, Indus Water Treaty,
Trans-boundary Water Issues and Prospects of Peace in South Asia, at the Forman Christian College on
Monday.
The roundtable was organised by the Centre for Public Policy and Governance with the College’s History
Department.
Pakistan Counsel for Indus Water Treaty Feisal Naqvi said that that there were some issues, but as a
whole the treaty had been a success.
“The fundamental issue for Pakistan is about the potential control of water by India.” Naqvi said that for
Pakistan, the concern was that India not decide the flow of water.
Giving India little discretion in this regards as possible, he said, was a provision of the treaty’s technical
mechanism.
Naqvi said that there were disputes between the two nations about the treaty but negotiating a new
treaty would not be wise. While India acted illegally from time to time, Pakistan’s disputes with India
over water issues were exaggerated, he added.
Dr Daniel Haines, a British Academy postdoctoral fellow at the Royal Holloway University of London, said
that the treaty was the best possible option available to Pakistan at the time.
He said Pakistan had already tried to resolve the water issue as early as 1948 and failed to achieve any
solution.
Therefore, a bilateral treaty was the only way out.
Dr Haines said Pakistanis tend to be sceptical of foreign intervention. “It would be naive to think that
the United States would not have had influence. But there is a misconception about the power the
World Bank wields,” he said.
He said that in the early 1950s, the World Bank was not a mighty power. “Power tends to flow down
the stream; people at the head of a canal will have greater power than the ones at the tail end.”
“The water dispute situation is far more complex today than what the two countries are and are not
doing,” said Dr Douglas Hill, a senior lecturer at the Development Studies at the University of Otago, He
said that it was time to start talking about the regional dimension of the water issue. “Indus Basin is not
just about two countries. At the very least it is about four.” He pointed out that the Indus Basin also
involved Afghanistan and China. He said it was essential to explore other regional interventions which
could help dilute the bilateral aspect of the issue.
Nuclear deterrence solves
Kumar 6/10 – Associate Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi (A Vinod,
“NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WORKS IN INDO-PAK TIES,” 6/10/13,
http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/1650-nuclear-deterrence-works-in-indo-pakties)//SJF
NEW DELHI (IDN | IDSA) - For over two decades, a dominant section of western analysts harped on the
volatilities of the India and Pakistan nuclear dyad, often overselling the ‘South Asia as a nuclear
flashpoint’ axiom, and portending a potential nuclear flare-up in every major stand-off between the two
countries. The turbulence in the sub-continent propelled such presages, with one crisis after another
billowing towards serious confrontations, but eventually easing out on all occasions.
While the optimists described this as evidence of nuclear deterrence gradually consolidating in this
dyad, the pessimists saw in it the ingredients of instability that could lead to a nuclear conflict. Though
there is no denial of the fact that the three major crises since the 1998 nuclear tests – Kargil (1999), the
Parliament attack and Operation Parakram (2001-2002) and the Mumbai terror strike (2008) – brought
the two rivals precariously close to nuclear showdowns, not once had their leaderships lost complete
faith in the efficacy of mutual deterrence. Fifteen years after the nuclear tests, it is relevant to
examine if deterrence remains weak in this dyad or has consolidated towards greater stability.
Complex deterrence matrix
With its history of deep-rooted hostility, the South Asian binary went through a tumultuous evolution of
deterrence structures and postures. The early years were marked by limited war and terror strikes
literally validating the western notion of an unstable region. India’s perceptibly transparent no-first-use
(NFU) doctrine was met with a policy of strategic ambiguity from Pakistan, which preferred to keep its
nuclear first-use option open and at the same time refusing to declare its threshold(s).
The proclaimed aim was to deter India at all levels of military action – sub-conventional, conventional or
nuclear. India’s military might was cited as justification for such postural asymmetry. The unprofessed
objective though was to carve out a space to sustain the low-intensity conflict (Kashmir insurgency and
terror strikes in Indian heartland) while mitigating any Indian retaliation. With its nuclear brinkmanship
behaviour fuelling global paranoia, the early years of nuclearisation and its primal instability was proving
to benefit Pakistan with no decisive Indian challenge to its sub-conventional influx.
Many Indian analysts highlighted this as evidence of the doctrinal imbalance, with some questioning the
efficacy of nuclear deterrence against Pakistan and a few others even demanding a review of India’s
NFU posture. Though the Indian leadership upheld the NFU as sacrosanct, the need to challenge the
status quo began to be felt after the 2001-2002 crises.
Largely attributed to the ‘lessons’ of Operation Parakram (which proved to be a costly mobilisation
effort with scope for rapid escalation), the Indian Army initiated a major doctrinal shift at the
conventional level through what is termed as the ‘Cold Start’ strategy. With its plan for rapid battlegroup thrusts into Pakistani territory without hitting its perceived nuclear tripwires, the military
leadership conceived the possibility of calling Pakistan’s ‘nuclear bluff’ by taking its response to
Pakistani soil. Though backed by an incipient belief that the space for a limited conventional war exists,
Cold Start embodied India’s resolve to alter the deterrence landscape without disturbing the nuclear
doctrinal framework.
Albeit the feasibility of this strategy was consistently doubted, its signalling spin-off was immense as
Pakistan began to doubt the credibility of its brinkmanship behaviour and ability to sustain the LIC
without inviting India’s retaliation. Through an assortment of political campaigns (by hyping the Cold
Start as escalatory) and technological responses (Nasr tactical nuclear missile, Babar and Ra’ad cruise
missiles), Pakistan struggled to project confidence in its deterrent.
The lack of a unitary effort from the security establishment to promote the Cold Start and the Indian
Army eventually having to disown it (by renaming as proactive strategy) largely denoted the efficacy of
Pakistan’s campaign, aided in some measure by the western alarmists.
Yet, its introduction marked a complex game of deterrence: while one actor propagated a proactive
nuclear posture to feed its sub-conventional plan, the other responded with a proactive conventional
posture for a range of non-nuclear responses. The official silence on Cold Start matched by Pakistan’s
refusal to brand the Nasr as a tactical nuclear response only added to this complexity, until the recent
articulation by the Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).1
By clarifying that India will not differentiate between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and will
consider any such use against its forces or territory as a first-strike (implicitly inviting nuclear
retaliation), the security establishment has belatedly implied the existence of its proactive strategy.
The next stage in this deterrence churning could come in the form of Pakistan’s response to the latest
Indian posturing, even as western observers anticipate India’s proactive military plan to see action after
the next major terror strike.
Tryst with doctrinal realignments
While its tryst with doctrinal realignments continues, India initiated a decisive new level of posturing,
with greater implications for the deterrence calculus, by introducing ballistic missile defence (BMD)
into the scene. Although India’s BMD programme originated out of concerns on Pakistan’s missile
prowess and the China-Pakistan proliferation nexus, the rapid advances on India’s BMD platforms has
emerged as a potent challenge to Pakistan’s deterrent.
Despite the fact that interception technologies are still evolving and are yet to guarantee leak-proof
protection, the Indian programme is geared towards developing an extended area defence capability,
and possibly a nationwide shield, that could limit the damage from Pakistani (and Chinese) missiles, if
not absolute destruction. With no technological counter of its own, but for the nascent cruise missile
inventory (with limited engagement scope against BMD systems), Pakistan realises that India’s pursuit
of a multi-tier interception network will negate its first-strike advantage, and could provide India with
greater defensive depth, which it argues, could encourage India towards pre-emption.
Besides the fact that even a failed first-use might invite Indian retaliation, the shift in the deterrence
calculus is such that even a marginally-effective Indian BMD could diminish the combative edge of
Pakistan’s strategic forces.
Similar to its response to the Cold Start, Pakistan is now projecting missile defence as causal for
instability and had reportedly argued against its deployment at the recent talks on nuclear Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs). Consequently, Pakistan attempted a weakly-devised signalling effort in May
2012 by declaring a survivable second-strike capability on its naval platforms.2
While the strategic component of its naval platforms remains unclear, the fact that Pakistan declared a
second-strike alternative (after years of reliance on its first-strike posture) is intrinsically a reflection of
its desperation on the Indian BMD. However, with no takers for this signalling effort,3 Pakistan may now
be left with fewer options, including: (a) developing its own BMD capability, which could be too costly
for its sinking economy,4 and (b) seek technological assistance from China or acquisition of its air and
missile defence systems.
What now?
Fifteen years of nuclear South Asia was all about a paradoxical deterrence seesaw that was intense,
yet not unstable enough to cause its failure. After the gains that Pakistan accrued from the initial
asymmetry, the scales are now favouring India with its doctrinal rejuvenation and technological
advances. Events like the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Abottabad operation and restoration of democracy
in Pakistan have also impacted this turnaround.
While Pakistan attempted to match India’s nuclear deal advantage by feverishly augmenting its fissile
stocks, the Abottabad operation eroded the credibility of its Army and diminished its leverage in the
India-Pakistan reconciliation process. With its leading political parties now favouring improved relations
with India, there is scope for a postural balancing that could contribute to greater stability between
the two nuclear neighbours. President Zardari’s suggestion for Pakistan’s adoption of a NFU posture is
one such step that the new civilian government could consider in this direction.
However, as is a well-known fact, it will be the Pakistani army which will have the final say on nuclear
policy issues. Besides resisting any such proposal to alter its nuclear policy, the army will have the
strongest urge to counter India’s recent gains by triggering newer crises. But with conditions no longer
favouring any strategy of brinkmanship, the onus may now shift on to the civilian government to
devise a postural transformation that could project Pakistan as a more responsible and rational
nuclear power.
This is an imperative forced upon Pakistan not just by the current strategic environment, but also will be
a factor in determining its future status in the normative structures of the non-proliferation regime.
Dialogue solves
Sadiq et al 6/4 (Muhammad, “Kashmir issue can be resolved: Vaidik,” 6/4/13,
http://kashmirwatch.com/news.php/2013/06/04/kashmir-issue-can-be-resolved-vaidik.html)//SJF
LAHORE: The Kashmir issue can be resolved through dialogue among all the stakeholders, Pakistan,
India and people of Indian and Pakistani occupied Kashmir. But independence from both India and
Pakistan can be changed to slavery of other world powers due to the lack of financial resources and
landlocked area of Kashmir.
This was stated by Council for Indian Foreign Policy Chairman Dr V.P. Vaidik at a private club during his
speech to the members of the Pakistan Visionary Forum on the topic of “Future of Indo-Pak relations.”
“I appeal to Pakistanis and Indians to take practical measures by withdrawing troops from Kashmir as a
first step to initiate peaceful dialogues,” he said. “We are in favour of freedom of Kashmiris but not
their separation from us,” he added.
Vaidik said solution to terrorism was also in negotiations which were not possible until America stopped
drone attacks. He added that only a few Indians had not accepted partition of India and Pakistan but it
did not mean that they were in favour of any kind of loss to Pakistan.
Answering to the question of strategic partnership between India and the US, raised by Col Farrukh, Dr.
Vaidik said that being a major regional power, India it had its own significance. Zubair Sheikh said that
confidence-building measures were necessary to resolve all the issues between India and Pakistan for
which intellectuals of both countries could play a pivotal role. Justice (retd) Sharif Hussain Bokhari said
that he had listened to only a few Indians who were in favour of resolving Kashmir issue and Dr. Vaidik
was one of them. He added that the movement of Pakistanis visiting India was suspiciously watched.
Prof Dr Mugheesudin said that until India stopped claiming Kashmir as its integral part, the issue could
not be resolved.
Jameel Gishkori read his poetry Amman Ki Asha.
Qayyum Nizami said that when Indian prisoners were released from Pakistani jails they proceeded to
India with better health and fitness as compared to the mentally and physically tortured Pakistani
prisoners released by India.
Former Chairman IRSA, Engr. Shafqat Masood, said that there was no example of giving rivers to
countries like the three devoted to India rather access to the waters of rivers was granted to countries.
Dr Vaidik informed him that he was going to have dialogue with Pakistan’s water experts on the issue
and invited him for such a meeting in Lahore.
ME ! D – 1NC
Middle East doesn’t escalate – no nuclear use
Singh 3 (Rahul, “Pak's N-threat exaggerated: Parthasarthy,” The Times of India, 9/29/3,
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-09-29/india/27199111_1_pakistani-army-nationalsecurity-nuclear-threat)//SJF
CHANDIGARH: The Pakistani military establishment became a virtual punching bag for security experts
on Sunday as they blasted the 'rogue' army for making militant Islam a vital instrument for foreign
policy.
The experts, who were here for a conclave on Integrated Management of National Security held at
Panjab University, said Pakistani military regimes were clear in their mind that the Indian threat had to
be kept alive if they were to stay in power.
G Parthasarthy, a former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, said after the 1971 war the Pakistani
objective was not to take away Kashmir from India but to destroy its fibre of unity "as they viewed our
existence as an ideological threat to theirs."
Underlining that it was not possible to deal with Pakistan in a compartmentalised manner, he said, "The
strategic challenge we face from Pakistan is that they want to weaken India. Pakistan is not the battle
of Army alone but every Indian has a role to play."
He said that Kargil was the product of Pakistani impression that Indians were tired after a decade of lowintensity conflict.
Parthasarthy further said that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons against India only as the last
resort – either when the Pakistani army had collapsed or they had drained their resources.
He added that the nuclear threat from Pakistan was exaggerated and there was no harm in calling
their bluff.
Although Parthasarthy said that India should attempt to isolate Pakistan at every international forum, he
said people to people contact should be cultivated and channels of communication should not be
closed.
Some experts, however, offered divergent views on the Pakistani role vis-à-vis national security and said
more emphasis should be placed on "setting our own house in order."
Lt Gen D B Shekatkar (retd), a security expert from Pune, said instead of blaming Pakistan for every ill
afflicting the country, the need of the hour was to provide security to the common man and strengthen
India at the grassroot level.
Delivering a talk on "Changing perspective of national security, challenges and responses," Shekatkar
said, "The country would be safe in real terms only when the common man feels secure. Nobody can
dare to touch us if we are strong internally. The genesis of most of our problems lies in our internal
differences."
He added that the supreme tragedy of the country was that the common man's faith had been eroded
not only in the government setup but in every possible sense.
Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak (retd), additional director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said
India must evolve a vision document for national security on the lines of the US.
He said that this was crucial because conventional wars were passé and future conflicts would be
limited in nature with limited objectives. Kak also called for greater interaction between the armed
forces and the ministry of defence to evolve higher defence control organisations.
Gen V N Sharma, a former Army chief, underscored the need for better coordination between Army and
intelligence agencies for optimum results in counter-insurgency operations.
In the concluding session, RSS national chief K S Sudershan said although the US had attempted to
manipulate India into sending troops to Iraq, the government did the right thing by turning down the
proposal.
ME ! D – 2NC
No nuclear arms race
Theodoulou 12 – FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT at The National (Michael, “A nuclear Iran unlikely to
trigger Middle East arms race: study,” 12/25/12, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/anuclear-iran-unlikely-to-trigger-middle-east-arms-race-study#page2)//SJF
During a recent visit to the UAE, David Cameron, the UK prime minister, gave stark warning that allowing
Iran to develop an atom bomb would trigger a "nuclear arms race" across the Middle East.
Related
■ Syria and Iran to top agenda at GCC summit
■ Iran claims to have decoded data from captured CIA drone
■ UN nuclear watchdog team in Iran
Turbulent year in Middle East hid deeper political currents
Topic
UK
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Barack Obama in March voiced the same fear in almost identical terms. But the assumption that Iran's
acquisition of a nuclear weapon would have a domino effect in the Middle East and on what the US
president termed the "most dangerous part of the world" is being strongly challenged.
In a study published last week, two experts from the Department of War Studies at King's College in
London argue that key regional players - Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey - are unlikely to follow suit
and develop their own nuclear arsenals.
Indeed, Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Moran argue that the Middle East itself offers evidence that
"nuclear proliferation is not inevitable". Israel remains the region's sole nuclear-armed power - albeit
an undeclared one - more than four decades after it acquired nuclear weapons capability.
The flaw in the logic that "proliferation begets proliferation" is also demonstrated in North East Asia
where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or South Korea, countries with
advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict.
The authors of Looking Beyond a Nuclear Iran make clear there are reasons to be to be wary of Iran's
nuclear ambitions. While Tehran insists its atomic programme is solely peaceful, they point out that
Iran's growing stockpile of medium-enriched uranium is already far in excess of its civilian needs.
Even so, Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran argue that this will not necessarily ignite a regional rush for the bomb.
This is not to say there is no history of regional powers harbouring nuclear ambitions. Iraq's Saddam
Hussein was thought to have embarked on a plan to refine weapons-grade nuclear fuel in the late
1970s, as did Syria's Bashar Al Assad in the early 2000's. In both cases, Israel responded with devastating
air strikes.
Still, this year, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia recognise that nuclear restraint is in their best interests
- not least because, according to Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran, "strong security alliances with the United
States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in dissuading these
countries from going nuclear".
All three, moreover, are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and have long pressed
for a nuclear-free Middle East.
Peter Jenkins, a former UK ambassador to the UN's atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, is also sceptical that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger a regional nuclear arms race. Saudi
Arabia, he argues, while deeply suspicious of Iran, would be loath to alienate the US, its long-standing
top supplier of conventional arms, and tacit guarantor of the kingdom's security, by seeking a nuclear
deterrent.
"It is hard to imagine that the US would stand by while its Saudi ally set about proliferating, or that Saudi
rulers would risk that friendship by defying America's wishes," Mr Jenkins said.
It has long been said that in the event of a successful Iranian nuclear test, Saudi Arabia would swiftly
purchase nuclear warheads off the shelf, most likely from Pakistan.
The Times (of London) in February quoted an unnamed senior Saudi source saying: "Politically, it would
be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom."
But it appears that Saudi views on the prospect of Iran going nuclear are not uniform. He recalls a
discussion in July hosted by the Global Strategy Forum, a London think tank, where Jack Straw, a former
British foreign secretary, recounted a Saudi official's reply when asked about the kingdom's nuclear
intentions.
"We say that we will have to keep step with Iran," the official said. "But in reality our people would
never forgive us for tolerating Israeli nuclear weapons for so many years and developing nuclear
weapons to balance their acquisition by Islamic Iran."
Turkey is another Sunni-dominated state keeping watch on Shiite Iran's ambitions for regional influence,
even though the countries have strong trade and energy links.
But as a Nato member, Turkey "already has indirect access to nuclear deterrent forces", Mr Jenkins
said. And "for more than 40 years, Turkey shared a border with a hostile, nuclear-armed Soviet Union,
but never sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent".
Ankara's generally positive relations with Tehran also mean Turkey would be unlikely to view a nucleararmed Iran as an "immediate threat", Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran write. And Ankara knows any attempt to
go nuclear would "spell the end of Turkey's EU aspirations".
Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt sees itself as a leader of Sunni Arab states. But Cairo has chosen a diplomatic
response to the much closer challenge of Israel's nuclear arsenal, using the NPT and other international
platforms to put pressure on Israeli leaders over its atomic programme for the past four decades.
"It would seem very unlikely that the threat presented by a nuclear-armed Iran would cause Cairo to
abandon this approach," Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran write.
Recent political divisions and economic difficulties also mean the Egyptian government that emerged
after the fall of Hosni Mubarak's regime would be ill placed to acquire a weapon.
"It would also invite a pre-emptive strike by Israel that would be free of the logistic obstacles that
have militated against a strike on Iran," Mr Jenkins said.
Moreover, Egypt's Islamist leadership is far less hostile to Tehran than was Mr Mubarak's regime.
Other non-proliferation experts are less sanguine.
Mark Fitzpatrick, a former US state department official now at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London, agrees that should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, it "would not necessarily provoke a
nuclear cascade in the Middle East". But it "certainly would cause one or more of those states [Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and Turkey] to "revisit their security strategies". Of them, Mr Fitzpatrick said, "it's pretty
clear that Saudi Arabia would feel an urge to match Iran".
Gerald Butt, a London-based risk analyst and Gulf expert, agreed.
"The Gulf states would definitely feel they needed to have a balance of power [if Iran developed a
nuclear weapon]. There'd be public pressure on the Gulf states for the Iran threat to be met," he said.
Mr Jenkins demurs. "The claim that Iran must be denied its NPT right to enrich uranium for fear of a
Middle East nuclear arms race seems unreasonable," he said. "It should not pass unquestioned.
Careless claims can have costly consequences."
Mutually assured destruction prevents nukes
China Daily 12 (“Iran unlikely to make war with US: Castro,” 1/14/12,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-01/14/content_14446371.htm)//SJF
HAVANA - Iran is unlikely to go to war with the United States, former Cuban leader Fidel Castro said
Friday.
"I'm sure that Iran will not perform thoughtless actions that could lead to war," Castro said in a newlypublished article carried by Cuba's official media.
Castro made the remarks just two days after he met with visiting Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad who was on the third leg of a Latin American tour.
"I saw the Iranian president, he is absolutely calm and quiet, completely indifferent to the Yankee's
threats, and confident about the ability of his people to confront any aggression," Castro said said.
Castro, 85, also accused the United States, Israel and their European allies of being involved in the
"selective" murders of Iranian nuclear scientists.
The current tensions over Iran "threaten the very existence" of humanity, he added.
Global security was in danger not only due to a potential conflict between the US and Iran, but
because of the complex situation in the Middle East and Central Asia, "where there are serious
problems provoked by the contradictory and absurd imperial policy of the United States," he said.
Castro last met Ahmadinejad on the sidelines of a Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana in 2006.
No war – they fear US status
Ismailzai 11 (Mo, “Getting Real – Why a War with Iran is Unlikely,” 2011,
http://www.academic.moismailzai.com/papers/PSC-260-Getting-Real.pdf)//SJF
Section 3 - Predictions
During a lecture delivered at the UNESECO Palace in Lebanon, Professor Noam Chomsky of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology discussed at length the threat of Iran (Chomsky, 2010). The
transcript of this lecture has been made available through his official website. Professor Chomsky
rejects the notion that Iran is powerful enough to be considered a military threat, either to the region
or to the US:
With regard to the threat of Iran, there is a very authoritative answer, provided by military and
intelligence reports to Congress in April 2010. They say that the threat of Iran is not a military threat.
Iran has virtually no offensive military capacity. Its military spending is very slight, of course a
minuscule fraction of US military spending, but also pretty low by regional standards. They point out
that the goal of Iranian military strategy is to try to defend the borders of the country and, in case
they're attacked, to try to delay invading forces sufficiently so as to permit a negotiated settlement
(Chomsky, 2010).
This is a sentiment echoed by scholars Ali Rahigh-Aghsan and Peter Viggo Jakobsen, writing for The
Middle East Journal (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). Iran‟s military strength is being inadequately
analyzed, they say, without taking into consideration the regional context.
For example, as the statistics in the previous sections show, Iran is being outspent by most of the states
in the region. Iran spends 2.7% of its GDP on military expenditures, significantly less than the regional
average of 4.7%. To add historical context, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates have “spent 7.5 times as much on their defense as Iran in the ten-year period between
1997-2207,” (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). Combined, these states have more naval combat ships
than Iran and their troops are significantly better trained than the Iranian armed forces (Rahigh-Aghsan
& Jakobsen, 2010). Saudi Arabia alone has many more high-quality combat aircraft and tanks than Iran
(Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). The authors go on to conclude that the likelihood of an overt Iranian
attack on its neighbours is “next to unthinkable,” (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010).
The threat of an Iranian Nuclear program is also not as imminent as it is sometimes made to sound,
nor is the best response to such a threat a military strike (Strategic Comments, 2011).
One alternative approach was the Stuxnet virus, which is widely believed to have American-Israeli
origins (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). This sophisticated computer virus was designed using highly
classified information about the computer hardware used in Iran‟s nuclear facilities (Rahigh-Aghsan &
Jakobsen, 2010). Once infected, computers in Iranian nuclear plantssabotaged the industrial hardware
used in enrichment (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). This led to a very high level of hardware failure.
This virus was so sophisticated that it lay dormant for over a year, finally being discovered in the
summer of 2010 (Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). It is estimated that this virus alone set back the
Iranian nuclear program by almost 2 years
(Rahigh-Aghsan & Jakobsen, 2010). Another alternative approach is much more controversial. Iran has
recently complained to UN that the agency has put the lives of its nuclear scientists at risk (Kreider &
Momtaz, 2011). The complaint stems from the UN‟s nuclear regulatory agency publishing the name of
Iranian nuclear scientists. Since 2007, four of these scientists have been killed under violent and
suspicious circumstances, including being shot, bombed, and poisoned (Kreider & Momtaz, 2011). A fifth
barely survived. The Iranians blame the US and Israel for these deaths and some western security firms
corroborate these suspicions (Kreider & Momtaz, 2011). These examples suggest that the US has far
more sophisticated options available to it than conventional warfare. If Iran does not pose a serious
military threat to the region, the recent public pressure on Iran must be explained. One explanation lies
in Iran‟s so-called soft power and the looming withdrawal of US military troops from Iraq, slated for the
end of 2011. Lara Jakes of the Associated Press quotes the US military spokesman in Iraq as saying “Iran
wants to make Iraq a weak state,” adding that “Iran is feeling increasingly isolated, and one of the ways
it can avoid isolation is by co-opting Iraq,” (Jakes, 2011). The article cites Iran‟s growing political and
economic influence in Iraq, as well its influence over some local militias (Jakes, 2011). US Getting Real –
Why a War with Iran is Unlikely Mo Ismailzaiofficials believe Iran trains and supply‟s these militiamen,
and attributes a recent rise in attacks against US troops as a warning to the American‟s “not to stay
beyond the deadline,” (Jakes, 2011). This seems to be precisely the message the American‟s have heard
and are responding to.
A recent White House statement supports this analysis: “The United States will continue this pressure
until Iran chooses to depart from its current path of international isolation, both in concert with our
partners as well as unilaterally,” (Bull, Cornwell, & Mohammed, 2011).
Professor Chomsky sums up:
The primary threat is that Iran is engaged in destabilizing its neighbors. It's trying to increase its
influence in surrounding countries, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US is, of course, involved in
Iraq and Afghanistan but that is not destabilizing. That's stabilizing. [...] It sounds like a contradiction but
it isn't when you understand that “stability” has a meaning. It means US control. So we had to
destabilize the country that was out of US control in order to bring about stability, and it's the same
problem with regard to Iran. It doesn't follow orders and, therefore, it is destabilizing the regional
situation (Chomsky, 2010).
Map 3 illustrates that Iran is almost entirely isolated in the region. It is surrounded by American allies,
bases, troops, and warships. The Iranian armed forces are primitive in comparison to those of the US
and an overt war would likely decimate the country. Given this calculus, it seems highly unlikely that
the Iranians would readily embrace a war with the US or its regional allies. Offensive realism dictates
that while the Iranians will constantly seek greater regional power, they will not seek power in the
face of certain destruction.
One interpretation of the recently intensified dialogue is that the Americans are signaling resolve to
protect their hegemonic interests in Iraq and punish Iranian interference. A quick glance at Map 3 seems
to corroborate this. It‟s difficult to imagine that the Iranians haven‟t seen and heard the same message.
Harder still to imagine that the Iranians would choose to go to war with a power that has them
surrounded from every direction, and outclassed by almost every measure. Offensive realism claims
states seek to increase their power but the motivation behind this power-grab is to increase the chance
of survival. If Iran attacks one of its neighbours, its chances of survival are next to nil, and as such, if
there is a new war in the Middle East, it is unlikely to be sparked by Iran. Nor is it likely that any of
Iran‟s neighbours would attack without the explicit approval of the US. Finally, having Iran contained
and boxed in, there seems little incentive for the US to attack Iran, either. Ultimately, it is unlikely
that Iran will spark a war in the Middle East.
Sopo ! D – 1NC
Soft power’s outdated – Iraq proves
Liaropoulos 11 – Senior Analyst in the Research Institute for European and American Studies; lecturer
in University of Piraeus, Department of International and European studies; also teaches in the Joint
Staff War College, the National Security College, the Air War College and the Naval Staff Command
College; Masters in Intelligence & Strategic Studies and PhD (Andrew, “Being Hard on Soft Power,” 2011,
http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/1519-being-hard-on-soft-power.html)//SJF
Over the past two decades, the term ‘soft power’ is one of the most contested concepts in international
relations. It is widely used in the international relations’ literature and lists as one of the most popular
clichés for policymakers. Despite the growing body of literature on the topic and the numerous policies
that assert some use of soft power elements, there is still no agreement on what exactly soft power is,
how it works and how to measure its effectiveness.
To begin with, soft power was first coined by Joseph Nye, in his 1990 book Bound to Lead. According to
Nye, soft power is ‘getting others to want the outcomes you want’. Therefore, soft power is the ability
to achieve political ends through attraction. In sharp contrast to hard power, which involves the use of
coercion and payment, soft power aims to attract and shape preferences. Whereas hard power rests on
inducements (carrots) and threats (sticks), soft power rests on the ability to shape the agenda in world
politics, based on your principles and ideas. The sources of soft power are culture, political values and
institutions. Nye argues that the United States have been attractive to the rest of the world, due to their
political values, democratic institutions and popular culture. As a result, Washington is able to achieve
some of its foreign policy goals, without necessary resorting to coercion, threats and bribery.
Soft power has been highly criticized as being a rather ineffective and vague concept. Neorealist
scholars place emphasis on hard power, meaning economic and military power and downgrade the role
of culture and values in shaping events. Critics argue that soft power is just a reflection of hard power.
States are able to exercise soft power, only through their hard power. Only states with a capable
military, economic power and industrial strength can claim to exercise soft power effectively. Another
point of criticism is that it is difficult to measure power in general and soft power in particular. By its
very nature, soft power is a relative and intangible concept, that is inherently difficult to quantify.
Quantitative metrics can be used to measure elements of hard power like population, defence
expenditure, military assets, gross domestic products and the effects of economic sanctions, but it is
tricky to meaure influence, reputation and cultural power.
The lack of a clear conceptual framework on soft power is evident when the latter is translated into
public diplomacy and strategic communication. The way soft power campaigns are conducted depends
on the nature of the state that exercises soft power, the type of message that is transmitted and the
nature of the target. Recent cases of soft power operations highlight the fact that successful
application of soft power is rather limited.
In Iraq, the United States were unable to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. The vast majority of
the polulation was against the U.S military occupation and this had a profound effect in the duration
and intensity of the counterinsurgency campaign. The Coalition Forces failed to communicate their
message successfully. The reasons for this failure lay in the nature of both the messenger (U.S / Coalition
Forces) and the target (Iraqis). The U.S in general lacked credibility in the Arab World and the Iraqis were
very skeptical of Washington’s intention. The U.S lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi
populace and in certain cases even lost the trust of some of their allies. After years of totalitarianism
Iraqis were ill-equipped to value the credibility of information and it was difficult for the Coalition
Forces to counter misinformation in a society that is not culturally receptive to such messages. In
addition, the U.S information campaign had to compete with a rather sophisticated information
campaign that took place both inside and outside Iraq. The insurgents were able to mobilize part of the
population and provide a credible anti-American rhetoric. Furthermore, the Iraqi populace was for the
first time exposed to alternative sources of information. In the post-invasion era, the Iraqis had access to
satellite television and foreign news services and as a result, part of the population was alienated and
hostile to U.S forces. The occupation clashed the interest of the Iraqi population that wanted to regain
control of their country and viewed the U.S forces as an imperial power that invaded in order to exploit
their natural resources.
The case of Iraq, vividly demonstrates the limitations of soft power. A serious constraint is that no
state, no matter how powerful, can control the information sphere. The U.S did not have the
monopoly on communication and therefore was unable to shape the battlefield of perception in a
close society like Iraq. Responding to misinformation, refuting conspiracy theories, filling information
vacuums and building credibility is not an easy task, even for a hegemon.
Sopo ! D – 2NC
Soft power detracts focus from domestic problems – net worse for international
standing
Neu 2/8 – senior economist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation (C Richard, “U.S. 'Soft
Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch,” 2/8/13, http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroadis-losing-its-punch.html)//SJF
The way America flexes it economic muscle around the world is changing dramatically—and not
necessarily for the better.
In 1997, facing a wave of sovereign debt defaults, the International Monetary Fund asked its member
states to pledge lines of credit to support Fund rescue efforts. The United States and other nations did
as asked. In 2009, the United States responded again to a call for expanded credit lines. When the Fund
sought yet another expansion of these credit lines last April, 39 countries, including China, Russia, Brazil,
Mexico, India, and Saudi Arabia, stepped up. Even cash-strapped Italy and Spain pledged support.
But the United States was conspicuously absent. A pledge from the United States requires congressional
authorization. In the midst of last spring's contentious debate over U.S. government deficits and debts,
support for an international body was a political nonstarter. Where the United States had previously
demonstrated international leadership, other countries—some of them America's rivals for international
influence—now make the running.
This is a small example of what may be a troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming
inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S.
“soft power” and on the country's ability to shape international developments in ways that serve
American interests.
The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the
biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics
profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth,
especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP.
The United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in
the future. These will come at a bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling
since 1999—by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share
of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international trade.
And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the
University of Chicago have demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policy—on the rise as a
result of political squabbling over U.S. fiscal policy—typically foreshadows slower economic growth.
Investors may be growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state of U.S.
fiscal policymaking.
From the beginning of 2002, when U.S. government debt was at its most recent minimum as a share of
GDP, to the end of 2012, the dollar lost 25 percent of its value, in price-adjusted terms, against a basket
of the currencies of major trading partners. This may have been because investors fear that the only way
out of the current debt problems will be future inflation. The dollar has also given up a bit of its
dominance as the preferred currency for international reserves among advanced economies. And the
renminbi appears to have replaced the dollar as the “reference currency” for most of East Asia. (The
good news is that in recent years U.S. banks have increased their share of deposits from foreigners,
mostly at the expense of banks in London.)
More troubling for the future is that private domestic investment—the fuel for future economic
growth—shows a strong negative correlation with government debt levels over several business cycles
dating back to the late 1950s. Continuing high debt does not bode well in this regard.
But perhaps the worst consequences of U.S. debt are actions not taken.
U.S. international leadership has been based, in part, on contributions—political and financial—to
major institutions and initiatives—International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade (and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement,
the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world better.
But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts at
coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding.
Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new free-trade area. And
warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his European counterparts about the dangers of failing to
resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get your own house in order before
you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility
to the extent that it can no longer lead?
And what about unmet needs at home—healthcare costs, a foundering public education system,
deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A strained fiscal situation that limits resources
for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be helping with any of these matters. But
without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified action
abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example?
America's fiscal predicament is serious. The problem has become obvious in the last few years, but it has
been building for decades, largely the result of promises of extensive social benefits without a
corresponding willingness to pay for them.
Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a
number of years—increased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost
certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal
adjustment and constrained government resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet
further.
It’s resilient
Bev 12 – regular columnist to Forbes Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, and Strategic Review, Associate
Partner of Fortune PR Indonesia and based in Northern California (Jennie S, “The Power of American
"Soft Power"” 5/23/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-of-americansoft-power/)//SJF
Almost four years since the beginning of the Great Recession, signified by the implosion of the financial
industry and the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the United States is recovering. In fact,
some sectors have grown to new heights. Thus, a “declining USA” is no more than a myth.
This myth is likely to continue for a while despite the recession officially ending in June 2009 as the high
unemployment and on-going foreclosure crisis have cloaked significant economic improvements. In the
last four years, declinism and declinists have been spreading paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine
this with Nouriel “Dr. Doom” Roubini’s “the perfect storm” forecast in 2013 and you probably would
become even more paralyzed.
Daniel Gross’ best-selling book Better, Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is
probably one of the first books that presents encouraging facts in this recovery period rather than
discouraging views of America’s future.
The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of one’s fall that lingers in mind. We
all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet creditors
and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day our loved
one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life with us.
Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just how our
brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution.
The world was so shocked with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasn’t yet created a lasting mental
image. Good news, American “soft power” is more powerful than any fiscal policy and political
maneuver.
Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government says “soft power” refers to the ability
to get through attraction rather than coercion or payments. By “to get” it means to receive favorable
treatments based upon attractiveness of a country’s culture, ideals, and policies. For instance, inspired
by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan aspire to study medicine at an American
university. Infatuated by the idea of a fair trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer.
“Soft power” can be hardcore power. And the American brand is still the best out there.
Also, thanks to low US dollar value, a record 62 million foreign tourists visited USA in 2011. In 2010,
some 1.04 million immigrants applied for permanent residency, following 1.13 million in the previous
year, which reflects the world’s insatiable faith in the US brand. The people of the world still believe that
the USA is the place to visit, to reside, and to prosper.
US brands, such as automobile giants Buick, GM, and Ford, continue to grow outside of the USA. US
brands continue to influence socio-political-economic wellbeing of people of the world: Facebook,
Twitter, and Youtube are vital in demonstrations and social unrests. US brands continue to serve
people’s mobility and communication: Apple, Microsoft, CISCO, Oracle, and Boeing. People of the world
is a market of seven-billion, and most of them have occasionally consumed black soda drinks called
Coca-Cola and Pepsi.
The US government has lost its geopolitical epicenter, yet American brands keep the legend alive. And
the shift has occurred from public power to private power, from political power to economic power,
from hard power to soft power, with the end of the Cold War as the turning point.
The recent approval of the JOBS Act in April 2012 may as well pick up where the failure of previous
policies have left, as its intention is creating an encouraging environment for growth of startup
companies through more efficient and lenient procedures of capital raising, including crowdsourcing,
venture capitalizing, and angel investing. And it is expected that every new investment would create at
least six new jobs.
I can see the greatness of American brands supported by the JOBS Act creating another shift in
economic recovery, as once again a policy is providing a conducive environment for growth, just like
when Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. Now the question is:
How far will the JOBS Act’s ripple effect go? And which direction does it go? North or south? Growth,
stagnation, or decadence?
Still, I believe in the power of “USA” as a brand and American brands. The world loves us.
Ethanol advantage answers
1nc sugar ethanol
Cuban sugarcane won’t be able to meet demand
Soligo & Jaffe, 10– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy
Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 102-103)//NG
Issues in Achieving Cuba’s Ethanol Potential As noted, estimates of Cuba’s ethanol potential will
depend on assumptions about the amount of sugarcane that can be planted and harvested, as well as
what sugarcane yields can be achieved. More ambitious assumptions will yield higher outputs. For
example, Juan Sanchez assumes that Cuba could devote 2 million hectares to sugarcane with yields of 80
tons per hectare and 83.6 liters per ton (6,688 liters per hectare). He projects ethanol output at 13.4
billion liters, or 3.5 billion gallons. 47
Three and a half billion gallons seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. There is some
question as to whether Cuba could ever again attain the 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane harvested
in 1970, let alone 2 million. According to Brian Pollitt, the 1970 harvest was achieved only by cutting
cane that would normally be left to mature for another season in order to produce a higher sugar
yield in the following year. 48 Obviously this is not a sustainable practice if optimal yields are to be
achieved.
Two billion gallons can be produced with a harvested area of 1.33 million hectares and a yield of
seventy-five tons per hectare. That area of cultivation is not too far from the average harvest of 1.28
million hectares that Cuba was able to maintain during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet reaching 1.33 million
hectares will require time and substantial investment in farm machinery and restoration of the land,
which has been neglected and compacted by the use of heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. The
land will also have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane.
Achieving higher sugarcane yields will also require time and investments to acquire or develop
higher-yielding sugarcane varieties. Cuban yields averaged only fifty-eight tons per hectare during the
1970s and 1980s, substantially below the seventy-five tons per hectare needed to produce 2 billion
gallons of ethanol. Yet other countries, as noted, have achieved or exceeded that yield, and some
private Cuban farmers are reported to have achieved even higher yields of 100 tons per acre. 49 Yields,
of course, are a function of other factors besides cane variety. The condition of the land, access to water
and fertilizer, and other inputs would all need to be considered.
Finally, Cuba will have to undertake significant investments in distilleries, transport, storage,
and distribution infrastructure if it wants to produce the levels of ethanol that the authors believe are
achievable. Investment costs for the biorefineries alone will come to billions of dollars. For example, in
2006, corn-based ethanol plants in the United States cost roughly $1.88 per gallon for a capacity of 48
million gallons per year, and $1.50 per gallon for capac- ity of 120 million gallons per year (reflecting
significant economies of scale). So even if all new plants in Cuba were built with the larger capacity, it
would require $3 billion dollars (at 2006 prices) to build sufficient capacity to produce 2 billion gallons.
Lifting restrictions won’t cause enough investment
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
III. THE POTENTIAL CUBAN ETHANOL INDUSTRY
To speak of a “Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry” is, at this point, largely a matter of
speculation. Thanks in large part to the anti-ethanol views of Fidel Castro (who has said that ethanol
should be discouraged because it diverts crops from food to fuel), Cuba currently has almost no ethanol
industry. In the words of Ronald Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings Institution, “Despite the
fact that Cuba is dependent on oil imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of Brazil in using
ethanol to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it has not embarked on a policy to develop a larger ethanol
industry from sugarcane.” There is, however, no reason why such an industry cannot be developed. As
Soligo and Jaffe wrote, “In addition, Cuba has large land areas that once produced sugar but now lie
idle. These could be revived to provide a basis for a world-class ethanol industry. We estimate that if
Cuba achieves the yield levels attained in Nicaragua and Brazil and the area planted with sugarcane
approaches levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba could produce up to 2 billion gallons of sugarbased ethanol per year.”
The ideal domestic policy scenario for the creation of a robust Cuban sugarcane ethanol
industry would be a situation in which the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba is ended, U.S. tariff barriers
have been removed (in the case of sugar) or not revived (in the case of ethanol), and the Renewable
Fuel Standard requiring that a certain percentage of U.S. fuel come from ethanol remain in place. Of
course, changes in United States policy alone, even those that ensure a steady source of demand for
Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol, would not be enough to create an ethanol industry from scratch. The
country will need to decide that fostering the industry is to be a key goal of the post-Castro era, and will
need to shape its domestic policies to encourage the growth of such an industry.
Given that the Cuban sugar industry lived and died by its ties with specific foreign powers for
most of the Twentieth Century, Cuba will likely be quite wary of investing too much in the creation of a
sugarcane ethanol industry that it perceives as being largely a creature of U.S. energy and agricultural
policy. Therefore, the creation of a significant sugarcane ethanol industry in Cuba will require a large
increase in domestic demand for ethanol. One way that Cuba could encourage domestic demand for
ethanol would be to follow the Brazilian model of encouraging the purchase of Flex Fuel vehicles, which
can run on any blend of fuel between 100% gasoline and 100% ethanol. Because Cuba has so many old
automobiles, expecting new vehicles to provide a source of demand for ethanol may be an extremely
unrealistic prospect. On the other hand, the fact that there is so much pent-up demand for new
automobiles in Cuba could mean that, with sufficient and well-directed government incentives, Flex Fuel
vehicles could be adopted in Cuba at faster rates than in other countries.
AT: Solves oil / warming
It solves close to 0%
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
It must be stressed that sugarcane-based ethanol, from Cuba or anywhere else, is not the solution to
the energy and climate change problems faced by the United States, as replacing just 10% of global
gasoline usage with sugarcane-based ethanol would require a tenfold increase in global sugarcane
production. To address the problems of both peak oil and climate change, the United States must do
much more to reduce its fossil fuel consumption. It should primarily do this by using the strategies
highlighted in the introduction to this Article: higher fuel efficiency standards, electric cars (powered
with electricity from renewable energy sources, not coal), more public transportation, more walkable
neighborhoods, and shorter commutes. To the extent to which there will inevitably still be high demand
for liquid fuels for automobiles, however, ethanol from Cuban-grown sugarcane can, and should, be part
of the solution to both problems.
AT: Amazon destruction causes warming
Turn– Brazilian sugarcane fields are better than the Amazon at stopping climate
change
Betts, 11– Head of the Climate Impacts strategic area at the Met Office Hadley Centre (Richard
A., April 17, 2011, “Direct impacts on local climate of sugarcane expansion in Brazil”,
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v1/n2/full/nclimate1067.html)//NG
The climate impact of biofuels is usually considered in terms of their net effect on greenhouse-gas emissions. The
expansion of sugar
cane into pastureland for biofuel production is now shown to also exert a direct local cooling effect.
Greenhouse-gas emissions are not the only way in which humans can alter climate. Changes in the characteristics of the
Earth's surface can also play a role, by affecting the fraction of the Sun's radiation that is absorbed by
the planet, as well as the flows of energy and moisture into the atmosphere from the surface. Although emissions and uptake of carbon
dioxide by forestry and agriculture are considered within policy discussions aimed at avoiding dangerous climate change, the changes in landsurface characteristics that accompany them are usually overlooked. Writing inNature Climate Change,
Loarie and colleagues1
consider the case of sugar cane grown for use as biofuel in Brazil, and find that expansion of sugarcane plantations into pasturelands cools the local climate by enhancing evapotranspiration. Brazil is a
leading user of ethanol from sugar cane as a biofuel. Fuel for unmodified road vehicles in Brazil has been one part ethanol to three parts
gasoline for several years2. This
helps reduce greenhouse-gas emissions: the use of one hectare of sugar cane
for ethanol is estimated to avoid about 14 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent greenhouse-gas
emissions per year compared with the use of fossil fuels3. Brazil is also a leading producer of ethanol from sugar cane.
Most of the sugar cane is grown in the southern and northeastern parts of the country, but plantations are also expanding in the
'cerrado' region in central Brazil. Cerrado is essentially savanna: a mixture of woodlands, shrublands
and open grassland. The cerrado region covers over two million square kilometres, but about 60% of
its natural vegetation has now been cleared for agriculture, mainly pasture, and the new sugar-cane
crop is mostly replacing this existing agriculture. As well as emitting or absorbing carbon, these land
transformations could affect climate through two other processes4. They could change the surface
albedo: the proportion of incoming solar radiation that is reflected back to space. Generally speaking,
forests have a lower surface albedo than grasslands, meaning that they absorb a greater fraction of
solar radiation, which warms the local area. Sugar cane has a higher albedo than both forests and
grasslands, so has a relative cooling effect. The land-cover changes could also affect
evapotranspiration. Plants extract water from the soil and release it to the air through pores in the
surface of their leaves. This process exerts a cooling effect by causing a greater proportion of energy
to be carried away as latent heat rather than sensible heat. Forests and large plants such as sugar cane
tend to exert a greater evaporative cooling effect than grasses, because their total surface area is
greater, their deeper roots can access more soil moisture, and their size and shape can induce more
turbulence in the overlying air flow. Sugar-cane cultivation also often involves irrigation, which provides an extra source of
moisture. The key question is: what is the net effect of these changes in albedo and evapotranspiration on climate? Loarie and colleagues1 used
satellite data to estimate the impacts that the two stages of land-use change in the Brazilian cerrado have had on local temperature. Their aim
is to provide a more complete picture of the climate impacts of biofuel cropping. By examining satellite-derived estimates of surface
temperature, evapotranspiration, albedo and vegetation cover, they show that shifting
from natural vegetation to non-
sugar-cane crops or pasture results in local warming. This temperature rise is due to reduced evapotranspiration, which
outweighs the cooling effect of increased albedo. However, a further shift to sugar cane partly offsets this warming
due to the combined cooling effects of increased evapotranspiration and an additional increase in
albedo. The researchers conclude that replacing pasture or crops with sugar cane can exert an
additional cooling influence on climate, over and above the biofuel's effect of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions by replacing fossil fuels (Fig. 1). They are careful to point out that this is contingent on the pasturelands not being
displaced elsewhere, as this could exert further negative impacts if it resulted in additional deforestation — through both carbon emissions and
reduced evapotranspiration.
Midwest economy disad link
Turn- Cuban ethanol tanks the Midwest economy
Specht, 13 – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc., B.A., LSU (Jonathan, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and
Environmental Effects on the United States”, UC Davis, 4-24-13, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)//NG
Absent a scenario in which the Renewable Fuel Standard was raised at the same time as U.S.
consumption of ethanol from Cuban sugarcane increased, it is likely that encouraging the importing of
Cuban sugarcane ethanol would have a negative economic effect on the Midwestern United States.
The worst case economic scenario for the United States that could possibly arise out of policy and law
changes that successfully encourage the development of a Cuban sugarcane ethanol industry would be
that such ethanol largely supplants rather than supplements the domestic ethanol industry. This could
lead to ethanol plant closures, job losses, and a regionalized economic slowdown across the
Midwestern United States. This regionalized economic slowdown would be made worse if a drop in
demand for corn-based ethanol led to a significant decline in corn prices and a resulting loss of
purchasing power by corn farmers (whose spending in times of high commodity prices boosts smalltown economies).
The likelihood of the worst-case economic scenario depends on a number of factors. The U.S.
ethanol industry, like the ethanol industry everywhere, is largely affected by two major variables:
governmental policy and commodity prices. While it has not received anything close to the level of
support granted to the Brazilian ethanol industry, the U.S. ethanol industry has received major boosts
from the federal government. The future strength of the domestic ethanol industry will depend on
whether it continues to receive the backing of the federal government. As a 2006 report from the
USDA’s Office of the Chief Economist candidly acknowledges, “Growth in the U.S. ethanol industry is
directly related to Federal and State policies and regulations.” According to a 2008 report for the USDA’s
Office of the Chief Economist, “The most likely scenario is that renewable fuels will continue to compete
with petrofuels only with the help of government incentives and/or mandates.”
Other Advantage answers
AT: Latin American conflict
No Latin American conflict impact
Ghitis, 12 - an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing
editor (Frida, World Politics Review, “Latin America, the World's Democracy Lab” 7/5,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12127/world-citizen-latin-america-the-worlds-democracylab)
Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules for what continue to be fierce political
battles. The disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now tend to spark bitter legislative
maneuvers, even thinly disguised coups, punctuated with street protests that sometimes turn violent,
but eventually die off.
Latin America still contains the ingredients for violent social conflict, but the willingness to experiment
within the elusive parameters of democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum. It has meant that
even when the system disappoints, there is always another democratic path to chart, another formula
to concoct.
To be sure, violence is far from defeated. Central American countries have some of the highest murder
rates in the world as a result of drug trafficking. Mexico has seen some 50,000 die in the battle to defeat
the narco-gangs. The decades-old insurgency in Colombia is not finished, and street protests
occasionally turn deadly throughout the region.
But it's a long way from the civil wars and the "dirty wars" that characterized the region in the second
half of the 20th century. Then, the routine means of deciding the shape of the political and economic
system was by taking up arms and killing those on the other side of the ideological divide. No more.
Subregional organizations prevent regional conflict
Isacson, 12 - senior associate for regional security at the Washington Office on Latin America (Adam,
“Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS” World Politics Review, 5/22,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-ofthe-oas)
The regional conflict-resolution trends are clear. Interstate conflicts remain far easier to resolve than
internal conflicts, although the task of resolving them is now falling less to the OAS and more to new
subregional organizations or ad hoc diplomatic arrangements. U.S. support, once seen as
indispensable for the success of any conflict-resolution effort, is now optional: Twenty years after
Esquipulas II, the region resolved the Colombia-Venezuela, Colombia-Ecuador and Zelaya disputes on
its own, with no input from Washington.
AT: Cuban bioweapons
Zero evidence supports a Cuban bioweapons program
Smith, 7 - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign
Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements
over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior
Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, “Take Cuba Off The
Terrorist List” The National Interest, 8/6,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733
Bogus Charges That Cuba is a Biological Warfare Threat
Back in 2004, Bolton said that the Bush administration was "concerned that Cuba is developing a
limited biological weapons effort . . . and believes Cuba remains a terrorist and biological warfare threat
to the United States."
Bolton's charges caused a stir. Over the past three years, however, they have widely come to be seen
as politically motivated and groundless. Certainly neither he nor anyone else has been able to put
forward any evidence to support the charges. The Department of State no longer even makes them.
Further, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) sent several delegations to Cuba to investigate and in
one case was accompanied by CIP. They were allowed to go anywhere they wished and see anything
requested. Their conclusions were perhaps best summed up by retired General Charles Wilhelm, the
former commander of SOUTHCOM, who accompanied one of the delegations. "While Cuba certainly
has the capability to develop and produce chemical and biological weapons, nothing we saw or heard
led us to the conclusion that they were proceeding on this path."
Wilhelm's conclusions were practically echoed by a National Intelligence Estimate conducted in the
summer of 2004 and reported in The New York Times on September 18, 2004. It said that "the
Intelligence Community continues to believe that Cuba has the technical capability [emphasis added] to
pursue some aspects of an offensive biological weapons program."
It made no claim, however, that Cuba was pursuing such a program.
In sum, unless accompanied by new evidence, any charges that Cuba poses a biological warfare threat
to the United States must be seen as baseless.
Cuba doesn’t have bioweapons
Fox 2002 -freelance writer based in Washington D.C.
(Jeffrey L., “Truth about Bioterrorism and Biowarfare Is Elusive”, American Society for Microbiology,
4/16/2002, google scholar)//KW
On the diplomatic front of efforts to counteract bioterrorist threats, clarity also remains elusive. For
example, in a speech early in May, John Bolton, an Undersecretary at the U.S. State Department,
accused the Cuban government of using biotechnology to develop weapons of mass destruction and of
exporting some of its sophisticated medical know-how for use by other nations to develop their own
bioweapons. However, he offered no proof to back those claims, which Cuban leader Fidel Castro
immediately rejected. A week later, Castro invited former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to inspect a
major Cuban biotechnology research center, offering him wide access and his choice of experts to deal
with technical analyses. Carter duly visited the center and speculated to the news media that the
allegations that were publicized a week earlier could have been intended to undermine the good will he
sought to build during his visit.
While those charges and counter-charges about Cuban biowarfare activities were being exchanged, a
group called the Sunshine Project released documents claiming that researchers in the U.S. military are
developing several types of "offensive biological weapons…[that] violate federal and international law."
The Sunshine Project, a public interest group with offices in Austin, Tex., and in Europe, focuses on
biowarfare and other controversial biological policy issues. It bases these particular claims on several
documents that describe biotechnology and microbiological research projects that were proposed
several years ago by staff researchers at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C. and the
Armstrong Laboratory at the Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, Tex. The organization obtained the
documents through a Freedom of Information Act request.
The projects outlined in those documents describe plans for using nonlethal, nonpathogenic genetically
modified microorganisms as well as a catalytic substance called diazoluminomelanin, which is prepared
on bacterial membranes from embedded catalysts. In general, plans call for using microorganisms and
other catalysts to degrade high-energy fuels, biopolymers, and other substances that are otherwise
useful to opponent military forces. More broadly, these projects would lead to products with which to
"stop land and sea vehicles and to neutralize facilities and equipment" and also to "degrade opposing
forces' mobility, logistical support, and equipment maintenance programs." Thus, the war-fighting
technologies envisioned in those documents are portrayed as a materials sciences research effort that,
in some cases, will depend on standard genetic engineering practices that are "exempt from biological
warfare restrictions."
Not so, according to the Sunshine Project. Its members accuse the Bush administration of hypocrisy
and pointedly criticize it for "aggressively accusing other countries of developing biological weapons"
and for rejecting "a legally binding system of United Nations inspections of suspected biological
weapons facilities."
The bioweapons charge was based on pre-Iraq WMD intel and Cuba doesn’t support
terrorism
Smith, et al 2004- *senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., and an
adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, Muse **member of the American Society of
International Law and the American branch of the International Law Association, Baker ***senior
researcher in the Washington, D.C. office of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
(Wayne S., Robert , Glenn, “Cuba Should Not Be on the Terrorist List”, International Policy Report,
November 2004,http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf, google
scholar)//KW
Cuba was placed on the list of terrorist nations in March of 1982 on bogus grounds (see below).
Twenty-two years later, the State Department’s reasons for keeping it there do not withstand the
most elementary scrutiny. Cuba does not, for example, endorse terrorism as a policy. On the contrary,
it has condemned it in all its manifestations, has signed all twelve UN anti-terrorist resolutions and
offered to sign agreements with the United States to cooperate in combating terrorism, an offer the
Bush administration ignores.
Nor is it harboring Basque and Colombian terrorists. Members of ETA are in Cuba, yes, but with the full
knowledge of the Spanish government. And as for the Colombian government, far from accusing Cuba of
harboring Colombian guerrillas, it stresses that the Cuban government is playing a helpful role in efforts
to bring peace to Colombia and that “there is no information…that Cuba is in any way linked to terrorist
activities in Colombia today.”1 It is also true that there are American fugitives from justice in Cuba. But
even under our own legislation, that does not constitute grounds for declaring Cuba to be a terrorist
state. And if Cuba does not regularly extradite those fleeing American justice, the United States has not
in more than 45 years extradited a single Cuban, including known terrorists guilty of multiple murders.
Indeed, the United States has not even answered Cuba’s extradition requests.
In March of 2004, Under Secretary of State John Bolton accused Cuba of moving ahead with a
developmental effort Conference panelists Glenn Baker, Cynthia McClintock and Jonathan Tucker..2 to
produce biological weapons. Cuba heatedly denies the charge and has invited anyone who wishes to
come and see for themselves. Various U.S. delegations to Cuba led by CDI have seen no evidence at all
to suggest that Cuba is in fact developing biological weapons. The charge that it is doing so appears to
be a politically motivated statement by Mr. Bolton based on fragmentary intelligence that is
ambiguous at best.
The central question we should ask here is how can U.S. interests possibly be served by putting forward
these spurious allegations against Cuba, by insisting that it is a terrorist state when it obviously is not,
and by rebuffing its offers to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism? Does this not undermine our
own credibility and cast doubt on our seriousness of purpose? Conference organizers invited Under
Secretary of State John Bolton and representatives of the State Department to participate in the
conference so as to have the opportunity to defend their positions. They declined to do so.
Alleged Reasons for Placing Cuba on the List in the First Place As reported in CIP’s IPR of November
2002, the State Department placed Cuba on the list of terrorist nations in March of 1982. A
Congressional Research Service (CRS) memorandum dated November 7, 2003, a copy of which CIP has
obtained, indicates that no explanation was given at the time for Cuba’s placement on the list.
According to the CRS memo, however, a State Department paper in February of 1982, a month before
Cuba was placed on the list, asserted that Cuba was encouraging terrorism and was especially active in
El Salvador and Guatemala. Clearly, this must have been part of the rationale for Cuba’s placement on
the list. And yet, if Cuba’s support for guerrillas trying to overthrow an established government in El
Salvador – or Guatemala – was enough to label it “a terrorist country,” then the U.S. would have
qualified as a terrorist state also because it was in the midst of supporting the contras in their efforts to
overthrow the established government of Nicaragua.
AT: US economy / competitiveness
Ending any trade restrictions undermines US competitiveness – Cuba will just flood US
markets
Suchlicki, 7-Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the
University of Miami (Jaime, “Implications of Lifting the U.S. Embargo and Travel Ban of Cuba”, Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 12/11/07,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/website_documents/SenateTestimony.pdf)//TL
Trade
• No foreign trade that is independent from the state is permitted in Cuba.
• Cuba would export to the U.S. most of its products, cigars, rums, citrus, vegetables, nickel, seafood,
biotechnology, etc. Yet since all of these products are produced by Cuban state enterprises, with
workers being paid below minimum wages, and Cuba has great need for dollars, the Cuban government
could dump products in the U.S. market at very low prices, and without regard for cost or economic
rationality. Many of these products will compete unfairly with U.S. agriculture and manufactured
products, or with products imported form the Caribbean and elsewhere.
• Cuban products are not strategically important to the U.S., and are in great abundance in the U.S.
internal market, or from other traditional U.S. trading partners.
• There is little question about Cuba’s chronic need for U.S. technology, products and services. Yet, need
alone does not determine the size or viability of a market. Cuba’s large foreign debt, owed to both
Western and former Communist countries, the abysmal performance of its economy, and the low prices
for its major exports make the “bountiful market” perception a perilous mirage.
• From the U.S. point of view, therefore, increased commercial ties with Cuba would create severe
market distortions for the already precarious regional economy of the Caribbean and Central America. It
would provide the U.S. market with products that are of little value and in abundant supply. And, while
some U.S. firms could benefit from a resumed trade relationship, it would not help in any significant way
the overall U.S. economy. Cuba does not have the potential to become an important client like China,
Russia, or even Vietnam.
AT: Biodiversity advantage
Economic engagement wrecks Cuban biodiversity
Dean, 7-Science Editor for the NYT (Cornelia, “Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo”, New York Times,
12/25/07, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all)//TL
Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. That is why many
scientists are so worried about what will become of it after Fidel Castro and his associates leave power
and, as is widely anticipated, the American government relaxes or ends its trade embargo.
Cuba, by far the region’s largest island, sits at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico
and the Caribbean Sea. Its mountains, forests, swamps, coasts and marine areas are rich in plants and
animals, some seen nowhere else.
And since the imposition of the embargo in 1962, and especially with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet
Union, its major economic patron, Cuba’s economy has stagnated.
Cuba has not been free of development, including Soviet-style top-down agricultural and mining
operations and, in recent years, an expansion of tourism. But it also has an abundance of landscapes
that elsewhere in the region have been ripped up, paved over, poisoned or otherwise destroyed in the
decades since the Cuban revolution, when development has been most intense. Once the embargo
ends, the island could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, eager to exploit
those landscapes.
Conservationists, environmental lawyers and other experts, from Cuba and elsewhere, met last month
in Cancún, Mexico, to discuss the island’s resources and how to continue to protect them.
Cuba has done “what we should have done — identify your hot spots of biodiversity and set them
aside,” said Oliver Houck, a professor of environmental law at Tulane University Law School who
attended the conference.
In the late 1990s, Mr. Houck was involved in an effort, financed in part by the MacArthur Foundation, to
advise Cuban officials writing new environmental laws.
But, he said in an interview, “ an invasion of U.S. consumerism , a U.S.-dominated future, could roll
over it like a bulldozer ” when the embargo ends.
By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey
Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, “we can
guess that tourism is going to increase in a very fast way” when the embargo ends.
“It is estimated we could double tourism in one year,” said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at
the Cuban ministry of science, technology and environment.
About 700 miles long and about 100 miles wide at its widest, Cuba runs from Haiti west almost to the
Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico. It offers crucial habitat for birds, like Bicknell’s thrush, whose summer
home is in the mountains of New England and Canada, and the North American warblers that stop in
Cuba on their way south for the winter.
Zapata Swamp, on the island’s southern coast, may be notorious for its mosquitoes, but it is also known
for its fish, amphibians, birds and other creatures. Among them is the Cuban crocodile, which has
retreated to Cuba from a range that once ran from the Cayman Islands to the Bahamas.
Cuba has the most biologically diverse populations of freshwater fish in the region. Its relatively large
underwater coastal shelves are crucial for numerous marine species, including some whose larvae can
be carried by currents into waters of the United States, said Ken Lindeman, a marine biologist at Florida
Institute of Technology.
Dr. Lindeman, who did not attend the conference but who has spent many years studying Cuba’s marine
ecology, said in an interview that some of these creatures were important commercial and recreational
species like the spiny lobster, grouper or snapper.
Like corals elsewhere, those in Cuba are suffering as global warming raises ocean temperatures and
acidity levels. And like other corals in the region, they reeled when a mysterious die-off of sea urchins
left them with algae overgrowth. But they have largely escaped damage from pollution, boat traffic and
destructive fishing practices.
Diving in them “is like going back in time 50 years,” said David Guggenheim, a conference organizer and
an ecologist and member of the advisory board of the Harte Research Institute, which helped organize
the meeting along with the Center for International Policy, a private group in Washington.
In a report last year, the World Wildlife Fund said that “in dramatic contrast” to its island neighbors,
Cuba’s beaches, mangroves, reefs, seagrass beds and other habitats were relatively well preserved.
Their biggest threat, the report said, was “the prospect of sudden and massive growth in mass tourism
when the U.S. embargo lifts.”
The embargo is key to maintaining Cuban biodiversity
PBS, 10-Government news network (“Cuba: The Accidental Eden”, PBS Nature,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/cuba-the-accidental-eden/a-brief-environmentalhistory/5830/)//TL
Cuba has been called the “Accidental Eden” for its exceptional biodiversity and unique historical
development. The island nation and its archipelagos support thousands of plant and animal species,
many of which are endemic, making Cuba the most naturally diverse Caribbean nation and a destination
for biological scientists and ecotourists.
Cuba’s natural blessings are the result of a manifold historical trajectory. The American trade and
tourism embargo and the collapse of the Soviet Union have both made “accidental” contributions to the
survival of Cuban wildlife.
Cuba’s low population density (about 102 people per square kilometer) and relative land isolation as an
island have afforded it moderately low levels of environmental destruction and high levels of endemism.
And Cuba remains biologically diverse, but it has seen its share of loss.
Spanish colonialism invited new plants, animals, and diseases, and some native lifeforms failed to cope.
Species unique to Cuba became extinct, including varieties of sloths and monkeys, among other animals.
The expansion of Cuban commercialism and industry, particularly with the influence of European and
American capital, continued to threaten Cuban wildlife populations. Tobacco and more significantly
sugar transformed the country from a Spanish shipping port to a major agricultural exporter. As sugar
demand rose, habitat was destroyed for farming. Today, farmers still compete with wildlife for use of
the land. At the same time, heavy industrial development polluted Cuban air, land, and water.
Cuba’s 1959 revolution set the country on a path apart from other post-colonial nations.
Although revolutionary Cuba instituted policies around agriculture, industry, forests, and water, like
most states in the 1960s, its moderate environmental efforts had mixed results. Focusing more heavily
on agriculture rather than heavy industry probably did more to save Cuban wildlife in the ‘60s and ‘70s
than did any environmentally conscious policies.
While global capitalism continued on a general course of thoughtless environmental destruction, the
U.S. embargo against Cuba, including a travel ban, freed the country from its most salient environmental
threat while putting the nation under great economic strain. Cuba traded and underwent forms of
“development,” but in many ways avoided the developments of late century American capitalism. While
both “capitalism” and “communism” ultimately undervalued natural resources, American executive and
legislative dispositions helped nurture the blossoming of Cuban wildlife.
A dramatic shift toward agriculture, industry, and the environment appeared after the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991. With shortages in fossil fuels and the disappearance of 80% of both imports and
exports, Cuba entered the “Special Period,” an economic depression that required new techniques to
help the country become more self-sustaining. Although Cuban beaches were opened to international
tourism, an environmentally significant aspect of the Special Period was the adoption of permaculture
agriculture and land use strategies.
Circumstances since the ’90s have led the Cuban government to take a stronger legislative and
rhetorical stance toward environmental management. Although initially centered around the human
species, Fidel Castro’s 1992 address to the UN Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro expresses this attitude of
environmental awareness and urgency:
“An important biological species is in danger of disappearing due to the fast and progressive destruction
of its natural living conditions: mankind. We have now become aware of this problem when it is almost
too late to stop it. … Tomorrow it will be too late to do what we should have done a long time ago.”
Today Cuba exhibits thriving natural diversity, though it may be tenuous. Agricultural pollution, habitat
destruction, and significantly tourism all threaten the island’s plants and animals and compete for land
and water use.
Every moment brings Cuba closer to the possibility of a lifted U.S. embargo, which would dramatically
affect Cuba’s economic possibilities and thus its wildlife. One of the many mixed blessing would be
increased tourism.
Marine conservationist Fernando Bretos notes that “The tourism impact has really been minimal in
Cuba, but that’s going to change. When you go from 2 million tourists a year to 4 to 6 to 8, everything
will change.”
Those with concern for Cuban wildlife but an understanding of the inevitable promote an ecotourism
that focuses on enjoying and even actively supporting nature. This practice necessitates natural
preservation, though potentially favoring certain species of flora and fauna over others. Mixed messages
from officials make it unclear how Cuba’s tourism industry will proceed, but some conservationists see
Cuba’s position as an opportunity to set a constructive example.
AT: Cuba-Russia militarization
Russia will not militarize Cuba
Logan 8 – reporter on Security in Latin America for the ISN (Samuel, “Cuba's emerging leverage”,
August 20, International Relations and Security Network, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Articles/Detail/?id=90231&lng=en)//ID
"Cuba has no strategic value to a post-Soviet Russia which is a regional great power but no longer a
global superpower and, furthermore, it runs counter to Moscow's attempt to play a constructive role in
international relations," Averre said, adding, "A revived military relationship is highly unlikely."
Russian military assets in Cuba would be limited to the projection of soft power, signaling Cuba's de
facto decision to fall into step with its old ally.
Due to the proximity of the US naval base in Key West, Florida as well as other naval and US Coast Guard
assets in the region, any hardware Moscow places on Cuban soil would most likely stay grounded or in
port or face a direct confrontation with a far superior fighting force supported by various nearby ports.
Russia would invite conflict half a world away from home – not an ideal situation for any military.
The reality of an aggressive Russian military presence in Cuba is one that is negative for both countries.
It is simply one neither country sees as beneficial to its long term geopolitical goals in the region.
Cuba in the middle
When US Congress approved some US$42 million in aid destined to Cuba on 22 July, it was a concrete
signal. Relations between the two countries are likely to improve over time despite the staunchly antiCastro contingent that retains a powerful voting block in southern Florida.
Raul Castro is well aware of this future. And while he is willing to play hard ball with Washington, he
knows the potential FDI upshot from the US could be beneficial to his people, Cuba's economy, and
ultimately his regime.
Raul is also aware that Russia is keen to improve relations. His three-day visit with Sachin erased any
doubt that Moscow is eager to invest in Cuba's energy and medical resources. Havana has long been
interested in becoming a refining hub in the region, and is eager to complete the LUKoil deal to have the
Russian energy firm refine Venezuelan heavy crude for domestic use and, perhaps, export to the US.
Cuba is in the middle with each hand on two heavy geopolitical levers. By applying the right amount of
pressure, the country can certainly benefit from both relationships. Too much pressure on either side,
and Cuba risks losing one or both connections. In the end, however, the island nation will stick to its
historical roots – maintain sovereignty and some dignity no matter what the cost.
"Cuba's attitude is 'We'll take your money, but that doesn't mean we'll do what you want,'" Erikson said,
adding, "Frankly, I don't see Russian power projection in the Caribbean or in the rest of Latin America."
AT: Cuban renewables
Renewables potential is limited
Belt, 10– Senior Economist at USAID, Director of Chemonics International, a consulting company (Juan
A. B., Cuba's Energy Future Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, p. 65-66)//NG
The Potential for Renewables in Cuba The potential for renewable energy sources is somewhat limited, and more
research is needed. Some of the conclusions of the International Resources Group report on the potential for renewables are outlined.
Hydropower The
total hydropower resource in Cuba has been estimated at 650 megawatts, 16
but much of the currently unutilized potential is in protected or naturally sensitive areas that may not
be candidates for development. The remaining resource appears suited for small facilities in areas that are mountainous or have
seasonal characteristics. Thus, we assumed that these resources could continue to be exploited primarily for off-grid electricity supply to rural
schools, medical centers, and small villages rather than for the grid-connected demand considered in this study. Therefore, new hydropower
installations were not included in the set of new power plant options.
Solar Photovoltaic Cuba obviously has excellent solar resources— the use of solar photovoltaic generation is
limited by capital cost rather than resource base. We investigated concentrated solar— the use of lenses or mirrors to focus
a large area of sunlight onto a small area, whence this concentrated light is directed onto a photovoltaic surface. We did not regard
concentrated solar as a realistic grid-connected option, because of limitations in radiation and
atmospheric clarity: Cuba’s high ambient humidity results in low efficiencies for concentrated solar
energy generation. Present photovoltaic applications are largely for off-grid uses. We developed solar PV
capacity factors for Cuba from the RETscreen Clean Energy Project Analysis Software, a decision support tool developed with the contribution
of numerous experts from government, industry, and academia. 17
Wind A preliminary estimate of Cuba’s wind potential is 400 megawatts. 18 Wind capacity factors and transmission costs are always
highly site-dependent, so only general estimates could be made until a detailed site inventory for Cuba was undertaken. A detailed highresolution wind energy resource map for Cuba was created at the United States Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory
as part of the Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment project for the United Nations Environment Program. The wind mapping— which
used a combination of analytical, numerical, and empirical methods employing GIS mapping tools and data sets— covered approximately
110,000 square kilometers of land area and, when offshore areas were included, more than 150,000 square kilometers. The resulting map
highlights the major wind resource areas and provides a wind resource estimate consistent with available measurement data. The report
estimated the total electricity-generating wind potential for Cuba at 2,550 megawatts for class 4 and 5 wind areas. 19
The national wind resource map indicates mostly moderate resources; the largest area with
good winds is an area offshore from Guantánamo. Mountain ridges are likely to have small localized good to excellent wind
resources.
AT: Iran-Latin American relations
Iran is not a threat to American interests in Latin America – any claims of threats are
racist and illiegitmate
Fernandez 2013 – journalist and the secretary of the Muslim Federation of Spain [Yusuf, “Why Latin America
will not bow to US pressure over Iran”, Jan 10, http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/01/10/282761/waning-us-influence-in-latin-america//cc]
On 28 December, US President Barack Obama enacted the so-called Countering Iran in Western
Hemisphere Act, which seeks to undermine Iran’s growing relations with Latin America, a region that
has traditionally been seen by the United States as its backyard and sphere of influence.
The Act requires the US Department of State to develop a strategy within 180 days to “address Iran’s
growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America. The Act points out that “Iran’s business and
diplomatic ties are a threat to US national security.” It is seen, however, as another anti-Iranian move
fabricated by the Zionist lobby in the US.
Shortly before, in July 2011, Robert F. Noriega - former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, former US ambassador to
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the current Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, one of the main neoconcontrolled entities in the US - said in a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence that Iran was carrying out
“an offensive strategy” in Latin America.
The Iranian presence in Latin America has been also harshly attacked by the pro-Israeli hawk Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, Foreign Affairs Committee chairman and self-appointed bulwark against the alleged
“Islamo-Boliviarian threat” to US security. She was co-star of a so-called “documentary” entitled “La
amenaza irani” (‘The Iranian Threat’), in which she said, without blushing, that the US should attack Iran
in order to “avert bomb explosions in various Latin American capitals.” The film was aired by Univision,
a US broadcast network, which is owned by someone who has hosted galas in honour of the occupying
Israeli army.
In 2009, another ridiculous “documentary” released by Univision involved Venezuelan consul in Miami, Livia Acosta, in an absurd cyber-plot
against the US, allegedly promoted by “Iranian diplomats and Mexican computer hackers.” This was the pretext used for expelling her from the
United States in a move that was widely seen as an American political revenge for Venezuela’s independent foreign policy.
Actually, the US Act rudely violates Latin American countries’ sovereignty and contains some stupid
claims such as that the opening of Iranian embassies or cultural centers is akin to “spread terrorism.”
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also echoed those views by claiming, in a recent visit to Colombia,
that Iranian attempts to expand its influence in South America amounted to expanding terrorism. Of
course, no real evidence has ever been shown to support that laughable allegation.
“The paranoid nature of these estimations, and the scant evidence presented for them, are eerily
reminiscent of the kind of broad-strokes, hawkish fear-mongering on display in the lead-up to the war
in Iraq. The testimony comes from a group bent on hyping security threats and, as Noriega admitted in
the testimony, is not even in agreement with the State Department or intelligence agencies,” wrote
expert John Glaser in a recent report.
The US accusations against Iran are also a way of targeting and casting suspicion on Latin American
Muslims. In the Act, Washington speaks of “isolating Iran and its allies” and US officials accuse Iran or
other pro-Iranian forces of “establishing mosques or Islamic centers throughout the region” in order
to advance violent jihad “on our doorstep.”
No threat – Iran influence is declining in Latin America – elections prove
Inside of Iran, June 28, 2013 [“Iranian Influence In Latin America On the Wane, State Department Report Says”,
http://www.insideofiran.org/en/component/content/article/25-important-news/7525-iranian-influence-in-latin-america-on-the-wanestate-department-report-says.html//cc]
Fox News - Iran is not actively supporting terrorist groups in Latin America, the U.S. State Department
acknowledged in a recent report – even though for years it has insisted the influence was growing.
The report, which said that the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region is still a “concern,” said that
due to strong sanctions imposed on the country by both the United States and the European Union,
Iran has been unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America.
“As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation
efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,” the report stated, according to Bloomberg
News.
While the State Department declined to comment on the report because it had not yet been sent to
Congress, some Republican lawmakers said that it was too lax on Iran and downplayed the Middle
Eastern nation’s threat in the U.S.’s perceived backyard.
“I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home,”
said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the
State Department report, told Bloomberg. “I question the methodology that was used in developing
this report.”
Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran had forged strong relationships with the leftleaning governments of Bolivian President Evo Morales and the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez.
Current Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced in late May that three surveillance drones
built with Iran’s help were launched by the Venezuelan government as part of an initiative to curb drug
trafficking.
The U.S. government and analysts throughout the region will be keeping a close eye on Iranian-Latin
American relations in the coming in the wake of Iran’s presidential election two weeks ago.
Cuban economy answers
Cuban economy 1nc
Can’t solve the Cuban economy – too many structural failures
Suchlicki, 12- Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at
the University of Miami (Jaime, “Getting Ready for Life after Castro”, 5/11/12,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=full)//TL
The challenges are many. First, there will be the tremendous task of economic reconstruction. For nearly
four decades, Cuba's extreme dependence on the Soviet bloc for trade, and the distorting effects of
huge subsidies from Moscow, created an artificial economy. Most of Cuba's exports are in decline, and
poverty is correspondingly growing. The internal market is weak, as domestic consumption is controlled
by a strict and severe rationing system. Many transactions take place in the illegal black market, which
operates in American dollars and with merchandise stolen from state enterprises or received from
abroad. The Cuban peso has depreciated and its purchasing power has waned considerably. Huge and
persistent government deficits, and the absence of virtually any stabilizing fiscal and monetary policies,
have accelerated the downward spiraling of the economy. (Socio-Economic Reconstruction: Suggestions
and Recommendations for Post-Castro Cuba, Antonio Jorge, and Institutions to Accompany the Market
in Cuba, Ernesto Hernandez-Cata).
Moreover, sugar production, Cuba's mainstay export, has dropped to Great Depression levels. With low
prices, a decline in sugar consumption worldwide, an increase in the number of competitive sugar
producers, and widespread use of artificial sweeteners, sugar is a losing commodity with dire prospects
for the future. Thus tourism, nickel exports, and even exile remittances have replaced sugar as the
mainstay of the economy. Oil exploration in Cuba's northwestern waters seems promising, but profits
must be shared with foreign partners, and costs are extremely high.
In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems, particularly
concerning foreign investment and the status of assets acquired during the Castro era. Obviously, Cuban
nationals, Cuban-Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of
the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation. (Property Rights in the PostCastro Cuban Constitution, Oscar M. Garibaldi and John D. Kirby; Alternative Recommendations for
Dealing with Confiscated Properties in Post-Castro Cuba, Mátias F. Traviesco-Diáz.) The U.S. and other
countries whose citizens' assets were seized without compensation are likely to support such demands.
Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. The
Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples vividly illustrate the complexities, delays, and uncertainties
accompanying the reclamation process. (What Can Countries Embarking on Post-Socialist
Transformation Learn from the Experiences So Far?, János Kornai).
Cuba's severely damaged infrastructure is in major need of rebuilding. The outdated electric grid
cannot supply the needs of consumers and industry. Transportation is inadequate. Communication
facilities are obsolete, and sanitary and medical facilitates have deteriorated so badly that contagious
diseases constitute a real menace to the population. In addition, environmental concerns such as the
pollution of bays and rivers require immediate intervention. (Environmental Concerns for a Cuba in
Transition, Eudel Eduardo Cepero.)
The plan won’t increase commercial investment – lack of a viable labor force or a
consumer market
Perales et al., 10- senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. (Jose Raul, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic
Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson Center Latin American Program, August 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//TL
Regardless of the U.S. government’s actions, a post-embargo, post-Castro Cuba does not
necessarily imply a business bonanza for U.S. companies, added Professor José Azel of the University of
Miami’s Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies. Conventional wisdom holds that U.S.
companies will rush in to invest in the island if and when the legal and political circumstances allow
them. However, given Cuba’s difficult economic situation, the international community needs to
significantly lower its expectations regarding U.S. foreign direct investment in Cuba. Azel predicted that
U.S. exports to Cuba will surge following a (hopefully) peaceful regime transition on the island;
however, exports will not lead to the technological transfers, expertise, and capital requirements that
the country will desperately need to grow its economy. The United States will obviously want to invest
in a post-Castro Cuba; but it is companies, not countries , that make investments.
To support his view, Azel explained the three principal reasons that companies engage in
foreign direct investment. First, companies are resource seeking; they invest to secure country-specific
resources available only within that market. Oil, nickel, and tourism are examples of such resources in
Cuba. These have and will continue to attract a certain level of foreign direct investment, argued Azel,
regardless of who is in power or the country’s market friendliness. Second, companies are efficiency
seeking; they invest to make efficiency gains. Companies engage in foreign direct investment for this
reason because they are looking to take advantage of lower labor costs or of a privileged distribution
location. However, Cuba lacks an ideal labor force in comparison to that of its neighbors. After more
than half a century under a totalitarian regime and a centrally planned command economy, Cuba’s
labor force has not been able to develop the kind of efficiencies needed to attract foreign direct
investment. Finally, companies are market seeking; they invest to establish a foothold in a new market
that is deemed strategic or dense. However, while the island nation has more than eleven million
citizens, its impoverishment means that its market has few effective consumers. A far more rational
strategy to supply a market exhibiting these conditions would be to manufacture finished goods
elsewhere and export them to Cuba.
Compensation disputes block all US foreign investment
Perales et al., 10- senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. (Jose Raul, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic
Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson Center Latin American Program, August 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//TL
The legal ramifications of doing business with Cuban firms can hamper a deepening of the U.S.Cuban economic relationship, not to mention all forms of foreign direct investment , warned Ignacio
Sánchez, a partner at DLA Piper. Since the vast majority of the island’s current businesses were formed
as the result of uncompensated confiscation following the Cuban Revolution, the victims of
expropriation—most of whom are now U.S. citizens—must be compensated before any advances in
U.S. investment in the island. Failure to do so while investing in Cuban firms will result in adverse legal
rulings; since World War II the legal concept of no confiscation without compensation has prevailed
throughout the world. Sánchez explained that although Cuba may not recognize these claims, the U.S.
government does and this can result in protracted litigation, especially against any foreign entities
involved with the confiscated properties. Such legal ramifications do not only stem from foreign direct
investment. If and when Cuban firms start exporting goods to the United States, the same issues will
arise. For instance, where will proceeds of Cuban rum sales go, to Cuban rum firms or to the Bacardi or
Arechabala families? The same goes for cigars and sugar. There are 5,911 U.S. citizens with claims
totaling USD $1.8 billion (in 1960 dollars) resulting from property that was confiscated from them in
1960; it would be an understatement to say that the value of these claims has increased significantly in
the ensuing 50 years. In Sánchez’s view, any discussion of post-transition Cuba needs to address these
issues.
The regime will strangle any new investment possibilities
Suchlicki, 7-Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the
University of Miami (Jaime, “Implications of Lifting the U.S. Embargo and Travel Ban of Cuba”, Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 12/11/07,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/website_documents/SenateTestimony.pdf)//TL
Investments
• Cuba has promoted investments in tourism as its highest priority and only recently has begun to
promote investments in other sectors. Cuba has not permitted greater individual freedom in economic
matters. Unlike China, Cuba has not legalized private agriculture or manufacturing.
• Investments are directed and approved by the Cuban government. They would be limited, however,
given the lack of an extensive internal market, the uncertainties surroundings the long-term risk to
foreign investment, an uncertain political situation; and the opportunities provided by other markets in
Latin America and elsewhere.
• The Cuban constitution still outlaws foreign ownership of most properties and forbids any Cubans
from participating in joint ventures with foreigners.
• It is illegal for foreign companies to hire Cuban workers directly. Foreign employers must pay the
wages owed to their employees directly to the Cuban government in hard currency. The Cuban
government then pays out to the Cuban workers in Cuban pesos, which are worth a fraction of the hard
currency.
• All arbitration most take place in the corrupt and arbitrary government offices or in the government
controlled judiciary, where little protection is given to the investor.
• Foreign investors must also confront political uncertainties that do not exist in many other countries.
They must contend with the possibility of the regime’s reversing its policies, the legal questions
surrounding previously confiscated properties, and potential sanctions against foreign investors that
cooperated with the Castro government in the event that an anti-Castro government eventually comes
to power.
• Opposition to market reforms will limit the extent to which the private sector emerges and functions
effectively, and thereby will slow, if not prevent, attaining a measurable degree of economic recovery.
The Castro brothers fear the likely erosion of political power that accompanies the restructuring of the
economy along free market rules. Adoption of market reforms may well represent a solution to the
economic crisis, but a full-blown reform process carries with it the risk of loss of control over society, as
well as the economy, and threatens to alienate some of the regime’s key constituencies.
The Cuban military will block any genuine economic or political reform
Suchlicki, 12- Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at
the University of Miami (Jaime, “Getting Ready for Life after Castro”, 5/11/12,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/11/getting_ready_for_life_after_castro?page=full)//TL
Economic and legal problems are not, however, the only challenges facing Cuba in the future. A major
problem that will confront post-Castro Cuba is the power of the military. (The Cuban Military and
Transition Dynamics, Brian Latell.) Cuba has a strong tradition of militarism, but in recent years, the
military as an institution has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable future scenario,
the military will continue to be a decisive player. Like Nicaragua, Cuba may develop a limited
democratic system in which Cubans are allowed to elect civilian leaders, but with the military
exercising real power and remaining the final arbiter of the political process.
An immediate and significant reduction of the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible. A
powerful and proud institution, the military would see any attempt to undermine its authority as an
unacceptable intrusion into its affairs and as a threat to its existence . Its control of key economic
sectors under the Castro regime will make it difficult to dislodge it from these activities and to limit its
role strictly to external security. Cutting the armed forces will also be problematic. The civilian economy
may not be able to absorb large numbers of discharged soldiers quickly, especially if the government
cannot come up with viable programs for retraining them.
Laundry list of alt causes to economic collapse
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
There are game-changing events outside of Cuba’s control that can negatively affect the future
success of the reforms. Cuba’s economic reforms cannot insulate the island from hurricanes, global
fluctuations in food prices, nickel prices, and tourism flows, or the risk that Venezuela’s voters or their
president’s poor health will sever the lifeline of petroleum that flows from Caracas to Havana.
--XT Reforms fail / structure
Doesn’t solve econ – current Cuban economic model prohibits FDI
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
Despite these advances, the Cuban economy remains in the doldrums (as described in Section 1) . The
main constraint slowing the Cuban economy is not U.S. sanctions (even as they have hit hard). Rather,
it is Cuba’s own outdated economic model, inherited from the Soviet Union, of central planning .
Cuba’s many commercial partners would like to invest more in Cuba and would prefer to purchase
more Cuban exports to correct the imbalances in their bilateral trade accounts, but are frustrated by
Cuba’s scant economic offerings.
Reforms now fail and economic collapse is inevitable – they are still too socialist
Ravsberg, 13 – BBC correspondent for Cuba (Fernando, “Cuba’s Economic System: Reform or
Change?”, June 20, 2013, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95012#sthash.Ev4eCAh6.dpuf)//eek
HAVANA TIMES — Marino Murillo, Vice-Chairman of Cuba’s Council of Ministers and architect of the
island’s recent economic reforms, has urged the country to aim for growth by eliminating “all of the
obstacles that the current economic model places in the way of the development of the productive
forces.”
The problem is that the greatest obstacle could be the model itself, which is based on relations of
production that hinder the country’s economic development, slow down changes, interfere with
reforms and bring about discontent among the population.
By implementing this socialist model, which dates back to Stalin’s time, Cuba obtained the same results
seen in all other countries which copied it: agricultural production crises, industrial stagnation,
shortages and a disaffected citizenry.
Murillo invoked socialism’s theoretical forefathers, who said that the new, socialist society would need
to nationalize only the “fundamental means of production”, a prescription that wasn’t exactly followed
by a model which placed even junk food stands in State hands.
To be at all effective, every economic change essayed in the country today, no matter how small,
invariably demands a whole series of subsequent reforms. And it is precisely there where the model,
and its defenders, prevent the reform from becoming effective or yielding its best results.
Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s
model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle
without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the
entire pattern.
Though the Cuban government’s official discourse itself is calling for a “rejuvenation” of the country’s
model, the fact of the matter is that it will be next to impossible to fit a new piece into this jigsaw puzzle
without altering the pieces around it, without producing a domino-effect that will ultimately change the
entire pattern.
The government runs into these obstacles every time it attempts to move one of the pieces of the
puzzle. When it decided to hand over State-controlled lands to the peasants, officials invoked Cuba’s
“current legislation” to forbid farmers to set up their homes in farm areas.
Such absurd restrictions discouraged many and pushed others to quit the food production sector
altogether and devote themselves to securing construction materials illegally, so as to be able to build a
home elsewhere, far from prying looks.
Massive and hugely inefficient, the agricultural sector may well be the very paradigm of bureaucratic
mismanagement, but it is far from being its only expression in the country. Cuba’s import system is a
true bureaucratic gem, in which producers are those with the least say in official decisions.
A Cuban factory wishing to import a piece of equipment from abroad is required to approach the
importing company assigned to it by the State. Technically speaking, this “importer” does not actually
import anything – it merely puts out a bid among foreign companies with offices in Cuba.
Employees from these companies are the ones who travel to the manufacturing country, purchase the
equipment and bring it back to Cuba. Under the country’s current model, the manager of a Cuban
factory is expressly forbidden from contacting the foreign export company directly.
Thus, the person who makes the order is an office clerk who knows little or nothing about what the
company needs and who, in the best of scenarios, will opt for the cheapest piece of equipment
available, something which often leads to serious production problems later.
The status quo relations of production continue to find support in Cuba, from the defenders of “Real
Socialism.” Ironically, or not surprisingly, most of them are isolated from the reality of this socialist
system, enjoying government perks that compensate for the “small inconveniences” of everyday life.
In the worst cases, these “intermediating State importers” are bribed by foreign companies so that
they will purchase obsolete or poor-quality equipment. In recent weeks, Cuban courts tried hundreds of
State employees implicated in these types of “deals”.
These are the “relations of production” which keep equipment in Cuban factories paralyzed for
months, waiting for the needed spare parts, while State importers take all the time in the world to
decide what to purchase.
Current reforms fail – delays and corruption
BBC 11 (Sarah, “Cuba's Raul Castro admits mass lay-offs behind schedule”, 1 March 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12606044)//eek
Cuba's plans to lay off half a million state workers by the end of March are behind schedule, President
Raul Castro has acknowledged.
Mr Castro, quoted by state television, said the timetable for the cuts would be altered to soften their
impact.
The redundancies form part of plans to revive Cuba's struggling economy, an issue due to be discussed
at a rare Communist Party Congress in April.
The Cuban government currently employs about 85% of the official workforce.
President Castro, addressing a joint meeting of his cabinet and the Council of State, said given the layoffs were behind schedule, the timeline would be adjusted, state television reported.
"A job of this magnitude which will affect so many citizens in one way or another cannot be marked by
inflexible timetables," the report quoted him as saying.
Privileges
President Castro did not give a new target date for the planned redundancies, saying only that the
overhaul of the economy would take at least five years.
He again insisted that the reforms would "leave nobody behind".
Last September, Mr Castro announced plans to lay off about a million state employees - about a fifth of
the workforce - with half the jobs going by 31 March.
This would have been just three weeks before the first congress of the ruling Communist Party in 14
years.
Thousands of committees have been set up across the island to decide which jobs to eliminate and
discuss the planned changes to the economy.
Thousands of Cubans have applied for licences to run their own businesses
According to state TV, the economy minister, Marino Murillo, said some seven million Cubans had taken
part in a total of nearly 130,000 such meetings.
But resistance among those supposed to implementing the cuts has clearly had an effect.
BBC Mundo's Cuba correspondent Fernando Ravsberg says a major weakness of the reforms is that
those supposed to be implementing them have most to lose in terms of economic interests and
privileges.
--XT – compensation disputes
The lack of property rights protection empirically prevents greater US commercial
investment
Perales et al., 10- senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. (Jose Raul, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic
Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson Center Latin American Program, August 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//TL
However, there are important pitfalls associated with deeper economic relations. In a April 29,
2010, hearing on H.R. 4645, the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act (designed to
remove obstacles to legal sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba—by eliminating the cashinadvance provision required for all such sales to Cuba—and to end travel restrictions on all Americans to
Cuba), Representative Kevin Brady (R-TX), the Republican ranking member on the House Ways and
Means Committee, outlined some of these drawbacks. Cuba’s economic climate is intolerant of U.S.
firms: there exists no accord on U.S. individual or corporate property claims . Indeed, in spite of the
Obama administration’s move to allow U.S. telecommunication firms to apply for licenses to conduct
business in Cuba, few such companies have rushed in . This is in no small part due to the important
challenges associated with policy unpredictability under the current Cuban regime, not to mention
significant questions arising from issues of human rights and labor relations. In spite of these
considerations, at the time of this publication, H.R. 4645 had been approved in the House Agriculture
Committee and awaited further consideration on the Foreign Affairs and Financial Services committees
before reaching the House floor.
Compensation is a prerequisite to greater relations
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
From the Revolution’s beginning, Castro’s attacks on U.S. economic interests have served his antiAmerican demagoguery and been central to the Revolution’s socialist pedigree. That early
nationalization of U.S. enterprises amounted to the theft of foreign direct investment (FDI) with a book
value of nearly $7 billion (in 2011 dollars).72 This does not even include the appropriation claims of
many Cuban exiles. While decades-long compensation claims will continue to pose a wicked problem
for future U.S.-Cuba reconciliations, it will present a most imposing challenge to any future GOC.
Though successive socialist regimes will be hard-pressed to come up with the assets or political will to
solve the quandary, the problem is not with successful precedence.73 In the other extreme, efforts by a
transitional democracy will also be stymied by exiles trying to return to recover appropriated
property. While significant economic improvements may be able to table the claims for some time,
compensations 23 issues will have to be resolved before any substantive U.S.–Cuban relations
normalization can take root.
--XT – Cuban military
Any threat to the revolution causes the military to seize power – stops a transition
Huddleston, 8 – Visiting Foreign Policy Fellow at Brookings (Vicki, “Cuba Embargo's Usefulness Has
Run Its Course”, March 10, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/03/10-cubahuddleston)//eek
Raúl's job at 76 is to prepare for a transition to one of the loyal elite, such as Vice President Carlos Lage,
Foreign Minister Felipe Roque, National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcón or even a lesser known
such as the glamorous former head of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington D.C., Fernando
Ramírez Estenoz.
If all goes well, Raúl will establish his legitimacy by carrying out modest reforms that put more food on
the table, provide better housing and allow a bit more personal freedom. Having waited so long for
improved living conditions, Raúl may not have to do very much to boost his dour image and popularity.
But if the revolution at any time appears to be in jeopardy, the older, harder, fighting men -- including
First Vice President José Ramón Machado Ventura, Gen. Julio Casas Regueiro, who replaced Raúl as
minister of defense, and Minister of Interior Abelardo Colomé Ibarra -- will bring the full force of the
institutions they command to ensure their own survival and that of the Cuban state.
The Cuban military will retain control in any transition – it controls 60% of the
economy and will resist reform
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
The FAR is the most important institution of the regime, first even to the Communist Party, and
intertwined with it in the upper echelons. Economic projects controlled by the military present
(upwards of 60 percent) of the Cuban economy in select fields. Their existence presents a new form of
the war for royalties and a definite form of corruption. It is also one of the most organized ways to
preserve the control of the Communist Party in the event of change. Those economic structures play an
important part of the clandestine organization that the party is supposed to adopt in the event of
losing political power partially or completely.38
Even if the military does not preserve power directly in the form of a junta or another despot, but
simply power shares with the Communist party, “under any conceivable scenario, the military will
continue to be a key, decisive player.”39 As a result, it would be a mistake to underestimate the
survivability of Cuba’s governing institutions. The EU Foreign Affairs Chief has concurred with this same
judgment when he warned that those institutions are more comparable to stronger China or Vietnam
models than they are to the weaker Central and Eastern European socialist ones. 40
When looking at international analogs for Cuba, another European military-first variation which could
evolve towards democratization is a “Turkish solution.” In that rendition “there is a likely short-term
solution predicated on military dominance that admits a strong place in the sun for a civilian sector in
organization, administration, and law.” 41
Within the same hemisphere, there have been examples of authoritarian Latin American militaries
which maintained absolute power but successfully placed technocrats in charge of major aspects of the
country, including the economy. A prime and perhaps palatable example was Pinochet’s coupe d’etat,
subsequent junta rule and eventually democratic handoff of power. 4214 It may be a fool’s hope to see
Cuba without an authoritarian government in the immediate future. Certainly the governing institution
are hardened and poised to prevent the missteps that precipitated European communism’s
implosions.43 And yet, this most likely post-Raúl outcome offers several opportunities. With the final
elimination of both Castros from the equation, it automatically opens a sizeable political space in U.S.
policy that has been prohibited by anti-Castro legislation and regulations. 44 From a Homeland Defense
perspective, the nominal capabilities of Cuba’s FAR will continue to pose no significant threat to America
into the foreseeable future. But most of all, the intransigence of U.S. domestic policy towards the
Castros’ Cuba could finally be denied of the myopia that has perpetuated ineffective policies for more
than a half century. All told, this possible future offers a likelihood of marginally encouraging
implications for U.S. national security implications.
--XT – alt causes
Alt cause to Cuban economic decline – demographics
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
Cuba’s demographic crunch only adds to the urgency. Advances in health care that have increased
longevity and the number of elderly Cubans, along with emigration spurred by disillusion among the
young, have left the country with population conditions similar to those in developed countries. People
over 60 years old accounted for over 17% of the population in 2010. As that number could reach 22% by
2020, the state will be ever more burdened with high bills for health care, housing, pensions, and
other services for retirees.22 Yet the diminishing percentage of working age citizens poses challenges
for increasing production and generating government income to pay for them.
Laundry list of alt causes to economic decline – that outweigh the aff
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
Today, the principal peril that Cuba faces comes not from the United States’ ineffective threat but
from its own crushing economic realities. The country’s government is struggling with both
demographic burdens and pressures from global creditors. It cannot ignore either. Cuba’s nearly
intractable problems stem from the limited ways in which its economy produces wealth, its heavy
reliance on imports to feed its population, growing domestic economic inequality, and the lack of
opportunities for citizens to productively use knowledge acquired through advanced education.
Alt cause to economic collapse – Venezuelan dependence
Messa-Lago, 13 – Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of
Pittsburgh (Carmelo, “The possible impact of the death of Chavez in the Cuban economy”, 12/03/2013,
http://www.cubaencuentro.com/cuba/articulos/el-posible-impacto-de-la-muerte-de-chavez-en-laeconomia-cubana-283444, translated from Spanish by Google Translate)//eek
Since Hugo Chavez took power in 1999, and particularly since 2001, Venezuela has provided financial
assistance to Cuba vital and growing, the death of that raises the question of whether this aid will
continue, diminish or end, and what the possible impact on the Cuban economy in the last two cases.
In 2005-2011 (no figures yet for 2012), the Cuban foreign trade goods Scale-concentrated with
Venezuela. The trade (exports plus imports) reached a record $ 8,325 million in 2011, more than four
times the exchange of 2005, primarily due to higher oil prices. Venezuelan participation in Cuban total
trade jumped from 23% to 42% between 2006 and 2011, followed by Japan with only 10%. In 2011 the
deficit in goods with Venezuela was $ 3,470 million (because Cuba exported and imported little much,
especially oil) and increased from 27% to 44% of the total deficit from $ 6.047 million Cuban. Cuba does
not report how you pay the deficit, but does so in part by a surplus in services. In 2010, the services
balance Cuban, excluding tourism, was $ 7,442 million, corresponding to the payment of Cuban
professionals abroad (doctors, nurses, teachers, sports coaches, security personnel), the great majority
stationed in Venezuela , and exceeded by more than $ 1,000 million deficit in goods.
The cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 2000 stated that Cuba will provide
professional services paid by Venezuela, in exchange for the supply of oil and its derivatives. The
current agreement runs from 2010-2020 and does not specify how to set prices for services Cubans,
according to ECLAC, the value of such services is indexed to oil prices. He estimated the value of the oil
imported from Venezuela in 2010 at $ 2.759 million and the value of professional services Cubans at $
5.432 million, resulting in a surplus of $ 2,673 million in favor of Cuba, which can be used to cover the
deficit merchandise trade with Venezuela.
There are conflicting figures on the number of Cuban professionals in Venezuela. If we take the most
quoted of 40,000 professionals in 2010 and the value of the services estimated at $ 5.432 million, would
result in an average of $ 135,800 annually by professional, 27 times the average salary of a Venezuelan
doctor and several times that of a nurse or a teacher. So Venezuela provides a subsidy to Cuba and
this could not easily export their professionals to other countries because they would pay market
prices without subsidies.
Venezuela supplies Cuba with 105,000 barrels of crude oil and derivatives, 92,000 for consumption
(62% of total demand Cuban) and 13,000 for refining in Cienfuegos, allegedly paid with professional
services, but was that the value of these is 2, 5 times higher than that of oil. Cuba receives preferential
treatment for payment of imports of Venezuelan oil: half payable in 90 days and the other half in 25
years, with two grace period and an interest rate of just 1%, the funding increases as you move up the
price of oil, which protects Cuba against price swings. There are no reliable statistics on oil payment by
Cuba, the Yearbook Be í stico and not report the volume and price of all crude oil imported and
disaggregated by country. It has been estimated cumulative oil debt between $ 5,000 million in 20012009 (24% of total debt of PDVSA) and $ 13,800 million. Cuba oil exports part of the global market.
Between 2000 and 2011, were signed 370 investment projects between the two countries by an
estimated $ 11,000 million, including a doubling of capacity of the refinery in Cienfuegos, a plant for
liquefied gas pipeline of 320 kilometers, a refinery in Matanzas, and the expansion of existing Santiago
de Cuba. In addition, the Bank of Economic and Social Development of Venezuela gave $ 1,500 million
to finance Cuban projects in 2007-2010, 88% of the total outlay of the bank in the period. Also the
International Cooperation Fund granted Autonomous credits for $ 1.083 million Cuban companies,
including international airports in Havana and Varadero.
I estimate the value of trade in goods and services with Venezuela in 2010 at almost $ 13,000 million,
including trade in goods, the payment of professional services and direct investment, excluding oil debt
and other loans mentioned. The total accounted for between 20.8% and 22.5% of Cuban GDP in 2010,
based on two estimates of GDP. A comparison with the trade, subsidies, loans and investment to the
former Soviet Union is difficult because part was in rubles, part in pesos and dollar part but, in my
estimate, the total in 1989 was $ 12.715 million. Although this figure must be adjusted for inflation, it is
obvious that the relationship with Venezuela is as paramount as he had with the USSR and,
consequently, their dependency.
The Venezuelan economy has benefited enormously from the rising oil prices and the corresponding
government income: 2.5 times in 2000-2012 over the previous 13 years (oil sales contribute 90% of
Venezuela's exports and 50% of its tax revenues). Despite this, there has been a deterioration in
macroeconomic indicators, due to inadequate policies Chavez (ECLAC figures): 1) per capita GDP
slowed from 16% in 2004 to 3.7% in 2012, 2) inflation rose from 22% to 29% between 2007 and 2011
(the largest by far in the region) 3) tax e1déficit increased from 1.2% of GDP in 2008 to 3.8% in 2012, 4)
the gross capital decreased from 28% of GDP in 2007 to 23% in 2012, 5) the capital account and
financial account was negative and deteriorated - $ 16,834 to - $ 20,241 million between 2009 and
2012, 6) gross international reserves fell 40% between 2008 and 2012 (from $ 43,127 to $ 25,864
million), 7) foreign direct investment turned from positive ($ 4,875 million) to negative (-759 000 000)
between 2010 and 2012, 8) capital flight in the last three years totaled $ 89,453 million and in 2012
was one of only two negative in the region, and 9) gross debt doubled between 2006 and 2012 and
exceeded $ 100,000 million.
The Venezuelan oil industry suffers growing problems that have caused a drop in production, exports,
profits and financial sustainability. Crude oil production fell from more than 3 to 2.5 million barrels per
day, due to lack of maintenance, the dismissal of 18,000 PDVSA employees (half of its technical staff)
and the lack of investment. PDVSA had to invest $ 13,300 million in 2010 but did not for lack of
resources, and in 2008 suspended payments to its contractors and suppliers incurring a debt of $ 7,000
million in 2009, according to the Central Bank did not pay the taxes due. The electricity crisis generates
frequent blackouts that affect production and population. In 2012 came to a close one of the ten
largest refineries in the world in the Virgin Islands, which PDVSA supplied half of its production, due to a
loss of $ 1,300 million from 2009. The heavy Venezuelan crude is difficult to process in global refineries
designed to process light crude and therefore has expanded Venezuela Cuban refineries.
On the social front Chavez redistributive policies decreased income inequality, which was very high,
while social programs reduced the incidence of poverty among the population from 48.6% in 2002 to
27.6% in 2008, without But poverty increased to 29.5% in 2011, similar to the regional average, and
Venezuela fie the only country in which poverty rose between 2008 and 2011. Open unemployment
rose from 7% to 8% between 2008 and 2012 (versus an average of 6% in the region) at par with the
average real wage has deteriorated by 8 percentage points (ECLAC figures). The huge increase in
inflation has reduced the purchasing power of lower income groups, health programs have
deteriorated, and the "misery index", estimated by The Economist in 2012, combining inflation and
unemployment stood Venezuela the second worst among 92 countries.
The government fixing ceilings on food prices has caused widespread shortages, black market growth
and escalating inflation, exacerbated by the expansion in the monetary issue. Total public expenditure
grew at 33% of GDP in 2008 and more than half of it was allocated to social spending. To avoid
hyperinflation and face the sharp cut in tax revenue, the government imposed a setting: reduced the
budget, increased VAT, expanded external indebtedness, cut in half currency and credit card
expenditures outbound travelers, decreased services expenditures and PDVSA, as well as senior civil
servants salaries. Chavez promised not to cut social spending or devalue the bolivar to new trading at
2.14 to the dollar, but in early 2010 it devalued and this year the Vice-President Maduro executed
another devaluation to third, but still the bolivar is traded on the black market well below the official
exchange rate. The devaluations cheapen exports, imports more expensive and generate more
revenue for the government but reduce the purchasing power of the population.
Trade, subsidies, oil, investment and credit Venezuelans are vital to Cuba and Chavez's death and
deterioration of the Venezuelan economy represent serious risks. If Maduro wins the election, face a
tricky decision between three objectives: to reinvest in the oil industry to increase production and
strengthen the economy, maintain expensive social programs that give political support and generosity
continue the level of aid to Cuba it is a powerful ally. It is impossible to get three goals and one must be
sacrificed.
Cuba is economically dependent on Venezuela – empirics, oil, and medical experts
LeoGrande, 13 – is a professor in the department of government at American University's School of
Public Affairs (William, “The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez”, 02 Apr 2013,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreign-policyafter-chavez)//eek
The Dangers of Dependency
Cuba has twice experienced the pain of ruptured economic relations with a dominant partner. In
1959, 68 percent of Cuban trade was with the United States. When Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower
and John F. Kennedy embargoed trade and investment, the island's economy was plunged into
recession. In 1964, the United States cajoled and coerced Latin America into adopting economic and
diplomatic sanctions as well. Every country but Mexico complied, severing diplomatic ties and joining
the embargo. Even Western European countries yielded, albeit reluctantly, to U.S. pressure to curtail
trade with Cuba. Only Soviet economic assistance enabled Castro's revolution to survive Washington's
concerted attempt at economic strangulation.
But the lifeline provided by the Soviet Union carried its own risks. The effectiveness of the U.S. embargo
forced Cuba into dependency on the Eastern Bloc as severe as its prerevolutionary dependency on the
United States. By the 1980s, more than 80 percent of Cuban trade was with the Soviet Union and its
Eastern European satellites. The collapse of European communism in 1989 dealt a crushing blow to the
Cuban economy. Economic assistance of some $3 billion annually disappeared overnight. Cuba's GDP
dropped 35 percent and its capacity to import fell by 75 percent. People went hungry. This era of
adversity, known as the "Special Period," lasted a decade, and production in some sectors has yet to
recover to 1989 levels. The lesson learned by Cuba's leaders was never again to allow the economy to
become so dependent on a single partner. This, however, proved easier said than done.
In the 1990s, Cuba had no choice but to reorient its international economic relations toward the West,
especially Latin America and the European Union. The Cuban economy shifted from a reliance on sugar
to tourism, with most visitors coming from Canada, Spain and Italy. Trade became diversified across a
wide variety of countries. Among Cuba's 10 largest trade partners in 2011, according to official statistics,
only Venezuela accounted for more than 10 percent of Cuba's total trade in goods. Trade with China,
for instance, was just 10 percent. Venezuela's share was 41 percent, however -- far less than the United
States in 1959 or the Soviet Union in 1989, but more than Cuban economists are comfortable with. The
fact that trade with Venezuela is subsidized makes Cuba's vulnerability more acute.
Chávez's friendship with Fidel Castro began when Castro invited him to visit Cuba just after Chávez’s
1994 release from prison, where he had served time for a 1992 coup attempt. Their personal
relationship grew close over the years, with Chávez openly seeking Castro's advice and acknowledging
the aging Cuban leader as his ideological mentor. "I admire many things about Fidel," Chávez told the
Washington Post in 2005. "For me, he is an exemplary friend, filled with a lot of solidarity." When
Chávez died, Castro lamented, "We have lost our best friend."
Like Fidel, Chávez had political ambitions that extended abroad. His "Bolivarian Alliance" imagined a
Latin America integrated economically and free at last from U.S. domination. Until his death in March,
Chávez used Venezuela's oil wealth as a diplomatic tool to advance this international vision. No
neighbor benefited more than Cuba. Economic cooperation between Venezuela and Cuba dates to
2000, when the two signed their first economic cooperation agreement, and the relationship has been
expanding ever since. Although the financial benefit to Cuba is difficult to quantify precisely, no one
doubts it is substantial and critical to Cuba's economic stability. Cuba, like a number of other countries
in the Caribbean Basin, pays for Venezuelan oil at discounted prices and is able to finance part of the
cost with long-term, low-interest loans. The rest of the cost is offset by Cuban professionals serving in
Venezuela.
The Cuban economy is entirely dependent on Venezuela for a laundry list of reasons –
any cut off or collapse of Venezuela destroys the Cuban economy
Merco Press, 12 – South Atlantic News agency (“Fearing a collapse of their economy, Cubans
overwhelmingly would vote for Chavez”, October 4th 2012,
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/10/04/fearing-a-collapse-of-their-economy-cubans-overwhelminglywould-vote-for-chavez)//eek
Venezuela in a decade became the main political ally and economic and trade partner of the island
ruled by the Castro family, which was going through one of its worst moments following the downfall of
the Soviet empire in 1991.
Even when all the Cuban media, (under government control) anticipate a ballot victory for Chavez as
inevitable, many fear that in the event of a defeat the country could be forced again to a similar crisis
period as suffered with the disintegration of the USSR.
“The moribund Cuban economy is holding together because of Venezuelan aid; if the umbilical chord
is cut off, this would be a disaster” said dissident economist and former political prisoner Oscar
Espinosa Chepe.
“The Cuban population to a great percentage is concerned about this”, added Espinosa Chepe in
reference to a possible victory of Capriles that has promised to cut all foreign aid and concentrate in
supporting Venezuela’s millions of needy.
With the support from Chavez, Cuba again has access to oil under preferential terms. Venezuela
supplies Havana with 100.00 bpd of oil under soft payment conditions, said Jorge Piñon, from the
University of Miami Centre for Hemispheric Policy.
“Cuba currently consumers 147.000 bpd of oil and home production is 50.000 bpd which means the
100.000 bpd deficit is supplied by Venezuela”, pointed out Piñón. The bilateral trade balance reached
6 billion dollars in 2010 with Venezuelan sales totalling 4.3bn and Cuba’s 1.7bn.
The two countries also retain an active cooperation which this year involved 47 projects valued at
1.6bn dollars in education, farming, health and sports, plus having several bi-national corporations.
Cuba also benefited from sending almost 40.000 professionals to Venezuela, mostly doctors to work in
the poor urban and rural neighbourhoods and to advise different sectors and offices of the Venezuelan
bureaucracy.
This services supply is precisely Cuba’s main source of income and provides annually, on a global basis,
6bn dollars, above tourism with 2bn and nickel exports of 1.1bn according to the official stats.
AT: Cuban economy impact
Any Cuban economic decline will be mitigated – remittances, tourism, oil, and
diversification
Messa-Lago, 13 – Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of
Pittsburgh (Carmelo, “The possible impact of the death of Chavez in the Cuban economy”, 12/03/2013,
http://www.cubaencuentro.com/cuba/articulos/el-posible-impacto-de-la-muerte-de-chavez-en-laeconomia-cubana-283444, translated from Spanish by Google Translate)//eek
If substantially reduce or end Venezuelan aid (equivalent to more than a fifth of the Cuban GDP), the
economic crisis in Cuba would be very strong but somewhat lower than the crisis of the 90s for several
reasons: an income of $ 2,800 million for the foreign tourists was meager in 1990 foreign remittances
which amount is not true but it is estimated between $ 2,000 and $ 3,000, which were much lower in
1990; 350,000 Cuban-Americans visiting the island each year and spend substantial resources; Cuba
also produces more oil than in 1990 but still relies on 62% of imports, and finally there is now a more
diversified trade partners in 1990 (42% versus 65% Venezuela with the USSR). Even with these
palliatives, the blow would be powerful and Cubans would suffer another crisis similar to the Special
Period. Raul Castro has sought alternative sources of trade and investment with other countries but
not yet achieved substantial results.
US-Cuban relations answers
U.S.-Cuban relations 1nc
Cuba will crack down and tank relations in response
Cave, 12 – NYT correspondent (Damien, “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S.
Embargo”, November 19, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cubacreate-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//eek
Any easing would be a gamble. Free enterprise may not necessarily lead to the embargo’s goal of free
elections, especially because Cuba has said it wants to replicate the paths of Vietnam and China,
where the loosening of economic restrictions has not led to political change. Indeed, Cuban officials
have become adept at using previous American efforts to soften the embargo to their advantage,
taking a cut of dollars converted into pesos and marking up the prices at state-owned stores.
And Cuba has a long history of tossing ice on warming relations. The latest example is the jailing of
Alan Gross, a State Department contractor who has spent nearly three years behind bars for distributing
satellite telephone equipment to Jewish groups in Havana.
Too many alt causes to relations
Hanson 9 - associate director and coordinating editor for the website of the Council on Foreign
Relations (Stephanie, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, 4-14, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03412.pdf)// ID
What is the main irritant in U.S.-Cuban relations?
A fundamental incompatibility of political views, experts say. While experts say the United States
wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power
at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban
Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the
region.
What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?
Experts say the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations include the following:
• Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and
journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with
the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent
years resorted to other tactics--such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street--besides
prison to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's
human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.
• Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought
prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on
the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained without recourse to
trial--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Obama has
ordered a review of U.S. policy on Guanatanamo Bay.
• Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida has traditionally
strongly influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating what is seen as a
strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections. Though the Bush admi
nistration's tightened travel restrictions upset many Cuban-Americans, hard-line Cuban exiles still lobby
for regime change.
--XT – alt causes
Multiple alt causes to relations – human rights, Cubans in Miami, expropriated
property, damages by the embargo, and Guantanamo Bay
Pascual et. Al. 9 – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki
Huddleston, Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark
Falcoff, Damian Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William
LeoGrande, Marifeli Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas,
“CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
President Obama has stated that full normalization of relations will depend on improved human rights
and progress toward democracy in Cuba. A truly successful and mutually beneficial relationship
between our countries will also be determined by the degree of reconciliation between Cubans in
exile and Cubans on the island. Concerns about illegal acts and human rights abuses on both sides
must be reviewed and solutions must be found. This is also true in the case of expropriated property,
made more complex by Cuban claims of damages for injuries allegedly caused by the embargo. leaving
these issues unresolved would not only stunt trade and investment, it would deprive the Cuban people
of fully utilizing their talents and improving their lives. resolution of claims for expropriated property, as
well as the restoration of Cuban sovereignty over the territory of Guantanamo Bay, is essential to a
prosperous and democratic Cuba and to the achievement of a healthy and normal relationship
between our two countries.
Alt cause to relations – Gross, USAID, and the Cuban 5
WHITEFIELD and TAMAYO, 13 – Writers for the Miami Herald (Mimi and Juan, “Deep freeze in USCuba relations could be thawing”, June 18, 2013,
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2013/06/18/3058438/deep-freeze-in-us-cuba-relations.html)//eek
But the arrest of Gross in December 2009 and his subsequent conviction froze any further opening
toward Cuba, although the Obama administration further tweaked travel restrictions in 2011 by reviving
and expanding people-to-people cultural trips to Cuba for Americans.
Although the U.S. government has pressed for the release of Gross, Havana has seemed more
interested in a swap for the release of five Cubans convicted more than 10 years ago of spying on antiCastro groups in Miami and military installations. Federal prosecutors contended the men's spying led to
the shoot-down of two Brothers to the Rescue planes, killing four members of the exile group in 1996.
The Cuban government, meanwhile, considers USAID pro-democracy programs to be subversive.
Cuban observers say the stalemate over Gross has been an obstacle to any further opening with Cuba
despite recent Havana's recent travel and economic reforms.
Relations high
Mail and migration talks now
WHITEFIELD and TAMAYO, 13 – Writers for the Miami Herald (Mimi and Juan, “Deep freeze in USCuba relations could be thawing”, June 18, 2013,
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2013/06/18/3058438/deep-freeze-in-us-cuba-relations.html)//eek
There have been signs on two fronts this week that the Obama administration is willing to work toward
warmer relations with Cuba that have been all but frozen since Havana jailed a U.S. government
subcontractor in 2009.
Two days of talks between U.S. and Cuban officials on resuming direct mail to Cuba - a service that has
been cut off for five decades - began Tuesday in Washington, and, perhaps more significantly, sources
said that U.S. and Cuban officials plan to resume migration talks in July.
Migration between the long-hostile countries has come under closer scrutiny since Havana eased its
restrictions on travel abroad on Jan. 14, raising the prospects that many more Cubans will leave the
island and head to the United States, legally or illegally. Cubans are no longer required to obtain an exit
visa or a mandatory invitation letter from a foreign host to leave the island.
But because Cubans still need an entry visa to visit the United States, some analysts say migratory
patterns could change as Cubans travel to countries that don't require visas and then use them as a
hopping-off point to enter the United States.
The migration talks will start July 17 in Washington between State Department and Cuban Foreign
Ministry officials, knowledgeable sources told El Nuevo Herald on Tuesday.
Although the resumption of the migration and mail talks are not especially significant by themselves,
they signal an effort by the Obama administration to improve its relations with Havana and provide a
setting for quiet discussions on other issues.
U.S.-Cuban relations high now – bilateral talks, prisoners, reform, and American
officials
Haven, 13 – Reporter for the Associated Press (Paul, “Cuba, US try talking, but face many obstacles ”,
Miami Herald, 6-21-13, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/21/v-fullstory/3462855/cuba-us-trytalking-but-face-many.html)//eek
HAVANA -- They've hardly become allies, but Cuba and the U.S. have taken some baby steps toward
rapprochement in recent weeks that have people on this island and in Washington wondering if a
breakthrough in relations could be just over the horizon.
Skeptics caution that the Cold War enemies have been here many times before, only to fall back into old
recriminations. But there are signs that views might be shifting on both sides of the Florida Straits.
In the past week, the two countries have held talks on resuming direct mail service, and announced a
July 17 sit-down on migration issues. In May, a U.S. federal judge allowed a convicted Cuban
intelligence agent to return to the island. This month, Cuba informed the family of jailed U.S.
government subcontractor Alan Gross that it would let an American doctor examine him, though the
visit has apparently not yet happened. Castro has also ushered in a series of economic and social
changes, including making it easier for Cubans to travel off the island.
Under the radar, diplomats on both sides describe a sea change in the tone of their dealings.
Only last year, Cuban state television was broadcasting grainy footage of American diplomats meeting
with dissidents on Havana streets and publically accusing them of being CIA front-men. Today, U.S.
diplomats in Havana and Cuban Foreign Ministry officials have easy contact, even sharing home phone
numbers.
Josefina Vidal, Cuba's top diplomat for North American affairs, recently traveled to Washington and
met twice with State Department officials - a visit that came right before the announcements of
resumptions in the two sets of bilateral talks that had been suspended for more than two years.
Washington has also granted visas to prominent Cuban officials, including the daughter of Cuba's
president.
"These recent steps indicate a desire on both sides to try to move forward, but also a recognition on
both sides of just how difficult it is to make real progress," said Robert Pastor, a professor of
international relations at American University and former national security adviser on Latin America
during the Carter administration. "These are tiny, incremental gains, and the prospects of going
backwards are equally high."
Among the things that have changed, John Kerry has taken over as U.S. secretary of state after being
an outspoken critic of Washington's policy on Cuba while in the Senate. President Barack Obama no
longer has re-election concerns while dealing with the Cuban-American electorate in Florida, where
there are also indications of a warming attitude to negotiating with Cuba.
Cuban President Raul Castro, meanwhile, is striving to overhaul the island's Marxist economy with a
dose of limited free-market capitalism and may feel a need for more open relations with the U.S. While
direct American investment is still barred on the island, a rise in visits and money transfers by CubanAmericans since Obama relaxed restrictions has been a boon for Cuba's cash-starved economy. Under
the table, Cuban-Americans are also helping relatives on the island start private businesses and
refurbish homes bought under Castro's limited free-market reforms.
Several prominent Cuban dissidents have been allowed to travel recently due to Castro's changes. The
trips have been applauded by Washington, and also may have lessened Havana's worries about the
threat posed by dissidents.
Likewise, a U.S. federal judge's decision to allow Cuban spy Rene Gonzalez to return home was met
with only muted criticism inside the United States, perhaps emboldening U.S. diplomats to seek
further openings with Cuba.
Solvency / say no
Conditions 1nc - Say no
Conditions aren’t credible – Cuba thinks the US will move the goalposts
Piccone 2011-Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy The Brookings Institution
(Ted, “To Effect Change in Havana, Support the Cuban People”, South Florida Sun Sentinel, 1/31/11,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/01/31-cuba-piccone, brookings institute)//KW
President Obama has stepped gingerly into this dilemma, despite initial promises of "a new day" in U.S.Cuban relations. His April 2009 decision to expand travel and remittances for Cuban-Americans, restart
migration talks and loosen telecommunications regulations was the bare minimum down payment on
this vision of change. But shortly thereafter, Washington fell back into a tit-for-tat mode , allowing
Havana to dictate the terms of normalization. Even when positive steps were taken by the Castro
regime — the release of more than 50 political prisoners since July 2010, and major economic reforms
that should reduce the dependence of the Cuban people on the state — the White House moved the
goalposts , demanding more fundamental change as well as the release of a U.S. government paid
contractor arrested for providing technical support to the small Jewish community on the island.
They also fear economic opening
Colomer 2005- Research Professor in Political Science, Professor at the University of Barcelona
(Joseph M., “Who Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective”, 2004-2005, 14 Transnat'l
L. & Contemp. Probs. 163, heinonline)//KW
For the same reason, the worst possible outcome for Cuba would be the one produced by the opposite
pairs of choices, embargo-democracy, as seems unnecessary to discuss. Issues may appear regarding
Cuban rulers' second and third preferences. The free trade-democracy outcome would give Cuba the
benefits of an open economy, but would fatally undermine the present rulers' control-what they call
"independence" or "revolution." Actually, even under the present circumstances, and in spite of their
claims against the U.S. embargo, Cuban rulers are wary of allowing more foreign investment,
tourism, Cuban-Americans' direct cash remittances, and international communications (including the
Internet) because they could enable anti- Castro opinion and pressures among Cuban population.
It thus seems realistic to assume that the present Cuban rulers-in other words, Fidel Castro-value the
endurance of the revolutionary dictatorship more than the advantages of open trade and investment.
While Cuban rulers may dream of a "Chinese way," with foreign trade and investments permitting them
to maintain the dictatorship, they would rather maintain the dictatorship even at the cost of the
embargo than risk their own position with a democratic opening. Usual slogans, such as "Revolution
or death," clearly illustrate this position. A different ordering will be considered later, basically as a
hypothetical preference change induced on Cuban rulers by either the further effects of the embargo or
their weakened capability to maintain social control.
It spurs a nationalist rejection of the plan
Thale 8 – Program Director at the Washington Office on Latin America (Geoff, “Opting for
Engagement,” April 2008,
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Cuba/past/Opting%20for%20Engagement.pdf)//
SJF
Independence and national sovereignty have been consistent themes in Cuba’s foreign relations since
Fidel Castro came to power, and this is unlikely to change under Raul Castro. Foreign governments who signal their
acceptance of the political succession in Cuba will not be able to demand political or economic
change in Cuba as a condition for recognition . Nonetheless, at a time when the Cuban government is re-examining aspects
of its internal policies, other countries with relations with Cuba – from the centrist and center-left governments of Europe, to Chavez
and the government of Iran – will be in a position to urge the new Cuban leadership to move in one direction
or another. Countries like the United States, with no contact with the Cuban leadership and few contacts with
Cuban society, will have no influence.
As long as the United States continues to isolate the island, the new government will certainly continue
to capitalize on proembargo rhetoric in the exile community or any other bold actions by the U.S. that threaten Cuban
sovereignty, in order to unite Cubans in a nationalist rejection of interference in Cuban affairs.
Conditions deter business investment
Gorrell, 5 - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
(Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074
Fragmenting the policy process may do more harm than good. It does too little too late and causes
hard feelings among Cubans and American businesses. The carrot-stick diplomatic approach will not
make Castro yield. Such policy breeds inconsistency as it can vary from administration to
administration, as it has between the Clinton and Bush administrations. The rules constantly change
and thus have a ripple effect on American businesses and the quality of life of Americans, CubanAmericans and native Cubans.
Cuban trade has already declined to a trickle since the Bush administration sought to further squeeze
the Castro government. Prior to the Bush administration’s trade crack down, 2004 was emerging as a
record year for U.S. imports to Cuba. By the end of December 2004 U.S. suppliers and shippers were
projected to have earned some $450 million, a 20% increase over 2003 sales.35 Imposing restrictions, as
the Bush administration did in June 2004, perplexed American businesses with unpredicted problems.
These businesses make adjustments, as do Cuban- American citizens, then must abruptly alter their
business strategies because of a Congressional vote or an Executive order. This political tug-of-war
does not move the U.S. any closer to realizing its security objectives.
--XT – say no
Cuba empirically says no when things are conditioned
Pascual et. Al. – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki Huddleston,
Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark Falcoff, Damian
Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William LeoGrande, Marifeli
Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas, “CUBA: A New policy of
Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
The second basket of initiatives is distinct from the first because it moves beyond enhancing the ability
of Cubans to take a more proactive and informed part in their society and government. The initiatives in
the second basket seek to build a foundation for reconciliation by beginning a process of resolving
long-standing differences. A number of these initiatives could serve as incentives or rewards for
improved human rights, the release of political prisoners, and greater freedom of assembly, speech
and rights for opposition groups and labor unions. Initiatives that fall within this category include
allowing Cuba access to normal commercial instruments for the purchase of goods from the United
States.
None of the initiatives, however, should be publicly or privately tied to specific Cuban actions. As the
Cuban government is on record as rejecting any type of carrot-and-stick tactic, it would be
counterproductive to do so. rather, the United States should decide the actions that it wishes to take
and when to carry them out. Doing so will give the president maximum flexibility in determining how
and when to engage.
--AT: Raul is different
Raul might be open to dialogue but he doesn’t care very much about relations
Hanson and Lee, 13-Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, the website of the
Council on Foreign Relations. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic
and political development in Africa and Latin America. Lee is the Senior Production Editor of CFR.org
(Stephanie Hanson and Brianna Lee, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1/31/13,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)//TL
Raúl Castro has signaled he is willing to engage in dialogue with Washington. At the same time, says
CFR's Sweig, seeking normalized bilateral relations is clearly not a priority for the Cuban government,
which has moved to diversify its relationships in the region. "Cuba no longer seems to need to see the
relationship with the United States improve as rapidly as it might well have, for example, when the
Soviet Bloc collapsed and it lost its Soviet subsidy overnight," Sweig told CFR.org in a March 2009
interview. A 2009 Human Rights Watch report found that Cuba's judicial system remained oppressive,
saying, "Raúl Castro's government uses draconian laws and sham trials to incarcerate scores more
[political prisoners] who have dared to exercise their fundamental freedoms."
Unconditional 1nc – Say no
Cuba says no to US economic concessions – it fears political change
Margulies 2008- J.D. from New York University School of Law
(Michael, “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO:
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED
STATES-CUBA RELATIONS”, 2008, 8 Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L. 147, heinonline)//KW
When the TSRA provisions took effect on 25 February 2001, Cuba did not immediately jump at the
opportunity to purchase agricultural commodities from the United States. 25 It took nearly one year
and dire circumstances for the Castro regime to accept the U.S. offer.2 6 Following the disastrous effects
of Hurricane Michelle in November 2001 and the subsequent food supply shortages experienced by the
Cuban population, the Cuban government not only continued to reject the opportunity to import U.S.
food products, but more significantly it also turned down the U.S. offer of disaster assistance. 27 It was
not until later - by the end of 2001, when their food reserves had become fully depleted - that Cuba
finally seized the opportunity to purchase bulk agricultural commodities from the United States. 28 The
Cuban government had felt slighted by the fact that the entire embargo had not been repealed; rather
the U.S. government had only opened up a specific sector with significant restrictions.2 9
TSRA-authorized trade was a significant initial step, easing the trade restrictions and moving towards
opening trade, social and political relations. However, it was also a sign of the difficulties that will
surely be encountered in any enhanced relationship between the United States and Cuba. Cuba's
reluctance to immediately enter into such a relationship with the United States, once TSRA had been
passed, is a strong indication that there are not only economic factors at play in the limited trade
relations between the two nations, but a multitude of other factors. Any normalization of a U.S.-Cuban
trade relationship will be played out against an imposing political, historical and ideological backdrop.
Opening the door to the export of medical and agricultural commodities, while a step forward, was
accompanied by a number of daunting obstacles for those wishing to take advantage of TSRA. The
legislative and administrative requirements have presented a series of burdens and logistical setbacks
for interested U.S corporations, which have served as a prohibitive factor for some. Over the years, it
has become exceedingly difficult for firms to take advantage of the legislation and tap into the potential
benefits of trading with the Cuban state.
Removing sanctions won’t change the overall relationship – too many other issues
Hanson and Lee, 13-Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, the website of the
Council on Foreign Relations. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic
and political development in Africa and Latin America. Lee is the Senior Production Editor of CFR.org
(Stephanie Hanson and Brianna Lee, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1/31/13,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)//TL
What is the likelihood that the United States and Cuba will resume diplomatic relations?
Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precede
resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though
"you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration,
or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in
the near term.
Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll
back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of
normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated
congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large
appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapproachement--it is clear that the
policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.
What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations?
A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations,
experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of
the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at
Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin
American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who
have challenged U.S. policy in the region.
What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?
Experts say these issues include:
 Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents
and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of
conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human
Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the
government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from
state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human
Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to
the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.
 Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought
prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since
seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a
"symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama
ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January
2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period.
 Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has
heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting
bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.
Gradualism turn
1nc – status quo solves
Diaz-Canel solves the aff – he’s a pragmatic reformer and creates space to lift the
embargo in 2018
Dallas Morning News, 13 - editorial (“Editorial: U.S. should reconsider embargo when Castros’ reign
ends”, 2/28/13, http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130228-editorial-u.s.-shouldreconsider-embargo-when-castros-reign-ends.ece)//TL
For years, the accepted view was that the end of the Castro regime in Cuba would be volatile, perhaps
even explosive.
But on Sunday, Raul Castro, younger brother to Fidel and current leader of the country, announced
plans to cede power. The news was remarkable simply for being so unremarkable. No parades in Miami
or demonstrations in Havana. No violence. Just an announcement: In 2018, Raul would turn over the
reins of power.
Oh, and everyone after Castro would face term limits. Go figure.
After maintaining a stranglehold on Cuba for almost 60 years, the longest-running dictatorship in the
world will cease to exist. It isn’t happening at the point of a bayonet or from a popular uprising, but
rather because of time. When Raul steps down, Fidel will be approaching 92 and Raul 87.
The man the Castros have chosen as successor is newly appointed Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel.
Diaz-Canel is seen as an effective manager and a steady though unspectacular mover in Cuba’s
Communist Party. A career communist. Because of that, the speculation is that not much change will
occur.
But remember, the same was said of Mikhail Gorbachev when he took control of the Soviet Union.
In a country defined by The Revolution, the impact of having a leader who is from the post-Revolution
generation cannot be overstated. Diaz-Canel’s generation, which has grown up in the lean times of the
embargo era, is more pragmatic and open to change.
If the plan goes as scripted (past “successors,” after all, simply disappeared from the political scene after
being anointed), this could also be a great opportunity for the United States. The U.S.-led embargo of
Cuba, which was started the same year that Diaz-Canel was born, 1960, and tightened in 1962 by thenPresident John F. Kennedy, has been devastating. Cuban diplomats claim it has cost their country $1
trillion since 1962.
It has also been a black eye internationally for the U.S. In 2010, a Cuba-backed resolution asking for an
end to the embargo passed the United Nations, 185-2.
Once new leadership is in place , the U.S. should reconsider its position on the embargo.
Slow change key to Cuban reform - avoids rapid regime collapse
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
Gradualism: Gradualism in economic reform—as opposed to an Eastern European-style sudden regime
collapse—appears to be the most likely scenario that Cuba will follow. As a result of economic
reforms, albeit halting and partial, Cuba today is different from the Cuba of 1989 . In 2011, Cuba’s
current leadership, however aging and proud, promulgated reform guidelines that recognize the
imperative of change and that empower the pro-reform factions. Moreover, as suggested by successful
Asian experiences (Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, China), where political leadership provides stability
and continuity, gradualism can be a feasible—indeed it may well be the only realistic—option.
Gradualism must not, however, be an excuse for policy paralysis or a smoke-screen for maintenance of
the status quo.
Rapid change risks Cuban civil war
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
Some in the United States have long supported severe sanctions intended to starve the Cuban regime
of resources and thereby precipitate a political breakdown . Yet, within the national security
bureaucracy of the U .S . Executive Branch, notwithstanding occasional presidential rhetoric, there is a
strong preference for gradual, peaceful evolution in Cuba . A sudden breakdown, it is feared, would
entail substantial risks for U .S . interests, including an immigration crisis right off of our shores, and in
the worst case, irresistible pressures for intervention to quell a bloody civil war and halt a mass
exodus of refugees.
This turns every part of the aff
NAÍM, 1 – editor of Foreign Policy (MOISÉS, “When Countries go Crazy”, MARCH 1, 2001,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/03/01/when_countries_go_crazy)//eek
Some countries can drive other countries crazy. When people have this effect on one another, it is
because of imbalances in the brain’s neurotransmitters. With countries, it often happens because of the
disproportionate influence of special interests. Cuba, for example, has long driven the United States
crazy. Just think of the Bay of Pigs invasion or the outsourcing of Castro's assassination to the Mafia. For
more recent examples of irrational behavior, think of the Helms-Burton Law or Elián.
The problem is that Cuba not only drives the United States crazy but also seems to induce some acute
form of learning disability among U.S. politicians. Cuba makes them forget -- or unlearn -- everything the
world has painfully discovered about the transition from communism.
This knowledge can be distilled into five simple maxims: Lesson one: Failure is more common than
success in the transition to a democratic market economy. Lesson two: The less internationally
integrated, more centralized, and more personalized a former communist regime was, the more
traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Lesson three: Dismantling a communist state is far
easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Lesson four: The brutal, criminal ways of
a powerful Communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the
brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public
institutions. Lesson five: Introducing a market economy without a strong and effective state capable of
regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates.
It is therefore safe to assume that if the Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking
more like Albania than the Bahamas. But that is not the assumption on which U.S politicians base their
efforts to hasten Castro's demise. Although a lot of money, political capital, and thought have been
expended trying to overthrow the Cuban government, ideas about what to do the morning after are
scarce and often unrealistic. They usually hinge on the expectation that in the post-Castro era
democracy will emerge and Cuban-American exiles will lead other investors in transforming Cuba into a
capitalist hub.
More likely is that instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, the United States will get
a massive inflow of refugees escaping the chaos of a post-Castro regime. Frictions between CubanCubans and Miami-Cubans will make politics nasty and unstable. New investments and privatizations
will be mired in the legal mess produced by the 5,911 claims to property in Cuba (valued at more than
$17 billion) that have been filed with the United States Claims Commission by former property owners.
(That amounts to nearly seven years' worth of Cuban exports.) The Cuban public sector is inextricably
intertwined with the Communist Party, so the demise of the party will paralyze the government, at least
for a while. And the cost of any resulting humanitarian crisis will mainly be borne by U.S. taxpayers,
who will likely pay much more than the $2 billion spent containing the influx of Haitian refugees in 1994.
But can't the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund
support Cuba's transition with money, experts, and projects? Sure, except that the United States forbids
them from spending even a dollar to prepare themselves and Cuba for the coming transition. The result
is that these institutions are not ready to help Cuba. Again, the United States forgets a useful lesson
from another continent: The day after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands at the White House
in 1993, the World Bank -- ---which had been instructed to prepare for the event -- was immediately
ready to lend and invest in projects under the control of the Palestinian Authority, even though the
authority was not and still is not a member of the bank.
Allowing such an initiative in Cuba's case would cost U.S. taxpayers nothing and would help plan for the
challenges ahead. Also, training Cuban professionals to run a modern market economy is bound to be a
better investment for the United States than blocking academic exchanges with the island. The rational,
self-interested approach for the United States that also avoids much future human pain in Cuba is to
concentrate all efforts on ensuring as smooth a transition as possible.
This view, of course, is not shared by all. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms recently said that "the opponents of
the Cuban embargo are about to run into a brick wall on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.
President Bush is a committed supporter of the embargo."
The failure of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba to achieve its stated objectives over the last 40 years
is dismissed by Senator Helms and some Cuban-Americans who argue that the embargo has never been
vigorously implemented. Perhaps, as Senator Helms predicts, things are about to change and the aging
Cuban dictator will finally fall. If Cuba collapses and becomes a failed state 90 miles away from U.S.
shores, the epicenter of the Caribbean drug trade, the source of a massive flood of refugees to the
United States, a corruption haven, and a black hole for substantial sums of U.S. aid, President Bush will
have no one to blame but himself. Or, more precisely, the powerful interest groups that blinded him to
the lessons of experience.
--XT – Diaz-Canel solves
US will lift the embargo when Diaz-Canel is the leader – current policy limits the
embargo to Castro
Estes, 13 – attended Harvard College where he was an editor at the Harvard Crimson and president of
Current Magazine (Adam Clark, “Can You Imagine Cuba Without a Castro?”, The Atlantic Wire, 2/24/13,
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/02/can-you-imagine-cuba-without-castro/62461/)//EX
Raul Castro announced in a speech on Sunday that he plans to step down as Cuba's president when his
second five-year term ends in 2018. Fidel's little brother is getting old — he's 81 now — and it's time to
start thinking about Cuba's future. That future, Castro said in his speech, is going to look a lot more like
Western democracies with term limits and age caps for political office. Castro also proposed changes to
the constitution that would require the people's vote to ratify it. Of course, the biggest change of all is
that, for the first time in the 51 years since the revolution, Cuba will almost certainly get a leader whose
last name is not Castro.
There had been some talk in the past about grooming a younger member of the Castro family to take
over for Raul, but it looks like that job will now go to Miguel Diaz-Canel. An electrical engineer and
former higher education minister, Diaz-Canel was elected on Sunday to become the first ever vice
president to Castro, and more than likely, president in five years. The 52-year-old will also be the first
person to hold such a high office in Cuba without having fought in the revolution. If Diaz-Canel does
make it to the country's highest office, there is a chance that the United States' 51-year-long economic
embargo on Cuba which stipulates that it must remain in place while a Castro is president of Cuba.
Castro was careful to say that not too much will change when he steps down. "I was not chosen to be
president to restore capitalism to Cuba," he said. "I was elected to defend, maintain and continue to
perfect socialism, not destroy it." Castro added that Diaz-Canel's new position "represents a definitive
step in the configuration of the future leadership of the nation through the gradual and orderly
transfer of key roles to new generations."
Diaz-Canel helping advance reforms in squo- will continue
Chazan 13 - former news producer and editor (Jackie, examiner.com,“Cuba soon to have a president
not named Castro”, Feb 26, 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/cuba-soon-to-have-a-presidentnot-named-castro)
This is a major change in Cuba, not just generational," said Arturo Lopez-Levy, an analyst at the
University of Denver who used to work for the Cuban interior ministry on intelligence issues and U.S.
relations. "The promotion of Diaz-Canel should be seen as part of an institutional change in the way
the Cuban elite is promoted."¶ Diaz-Canel’s experience will help Castro advance reforms designed to
make the economy more efficient and bring in more foreign currency, without loosening the
Communist Party's political control.¶ He was brought to Havana in 2009 to become minister of higher
education and then a vice president of the Council of Ministers. He is seen within the Communist Party
as incorruptible, a staunch communist, and a nationalist loyal to the Castros' revolutionary vision.¶ He
has a reputation as an effective manager and for negotiating the fine line between Raul Castro's
reform agenda and the sometimes more dogmatic doctrine of provincial party members resistant to
change.
Under Diaz-Canel Cuba will forge a new and beneficial relationship with US
Gott 13 - writer and historian, Latin America correspondent, (Richard, The Guardian, DAWN.com, “A
post-Castro Cuba”, 2/27/13, http://beta.dawn.com/news/788938/a-post-castro-cuba)//EK
In this context it is now the US that is the odd man out. Indeed the most intriguing question now
concerns Cuba’s future relationship with the US. Many people have expressed the hope that Obama,
with no re-election problem to worry about, might feel emboldened to make conciliatory noises towards
the existing Castro government.
The road to a new friendship remains a possibility, yet one of the stumbling blocks has been the
continued existence of a Castro in power. Under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, imposed by the US
Congress in 1996, the US cannot contemplate recognising a Cuban government in which one of the
Castro brothers has a continuing role. By 2018, this will no longer be relevant. There seems little
doubt that under a future President Diaz-Canel, Cuba would be able to forge a new and beneficial
relationship with the US.
Diaz-Canel on board with reforms
Rajo 13 - Reporter Telemundo 52 Opinion Editor; Political Reporter (Carlos, NBCNews.com, “Analysis:
Castro brothers' successor may inherit a very different Cuba”, 3/2/13,
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/02/17133513-analysis-castro-brothers-successor-mayinherit-a-very-different-cuba?lite)//EK
These reforms already are changing the face of Cuban socialism. Castro has introduced private farms,
cooperatives in industries and activities outside agriculture, and an array of small business. Granted,
these are restricted and heavily regulated, but still they are earning profits and starting to create a
segment of wealthier, successful entrepreneurs. Cubans are also now allowed to sell houses and cars,
and more recently, to travel abroad if they can get a visa from another country.
While little is known of Diaz-Canelm765
’s ideology, it is likely that as the appointed Castro successor he is on board with the reforms.
Diaz- Canel will reform when needed to modernize government
Frank 13 –freelance journalist for Reuters, Financial Times, ABC News (Marc, Reuters, “Analysis: Castro
successor lacks charisma but is experienced manager”, Feb 25, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/us-cuba-castro-diaz-canel-idUSBRE91P00W20130226)//EK
"Diaz-Canel, while a loyalist of the old style, is young, reformist when reform is called for, a known
entity without ever being singled out or even thought of as a threat to Fidel or Raul," said Hal Klepak,
professor of history and strategy at the Royal Military College of Canada.¶ Klepak, who wrote a book on
the Cuban military under Raul Castro, pointed out the president is well known for picking the best man
for a job. "He is just the sort of man that Raul, looking for continuity and institutionalization of the
revolution, can count on, but anxious like Raul to modernize that government."
Diaz-Canel will continue economic liberation- already played key role in FDIs for Cuban
hotels
George 13 – writer for Se Mancha (Samuel, Se Mancha, “Cuba in Transition, United States Stuck in
Yesterday”, March 3, 2013, http://semancha.com/2013/03/03/cuba-in-transition-united-states-stuck-inyesterday/)//EK
Fidel Castro, who removed himself from power in 2008 due to ill health, made a rare appearance at the
National Assembly meeting on Sunday where Diaz-Canel's appointment was made, appearing to add his
seal of approval to the choice.¶ Yet compelling indicators suggest that Diaz-Canel is more than a party
hack, and that he will continue Raúl’s progress towards economic liberalization. Diaz-Canel has
distinguished himself for his pragmatism. He is believed to have played a key role in facilitating
foreign investment in Cuban hotels. As Minister of Higher Education, he gained the respect of his peers
by listening and probing, rather than dictating. The ascension of Diaz-Canel represents a break from the
geriatric revolutionary leaders – a break that was likely a precondition for any serious modernization.¶
Moreover, Diaz-Canel would struggle to hold a hard line even if he wanted to.¶ Raúl’s reforms have been
slow and halting, but they have also been irreversible. The Economist reports that “much of Cuban
farming” has been privatized and that, by 2015, one-third of the workforce will be in the private
sector. With cars, computers and phones already traded, the momentum of commercialization – the
allure of possession – will be difficult to stymie. The Castros’ success in containing reform momentum
owes much to personal allegiance and veneration. Diaz-Canel will command no such respect.
Diaz-Canel will reform Cuba
Haven, 13 – the Associated Press bureau chief in Madrid (Paul, “Miguel Diaz-Canel, First Vice President
Of Cuba's Communist Party, Rose Gradually To Castro's No. 2”, Huffington Post, 2/25/13,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/25/miguel-diaz-canel-cuba-first-vicepresident_n_2758824.html)//EX
HAVANA -- Miguel Diaz-Canel has five years to get started and a lot of work to do.¶ The man tapped as
Cuban President Raul Castro's chief lieutenant and likely successor must quietly fend off any
challenges from within the Communist-run island's secretive citadel of power.¶ He must gain
legitimacy with young, and even middle-aged, Cubans who have never known a leader not named
Castro. And he must deal with an exiled diaspora and American officials who were already making
clear on Monday they will not be mollified by a new, younger face.¶ "There's going to be a huge
charisma deficit," said Ann Louise Bardach, author of "Without Fidel: A Death Foretold in Miami, Havana
and Washington." "You go from Fidel to Raul who at least had some of the shine of the Castro mantle,
somebody who fought in the revolution."¶ She said Cuba faces "massive" problems including a large
public debt, dependence on Venezuela, an aging population, decades of brain drain and one of the
world's slowest Internet connections.¶ Whether Diaz-Canel is the man to fix all that is very much open
to debate. Will Cubans accept another leader who was hand-picked from above and whose ascension –
if it happens – will not come through multiparty democratic elections?¶ And will those passed over for
the top job fall in line? If Fidel and Raul Castro are still alive, will the 52-year-old electrical engineer and
former minister of higher education be able to set his own course?¶ On the streets of Havana, a day after
Castro accepted a new term and said he would step down when it ends, many had their doubts about
the future.¶ "Change? Was there a change?" asked Ernesto Silva, a 25-year-old student who scoffed at
the idea that the country must wait another five years for new leadership, and said he hopes to
emigrate to the United States in the meantime. "I find it hard to believe that he will be able to do, say or
truly change anything."¶ Others were more enthusiastic, but still unsure how Diaz-Canel will establish
control.¶ "I think it is good. He is a new and young figure. But he was trained by the old guys," said Maria
Quesada, a 45-year-old office worker. "We still can't talk about a government without Castro because
he's still going to be there, and I think the true test for Diaz-Canel will be when his vision differs from
Raul's."¶ Raul himself faced a similar challenge when he took over from the ailing Fidel in 2006. The
younger Castro was seen as a bland and unassuming figure who had always operated in the shadow of
his larger-than-life older brother.¶ But he has overseen a series of sweeping changes since then in an
effort to right the country's ever-weak Marxist economy, expanding private enterprise, legalizing a real
estate market and eliminating most travel restrictions.¶ Behind the scenes, Raul has led an anticorruption campaign and replaced many of Fidel's confidantes with loyal military officials who earned
his trust during his four plus decades as the nation's armed forces chief.¶ Observers say it is those men,
who have been put in charge of important state-owned enterprises like the phone company, the
enormous holding company Cimex and virtually the entire tourism industry, who Diaz-Canel must
persuade to follow him.¶ "I'm sure he's shown himself to be acceptable to the military already, otherwise
this would never have happened," said Paul Webster Hare, the British ambassador to Cuba from 2001 to
2004 and now a lecturer in international relations at Boston University. "He has to be acceptable to
them."¶ In Washington on Monday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the U.S. remained
"hopeful for the day that the Cuban people get democracy, when they can have the opportunity to
freely pick their own leaders."¶ "We're clearly not there yet," he added.¶ Ventrell said Cuba needed to do
more to open up if it wants repaired relations with the United States.¶ Still, observers said the naming of
a successor, along with the economic and social changes Castro has instituted, could eventually lead to
detente, or at least an easing of bad blood.¶ "There is a psychological and political benefit to naming
somebody now," said Julia Sweig, a Cuba expert at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations.
"It can demonstrate to the United States that there is an opportunity to change how we relate to this
new Cuba."¶ Reaction to Diaz-Canel's promotion was met with a shrug by Cuban-American politicians
who said that changing the nameplate outside the presidential office won't alter a system they see as
repressive and undemocratic. And some analysts and exiles in South Florida questioned whether he will
survive politically long enough to ever take control.¶ Little is known of Diaz-Canel's relationship with
Cuba's other political or military elites, or his own personal ideology.¶ He is said to be a fan of the Beatles
who in his youth wore his hair long at a time when both acts were considered anti-revolutionary. And a
former colleague says he is a private jokester despite his somber public demeanor.¶ Like almost all
Cuban politicians who earned their stripes by mastering the art of backroom party maneuvering, DiazCanel seems to have learned long ago that there was no benefit to putting himself in front of the
cameras.¶ It was a lesson he probably learned back in 2002, when fellow young turk Roberto Robaina
was dumped as foreign minister after being accused of "political and ethical errors."¶ Diaz-Canel, who
was part of Robaina's circle, not only survived the purge and a subsequent one that took down the next
foreign minister and a prominent young vice president – but he appears to have thrived behind the
scenes.¶ Robaina, who now paints pictures and runs a private restaurant in Havana, would not comment
Monday on Diaz-Canel's rise. But a former colleague who has known Diaz-Canel since the 1980s said his
career really began to take off after the purge.¶ In 2003, he was named head of the Communist Party in
Holguin, a role he had held previously in his native Santa Clara. The same year, Raul Castro helped get
him a seat on the Political Bureau, the island's equivalent of a Politburo.¶ The experience in Holguin was
a trial by fire for Diaz-Canel, who had been popular in Santa Clara but met resistance in his new role.¶
"People didn't like him in Holguin," said the former colleague, who would speak only on condition of
anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. But he caught Castro's eye, and earned his praise.¶
"He has demonstrated a solid ideological firmness," Castro, who was then vice president himself, said of
his protege, perhaps presaging his future rise.¶ Cuban officials insist that a post-Castro era will be no
different and that the nation's institutions will unquestionably back the new prince. They point to a long
history of exiles wrongly predicting the collapse of the revolution, which has so far survived the demise
of the Soviet Union and retirement of Fidel Castro, not to mention Washington's 51-year economic
embargo.¶ But Hare, the former ambassador, says it would be a mistake to underestimate the
challenges Diaz-Canel would face getting state machinery and political rivals to fall in line. ¶ "Does he
have rivals in the 50-something generation in Cuba who perhaps resent what happened?" Hare asked.
"There is a scenario where other people will be sensing ... that Diaz-Canel doesn't have all the
attributes of the Castros and therefore (will ask) `Why shouldn't I have a chance at it?'"
Diaz-Canel will reform Cuba – small-scale reforms have happened and Canel will
support them on a bigger scale
Rajo, 13 – Policy Analyst at Telemundo (Carlos, “Analysis: Castro brothers' successor may inherit a very
different Cuba”, NBC News, 3/2/13, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/02/17133513analysis-castro-brothers-successor-may-inherit-a-very-different-cuba?lite)//EX
Raul Castro’s recent announcement that he will leave power in 2018, and his appointment of 52-yearold Miguel Diaz-Canel as first vice president and his de facto successor, are signs of the glacial pace of
political change in Cuba.
Certainly, these announcements won’t satisfy those who for decades have been waiting for the Castro
brothers’ exit.
Nevertheless, the move marks the beginning of the passing of the torch of power to a new generation.
For the first time in half a century, there is the real possibility that a person who did not fight in the
Cuban Revolution will lead the country. Diaz-Canel was not even born when Fidel Castro overthrew
Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. Since then, a Castro has been in power in Cuba: first the nowretired, 86-year-old Fidel, and from 2006 to now, his younger brother, Raul, 81.
This generational change does not mean that Cuba will move to a different political system. There is
no going back to capitalism, Raul Castro told the National Assembly on Sunday. Nevertheless, the
move toward a generational change must be seen in the context of other reforms implemented by the
younger Castro.
These reforms already are changing the face of Cuban socialism. Castro has introduced private farms,
cooperatives in industries and activities outside agriculture, and an array of small business. Granted,
these are restricted and heavily regulated, but still they are earning profits and starting to create a
segment of wealthier, successful entrepreneurs. Cubans are also now allowed to sell houses and cars,
and more recently, to travel abroad if they can get a visa from another country.
While little is known of Diaz-Canel’s ideology, it is likely that as the appointed Castro successor he is
on board with the reforms.
The U.S. State Department reacted tepidly to Castro’s announcement and made clear that it would not
be sufficient to prompt a lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. Although President Barack Obama doesn’t
have election constraints in formulating a Cuba policy in his second term, the issue remains emotionally
and politically charged in the U.S., and Congress is not likely to change its mind and lift the embargo
while a Castro remains in power.
That doesn’t mean relations can’t change, however.
For instance, the Obama administration could remove Cuba from the list of states that sponsor
terrorism. Cuba had been on that list since 1982, when it had the financial support of the Soviet Union
and could afford to help guerrilla groups in Central and South America.
Cuba doesn’t have the resources to help armed groups - or even the political will to do so. Cuba is not
Syria, North Korea or Iran in terms of being a threat to the U.S.
However, the lifting of the embargo is likely only after a period of more normal relations between the
countries. There is also a legal obstacle: According to the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the U.S. will
recognize the legitimacy of a Cuban government only when someone other than a Castro is in power.
For now, at least, it seems that won’t happen until 2018.
All Signs point to Diaz-Canel’s as next in secession
Miroff 13 - correspondent for The Washington Post the Caribbean, senior correspondent for
GlobalPost, contributor to National Public Radio. (Nick, Official On Deck To Succeed Castros Still A
Question Mark To Many Cubans, NPR, 4-03-2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/04/03/176023531/officialon-deck-to-succeed-castros-still-a-question-mark-to-many-cubans)//BDS
Within 10 days of Miguel Diaz-Canel's big promotion to vice president of Cuba in February, he was
already being tapped as a stand-in for reticent, 81-year-old President Raul Castro. It was Diaz-Canel,
not Raul or Fidel Castro, who gave Cuba's first public condolences when the communist government
lost its best friend and benefactor, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. "We're saddened, but more
determined than ever," Diaz-Canel said in a speech broadcast on national television. "Our tears will be
worthless if they don't come with a commitment to carry on the beloved leader's vision." Diaz-Canel's
appointment makes him the designated successor to Fidel and Raul — and has put him on the Cuban
equivalent of a media blitz. It's the first step in what appears to be a carefully orchestrated campaign to
ready the island for an uncertain post-Castro future. Relatively Young And Unconventional Cubans are
now wondering what sort of vision Diaz-Canel will have for their country. The island has been under the
stern hand of Fidel and Raul Castro since 1959, and the vast majority of Cubans, like Diaz-Canel himself,
have never lived under another leader. Raul Castro says his current five-year term, which ends in 2018,
will be his last. But given Castro's age, Diaz-Canel could take over sooner. Many Cubans are only
beginning to form impressions of the new vice president, but he is especially well known in his home
province of Villa Clara, where he first rose to be the top Communist Party official, according to Rafael
Hernandez, editor of the Cuban journal Temas. "This is the only political leader in Cuba that has
conducted a radio show, so he has a communication capacity," Hernandez says. "He was known in Villa
Clara because he used to sit down and drink beer and talk in the streets. The majority of Cuban
politicians are not like that. I mean, the majority of the old bureaucrats are not like that." The adjective
most often used here to describe the tall, burly Diaz-Canel is "young," even though he's 52. Archival
photos show him wearing his silvery hair a bit long in the back, in the style of a mullet. His reputation is
that of a low-key, technocratic manager who listens and doesn't lecture, but his only experience at the
national level came when he became Cuba's minister of higher education in 2009.
Reform under Diaz-Canel is Likely
George 13 - Project Manager with the Bertelsmann Foundation, a European think tank, developing a
Latin America project portfolio for the new Global Economic Dynamics project based in D.C. and
Germany (Samuel George, Cuba in Transition, United States Stuck in Yesterday, No Se Mancha, 3-32013, http://semancha.com/2013/03/03/cuba-in-transition-united-states-stuck-in-yesterday/)//BDS
The United States’ embargo against Cuba is like the war on drugs – everyone in Washington realizes the
policy is shortsighted and ineffective, yet nobody steps forward to change it. The Soviets appear
increasingly unlikely to use Cuba as a conduit to spread international communism throughout the
Americas. Anyone worth their salt on the Hill, from the State Department, or the Treasury will privately
admit as much. Yet the policy remains firmly entrenched. The same Hill staffer that admits the
anachronistic fallacy underlying the Cold War campaign will simply shrug it off as an inevitable fact of
life: death, taxes, and the embargo on Cuba. The US stubbornly sticks to a bad policy because it is good
politics. Yes, the War on Drugs is counterproductive, but as long as “tough-on-drugs” continues to poll
well, the electoral reward for reform seems scant. Similarly, anything but the hardest line on Cuba could
cost either party Florida and, in turn, a national election. This is unfortunate. Winds of change are
stirring in Cuba, yet the US’s stubbornness, embodied in the 1996 Helms-Burton act, could lead Uncle
Sam to blow the opportunity. Here Comes the Sun On Sunday, February 24, President of the Council of
State of Cuba and de facto head of state Raúl Castro announced that he would surrender power in
2018. He also appointed 52-year old Miguel Diaz-Canel as first vice president, implying that a man who
had yet to be born when Fidel Castro took Havana would be Cuba’s next leader. The exit of Raúl, the
emergence of a younger, less ideological generation of leaders, and the incessant, if slow transition to
a market economy combine to create an opportunity for the US to normalize relations with the
Caribbean island. In fact, such normalization would reinforce all three trends. Little is immediately clear
about Vice President Diaz-Canel. We understand that he was a heartthrob in the 1980s, that he rides his
bike to work, and that he listens to The Beatles. We know Raúl Castro has praised his “ideological
firmness” and that he has served in the Cuban military – two facts that have raised red flags for
hardliners in Miami. Yet compelling indicators suggest that Diaz-Canel is more than a party hack, and
that he will continue Raúl’s progress towards economic liberalization. Diaz-Canel has distinguished
himself for his pragmatism. He is believed to have played a key role in facilitating foreign investment in
Cuban hotels. As Minister of Higher Education, he gained the respect of his peers by listening and
probing, rather than dictating. The ascension of Diaz-Canel represents a break from the geriatric
revolutionary leaders – a break that was likely a precondition for any serious modernization.
Moreover, Diaz-Canel would struggle to hold a hard line even if he wanted to. Raúl’s reforms have
been slow and halting, but they have also been irreversible. The Economist reports that “much of
Cuban farming” has been privatized and that, by 2015, one-third of the workforce will be in the private
sector. With cars, computers and phones already traded, the momentum of commercialization – the
allure of possession – will be difficult to stymie. The Castros’ success in containing reform momentum
owes much to personal allegiance and veneration. Diaz-Canel will command no such respect. Toe Jam
Policy Castro’s exit opens a window of opportunity for the United States. But US obstinacy, embodied
by the Helms-Burton Act, threatens to pull the curtains on this window. The Helms-Burton Act, passed
by the US congress in 1996, requires a series of stringent reforms (including the abolishment of the
Cuban Ministry of the Interior, the issuance of private media permits and a new, democratically elected
government within 18 months) that must be addressed before the embargo can be lifted. Such reforms
have not been required of other American partners, including China, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. The
Helms-Burton Act can already be implicated in one missed opportunity. The fall of the Soviet Union in
1991 pulled the rug out from under the Cuban economy, and Fidel Castro was forced to slowly
implement market-based reform. Rather than encouraging these reforms, the US congress enacted a
series of draconian laws, culminating in the Helms-Burton act, all geared towards further isolating Castro
and spiking the final nail into the regime’s coffin. Instead of facilitating Cuban reform, the US left Castro
exposed only until a new sugar daddy emerged in the form of Hugo Chávez in 1999. The standards of
Helms-Burton remain unrealistic, and observing the act would force the US to impede and frustrate a
transition that was always going to be difficult.
XT – post-Castro improves relations
The Castro brothers are the main barrier to U.S. Cuban relations – their deaths will
change US policy
Farnsworth 12 – Vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society (Eric,“Top 10
Policy Drivers for U.S.-Latin American Relations in 2013”, Americas Society Council of the Americas,
November 05, 2012,
http://www.as-coa.org/articles/top-10-policy-drivers-us-latin-american-relations-2013)// WNM
Assuming that the world does not end, according to the Mayan calendar in December, 2013 will be an
important year south of the U.S. border. There are a number of issues to watch in determining the
hemisphere's direction, although most depend less on the Nov. 6 election results and more on factors
that are out of White House control. Savvy observers of the region will watch the 10 "C's" as the real
policy drivers.
The first of these is Castro, as in Raul and Fidel. The U.S. election may bring a moderate tightening or
loosening of U.S. restrictions on engagement with the island. The Cuban regime may or may not
continue its episodic policy liberalization -- Cuban perestroika -- as a means to extend rather than
overturn the Cuban system. But the real driver of change will be the death of one or both of the Castros.
While it's true that no one has yet won a bet predicting their death, even the Castro brothers will
succumb at some point to nature. Each passing year makes that more likely. When they do, there will be
a power struggle on the island, and the United States will be faced with the critical decision of how to
respond. This will be a game-changer, with historic implications, sucking the oxygen out of other
hemispheric policy matters at least for a time. It is the one issue above all others that has the potential
to scramble hemispheric policy, putting bilateral relations on the road to normalization and removing an
irritant in the broader hemispheric agenda. Or not. The truth is that nobody knows what will come after
the Castros, but the U.S. response must be nuanced and appropriate so as to encourage, rather than
discourage, the advent of true democracy on the island.
Link – fast reform causes collapse
A democratic uprising will collapse Cuba and the military will crush it
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
3) Democratic Uprising – A democratic uprising on the island presents a confounding paradox. While it
would result in optimal strategic outcomes for the island and the U.S. in the long-term, it also poses the
most significant near-term risk to the Cuban people and U.S. national interests.
The road to a “Free Cuba” has several potential paths. The least likely but most dangerous scenario
would be a “Cuban Spring” popular uprising. The most likely and least dangerous would be a protracted
economic and political evolution across a series of governments concluding in a democratic or quasidemocratic state. Such post-Castro era governments will most likely come from factions of the existing
regime.45
Similar to 2011’s events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and the broader middle-east, a Cuban Spring could
fracture the island’s existing power structure at best and might even15 overthrow the GOC altogether.
For that to evolve, several key events would have to develop. The paramount requirement would be an
internal security withdrawal from the civic space which would afford dissidents the political maneuver
space to solicit and coalesce opposition support. To incentivize and coordinate support, continued
liberalization of cellular and internet usage could be leveraged as popular informational linkages. Finally,
if a critical civic mass was achieved by dissidents and their supporters, a singularly brutal or
compelling event could unleash Cuba’s DNA which historically has endorsed violence to effect political
change. At the extreme, the deeprooted hatred and resentments that the Revolution has pressurized
over the last half century could erupt in political vendettas, infighting over societal restructuring, and
strife over the political process.46
The MININT forces would lead any crackdown. However, if it failed to quell the uprisings, the FAR could
be drawn into direct violence against the Cuban people. This would be unprecedented and could have
devastating repercussions for the FAR and the regime. If the FAR did act against the people, it would
shatter its reputation as the protector of the people; this would be eerily similar to the Egyptian Army’s
evolving relations with the Egyptian people. The outcome of a violent upheaval could be tragic for
Cubans and threatening to U.S. national interests. Regardless of the outcome, security and stability in
post-Castro Cuba would remain at risk if not completely crushed. At the other end of the regime’s risk,
time and likelihood spectrums is a slow decay away from Revolutionary socialism. Marxist-Leninist
communism’s global bankruptcy has not gone unnoticed by Raúl or the rest of the ruling elite. A
transition to “Socialism with a Cuban character” seems likely after Fidel’s death and will put the 16
country on a slippery path to liberalization. As discussed above, economic reforms will likely lead the
transition. However, as the “proletariats” dependence on the state is displaced by economic selfreliance, so too will the demands for greater political freedom be disengaged from economic
dependence. The benefits to Cuba are many, as they are to American national interests.
Civil war impacts
Cuban collapse turns every 1ac internal link
Gorrell, 5 - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
(Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074
Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro
transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will
return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will
attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for
instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can
hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an
indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is
a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an
unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During
the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could
be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.
Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next
series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the
U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In
fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its
increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may
be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of
drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least
resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be
greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.
In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the
region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the
hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase
direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are
budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy
military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action
could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now
can mitigate these potential future problems.
Cuban collapse causes a flood of refugees – on a already stressed system
Sanders, 10 – writer for the Washington Times (Sol, “A Cuban time bomb?”, September 19, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/19/a-cuban-time-bomb/)//eek
Remembering how suddenly other seemingly iron-clad communist regimes fell, the possibility of a
Cuban implosion is real. That, of course, would be a nightmare for the U.S. The memory of Fidel Castro
dumping 125,000 political opponents and jailbirds he called “worms” on Miami in the summer of 1980
is all too vivid in Florida, now the fourth-largest state. A sudden refugee flood would tax U.S. facilities
already inadequately handling illegal Mexican immigration. Although Cuba crisis studies are stacked in
dark corners at the State Department and the Pentagon, Washingtons response - given all the other
crises the U.S. faces - might be Katrina-like to a sudden Cuban collapse.
Squo solves – oil
A resumption of drilling will cause the US to lift the embargo
Lopez-Gamundi 11- COHA Research Associate
(Paula, “Cuban Oil Demands Washington’s Attention” Council on Hemispheric affairs, June 22, 2011,
http://www.coha.org/cuban-oil-demands-washingtons-attention/)//HA
On the brink of oil exploration, newfound petroleum and natural gas deposits near Cuba, as well as
pressure at the pumps, may push Washington to lay the foundation for more open relations with
Havana.
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated between 7 to 14 billion barrels of oil were trapped
within Cuba’s continental shelf. Three years later, the Cuban government and Spanish oil company
Repsol YPF, estimate that over 20 billion barrels of oil are sitting under the ocean floor just a few miles
off the north-west end of the island, waiting to be exploited. As part of a multinational partnership,
Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible drilling rig, owned by the Italian oil company, Eni SpA, is currently being
constructed by the Chinese in Singapore. Nearing completion, the oil rig is scheduled to be towed to
Cuba by September or October of this year. While future oil revenue will have obvious economic
benefits for the island nation, this recent oil discovery may also force Washington to relax its
incredibly stale trade embargo.
At the same time, the spike in global oil prices has persuaded the Obama administration to open up
delicate environmental domestic regions for drilling. In his May 14th Weekly Address, the U.S.
president outlined a handful of strategies to alleviate skyrocketing oil prices. One of these strategies
calls upon the Department of the Interior to accept bids for annual leases for oil drilling in Alaska’s
National Reserve and in the Gulf of Mexico while, theoretically, “respecting sensitive areas.” To allow oil
companies more time to catch up with the newly enhanced environmental and safety standards,
Obama’s administration has consistently extended leases already granted for drilling in the Arctic Ocean
and the Gulf of Mexico. However, these measures could not possibly affect oil prices significantly; after
all, Americans consume over 20 percent of the world’s oil supply, yet produce a mere five percent of
what they consume. Furthermore, OPEC’s refusal on June 8th to increase oil production shot oil prices
up by as much as USD 2 a barrel. Cuban oil would provide an immediate, possibly convenient source of
nearby oil for the United States. Nevertheless, this black gold will not even remotely benefit the U.S.
financially if Washington mechanically refuses to engage in dialogue with Havana.
If drilling begins, the US will lift the embargo
Gentile 06- senior international correspondent for ISN
(Carmen, “Cuba banking on the military and oil” ISN, 10 Aug 2006, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Articles/Detail/?id=52231&lng=en)//HA
That kind of crude would more than meet Cuba’s daily oil intake - about 205,000 barrels per day - and
provide enough excess to keep the lights on. This would prove extremely beneficial to both the
domestic economy and attractive to foreign investors, like China and even the US, looking for the next
untapped oil reserve.
The potential for striking oil in what amounts to Florida’s backyard has seemingly swayed a handful of
Republican leaders in Washington to change their minds on the Cuba issue, a stark contrast to the
White House's traditional hard-line stance against pouring investment dollars into Castro's coffers.
Among them is Sen Larry Craig, a Republican lawmaker from Idaho, who earlier this year introduced a
bill that would waive the Cuban embargo and allow US companies to do business with Cuba's stateowned oil company, Cubapetroleo.
The senator argues that while US firms are prohibited from doing business with Castro and from
exploring fields off the shores of southern Florida due to environmental restrictions, Cuba is already
planning its own off-shore exploration and cultivating ties with countries like China.
Cuba is only 90 miles from the United States at its closest part. An agreement brokered in 1977 split the
waters between the two nations in half. The United States does not permit drilling on its half, though
Castro is reportedly eager to explore Cuban waters.
"The bottom line is that Cuba will develop its oil fields within 45 miles of our shore. We can sit by and
complain, only to watch rigs go out and start extracting oil, or we get involved," Craig said.
Larry Birns, director of the Council of Hemispheric Affairs, notes that if Cuba’s hydrocarbon bounty is as
plentiful as some think, “it could mark the final death toll for the US embargo on Cuba.”
“If that’s the case, Cuba will have successfully outflanked the embargo,” Birns said.'
New oil drilling will create overwhelming pressure to lift the embargo
Carroll 8- staff writer for The Guardian
(Rory, “International: 20bn barrel oil discovery puts Cuba in the big league: Self-reliance beckons for
communist state: Estimate means reserves are on a par with US” The Guardian, 18 Oct 2008,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/244311287/13EE7825B9F1022E805/3?accou
ntid=14667)//HA
Cuba's unexpected arrival into the big oil league could increase pressure on the next administration to
loosen the embargo to let US oil companies participate in the bonanza and reduce US dependency on
the middle east, said Jones. "Up until now the embargo did not really impact on us in a substantive,
strategic way. Oil is different. It's something we need and want."
Disad links
Diplomatic capital link
The plan costs diplomatic capital
LeoGrande, 13 - professor in the Department of Government, School of Public Affairs at American
University in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After
Chavez” World Politics Review, 4/2, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-ofdependence-cubas-foreign-policy-after-chavez)
Obama took some early steps that augured well. In April 2009, he ended restrictions on CubanAmerican remittances and family travel and subsequently eased regulations limiting cultural and
academic exchange. At Washington's initiative, the United States and Cuba resumed bilateral talks on
migration, suspended by President George W. Bush in 2004. The two governments also began
discussions on other issues of mutual interest, such as Coast Guard cooperation and drug interdiction.
But the momentum in Washington soon dissipated in the face of more pressing foreign policy
priorities, opposition from Congress, even among some Democrats, and resistance from an inertial
State Department bureaucracy more comfortable with the familiar policy of the past -- its failure
notwithstanding -- than the risk of trying something new. As a former senior State Department official
explained, high-visibility foreign policy changes of this magnitude only happen if the president
demands that they happen, and Obama's attention was focused elsewhere. In December 2009, Cuba's
arrest of Alan Gross, a consultant for the U.S. Agency for International Development's "democracy
promotion" programs, brought all progress to a halt. At the end of Obama's first term, relations with
Cuba were not much better than at the start.
China links – Cuban oil
US oil investment will tradeoff with Chinese investment
Snow 10- Washington Editor for Oil & Gas journal
(Nick, “Experts examine how Cuba's offshore oil could be 'game changer'” Oil & Gas Journal 108.39, Oct
18, 2010,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/866205441/13EE7825B9F1022E805/10?acco
untid=14667)//HA
Cuba's anticipated development of its offshore oil resources would profoundly affect its national
economy, but have more political impacts on relations with the US, experts generally agreed at a
forum on Oct. 8. "What we're seeing could be a potential game changer," said Kirby Jones, president of
the Alamar Associates consulting firm. "For the first time in 50 years, Cuba would have something the
US needs, something of strategic importance."
The quantity of foreign oil companies already present in Cuba suggests that the country doesn't
necessarily need the US as it moves ahead, he suggested during a seminar cosponsored by InterAmerican Dialogue and Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. "The question of
whether we provide a lifeline to Cuba's economy has become academic," he said. "We're starting a
new ballgame here, and have had some spring training. But others are crowding into the lineup."
Participants immediately dismissed rumors of the Chinese already drilling off Cuba. But they also
indicated that China could eventually play an important role in parts of Cuba's oil industry beyond
exploration and production.
China could invest heavily and be the operator of two new refineries which have proposed to process
the heavy crude from offshore wells, according to Jorge R. Pinon, a visiting research fellow at CRI's Latin
American and Caribbean Center. It's uncertain whether the North Belt offshore region could make
Cuba a net oil exporter, but it could break the country's dependent relationship with Venezuela to
both countries' satisfaction, he said.
"The same relationship Cuba had with the Soviet Union in the 1960s and '70s it now has with
Venezuela," said Pinon. "I believe China could become its new partner. It's looking for Caribbean
refining capacity, including Valero's facility in Aruba, and could use Cuba's new refineries to sell light
products to the US and keep the diesel and fuel oil for itself."
US not out yet
Many Cuban government officials, however, also believe it would make more logistical sense to deal
with US companies on the Gulf Coast than European, Middle Eastern, or Asian partners, Jones said. The
main obstacle remains the US embargo against Cuba and onerous provisions which make it nearly
impossible for US firms to do business there even if they can get exemptions from it, he continued. "If
we continue to play the reciprocity game, Cuba will simply continue going somewhere else," he said.
Heg bad links
Cuban relations with other emerging markets spurs a transition to multipolarity – the
plan reverses that
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
From the perspective of the Cuban government, the new focus on emerging markets is a savvy strategic
move. While Cuba and its EM partners differ in important respects, they share critical economic and
geopolitical interests. Cuba and its EM partners are comfortable with state-to-state transactions that
include subsidized finance and other non-market elements . In particular, their large state-owned firms
are accustomed to acting upon political direction and covering losses in politically-driven transactions
with cross-subsidies. Furthermore, Cuba and its EM commercial partners share a core geopolitical
interest: building a more multi-polar world where U.S. power is diminished. The Venezuela of Hugo
Chavez makes that goal the core of its diplomacy. While China and Brazil seek cordial relations with
the United States, there should be no illusions but that they also seek a diplomatic environment where
their respective power gains at the expense of the United States. The Russia of Vladimir Putin, who
has begun to re-engage in Cuba, shares that geopolitical aspiration.
Neolib link to Cuban energy
The aff perpetuates endless consumptive practices by trying to facilitate the use of oil
in Cuba. Cuba will continue to consume and pollute, because their transition to
renewables has proved to be ineffective, boastful and manipulative of the population.
By the way collapse of the market is inevitable because of the US’ transition to a selfsustained energy system
Torres 13-staff writer for Havana times
(Isbel Díaz, “Cuba: Wind Power vs. Oil” Havana Times, June 21, 2013,
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95091)//HA
HAVANA TIMES — It would seem that local newspapers are intent on misinforming the public – both at
home and abroad – about the Cuban government’s priorities with respect to the development of
alternative energy sources.
A case in point was the news surrounding the recently-concluded congress of the World Wind Energy
Association and the Renewable Energy Exhibition (WWEC 2013), held in Havana at the beginning of this
month.
During a press conference, the director of Cuba’s Center for the Study of Renewable Energy
Technologies (CETER), Conrado Moreno, declared that Cuba plans on developing the infrastructure
needed to generate at least 10 percent of its electricity with renewable sources by the year 2030.
In this connection, the official lauded “the great strides in the development of wind power
technologies” that Cuba has made in recent years, adding that the country has “a program the world
can learn from.”
However, thanks to this impressive wind power “program”, whose installed capacity was less than 0.5
Megawatts (MW) in 2005, the country barely produced 12 MW of electricity in 2010.
That Cuba should present the congress with such an out-of-date figure (a figure which, in addition, is
anything but impressive , representing a mere 0.08 % of the country’s entire energy output) should
raise some eyebrows.
This figure may help explain why it will take thirteen years for the country to be able to generate 10 %
of its energy with wind power and the other renewable sources of energy used on the island.
The fact of the matter is that Cuba currently has 9,343 wind turbines, 15 turbines and 4 wind farms in
operation, for an installed capacity of 11.7 MW, a figure which places it beneath 68 other countries
around the world.
Cuban biodiesel.
As a way of comparison, in 2010 Nicaragua had a generating capacity of 40 MW (the equivalent of 5 % of
the country’s total installed capacity), garnered from wind power technologies alone, while Cuba
currently generates a mere 4 % of its electricity via renewable energy sources in general.
Local optimism, however, isn’t dampened by any of this, and experts continue to extol the virtues of
Cuba’s largest wind farm (with a capacity of 51 MW), whose construction on the northern coast of the
island’s eastern province of Las Tunas, a place of allegedly “ideal” wind conditions, is expected to be
completed next year.
It is estimated that the wind farm could generate some 153 GW/h a year, allowing the country to cut
down its fossil fuel consumption by some 40 thousand tons a year.
Not without a number of altercations at different levels, the Cuban government has managed to secure
the environmental licenses required for the project from the pertinent agencies rather quickly, giving
technicians a mere week to collect the required data.
The Wind Energy Debate
Wind power is an abundant, renewable and clean energy resource which can aid in the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. Cubans, however, have never received any in-depth information regarding
its benefits and limitations, nor have we ultimately been consulted in connection with its
implementation.1
Boasting of a relatively high Energy Return Rate* (18.1:1), wind power is cursed by one, significant
limitation: its intermittence, that is, the fact that wind currents are not constant.
According to experts, wind currents on Cuba’s northern coastline are not uniform and are heavily
influenced by local conditions , resulting from the interaction of trade and local winds and seasonal
meteorological events.
Because of this, wind power can only ever supplement, never wholly replace, fossil fuel sources on the
island, as the contribution of conventional energy sources is indispensible. In addition, as these
conventional technologies operate in “backup mode” in this scheme, they consume a lot more fuel per
KW produced every hour.
Fossil fuels are also consumed during the process of constructing the wind farm (during the mining of
the materials, transportation and industrial processing) and all subsequent, indispensable maintenance
operations.
Another inconvenient aspect of this technology is that winds must reach a certain, minimum velocity to
be able to move the blades of the turbines. There is also a maximum wind velocity that, if exceeded,
causes the entire network circuit to shut down.
In addition to the noise they produce and the disruption of the natural environment they represent,
these wind farms reportedly affect the routes of migratory birds or the areas where these birds avail
themselves of lateral winds, and the creation of access roads – and regular human presence, in general –
damages local fauna.
The limitations of this technology, and the impact it has on the environment, ought not make us reject
wind farms outright, but should, rather, make us re-think the way in which we have been
implementing the technology and how congruous it is with the country’s global development strategy,
as well as prompt us to demand accurate information in this regard.
Cuba has been working in the renewable energy field for decades without any type of legal
regulations and without incurring any legal action from anyone. Recently, the director of CETER claimed
that “a team of experts is working to implement it [the legal regulations] in a manner that suits Cuba’s
economic development model.”
The Oil Question
One of the more disquieting aspects of the wind power issue is how the Cuban media portray its state of
development on the island, selling an image of a sustainable and ecological program, when, in fact,
the country is heading down the more profitable road, caring little about its environmental impact .
Some statements we find in the press include:
“In recent years, Cuba has made great progress in the development of wind power technologies.” /
“Cuba has developed a wind power infrastructure (…) which only highly developed countries can boast
of.” / “Cuba’s renewable energy program includes photovoltaic energy sources, which have experienced
considerable development since the 1990s.” / “The ‘solarization’ of Cuba’s energy generating system.” /
“The generation of electricity with renewable sources of energy will grow by 949 MW.”
As these grandiloquent reports on “green” energy sources are published, oil prospecting projects
across Cuba’s platform continue in almost utter silence . This means that the government continues to
invest heavily in this polluting energy source.
Cuban oil experts and government officials had anticipated that the country would be producing 90 %
of its electricity with domestic oil reserves by 2010, but were unable to achieve this .
According to recent declarations made by Jorge Piñon, Associate Director of the Latin American and
Caribbean Energy Program, Cuba could be producing as many as 250 thousand barrels of crude a day
within five to seven years.
Enthusiastic Cuban government experts estimate that the Gulf of Mexico platform could contain as
many as 20 billion barrels of oil. The U.S. Geological Service estimate is considerably more modest,
calculating reserve volumes there at 5 billion oil barrels.
To date, results have not been exactly promising. The “Scarabeo 9” platform had to pull out of the socalled Exclusive Economic Zone last year, following three unsuccessful attempts to find oil in the area.
To top things off, a few weeks ago, the Russian oil company Zarubezhneft decided to push back
prospecting efforts to 2014, reporting “complications of a geological nature.”
These fiascos do little to burst the oil bubble of the Cuban government, which continues to spend
millions in prospecting infrastructure.
Following the intensive modernization of the country’s thermoelectric plants ten years ago, Cuba is
now working to expand its refinery in Cienfuegos, construct an oil duct connecting Cienfuegos and
Matanzas, build a storage facility that can house 600 thousand oil barrels in Matanzas and complete the
vast commercial port in Mariel (a billion dollar investment), and in many other related projects.
In the meantime, Venezuela continues to ship an average of 100 thousand barrels of oil to the island
every day, 30 thousand of which are financed by PetroCaribe, as per a 25-year agreement with an
interest rate of only 1 % signed with the island.
What will Cuba do in 2030, then, when it has the infrastructure to generate 10 % of its electricity using
renewable energy sources? Will it have found the oil it seeks by then? Will it abandon the idea of using
this oil for energy production? Will it sell it to the United States?
According to the most recent report issued by the National Intelligence Council, the CIA bureau
responsible for analyzing and anticipating geopolitical and economic developments around the world,
by 2030 the United States (the world’s largest importer of hydrocarbons today) will be entirely selfsufficient in terms of oil resources, and the world’s oil market could well collapse as a result of this.
We must acknowledge that hydrocarbons continue to be the world’s chief energy resource and that, like
the rest of the world, Cuba does not have the infrastructure or programs needed to make the
transition to a post-oil economy.
Broadening Cuba’s Energy Sources
Many experts agree that the diversification and expansion of energy sources must become one of the
pillars of Cuba’s future energy production scheme.
A broad range of alternative energy sources, from natural gas (the least polluting of all hydrocarbons) to
renewable sources such as ethanol extracted from sugar cane, wind power, solar energy and bio-gas
could be developed in Cuba.
Alternative energy source production in Cuba.
That said, according to Cuba’s National Statistics Bureau, the amount of energy Cuba produced using
renewable sources in 2011 was nearly 2 million tons less of oil equivalent than in 2001. This report
reveals a marked decline in the use of these alternative energy sources in the course of the decade, a
trend which coincides with the “oil enthusiasm” of recent years and the shutting down of numerous
sugar refineries across the country.
The greatest drop was experienced in the use of biomass (chiefly sugar cane bagasse). Hydroelectric
plants are the most widely used forms of primary energy production, while wind power generators
occupy the fifth place among renewable energy technologies used on the island.
In recent years, experts in the field have voiced complaints that Cuba’s Electricity Law does not
particularly encourage the use and commercial promotion of renewable energy sources.
The truth of the matter is that none of these sources of energy afford us one , magical solution to the
problem of the energy deficit, and many of these technologies pose serious bioethical questions . If
anything, they underscore the fact that the demands of contemporary society, engineered by global
capitalism, are insatiable.
The policy of development at all costs, planned obsolescence, the alienation of individuals and
collectives in productive processes, the outsourcing of production, the deification of consumption,
policies which protect banks and international financial institutions, these and many other problems
are at the root of the crisis faced by the energy sector and, I dare say, our civilization as a whole .
In the words of social anthropologist Emilio Santiago Muiño, “a sustainable system which is not
grounded in marketing implies a profound change in lifestyle.”
Cuban economists and politicians do not appear to be equipped with the mentality needed to
understand this. They are prey to the same ills mentioned above, and they are irresponsibly
supported, in their policies, by a good part of Cuba’s scientific community, which does little to re-think
the idea of “development” that prevails today.
At the recently-concluded world conference on wind power, Cuba sought to put together a business
portfolio with a view to signing international agreements and broadening productive capacities in the
sector.
This, which appears commendable, is congruous with the pragmatism of calculating analysts within and
outside Cuba, who seek a painless reinsertion of the island’s economy in the international market.
Politics
1nc general political capital link
The Cuba lobby will block the plan – it costs capital to get past it
LeoGrande, 13 - professor in the department of government at American University's School of Public
Affairs in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Cuba Lobby” Foreign Policy, 4/11,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the_cuba_lobby_jay_z
Today, U.S. relations with Latin America are suffering from an equally irrational policy toward Cuba -- a
policy designed in the 1960s to overthrow Fidel Castro's government and which, more than 50 years
later, is no closer to success. Like U.S. policy toward China in the 1950s and 1960s, policy toward Cuba is
frozen in place by a domestic political lobby, this one with roots in the electorally pivotal state of
Florida. The Cuba Lobby combines the carrot of political money with the stick of political denunciation
to keep wavering Congress members, government bureaucrats, and even presidents in line behind a
policy that, as President Barack Obama himself admits, has failed for half a century and is supported by
virtually no other countries. (The last time it came to a vote in the U.N. General Assembly, only Israel
and the Pacific island of Palau sided with the United States.) Of course, the news at this point is not that
a Cuba Lobby exists, but that it astonishingly lives on -- even during the presidency of Obama, who
publicly vowed to pursue a new approach to Cuba, but whose policy has been stymied thus far.
Like the China Lobby, the Cuba Lobby isn't one organization but a loose-knit conglomerate of exiles,
sympathetic members of Congress, and nongovernmental organizations, some of which comprise a selfinterested industry nourished by the flow of "democracy promotion" money from the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). And like its Sino-obsessed predecessor, the Cuba Lobby was
launched at the instigation of conservative Republicans in government who needed outside backers to
advance their partisan policy aims. In the 1950s, they were Republican members of Congress battling
New Dealers in the Truman administration over Asia policy. In the 1980s, they were officials in Ronald
Reagan's administration battling congressional Democrats over Central America policy.
At the Cuba Lobby's request, Reagan created Radio Martí, modeled on Radio Free Europe, to broadcast
propaganda to Cuba. He named Jorge Mas Canosa, founder of the Cuban American National Foundation
(CANF), to chair the radio's oversight board. President George H.W. Bush followed with TV Martí. Sen.
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.) authored the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act, writing the economic embargo into law so no president could change it without
congressional approval.
Founded at the suggestion of Richard V. Allen, Reagan's first national security advisor, CANF became one
of the most powerful ethnic foreign-policy organizations in the United States and was the linchpin of the
Cuba Lobby until Mas Canosa's death in 1997. "No individual had more influence over United States
policies toward Cuba over the past two decades than Jorge Mas Canosa," the New York Times
editorialized. In Washington, CANF built its reputation by spreading campaign contributions to bolster
friends and punish enemies. In 1988, CANF money helped Joe Lieberman defeat incumbent Sen. Lowell
Weicker, whom Lieberman accused of being soft on Castro because he visited Cuba and advocated
better relations. Weicker's defeat sent a chilling message to other members of Congress: challenge the
Cuba Lobby at your peril. In 1992, according to Peter Stone's reporting in National Journal, New Jersey
Democrat Sen. Robert Torricelli, seduced by the Cuba Lobby's political money, reversed his position on
Havana and wrote the Cuban Democracy Act, tightening the embargo. Today, the political action arm of
the Cuba Lobby is the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, which hands out more campaign dollars than CANF's
political action arm did even at its height -- more than $3 million in the last five national elections.
2nc general political capital links
Plan costs political capital
Grandin 10 – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” New Labor Forum, 19:1,
Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF
Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the
broader conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle
Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan
Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far
goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern
defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997, acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales
to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the lead).6
As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in
Mexico, said it would have to wait until next year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he
says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7 Obama could easily assemble a majority
coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of
the labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has
led him to back- burner the issue. The
same conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to
modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no
equivalent of North Korea or Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and
no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in the region, Venezuela, continues to sell
most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy
coalition to expend political capital on trying to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from
Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique ability to subsume
competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which
has led America to unprec- edented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous
overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power
centers—expansion has given way to involution. The
U.S. political system seems to be literally devouring itself from
within, paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust to a rapidly changing world. Unable to
leverage its soft, smart power even in its own hemisphere, Washington is ever more dependent on the
military and corpo- rate mercenary forces that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard
power in the Andes.
Travel ban link
Even lifting the travel ban is controversial in Congress
Hanson 9 - associate director and coordinating editor for the website of the Council on Foreign
Relations (Stephanie, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, 4-14, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03412.pdf)//ID
Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to
roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process
of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated
congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to include provisions easing travel and
trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. These provisions passed in a March 10 vote. "Whatever
we call it-- normalization, detente, rapproachement--I think it is clear that the policy process risks
falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.
Travel restrictions and export enhancement is unpopular – it is unpopular in the
House and is a large bill
WERNER, 10 – editor of the Cuba Standard (JOHANNES, “WINDOW OPENS TO LIFT CUBA TRAVEL
BAN”, July 11, 2010, lexis)//eek
As Spain's foreign minister put it during a press conference in Havana on Wednesday: The United States
"will have to take note."
The "Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act," which would lift travel restrictions for
all Americans and ease agricultural sales to Cuba, is the closest any major embargo-easing bill has ever
come to being signed into law. It enjoys a filibuster-proof majority in the U.S. Senate, and the president
has not indicated he would veto it should the bill make it to his desk.
But there's a hangup in the House of Representatives.
Supporters said two weeks ago they were 13 votes short should it come to a floor vote in the House. So
proponents and opponents of the bill are using all they have to pull fence-sitters on their side.
IFI inclusion link
Pursuing IFI membership is massively unpopular – Cuban-American lobby bullies
Congress even if the executive acts
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Diego, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
What, then, accounts for the anomaly of the empty Cuban seat at these international organizations?
The principal answer is as simple as it is disturbing: a relatively small but well placed and hard-charging
community of Cuban-American exiles . As will be explained toward the end of this section, U .S .
legislation mandates the U .S . executive director in the IFIs to oppose the admission of Cuba, and to
withhold U .S . payments to the IFIs should they approve assistance to Cuba over U .S . opposition .
Moreover, influential congressional representatives stand ready to hold legislation or personnel
confirmations of interest to the executive branch hostage to their Cuba-related concerns . To a
remarkable degree, the unyielding Cuban-American lobby has bullied the U .S . executive branch and
the IFI leadership into submission, even as many of their economists and staff understand that
excluding Cuba—or any country, for that matter—on political grounds runs counter to U .S . strategic
interests and core IFI norms . In U .S . debates on Cuba policy, there is no equally insistent counterlobby to balance the hard-line pro-sanctions faction .
Oil investment link
The plan is the worst nightmare for the Cuba lobby
Voss 11-staff writer for the BBC News in Havana
(Michael, “Cuban oil project fuels US anxieties” BBC News, November 15, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15737573)//HA
Oil windfall?
The anti-Castro groups want the administration to take action to halt the drilling altogether and not
just for safety reasons.
A major oil find would make this communist-run Caribbean island financially independent for the first
time since the revolution in 1959.
For more than half a century Cuba has been dependent on the largesse of its ideological allies. First it
was subsidised by the Soviet Union, then more recently Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, China.
Cuba has long produced some oil from a series of small onshore and coastal deposits.
Cuba already has a small domestic oil industry
Tourists going from Havana to the beach resort of Varadero drive past several kilometres of nodding
donkeys and the occasional Chinese or Canadian drilling rig.
Cuba currently produces about 53,000 barrels of oil a day but still needs to import about 100,000
barrels, mainly from Venezuela.
Its deep territorial waters, though, lie on the same geological strata as oil rich Mexico and the US Gulf.
Estimates on just how much offshore oil Cuba is sitting on vary. A US Geological Survey estimate
suggests 4.6bn barrels, the Cubans say 20bn.
Even the most conservative estimate would make Cuba a net oil exporter. A large find would provide
untold riches.
It is one of the US-based anti-Castro lobby's worst nightmares .
"The decaying Cuban regime is desperately reaching out for an economic lifeline, and it appears to
have found a willing partner in Repsol to come to its rescue," Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Cuban-born
Republican and Chairwoman of the influential House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement
recently.
The Florida Congresswoman and a group of 33 other legislators, both Republican and Democrat, wrote
to Repsol warning the company that the drilling could subject the company to "criminal and civil
liability in US courts".
Repsol responded saying that its exploratory wells complied with all current US legislation covering the
embargo as well as all safety regulations.
If oil exploration goes well, Cuba could meet its energy needs and become a net exporter
It has also agreed to allow US officials to conduct a safety inspection of the Chinese rig before it enters
Cuban waters.
Under the embargo it is limited to just 10% American technology.
The rig was fitted in Singapore and the one piece of US equipment which was installed was the blow-out
preventer.
It was the failure of BP's blow-out preventer which was at the heart of that disaster.
According to Lee Hunt, the Scarabeo 9 is a state of the art deep-water rig and there are six similar
platforms built at the same Chinese shipyard currently operating in US waters.
For the moment environmental concerns appear to be taking precedence over politics.
The government will take up Repsol's offer to inspect Scarabeo 9 and a limited number of licences have
been issued to US clean-up operators to enter Cuban waters and assist in the event of a spill.
But the arguments are far from over as environmentalists are pushing for greater co-operation while
Cuban-American groups are looking at ways to place legal and legislative hurdles in the way.
The plan will be spun by the Cuba lobby as giving Castro a new lease on life – they see
it as the equivalent of ending the embargo
Ravsberg 11-staff writer for Havana Times
(Fernando, “Cuba-Repsol Oil Operation Threatened” Havana Times, December 20, 2011,
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=58002)//HA
The possibility of Cuba becoming an oil-producing country is worrying politicians in the US. They have
therefore begun putting pressure on those firms operating in Cuban waters, particularly the Spanish
corporation Repsol, which will be the first to start drilling.
While Washington says it’s afraid of an oil spill, Cuban-American lawmakers are complaining that oil
finds could strengthen the Castro government, and US oil companies are alarmed by the idea of drilling
competition 60 miles off their shores.
For years there was speculation that Cuban waters could possess deep underwater oil reserves and,
paradoxically, the confirmation of this came from the US.
A study carried out in 2004 by the US Geological Service claimed that the Gulf area belonging to Cuba
had oil reserves estimated at 4.6 billion barrels, in addition to 2.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas and
900 million barrels of liquid natural gas.
Cuban sources now claim there are actually five times more than what the Americans identified.
Cuba parceled its 112,000 square kilometers of offshore Gulf waters into 59 blocks and signed
exploration contracts with various oil companies, which will take a percentage of any oil discovered or
lose their investment if they fail to find exploitable deposits.
The investments are huge, while exploration requires working at a depth of 1,700 meters with
sophisticated and expensive technology. An aggravating factor is that to avoid a legal problem with the
United States, no oil rig can have more than 10 percent of its components made in the USA, according
stipulations in Washington’s 50-year economic embargo against Cuba.
Repsol is the leading company working in the area and will start drilling early next month from its
Scarabeo 9 platform, manufactured especially for Cuba taking into account the constraints imposed by
the US.
Other companies are waiting in line to use that platform in the exploration of their own blocks.
Operating costs are so high that for oil companies to invest, they must have prior evidence that they will
find exploitable reserves.
Cuban-American representatives in the US Congress rapidly began pressuring Repsol and other oil
companies. Thirty-four federal lawmakers, led by Miami Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
demanded that the project be halted.
They claimed that discoveries would only serve to “finance the repressive apparatus,” arguing that the
Cuban government is looking for an “economic lifeline” while accusing Repsol of being a “partner
ready to rescue it.”
Since this political offensive didn’t work, they returned to the attack by questioning the safety of the
operation, given the catastrophe impact an oil spill would have on the coast of Florida.
In response, a group of US experts (led by William Reilly, the co-chair of the commission investigating
last year’s BP spill in the Gulf) was invited to the island this past September. He was accompanied by
Daniel Whittle, from the Environmental Defense Fund; and Lee Hunt, from the International Association
of Drilling Contractors. The three were “optimistic,” stressing the willingness of Cuban experts to
cooperate with the US and recognizing Repsol’s experience in this kind of operation.
Michael Bromwich, the head of the US Office of Environmental Safety, assured that “the exploration
plan by Repsol-YPF is sensitive to the political and environmental issues of the US, which wants to
protect the Florida coast from any oil spill while complying with the embargo against Cuba.”
He added that Washington is preparing licenses [to get around the blockade] so that US companies can
“deploy equipment for collecting oil, dispersants, pumps and other equipment and supplies needed to
minimize environmental damage in the event of a spill.”
As the blockade seeks to “weaken Cuba’s economy,” the discovery of reserves would neutralize that
attempt.
Therefore, Cuban-American politicians are not giving up on their efforts. They presented a bill that
would punish foreign oil firms if there were a spill.
Senator Bob Menendez, one of the bill’s sponsors, explained the purpose of this, saying, “Companies
that want to drill in Cuban waters will have to think twice if they know they’ll be held responsible for any
damage to the Florida Keys.”
The Cuba lobby demands crack downs on Cuban oil development – they think it
violates the embargo
Lobe 11- Washington bureau chief for Inter press services
(Jim, “Cuba-Repsol Rig Upsets Anti-Castroites” Havana Times, November 4, 2011,
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=54907)//HA
“We are extremely concerned over what seems to be a lack of a coordinated effort by the
Administration to prevent a State Sponsor of Terrorism, just 90 miles form our shores, from engaging in
risky deep sea oil drilling projects that will harm U.S. interests as well as extend another economic
lifeline to the Cuban regime,” complained four Cuban-American congressmen in a letter to Obama
earlier this week.
They demanded, among other things, that the administration investigate whether any part of the
Scarabeo has been made with U.S.- origin parts in violation of the 49-year-old U.S. trade embargo, and
whether Obama’s own Interior Department may itself be violating the law by providing Repsol with
technical advice.
“The administration needs to provide answers and change course,” said Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, one
of the four lawmakers and chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who in September also helped
persuade 35 of her House colleagues to sign a letter to Repsol’s chairman urging him to immediately
halt the company’s plans to drill.
The signatories included most lawmakers from Florida whose Gulf coast would almost certainly be
affected by any spill originating in the drilling area.
Oil spill coop link
Seeking safety technology licenses for oil spills causes Congressional backlash
Lobe 11- Washington bureau chief for Inter press services
(Jim, “Cuba-Repsol Rig Upsets Anti-Castroites” Havana Times, November 4, 2011,
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=54907)//HA
“First and foremost, the administration should take steps now to ensure that U.S.-based companies
are pre-authorised to assist in preventing and containing major oil spills in Cuban waters,” he testified.
“It’s critical to get U.S. companies into the act because of their technology, know-how, and proximity,”
agreed Jake Colvin, vice president of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), a business lobby that
represents major multi-national corporations here. “While the administration has the authority to
license a rapid response by those companies in the event of an accident, it hasn’t yet authorised it.”
“The reason they’re not issuing a general license is entirely political,” according to Sarah Stephen, the
director of the Washington-based Center for Democracy in the Americas, which has lobbied against the
embargo and last summer published a booklet on Cuba’s drilling plans.
“The administration clearly understands the urgency here, but it’s worried about the pressure from
Congress, especially from the Floridians,” she said.
Terror list link
Executive delisting Cuba diverts focus from immigration reform
Thale and Anderson, 13 – Program director and WOLA and a Senior Associate for Cuba at the Latin
America Working Group (Geoff and Mavis, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List”, 24 May
2013, http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list)//eek
Does this mean that the administration is no longer thinking about delisting Cuba? Should those of us
who support a more rational relationship between the United States and Cuba throw up our hands in
despair? No and no. The President can remove Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism at any
time. In fact, few observers expected Cuba to be removed from the terrorist list this spring anyway,
given the major legislative battles on immigration and gun violence prevention.
Delisting links – it is perceived and disliked
Thale and Anderson, 13 – Program director and WOLA and a Senior Associate for Cuba at the Latin
America Working Group (Geoff and Mavis, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List”, 24 May
2013, http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list)//eek
Importantly, the State Department will have many opportunities over the course of the year to take
the sensible step of removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. In fact, it is because of
this possibility that opponents of change are working so hard to convince the administration to sit on
its hands. Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio Sires recently sent a letter to
Secretary of State John Kerry asking him to keep Cuba on the list.
Removing Cuba from the terrorist list triggers hardline opposition
Ryan 13- former US diplomat
(Patrick, “Former U.S. diplomat Patrick Ryan: Time to drop Cuba from terror list” The Hill, 4/30/13,
http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/guest-commentary/296867-former-us-diplomat-patrick-ryan)//HA
As a former U.S. diplomat who authored the 2007-09 Country Reports on Terrorism for Nigeria and
visited Cuba many times on official business, I believe keeping Cuba on the list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism is absurd and highly political, particularly given its glaring omissions.
Where is North Korea, which has conducted small-scale attacks against the South over the past several
years — and recently threatened a nuclear first strike against the United States? Despite the fact that
Cuba maintains a capable espionage network, no credible intelligence sources claim it is currently a
security threat to us. Cuba’s listing is about Florida electoral politics.
A small minority of Cuban-American politicians has been dictating U.S. foreign policy toward one of
our most geographically proximate neighbors for too long — and using the highly questionable
terrorist listing to justify continuation of the Cold War-era embargo.
Ironically, these members of Congress support Cubans’ ability freedom to travel to the United States
but not Americans’ freedom to travel to Cuba, and use the terrorist justification for this. If we truly
want to undermine the Castro regime, the best way would be to end the listing, including the embargo
and travel ban, and flood Cuba with American visitors, as well as our products and democratic ideas.
Ending the restrictions would also demonstrably help the Cuban people — a stated aim of these same
politicians.
GOP opposes lifting embargo
Key Republicans want the embargo
Hanson and Lee, 13-Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, the website of the
Council on Foreign Relations. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic
and political development in Africa and Latin America. Lee is the Senior Production Editor of CFR.org
(Stephanie Hanson and Brianna Lee, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1/31/13,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)//TL
Ending the economic embargo against Cuba would require congressional approval. Opinions in Congress
are mixed: A group of influential Republican lawmakers from Florida, including former representative
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, his brother Mario Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen are stridently anti-Castro.
Still, many favor improving relations with Cuba. In 2009, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the top-ranking
Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released a report calling for U.S. policy changes.
He said: "We must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in
a way that enhances U.S. interests" (PDF).
They’re the rising stars of the party and the most powerful
White, 13-Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay
and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times,
3/7/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latinamerica.html?pagewanted=all)//TL
And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will
retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that
two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of
Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of
Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is
the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a
continuing ethics controversy.)
AT: Plan uses the executive
Plan still requires massive amounts of capital – it takes strong-arming to get it through
the executive branch and Congress will try to block it because of the Cuba lobby
LeoGrande, 13 - professor in the department of government at American University's School of Public
Affairs in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Cuba Lobby” Foreign Policy, 4/11,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the_cuba_lobby_jay_z
Like the China Lobby before it, the Cuba Lobby has also struck fear into the heart of the foreign-policy
bureaucracy. The congressional wing of the Cuba Lobby, in concert with its friends in the executive
branch, routinely punishes career civil servants who don't toe the line. One of the Cuba Lobby's early
targets was John J. "Jay" Taylor, chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, who was given an
unsatisfactory annual evaluation report in 1988 by Republican stalwart Elliott Abrams, then assistant
secretary of state for inter-American affairs, because Taylor reported from Havana that the Cubans were
serious about wanting to negotiate peace in southern Africa and Central America. "CANF had close
contact with the Cuban desk, which soon turned notably unfriendly toward my reporting from post and
it seemed toward me personally," Taylor recalled in an oral history interview. "Mas and the foundation
soon assumed that I was too soft on Castro."
The risks of crossing the Cuba Lobby were not lost on other foreign-policy professionals. In 1990, Taylor
was in Washington to consult about the newly launched TV Martí, which the Cuban government was
jamming so completely that Cubans on the island dubbed it, "la TV que no se ve" ("No-see TV"). But TV
Martí's patrons in Washington blindly insisted that the vast majority of the Cuban population was
watching the broadcasts. Taylor invited the U.S. Information Agency officials responsible for TV Martí to
come to Cuba to see for themselves. "Silence prevailed around the table," he recalled. "I don't think
anyone there really believed TV Martí signals were being received in Cuba. It was a Kafkaesque moment,
a true Orwellian experience, to see a room full of grown, educated men and women so afraid for their
jobs or their political positions that they could take part in such a charade."
In 1993, the Cuba Lobby opposed the appointment of President Bill Clinton's first choice to be assistant
secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Mario Baeza, because he had once visited Cuba. According
to Stone, fearful of the Cuba Lobby's political clout, Clinton dumped Baeza. Two years later, Clinton
caved in to the Cuba Lobby's demand that he fire National Security Council official Morton Halperin,
who was the architect of the successful 1995 migration accord with Cuba that created a safe, legal route
for Cubans to emigrate to the United States. One chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Cuba told me he
stopped sending sensitive cables to the State Department altogether because they so often leaked to
Cuba Lobby supporters in Congress. Instead, the diplomat flew to Miami so he could report to the
department by telephone.
During George W. Bush's administration, the Cuba Lobby completely captured the State Department's
Latin America bureau (renamed the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs). Bush's first assistant
secretary was Otto Reich, a Cuban-American veteran of the Reagan administration and favorite of Miami
hard-liners. Reich had run Reagan's "public diplomacy" operation demonizing opponents of the
president's Central America policy as communist sympathizers. Reich hired as his deputy Dan Fisk,
former staff assistant to Senator Helms and author of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.
Reich was followed by Roger Noriega, another former Helms staffer, who explained that Bush's policy
was aimed at destabilizing the Cuban regime: "We opted for change even if it meant chaos. The Cubans
had had too much stability over decades.… Chaos was necessary in order to change reality."
In 2002, Bush's undersecretary for arms control and international security, John Bolton, made the
dubious charge that Cuba was developing biological weapons. When the national intelligence officer for
Latin America, Fulton Armstrong, (along with other intelligence community analysts) objected to this
mischaracterization of the community's assessment, Bolton and Reich tried repeatedly to have him
fired. The Cuba Lobby began a steady drumbeat of charges that Armstrong was a Cuban agent because
his and the community's analysis disputed the Bush team's insistence that the Castro regime was fragile
and wouldn't survive the passing of its founder. The 2001 arrest for espionage of the Defense
Intelligence Agency's top Cuba analyst, Ana Montes, heightened the Cuba Lobby's hysteria over traitors
in government in the same way that the spy cases of the 1950s -- Alger Hiss and the Amerasia magazine
affair -- gave the China Lobby ammunition. Armstrong was subjected to repeated and intrusive security
investigations, all of which cleared him of wrongdoing. (He completed a four-year term as national
intelligence officer and received a prestigious CIA medal recognizing his service when he left the agency
in 2008.)
When Obama was elected president, promising a "new beginning" in relations with Havana, the Cuba
Lobby relied on its congressional wing to stop him. Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), the senior CubanAmerican Democrat in Congress and now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
vehemently opposes any opening to Cuba. In March 2009, he signaled his willingness to defy both his
president and his party to get his way. Menendez voted with Republicans to block passage of a $410
billion omnibus appropriations bill (needed to keep the government running) because it relaxed the
requirement that Cuba pay in advance for food purchases from U.S. suppliers and eased restrictions on
travel to the island. To get Menendez to relent, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner had to promise in
writing that the administration would consult Menendez on any change in U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Senate Republicans also blocked confirmation of Arturo Valenzuela as Obama's assistant secretary for
Western Hemisphere affairs until November 2009. With the bureau managed in the interim by Bush
holdovers, no one was pushing from below to carry out Obama's new Cuba policy. After Valenzuela
stepped down in 2012, Senator Rubio (R-Fla.), whose father left Cuba in the 1950s, held up confirmation
of Valenzuela's replacement, Roberta Jacobson, until the administration agreed to tighten restrictions
on educational travel to Cuba, undercutting Obama's stated policy of increasing people-to-people
engagement.
When Obama nominated career Foreign Service officer Jonathan Farrar to be ambassador to Nicaragua,
the Cuba Lobby denounced him as soft on communism. During his previous posting as chief of the U.S.
diplomatic mission in Havana, Farrar had reported to Washington that Cuba's traditional dissident
movement had very little appeal to ordinary Cubans. Menendez and Rubio teamed up to give Farrar a
verbal beating during his confirmation hearing for carrying out Obama's policy of engaging the Cuban
government rather than simply antagonizing it. When they blocked Farrar's confirmation, Obama
withdrew the nomination, sending Farrar as ambassador to Panama instead. Their point made,
Menendez and Rubio did not object.
The Cuba Lobby's power to derail diplomatic careers is common knowledge among foreign-policy
professionals. Throughout Obama's first term, midlevel State Department officials cooperated more
closely and deferred more slavishly to congressional opponents of Obama's Cuba policy than to
supporters like John Kerry, the new secretary of state who served at the time as Senate Foreign
Relations Committee chairman. When Senator Kerry tried to get the State Department and USAID to
reform the Bush administration's democracy-promotion programs in 2010, he ran into more
opposition from the bureaucracy than from Republicans. If Obama intends to finally keep the 2008
campaign promise to take a new direction in relations with Cuba, the job can't be left to foreign-policy
bureaucrats, who are so terrified of the Cuba Lobby that they continue to believe, or pretend to
believe, absurdities -- that Cubans are watching TV Martí, for instance, or that Cuba is a state sponsor of
terrorism. Only a determined president and a tough secretary of state can drive a new policy through
a bureaucratic wasteland so paralyzed by fear and inertia.
Plan costs capital even if a unilateral executive action – there will still be a fight
Piccone, 13 – senior fellow at Brookings (Ted, “Time to Bet on Cuba” The Hill, 3/18,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/18-cuba-piccone)
Cuba’s efforts to “update” its socialist system through a series of economic reforms just got more
complicated. The death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, its principal benefactor, could seriously disrupt
what is already a precarious process of maintaining top-down political control while liberalizing
elements of the economy. Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will step down in five years and the
emergence of younger leaders born after the 1959 revolution add further uncertainty to the island’s
future.
These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an
outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement. In his second term in
office, he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that
will advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba.
Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the
economy. Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire
employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing. The updating
of the Soviet-style economic system is a gradual and highly controlled process. But the recent legal
emergence of formal, small-scale private businesses (cuentapropistas) that can now compete on a more
equal footing with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking already
under way on the island. The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.
Castro’s loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, the Cuban government
lifted exit controls for most citizens, which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the
Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States,
demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. The gradual handoff of
power to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace
and scope of the reform process is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to
securing a viable legacy.
The U.S. approach to Cuba has likewise undergone important changes since Obama took office. Since
the expansion of travel and remittances in 2009, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban
Americans living in the United States have sent more than $2 billion to relatives there, providing
important fuel to the burgeoning private sector and empowering citizens to be less dependent on the
Cuban state.
Much more, however, could be done. In his second term, Obama has a wealth of policy options available
to him through executive authority that would reframe U.S. support for the Cuban people and advance
U.S. national interests.
In his second term, the president can (and should):
Appoint a special envoy to open a discrete dialogue with Havana without preconditions to discuss such
issues as migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, energy and the environment, and
trade and investment. Such talks could result in provisions that strengthen border security, protect
Florida from oil spills, break down the walls of communication that prevent our diplomats from traveling
outside Havana and help U.S. businesses export more goods, and thereby create jobs.
Authorize financial and technical assistance to support burgeoning small businesses and permit trade in
goods and services with certified independent entrepreneurs.
Expand the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including school and art supplies, water and food
preparation systems and telecommunications equipment.
Grant general licenses for journalists, researchers, humanitarian organizations and others to facilitate
people-to-people exchanges.
Remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it does not belong, allowing a greater
share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce.
This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations
and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant
pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step
with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama’s share of the Cuban-American vote
increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating
that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous
Cuba.
Plan saps polcap – even democrats don’t like it and it is high visibility
LeoGrande, 13 – is a professor in the department of government at American University's School of
Public Affairs (William, “The Danger of Dependence: Cuba's Foreign Policy After Chavez”, 02 Apr 2013,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12840/the-danger-of-dependence-cubas-foreign-policyafter-chavez)//eek
But the momentum in Washington soon dissipated in the face of more pressing foreign policy
priorities, opposition from Congress, even among some Democrats, and resistance from an inertial
State Department bureaucracy more comfortable with the familiar policy of the past -- its failure
notwithstanding -- than the risk of trying something new. As a former senior State Department official
explained, high-visibility foreign policy changes of this magnitude only happen if the president
demands that they happen , and Obama's attention was focused elsewhere. In December 2009,
Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a consultant for the U.S. Agency for International Development's
"democracy promotion" programs, brought all progress to a halt. At the end of Obama's first term,
relations with Cuba were not much better than at the start.
AT: Cuba lobby decreasing
The Cuba Lobby persists despite that the majority of Cuban Americans want
engagement
LeoGrande, 13 - professor in the department of government at American University's School of Public
Affairs in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Cuba Lobby” Foreign Policy, 4/11,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/11/the_cuba_lobby_jay_z
The irrationality of U.S. policy does not stem just from concerns about electoral politics in Florida. The
Cuban-American community has evolved to the point that a majority now favors engagement with
Cuba, as both opinion polls and Obama's electoral success in 2008 and 2012 demonstrate. Today, the
larger problem is the climate of fear in the government bureaucracy, where even honest reporting
about Cuba -- let alone advocating a more sensible policy -- can endanger one's career. Democratic
presidents, who ought to know better, have tolerated this distortion of the policy process and at times
have reinforced it by allowing the Cuba lobby to extort concessions from them. But the cost is high -- the
gradual and insidious erosion of the government's ability to make sound policy based on fact rather than
fantasy.
Through bullying and character assassination, the China Lobby blocked a sensible U.S. policy toward
Beijing for a quarter-century, with tragic results. When Richard Nixon finally defied the China Lobby by
going to Beijing in 1972, the earth did not tremble, civilization did not collapse, and U.S. security did not
suffer. If anything, U.S. allies around the world applauded the adoption -- finally -- of a rational policy. At
home, the punditocracy was surprised to discover that Nixon's bold stroke was politically popular. The
China Lobby proved to be a paper tiger; the Red Scare fever of the 1950s had subsided, robbing the
movement of its political base.
Likewise, the Cuba Lobby has blocked a sensible policy toward Cuba for half a century, with growing
damage to U.S. relations with Latin America. When a courageous U.S. president finally decides to defy
the Cuba Lobby with a stroke as bold as Nixon's trip to China, she or he will discover that so too the
Cuba Lobby no longer has the political clout it once had. The strategic importance of repairing the
United States' frayed relations with Latin America has come to outweigh the political risk of
reconciliation with Havana. Nixon went to China, and history records it as the highlight of his checkered
legacy. Will Barack Obama have the courage to go to Havana?
Political opposition outweighs the turn
Ratliff, 13 - research fellow and former curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution. He
is also a research fellow of the Independent Institute. An expert on Latin America, China, and US foreign
policy, he has written extensively on how traditional cultures and institutions influence current
conditions and on prospects for economic and political development in East/Southeast Asia and Latin
America (William, “Cuba's Tortured Transition” 1/30,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281
A New Policy to Cuba
Since the early 1990s U.S. “proactive” policies have done more to stoke than reduce domestic tensions
in Cuba, though we profess to seek a “peaceful transition.” Most U.S. legislators have supported proembargo Cuban-Americans even though Gallup polls have long shown that most Americans favor
diplomatic relations with Havana and lifting the embargo. On balance, politicians don’t think Cuba
policy is important enough to be worth stirring up the hornets in the still fairly militant and wellfinanced pro-embargo lobby. Not only have all presidential candidates including Obama supported the
embargo, most have resisted even seriously discussing it.
Even if Cubans and Florida have changed their minds congress hasn’t – the plan is
unpopular – republicans are stubborn
Thale, 13 – a Program director at WOLA (Geoff, “The Writing is on the Wall: The Cuban-American Vote
and the Future of U.S. Policy toward Cuba", 8 Nov 2012,
http://www.wola.org/commentary/the_writing_is_on_the_wall)//eek
Advocates of change in U.S. policy toward Cuba have long argued that the community is shifting:
newer immigrants and younger Cuban-American voters are less committed to continuing the U.S.
embargo of Cuba, and U.S. policy toward Cuba is less of a priority issue for them than it was for the
previous generation. Defenders of hardline policies toward Cuba have always responded that CubanAmerican voting gives the lie to this argument (see the post-election commentary by Capitol Hill
Cubans, here). They point to the continuing support for hardline positions in Congress and in the
Florida legislature, and they emphasize the modest support for presidential candidates who have
more pro-engagement positions. “Where’s the beef?” has been their essential response.
AT: Links assume lifting the embargo
Anything positive action toward Cuba links
Ayuso and Risco, 13 – are writers for the Havana Times (Silvia and Isaac, “Cuba/USA to Resume
Immigration Talks”, June 20, 2013, http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94992)//eek
The remark mirrors one made earlier this week, when the U.S. State Department confirmed that a new
2-day bilateral meeting would be held in Washington to explore the possibility to re-establishing
direct correspondence channels between Cuba and the United States, eliminated over fifty years ago.
The fact of the matter is that any gesture towards Cuba that Washington essays is often vehemently
condemned by a sizable group of legislators who are opposed to any kind of rapprochement with
the island.
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Cuban-born Republican Congresswoman for Florida Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who condemned this last
meeting before it was even held, is one case in point.
“The regime is once again manipulating the US administration in this game because they want us to lift
the blockade and make further concessions,” the legislator stated.
Any small action links – hardliners hate any engagement with Cuba
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
In the interim, these recommendations could make an important difference. They would put the
interests of the United States into alignment with the humanitarian interests of the Cuban people, send
a long overdue message of encouragement to the advocates of reform on the island, and demonstrate
that our country is finally ready to move beyond Cold War policies of the past and modernize our
approach toward Cuba for the 21st Century. None of these actions would sit well with the hardest of
the hardliners in the Cuban American community or their representatives in Washington. Their terms
of surrender for Cuba, as Phil Peters pointed out in his Cuban Triangle Blog, are written into the
statutes of the U.S. embargo. In Congress, legislators including Representatives Mario Díaz-Balart,
David Rivera and others, are trying to reverse President Obama’s travel reforms, dialing back family
travel and remittances to the levels imposed by President Bush.134 They will certainly fight actions
that loosen restrictions to help push along Cuba’s economic reforms.
Even smaller mechanisms and executive actions spark backlash in Congress
Piccone 13 –Deputy Director of Foreign Policy at Brookings (Ted, “Opening to Havana”, January 17,
2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana)//eek
Under this chapeau of direct talks, your administration can seek a negotiated solution to the thorny
issue of U.S. and Cuban citizens serving long prison sentences, thereby catalyzing progress toward
removing a major obstacle to improving bilateral relations.
You should, in parallel, also take unilateral steps to expand direct contacts with the Cuban people by:
• authorizing financial and technical assistance to the burgeoning class of small businesses and
cooperatives and permitting Americans to donate and trade in goods and services with those that are
certified as independent entrepreneurs, artists, farmers, professionals and craftspeople;
• adding new categories for general licensed travel to Cuba for Americans engaged in services to the
independent economic sector, e.g., law, real estate, insurance, accounting, financial services;
• granting general licenses for other travelers currently authorized only under specific licenses, such as
freelance journalists, professional researchers, athletes, and representatives of humanitarian
organizations and private foundations;
• increasing or eliminating the cap on cash and gifts that non- Cuban Americans can send to
individuals, independent businesses and families in Cuba;
• eliminating the daily expenditure cap for U.S. citizens visiting Cuba and removing the prohibition on
the use of U.S. credit and bank cards in Cuba;
• authorizing the reestablishment of ferry services to Cuba;
• expanding the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including items like school and art supplies,
athletic equipment, water and food preparation systems, retail business machines, and
telecommunications equipment (currently allowed only as donations).
The steps recommended above would give your administration the tools to have a constructive dialogue
with the Cuban government based on a set of measures that 1) would engage Cuban leaders in highlevel, face-to-face negotiations on matters that directly serve U.S. interests in a secure, stable,
prosperous and free Cuba; and 2) allow you to assert executive authority to take unilateral steps that
would increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress.
To take this step, you will have to contend with negative reactions from a vocal, well-organized
minority of members of Congress who increasingly are out of step with their constituents on this issue.
Your initiative should be presented as a set of concrete measures to assist the Cuban people, which is
well within current congressional mandates, and as a way to break the stalemate in resolving the case of
U.S. citizen Alan Gross (his wife is calling for direct negotiations). Those are winnable arguments. But
you will need to be prepared for some unhelpful criticism along the way.
There is massive republican opposition to weakening the embargo – human rights,
democracy, Iran, and narcotics
Isacson, 10 – senior associate and director of the regional security program at WOLA (Adam, “The
House Republicans and Latin America”, 3 Nov 2010,
http://www.wola.org/the_house_republicans_and_latin_america)//eek
Having majority control of a chamber of Congress means having overwhelming control of that
chamber’s agenda. In the House, the Republican Party leadership will decide what legislation gets
debated and voted on the floor (in plenary). It gets to write the first draft of every budget bill, starting
next year with those for 2012. And they get the chairmanships of all committees, which hold hearings,
draft and approve legislation.
Legislation approved by the House must also pass the Democratic-controlled Senate. The two houses
must then reconcile differences in the legislation, which may prove to be very difficult. Then, bills
must ultimately be signed into law by Democratic President Barack Obama, who could refuse to do so
if he objects strongly to provisions that come out of the Republican House’s version.
What this means for Latin America
In general, the new Republican House majority favors:
A tougher stance toward leftist governments, especially Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia.
Legislative efforts to soften the Cuba trade embargo or travel ban will face huge obstacles . Expect
more resolutions, legislative language and hearings criticizing human rights abuses, evidence of
democratic weakening, ties to Iran and other non-democratic regimes, or increased narcotrafficking
activity in Venezuela or Bolivia.
Easing the embargo is enough to trigger the link
Goodman, 13-Reporter for Bloomberg News (Joshua, “Obama Can Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open
Economy, Groups Say”, Bloomberg, 2/20/13, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obamashould-bend-cuba-embargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html)//TL
The Washington-based Cuba Study Group urges Obama to gain even more leverage by getting Congress
to repeal the so-called Helms-Burton act of 1996 and other legislation that conditions the easing of
sanctions on regime change.
Any move to ease the five-decade-old embargo would probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in
Florida, one of the biggest prizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers
including Senator Robert Menendez, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
A bill introduced by Representative Jose Serrano, a New York Democrat, in the 112th Congress to
dismantle the web of legislation governing relations with Cuba since as early as the 1960s received no
co-sponsors.
Another obstacle to an improvement in relations is the fate of U.S. contractor Alan Gross, who remains
jailed in a Havana prison three years after he was arrested on charges of spying for carrying
telecommunications equipment to the island.
A delegation of U.S. lawmakers led by Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democrat from Vermont, is in Cuba this
week and is expected to meet with Gross and seek his immediate release.
Commie Creep DA
1nc – Commie Creep
Reforms now because of economic pressure – it will end Cuban communism
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
RECENT ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES IN CUBA SIGNAL THE END OF OPPRESSIVE CUBAN RULE
Economic pressure has been weighing heavy on the Castro regime, foreshadowing an end to its
oppressive rule over Cuba. 82 When asked if Cuba's economic system was still worth exporting, Fidel
Castro admitted, "[t]he Cuban model doesn't even work for us any more."83 Stephen Wilkinson, a Cuba
expert at the London Metropolitan University, notes that Castro's words FALL 2011 are not a
condemnation of socialism but rather "an acknowledgement that the way in which the Cuban system is
organised has to change ... [w]e can now expect a lot more changes and perhaps more rapid changes as
a consequence."84 Fidel's departure as the leader of Cuba and Raul's subsequent economic reforms are
indicative of imminent political changes, and signal the end of communism in Cuba.85 These
developments may result in an improvement in Cuban human rights and social conditions. For
example, Raul has already eased the impact of the world food crisis, released prisoners, and
commuted death sentences.86
Expanding economic engagement provides profits to the regime to finance the
expansion of communism globally and strengthen Cuban alliances with rogue states
Brookes, 9 - Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation (Peter, “Keep the
Embargo, O” 4/16, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)
Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which
undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's
part, of course.
Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin
American Left.
Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad .
The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot
on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough
already.
The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people
enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.
Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the
domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.
We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin
America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with
a revitalized Cuba.)
With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like
Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western
Hemisphere.
The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the
early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast
that with the 1980s some time.
Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free.
Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.
The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal
repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?
Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should
hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.
The spread of communism causes mass exterminations globally
Kors, Professor of History at University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, 2001 (Alan Charles, “Triumph without Self-Belief,” Orbis, Summer, ebsco)
The most that can be said in communism's favor is that it was capable of building, by means of, slave
labor and terror, a simulacrum of Gary, Indiana, once only, without ongoing maintenance, and minus the
good stuff. Secondly, voluntary exchange among individuals held morally responsible under the rule of
law has demonstrably created the means of both prosperity and diverse social options. Such a model
has been a precondition of individuation and freedom, whereas regimes of central planning have
created poverty, and (as Hayek foresaw) ineluctable developments toward totalitarianism and the worst
abuses of power. Dynamic free-market societies, grounded in rights-based individualism, have altered the entire human conception of freedom and dignity for formerly
marginalized groups. The entire "socialist experiment," by contrast, ended in stasis, ethnic hatreds, the absence of even the minimal preconditions of economic, social, and political renewal,
Thirdly, the willingness to contain communism, to fight its
expansion overtly and covertly, to sacrifice wealth and often lives against its heinous efforts at
extension--in Europe, Vietnam, Central Asia, Central America, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and, indeed,
Grenada--was, with the struggle against Nazism over a much briefer period, the great gift of American
taxpayers and the American people to planet earth. As Britain under Churchill was "the West" in 1940, so was the United States from 1945 to 1989,
and categorical contempt for both individuation and minority rights.
drawing from its values to stand against what was simultaneously its mutant offspring and its antithesis. In the twentieth century, the West met and survived its greatest trial. On the whole,
however, Western intellectuals do not revel in these triumphs, to say the least. Where is the celebration? Just as important, where is the accounting? On the Left, to have either would be to
We have seen myriad documentaries on the
collective and individual suffering of the victims of Nazism, but where is the Shoah, or the Night and Fog,
let alone the Nuremberg trails of the postcommunist present? As Solzhenitsyn predicted repeatedly in
The Gulag Archipelago, the countless victims who froze to death or were maimed in the Arctic death
camps would go unremembered; the officers and guards who broke their bodies and often their souls
would live out their lives on pensions, unmolested; and those who gave the orders would die peacefully
and unpunished. Our documentary makers and moral intellectuals do not let us forget any victim of the
Holocaust. We hunt down ninety-year-old guards so that the bones of the dead might have justice, and
properly so. The bones of Lenin's and Stalin's and Brezhnev's camps cry out for justice, as do the bones
of North Vietnam's exterminations, and those of Poi Pot's millions, and Mao's tens of millions. In those cases,
implicate one's own thought and will in the largest crime and folly in the history of mankind.
however, the same intellectuals cry out against--what is their phrase?--"witch-hunts," and ask us to let the past be the past. We celebrated the millennium with jubilation; we have not yet
celebrated the triumph of the West. Ask American high school or even college students to number Hitler's victims and Columbus's victims, and they will answer, for both, in the tens of
millions. Ask them to number Stalin's victims and, if my experience is typical, they will answer in the thousands. Such is their education, even now. The absence of celebration, of teaching the
Convinced that the West above all has been the
source of artificial relationships of dominance and subservience, the commodification of human life, and
ecocide, leftist intellectuals have little interest in objectively analyzing the manifest data about societies
of voluntary exchange, or in coming to terms with the slowly and newly released data about the conditions of life and death under the Bolsheviks and their heirs, or in
lessons learned, and of demands for accountability is perhaps easily understood on the Left.
confirming or refuting various theories on the outcome of the Cold War (let alone, given their contemporary concerns, in analyzing ecological or gender politics under communist or Third
World regimes). Less obvious, but equally striking in some ways, has been the absence of celebration on so much of the intellectual Right, because it is not at all certain something worth calling
Western civilization did in fact survive the twentieth century.
Links – removing sanctions
Lifting sanctions consolidates the regime’s power by creating a new influx of cash – it
allows Cuba to fund global terrorism
Menges, 8 – Editor in Chief of the Americas Report (Nancy, “CUBA'S FUTURE”, Congressional
Testimony, March 5, 2008, lexis)//eek
Contrary to critics' claims, lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in
Cuba will have several negative repercussions. First, it will send a poor message about U.S. toleration
both of Cuba's patterns of unsavory behavior and its totalitarian system. Second, a cessation of the
embargo will strengthen state enterprises since most Cuban businesses are run by the state and since
the Cuban government retains a partnership interest in all foreign investment. Third, it will lead to
greater domestic repression and control because the leadership fears the "subversive" effects of U.S.
influence upon the Cuban people. Thus, a transition to democracy on the island will be delayed. Finally,
the regime in Havana will gain access to financial benefits from international organizations such as the
IMF and the World Bank that could help it resolve its debt and solvency concerns.[3]
The embargo should only be lifted when Cuba changes its current system and develops a democratic
society. U.S. policy towards Cuba is not anachronistic but is rather aimed at the legitimate goal of a free
Cuba; the lifting of the embargo now will be an important psychological victory for Castro and would be
interpreted as a defeat for U.S. policy. There is also no indication that negotiation and incentives can
influence Cuba, which has ignored such "carrot and stick" approaches in the past. Without major
internal reforms in Cuba, the Castro government - not the Cuban people - will be the main beneficiary
of the lifting of the embargo, since it will use this newly acquired wealth to strengthen its hold on the
Cuban people, to rebuild its military apparatus, and to engage again in supporting anti-American
terrorist and violent groups in Latin America and elsewhere.
Lifting the embargo provides a lifeline to the regime, collapses regional democracy
and eliminates US credibility
Suchlicki, 7 – Professor History and Director Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (Jaime,
“AGRICULTURAL AND MEDICAL TRADE WITH CUBA”, Congressional Testimony, December 11, 2007,
lexis)//eek
A change in U.S. policy toward Cuba may have different and unintended results. The lifting of the
embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will:
-- Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures;
-- Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses owned by the Cuban
government. Most businesses are owned in Cuba by the state and, in all foreign investments, the Cuban
government retains a partnership interest.
-- Lead to greater repression and control since the Cuban leadership will fear that U.S. influence will
subvert the revolution and weaken the Communist party's hold on the Cuban people.
-- Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy in the island.
-- Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations. Loans will be wasted by Cuba's inefficient
and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Cuba has been unable to pay back loans to
other countries is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because its economic system stifles productivity
and the Castro brothers continue to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a
bankrupt welfare system in the island.
-- Perpetuate the rather extensive control that the military holds over the economy and foster the
further development of "mafia type" groups that manage and profit from important sectors of the
economy, particularly tourism, biotechnology , and agriculture.
-- Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin America since the Ford/Carter era, which emphasize
democracy, human rights, and market economies, and send the wrong message to Latin American
democracies that the U.S. is willing to support a military dictatorship in Cuba and a succession of
power to General Raul Castro.
-- Send the wrong message to the enemies of the U.S.: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties
without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at
the U.S.; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the U.S. will
"forget and forgive," and reward him with tourism, investments an economic aid. Specific
considerations:
Lifting the embargo sends international signal of ceding influence
Anne-Geyer 2k – Universal Press syndicate (Georgie, “Ending The Cuban Embargo Would Perpetuate
Castro's Totalitarian Control,” 7/7/00, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-0707/news/0007070222_1_cuban-american-studies-trade-embargo-free-elian)//SJF
This new "make peace with Cuba" lobby is to be found every day in the press and in Congress arguing that the lifting of the embargo would
serve to open up Cuba, to give the Cuban people a whiff of freedom, and to introduce free trade (and American profits) to the closed island. But
is that really true? Oddly enough, until now the embargo has been defined in the U.S. almost exclusively in terms of ideological preference
and/or commercial wish fulfillment, and pathetically little research has been done on what the lifting of the trade embargo would really mean.
But now, we
have a major "occasional paper" on the subject, which clarifies the results, were the
embargo to be lifted. Professor Jaime Suchlicki, director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of
Miami, says lifting the embargo and travel ban, without meaningful changes in Cuba, will: - Guarantee the continuation of
the current totalitarian structures. - Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into
businesses owned by the Cuban government. - Lead to greater repression and control since Castro and
the leadership will fear that U.S. influence will subvert the revolution. - Delay instead of accelerate a transition to
democracy on the island. - Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars and has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new loans will be wasted by Castro's
inefficient system and will be uncollectible. - Perpetuate
the control that the military holds over the economy and
foster the further development of mafia-type groups. - Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin
America, which emphasize democracy, human rights and market economies. - Send the wrong
message to the enemies of the United States: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without
compensation, allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the U.S.,
espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the U.S. will "forget and
forgive," and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. It is likely that, if we were to open trade,
tourism and perhaps even diplomatic relations with Cuba for the first time since the early l960s, we would be in the same situation we find
ourselves in with Russia. Remember the early '90s, when Washington was going to transform Russia through the same vehicles? Instead,
Russians today angrily blame the U.S. for their failures. That is a very real risk of meddling innocently with totalitarian structures. We can also
be assured that thousands of well-meaning Americans would attempt to get to Cuba to save the Cubans from themselves. But Castro, one of
the coolest and most manipulative customers of the 20th Century, will involve these new Americanos in Cuba and ensure that they cannot
leave with their reputations intact. Then he will also have another guilty ready-made lobby to Washington, even while the "Free Elian!" rallies
continue. Finally, the
United States does not have diplomats with enough shrewdness or savvy to deal
effectively with Castro. Our present-day diplomats tend to want, above all, to make peace and to do good. There is almost an
embarrassment, particularly in this administration, with the idea of representing American interests,
much less with having the toughness to force through quid-pro-quo policies and programs that might
seriously initiate change in Cuba. All we would succeed in doing then is to help Castro cement his power--and, by
the way, to look once again like a clueless superpower. That is why, when Americans now talk so enthusiastically about
opening up Cuba and about liberalizing the communist state, I check for my wallet. I know who's already reaching for it.
Links – energy cooperation
Pressure causes a political transition – opening Cuba to oil drilling derails it
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and flowed in severity and support. While the
measure seems to be increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime characterized by
intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to
blame Cuba's failures,94 recent changes suggest the embargo is indeed close to accomplishing its
goals.95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil producers, want the embargo dropped.
Regardless of criticism, the embargo must remain in place until its goals are met. Environmental fears
can be effectively countered through bilateral response and preparation agreements with Cuba. Also,
economic and energy needs are more properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately,
with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan's bill, the United States should exercise its political and
economic power to pressure foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The United States
can dissuade foreign investment without compromising the embargo. It appears an end to oppressive
communist rule in Cuba is nearing. Now is the time for the United States to both reject offshore
drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in meeting the goals of the economic embargo.
lifting the embargo on oil sends a signal to countries that America is weak
Claver-Carone, 11 – Executive Director of the Cuba Democracy Advocates (“GULF COAST OIL SPILL
INVESTIGATION REPORT; COMMITTEE: HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES”, November 2, 2011, lexis)//eek
Cuba is a totalitarian dictatorship. It is the sole remaining dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere.
Therefore, it should not be viewed through the same lens as its democratic neighbors, the Bahamas and
Mexico -- nor should it be treated in the same manner.
The Bahamas and Mexico are allies of the United States. We share a relationship of trust and
cooperation with these two friendly nations. Meanwhile, the Cuban regime remains under U.S.
sanctions, which Congress codified into law under the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act, due to three fundamental reasons: 1. the brutal violations of the Cuban people's human, civil,
political and economic rights. 2. its hostile anti- American policies. 3. the illegal expropriation of
properties belonging to U.S. nationals.
Moreover, Cuba remains one of four countries designated by the U.S. Government as a state-sponsor
of terrorism based on its harboring of fugitives (including the murderers of U.S. law enforcement
officials); its unwillingness to cooperate with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts; its intelligence gathering and
sharing with other rogue regimes; and its support for foreign terrorist organizations. The other three
countries on the state-sponsors of terrorism list are Iran, Sudan and Syria.
Considering the background of Cuba's regime, a strong case can be made that it is not in our national
interest to lift sanctions and assist yet another anti-American dictatorship -- and state- sponsor of
terrorism -- in its ambitions for oil exploration. To do so would not ease domestic fuel costs or enhance
energy independence here at home, which should be the goals of U.S. energy policy. To the contrary, it
would add to the extortionate practices that other oil-producing dictatorships have exploited for the
last half-a-century.
Furthermore, considering that this same Cuban regime has already expropriated U.S. oil assets in the
past (Esso and Texaco), it would send a dangerous message to other hostile governments that -- in this
region alone (e.g. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela) -- would like to do the same.
New oil wealth will give the regime a new lease on life
Goforth, 12 - author of Axis of Unity: Venezuela, Iran and the Threat to America (Sean, The National
Interest, “Cuba's Economic Desperation” 7/31, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cuba%27seconomic-desperation-7269)
Communist Cuba’s salvation this time around was expected to come in the form of massive offshore
oil and gas deposits. The Economist last year called the Scarabeo 9, a rig built and shipped from China
by the Spanish oil firm Repsol in order to skirt the U.S. embargo, “Cuba’s main hope of economic
independence.” China, Russia and other countries eagerly courted Raul as the rig moved into place,
each vying for a sizeable concession or servicing contract, and each probably rather pleased by the
potential side effect of sticking in Washington’s craw.
Then, after spending over $100 million in the endeavor, Repsol decided in late May to stop exploring
off Cuba’s coast. Four of the five wells it drilled didn’t turn up any oil. In turn, Raul’s visit to China,
Vietnam and Russia earlier this month—almost certainly scheduled before the Repsol announcement—
didn’t result in any breakthrough commitments for investment in Cuba.
Of course, Cuba still may become an oil-rich nation in time; already a Malaysian outfit plans to explore a
separate offshore bloc. But that’s scant consolation for the communist government, which desperately
needs the influx of international credit that would accompany a significant oil strike. In more stark
terms, Cuba needs a new sponsor, and just who that might be is now in doubt given the recent
reticence of the Chinese, Brazilians and others to having greater sway over the island’s future.
The bad news about oil also makes it harder to envision the Cuban economy transitioning to a state
capitalist system. Meanwhile, those in the privatized economy are thrashing out wholesale markets
via the informal sector, largely at state expense. For the first time since Raul ushered in his seemingly
methodical economic reforms, the aging autocrat faces a pressing “from, to” dilemma.
Links – unconditional removal
Lifting the embargo unconditionally give the regime a massive victory that ends
political reform
Colomer 2005- Research Professor in Political Science, Professor at the University of Barcelona
(Joseph M., “Who Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective”, 2004-2005, 14 Transnat'l
L. & Contemp. Probs. 163, heinonline)//KW
VIII. Conclusion
* The United States' policy of embargo on trade, investment, and travel with Cuba has been analyzed as
the outcome of a strategic interaction between the U.S. and Cuban governments in which each party
can make decisions on the basis of expected benefits and costs from the available alternatives. The
following are relevant findings:
* The U.S. government has no strong incentives to unilaterally lift the embargo, in spite of the fact that
some initial motivations and justifications for the embargo - especially regarding Cuba's external threat have lost appeal. This is due to the low costs that maintaining the embargo inflicts upon the United
States, the value of Cuban-Americans' votes in the U.S. political system, and the expectation to use the
embargo as leverage for further changes in Cuba.
* An opportunity for a policy to promote economic and political reforms able to trigger the end of the
embargo lies on the side of the Cuban government, in spite of its claims to the contrary. In order to
induce this move on the Cuban side, the U.S. strategy should be maintaining or even strengthening
the embargo. This may be paradoxical due to the fact that, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
which protected and subsidized Cuba, the Cuban dictatorship is now weaker than a few decades ago
and, therefore, less threatening to the United States. Precisely because of this weakness, U.S. decisionmakers may expect the embargo to be more effective in the present and foreseeable future than it was
in the past.
* In a hypothetical future scenario in which the Cuban government - perhaps after Fidel Castro's death
- launches a political opening, it would be in the U.S. government's interest to respond positively by
lifting the embargo. In foreseeable circumstances, the Cuban move might be the result of strategic
calculations, especially dependent on the new difficulties of maintaining public order and preventing
social unrest, rather than of Cuban rulers' formal democratic commitment. In that case, it would be in
the U.S. interest to lift the embargo only conditionally , in the aim of preventing a further move by
the Cuban government back to political closeness and restrictions.
* Alternatively, the embargo on Cuba could be lifted unilaterally by the United States if decisionmakers in their institutions, especially legislators in Congress, were sensitive to increasing pressures
from lobbies in agrarian export states and other groups. To this move, the United States should not
expect any positive response from the Cuban government, at least in the sense of openly promoting
political liberalization and democratization - more or less as has happened in China or Vietnam. The
Cuban dictatorship would find in this move a political victory in its long-term confrontation with the
United States, as well as a source of material help able to diminish the risks of social turmoil and
increase the chances of its own political survival.
Lifting the embargo while avoiding political reform shreds US credibility in promoting
democracy
Perales et al., 10- senior program associate of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. (Jose Raul, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic
Relationship,” Woodrow Wilson Center Latin American Program, August 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//TL
The U.S. embargo may need to be changed; however Sánchez vehemently opposed its complete
elimination. The Helms-Burton Act created a clear roadmap stipulating the conditions by which the
embargo could be suspended and ended. These include: legalization of political activity, the release of
all political prisoners, dissolution of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior’s Department of State Security,
establishment of an independent judiciary, and a government that does not include the Castro
brothers. Only when these conditions are met and democracy is reestablished should the embargo be
scrapped. Elimination of the embargo prior to meeting these conditions will rightly be perceived as
weakness in the face of political pressure. For instance, the Obama administration has little intention
of signing a free trade agreement with Colombia—a staunch ally with whom the United States has a
very positive economic relationship—because of concern over the country’s inadequate labor rights.
Imagine the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy were it to punish a consolidated democracy with strong,
albeit imperfect, labor rights, yet capitulate and reward the Cuban government for systematically
abusing labor rights. What sort of message would that send to the world?
Links – terrorist list
Specific support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Basque terrorists, harboring fugitives, and
rhetorical support for Palestinian terrorism justify inclusion on the list
Suchlicki, 13- Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at
the University of Miami (Jaime, “Cuba’s Continuous Support for Terrorism”, Cuba Democracia Y Vida,
4/22/13, http://www.cubademocraciayvida.org/web/article.asp?artID=21053)//TL
In more specific terms:
Cuba directly and through Venezuela continues to provide intelligence to Hamas and Hezbollah.
Ghazi Nasr al Din, one of the most important representatives of Hezbollah in Venezuela, has maintained
close contact with Venezuelan government officials and most likely with Cuban officials.
Current and former member of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a Basque terrorist organization
continue to reside in Cuba. While some of these terrorists are on the island as part of an accord
between the Cuban and Spanish governments, others are hiding in Cuba, fugitives of Spanish justice.
The FBI estimates that Cuba has provided safe harbor to dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice who live on
the island under the protection of the Castro regime. Some of these fugitives are charged with or have
been convicted of murder, kidnapping, and hijacking, and they include notorious killers of police officers
in New Jersey and New Mexico.
Warranting special mention are the outstanding U.S. indictments against Cuban Air Force pilots Lorenzo
Alberto Pérez-Pérez and General Rubén Martínez Puente, the head of the Cuban Air Force, who in 1996
ordered these Cuban pilots to shoot down two unarmed civilian American aircraft over international
waters in the Florida Straits. That act of terrorism killed four men, three of them American citizens.
On March 4, 2013, the 44th Anniversary of the founding of the “Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine,” an Iranian supported organization, the Cuban Ambassador to Lebanon, Rene Ceballo Prats,
reaffirmed “Cuba’s firm support for the Palestinian cause.”
The previous year, in March 2012, a delegation of the Front headed by Abu Sami Marwan, visited Cuba
at the invitation of Cuba’s Communist Party. Jose R. Balaguer, head of Cuba’s party International
Department expressed “the support and solidarity of Havana with the Palestinian cause.” Another
Cuban official emphasized “Cuba’s support for the Palestinian struggle to establish an independent state
with eastern Jerusalem as its capital.”
In an attempt to obtain unilateral concession from the U.S., Gen. Raul Castro’s regime has toned down
some of the violent anti-U.S. propaganda of older brother Fidel. Yet the commitments and
interrelationships with anti-American terrorist groups have not disappeared. They have taken a more
sophisticated approach; many times using proxies such as Venezuelan supporters.
The U.S. should do well to remain alert and vigilant. Cuba’s proximity to the U.S. makes the island an
ideal platform for hostile acts against the U.S. In the event of conflict with Iran and/or North Korea, two
allies of Cuba, the Castro regime may be called upon to support its allies.
Uniqueness – transition now
The death of Chávez has led to a re-evaluation of the Pink Tide
Fidler ’13- Long-time socialist activist and writer (Richard, “'Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions': compelling contribution to our understanding of the 'pink
tide'”, LINKS, March 11 2013, http://links.org.au/node/3254) //CW
In a number of countries, this powerful democratic ferment has led to the election of anti-neoliberal, anti-imperialist
governments — a process that started with the initial electoral victory of Hugo Chávez Frias in the late 1990s. The untimely death of the
outstanding Venezuelan leader on March 5, 2013, prompted many to reflect on his government’s important
achievements and the still unresolved challenges facing not only Venezuela but the whole of Latin America. What is
the nature of these new governments of the so-called “pink tide”? And what are the prospects for building a
continental movement toward a mass-based democratic socialism of the 21st century, the goal that Chávez embraced and
advocated in the international arena?
Reformers are picking up speed and Chavez’s death is the catalyzing point –
maintaining a firm stance against the regime is crucial
Simonyi and Otero, 13- Simonyi is the Managing Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations and
Otero is a former Ambassador of Bolivia to the United States (Andras and Jaime, “Cuba's Future
Transition to Democracy Can Be a Success”, Huffington Post, 3/12/13,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andras-simonyi/cubas-future-transition-t_b_2859520.html)//TL
It is too early to say how Hugo Chavez's passing will effect developments elsewhere in the region. One
wonders first and foremost about the consequences on and in Cuba. It is a reminder to the Castro
brothers that power is ephemeral.
Cuba is ready for change. In spite of the efforts by the regime to paint a rosy picture, eye witnesses tell a
sad story. Living conditions are bad, the economy survives only at the mercy of Venezuela. The InterAmerican Human Rights Commission, in its 2012 a report on Cuba, speaks of "permanent and
systematical violations of the fundamental rights of Cuban citizens." Ironically, however while the Cuban
people suffer, the regime is internationally stronger than ever.
Progressive rock musicians, like Gorki in the band Porno Para Ricardo, are prevented from writing and
performing freely. The international pressure for the respect for human rights is weak and inefficient.
It seems like the ethic conscience of the west is comfortable with the situation. It shouldn't be.
Solidarity with the people submitted to human rights violations by dictatorships is a moral imperative.
However, the opposition movement is gaining voice, even in face of a forgetful international
community. They are increasingly self-confident. Oswaldo Paya is now dead, but others, like Yoani
Sanchez stepped into his place. Courageous people, who defy threats and speak more and more openly
about the true state of the country. They deserve all the support they ask for. Cuba is ripe for change.
To understand today's Cuba, one must better study the history of communist Eastern Europe, rather
than that of Latin America. The resemblance is striking. The inner workings of the regime are similar to
the more conservative countries of the former communist bloc in 1989.
Halfhearted, thus unsuccessful economic reforms, the total control of the media, isolating the
population from the world, harassment of the political opposition and the communist elite clinging to
power. At the same time a disenchanted population, including a big part of the party membership, the
majority of which does not any longer believe in the ideology or the future of the system. It is more like
East Germany or Romania, rather than Hungary or Poland of the day. However, the leaders of Cuba
surely understand, that the desire for change swept away even the harshest regimes of Eastern Europe.
Cuban society is fractured, with the supporters of the regime and those who reject it altogether
representing approximately 25-30 percent each. It is however the remaining silent 40-50 percent that
can make transition a success or a disaster. The regime is playing on their fears of the unknown. Having
them on the side of change is decisive.
Europe's and more importantly, America's stance is key . Europe needs to be a lot more outspoken on
human rights. The U.S. must have a policy that takes note of the diverse interests of all stakeholders of
democratic change. First and foremost the majority of Cubans living in the Island State and help
genuinely democratic minded leaders in their midst, like it did in Eastern Europe, in an open and
transparent manner. It must cater for the interests of its vast, talented, successful and influential CubanAmerican community. The two interests are not similar, but mostly overlapping. They can and should be
aligned in a generous, smart and forward looking policy. Cuban-Americans must play their cards
smartly. They will be an important, even decisive, but perhaps not dominant part of transition and
future democratic Cuba. They must be magnanimous. Their most important task will be to accelerate a
transition to knowledge and internet based economy. They must win the confidence of the majority on
the Island. They must also understand that Castro's successors will single them out as being responsible,
when the inevitable difficulties of the transition arise.
The Cuban democracy movement will topple the regime but international solidarity is
key to a stable transition
Gershman, 12- President of the National Endowment for Democracy (Carl, “The Sharpening Crisis in
Cuba”, National Endowment for Democracy, 8/2/12, http://www.ned.org/about/board/meet-ourpresident/archived-presentations-and-articles/the-sharpening-crisis-in-cuba)//TL
We have arrived at a very dangerous new moment in Cuba. The deaths on July 22 of Oswaldo Paya and
Harold Cepero, which could have been instigated by the Cuban regime, following hard upon the death
under mysterious circumstances in October of Laura Pollan and the death in January of Wilmar Villar are
ominous signs that the threat to democracy activists in Cuba is growing. The fact that Angel Carromero,
the Spanish driver of the car in which Paya and Cepero were killed, is being held for homicide – when no
independent investigation of the accident is being conducted, despite statements by members of Paya’s
family that a second vehicle had run Paya’s car off the road – is very ominous. Carromero is being held
as a hostage, possibly to silence critics or exact concessions. Never has there been a greater need for
international solidarity to protect the civic activists in Cuba.
That is why the presentation here in the United States Congress of the Pedro Luis Boitel Award to six
activists on the front lines of struggle is so important. These brave activists – Julio Columbie Batista and
Blas Augusto Fortun Martinez, who are associated with the National Civic Resistance Movement Pedro
Luis Boitel; Damaris Moyas Portieles, Donaida Perez Pasiero and Marta Diaz Rondon, who are with the
Rosa Parks Women’s Movement for Civil Rights; and Jorge Olivera Castillo, a writer and trade unionist
who is also the president of the Writers Club of Cuba – not only deserve but also need our fullest
solidarity.
In 2009, I presented the Boitel Award to Ivan Hernandez Carrillo, the labor activist who was arrested in
the Black Spring of 2003. In my remarks that evening, I drew a contrast between Boitel and Che
Guevara. They were both of the same generation, Guevara having been born in 1928 and Boitel in 1931;
and each became the emblematic representative of one of the two contradictory tendencies within the
revolutionary movement. Boitel represented the movement’s democratic aspirations, for which he gave
his life. And Guevara was the leader of the hard-line, pro-Soviet faction that imposed a harsh totalitarian
system on the Cuban people.
Guevara oversaw the firing squads, founded the forced labor camps for political prisoners, and helped
embed the ideology of class hatred into the Cuban system. As we know, Che Guevara became a cult
figure for the political left, while Boitel died of a hunger strike in prison and was buried in an unmarked
grave. And I asked the question: Between Boitel and Guevara, who will ultimately win – the democratic
martyr whose unmarked grave has become a shrine for Cuban dissidents; or the murderous cult figure
whose image adorns countless t-shirts and has been tattooed on the right arm of the Argentine soccer
star Diego Maradona and the abdomen of boxer Mike Tyson? Whom will history absolve?
I believe that the answer is clear. Boitel will win because the Cuba system is now in the throes of a
terminal economic, political and ideological crisis . Fidel Castro himself has said, in his famous
interview with The Atlantic, that “the Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore.” It will end, as
President Reagan said of Marxism-Leninism in his famous Westminster Address, “on the ash heap of
history” along with “other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the
people.”
Just look at the continued activism of the five Cuban dissidents who received the NED Democracy Award
in 2009. Ivan Hernandez Carrillo is out of prison and now is the spokesman for the coalition of
independent trade unions in Cuba. Antunez and his wife Iris remain militant activists in Central Cuba,
while the intellectual Librado Linares and the Catholic activist Jose Daniel Ferrer are also both out of
prison and fighting with renewed determination. Ferrer, the leader of the Union Patriotica de Cuba
(UNPACU), an island-wide resistance movement, had been arrested earlier this week in the eastern
province of Holguin, but he was released yesterday without any charges being pressed. His quick release
is a sign of the erosion of the regime’s system of control and its inability to suppress a growing
movement of civic resistance.
We can see evidence of that movement in many areas: human rights defense; independent journalism;
growing labor unrest and the networks of independent trade unionists that Anibal Cabrera will be
discussing later in this conference; independent bloggers and underground rock musicians; youth
activists; and activists in professional associations of lawyers, academics, doctors, and intellectuals.
Change is coming, and it’s important that we start preparing now for the post-Castro future. While the
struggle for a democratic breakthrough is still the highest priority, it’s necessary now to start thinking
about and preparing for the process of democratic transition, which as we know from other
contemporary experiences – think of Nicaragua, or Egypt, or Ukraine – will not be easy.
This was the advice that Czech President Vaclav Havel gave to Paya on November 17, 2003 – the
anniversary of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia – in an exchange of letters that we published in
the Journal of Democracy. “Each democrat,” Havel wrote, “should behave today as if power were to be
handed over tomorrow.” It was on the basis of that advice that Paya initiated a process of independent
national dialogue, involving some 14,000 Cubans, that he called the Cuban Forum. This initiative
produced a 170-page “All-Cuban Plan” containing recommendations on issues ranging from economic
and political reform to education and health, the environment and public order, privatization of the
media, and reuniting with the exile community.
Other activists today are also looking at the coming transition. The significance of this work goes beyond
helping Cuban democrats prepare for the inevitable change. It also helps the opposition counter the
regime’s strategy of instilling fear in the population – not just fear of repression, which is largely
disappearing, but fear of the consequences of change, which the regime claims will being rampant
capitalism as well as domination by the United States and Cuban exiles. As Paya said, it’s necessary to
“dispel the myth that a transition will mean catastrophe for Cuba.”
For now, two things are essential. The first is that the forces of political opposition and the movement of
civic resistance must stay united and project a vision of a new Cuba that builds on the legacy of past
heroes like Felix Varela and Jose Marti, and draws inspiration from the martyrs of the present – brave
democrats like Orlando Zapata, Juan Wilfredo Soto Garcia, Wilman Villar, Harold Cepero, Laura Pollan
and Oswaldo Paya who have not died in vain. The second necessity is building international solidarity for
the Cuban democracy movement, especially in Latin America. This will help isolate the dictatorship
and defend the front-line activists who desperately need our support. The difficulties that lie ahead are
very great, but change is coming, and the courage of the activists on the ground in Cuba will hasten its
arrival.
Transition inevitable – the old guard will die soon
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
The second major hurdle to values liberalization, scapegoating the U.S., has already been dealt a severe
blow by Fidel Castro’s physical decline. Raúl, by all accounts, lack the vision and charisma to sell the
increasingly untenable rhetoric to the Cuban people. It would be miraculous if another caudillo-inwaiting were able to duplicate the charismatic and populist support that such a tired excuse would
require. It’s therefore probable that without an extreme misjudgment by the U.S., this “weapon of mass
distraction” will follow the fate of its master.
This same biological solution hastens Cubans dissatisfaction with government incompetence and
corruption. The two-thirds of the island’s population were born after 1959 and one in six have only
known the post-Special Period austerity. Because these younger generations have no direct ties to
causes of the Revolution and have only known its ravages, they are prone to be less loyal and even
disillusioned. 91 When the mirage of the revolutionary egalitarianism and its lead magicians are but a
distant dream, only the nightmares of batons, guns and prison bars remain to suppress the their rights.
As the only country in the Western hemisphere whose per capita caloric intake has decline over the last
50 years, that same majority must find the urgency to reject the empty substitutes of Revolutionary
rhetoric.92 While the U.S. does have an irreplaceable role in promoting a Free Cuba, only the island’s
people can successfully break their shackles and finally rejoin the free global community. 9329
AT: N/U – engagement now
The current US strategy is incrementalism – further concessions require Cuban
reciprocation
Arnson 2010- Ph.D., International Relations, and M.A., Latin American Studies, The Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies
(Cynthia J., “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship”, 5/24/10,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-united-states-and-cuba-implications-economic-relationship
Wilson center)//KW
Nonetheless, Reinsch noted that there are far fewer statutory obstacles to a change in U.S. policy than
most observers suggest. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, commonly
known as the Helms-Burton Act, codified the President's licensing authority and thus his or her ability
to make changes to the embargo. Given his mid-April declaration to thaw relations, President Obama
appears to know and understand this authority, though his approach has been one of modest,
piecemeal change. Reinsch explained that the Obama administration's tempered approach to policy
change is based on an assumption that any U.S. concession will prompt a Cuban concession, though
Reinsch believes that Cuba—as the biggest beneficiary of the embargo—would not reciprocate.
All current engagement is over Alan Gross – no further action until he’s released
Ross, 13 – feature writer and former Middle East correspondent for the Toronto Star(Oakland, The Star,
“Cuba and U.S. still at odds despite Havana’s reforms” 3/1,
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/03/01/cuba_and_us_still_at_odds_despite_havanas_refor
ms.html
An increase in diplomatic activity across the Straits of Florida is already underway.
Late last month, a seven-member U.S. congressional delegation led by Vermont Democrat Patrick Leahy
traveled to the island and held wide-ranging talks with Castro and other top officials.
They were unable to resolve the case of American Alan Gross, whose imprisonment in Cuba remains a
festering source of discord between the two governments.
Gross was jailed for 15 years in 2009, after the Cubans convicted him of bringing satellite
communications gear into the country, part of an effort to provide the island’s miniscule Jewish
community with secure access to the Internet.
Washington refuses to negotiate other bilateral disputes until Gross is freed and won’t consider
Cuban suggestions of a prisoner swap — the American’s freedom in exchange for the release of several
men known collectively as the Cuban Five, who were convicted of espionage in Florida in 2001 and
sentenced to long prison terms.
In many ways, the dispute over Gross is just the latest in a series of entanglements that have long
frustrated efforts to improve relations between the two sides. This pattern of failure dates back to the
early 1960s, when Washington imposed an embargo on trade with the island, a measure that has
caused little but trouble since.
“The Cubans box themselves in,” says Harvard’s Dominguez, “and the U.S. administration boxes itself
in.”
AT: Engagement spurs reform
Economic liberalization won’t cause political reform and will just empower hardliners
Cave 12 – Foreign Correspondent New York Times (Damien, “Rethinking Cuba embargo: As Havana
introduces reforms, debate grows in U.S. on trade sanctions”, 11-21, International Herald Tribune,
ProQuest)//ID
Any easing would be a gamble. Free enterprise may not necessarily lead to the embargo's goal of free
elections, especially because Cuba has said it wants to replicate the paths of Vietnam and China,
where the loosening of economic restrictions has not led to political change. Indeed, Cuban officials
have been adept at using previous U.S. efforts to soften the embargo to their advantage, taking a cut
of dollars converted into pesos and marking up the prices at state-owned stores.
And Cuba has a long history of tossing ice on warming relations. The latest example is the jailing of
Alan Gross, a U.S. State Department contractor who has spent nearly three years behind bars for
distributing satellite telephone equipment to Jewish groups in Havana.
In Washington, Mr. Gross is seen as the main impediment to an easing of the embargo, but there are
also limits to what the president could do without congressional action. The 1992 Cuban Democracy Act
conditioned the waiving of sanctions on the introduction of democratic changes inside Cuba. The 1996
Helms-Burton Act also requires that the embargo remain until Cuba has a transitional or democratically
elected government. Obama administration officials say they have not given up and could move if the
president decides to act on his own. Following the legal logic of Mr. Obama's changes in 2009, further
expansions in travel are possible along with new allowances for investment or imports and exports,
especially if narrowly applied to Cuban businesses.
Even these adjustments -- which could also include travel for all Americans and looser rules for ships
engaged in trade with Cuba, according to a legal analysis commissioned by the Cuba Study Group -would probably mean a fierce political fight. For a handful of Cuban-Americans in Congress, the
embargo is sacred.
When asked about Cuban entrepreneurs who are seeking more support from the United States,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Florida Republican who is chairwoman of the House Foreign
Relations Committee, proposed an even tighter embargo.
"The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be
altered," she wrote in an e-mail. "Responsible nations must not buy into the facade the dictatorship is
trying to create by announcing 'reforms' while, in reality, it's tightening its grip on its people."
Many Cubans agree that their government cares more about control than economic growth. Business
owners complain that inspectors pounce when they see signs of success and demand receipts to prove
that supplies were not stolen from the government, a common practice in Cuba. One restaurant owner
in Havana said he received a large fine for failing to produce a receipt for plastic wrap.
Engagement doesn’t cause democratization – empirics and Castro
Purcell, 8 – Ph.D. Director at Center for Hemispheric Policy University of Miami (Susan, “CUBA'S
FUTURE”, Congressional Testimony, March 5, 2008, lexis)//eek
The engagement option is based on the assumption that current U.S. policy - particularly the embargo has not worked, in the sense of either toppling the Cuban government or getting to open Cuba's
economy and/or political system. This argument is correct as far as it goes, but it does not go far
enough. In advocating engagement as an alternative, it ignores the fact that the rest of the world has
been "engaging" with Cuba for many years, also with no apparent success in producing positive
change in Cuba.
The main obstacle until now to a meaningful transition from a closed to a more open political and
economic system has not been U.S. policy, but rather, Fidel Castro's desire to maintain political and
economic control over the island and its people. The experiment with an economic opening in the
1990s, for example, occurred in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and the termination of billions of
dollars of Soviet aid to Cuba. Fearful of an economic, and possibly, a political collapse, Fidel accepted
Raul's recommendation to allow some foreign private investment on the island and permit the
circulation of dollars, as well as the creation of some small, private businesses. The reforms produced
encouraging economic results, but Fidel accurately concluded that the latter two in particular
threatened his political control. They were therefore reversed.
Increasing contacts will be tightly controlled by the regime to prevent reform
Suchlicki, 7-Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the
University of Miami (Jaime, “Implications of Lifting the U.S. Embargo and Travel Ban of Cuba”, Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 12/11/07,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/website_documents/SenateTestimony.pdf)//TL
Specific considerations:
Tourism: • If tourists are allowed to visit Cuba, the Castro government will follow the same practices of
the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the past: tourist would have to obtain visas from the
Cuban Interests Section in Washington; their travel would be controlled and channeled into the tourist
resorts built in the island away from the major centers of population; and tourists will be screened
carefully to prevent “subversive propaganda” from entering the island.
• Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e. rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and
tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government.
• The Cuban government would be able to select which U.S. hotel chains will be allowed to invest in the
island in joint ventures with the Cuban government.
• The economic impact of tourism, while providing the Castro government with much needed dollars,
would be limited. Dollars will flow in small quantities to the Cuban poor; state and foreign enterprises
will benefit most and a large percentage of the tourist dollars spent on the island will be sent abroad by
the foreign entities operating hotels and nightclubs.
• A large influx of tourists into Cuba will have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean
islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Bahamas, and Puerto Rico, as well as Florida; highly
dependent on tourism for their well being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant
hardships and social problems in these countries.
• Since tourism will become a two-way affair, with Cubans visiting the U.S. in great numbers, it is likely
that many will stay in the U.S. as illegal immigrants, complicating a rather thorny issue in American
domestic politics.
• If we honestly belief that tourism can bring democracy to a foreign society we should also encourage
Americans to visit North Korea and Iran to democratize those countries.
The empirical evidence is overwhelmingly against engagement
Azel, 12- a senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (Jose, “Cuba’s
Economic Sanctions and Property Rights**”, Cuba Transition Project of the Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies, 5/21/12, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue165.htm)//TL
Currently over 190 nations engage economically and politically with Cuba while the United States
remains alone in enforcing its economic sanctions policy. If indeed U.S. policy is deemed as one case of
failure to change the nature of the Cuban government, there are 190 cases of failure on the same
grounds. By a preponderance of evidence (190 to 1) the case can be made that engagement with that
regime has been a dismal failure.
Empirically new contacts don’t cause political reform
Bustillo, 13- will be attending Columbia University in the fall where he will be majoring in Engineering
with a minor in Economics on a Pre-Law track. He is a first-generation Cuban-American, a Hispanic
Heritage Foundation Gold Medallion Winner, and a former United States Senate Page (Mitchell, “Time
to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 5/9/13,
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/)//TL
Washington’s goal in its dealings with Havana is clear: facilitate the introduction and growth of
democracy while increasing personal freedoms. There are many who argue that the best way to spread
democracy is by lifting the embargo and travel restrictions. U.S. Rep. Michael Honda argues that an
influx of politically enlightened U.S. travelers to Cuba would put Havana in a difficult place, leading to
their own people calling for change. However, this is erroneous. Due to the fractured and weakened
state of the embargo, over 400,000 U.S. travelers visited Cuba in 2011, making the United States the
second-largest source of foreign visitors after Canada, according to NPR’s Nick Miroff. Obviously, this
influx of what has been theorized to be liberty-professing tourists has not resulted in an influx of such
democratic ideals into this overwhelmingly federally controlled country.
One example is the case of Alan Gross, an American citizen working for USAID. He was arrested in Cuba
in 2009 under the allegations of Acts against the Independence and Territorial Integrity of the State
while distributing computers and technological equipment to Jewish communities in Cuba. He is
currently serving the fourth of his fifteen-year conviction, is in poor health, and receiving little to no aid
from the U.S., according to the Gross Family website. In light of this, it is hard to believe that the U.S.
would be able to protect a large number of tourists in a hostile nation, especially when they plan to
‘profess’ political freedom. This view is further promoted by the Ladies in White, a Cuban dissident
group that supports the embargo. They fear ending it would only serve to strengthen the current
dictatorial regime because the real blockade, they claim, is within Cuba. Allowing American travelers to
visit Cuba does not help propel the cause of Cuban democracy; it hampers it.
Any reforms will be cosmetic only
Roger 8 (E., “Wrong time to lift embargo on Cuba”, 2-27, Home News Tribune, ProQuest)//ID
Actually, what would really really leave the United States without influence in Cuba is to unilaterally
lift the embargo without preconditions, as some have urged.
That "some" includes everybody in Havana's ruling elite.
Nobody in those circles looks like a Cuban Gorbachev or, to be more culturally precise, nobody looks like
an Adolfo Suarez. Suarez was the apparatchik in Francisco Franco's regime who became president of
Spain's government after Franco's death, and led his country to the democracy and prosperity it now
enjoys.
But among top apparatchiks in Castro's regime, there is no hint that anyone desires anything beyond
cosmetic changes. So in the next few months, you might see a loosening of economic restrictions. You
might see some political prisoners released. You might see fewer arrests of dissidents.
It will all be done to give the impression that things have changed, so that Havana can claim the
system is moving toward democracy and lend legitimacy to calls for the end of the embargo.
But the system will continue to deny basic liberties: Opposition political parties still will be banned, a
free media and a judiciary independent of government still will not exist, political prisoners will be
released only if they agree to leave the country, dissidents will be detained and harassed instead of
officially arrested, as human-rights activists are already noting.
There would be no better gift for an essentially unchanged Cuban regime than re-established trade with
the United States or (their fondest hope) a friendly normalization of diplomatic relations. The Havana
leadership hopes that with U.S. backing, the system can perpetuate itself for a generation. And that is
why the embargo cannot be reduced to an outdated policy favored by a couple of old guys in Miami.
The embargo cannot bring democracy to Cuba, but lifting it at the wrong time can keep democracy
out.
Impact – US heg
The Pink Tide spread kills US hegemony
Fidler ’13- Long-time socialist activist and writer (Richard, “'Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions': compelling contribution to our understanding of the 'pink
tide'”, LINKS, March 11 2013, http://links.org.au/node/3254) //CW
Although, as the title indicates, a subtext of this volume is the
professed effort in some countries to build a “socialism of the 21st
century”, the term itself (as the authors acknowledge) calls for clarification. Although Venezuela has established that as its goal, no Latin American
government (with the partial exception of revolutionary Cuba) has gone beyond capitalism. However, some governments in South America are
attempting with notable successes to reverse the ravages of neoliberalism. Each is pursuing distinct strategies
tailored to meet the needs of its particular social conditions, subject to the limitations imposed on all of them by their
insertion within the global capitalist system. An opening chapter outlines the international context. “The old order is breaking down
with the decline of the United States as the planet’s hegemonic power.” And while Washington is preoccupied with its wars in the
Middle East and South Asia, its grip on Latin America has weakened as an emerging China enters this market in search of raw materials to supply
its booming economy. China is now the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Its trade with Latin America as a whole increased 18-fold in the first decade of
this century, while US exports dropped from 55 per cent of the region’s total to 32 per cent.
The Pink Tide has pushed US heg out of the region letting China step up
Beverley ’12- is Distinguished Professor of Hispanic Languages and Literatures at the University of Pittsburgh (John, “Latin America after 9/11: Geopolitics
and the Pink Tide”, berfrois, Jan 6 2012, http://www.berfrois.com/2012/01/john-beverley-latin-americas-pink-tide/) //CW
China is a new factor in the region. China senses that a vacuum of hegemony has emerged in Latin America, and is
stepping in to fill it. Where Castañeda argues for a US policy that “fortifies the modern left, and weakens the retrograde left,” inviting in this way
continued confrontation of the US with major actors and constituencies in Latin America, China, has not been guided
in its approach to Latin America by this dichotomy, precisely because it would like to break open that framework in
some ways. It is in the process of deepening its economic, cultural and political relations with all governments in Latin
America. The main determination here, is of course economic: China’s voracious appetite for raw materials. But there is a
postcolonial dimension too: although there has been no return to the Maoist Third Worldism of the fifties and sixties, the fact that China, like Latin America
has been at the bottom end of European imperial and colonial designs is, I think, a not inconsiderable factor in its
emerging relationship with Latin America.
Impact – turns Cuban suffering
The Cuban regime is the main source of Cuban suffering – not US policy
Bustillo, 13- will be attending Columbia University in the fall where he will be majoring in Engineering
with a minor in Economics on a Pre-Law track. He is a first-generation Cuban-American, a Hispanic
Heritage Foundation Gold Medallion Winner, and a former United States Senate Page (Mitchell, “Time
to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 5/9/13,
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/)//TL
These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban
government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the
Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard
of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current
regime stands. “After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from
Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,”
states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent
Institute.
However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and
powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape
or even improve their fate. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the
Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation
of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.
Pink Tide leads to massive economic inequality
Foran No Date- is an American sociologist with research interests in global climate justice; radical social movements, revolutions, and radical social
change; Third World cultural studies; and Latin American and Middle Eastern studies. (John, “Theorizing the Cuban Revolution”, No Date,
http://www.utm.utoronto.ca/~w3his390/A-Foran-Theorizing.the.Revolution.pdf) //CW
By the late 1990s, the economy had regained its footing on a new basis without Soviet aid, a remarkable feat. Strong new economic sectors were created as
resources were directed toward foreign tourism, biotechnology, and oil exploration. New trade partners emerged in China and Latin America, a trend
reinforced of late by the “pink tide” of left-of-center governments throughout the continent. Measures to revive the economy
have included legalizing dollars (and encouraging Cubans in the United States to send money to their relatives on the island) and allowing a certain amount of
private enterprise (bicycle repair shops, beauty salons, etc.). These steps may help ease life for some, but it
is doubtful that they will solve the
problems posed now by the onslaught of globalization, and in any case they lead to increased inequality between those with access to dollars
and those who lack this. In the twentyfirst century, people make ends meet by helping out family members, going to the black
market, working extra jobs, and in some cases engaging in crime and prostitution (eliminated after the revolution came to power).
Impact – terrorism
Economic engagement will legitimize Cuba’s regime, wreck US credibility in containing
rogue states and spur terrorism
Suchlicki, 7-Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the
University of Miami (Jaime, “Implications of Lifting the U.S. Embargo and Travel Ban of Cuba”, Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 12/11/07,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/website_documents/SenateTestimony.pdf)//TL
A change in U.S. policy toward Cuba may have different and unintended results. The lifting of the
embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will:
• Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures;
• Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses owned by the Cuban
government. Most businesses are owned in Cuba by the state and, in all foreign investments, the
Cuban government retains a partnership interest.
• Lead to greater repression and control since the Cuban leadership will fear that U.S. influence will
subvert the revolution and weaken the Communist party’s hold on the Cuban people.
• Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy in the island.
• Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations. Loans will be wasted by Cuba’s inefficient
and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Cuba has been unable to pay back loans to
other countries is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because its economic system stifles productivity
and the Castro brothers continue to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a
bankrupt welfare system in the island.
• Perpetuate the rather extensive control that the military holds over the economy and foster the
further development of “mafia type” groups that manage and profit from important sectors of the
economy, particularly tourism, biotechnology , and agriculture.
• Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin America since the Ford/Carter era, which emphasize
democracy, human rights, and market economies, and send the wrong message to Latin American
democracies that the U.S. is willing to support a military dictatorship in Cuba and a succession of
power to General Raul Castro.
• Send the wrong message to the enemies of the U.S.: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties
without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the
U.S.; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the U.S. will “forget
and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments an economic aid.
A strong embargo deters other Latin American countries from supporting terrorist
groups
Colomer 2005- Research Professor in Political Science, Professor at the University of Barcelona
(Joseph M., “Who Could End the Embargo? A Game-Theoretical Perspective”, 2004-2005, 14 Transnat'l
L. & Contemp. Probs. 163, heinonline)//KW
As discussed above, the most important benefit of the embargo policy to the United States is the
opportunity to use it as a deterrent to new revolutionary initiatives and as leverage for intervening in
future Cuban events. In the past, the Cuban regime supported every single guerrilla, insurrectionary
movement, or terrorist group in Latin America (with the only exception being the Shining Path in Peru).
A report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency released in May 1998 stated that Cuba does not
pose "a significant military threat to the United States and to other countries in the region" any longer.
19 But, it is also a fact that Castro continues to view violent action and terrorism as legitimate
revolutionary tactics and protects terrorist group members (for instance, from the Basque Country and
Colombia), which is why the U.S. State Department keeps Cuba on the list of states supporting
terrorism. The U.S. embargo also sets an example, deterring would-be revolutionary leaders in other
countries from engaging in initiatives leading to the confiscation of American properties or other
forms of hostility. Regarding the future, U.S. leaders can expect to use the embargo as an exchange
tool for liberalization, democratization, and compensation decisions on the Cuban side, as discussed
above.
The Pink Tide puts leaders in charge who fund terrorism and commit human rights
atrocities
Newman ’13- Correspondent at The New American magazine (Alex, “Communist Cuban Tyrant Raul Castro to Lead Latin American Bloc”, New American,
Feb 1 2013, http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/south-america/item/14396-communist-cuban-tyrant-raul-castro-takes-over-latin-american-bloc) //CW
Raul’s brother Fidel, who originally foisted authoritarian communist rule on the people of Cuba, played a key role in
the now-obvious spread of socialism and communism across Latin America. Working with former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio
“Lula” da Silva, the Sandinistas, Marxist terror groups such as the FARC in Colombia, and others, Castro helped found the Foro de São Paulo
(São Paulo Forum, or FSP), a coalition of communist and socialist forces that now dominates Latin American politics and controls most national governments in
the region. Considering
that history, despot Raul Castro’s new-found prominence on the geopolitical stage is hardly a
surprise. Despite decades of ruthless barbarity from the Communist Cuban regime — mass murder, failed central
planning, political prisoners, persecution, torture, terror, and more — the Cuban tyrant was welcomed with open arms
by fellow totalitarian-minded rulers of the region at the CELAC summit in Santiago, Chile, this week. "Cuba's assumption of the presidency of the CELAC marks a
change of times," said socialist Argentine President Cristina Fernandez, a member of the FSP whose authoritarian-oriented regime is presiding over the
spectacular implosion of Argentina and its once vibrant economy. "For Chilean President Sebastian Pinera to transfer the presidency pro tempore to Castro
shows the times we're living in." The
socialist Venezuelan regime of strongman Hugo Chavez — key to financing the “pink
tide” sweeping Latin America with its vast stash of “petro-dollars,” as well as the prime architect of CELAC itself — celebrated the move
to put the Cuban dictatorship at the helm, too. “Vice President” Nicolas Maduro read a letter that supposedly came from the cancer-stricken Chavez himself,
calling on governments in the region to stay united in the fight against so-called “economic imperialism.” "We have to live with our differences ... always trying to
find the best way of complementing each other. We cannot let intrigues divide us," Chavez said in the letter read by his deputy. "After 30 years of resisting this
criminal imperial blockade (embargo on Cuba) Latin America and the Caribbean are using a single voice to tell the United States: All your attempts to isolate
Cuba are failing." Ironically, or Orwellian to the extreme, depending on how one views the developments, CELAC’s founding charter claims that “democracy,”
“human rights,” and the “rule of law” are among the supranational entity’s foundational principles. In reality, with very few exceptions, its membership roster is
dominated by socialist and communist strongmen like Castro, Chavez, Evo Morales of Bolivia, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, “former” communist guerilla and current
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, and other, lesser known but equally despotic rulers. The
clear message sent by Castro’s surge to
prominence — the establishment publication the Economist even called him “the new leader of Latin America” — was
not lost on human rights activists, however. “It sends a message from the governments of the region that they
couldn’t care less about the poor human rights record and the lack of fundamental freedoms in Cuba,” noted José Miguel
Vivanco, director of the Americas Division for the New York-based Human Rights Watch. “I think it’s a disaster, a very serious mistake
and a setback for the region.”
Impact – Cuba-Iran alliance
Cuba-Iran ties risks EMP and bioweapons attacks against the US without containing
Cuba
Suchlicki, 13- Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at
the University of Miami (Jaime, “Cuba’s Continuous Support for Terrorism”, Cuba Democracia Y Vida,
4/22/13, http://www.cubademocraciayvida.org/web/article.asp?artID=21053)//TL
Iran, Cuba and Venezuela have developed a close and cooperative relationship against the U.S. and in
support of terrorism. The three regimes increasingly coordinate their policies and resources in a three
way partnership aimed at counteracting and circumventing U.S. policies in the Middle East and Latin
America. Within this relationship, Cuba plays a strategic role in terms of geography (proximity to the
U.S.), intelligence gathering (both electronic eavesdropping and human espionage) and logistics.
Worrisome to the U.S. are reports that “have uncovered covert operations between Cuba and Iran in the
development and testing of electromagnetic weapons that have the capacity to disrupt
telecommunication networks, cut power supplies and damage sophisticated computers.” (1)
Furthermore, Cuba can easily provide Iran with valuable information from its sophisticated espionage
apparatus. Iran is also able to obtain information on biotechnology from Cuba. In the late 1990s, Cuba
began “transferring (licensing) both its medical biotechnologies and, along with the technical knowhow, implicit capabilities to develop and manufacture industrial quantities of biological weapons,”
creating a significant security threat for the United States and Israel. (2)
In addition to its proven technical prowess to interfere and intercept U.S. telecommunications, Cuba has
deployed around the world a highly effective human intelligence network. The type of espionage carried
out by Ana Belén Montes, the senior U.S. defense intelligence analyst who spied for Cuba during some
16 years until her arrest in 2001, has enabled the Castro regime to amass a wealth of intelligence on U.S.
vulnerabilities as well as a keen understanding of the inner-workings of the U.S. security system. Such
information and analysis was provided to Saddam Hussein prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and would
undoubtedly be provided to a strategic ally like Iran. While one may argue that factors such as Iran’s
limited military capabilities and sheer distance diminish any conventional concerns, one should expect
that Tehran, in case of a U.S.-Iran conflict would launch an asymmetrical offensive against the U.S. and
its European allies through surrogate terrorist states and paramilitary organizations. In such a scenario,
Cuban intelligence would be invaluable to Iran and its proxies and Cuban territory could be used by
terrorist groups to launch operations against the U.S.
Iran’s sphere of influence is expanding into Latin America
Cardenas, 12 – former senior official at the U.S. State Department (Jose, “ Soft-Pedaling the Iranian
Threat in the Americas”, Foreign Policy, June 28, 2013,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/28/soft_pedaling_the_iranian_threat_in_the_america
s)//eek
Three months after Southcom commander Gen. John F. Kelly told the House Armed Services Committee
that the United States needs to be "extremely concerned" about Iran's expanding presence in the
Western Hemisphere, the State Department has just informed Congress that Iran's regional influence is
"waning."
Indeed, even though around the same time Kelly told an audience at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) that he is constantly approached by his regional counterparts requesting any
information he can provide them on Iranian activities in the hemisphere, the State Department is
reporting to Congress that it "will work closely with and inform our partners in the hemisphere about
malign Iranian activities."
The State Department's assertions come in a two-page unclassified annex to a long-awaited classified
report to Congress mandated by the bipartisan Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, signed
into law by President Barack Obama late last year. It directs the secretary of state to "conduct an
assessment of the threats posed to the United States by Iran's growing presence and activity in the
Western Hemisphere and submit to the relevant congressional committees the results of the
assessment and a strategy to address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the Western
Hemisphere."
Granted, the bulk of the report is classified, but it is not difficult to conclude that its tone is unlikely to
diverge much from the unclassified annex -- and that is deeply disturbing.
Especially when just last month an Argentine prosecutor added to the growing paper trail on Iran's
nefarious activities in the Americas by releasing a 500-page report detailing how Iran has
systematically built a clandestine intelligence network throughout the region "designed to sponsor,
foster and execute terrorist attacks."
The prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, who investigated the notorious 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish
community center in Buenos Aires, provides compelling evidence of covert Iranian activity in
numerous countries, including Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Suriname.
Undoubtedly, the Nisman report will be a focus of attention when the House Homeland Security
Committee holds a hearing on July 9 on the State Department report. Already, Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.),
who sponsored the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act and is chairing the hearing, has
expressed his displeasure with the unclassified annex. He said in a statement, "I believe that the
Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran's presence here at home."
Ironically, one of the objectives of Duncan's legislation was to foster better interagency cooperation on
addressing the Iranian presence in the hemisphere. I attended the CSIS forum with General Kelly and
can unequivocally say he gave no impression that his concerns about Iran in the hemisphere were
"waning." He quite rightly pointed out how easy it is for anyone wishing to do the United States harm
to meld with the criminal networks that can move anything to the United States' borders within days
or hours: drugs, people, contraband, anything....
By this time, the penetration of the Western Hemisphere by Iran -- and its proxy, Hezbollah -- should
be a subject beyond debate, especially after the assessment by the director of national intelligence,
James Clapper, following the 2011 Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington,
D.C., "that some Iranian officials -- probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- have changed
their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real
or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime."
In this light, there remains no defensible reason for the State Department to continue to soft-pedal the
issue, whether the department believes for some reason that it complicates negotiations over Iran's
illegal pursuit of nuclear weapons or because it offends the sensitivities of some Latin American
governments. Congress is right to demand accountability on the matter. Iran is playing for the highest
stakes; it is high time the United States did as well.
Impact – shun commies
Communism is a synonym for fascism. A cult of personality always arises around a
central dictator resulting genocide, starvation, and violence.
Gardner, 8 – a director of communications at a leading digital ad company (Jonathan, “Communism is
Evil. Here’s Why.”, March 7, 2008, http://fwcon.wordpress.com/2008/03/07/communism-is-evil-hereswhy/)//33k
What you don’t know or believe in can kill you. Just because you don’t believe a snake is poisonous
doesn’t mean a snake bite won’t send you to an early grave. Just because you don’t believe cancer is a
deadly disease doesn’t mean you won’t die from it.
The same is true for philosophies. Communism, the philosophy, is a poison, a poison that will kill
Americans as fast as it has killed millions of people across the world.
Let me spell it out for you in plain English: There are evil men out there, and there are a lot of them.
Hitler was one of many. The world is filled with these men. Some are not as extreme as others, but the
extreme ones have a certain bloodlust for power, and are willing to kill their own mothers, children,
and wives to get it.
Read your history. Study what power does to people. Study about the kind of people drawn to power.
Study how the get power, how they keep it, and how they use it. You will come to one conclusion: Your
mindset of tolerance and compassion isn’t shared by everyone. And when push comes to shove, those
people will try to use it against you.
Take the communist movement. A young idealist, Karl Marx, is simply trying to think about all the poor
people around the world, and trying to come up with a fair way to help them be free from economic
slavery. Sounds noble and good, right? And it is. This is something everyone should work for, starting
with themselves, and then their families, and then their communities.
What wasn’t good was Karl Marx’s plan to make everyone equal by government rule. Rather than build
up, he wanted to tear down. Rather than quicken, he wanted to kill. He saw obstacles to his wonderful
utopic recipe everywhere he turned. His conclusion, and the conclusions of everyone who tries to
follow his path, is that everyone else, every other organization, must be destroyed. The ones that
must be destroyed first are those that do the most good. In the ashes, society can be rebuilt in the just
and true way.
Communism, as Reagan carefully explained, is not a new idea. It is a very old idea, dressed up in modern
clothes and freshened up with modern language. It is the same idea that the Egyptians had when they
enslaved the Jews. It is the same idea that the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, and
Mongols had as they sent out murdering armies to torture the earth and enslave free people. It is the
same idea as the people who bought and sold men. It is simply man’s quest to conquer everyone else
and make themselves king or emperor. They want to eat the food made by others for free, and they
will say and do anything to get it.
Under communism, a select group of elites control every aspect of life. They control who gets to grow
food, who gets to eat that food, and who gets to starve. Interestingly, it is the people who grow the
food who starve. They control what people are allowed to think, say, and do. They control every
aspect of society. Or so they wish to do so.
As my friend who actually lived under Communist Russia explained, early into the revolution, it was
realized that communism was much more dangerous than any anti-communist had thought. It was a
dangerous thing, dangerous not just to the people but to those high up in the power chain. And so the
government began to relax the very controls that communism prescribed. That is, Russia only boasted
that they were communist, but what kept them alive was the black markets, black markets that moved
food, medical supplies, and expertise around the country without any government intervention. And the
government did little to stop the black markets, acknowledging, privately, that those markets kept the
people alive.
As another friend who lived under communist rule observed, upon arriving in Boston, while the Russians
talked about communism, the Americans were actually doing it. He had never felt so little in the eyes of
government officials than when he had to interact with the federal and state and city governments. At
least the communists could be bribed to make things go smoothly.
We are fast headed down the path where every person must bow to the government to obtain
permission to wipe their own bottoms, literally. They have already legislated how much water we can
flush with. Just now, a bill is crossing the desk of the governor, asking her to set state-mandated limits
on how many miles we can drive. Bit by bit, our freedoms are disappearing.
We know from human experience what lies down this path of increasing government control. We
have seen the holocaust. We have seen millions of starving Ukrainians and Chinese. We saw the killing
fields in Southeast Asia. We see the mass starvation and complete lack of any freedom in North
Korea. We see Canadians and Englishmen caught in a failing medical system, waiting endlessly for
simple operations, dying before they can even see a surgeon. We know, without a doubt, where this
road leads us.
On the other hand, and friends, this is not “right” versus “left”, this is “up” versus “down”, on the other
hand we see another option. Limited government. Government applied sparingly, with extreme caution,
and most importantly, in a cold, calculating way, calculated to maximize the freedoms of the individual.
We see societies not limited by permits and taxes and regulations on speech. We see them
spontaneously organize to address every social need, long before politicians even realize there is a need.
As Alexis de Tocqueville commented upon seeing the American people in action, there was no need for
government to spend a moment of time thinking about the poor, since the people were already
addressing every need at the best of their ability. This is what “up” gets you. This is what limited
government gets you. Yes, there are rich, and there are poor, but the rich have no power to imprison,
torture, and kill the poor.
“Down” leads to slavery, concentration camps, reeducation camps, poverty, starvation, warfare.
“Down” leads to the deepest and darkest moments in human history, human slaughter that the most
bloodthirsty mongol conqueror could never even imagine. “Down” is all that communism has to offer.
As Mark Levin commented, “Government gets you concentration camps and the holocaust. Do you want
more government?” And as he contrasted, “Exxon may be evil, but who have they falsely imprisoned, or
tortured, or killed?” I would rather live in a society run by evil corporations than good government.
Impact – turns the environment
Communism is terrible for the environment- USSR proves- laundry list of impacts
Dilorenze ’92- an American economics professor at Loyola University Maryland. (Thomas J., “Why Socialism Causes Pollution”, FEE, March 1 1992,
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/why-socialism-causes-pollution#axzz2Y0u7FfBX) //CW
But if the profit motive is the primary cause of pollution, one
would not expect to find much pollution in socialist countries, such as the
theory. In reality exactly the
opposite is true: The socialist world suffers from the worst pollution on earth. Could it be that free enterprise is not so
former Soviet Union, China, and in the former Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. That is, in
incompatible with environmental protection after all? I. Socialist Pollution The Soviet Union In the Soviet Union there was a vast body of environmental law and
regulation that purportedly protected the public interest, but these constraints have had no perceivable benefit. The Soviet Union, like all socialist
countries, suffered from a massive "tragedy of the commons", to borrow the term used by biologist Garrett Hardin in
his classic 1968 article. Where property is communally or governmentally owned and treated as a free resource,
resources will inevitably be overused with little regard for future consequences. The Soviet government’s
imperatives for economic growth, combined with communal ownership of virtually all property and resources, caused
tremendous environmental damage. According to economist Marshall Goldman, who studied and traveled extensively in the Soviet Union,
"The attitude that nature is there to be exploited by man is the very essence of the Soviet production ethic." A typical
example of the environmental damage caused by the Soviet economic system is the exploitation of the Black Sea. To comply with five-year plans for housing and
building construction, gravel, sand, and trees around the beaches were used for decades as construction materials. Because there is no private property, "no
value is attached to the gravel along the seashore. Since, in effect, it is free, the contractors haul it away. This
practice caused massive beach erosion which reduced the Black Sea coast by 50 percent between 1920 and 1960. Eventually, hotels, hospitals,
and of all things, a military sanitarium collapsed into the sea as the shore line gave way. Frequent landslides–as many as 300 per year–have
been reported. Water pollution is catastrophic. Effluent from a chemical plant killed almost all the fish in the Oka River in
1965, and similar fish kills have occurred in the Volga, Ob, Yenesei, Ural, and Northern Dvina rivers. Most Russian factories discharge their
waste without cleaning it at all. Mines, oil wells, and ships freely dump waste and ballast into any available body of
water, since it is all one big (and tragic) "commons." Only six of the 20 main cities in Moldavia had a sewer system by the late 1960s, and only
two of those cities made any effort to treat the sewage. Conditions are far more primitive in the countryside. The Aral and Caspian seas have been gradually
disappearing as large quantities of their water have been diverted for irrigation. And since untreated sewage flows into feeder rivers, they
are also heavily polluted. Some Soviet authorities expressed fears that by the turn of the century the Aral Sea will be nothing but a salt marsh. One
paper reported that because of the rising salt content of the Aral the remaining fish will rapidly disappear. It was
recently revealed that the Aral Sea has shrunk by about a third. Its shore line "is arid desert and the wind blows dry
deposits of salt thousands of miles away. The infant mortality rate [in that region] is four to five times the national
average." The declining water level in the Caspian Sea has been catastrophic for its fish population as spawning
areas have turned into dry land. The sturgeon population has been so decimated that the Soviets have experimented
with producing artificial caviar. Hundreds of factories and refineries along the Caspian Sea dump untreated waste into the sea, and major cities
routinely dump raw sewage. It has been estimated that one-half of all the discharged effluent is carried in the Volga River, which flows into the Caspian Sea. The
concentration of oil in the Volga is so great that steamboats are equipped with signs forbidding passengers to toss cigarettes overboard. As might be expected,
fish kills along the Volga are a "common calamity." Lake Baikal, which is believed to be the oldest freshwater lake in the world, is also one of the largest and
deepest. It is five times as deep as Lake Superior and contains twice the volume of water. According to Marshall Goldman, it was also "the best known example
of the misuse of water resources in the USSR." Factories and pulp mills have been dumping hundreds of millions of gallons of effluent into Lake Baikal each year
for decades. As a result, animal life in the lake has been cut by more than 50 percent over the past half century.
Untreated sewage is dumped into virtually all tributaries to the lake. Islands of alkaline sewage have been observed
floating on the lake, including one that was 18 miles long and three miles wide. These "islands" have polluted the air
around the lake as well as the water in it. Thousands of acres of forest surrounding the lake have been denuded,
causing such erosion that dust storms have been reported. So much forest land in the Lake Baikal region has been destroyed that some
observers reported shifting sands that link up with the Gobi Desert; there are fears that the desert may sweep into Siberia and destroy the lake. In other regions
the fact that no compensation has to be paid for land that is flooded by water projects has made it easy for government engineers to submerge large areas of
land. "As much land has been lost through flooding and salination as has been added through irrigation and drainage in the Soviet Union." These
examples of environment degradation in the Soviet Union are not meant to be exhaustive but to illustrate the
phenomenon of Communist pollution. As Goldman has observed, the great pollution problems in Russia stem from the fact that the
government determined that economic growth was to be pursued at any cost. "Government officials in the USSR generally have a greater
willingness to sacrifice their environment than government officials in a society with private enterprise where there is
a degree of public accountability. There is virtually a political as well as an economic imperative to devour idle
resources in the USSR."
Seriously, communism is bad for the environment- Poland proves
Dilorenze ’92- an American economics professor at Loyola University Maryland. (Thomas J., “Why Socialism Causes Pollution”, FEE, March 1 1992,
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/why-socialism-causes-pollution#axzz2Y0u7FfBX) //CW
According to the Polish Academy of Sciences, "a third of the nation’s 38 million people live in areas of ecological
disaster." In the heavily industrialized Katowice region of Poland, the people suffer 15 percent more circulatory disease, 30 percent
more tumors, and 47 percent more respiratory disease than other Poles. Physicians and scientists believe pollution
is a major contributor to these health problems. Acid rain has so corroded railroad tracks that trains are not
allowed to exceed 24 miles an hour. The air is so polluted in Katowice that there are underground "clinics" in uranium
mines where the chronically ill can go to breathe clean air. Continuous pumping of water from coal mines has caused so much land to
subside that over 300,000 apartments were destroyed as buildings collapsed. The mine sludge has been pumped into rivers and streams
along with untreated sewage which has made 95 percent of the water unfit for human consumption. More than 65
percent of the nation’s water is even unfit for industrial use because it is so toxic that it would destroy heavy metals
used by industry. In Cracow, Poland’s ancient capital, acid rain "dissolved so much of the gold roof of the 16th century Sigismund Chapel that it recently
hd to be replaced." Industrial dust rains down on towns, depositing cadmium, lead, zinc, and iron. The dust is so heavy that huge trucks drive through city streets
daily spraying water to reduce it. By some accounts eight tons of dust fall on each square mile in and around Cracow each year. The
mayor of Cracow
recently stated that the Vistula River — the largest river in Poland — is "nothing but a sewage canal." The river has
mercury levels that are three times what researchers say is safe, while lead levels are 25 times higher than deemed
safe. Half of Poland’s cities, including Warsaw, don’t even treat their wastes, and 41 animal species have reportedly
become extinct in Poland in recent years. While health statistics are spotty — they were not a priority of the
Communist government–available data are alarming. A recent study of the Katowice region found that 21 percent of the children
up to 4 years old are sick almost constantly, while 41 percent of the children under 6 have serious health problems.
Life expectancy for men is lower than it was 20 years ago. In Upper Silesia, which is considered one of the most heavily industrialized
regions in the world, circulatory disease levels are 15 percent higher, respiratory disease is 47 percent higher, and there
has been "an appalling increase in the number of retarded children," according to the Polish Academy of Sciences. Although pollution
cannot be blamed for all these health problems, physicians and scientists attach much of the blame to this source.
Communism doesn’t care about the environment whatsoever
Dilorenze ’92- an American economics professor at Loyola University Maryland. (Thomas J., “Why Socialism Causes Pollution”, FEE, March 1 1992,
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/why-socialism-causes-pollution#axzz2Y0u7FfBX) //CW
The second lesson is that the plundering of the environment in the
socialist world is a grand example of the tragedy of the commons.
Under communal property ownership, where no one owns or is responsible for a natural resource, the inclination is
for each individual to abuse or deplete the resource before someone else does. Common examples of this "tragedy"
are how people litter public streets and parks much more than their own yards; private housing is much better maintained than
public lands but maintain lush pastures on their own property; the national forests are carelessly over-logged, but private forests are carefully
managed and reforested by lumber companies with "super trees"; and game fish are habitually overfished in public waterways but thrive in
private lakes and streams. The tragedy of the commons is a lesson for those who believe that further nationalization and
governmental control of natural resources is a solution to our environmental problems.
Pink Tide countries in LA have failed to curb environmental or social harms
Fidler ’13- Long-time socialist activist and writer (Richard, “'Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions': compelling contribution to our understanding of the 'pink
tide'”, LINKS, March 11 2013, http://links.org.au/node/3254) //CW
All Latin American governments are heavily dependent on exports of largely unprocessed natural resources. In the case
of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, hydrocarbons, minerals and agricultural commodities account for more than 90 per cent of their exports; but even Brazil, with
a substantial industrial sector, derives more than 50% of its export revenue from primary commodities. “Are
we just witnessing a neodevelopmentalist twenty-first-century version of the failed import substitution industrialization project of the 1960s and
1970s, or have any of these governments begun to break with the logic of capital?,” ask the authors. They acknowledge the
criticism of Uruguayan ecologist Eduardo Gudynas, that none of the pink tide governments has “substantially modified the
extractive sector” or lessened its negative social and environmental impacts. These are legitimate concerns.
Excessive dependency on resource exports tends to block economic diversification. And it entails constant conflict
with Indigenous and campesino populations by contaminating their waters, spurning their ancestral rights and
traditions, and violating international law on prior consultation of peoples expelled from their lands. Examples of such
practices are legion in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, among others.
Intermediary CP
Intermediary CP – 1nc
Text:
The United States federal government should ask the governments of Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia
diplomatically engage Cuba on its behalf.
Intermediaries are more effective forms of engagement – boosts relations and avoids
politics
Iglesias, 12 – Commander, US Navy. Paper submitted for the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the
the US Army War College (Carlos, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) GOC = Government of Cuba, FAR = Cuban
military
Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not come from any
continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International opposition to the perceived
fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the
global scale, the problem is epitomized by the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General
Assembly resolution votes against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union
partners have strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic,
“since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would work, and (the
next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has managed to generally retain
positive feelings among the people of Latin American in spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The
rise of Raúl and any subsequent successions further complicated the problem of mustering
international consensus. Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh
30 opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, Brazil and
Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their interests in forging new ties
since Fidel’s stepped down.99
On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft
power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries
interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising
legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire . In this approach, burgeoning
relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that
have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island
through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the
proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of antiAmerican influences (e.g. Chávez). 100
2nc – intermediary solves
Having other Latin American leaders take the lead solves US engagement and is a
better approach to multilateralism
White, 13-Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay
and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times,
3/7/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latinamerica.html?pagewanted=all)//TL
Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can
prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?
The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess
the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president
and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like
President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the
Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show
some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help .
Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral
challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a
sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed
entirely of elected governments.
Brazil says yes and will engage Cuba behind the scenes on behalf of the U.S. – it will
deploy its former President Lula as an intermediary to lay the groundwork for more
successful engagement
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
Washington should incrementally engage Cuba by first encouraging the island to participate within
the Organization of American States. Second, the State Department should convene an annual summit
of foreign ministers from the Americas to be held six months after the Summit of the Americas
presidential conference. Third, the next Summit of the Americas should include Cuba.
Suggesting that the United States would be willing to talk directly with Cuba accomplishes the goal of
jumpstarting diplomacy without actually beginning talks . Doing so would be consistent with similar
policy revisions [*197] concerning Iran and Syria. n22 One key question is how the Cuban government
would react to an indication that the United States would be willing to begin talks. For his part, Fidel
Castro wrote in December 2008 that, "A discussion with Obama can take place wherever he should
wish." n23 Castro, however, qualified his overture by warning the President that, "he should be
reminded that the theory of the carrot and the stick will not have any effect in our country." n24
Given the significance of establishing direct contact immediately, any initial consultations can be
ferried through Brazil , whose president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, has indicated a strong preference for
the U.S. to begin direct talks with Cuba. Since President Lula entered office in 2003, he has sought to
strengthen ties with both Washington and Havana, and would serve as a natural intermediary. President
Lula's second presidential term ends in January 2011, and he has indicated that he will not seek a
constitutional change to allow him to run for a third term. Given this timeline, the United States can use
President Lula as a short-term intermediary while it lays the groundwork for more direct talks after
2011. Additionally, given his relationship with both Castro brothers, and his reputation as a moderate
presence in the region, President Lula could still serve as an intermediary even after he has left office.
Regional Engagement is key to strengthen US-Cuba relations
Moncarz 2010- Professor of Finance at Florida International University
(Raul, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: A ‘New Partnership for the Americas’” Global
Economy Journal, 2/19/10,
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gej.2010.10.1/gej.2010.10.1.1610/gej.2010.10.1.1610.xml?onlyResul
tQuery=IWP#a1, google scholar)//KW
Every new U.S. administration brings renewed hope and vigor to the World regarding unrealized dreams
and aspirations as well as unfinished and not realized agendas. The U.S. has not neglected Latin
America, even according to some the region has probably benefited from U.S. involvement in the
Middle East and Afghanistan.A New Partnership for the Americas is the name that the Obama group
used during the election campaign. The common thread is a preference to develop cooperation through
converging national interests as articulated by the U.S. and Latin American Caribbean governments.The
U.S. and Cuban government officials are talking for the first time in years raising hopes for a thaw in
long-icy relations. President Obama has granted Cuban-Americans the right to travel freely to Cuba
and to send remittances there, and to give U.S. telecommunications companies the right to pursue
business there represents a first step in trying for better relations.If the new Obama administration
thought that a change in the rhetoric and tone would make the likes of Castro, Chavez and others see
things the U.S. way, a new lesson was learned in that sometimes countries disagree simply because their
goals are mutually exclusive.A year after Barack Obama became U.S. president, pledging "a new
beginning" in relations with Cuba and wining praise from Fidel Castro, bitter rhetoric is once more
flying between the two states.At the outset it has to be recognized that the U.S. government actually
understands what is happening in Latin America. The U.S. policy is highly sophisticated and often seems
more drastic on its understanding of what is happening than some or most of its critics.Looking at some
people's history of the hemisphere it is remarkable and transformative that for the first time in many
years, the U.S. does not seem to care much what happens in Latin America. In an interconnected world,
power does not need to be a zero sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another.
Cultivating spheres of cooperation--not competing spheres of influence--will lead to progress in the
Caribbean and Latin America. Engagement meaning expanded cooperation with and the need to
broaden policy efforts with the group of leftists rules countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador,
Nicaragua, Uruguay, Peru and Venezuela beyond the previous administration focus on regional
economic integration through competitive liberalization.
CP boosts Brazilian leadership
Cuba key to Brazilian regional leadership
Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow
with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the
International Response”, November, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cub
a_feinberg.pdf)//ID
Emergent Brazil’s special interest in Cuba obeys several motives . The Brazilian and Cuban economies
have salient complementaries—in the sugar industry, off-shore petroleum, pharmaceuticals, and
infrastructure construction—that attract Brazilian exporters and investors . In the diplomatic realm, the
accelerating Brazilian drive toward hegemony in Latin America and influence throughout the developing
world steers it naturally to Havana Harbor; Cuba is easily the largest of the Caribbean islands, and Cuba
retains considerable prestige in certain circles worldwide . Brazil would cherish Cuban support for its
overriding ambition to gain a permanent seat on the U .N . Security Council . Although Brazilian
diplomats are quick to deny it, there is fierce competition between Brasilia and Caracas for leadership
throughout the Americas, and nowhere is this head-to-head rivalry sharper than in Cuba.
There are also matters of ideology and domestic politics that contribute to Brazil’s special interest in
Cuba . Within Brazilian internal politics, the more left-wing faction of the governing Workers Party has
an historic affinity with revolutionary Cuba and wants Brazil positively engaged on the island . More
generally, Brazil touts its modern social democratic model of development, in contrast to Chavez’s “21st
Century Socialism,” and if Brazil could nudge Cuba gradually toward its ideological direction, that
would be a major diplomatic accomplishment.
Brazil solves as mediator between US and Cuba
Stabroek News 2009
(“Brazil: US’s Cuba move good first step, more needed” 4/15/09,
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/news/regional/04/15/brazil-us%E2%80%99s-cuba-move-goodfirst-step-more-needed/)
BRASILIA, (Reuters) – Brazil said yesterday that the U.S. lifting of limits on family travel and remittances
to Cuba was a good first step but that it should not require gestures from the Cuban government
before dismantling trade sanctions against the island.
President Barack Obama on Monday ended travel and money transfer restrictions for Cuban Americans
and allowed U.S. telecommunications firms to offer cellphone roaming and satellite radio and
television to Cubans.
“It’s a small step in the right direction,” Foreign Minister Celso Amorim told reporters on Tuesday.
“It’s important that it be a first step and that (the United States) not wait for gestures from Cuba to be
able to continue,” Amorim said. At the Summit of the Americas starting on Friday, several Latin
American leaders will push for the return of Cuba to the hemisphere’s forums such as the Organization
of American States, from which Havana was excluded in 1962 when it embraced Soviet communism at
the height of the Cold War. Amorim said Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a moderate leftwing leader who often tries to mediate between Latin America and the United States, would raise the
Cuban issue at the meeting, but without putting Obama in a corner.
“(Obama) needs to understand that the region wants the end of the embargo,” said Amorim. “Now,
there is no interest in creating an (awkward) situation for President Obama,” he said.
The White House said it wanted to increase the flow of information to Cuba. Obama has said he is open
for dialogue with Cuba’s leaders, but does not intend to lift the trade embargo until the one-party
state adopts democratic reforms.
The Obama administration also does not want the April 17-19 Summit of the Americas to be dominated
by the Cuba issue.
OAS chief Jose Miguel Insulza expressed caution this week, saying Cuba needed to show clearly that it
was committed to democracy to be readmitted to the group. Cuba has been ruled by Fidel Castro and
his younger brother, Raul, since a 1959 revolution.
OAS intermediary solves
Engaging Cuba through the OAS boosts US diplomacy
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
(2A) Engage Cuba Within the Contours of the OAS
The U.S. must reinvigorate global and regional institutions in order to serve its national interest and
meet twenty-first century challenges. n25 A critical venue for any hemispheric engagement is the
Organization of American States (OAS). The U.S. lobbied the OAS to suspend Cuba's membership in 1962
and to declare that a communist government was "incompatible" with the organization's mission. n26
Since OAS member states supported reopening its doors to Cuba in 2009, the U.S. was well advised to
not obstruct this process when the foreign ministers of each state voted unanimously to lift Cuba's
suspension. n27 The organization provides a ready-made venue for cooperation on a variety of issues
facing the region. Admitting Cuba into the OAS strengthens the organization's institutional legitimacy
by turning the page on a Cold War-era exclusion - one that long ago became anachronistic.
Strengthening the institutional architecture of the OAS helps extend American [*198] power by
increasing the legitimacy of certain U.S. policy objectives, and by facilitating burden sharing,
consultation, and diplomacy.
OAS membership for Cuba, along with an increased role for the organization itself, would amount to
formalized cooperation. Such an outcome should not be pursued as an end itself, n28 but as a way to
deftly increase the accountability of other actors in areas of concern, such as labor and human rights,
free trade, humanitarian crisis response, and the drug trade. n29
Increase pressure CP
1nc – increase pressure
The United States federal government should strengthen economic pressure on Cuba, explicitly linking
the continuance of current engagement to a Cuban political transition and denying domestic oil drilling
permits to any company that assists Cuba in energy development.
Increasing the embargo is key to solving human rights and regime change – contact
empirically fails and just gives Cuba money
Burton, 12 – former Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee (Dan, “HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CUBA; COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS; SUBCOMMITTEE: AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS”, February 16, 2012, lexis)//eek
As the former Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee and author of one of the most
important pieces of legislation in the Cuba-U.S. relationship, I would like to thank Chairman Smith and
Ranking Member Payne, Chairman Mack and Ranking Member Engel, for holding this timely joint
hearing today. It is essential that we continue to bring to light the ongoing gross human rights
violations and atrocities committed by the Castro regime. The Cuban people, like all of us, deserve
basic human rights. I believe that these rights will only come as a result of the removal of the Castro
brothers from power and the reinstatement of constitutional democracy.
For the past 53 years, more than eleven million Cuban people have been subject to the iron fists of the
Castro brothers. From its inception, this regime has been anti-U.S., repeating a pathetic David and
Goliath narrative in order to blame their economic, social and political problems on the United States.
This narrative has succeeded thus far and its acceptance serves to solidify the Castro's grip on power. At
every turn, the Castro regime has sought to unite with enemies of the United States, no matter how
culturally and ideologically different. During the cold war, they allied with the Soviet Union. Now, they
are actively engaging Iran.
The resilience of this regime has significantly contributed to the leftward and more undemocratic
movement of many Latin American nations. We are seeing populist leftist regimes such as that of
Chavez in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua, Correa in Ecuador and Morales of Bolivia rise to power aided
and abetted by the Communist Regime in Cuba. These leaders have gone to great lengths to suppress
freedoms, censor the opposition and even change their constitutions, in order to maintain their hold
on power. I believe that our policy toward Cuba is crucial to the success of our policy towards other
nations in the Western Hemisphere.
When we passed the LIBERTAD Act of 1996, known also as Helms- Burton, our goal was to isolate the
Castro brothers. I still stand by this law and I agree with the great majority of the Cuban exile community
that there will be no change in Cuba while a Castro is in charge. Only after regime change will Cuba's
people be truly free.
The argument that the economic embargo hasn't worked and should be done away with is misguided.
It can work. Unfortunately the fact is that there is no true embargo on Cuba in place. The U.S. is one of
the biggest exporters of food to the island and Cuban- Americans send hundreds of millions of dollars
annually back home to their relatives, propping up a black-market for goods and services that the
Communist system does not provide - remittances which are highly taxed by the Castro regime. The
moment that we started allowing food sales to the Cuban regime and remittances to go through, was
the moment the embargo became more of a symbol than a policy tool. The fact that the "embargo"
hasn't worked and the regime is all the more autocratic really means that our policies should become
more stringent, not less so.
The alternative, that has been supported by many members of this committee, has failed miserably. As
a result of open tourism and international investment, the regime has recently enjoyed a tremendous
influx of money from Canadians, Latin Americans, and Europeans who have access to the island. Why
haven't these tourists from democratic countries transformed this dictatorship into a democracy? The
answer is that the regime barely lets tourists travel outside Veradero Beach or historical landmarks in
Havana. It guarantees as little interaction between tourists and locals as possible, though it looks the
other way in regards to the thriving sex trade.
This so-called openness has done little if anything to help those whose political and economic
freedoms are suppressed. I wish I could tell you that stories like that of Armando Valladares, who was
imprisoned in 1960 for 23 years, are no longer being written. He was deemed counterrevolutionary
because he refused to display a communist sign on his bank desk. These atrocities are still happening. In
March of 2003, while the world was watching the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Cuba experienced a brutal
crackdown by the Castro regime to crush the efforts by the Cuban people to achieve a free and
democratic Cuba. This "black spring" as it was later called, resulted in the arrest of 75 dissidents, 29 of
them journalists, on the charge of "dangerousness."
In Cuba, it is entirely lawful to arrest someone if one has suspicion that the individual may be inclined
to dissent against the state. This is part of the reason why thousands of Cubans still risk their lives every
year to flee the Communist regime by any means necessary, even attempting to brave the hazardous
90- mile crossing between the United States and Cuba on makeshift rafts. The regime denies citizens the
right to change their government.
We must continue to send a strong message to the Cuban government that the United States will not
forget those people who are languishing in Cuban prisons for the so-called crime of speaking out
against the injustices perpetrated by the Castro regime.
I commend the bravery of men like Orlando Zapata Tamayo who died in protest of the ill conditions of
the prison system. No prisoner in Cuba has access to the much-touted Cuban universal health care
system. In fact, according to the State Department's 2010 report, the prisons are overcrowded, infested
with vermin and prisoners are often sick and inadequately treated. Women are denied access to
feminine hygiene products and adequate prenatal care as well as being subjected to sexual abuse and
violence.
Prisoners who are released from these hellish prisons are most often forced to leave Cuba, their
home, as a condition of release. While I celebrate the fact that they are free from prison, I mourn the
thought that they have to join the ranks of thousands of Cuban exiles throughout the world, who want
nothing more than to return to their home as free citizens, an impossible wish as long as the Castros
remain in power.
2nc – pressure solves
Chavez’s death means strengthening the embargo will collapse Cuba’s government
Bustillo, 13- will be attending Columbia University in the fall where he will be majoring in Engineering
with a minor in Economics on a Pre-Law track. He is a first-generation Cuban-American, a Hispanic
Heritage Foundation Gold Medallion Winner, and a former United States Senate Page (Mitchell, “Time
to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, 5/9/13,
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/)//TL
When thinking of U.S.-Cuba relations, the trade embargo, or el bloqueo, is first and foremost on
people’s minds. In 2009, President Barack Obama eased the travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans to
travel freely to Cuba, and again in 2011, allowing students and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba,
as recently demonstrated by American pop culture figures, Beyoncé and her husband Jay-Z. Despite a
history of hostile transgressions, the U.S. is inconsistent with its implementation of the embargo, which
sends mixed signals to Havana and displays our weak foreign policy regarding Cuba.
Undoubtedly, Cuba is capitalizing on this weakness by using the embargo as a scapegoat for all of its
woes without any immediate fear of reinstated restrictions. Because the goal is to promote Cuban
democracy and freedom through non-violent and non-invasive means while refraining from providing
any support to the current oppressive Cuban government, the current legislation regarding the embargo
and travel ban against Cuba needs to be modernized and strengthened. The need for an embargo has
never been more important or potentially effective, even considering the current human rights and
economic arguments against the embargo.
Washington’s goal in its dealings with Havana is clear: facilitate the introduction and growth of
democracy while increasing personal freedoms. There are many who argue that the best way to spread
democracy is by lifting the embargo and travel restrictions. U.S. Rep. Michael Honda argues that an
influx of politically enlightened U.S. travelers to Cuba would put Havana in a difficult place, leading to
their own people calling for change. However, this is erroneous. Due to the fractured and weakened
state of the embargo, over 400,000 U.S. travelers visited Cuba in 2011, making the United States the
second-largest source of foreign visitors after Canada, according to NPR’s Nick Miroff. Obviously, this
influx of what has been theorized to be liberty-professing tourists has not resulted in an influx of such
democratic ideals into this overwhelmingly federally controlled country.
One example is the case of Alan Gross, an American citizen working for USAID. He was arrested in Cuba
in 2009 under the allegations of Acts against the Independence and Territorial Integrity of the State
while distributing computers and technological equipment to Jewish communities in Cuba. He is
currently serving the fourth of his fifteen-year conviction, is in poor health, and receiving little to no aid
from the U.S., according to the Gross Family website. In light of this, it is hard to believe that the U.S.
would be able to protect a large number of tourists in a hostile nation, especially when they plan to
‘profess’ political freedom. This view is further promoted by the Ladies in White, a Cuban dissident
group that supports the embargo. They fear ending it would only serve to strengthen the current
dictatorial regime because the real blockade, they claim, is within Cuba. Allowing American travelers to
visit Cuba does not help propel the cause of Cuban democracy; it hampers it.
Still there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at
least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy
solution. From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the
Cuban government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is perhaps the single largest
source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.”
These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban
government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the
Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard
of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current
regime stands. “After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from
Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,”
states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent
Institute.
However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and
powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape
or even improve their fate. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the
Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation
of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.
No doubt, it has been a fruitless 50 years since the embargo was enacted. Little has changed as far as
democracy and human rights are concerned. To maintain control, Cuba has “managed to offset much of
the effects over the years in large part because the Soviets subsidized the island for three decades,
because the regime welcomed Canadian, Mexican and European capital after the collapse of the Berlin
Wall, and because Venezuela is its new patron,” according to Llosa. However, Venezuela is now
undergoing a political transition of its own with the recent death of Hugo Chávez, its president for the
past 14 years, and the controversial election of Nicolás Maduro.
Despite being Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro only won by a narrow margin and will likely be
forced to cut spending on social programs and foreign assistance in an effort to stabilize Venezuela’s
dire economic problems. Therefore, now is the ideal time to take action. Without Venezuela’s support,
the Cuban government will assuredly face an economic crisis. Strengthening the embargo to limit U.S.
dollars flowing into Cuba would place further pressure on the Cuban government and has the potential
to trigger an economic collapse. A change in the Cuban political climate is within reach.
According to U.S. Senator Robert Menendez, “Tourism to Cuba is a natural resource, akin to providing
refined petroleum products to Iran. It’s reported that 2.5 million tourists visit Cuba – 1.5 million from
North America…1 million Canadians…More than 170,000 from England…More than 400,000 from Spain,
Italy, Germany, and France combined – All bringing in $1.9 billion in revenue to the Castro regime.” This
behavior undermines the embargo, which is why the U.S. should urge other nations to adopt similar
policies toward Cuba. A strong and unyielding embargo, supported by the U.S. and its allies, is necessary
to incite political change. Furthermore, Sen. Menendez argues, “Those who lament our dependence on
foreign oil because it enriches regimes in terrorist states like Iran, should not have a double standard
when it comes to enriching a brutal dictatorship like Cuba right here in our own backyard.”
If the policy of the U.S. is to challenge these behaviors, then it must also stand up to Cuba. It would be a
disservice to squander the progress of the past 50 years when opportunity is looming.
Tightening pressure will collapse the Cuban regime – comparatively better than
engagement
Burton, 12 – US Representative (Dan, CQ Congressional Testimony, “Human Rights in Cuba”, 2/16, lexis)
The argument that the economic embargo hasn't worked and should be done away with is misguided.
It can work. Unfortunately the fact is that there is no true embargo on Cuba in place. The U.S. is one of
the biggest exporters of food to the island and Cuban- Americans send hundreds of millions of dollars
annually back home to their relatives, propping up a black-market for goods and services that the
Communist system does not provide - remittances which are highly taxed by the Castro regime. The
moment that we started allowing food sales to the Cuban regime and remittances to go through, was
the moment the embargo became more of a symbol than a policy tool. The fact that the "embargo"
hasn't worked and the regime is all the more autocratic really means that our policies should become
more stringent, not less so.
The alternative, that has been supported by many members of this committee, has failed miserably. As
a result of open tourism and international investment, the regime has recently enjoyed a tremendous
influx of money from Canadians, Latin Americans, and Europeans who have access to the island. Why
haven't these tourists from democratic countries transformed this dictatorship into a democracy? The
answer is that the regime barely lets tourists travel outside Veradero Beach or historical landmarks in
Havana. It guarantees as little interaction between tourists and locals as possible, though it looks the
other way in regards to the thriving sex trade.
2nc – solves oil drilling
Denying domestic permits to foreign oil companies that drill in Cuba will empirically
stop foreign investment
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
CONGRESSMAN BUCHANAN'S BILL TO STOP CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING IS THE PROPER ACTION FOR
THE UNITED STATES
On January 21, 2011, Florida Congressman Vern Buchanan introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives aimed at thwarting Cuba's drilling efforts.8 7 The bill would permit the U.S. Secretary
of the Interior to deny drilling leases to foreign companies that deal with countries under U.S. trade
sanctions, including Cuba.88 Following the successful application of U.S. pressure on Repsol to pull
out of drilling in Iran, Buchanan's bill is designed to again put pressure on Repsol to pull out of Cuban
drilling plans.89 Buchanan's bill could threaten Repsol's projects elsewhere in U.S. territory where the
company operates rigs near Texas and Louisiana. 90
While the success of the bill is not yet certain,91 foreign firms should seriously weigh the rewards of
Cuban oil against the possible risk of being ostracized by America economically.92 Mr. Buchanan's bill is
the proper approach for U.S. legislation and policy to make a stand against Cuba's offshore oil
exploration.93
Increasing trade restrictions solves oil spills and other countries sphere of influence –
it collapses the profitability
Claver-Carone, 11 – Executive Director of the Cuba Democracy Advocates (“GULF COAST OIL SPILL
INVESTIGATION REPORT; COMMITTEE: HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES”, November 2, 2011, lexis)//eek
Similarly, after much initial fanfare, Canada's Sherritt and Brazil's Petrobras -- perhaps the most
credible and respected of the region's oil companies outside the United States -- publicly abandoned
their efforts in 2008 and 2011, respectively, stating that Cuba offshore drilling was "not commercially
viable" and citing "poor prospects." Much of this can be attributed to U.S. sanctions, which
dramatically drive up costs of production. The Cuban regime has itself admitted that U.S. sanctions
make it commercially impractical to produce oil in its territorial waters. Keep in mind that even the
largest neighboring foreign oil companies, Mexico's Pemex and Venezuela's PdVSA, refine the majority
of their oil in the U.S. and then repatriate it, for they lack the domestic infrastructure to process their
own heavy crude and the U.S.'s geographical proximity enhances profitability.
As long as U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba's regime are in place, producing and refining any oil found
in Cuban waters in the United States isn't an option. That leads to a question: If off-shore drilling in
Cuban waters is not commercially viable for the most respectable regional oil companies, which are
located relatively close to Cuba and have the most experience in dealing with Cubans, is such drilling
really viable for the Angolans, Malaysians or the Chinese? The answer is no.
Initially, we learned this in 2006, when the Cuban regime seemingly had convinced public policymakers
in Washington -- including many here in Congress -- that the Chinese were ready to drill off Cuba's
shores. The threat never materialized, but it served the Cuban regime's political interests. As Reuters
reported from Cuba at the time: "Havana is eager to see American oil companies join forces with the
anti-embargo lobby led by U.S. farmers who have been selling food to Cuba for four years."
Last year's oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico by BP and the justifiable public outrage that ensued has given
the Cuban regime a new and strategic opportunity to use the threat of offshore drilling as a means of
forcing the U.S. to unilaterally ease sanctions. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez has confirmed
this on various occasions and relayed as much to former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, who recently
traveled to Havana in an unsuccessful effort to secure the release of American hostage Alan Gross;
Gross has been held for nearly two years in a Cuban prison for helping the island's Jewish community
connect to the Internet.
In a flashback to 2004, Spain's Repsol is back in Cuba preparing to drill another exploratory well early
next year. This time, the Cuban regime is "threatening" that if Repsol is pressured into abandoning
drilling, India's ONGC Videsh or Malaysia's Petronas will step forward.
Curiously, this peculiar corporate trio was granted extensive oil- rights last year by Hugo Chavez to
develop a block with 235 billion barrels of reserves in Venezuela's oil-rich Orinoco belt. Reserves in that
one Venezuelan block alone are believed to be 50 times greater than the best estimates in all of
Cuba's territorial waters. Some geo-political foul play can surely be deduced from the particularity and
timing of this arrangement.
Despite the fact that Repsol still faces exploratory hurdles (and gargantuan production costs if oil is
ever found), the United States is erring on the side of caution and licensing specialty oil spill mitigation
firms to respond quickly in the case of an accident. This is also not a new phenomenon. The U.S. has
been licensing such firms since at least 2001. Moreover, current U.S. law provides all of the necessary
flexibility to do so.
While such precautions are necessary, efforts should also be made to prevent the Cuban regime from
engaging in offshore exploration altogether. The anti-American nature of the Cuban regime will simply
not provide the necessary safeguards regardless of the level of U.S. engagement on this issue. Thus,
there is currently legislation filed with this goal in mind, including H.R. 2047, the Caribbean Coral Reef
Protection Act, which targets U.S. visas and loans to the Cuban regime's foreign business partners, and
H.R. 373, which amends the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to deny U.S. leases to foreign
companies that engage in oil exploration with countries under U.S. sanctions, such as Iran and Cuba.
Precaution might bring us temporary peace of mind, but prevention would better serve our long-term
national interests.
Property rights net benefit
The embargo is justified as the only rational response to expropriation – property
rights outweigh the freedom to travel or trade. Even if sanctions fail it’s morally
justified as an expression of contempt towards theft
Azel, 12- a senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (Jose, “Cuba’s
Economic Sanctions and Property Rights**”, Cuba Transition Project of the Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies, 5/21/12, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue165.htm)//TL
Libertarians hold that the fundamental reason for the existence of governments is to protect life,
liberty, and property. These are the principles articulated by John Locke (1632-1704) regarded as the
principal architect of liberal thought (in the historical European use of the term) and who deeply
influenced our own Declaration of Independence.
Within a democratic realm, citizens are expected to rely on our domestic institutions for the
protection of these rights. For instance, an independent judiciary is essential for the resolution of
property claims and other matters. But what is a citizen to do when his property rights are violated by a
foreign totalitarian regime where no recourse to the rule of law is available?
It would seem that, when a U.S. citizen’s property is expropriated by a foreign country, the
property rights principle, so dear to libertarians, would take center stage. And yet, paradoxically,
libertarian thinkers often argue against economic sanctions with nary a word about property rights.
They argue that unilateral economic sanctions do not work, and that individuals should be free to
invest as they choose and undertake the risk of their investments. Agreed, but that leaves open the
question as to how a government should protect its citizen’s property rights when a foreign government
capriciously and arbitrarily changes the rules of the game.
U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba are a case in point. The sanctions were first authorized in 1961
when President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order in response to the Cuban government’s
expropriation without compensation of American assets-an issue that remains unresolved.
It is valid to state that the sanctions have failed to change the course or nature of the Cuban
government, but the failure argument is peculiarly offered in a form of isolated reverse logic. It is also
valid and necessary to point out that the alternative policy pursued by the international community of
engaging with the Cuban government has also failed to change the nature of that regime.
Currently over 190 nations engage economically and politically with Cuba while the United States
remains alone in enforcing its economic sanctions policy. If indeed U.S. policy is deemed as one case of
failure to change the nature of the Cuban government, there are 190 cases of failure on the same
grounds. By a preponderance of evidence (190 to 1) the case can be made that engagement with that
regime has been a dismal failure.
Fifty years ago President John F. Kennedy sent a reasonable message to the international
community that governments that choose to expropriate the properties of U. S. citizens need to
compensate them. Governments that choose to simply steal the properties of U. S. citizens should
expect some form of retaliation from the U.S. government. That message remains valid today as an
expression of a government’s duty to protect the property rights of its citizenry in foreign countries
where the rule of law does not prevail.
It is one thing to argue, as those of us that value personal freedoms do, that investors should be free
to invest and accept all the risks of their decisions when the rules of the game are known in advance and
where the rule of law prevails. It is a different situation when the rules are changed after the fact, as
the Cuban government did, and where no legal recourse is available.
Investors in communist countries cannot expect their government’s protection; they know in advance
what they are getting into. The maxim “investors beware” is fully in place. After all, Karl Marx makes it
clear in chapter two of The Communist Manifesto that “...the theory of the Communists may be
summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.”
Independently of their usefulness, the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool is neither
new nor particularly American. Pericles’ decree banning the Megarians from the Athenian market and
ports helped incite the Peloponnesian War in 431 B. C.
Unintended and undesirable consequences are inherent in the use of economic sanctions. Arguably
they should not be used to compel a democratic transformation or even to advance human rights or
other laudable goals. They seem, however, an appropriate in-kind response to the economic aggression
of another country such as expropriations without compensation. What are the policy alternatives to
protect the property rights of a citizenry when negotiations fail?
You have a moral obligation to uphold property rights – they are they only thing that
checks totalitarianism from blindly sacrificing people
*war, violence, and vtl
Rand, 63 – degree in social pedagogy and political philosopher (Ayn, “MAN’S RIGHTS”, April 1963,
http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=arc_ayn_rand_man_rights)//eek
“Rights” are a moral concept—the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles guiding
an individual’s actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others—the concept that preserves
and protects individual morality in a social context—the link between the moral code of a man and the
legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. Individual rights are the means of subordinating
society to moral law.
Every political system is based on some code of ethics. The dominant ethics of mankind’s history were
variants of the altruist-collectivist doctrine which subordinated the individual to some higher authority,
either mystical or social. Consequently, most political systems were variants of the same statist
tyranny, differing only in degree, not in basic principle, limited only by the accidents of tradition, of
chaos, of bloody strife and periodic collapse . Under all such systems, morality was a code applicable
to the individual, but not to society. Society was placed outside the moral law, as its embodiment or
source or exclusive interpreter—and the inculcation of self-sacrificial devotion to social duty was
regarded as the main purpose of ethics in man’s earthly existence.
Since there is no such entity as “society,” since society is only a number of individual men, this meant, in
practice, that the rulers of society were exempt from moral law; subject only to traditional rituals,
they held total power and exacted blind obedience—on the implicit principle of: “The good is that
which is good for society (or for the tribe, the race, the nation), and the ruler’s edicts are its voice on
earth.”
This was true of all statist systems, under all variants of the altruist-collectivist ethics, mystical or social.
“The Divine Right of Kings” summarizes the political theory of the first—”Vox populi, vox dei” of the
second. As witness: the theocracy of Egypt, with the Pharaoh as an embodied god—the unlimited
majority rule or democracy of Athens—the welfare state run by the Emperors of Rome—the Inquisition
of the late Middle Ages—the absolute monarchy of France—the welfare state of Bismarck’s Prussia—
the gas chambers of Nazi Germany—the slaughterhouse of the Soviet Union.
All these political systems were expressions of the altruist-collectivist ethics-and their common
characteristic is the fact that society stood above the moral law, as an omnipotent, sovereign whim
worshiper. Thus, politically, all these systems were variants of an amoral society.
The most profoundly revolutionary achievement of the United States of America was the subordination
of society to moral law.
The principle of man’s individual rights represented the extension of morality into the social system—
as a limitation on the power of the state, as man’s protection against the brute force of the collective,
as the subordination of might to right. The United States was the first moral society in history.
All previous systems had regarded man as a sacrificial means to the ends of others, and society as an
end in itself. The United States regarded man as an end in himself, and society as a means to the
peaceful, orderly, voluntary coexistence of individuals. All previous systems had held that man’s life
belongs to society, that society can dispose of him in any way it pleases, and that any freedom he enjoys
is his only by favor, by the permission of society, which may be revoked at any time. The United States
held that man’s life is his by right (which means: by moral principle and by his nature), that a right is the
property of an individual, that society as such has no rights, and that the only moral purpose of a
government is the protection of individual rights.
A “right” is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man’s freedom of action in a social context.
There is only one fundamental right (all the others are its consequences or corollaries): a man’s right to
his own life. Life is a process of self- sustaining and self-generated action; the right to life means the
right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action-which means: the freedom to take all the
actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and
the enjoyment of his own life. (Such is the meaning of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.)
The concept of a “right” pertains only to action—specifically, to freedom of action. It means freedom
from physical compulsion, coercion or interference by other men.
Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive—of his freedom to act on his own
judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice. As to his neighbors, his rights
impose no obligations on them except of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights.
The right to life is the source of all rights—and the right to property is their only implementation.
Without property rights, no other rights are possible . Since man has to sustain his life by his own
effort, the man who has no right to the product of his effort has no means to sustain his life. The man
who produces while others dispose of his product, is a slave .
Bear in mind that the right to property is a right to action, like all the others: it is not the right to an
object, but to the action and the consequences of producing or earning that object. It is not a guarantee
that a man will earn any property, but only a guarantee that he will own it if he earns it. It is the right to
gain, to keep, to use and to dispose of material values.
The concept of individual rights is so new in human history that most men have not grasped it fully to
this day. In accordance with the two theories of ethics, the mystical or the social, some men assert that
rights are a gift of God—others, that rights are a gift of society. But, in fact, the source of rights is man’s
nature.
The Declaration of Independence stated that men “are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights.” Whether one believes that man is the product of a Creator or of nature, the issue of
man’s origin does not alter the fact that he is an entity of a specific kind—a rational being—that he
cannot function successfully under coercion, and that rights are a necessary condition of his particular
mode of survival.
“The source of man’s rights is not divine law or congressional law, but the law of identity. A is A—and
Man is Man. Rights are conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival. If man
is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right
to work for his values and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is his purpose, he has a right
to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational.” (Atlas Shrugged)
To violate man’s rights means to compel him to act against his own judgment, or to expropriate his
values. Basically, there is only one way to do it: by the use of physical force. There are two potential
violators of man’s rights: the criminals and the government. The great achievement of the United States
was to draw a distinction between these two—by forbidding to the second the legalized version of the
activities of the first.
--XT – property rights outweigh
Private Property is the only way to protect Freedom – without property anything can
be done to us
Younkins, 2k – Ph.D. and Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit
University (Edward, “Private Property Rights: The Moral and Economic Foundation of a Free Society ”,
Liberty Free Press, April 15, 2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/younkins5.html)//eek
Private property, the bedrock institution of capitalism, is essential for the preservation of individual
freedom. When property rights are respected and protected, a person is able to keep and enjoy the
product of his labor. In addition, human creativity and flourishing require property ownership by
individuals. The free market requires that a person has the right to possess, use for consumption or
further production, exchange for money or other property, dispose of, and restrict the access of others
to his property. He may do whatever he wishes with his legitimately-held possessions as long as he
does not in so doing violate the natural rights of another person. In other words, individuals may
possess, purchase, give away, and sell property (including their own labor) if they do not do so
fraudulently, and they can do what they want with their property as long as they do not injure others.
Freedom is based on ownership. If it is possible for a man to own assets, it is also possible for him to
have freedom of speech, religion, the press, etc. Private property increases individual freedom by
dispersing ownership and control of property among a great number of people.
Reject any infringement on freedom
Petro, 74 – Professor of Law at NYU (Sylvester, Toledo Law Review, Spring, p. 480,
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200304/0783.html)
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is
always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at
once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no importance
because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny,
despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one
believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to
maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically
identified and resisted with undying spirit.
Property is an extension of one's self and labor--failure to give credence to these
natural rights undermines the basis of freedom, opens the door to authoritarianism
and compromises the foundation of a progressive economy
Younkins 2k, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in
West Virginia and author of "Capitalism and Commerce" (Edward, "Private Property Rights: The Moral
and Economic Foundation of a Free Society" 4/15/2000, Liberty Free Press,
http://www.quebecoislibre.org/younkins5.html)//AD
The institution of private property is based on the natural human desire and right to survive and
pursue one's vision of happiness. The idea of "freedom under the law" is rooted in the property
acquiring instinct and the need for safeguarding the possession of one's property. The body of law that has
developed to protect ownership is based on the assumption that every rational man knows his interests best and should be permitted to pursue them.
The
right of private property is a moral and economic preqrequisite for making the pursuit of individual
excellence possible . There can be no morality without self-responsibility and self-determination
which, in turn, depend upon the existence of private property rights.
Private Property Rights: A Moral Concept
According to John Locke, the blending of an individual's labor with God's created universe produces private property.
Private property results
when something has been added by individual effort to transform previously unowned property. In
Locke's view, individuals form societies in order to gain the strength to secure and defend their properties.
It follows that the proper end of government is the preservation of property. Locke's main theme was that the ownership of
private property is a natural right of every individual and that this right pre-existed government . The inalienable rights of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, included in the Declaration of Independence, are Lockean in nature and must be protected. Without
protection of one's private property, other rights would have little meaning.
The Lockean approach is rooted in the idea that people own their own labor . Locke has implied that any man who has
transformed an unowned resource owns the transformation that he has created. If a person owns what he has
created from an unowned resource, he logically also owns whatever he or his agent creates from his property which could then be sold for whatever price the
market will yield. In other words, the voluntary transfer of justly acquired property is morally proper.
If men, who are at least partly material beings, have the right to life, then they have the right to maintain their lives with their own means and time as long as they
do not infringe on the equal rights of others. Since human physical survival depends on the use of material objects, people have the right to determine the uses of
these material objects.
All men are self-owners who have property in the free use of their time, abilities, and efforts. Each man
has the moral right to control his own labor power and to claim ownership of the fruits of his labor. The
right to property is a natural right and shares the characteristics of any natural right. The hallmark of our
free market economy is that we have a moral right to property.
A distinction exists between innate and acquired property. A person possesses innate property as part of his own nature, along with the right to its control. Innate
property refers to the productivity that is inherent in an individual's ability to work physically and mentally. Acquired property refers to things external to one's own
person. It is not only the possession of material property, but the possession of scientific know-how, technical skills, and experience that determines the value of an
individual in society.
Property may be viewed as mainly consisting of actions and knowledge rather than things. This idea is
compatible with intellectual property such as patents and copyrights. This form of property does not
refer to specific objects, but rather to the right of an inventor to build a mechanism or of an author to
publish a work.
Property is best understood as a relationship between persons. One person has the right to exclude others from the current or future use of a certain resource. In
addition, we have evolved from the idea of property as real assets to the idea of property as promises stocks, bonds, mortgages, paper money, bank books, etc.
These are symbols of ownership and do not refer to actual possession. Ownership of this type of property requires a specialized knowledge such as that possessed
by accountants, bankers, lawyers, brokers, and managers who aid the owner in determining the best uses of his resources.
Knowledge is a type of property. Persons engaged in professions requiring long and advanced education have invested time, effort, and intelligence in a special kind
of property, knowledge, and thus have a legitimate claim on the professional use of it.
Included in the concept of private property are the notions that an individual's work creates private
property and that a person owns himself and therefore has property in the free use of his time, abilities,
and efforts. Work requires the expenditure of time and energy. It is in work that we can find the
foundations of profit, property, and corporations all are justified in terms of the perfection of the human
being.
Private Property and Individual Freedom
Private property, the bedrock institution of capitalism, is essential for the preservation of individual freedom. When
property rights are respected and protected, a person is able to keep and enjoy the product of his
labor. In addition, human creativity and flourishing require property ownership by individual s. The free
market requires that a person has the right to possess, use for consumption or further production, exchange for money or other property, dispose of, and restrict
the access of others to his property. He
may do whatever he wishes with his legitimately-held possessions as long
as he does not in so doing violate the natural rights of another person. In other words, individuals may
possess, purchase, give away, and sell property (including their own labor) if they do not do so
fraudulently, and they can do what they want with their property as long as they do not injure others.
Private
property increases individual freedom by dispersing ownership and control of property among a great
number of people.
Freedom is based on ownership. If it is possible for a man to own assets, it is also possible for him to have freedom of speech, religion, the press, etc.
Oil spill CP
1nc MEXUS CP
The United States federal government should establish contingency plans for a Cuban
oil spill and create an operational framework to develop systems for reporting an oil
spill. The United States federal government should instruct the Coast Guard to
conduct basic spill response coordination with its Cuban counterpart and develop
basic spill-oriented advance coordination and communications. The United States
should pre-approve companies to assist in prevention and cleanup for oil spills.
The CP solves oil spills without disrupting the embargo, that avoids politics
Bert and Clayton 12- military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations AND
fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations.
(Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2012,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515)//HA
The imminent drilling of Cuba's first offshore oil well raises the prospect of a large-scale oil spill in
Cuban waters washing onto U.S. shores. Washington should anticipate this possibility by
implementing policies that would help both countries' governments stem and clean up an oil spill
effectively. These policies should ensure that both the U.S. government and the domestic oil industry
are operationally and financially ready to deal with any spill that threatens U.S. waters. These policies
should be as minimally disruptive as possible to the country's broader Cuba strategy.
The Problem
A Chinese-built semisubmersible oil rig leased by Repsol, a Spanish oil company, arrived in Cuban waters
in January 2012 to drill Cuba's first exploratory offshore oil well. Early estimates suggest that Cuban
offshore oil and natural gas reserves are substantial—somewhere between five billion and twenty
billion barrels of oil and upward of eight billion cubic feet of natural gas. Although the United States
typically welcomes greater volumes of crude oil coming from countries that are not members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a surge in Cuban oil production would
complicate the United States' decades-old effort to economically isolate the Castro regime.
Deepwater drilling off the Cuban coast also poses a threat to the United States. The exploratory well is
seventy miles off the Florida coast and lies at a depth of 5,800 feet. The failed Macondo well that
triggered the calamitous Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010 had broadly similar features, situated
forty-eight miles from shore and approximately five thousand feet below sea level. A spill off Florida's
coast could ravage the state's $57 billion per year tourism industry.
Washington cannot count on the technical know-how of Cuba's unseasoned oil industry to address a
spill on its own. Oil industry experts doubt that it has a strong understanding of how to prevent an
offshore oil spill or stem a deep-water well blowout. Moreover, the site where the first wells will be
drilled is a tough one for even seasoned response teams to operate in. Unlike the calm Gulf of Mexico,
the surface currents in the area where Repsol will be drilling move at a brisk three to four knots, which
would bring oil from Cuba's offshore wells to the Florida coast within six to ten days. Skimming or
burning the oil may not be feasible in such fast-moving water. The most, and possibly only, effective
method to respond to a spill would be surface and subsurface dispersants. If dispersants are not
applied close to the source within four days after a spill, uncontained oil cannot be dispersed, burnt,
or skimmed, which would render standard response technologies like containment booms ineffective.
Repsol has been forthcoming in disclosing its spill response plans to U.S. authorities and allowing them
to inspect the drilling rig, but the Russian and Chinese companies that are already negotiating with
Cuba to lease acreage might not be as cooperative. Had Repsol not volunteered to have the Cubabound drilling rig examined by the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement to certify that it met international standards, Washington would have had little legal
recourse.
The complexity of U.S.-Cuba relations since the 1962 trade embargo complicates even limited efforts to
put in place a spill response plan. Under U.S. law and with few exceptions, American companies cannot
assist the Cuban government or provide equipment to foreign companies operating in Cuban territory.
Shortfalls in U.S. federal regulations governing commercial liability for oil spills pose a further problem.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) does not protect U.S. citizens and property against damages
stemming from a blown-out wellhead outside of U.S. territory. In the case of Deepwater Horizon, BP was
liable despite being a foreign company because it was operating within the United States. Were any of
the wells that Repsol drills to go haywire, the cost of funding a response would fall to the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is woefully undercapitalized. OPA 90 limits the OSLTF from paying out
more than $50 million in a fiscal year on oil removal costs, subject to a few exceptions, and requires
congressional appropriation to pay out more than $150 million.
Pre-approval solves
A technology safety exemption can be done through the executive and causes USCuban oil spill cooperation
Jordan 10- staff writer
Levi, “Oil Spill Diplomacy: The Response from the Americas” as-coa, June 24, 2010, http://www.ascoa.org/articles/oil-spill-diplomacy-response-americas
The BP oil spill also has spurred an unexpected round of talks between the United States and Cuba.
U.S. State Department officials have contacted Cuban officials to share information that would help
Havana better prepare for the oil slick reaching its coast. Although not acknowledged as official
diplomatic relations, cooperation between the United States and Cuba is common on environmental
issues such as hurricanes and earthquakes, as outlined by the 1983 UN Cartagena Convention. The
inability to predict the spill’s size or direction has meant ongoing contact between officials of both
countries.
As The Christian Science Monitor reports, the oil spill has placed pressure on the Obama
administration to make petroleum safety equipment, resources and technology exempt from the U.S
embargo on Cuba . Before the oil spill in the Gulf, Cuba had announced plans to develop offshore
deposits located within its territorial waters. A May report by the Brookings Institution in Washington
D.C. recommends that Obama issue an executive order to modify the embargo so that U.S.
companies can more easily respond in the event of any future oil spill in Cuban waters that may
threaten the U.S. mainland. With oil from the spill last reported just 100 miles northwest of Cuba, the
disaster creates a path for Washington and Havana to communicate, even as Cuba accepts teams from
Venezuela to help it deal with the crisis. Oil, as well as politics as it seems, can sometimes make strange
bedfellows.
Pre-approval of exports and a joint contingency plan based on the MEXUS agreement
solves – it allows a quicker response than other countries
Whittle, 11 – Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director for the Environmental Defense Fund
(“NORTH AMERICAN OFFSHORE ENERGY; COMMITTEE: HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES; SUBCOMMITTEE:
ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES”, November 2, 2011, lexis)//eek
First and foremost, the Administration should take steps now to ensure that US-based companies are
pre-authorized to assist in preventing and containing major oil spills in Cuban waters. Specifically, the
US Department of Treasury should adopt a new general license that provides authority to any
qualified oil services company in the United States to send personnel to Cuba in response to a request
from Cuba, Repsol or any other oil company conducting operations in Cuban waters; likewise, the US
Department of Commerce should pre-approve the export of vessels, equipment, and supplies needed
for containment and response. This would allow Repsol and other foreign oil companies to contract
with US oil service companies in advance of drilling. This is particularly important because of the
proximity to Cuba of US firms with the requisite deep water drilling and advanced response, technical,
and planning capabilities, in contrast to the distance between Cuba and other countries, such as the
UK, Norway or Brazil, with state-of-the-art deep water oil development experience.
Second, it is in our national interest to negotiate now with Cuba, Mexico and the Bahamas to ensure
that any future drilling in waters of the Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, or Caribbean is conducted according to
the highest possible environmental and safety standards. In addition, the Administration should
develop a joint contingency plan with Cuba that ensures the full participation of key US government
agencies in oil spill response, including the US Coast Guard, the Department of Interior, NOAA and
others. The MEXUS agreement discussed above can serve as a potential model for a US-Cuba
agreement or for a region-wide agreement that includes the United States, Cuba, Mexico and the
Bahamas. We urge action on this score as soon as possible.
Preapproval of companies stopping oil spill solves – it removes the dense regulatory
process
Whittle, 11 – Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director for the Environmental Defense Fund
(“NORTH AMERICAN OFFSHORE ENERGY; COMMITTEE: HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES; SUBCOMMITTEE:
ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES”, November 2, 2011, lexis)//eek
Current US Policy on Cuba Impedes Cooperation on Environmental Protection
Current US policy on Cuba permits EDF and other scientific, academic, and conservation organizations to
conduct on-the-ground research and conservation projects with Cuban partners and institutions.
Scientific and professional exchange is generally limited, however, to non-governmental groups and
academic institutions. Most private companies are prohibited from doing business in Cuba because of
the embargo. There is a narrow exception for some private entities, such as oil services companies,
but they must first apply for specific approval from the US Treasury and Commerce Departments to
provide services and export equipment to Cuba. This process is complicated and time- consuming and
apparently few companies in the oil services sector have asked for or received specific licenses so far.
In the event of an oil spill in Cuban waters, this licensing process would cost precious time.
US government agencies such as the Coast Guard, the Department of Interior, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are extremely
limited in their ability to communicate or coordinate with their Cuban government counterparts on
environmental protection or natural resources management. This compromises each country's ability
to ensure that shared waters and natural resources are properly managed and adequately protected.
This lack of dialogue, cooperation, and joint planning between government agencies leaves the United
States especially vulnerable to future oil spills in Cuban waters. Florida and other states along the east
coast as far as North Carolina would be threatened by a major oil spill in Cuba. Therefore, as outlined
below, the Administration should take immediate steps to initiate negotiations with the Cuban
government to ensure that sufficient environmental and safety safeguards are in place before drilling
begins later this year. In addition, the Administration should pre-approve categories of private
companies to send personnel and equipment to Cuba in the event of an oil spill that threatens US
waters.
Pre-approval for private companies to mitigate oil spill risks solves the impact – the CP
replicates existing US/Mexican cooperation for Cuba
Whittle, 11 – Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director for the Environmental Defense Fund
(“NORTH AMERICAN OFFSHORE ENERGY; COMMITTEE: HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES; SUBCOMMITTEE:
ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES”, November 2, 2011, lexis)//eek
In the absence of meaningful government-to-government dialogue, the Administration has taken
some positive steps to enable private companies and non-governmental organizations to interact with
Cuban agencies directly on this issue. For example, in the wake of BP, the US Treasury Department
authorized the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) to meet with Cuban energy
officials to discuss safety and environmental issues associated with offshore oil and gas production in
Cuban waters. The Treasury and Commerce Departments have also signaled that they are prepared to
issue more specific licenses to private companies in the US with the capacity to respond to, contain,
and clean up oil spills. At least one US company, Clean Caribbean and Americas, already has Treasury
and Commerce approvals to provide oil spill response services in Cuba.
The Department of Interior has also reportedly had productive discussions with the Spanish company
Repsol over its future drilling in Cuban waters and has apparently secured the company's pledge to
adhere to US environmental and safety standards. These positive steps, however, fall far short of those
needed and pale in comparison to those the Administration taken to strengthen and expand
cooperation with Mexico. As a result, the United States remains unprepared to effectively assist in the
prevention, containment, or clean-up of a major oil spill in Cuban waters.
A general license for safety technology solves
Lobe 11- Washington bureau chief for Inter press services
(Jim, “Cuba-Repsol Rig Upsets Anti-Castroites” Havana Times, November 4, 2011,
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=54907)//HA
But the fear of a major accident has prompted a number of environmental groups and independent
experts to urge the administration to become significantly more engaged with both the Cuban
government and all of the companies that will be operating the rig.
In particular, they want the administration to issue a general license for U.S. oil services companies to
work in Cuba, which would permit them to respond quickly to any spill or related emergency resulting
from drilling operations. Under the trade embargo, each company would have to apply for a special
license to do so.
“We are very naïve to think that, in the case of Cuba, a handful of individual exports licenses could
prevent and contain a deepwater oil exploratory well blow-out,” Jorge Pinon, a former oil executive
and consultant at Florida International University, told the Subcommittee.
“A general license to export and supply equipment, personnel and services to international oil
companies operating in Cuba in the case of an emergency is urgently needed,” he stressed, noting that
more than 5,000 vessels, millions of metres of booms; and nearly eight million litres of dispersant were
deployed to contain the Deepwater Horizon spill.
That message was echoed by Daniel Whittle, who directs the Cuba programme at the Environmental
Defense Fund and who organised a delegation headed by President George H.W. Bush’s environment
chief, William Reilly, that visited Cuba earlier this year. Reilly was the co-chairman of the national
commission that investigated the Deepwater disaster.
2nc – CP solves oil spills
The CP is modeled off of the MEXUS agreement, which solves, but maintains the
embargo
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
THE EMBARGO IS STILL NECESSARY
Despite calls for its revocation, the embargo's purpose is as important now as when it was enacted.
Cuba is still an oppressive country.59 Cubans may not leave the country without permission and still
lack fundamental freedoms of expression.60 JOS6 Miguel Vivanco, the director of Americas division at
Human Rights Watch, notes that as "Cuba's draconian laws and sham trials remain in place, [the
country] continue[s] to restock the prison cells with new generations of innocent Cubans who dare to
exercise their basic rights."61 Moreover, a recent proposal by the Cuban Communist Party makes clear
that there will be no change in the country's oppressive one-party political system.62 In doing so, the
lengthy document declares "[o]nly socialism is capable of overcoming the current difficulties and
preserving the victories of the revolution."63 Cuba's treatment of its own citizens is a situation the
United States cannot ignore. The embargo's twin goals of backing democracy and ending oppressive rule
have not been met. Until they are, the embargo must remain in place.
CALMING ENVIRONMENTAL FEARS WITH AN OIL SPILL RESPONSE AGREEMENT WITH CUBA
Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environmental threats because of the proximity to the
United States and the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are overblown. Cuba has at least as much
incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices as does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is
taking safety seriously.64 Lee Hunt, President of the Houston-based International Association of Drilling
Contractors, said, "[t]he Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought into what will
be required to safely drill," and that "they are very knowledgeable of international industry practices
and have incorporated many of these principles into their safety and regulatory planning and
requirements." 65 Thus, while the economic embargo of Cuba restricts American technology from being
utilized, foreign sources have provided supplemental alternatives.66 Further, spill response planning
can be implemented before drilling begins. The United States currently has oil spill response
agreements with Mexico 67 and Canada,68 but not with Cuba.69
As the Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted, planning for disaster is essential. To achieve this goal, the
United States can model 38 a Cuban plan on the Joint Contingency Plan between the United Mexican
States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Maritime Environment by Discharge
of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances ("MEXUS Plan"). 70 That plan originates from an
agreement between Mexico and the United States signed on July 24, 1980, and developed in
accordance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation, adopted on November 30, 1990.71 The Plan pre-designates on-scene coordinators, a
joint response team, response coordination centers, rapid notification protocols, and
communications procedures for the event of an oil disaster.72 The Plan has triumphed in test
simulations, which validates its concepts. 73
The United States must initiate the same level of planning with Cuba. Given the proximity of potential
Cuban wells to the Florida coast, the need for a contingency plan is clear. Fortunately, the MEXUS Plan
provides a guiding framework upon which the United States and Cuba can draw. Furthermore, a recent
Congressional report indicates that Cuba is open to certain bilateral agreements with the United
States, noting Raul Castro's willingness to engage with the United States where mutual interests exist.74
Since an oil spill agreement is of mutual interest, both countries should work to draft and implement
it.
CP is key to avert disaster
Bert and Clayton 12- military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations AND
fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations.
(Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2012,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515)//HA
Defending U.S. Interests
An oil well blowout in Cuban waters would almost certainly require a U.S. response. Without changes
in current U.S. law, however, that response would undoubtedly come far more slowly than is
desirable. The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially
designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil
companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and
other vital technologies. Although a handful of U.S. spill responders hold licenses to work with Repsol,
their licenses do not extend to well capping or relief drilling. The result of a slow response to a Cuban
oil spill would be greater, perhaps catastrophic, economic and environmental damage to Florida and
the Southeast.
Emergency response agreements solve oil spills
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International
Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework
of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37, lexis)//KW
Cuba plans to drill seven exploratory oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico by 2014.1 Some argue that the
threat of Cuban offshore oil drilling will increase the embargo's costs and that U.S. oil companies will
miss out on oil exploration that will go to foreign countries.2 In response, some U.S. lawmakers and
U.S. oil lobbyists have advocated for an exception to the Cuban embargo permitting energy
cooperation. 3 Notwithstanding these concerns, the long-standing Cuban embargo is an economic
restriction with a significant purpose and should not so easily be forsaken.
This article argues that, despite the added pressure Cuba's offshore oil developments have placed on
U.S. policy, the embargo's twin goals of bringing democracy to the Cuban people and ending their
oppressive rule have not been met. Thus, now is not the time to lift or ease the embargo. The
embargo itself serves to restrict Cuba's drilling efforts4 and new legislation may further hamper Cuba's
exploration.5 Additionally, the economic concerns of the U.S. energy industry do not warrant a change
in the U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, and those concerns can be better met by tapping U.S. resources.
Furthermore, fears of a Cuban oil spill can be assuaged through less drastic measures such as an oil
spill emergency response agreement with Cuba, similar to the one that the United States has enacted
with Mexico.
Cuba says yes
Cuba says yes to oil spill cooperation
Whittle, 11 – Senior Attorney and Cuba Program Director for the Environmental Defense Fund
(“NORTH AMERICAN OFFSHORE ENERGY; COMMITTEE: HOUSE NATURAL RESOURCES; SUBCOMMITTEE:
ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES”, November 2, 2011, lexis)//eek
The Cuban government made clear its determination to begin exploratory activities this year. Cuban
energy officials indicated to us that, in partnership with Repsol and other foreign oil companies, they
expect to drill up to six exploratory wells between 2011 and 2013. In such a short period of time, it was
not possible for us to conduct a comprehensive assessment of Cuba's oil drilling plans or of the strength
of its regulatory framework and capacity, and many questions remain. Nonetheless, we had frank and
open discussions and Cuban officials acknowledged the challenges associated with building an
offshore oil and gas industry from scratch. They repeated their pledge to follow the highest
international environmental and safety standards and expressed a strong willingness to cooperate
with the United States and other countries in the region on all aspects of environmental protection
and safety matters. After all, adopting all possible measures to minimize the likelihood of an oil spill is
very much in the interest of Cuba, not just the United States, because of the importance of its coastaloriented economy.
2nc – avoids politics
The CP solves and avoids politics
Bert and Clayton 12- military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations AND
fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations.
(Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2012,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515)//HA
Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its
government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They
might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies
operate in Cuban territory.
However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters
would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba . For years,
Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely
coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat
illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms.
The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil
spill poses to the United States . They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they
would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba.
Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States .
Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with
the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without taking these
precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.
Specific CP recommendations
The CPs actual CP recommendations and what it does
Bert and Clayton 12- military fellow (U.S. Coast Guard) at the Council on Foreign Relations AND
fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations.
(Melissa and Blake, “Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2012,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515)//HA
As a first step, the United States should discuss contingency planning for a Cuban oil spill at the regular
multiparty talks it holds with Mexico, the Bahamas, Cuba, and others per the Cartagena Convention. The
Caribbean Island Oil Pollution Response and Cooperation Plan provides an operational framework
under which the United States and Cuba can jointly develop systems for identifying and reporting an
oil spill, implement a means of restricting the spread of oil, and identify resources to respond to a
spill.
Washington should also instruct the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct basic spill response coordination
with its counterparts in Cuba. The United States already has operational agreements in place with
Mexico, Canada, and several countries in the Caribbean that call for routine exercises, emergency
response coordination, and communication protocols. It should strike an agreement with Cuba that is
substantively similar but narrower in scope, limited to basic spill-oriented advance coordination and
communication. Before that step can be taken, U.S. lawmakers may need to amend the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 to allow for limited, spill-related coordination and communication with the
Cuban government.
Next, President Barack Obama should issue an export-only industry-wide general license for oil spill
response in Cuban waters, effective immediately. Issuing that license does not require congressional
authorization. The license should allow offshore oil companies to do vital spill response work in Cuban
territory, such as capping a well or drilling a relief well. Oil service companies, such as Halliburton,
should be included in the authorization.
Finally, Congress should alter existing oil spill compensation policy. Lawmakers should amend OPA 90
to ensure there is a responsible party for oil spills from a foreign offshore unit that pollutes or
threatens to pollute U.S. waters, like there is for vessels. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and
Congressman David Rivera (R-FL) have sponsored such legislation. Lawmakers should eliminate the
requirement for the Coast Guard to obtain congressional approval on expenditures above $150
million for spills of national significance (as defined by the National Response Plan). And President
Obama should appoint a commission to determine the appropriate limit of liability cap under OPA 90,
balancing the need to compensate victims with the desire to retain strict liability for polluters.
There are two other, less essential measures U.S. lawmakers may consider that would enable the
country to respond more adeptly to a spill. Installing an early-response system based on acoustic,
geophysical, or other technologies in the Straits of Florida would immediately alert the U.S. Coast
Guard about a well blowout or other unusual activity. The U.S. Department of Energy should find out
from Repsol about the characteristics of Cuban crude oil, which would help U.S. authorities predict
how the oil would spread in the case of a well blowout.
Terror list CP
Terror list CP
The United States federal government should remove Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Delisting solves relations – it is a positive action toward Cuba and sends a signal to the
region
Thale and Anderson, 13 – Program director and WOLA and a Senior Associate for Cuba at the Latin
America Working Group (Geoff and Mavis, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List”, 24 May
2013, http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list)//eek
Delisting Cuba would be an important step in the right direction: it would send a message to the
Cuban government that the United States wants to improve the relationship. It could help set the
stage for the kind of dialogue and negotiations that are needed to address many issues of common
concern, including securing the release of USAID contractor Alan Gross, who is currently serving a 15year sentence in Cuba. Delisting Cuba would also send an important and long-awaited message to
Latin American governments from across the political spectrum. Both publicly and privately, Latin
American governments have made it clear to the Obama administration that U.S. policy toward Cuba
needs to change.
If the administration needed an additional reason to take Cuba off the terrorist list, Cuba’s constructive
role in the Colombian peace talks provides an excellent justification for doing the right thing. Peace
talks between the Colombian government (a stalwart U.S. ally and the recipient of hundreds of millions
of dollars in U.S. assistance) and the FARC (the Colombian guerilla organization, which the United States
has designated a terrorist organization) are currently taking place in Havana. The talks are making real
progress.
Noneconomic engagement solves relations
Cooperation on non-economic issues spills over to eventual normalization of relations
Barnes, 13 – Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy (Michael, “Time is Ripe For a New
Approach to Cuba” 3/4, http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/time-is-ripe-for-a-new-approach-tocuba)
I am advocating a series of engagements with Cuba on issues of mutual concern. Both countries are
concerned about drug trafficking, environmental issues (including hurricane tracking), migration, and
development of potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves in the Florida Straits.
Recently, I heard Cuba's senior representative in Washington, Ambassador Jose Cabanas, speak with
considerable logic about how his country could cooperate with the United States on energy production,
which is now being joint-ventured by Cuba with companies from many other countries, while our energy
companies are prohibited from participating. He noted that an oil spill, for example, off the coast of
Cuba would affect not only Cuba but almost immediately South Florida as well.
The United States has had informal contacts with Cubans on these and other mutual concerns. I am
proposing that the Obama administration, with the secretary of state taking the lead, move quickly to
formalize arrangements that will serve the unquestioned interests of both countries. Cuban officials
have indicated they are willing to do so, and we should test this assertion without preconditions.
Although I do not propose seeking immediate normalization of relations with Cuba, that could well be
the ultimate result of the phased steps I am advocating.
Even small-scale diplomacy efforts are sufficient to revive the relationship
DeShazo 7 – Executive Director of Academic and Professional Programs for the Americas, director of
the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Peter, “New Policy Direction
on Cuba in Global Forecast: the Top Security Challenges of 2008,” 11/14/7, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071120_gf_cubapolicy.pdf)//SJF
Whatever sense adherence to a rigid policy of sanctions and restrictions on Cuba may have made while Fidel Castro was in power no longer
holds weight with raúl in charge. instead, it is in the national interest of the united States and of the Cuban people to encourage a peaceful
transition that leads to democracy. the
united States should promote dialogue with the Cuban government as
well as cooperation on any issue of mutual benefit—of which there are many. it should use “soft-power”
tools—academic and cultural exchanges, sports programs, technology exchange, and information
outreach to begin to break the ice that has encrusted the bilateral relationship. the Cuban people hunger for a
closer relationship with the united States—based on mutual respect—and Raúl may see considerable benefit to an opening. Confidencebuilding measures, however small, can be meaningful in helping to promote real reform in Cuba
through a step-by-step approach. the united States should work with other democracies, at the
organization of American States and in Europe, to develop a more coordinated approach toward
encouraging change in Cuba. A more openminded u.S. policy will win greater credibility for such
efforts and will broaden the effectiveness of other u.S. policy initiatives in the Americas. u.S. public
diplomacy should underscore a positive desire to see Cuba rejoin the community of democracies at
the oAS and seek means by which that organization—in the spirit of the inter-American democratic Charter—can help
Cuba move toward democracy. reaching out to a new Cuban regime by no means implies an abandonment of u.S. commitment to democracy in
Cuba, but instead a more realistic and pragmatic approach toward meeting that goal. rather
than stepping back until a
transitional government comes into being that meets the strict standards of the Helms-Burton
legislation, the united States should engage with Cuba as a means of helping promote positive change.
there is nothing to lose and much to gain by doing so.
Diplomatic Contact spills over – strengthens trading ties
Honda 10 – serves on the House Budget and Appropriations Committees (Mike, “Political
Grandstanding in US Prevents Economic Opportunity in Cuba,” 5/4/10,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-mike-honda/political-grandstanding-i_b_562468.html)//SJF
Although it's infamous for socialism, cigars and salsa, few people know that Cuba was recently the
United States' largest rice export market, is the fifth-largest export market in Latin America for U.S. farm
exports and holds $20 billion in trade with America over a three-year term. Our economy could benefit
mightily from better relations, yet we alienate this potential ally
When I traveled to Cuba on a Congressional delegation recently, it became clear that the embargo is
imprudent politically, economically and socially. Everyone we met with -- U.S. and Cuban government
officials, trade organizations, journalists, cultural attachés, foreign diplomats and rural farmers -confirmed this point.
Politically, now that Latin America stands beside Cuba -- as evidenced by diplomatic reinstatements with
holdouts El Salvador and Costa Rica, and the reintegration of Cuba into the Organization for American
States and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States -- the U.S. risks ruinous relations with
countries that see the blockade as backward. The U.S. is already marginalized: CLACS explicitly bars
U.S. participation.
The impact of this Latin tack toward insularity is not insignificant. Consider grandstanding by Brazilian
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who rebuffed Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's efforts to
bring Brazil on Iran sanctions while courting Cuba's leadership. Lula, capitalizing on Cuba's appetite for
growth, proposed investments in industrial, agriculture and infrastructure projects, including ports
and hotels, and an agreement with Brazil's oil company.
We will see more of this. The Cubans are seeking suitors. Like the Bank of the South, Latin America's
attempt to wean countries off U.S. institutions like the World Bank, the longer we keep Cuba at arm's
length, the more likely Brazil and others will take our place.
The longer we keep Cuba listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, an allegation roundly criticized by
diplomats, the more we risk the credibility of our national security regime and reputation in the
region.
Economically, the case for cooperation is even clearer. Despite the trade embargo, there is some
engagement. Cuba continues to rely on U.S. agriculture. Since 2002, we have been Cuba's largest
supplier of food and agricultural products, with Cuba purchasing more than $3.2 billion in products since
2001.
This agricultural reliance is in jeopardy, which puts American farmers at risk. In 2008, U.S. food imports
to Cuba totaled $712 million, declined to $533 million last year and are declining this year. Cuba, having
witnessed strong economic growth in the early 2000s at 11 percent and 13 percent, is now struggling to
make ends meet, slipping below 2 percent growth in 2009.
Beyond foodstuffs, other natural resources offer potential for partnership. The U.S. Geological Survey
estimates that Cuba owns 9 billion barrels of untapped oil, along with 9 billion cubic meters of natural
gas. The Cuban government cites higher oil numbers, at 20 billion barrels. Either way, there's money to
be made, and Cubans welcome participation from countries that can help them tap and market the oil.
While the U.S. disengages, countries such as Brazil, Russia, Venezuela and China are talking. We are
clearly missing investment opportunities.
Socially, Cubans emphatically embrace the cultural convergences between our countries. Their love of
music, art, dance, history and architecture is ubiquitous, drawing 2.5 million tourists annually to Cuba,
800,000 of whom are Canadian. If the travel ban were lifted, 2 million Americans are expected
immediately, growing to 4 million. This is hardly surprising. Havana retains the Caribbean's largest,
oldest and best-preserved Spanish colonial architecture. The city's charm is intoxicating.
We should expand cooperation on education, medicine, science and sports through nonpolitical,
people-to-people exchanges. President Barack Obama has the authority to return the rules for
academic, science, religious and other "purposeful travel" so that exchange can flourish again. This is
how we rebuild relations.
None of this negates the sobering negatives characterizing U.S.-Cuba relations. Cubans remain poor,
irrespective of education (at nearly 100 percent literacy) or health care (everyone is covered, for
everything). The government is inadequately serving the population and there is a palpable, public
rethink surfacing within society, from government officials to academics to farmers. Reform is coming,
though not as soon as, or in the form that, the U.S. prefers. America's annual $60 million in democracybuilding, which is covertly distributed for explicitly stated regime change, exacerbates the problem by
goading the government, jeopardizing the safety of reformers and marginalizing the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana. The U.S. penchant for positioning Cuba-related communiqués as primarily human
rights reprimands resonates rankly as an inconsistent singling out.
Amid the acrimony, the U.S. and Cuba are cautiously coordinating on areas of mutual interest, such as
migration, counter-narcotics and disaster preparedness. The U.S. must build on this sooner than later,
before others opt in while we opt out. Cuba is not the enemy. She may frustrate American proclivity for
democracy promotion, but her behavior is nothing near as nefarious as that of certain U.S. allies
elsewhere.
The time is now to engage. Cubans are increasingly confabbing about reform while we sideline
ourselves from the conversation.
2nc delist solves relations
Taking Cuba off the terrorism list is sufficient to send an international symbol of
engagement and isn’t appeasement
López-Levy, 13 - PhD candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of
Denver (Arturo, “Getting Ready for Post-Castro Cuba” The National Interest, 4/10,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-ready-post-castro-cuba-8316
Time for Presidential Action
In this new context, the United States should open a path for those regime voices who have an interest
in backing more serious reforms. Washington should weaken the naysayers within the Cuban elites by
showing what Cuba can gain through opening up. This requires a U.S. willingness to test Havana with
real incentives in ways it has not done since the Ford and Carter Administrations.
Washington's current strategy—ignoring Raúl Castro's promarket moves and using USAID regimechange programs to meddle in Cuba's domestic politics—is yielding diminishing returns. The United
States would gain more by allowing its own business community to trade and invest in the emerging
Cuban non-state sector and beginning a limited engagement with the new leaders in Havana. A
dynamic Cuban market would whet corporate appetites and put the U.S. embargo against the island
in jeopardy. This vision lines up with the criticism of Cold War-era U.S. Cuba policy expressed in the past
by President Obama and his new secretaries of state and defense, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel.
The opportunity to redesign U.S. policy towards Cuba will not last forever. A failure to respond to Raúl
Castro’s overtures for negotiation with Washington would be a strategic mistake. Unfortunately, the
1996 Helms-Burton law codified the embargo as a legislative act, limiting presidential authority to
terminate sanctions in response to changing conditions. But President Obama still can make a significant
difference in bilateral relations if he decided to lead on the issue by using his prerogative as a diplomatin-chief.
The president can begin by taking Cuba off the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. It
would be a positive gesture towards Havana and a signal to the world that he meant what he said
when he advertised a new diplomatic approach towards U.S. adversaries. It will not be a concession to
Cuba, since Havana has not been connected to any terrorist actions for at least the last twenty years.
The misuse of the list to serve the agenda of the pro-embargo lobby undermines its credibility against
real terrorist threats.
Taking Cuba off the State Department terror-sponsor list also will provide a framework to negotiate
the Alan Gross affair. Gross, a USAID subcontractor, is serving a fifteen-year prison sentence in Havana.
He was arrested by Cuban authorities because of his covert mission providing satellite access to internet
to several Cuban civil-society groups, circumventing government controls. The Cuban government
admits that Gross was not a spy but found that his actions could make Cuba vulnerable to cyber warfare
by the United States. Gross’s activities are provided for under section 109 of the Helms-Burton law, a
program designed to promote regime change on the island.
Negotiation on the Gross case is held up because of the false premise that he is a hostage of a terrorsponsoring nation. But the situation might become manageable if the two countries negotiate an
agreement that could be face-saving for both governments. Such an agreement could be the first step
in a course of engagement and people-to-people contact. If the United States is to have some influence
during the transition to a post-Castro Cuba, it must start this process today.
Removal from the terrorist list increases diplomatic engagement and makes free
travel possible – boosts relations and US cred
Williams 13- staff writer for LA Times
(Carol, “Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors” LA times, May 3, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list20130502,0,2494970.story)//HA
Cuba’s communist leadership was quick to send condolences to the victims of the Boston Marathon
bombings and to reiterate to Washington that it “rejects and condemns unequivocally all acts of
terrorism.”
Once a key supplier of arms and training to leftist rebels in Latin America, the Castro regime long ago
disentangled itself from the Cold War-era confrontations. Havana now hosts peace talks between the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia that it once supported and the U.S.-allied government the
insurgents battled for years.
Havana still gives refuge to a few fugitive radicals from the Black Panthers and Basque insurgents, and
two years ago a Cuban court convicted 64-year-old development specialist Alan Gross on spying charges
for attempting to install satellite equipment without government permission.
But nothing that Cuba has done suggests its government is plotting harm against Americans, national
security experts say. And they criticize as counterproductive the State Department’s decision, disclosed
this week, to keep Cuba on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism.”
“We ought to reserve that term for nations that actually use the apparatus of statehood to support
the targeting of U.S. interests and civilians,” said Juliette Kayyem, a former assistant secretary for
intergovernmental affairs at the Department of Homeland Security and now writing and lecturing on
national security in the Boston area. “Yes, Cuba does a lot of bad things that we don’t like, but it
doesn’t rise to anything on the level of a terrorist threat.”
On Wednesday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration “has no current
plans to remove Cuba” from the list to be released later this month. The island nation that has been
under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary leader Fidel Castro came to
power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the “state sponsor”
label.
Kayyem laments the “diluting” of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological disputes.
“We work with a lot of countries we don’t like, but the imprimatur of ‘terrorism’ has a ring to it in a
way that can be harmful to us,” she said.
Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual
threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and
financial restrictions that comes along with the “state sponsor” censure, Kayyem said.
“There are some real operational impediments when we have a system that begins with ‘no’ rather
than ‘why not?’ ” she said of the legally encumbered contacts between Havana and Washington.
Politicians who have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the
Obama administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a South Florida
Republican whose efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her
election strategy throughout her 24 years in Congress, hailed the State Department decision as
“reaffirming the threat that the Castro regime represents.”
Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School, blamed the continued branding of
Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians “pandering for a certain political base.” He also said President
Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry have failed to make a priority of removing the impediment
to better relations with Cuba.
“As much as I’d like to see the Castro regime gone and an open and free Cuba, it takes away from the
State Department’s credibility when they include countries on the list that aren’t even close” to
threatening Americans, Aramesh said.
Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state sponsor” list, he said,
pointing to Pakistan as a prime example. Although Islamabad “very clearly supports terrorist and
insurgent organizations,” he said, the U.S. government has long refused to provoke its ally in the region
with the official censure.
The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship
between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of
power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government
has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country
for foreign travel.
Removing Cuba from the state sponsor of terrorism list solves Cuban and Latin
American relations – positive step and sends a signal
Huddleston, 8 – Visiting Foreign Policy Fellow at Brookings (Vicki, “Cuba Embargo's Usefulness Has
Run Its Course”, March 10, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/03/10-cubahuddleston)//eek
News reports continued to indicate that the State Department is considering removing Cuba from the
list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. U.S. Cuba policy has been codified into law, and ending the U.S.
embargo or the travel ban requires congressional action. But there are many steps that the President
and the Secretary of State can take on their own (both President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry
have previously expressed and demonstrated their commitment to changing U.S. policy toward Cuba).
Removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is one of the most significant changes that
do not require congressional approval. It would reflect the reality that Cuba is not a sponsor of
terrorist groups, thus helping to improve relations, and it would deprive congressional hardliners of a
powerful tool in their efforts to harden U.S. policy toward Cuba. At a time when Cuba is playing a key
role in the Colombia peace talks (which are making real progress), taking Cuba off the list of State
Sponsors of Terrorism would also send a message throughout the Western Hemisphere that the
United States is serious about improving its relationship with Latin America.
Delist solves cred / leadership
Cuba’s inclusion in the terror list alienates allies
Lopez-Levy 11 – lecturer and doctoral candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies of
the University of Denver (Arturo, “Does including Cuba on the State Department's list of terrorism
sponsoring nations serve the United States' national interest?,” 10/15/11,
http://thehavananote.com/2011/10/does_including_cuba_state_departments_list_terrorism_sponsorin
g_nations_serve_united_states_)//SJF
According to a New York Times story , in his recent visit to Havana, former Governor of New Mexico Bill Richardson told Bruno Rodriguez,
Cuban Minister of Foreign Relations, that by releasing Alan Gross, Cuba could begin a process of being removed from the state sponsors of
terrorism list. Since both Richardson and the State Department have repeatedly declared that they have been working together on this issue,
this is practically a confession that Cuba’s inclusion on the state sponsors of terrorism list is a sham.
The list of terrorist sponsoring nations should be a bargaining tool for dealing with, well, countries that
engage in or sponsor terrorism. The misuse of an otherwise effective foreign policy tool must give
pause to responsible members of Congress and the Washington intelligence community. First, it
focuses efforts and resources in the wrong direction, taking eyes and dollars from where the real
threats are. Second, it sends the wrong message to other countries, diminishing the impact of a warning
to countries such as Iran and Syria and the groups they sponsor such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Third,
it weakens the capacity of US allies like Israel , who are real targets of terrorist threats, to make a case
for the isolation or monitoring of countries such as Iran whose presence on the list is justified.
It is positive that the Obama Administration is considering removing Cuba from the list. Cuba’s inclusion on the list is based on
bogus allegations that undermine the credibility of the mechanism. The list was intended to be an
effective foreign policy tool for warning Americans and the international community against countries that “repeatedly provide
support for international terrorism” (as was the purpose of Section 6 (j) of the 1979 Exports Administration Act) and sanctioning them. By
placing Cuba on this list with Syria, Iran, and Sudan—real sponsors of terrorism—the list becomes nothing more than another official method
for some South Floridians to express their hostility to Cuba. If the goal is to provide right wing Cuban Americans a venue for psychological
catharsis, there
are other ways for them to vent their frustrations that are less harmful to US national
security.
Moreover, the language of the The three Cuba Reports (2008, 2009, and 2010) written by the State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism under the Obama Administration is more an argument for removing rather than for keeping Cuba on the list. This is
particularly evident in the discussion of Cuba’s alleged links with three groups connected to international terrorist activities: The FARC and the
ELN from Colombia, and the Spanish ETA. The presence of members of these groups in Cuba is positively recognized by the Spanish and
Colombian governments as part of their respective peace processes.
Cuba’s appearance on the list of terrorism sponsoring states is particularly hypocritical if one contrasts it with the absence of governments such
as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia that do engage in, tolerate or provide physical refuge and ideological support to terrorist organizations such as
Hamas and Hezbollah who are responsible for the deaths of American citizens. The presence of Cuba on the list is even more scandalous given
that the Bush Administration removed Kaddafi’s Libya and Kim Jong-il’s North Korea based on some mysterious criteria.
Washington’s persistent discourse that characterizes Cuba as a terrorist state hinders the development of a strategic vision for addressing the
challenges Cuba presents to US foreign policy. Post-Cold War Cuba is not a military threat to American lives or US interests at home or abroad.
The island is a country in transition that is carrying out market oriented economic reforms without changing its centralized, one party system.
This situation calls for policies completely different from those required for dealing with a terrorist menace.
“The principal responsibility of the thinking man is to make distinctions,” William F. Buckley wrote. “Physics primers remind us that ‘all of the
progress of mankind to date has resulted from the making of careful measurement’”. Secretary Clinton, who is well known for her methodic
and organized approach to politics, has the opportunity to leave a positive legacy in this area. Cuba’s presence on the state sponsors of
terrorism list must end.
Terror list inclusion wrecks credibility
Adams and Jones 12 – president of Guardian Six Consulting LLC, a national security consulting firm,
retired Army General brigadier (John, David W, “Is Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism? Let’s get real,
State Department,” 3/21/12, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/217483-is-cuba-a-state-sponsor-ofterrorism-lets-get-real-state-department)//SJF
In addition to the lack of evidence to support the listing, there are convincing reasons why Cuba should be removed:
Cuban presence on the list damages U.S. credibility with almost all of our key allies and puts us at
odds with every country in Latin America, who view the listing as capricious and politically motivated.
It impedes our ability to work with allies to facilitate contacts with rebel groups, such as FARC, that
are aimed at reconciliation.
U.S. policy cripples efforts to cooperate with Cuba on important American national security issues,
including transnational human, drug and weapons smuggling, as well as environmental disasters.
American policy hurts our businesses and workers by providing a rationale to continue the job-killing embargo on trade with Cuba.
Most of all, retaining Cuba on the State Department’s list undermines American efforts in the broader
— and very real — fight against terrorism.
For all these reasons, it is time for the United States to end our counterproductive and hypocritical policy and remove Cuba from the State
Sponsor of Terrorism list.
Inclusion removes Cuban sovereign immunity – wrecks US credibility
Newhouse 11 – associate, Center for International Policy, LATIN AMERICA RIGHTS & SECURITY: CUBA
PROJECT (Elizabeth, “The United States Should Take Immediate Steps to Improve Relations with Cuba,
2/14/11, http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/us-should-take-immediate-steps-to-improverelations-with-cuba)//SJF
STATE’S TERRORISM LIST
Colonel Wilkerson pointed out that many of the disadvantages of including Cuba on the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism are well-known, from the economic constraints placed on Cuba to the diversion of
U.S. law enforcement and counterterrorism personnel from real threats such as al-Qa’ida. Since the U.S.
list originated in the Export Administration Act of 1979, Wilkerson said, a serious sovereignty issue exists
for Cuba. Wilkerson highlighted the United States’ hypocrisy in keeping Cuba on the list and demanded
it be removed immediately. He quoted a January 12 article in the Los Angeles Times by Julia E. Sweig and
Peter Kornbluh: “Cuba landed on the list in the early 1980s for the support it provided to insurgencies in
Central America. There is no longer evidence of support for political violence or terrorism that merits
Cuba remaining on the list. In the State Department’s own words last year, Cuba remains on the list
primarily because it is ‘critical of the U.S. approach to combating international terrorism.’ If disagreeing
with American foreign policy is a criterion for inclusion, dozens of countries, including close allies of
the United States in Latin America, would seem eligible.”
Wilkerson noted that in his experience as chief of staff at the State Department, countries were
frequently listed for no other reason than political purposes, often stemming from Congressional
pressure. Such politically motivated listings damage U.S. credibility and reputation, doing more harm
than good, said Wilkerson. For example, the United States is considering removing an actual terrorist
group trying to destabilize the regime in Iran, while insisting on including Cuba on the list of state
sponsors. Wilkerson recalled meeting with Chinese diplomats who scoffed at U.S. comments about
China’s record on human rights when the United States itself behaved like such a hypocrite. A
challenge for those trying to change U.S. policy toward Cuba is that Cuba, unlike Iran, does not generate
much attention in the United States, so the government can get away with it.
Alarmingly, according to Wilkerson, a group of moderates—including Generals Anthony Zinni and James
Jones (who just stepped down as National Security Advisor to President Obama), as well as Ambassador
Mitchell Reiss—has joined a group of Washington neoconservatives to have the Mujahiden-e Khalq
(MeK), a bloody-minded terrorist group, delisted so it can be used to help overthrow Iran’s regime. This
effort could prove successful because it can be presented as a national security issue and thus resonate
with Americans. But how does this go over abroad? It makes the United States look like the ultimate
hypocrite by pursuing policies that demonstrate it has little interest in the truth or in human rights but
is driven entirely by selfish special interests. For this pragmatic reason alone, we must get Cuba off the
list to balance the scales and restore a reasonable policy not reeking of hypocrisy, insisted Wilkerson.
Increasingly, he concluded, the international community—looking at the U.S.’s steadfast and
unquestioning support for Israel, its steadfast maintenance of the embargo against Cuba, and its
steadfast inclusion of Cuba on the state sponsors’ list, as well as other special interest-driven foreign
policies—has begun to back away from U.S. leadership and started to create and shape policies
irrespective of U.S. views.
Attorney Robert Muse went on to explain the important practical consequences for a country on the
terrorism list. The economic sanctions are less meaningful for Cuba because the U.S. embargo already
prohibits trade; however, a listed country loses its claim to sovereign immunity in U.S. courts and is
therefore subject to suits that would otherwise be dismissed. Court judgments resulting from such
suits have long-term implications for U.S.-Cuba relations.
Delist solves the economy
Delisting solves the economy – laundry list of sanctions it imposes
Laverty, 11 – former Senior Program Associate at The Center for Democracy in the Americas (Collin,
“Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”, 2011,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//eek
Cuba should also be removed from the U.S. State Department list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. This
designation subjects Cuba to sanctions including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; controls over
exports of certain dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Cuba’s presence
on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is both substantively wrong and harmful to the Cuban
economy, because it punishes Cuba for legal trade and financial transactions and deprives its people
access to modern technology. The president can remove Cuba unilaterally from the terror list. He
should do so.
AT: Terrorist list justified
Cuba doesn’t support terrorism
Smith, 7 - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign
Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements
over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior
Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, “Take Cuba Off The
Terrorist List” The National Interest, 8/6,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733
Cuba was placed on the list of terrorist nations in March of 1982 with little in the way of explanation.
Twenty-five years later, the State Department's reasons for keeping it there are totally unconvincing. It
is not involved in any terrorist activities that the State Department can point to. It does not endorse
terrorism, as the State Department says it does. On the contrary, it has condemned it in all its
manifestations, has signed all twelve UN anti-terrorist resolutions and offered to sign agreements
with the United States to cooperate in combating terrorism-an offer the Bush Administration ignores.
There are American fugitives in Cuba, yes, but even under our own legislation, this does not constitute
grounds for declaring Cuba to be a terrorist state. And if Cuba does not regularly extradite those fleeing
from American justice, the United States has not in more than 47 years extradited a single Cubanincluding infamous terrorists such as Orlando Bosch and Luis Posada Carriles.
In sum, there is simply no credible evidence that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The central
question we should be asking is how can U.S. interests possibly be served by putting forward these
spurious allegations and insisting that it is a terrorist state when it obviously is not, and by rebuffing its
offers to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism? Does this not undermine our own credibility and
cast doubt on our seriousness of purpose? Surely it is time to put an end to this dishonest and
counterproductive policy. Congress should take the first step by holding hearings to examine the
rationale and evidence-if any exists-behind this policy and to call for a new, more constructive approach.
No credible reason Cuba is on the terrorism list
Smith, 7 - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign
Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements
over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior
Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, “Take Cuba Off The
Terrorist List” The National Interest, 8/6,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733
Bogus Reasons for Keeping Cuba on the List
After 25 years, Cuba remains on the State Department's annual list of state sponsors of terrorism for
reasons that do not withstand the most perfunctory examination. There is, for example, the oftrepeated charge that Cuba endorses terrorism as a tactic. Former Undersecretary of State John Bolton,
for one, claimed in March of 2004 that Fidel Castro "continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to
further revolutionary objectives."
The charge is simply not true, and neither Bolton nor anyone else has been able to point to a single
statement of Castro's endorsing terrorism. On the contrary, there are myriad Cuban statements
condemning it. Within hours of the 9/11 attack, for example, the Cuban government issued a statement
condemning the attacks and ruing the loss of life. Late in September, Castro categorically condemned all
forms of terrorism as an "ethically indefensible phenomenon which must be eradicated." He vowed
that, "the territory of Cuba will never be used for terrorist actions against the American people."
Cuba doesn’t shelter FARC or Basque guerillas
Smith, 7 - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign
Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements
over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior
Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, “Take Cuba Off The
Terrorist List” The National Interest, 8/6,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733
And as it does every year, last year's report mentions the presence in Cuba of members of the Basque
ETA guerrilla organization, and the Colombian FARC and ELN. In past years, the State Department tried
to suggest that they were in Cuba against the wishes of their respective governments and had sinister
objectives. But that suggestion was shot down year after year by representatives of the Spanish and
Colombian governments. This year, no such allegations are made. It is acknowledged that they are living
in Cuba legally. Further, the report states that: "There is no information concerning terrorist activities of
these or other organizations on Cuban territory. . . . The United States is not aware of specific terrorist
enclaves in the country."
Failure to extradite doesn’t merit putting Cuba on the terrorist list
Smith, 7 - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign
Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements
over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior
Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, “Take Cuba Off The
Terrorist List” The National Interest, 8/6,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733
True, there are American fugitives in Cuba. Most are hijackers who came in the 1970s and have lived in
Cuba since then. There are a few others, probably seven or eight, wanted for crimes committed in the
United States. It is also true that Cuba has not responded positively to U.S. extradition requests. But
two things must be noted about that. First, for all practical purposes, the 1904 extradition treaty is
simply no longer operative, principally because the United States has not honored a single Cuba
request for extradition since 1959. Second, most of the "crimes" committed in the U.S. were of a
political nature, and Article VI of the treaty excludes the extradition of those whose crimes were of a
"political character."
Furthermore, as Robert Muse, an international lawyer, noted in a 2004 report, none of the U.S.
fugitives in Cuba provides a basis for declaring Cuba to be a "state sponsor of terrorism." Legal
authority to make such a designation is found in Section 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act,
which says that it must be demonstrated that the fugitives have committed "terrorist" acts and that
those acts were "international" in character. Muse states that he has been unable to identify a single
U.S. fugitive in Cuba who meets those twofold criteria. Thus, they are extraneous to the definition of
Cuba as a "state sponsor of terrorism."
In sum, as CIP has noted in its responses over the past few years, the annual reports present not a shred
of evidence to confirm that Cuba is in fact a terrorist state.
No terrorist assets exist in Cuba
Smith, 7 - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign
Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements
over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior
Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, “Take Cuba Off The
Terrorist List” The National Interest, 8/6,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733
The Case of the Annual Reports
One may have a twinge of sympathy for the analysts who craft the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Their instructions are to write and publish a report every year saying that Cuba is such a sponsor. But
what about evidence?
In years past, the analysts seemed to handle that dilemma by using unverified and highly questionable
reports. As monitoring efforts have increased over the past few years and the specious conclusions
pointed out, the analysts seem to have turned to a new tactic-non-sequitors that do not prove that
Cuba sponsors terrorism. This year's report, for example, complained that "Cuba did not attempt to
track, block, or seize terrorist assets, although the authority to do so is contained in Cuba's Law 93
against acts of terrorism, as well as Instruction 19 of the Superintendent of the Cuban Central Bank."
But any decent lawyer would respond to that by asking "what assets?" There is no evidence at all that
Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has any assets in Cuba. And so, there is nothing to seize.
The only thing the statement makes clear is that Cuba does have laws on the books against acts of
terrorism. How, one might ask, does that square with the report's assertion that it is a terrorist state?
Lift communications embargo CP
Communications embargo – 1nc
The United States federal government should exempt all communications equipment from economic
sanctions on Cuba.
Completely lifting the ban on communications equipment spurs Cuban political reform
and facilitates greater cultural engagement
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
(8D) Repeal the "Communications Embargo"
Removing the targeted sanctions on communications equipment would facilitate the transfer of ideas,
information, and communication between the Cuban people and the rest of the world. The Obama
Administration has taken a step in this direction by easing restrictions that prevented American
companies from providing telecommunications services between Cuba and the United States. With
these changes, U.S. companies can now install fiber optic cables, as well as provide satellite radio and
television. These changes have not, however, gone far enough.
To be sure, removing sanctions on communications equipment would make communication and
information dissemination easier for the Cuban government, but the embargo itself does not prevent
this. As long as the European and Canadian markets are available, the regime will have access to the
Internet and to computer systems. Restrictions like these impact the people, particularly the dissident
movement, far more than the government. Put differently, the American restrictions on
communications equipment amounts to a minor inconvenience for the regime, but a rather
impossible hurdle for those struggling to create a civil society in Cuba.
The author has had numerous discussions with Cuban dissidents like Oswaldo Paya and Oscar Espinosa
Chepe, both in person and electronically. The Cuban government clearly has an interest in keeping
dissidents like [*234] Paya and Chepe as isolated as possible. By cracking down on the
communications equipment available on the island, the U.S. creates a bottleneck of information flow,
whereby the Cuban government alone has access, helping the regime maintain a totalitarian
stranglehold on the island and keep its dissident problem in check. Even if Cuba were to remain on the
State Sponsors of Terrorism List, the Administration can still remove the ban on communications
equipment pursuant to the Export Administration Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. n155 The recent
reforms introduced by the Obama Administration begin to address the flow of information to the island,
but much more should be done.
By entirely eliminating the communications plank of the economic sanctions, the U.S. will have
removed a serious barrier to constructive academic and cultural exchanges. Many of these exchanges
involve ordinary Cubans who would otherwise be left rudderless without communications equipment to
link with their American counterparts. By encouraging nonpolitical contact between Cuban academics,
cultural elites, and even athletes, the U.S. could circumvent the totalitarian strictures set up by the
Cuban regime to isolate its own people.
American and global NGOs would also finally find their hands untied to establish a network of contacts
in order to help nurture a fledgling civil society. This recommendation amounts to a negative suggestion:
the less U.S. government involvement, the better. By stepping back and simply allowing private-toprivate contacts flourish across the border, the U.S. government would be striking at the very heart of
Cuba's totalitarian maintenance: its relative isolation.
It avoids politics
Burns, 9 - journalist based in New York. He often covers the United Nations, with an emphasis on the
political and multilateral relations of Latin American and Asian countries (Patrick, World Politics Review,
“Engaging Cuba, One Step at a Time” 11/13,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4620/engaging-cuba-one-step-at-a-time)
There are currently two bills in Congress that would lift U.S. travel restrictions. But the political costs of
major changes in Cuba policy are still too high for Washington to bear in the near future. So for now,
argues Robert Pastor, professor of international relations at American University, the Obama
administration's incremental steps are the best way to open doors for more pragmatic cooperation.
"There are many smaller issues that cry for a more imaginative approach that would meet both
countries' needs," Pastor says.
Indeed, when trivial gestures like flags and marquees can be interpreted as meaningful, policy-based
initiatives, practical engagement on issues like mail service, communication, and countering drug
trafficking could have a dramatic impact. But given the 50 years of mutual antagonism between the
two countries, even small steps will take time.
2nc – CP solves
OFAC reinterpretation of licensing allows democratization and a free flow of
information – telecommunications will be able to move in
Pascual et. Al. 9 – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki
Huddleston, Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark
Falcoff, Damian Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William
LeoGrande, Marifeli Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas,
“CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
The aforementioned initiatives are non-controversial and widely supported by the American public.
More controversial—although still enjoying widespread public support—would be licensing the sale and
donation of all communications equipment, including radios, televisions, and computers. The CDA
recognized the importance of expanding access to ideas, knowledge, and information by authorizing
the licensing of telecommunications goods and services. U.S. government financing of books and radios
that are distributed to Cubans throughout the island demonstrates a belief that breaking down the
barriers to the flow of information is critical to promoting change in Cuba. The president should
therefore instruct the Department of Commerce and OFAC to internally change their respective
licensing policies with regard to Cuba from a “presumption of denial” to a “presumption of approval”
with respect to items deemed to be in the U.S. national interest for Cuba to receive, including laptops,
cell phones and other telecommunications equipment, computer peripherals, internet connection
equipment, as well as access to satellite and broadband communications networks.
Dismantling the communications embargo solves – it allows for a bottom up change
WERNER, 10 – editor of the Cuba Standard (JOHANNES, “WINDOW OPENS TO LIFT CUBA TRAVEL
BAN”, July 11, 2010, lexis)//eek
Nonetheless, as Cuba’s central government is strengthened and enriched by its energy resources, the
vulnerability of the Cuban people to a “top-down” model of economic control could be reinforced.
The regime’s ability to fund its monopoly on information, employment, and a myriad of social services
would enhance the vulnerability of the average citizen to regime control. To counter this prospect, the
U.S. and other governments might take some or all of the following measures to stimulate a “bottomup” transformation that would at a minimum offer the Cuban people the tools to begin reducing their
dependence on the government and enhance their ability to have a voice in Cuba’s future.
Reaffirm U.S. commitment to human rights and democracy by empowering the Cuban people in ways
that make them less depend on the Cuban government.
Begin to dismantle the communications embargo that reinforces Cuban state security by allowing the
free flow of information, communications equipment, and people, including support for educational
and cultural exchanges.
Consider ending the diplomatic/security embargo through exchange of military personnel, talks on
issues of mutual interest, migration, crime, and the environment.
Diplomatic engagement and allowing telecommunications technology will hasten the
political transition
Huddleston, 8 – Visiting Foreign Policy Fellow at Brookings (Vicki, “Cuba Embargo's Usefulness Has
Run Its Course”, March 10, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/03/10-cubahuddleston)//eek
There can no longer be any doubt that our isolation of Cuba did not and cannot bring about the end of
the revolution. What will bring about the revolution's demise are old age, illness and death. More
important, the revolution will evolve as it loses its founding fathers and becomes increasingly less
isolated from its neighbors though the Internet, television, travelers and the flow of information.
But how fast and how far the revolution evolves depends upon U.S. policy. If we remove the barriers
to communication, we will speed the forces of change. Just as was the case in Eastern Europe as a
result of the Helsinki agreements, the Cuban people will be empowered by human contact, the free
flow of information, and the support and encouragement of Americans and Cuban Americans from
Florida to California.
If U.S. policy can deal with Cuba -- not as a domestic political issue -- but as one sovereign state to
another, then we will resume official diplomatic relations with the exchange of ambassadors and
begin -- once again -- to talk about matters that affect the well being and security of both our
countries, namely migration, anti-narcotics, health and the environment. Starting a dialogue will allow
us to press Cuba's leaders to respect the principles that we and the region hold dear: human rights,
rule of law and freedom.
Removing the barriers to communications and to normal diplomatic relations are not concessions as
some would claim. Rather, they are practical initiatives that will reduce the dependence of the Cuban
people on the Cuban state by providing them with alternative sources of information and resources to
improve their daily lives.
More critically, a policy based on helping the Cuban people succeed would enable them to build civil
society and begin a process of growing democracy from the bottom up.
Removal of the communications embargo is key to the Cuban economy and
democracy – it holds them back and impedes information flow
Casas-Zamora, 9 – Senior Fellow at Brookings (Kevin, “Communications Embargo on Cuba: Let Them
Surf, Not Float”, January 22, 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/01/22-cubacasaszamora)//eek
The Cuban Revolution has turned 50 in subdued fashion. The economy is, once more, in a dire situation
and Raul Castro’s commitment to liberalizing reforms remains uncertain. Ideological stubbornness
continues to keep Cuba from realizing its potential as a regional economic powerhouse. Indeed,
despite the dead weight of socialist mismanagement, the fundamental assets that Cuba has to succeed
economically in the long run are numerous and significant. They include an educated and healthy
population, an unbeatable geographic location, and very low levels of crime, an obvious allure in one
of the world’s most violent regions.
Yet, a serious economic hurdle has received very limited attention. Cuba is lagging desperately behind
the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean when it comes to information and communication
technologies (IT). According to figures from the International Telecommunications Union, at the end of
2007 Cuba had less than 2 subscribers to mobile phones per 100 inhabitants, roughly on a par with
Ethiopia and Eritrea. This is one fifteenth of Haiti’s rate, the second lowest in the region. The number of
fixed telephone lines in Cuba stood at less than half the regional average. Internet penetration figures
were dismal too. At 12 users per 100 people, Cuba was only slightly above Haiti and Belize, and way
behind the Latin American average of 28. A 2006 report from the organization Reporters without
Borders considered Cuba one of the world’s most backward countries regarding Internet usage,
ranking it as the worst in Latin America and comparable to Uganda.
None of this is likely to have changed significantly in the past few months, after the Cuban government
lifted bans on the purchasing of mobile phones and computers, which remain unaffordable for the
vast majority of Cubans. A Cuban computer scientist recently interviewed by Inter Press Service
described the country’s IT prowess rather amusingly, “in Cuba you don’t surf (the Internet), you float.”
The primary responsibility for this sorry state of affairs lies with the Cuban regime government, which
harbors deep fears of the spread of IT. Yet, the U.S. is hardly helping. One of the most unfortunate
consequences of the U.S. commercial embargo on Cuba is that the prohibition on trade and investment
reduces the access of Cubans to technology that would enhance their ability to contact loved ones,
improve their skills, and broaden their knowledge. This “communications ban” has been restated by
successive pieces of legislation, notably the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, which expanded it to include
even the donation of computers and all kinds of electronic equipment.
This has far reaching implications. It has often been said that through the so-called “communications
embargo” the U.S. government has become an unwitting accessory to the Cuban regime’s policy of
stifling the free flow of ideas and the Cubans’ access to information about the world. What is less
obvious is that the current legislation is reinforcing a critical barrier for the successful reintegration of a
(hopefully) free Cuba into the world economy. There is no chance that Cuba can live up to its potential
in the global economy if the current levels of dissemination of IT are not radically improved in the
short term. Even if the Communist regime fell tomorrow, no Intel, Motorola or Microsoft plants would
come Cuba’s way any time soon. Maquiladoras would, perhaps.
Hence, as advocated by the recent report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, convened by
The Brookings Institution, it is high time to “liberalize regulations on the sale of all communications
equipment (to Cuba), including computers, as admissible under the State Sponsors of Terrorism List
under the Export Administration Act and the Foreign Assistance Act.” The future economic viability of a
free Cuba is at stake.
2nc – executive only
The CP can be done via executive order – doesn’t require Congress
Perales 10- executive director of the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America
(José Raúl, “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship” WOODROW WILSON
CENTER LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM, August 2010,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)//HA
Sabatini noted that the ability to affect significant change on the embargo falls within the scope of
executive regulatory authority, particularly in areas such as telecommunications and some elements of
travel—particularly in licensing for cultural and educational exchanges and even some elements of
marketing trips. In this sense the Obama administration took a first step on April 13, 2009, when
President Obama announced an increased allowance for U.S. telecommunications companies to
establish licensing agreements to allow roaming coverage on the island and establish a fiberoptic cable
to Cuba, with the stated purpose of helping Cubans communicate with the rest of the world. However,
according to Sabatini, it turned out that despite the fanfare, the regulations that came out of the U.S.
bureaucracy five months later did little realistically to allow U.S. companies to establish the necessary
and sufficient links to allow broad communication between Cubans and the rest of the world. For
instance, in his announcement, President Obama called for the establishment of a fiberoptic cable
linking Cuba to the outside world. However, regulations prohibiting U.S. equipment transfers or sales to
the island for commercial purposes persist.
Similarly, the regulations continued to prevent the sale of handsets on the island for commercial
purposes and blocks infrastructure investments such as cell phone towers, routers, and switchers. All of
these sorts of now-prohibited equipment is essential if there is to be any meaningful broadbased
access to the tools of communication Sabatini contended that other stated goals of the Obama
administration have suffered a similar fate, yet he also claimed this does not mean all is lost. In his
view President Obama just needs to take the next step: with the stroke of the executive pen he can
introduce regulatory modifications that can allow the federal bureaucracy to meet his stated goals
regarding Cuba.
The executive can allow telecommunications sales without Congress
Americas Society and Council of the Americas, 13- Americas Society is an organization dedicated to
education, debate, and dialogue in the Americas. The Council of the Americas is an American business
organization whose goal is promoting free trade, democracy and open markets throughout the Americas
(“Seven Steps the U.S. President Can Take to Promote Change in Cuba by Adapting the Embargo”,
AS/COA, 2/20/13, http://www.as-coa.org/articles/seven-steps-us-president-can-take-promote-changecuba-adapting-embargo)//TL
6. Allow for the sale of telecommunications hardware—including cell towers, satellite dishes, and
handsets—in Cuba.
On April 13, 2009, the President issued a memorandum containing directives designed to increase the
free flow of information to the Cuban people and expand communications links between the United
States and Cuba by, among other things, allowing for U.S. telecom providers to enter into agreements to
establish fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications facilities linking the United States and Cuba,
allow U.S. service providers to enter into roaming service agreements with Cuban providers, and for
allow for the donation of consumer communications devices (CCDs) such as mobile phone systems,
computers and satellite receivers. What they did not do was allow for the sale of hardware (handsets,
cell towers, etc.) that would make many of these activities feasible or sufficiently profitable. As a result,
the private sector response has been minimal.
Legal Basis: The language for the CDA’s prohibition on investment in the domestic infrastructure in Cuba
(often cited as the regulatory constraint in this regard) is not stated as a statutory prohibition, but
rather clarifies that the section shall not be construed to authorize investment in the domestic
telecommunications network in Cuba. Thus, although the CDA does not itself authorize investments in
Cuba’s domestic network, it does not rule out the possibility that the President retains the authority to
do so under the EAR.
Obama can do the CP through executive action
Taylor 13- staff writer for the Washington Times
(Guy, “Obama urged to take lead on easing Cuba policy” the Washington Times, February 21, 2013,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/21/reports-urge-obama-ease-policy-cuba/)//HA
The Obama administration should — and has the legal authority to — use its executive power to begin
lifting the decades-old embargo on trade with Cuba, according to two papers this week issued by an
influential Latin America think tank and a leading Cuban exile group.
The New York-based Council on the Americas and the Washington-based Cuba Study Group both call on
the White House to ease the 60-year-old embargo in order to promote free market activity on the
communist island.
The State Department so far has declined to comment on the documents, but one official described the
Council on the Americas as “influential” and told The Washington Times that the State Department
does “appreciate their views.”
Circulation of the white papers came the same week that a delegation of U.S. lawmakers, headed by
Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont Democrat, met with Cuban President Raul Castro in an unsuccessful
attempt to secure the release of Maryland contractor Alan Gross, who has been imprisoned in Cuba
since 2009.
Mr. Gross is accused of illegally bringing communications equipment to Cuba as part of a democracybuilding program supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development. His detention remains a
source of friction between Washington and Havana.
State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland categorically denied a Boston Globe report Thursday
which suggested that newly confirmed Secretary of State John F. Kerry may be seriously considering
removing Havana from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism as a first step to improved relations.
Citing interviews with “a series of top administration officials and members of Congress,” the newspaper
reported that “there is a growing consensus in policy and intelligence circles that Cuba’s support for
terrorist groups has been terminated and the country should be removed from the list — much like
the George W. Bush administration did with North Korea in 2008.”
Ms. Nuland said The Globe piece was “incorrect,” telling reporters at Thursday’s briefing that “this
department has no current plans to remove Cuba from the state sponsor of terrorism list.”
She added, however, that officials review the list annually and will do so during 2013.
Questions about Cuba’s status coincide with growing speculation in Washington that Mr. Kerry — a
former Democratic senator from Massachusetts — may be eager to push the White House toward an
easing of relations with the communist island.
Mr. Kerry did not single out Cuba during his wide-ranging foreign policy address Wednesday at the
University of Virginia, but he did publish an article in 2009 in The St. Petersburg Times calling for a
lifting of all restrictions to travel to the island.
The white papers circulated this week argue that Mr. Obama should do just that despite a law
preventing the restoration of U.S.-Cuba diplomatic relations without congressional approval.
The 1996 Helms-Burton Act also blocks the lifting of the embargo on trade unless significant
democratic reforms are implemented and a functional democratic government is established on the
island.
The Cuba Study Group called on Congress to repeal the 1996 law, saying it would allow the White
House to “adopt more efficient, targeted policies necessary for pressuring the Cuban leadership to
respect human rights and implement political reforms, while simultaneously empowering all other
sectors of society to purse their economic well-being and become the authors of their own futures.”
The Council on the Americas paper argues that Mr. Obama could work around restrictions associated
with Cuba’s current status as a state sponsor of terrorism. The White House, according to the paper,
should “grant exceptions” for “sales and imports” of goods for businesses in Cuba that can prove they
are not working for the Castro regime, as well as allowing for the “sale of telecommunications
hardware” such as cellphone towers and satellite dishes in Cuba.
Travel ban CP
Travel ban CP – 1nc
The United States federal government should substantially reduce restrictions on travel to Cuba and
expand academic and cultural exchanges
Reforming travel restrictions solves and avoids politics – it speeds up and increases
the approval process and avoids Congress
Tampa Tribune, 13 – Newspaper for Tampa, Florida “Ease travel restrictions to Cuba to boost
freedom”, Jun. 18, 2013,
http://www.coshoctontribune.com/article/20130618/OPINION04/306180003/Ease-travel-restrictionsCuba-boost-freedom)//eek
There is a quick way for our nation to help overwhelm Cuba’s censorship and propaganda.
Simply allow Americans —the most effective ambassadors for democracy and free enterprise —to
travel more easily to Cuba.
Having more Americans visit Cuba would almost surely boost capitalism in a country that is cautiously
experimenting with property rights and private enterprise.
This can be done without the political firefight of eliminating the 50-year-old Cuban embargo , which
greatly restricts trade and travel to Cuba.
We think the embargo no longer serves a useful purpose. Indeed, it gives the Cuban government a
scapegoat for its failed economic policies. As John Caulfield, chief of Mission of the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana, says, Cuba’s financial woes are a result of “Cuba’s choice of an economic model.”
But eliminating the embargo or allowing unrestricted travel to Cuba will require congressional
approval, a political challenge.
In contrast, President Barack Obama by executive order can require general licenses be issued for all
approved travel to Cuba.
Americans now can receive a visa to travel for such specific purposes as education and cultural studies.
These trips must be guided by licensed travel services that are required to follow a strict agenda.
Everything is tightly regulated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control to ensure there are no violations of
the sanctions against Cuba. (Cuban-Americans appropriately have no restrictions on traveling to visit
family.)
The approval process for the specific visas can be cumbersome and time-consuming. Obtaining
general license is far less complicated, so expanding its use would eliminate red tape and diminish
barriers to travel.
It solves every affirmative internal link and spills over into more gradual liberalization
Pascual et. Al. 9 – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki
Huddleston, Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark
Falcoff, Damian Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William
LeoGrande, Marifeli Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas,
“CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
The more open travel and remittance measures put in place by the Clinton administration in 1998 and
continued by the Bush administration until 2003 contributed to creating the conditions that brought
about a more open political atmosphere. During the period now known as the “Cuban Spring,” Oswaldo
payá, leader of the Varela project, worked with Cuba’s human rights activists to collect 11,000
signatures on a petition that requested a referendum on the Cuban constitution. Former president
Jimmy Carter gave a speech at the University of Havana in Spanish in which he asked Fidel Castro—who
was sitting in the front row—to permit the vote; the speech was broadcast live throughout the island.
Martha Beatriz roque, an important dissident leader, held a national assembly to advocate reforms to
the Cuban government. religious groups, with help from their American counterparts, provided
equipment, food, and medicines to sister organizations that bolstered outreach to their communities.
Students from colleges throughout the United States studying in Cuba were engaged in a lively
discussion with students, academics, and people across the island.
The presence of licensed American and Cuban American visitors provided moral support, advice, and
assistance to diverse civil society institutions, allowing them to expand and more effectively assist
their membership. And, interventions by U.S. government and private sector personalities with highlevel Cuban officials resulted in reducing repression against dissidents, human rights activists,
independent journalists, and librarians. This more fluid and open atmosphere was essential to the
growth of civil society and to the freedoms and creation of spaces in which human rights activists and
dissidents could operate.
President Obama should replicate these conditions through unilateral and unconditional actions that
promote enhanced human contact by generously licensing all categories of travel permitted in the
TSrA. He should, first, follow his campaign promise to grant Cuban Americans unrestricted rights to
family travel and to send remittances to the island, since Cuban American connections to family are
our best tool for helping to foster the beginnings of grass-roots democracy on the island. Further, the
president should expand travel for all American citizens and permanent residents by instructing the
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to license people-to-people travel for educational, cultural,
and humanitarian purposes.
Cuban citizens should also be permitted to travel to the United States for a variety of purposes —
including family, academic and cultural visits—in order to enhance their understanding of our open and
democratic society. The Secretary of State should instruct the Department of State and the United
States interests Section (USiNT) in Havana to use standard criteria applied around the world for
awarding non-immigrant visas to Cubans. This more tolerant approach would strengthen the bonds of
family and culture, while helping the Cuban people improve their lives and grow the social
organizations necessary for a democratic civil society.
Diplomatic travel and interaction must be reciprocally expanded so that our diplomats in Havana have
the knowledge, access, and expertise needed to predict, evaluate, and deal with any eventuality in
Cuba. This requires permitting comparable opportunities to Cuban diplomats posted in Washington.
There is little the United States has to fear by allowing Cuban diplomats to see for themselves the
realities of American life. To reduce illegal migration, enhance our security, and conserve our fisheries,
the State Department should resume migration talks at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level and begin
a dialogue between the respective heads of the interests Sections on other issues of mutual concern,
including the environment, health, and counter-narcotics.
Conditional reform net benefit
Relaxing travel restrictions while conditioning further engagement solves but retains
sanctions as crucial leverage for reforms
Colthart, 11- undergrad at Arizona State (David, “Cuba Embargo still makes sense”, The State Press,
4/5/11, http://www.statepress.com/2011/04/05/cuba-embargo-still-makes-sense/)//TL
Last week former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Cuba and chatted with Fidel Castro like “old
friends” — in his words.
At a press conference before leaving Cuba, he urged the U.S. to “immediately end the trade embargo
which [it] has imposed on the people of Cuba.”
Carter’s view is increasingly popular, but it’s also rather simplistic. It advocates a broad and haphazard
policy reversal where careful, focused measures would be most useful.
For a variety of reasons, many on the left and the right have come to see the 50-year-old embargo as
outdated and counterproductive.
Ending the embargo is “the right thing to do,” said ASU Professor Lynn Stoner in a phone interview.
Stoner teaches at the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies and has written
extensively about Cuba.
She argues that the current policy has done nothing but create hardship for the Cuban people while
allowing the government to blame all of its economic failure on the U.S.
“Their chess piece is bigger than ours,” she said.
True, both Fidel and Raul Castro have done their best to capitalize on our policies, but wouldn’t an
unconditional concession that pumps billions of dollars into an economy they control also give them
much to capitalize on?
A complete end to the trade embargo should only come after permanent democratic reforms are made.
Otherwise we risk strengthening the dictator we intend to undermine.
That said, our policy is not perfect and certain reforms are needed for us to support and encourage
Cuban pro-democracy forces.
The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), a non-profit organization that advocates for internal,
non-violent change leading to a free and democratic Cuba, suggests many such reforms.
For one, we should reverse the restrictions the Bush administration placed on family remittances in
2004. Allowing Cuban-Americans to assist their family in Cuba serves an important humanitarian
purpose and reduces dependence on the Cuban government.
We should also reverse the ban on cash aid to opposition groups in Cuba. This policy has caused millions
of dollars intended to support Cuban dissidents to be filtered through non-government organizations in
the U.S.
In a 2008 report, the CANF found that 80 percent of the grant money intended for pro-democracy
groups in Cuba ended up spent on salaries and overhead in the U.S. and elsewhere.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should relax travel bans for certain people in certain
situations. Academic exchanges along with humanitarian and family travel all promote the sharing of
objective news and information.
The presence of supporters in their midst is also the best way of showing the Cuban people that they
aren’t alone.
Targeted efforts like these are what our policy toward Cuba is really lacking. Of course it’s frustrating
that our policy toward Cuba has reaped no rewards in its five decades of existence, but that’s no reason
to hastily give up what still amounts to a very big bargaining chip — the economic blessings of free trade
with the U.S.
Removing and reforming restrictions on travel and remittances solves without
strengthening the regime
Ruiz, 8 – Cuban Democracy Advocate (Hector, “CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON CUBANAMERICAN TRAVEL”, Congressional Testimony, September 18, 2008, lexis)//eek
1- Eliminate all travel restrictions to Cuba for Cubans residing in the United States. They can be the best
messengers of hope, moral support and relationships that are so needed.
2- Lift current restrictions that limit remittances to the island and which criminalize assistance to family
members.
3- Allow Cubans wishing to cooperate financially with the internal dissident movement to do so
without penalties. Those resources are necessary for the work of the dissidents in Cuba.
Conclusion
The elimination of restrictions that we have described would not solve the financial situation of the
regime, but rather would immediately provide dissidents with the needed support, contacts and
resources to carry out our patriotic activities. Cuban government officials are not interested in
economic advantages, but political ones and such actions would consolidate society and weaken the
political elite.
Lifting the travel ban and allowing greater cultural exchanges solves relations without
sacrificing U.S. leverage or credibility over the embargo
Hamilton, 8- Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University and Director of the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars (Lee, “1st step toward change for Cuba: End embargo”, The
Center on Congress, 3/10/08, http://www.centeroncongress.org/1st-step-toward-change-cuba-endembargo)//TL
The end of Fidel Castro's rule provides an opportunity to ease the pain of a half–century–long repressive
era in Cuban history. Fidel's younger brother Raúl's ascension could mean a Cuban opening is on the
horizon.
At age 76, whether Raúl Castro is a reformer or not will not change the fact that Cuba is entering a
prolonged transition period away from one–man, and now dynastic, rule.
The United States wants a free, democratic and prosperous Cuba, but we need the right policies to help
Cubans. Real change can begin soon, and we should be trying to influence it. There are two broad
options for U.S. policy toward Cuba.
The United States can press on with its 46–year embargo in hopes of finally inspiring a popular revolt
against the communist regime. This option insists that Cuba embrace democracy before the U.S. re–
establishes bilateral ties. Or it can opt for engagement in hopes of promoting a gradual and peaceful end
to one of the Cold War's last lingering conflicts.
My view is that beginning to normalize our relations with Cuba would help, not hinder, those in Cuba
who want a change of political direction.
As far as the embargo goes, its major benefactors have been politicians seeking support in this country
and anti–American leaders overseas in need of talking points — not the Cuban or American people. The
embargo has failed to achieve regime change in Havana, the Cuban people continue to suffer under a
repressive regime, and, furthermore, it has alienated our Latin American allies.
But ending the embargo is hardly a solution in and of itself. Though its repeal would allow Cubans and
Americans to trade, invest and travel, we must recognize that Cuba is a closed and repressed society,
one that Fidel Castro increasingly victimized throughout his dictatorial rule starting in 1959. The
hesitancy with which ordinary Cubans have discussed their country's future in the last few weeks
illustrates the constant fear Castro's police state has instilled.
As we have seen in other countries subjected to despotic rule, the wounds of tyranny are deep, and we
cannot treat them brazenly. Also, Raúl Castro and his elite chums will not go to bed tonight communist
revolutionaries and wake up Jeffersonian democrats tomorrow morning. Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese
may be more likely economic role models. Change will be gradual.
Certainly, we can engage in informal, unofficial exchanges with a country 90 miles from our border
that shares some of our cultural fixations, like baseball, as those who followed the World Baseball
Classic in 2006 know.
Building up an economic relationship could also pay dividends. The recent pandemonium in Havana
resulting from rumors of a shift away from Cuba's failing dual–currency system reveals Cuba's present
economic dysfunction. Raúl Castro himself has critiqued a bloated and inefficient public sector, with
government salaries unable to cover the costs of living. Commerce is more likely than isolation to inspire
positive change.
We could relax the travel ban. Academic exchanges would be welcome too, allowing university students
to establish bonds that could form the foundation of a new era of Cuban–American amity.
Cuba remains a communist country, and its governing ideology is irreconcilable with the universal ideals
of liberty and self–government. Cuba eventually will need to dismantle communism's failed institutions
— this is not something America can, or should try to, initiate.
It is time for responsible, relaxed, non–interventionist approaches in our policy toward Cuba. With so
much talk of change in politics this year, our relationship with Havana is an obvious example of where it
is necessary, realistic and high time.
Politics net benefit
The CP is popular – commercial and Cuban backing
WERNER, 10 – editor of the Cuba Standard (JOHANNES, “WINDOW OPENS TO LIFT CUBA TRAVEL
BAN”, July 11, 2010, lexis)//eek
Last but not least, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a host of agribusiness trade associations
recently upped the ante by threatening representatives it will "score" any vote against the bill. That
means a "no" vote will come at a political cost.
Add to that recent surveys showing that more than 60 percent of Cuban-Americans are in favor of Cuba
travel for all Americans, and you begin to understand why free-travel advocates believe that a slim
majority in the House is within reach.
Lifting the travel ban is popular with the public and the majority of Congress secretly
supports it
Lloyd, 10- Writer for the NYT among other major publications and former Political Science teacher at the
University of Chicago (Delia, “Ten Reasons to Lift the Cuba Embargo”, Politics Daily, 8/24/10,
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/08/24/ten-reasons-to-lift-the-cuba-embargo/)//TL
9. It's unpopular. According to the travel-service provider Orbitz Worldwide, 67 percent of Americans
favor lifting the travel ban, and 72 percent believe that expanding travel to Cuba would positively impact
the lives of Cubans. Orbitz has collected more than 100,000 signatures in favor of restoring travel to
Cuba through its OpenCuba.org drive. And according to Rep. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), one of the leading
proponents of lifting the embargo, if a vote in Congress were taken secretly, the ban on travel and trade
would most likely fall. In other words, the environment to lift sanctions may be ripe politically in a way
that it wasn't even six months ago.
Solves the economy
Removal of travel restrictions give an immediate economic boost – tourist spending
spurs exports and growth in multiple sectors
Rosson 10 – Extension Economist and Director at the Center for North American Studies (Parr,
“Estimated Economic Impacts of the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2010”,
March 11, 2010,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/TX_AM_Estimated_Impacts_of_HR_4645.pdf)//eek
The short run analysis provides estimates of U.S. exports and economic activity before Cuba has time
to adjust to the increased number of tourists/visitors from the United States by increasing hotel room
capacity, and improving critical infrastructure such as power generation and transportation. It also
assumes that visitors remain in Cuba for 4.5 days. Based on the USITC report, 538,000 additional visitors
were estimated to arrive and spend $50/day for food/drink. CNAS estimates that the U.S. share of
tourist expenditures on food/drink would be 40 percent.
This results in additional U.S. food/drink exports to Cuba of $48.4 million/year (table 1). Major exports
would be frozen broilers/turkeys/eggs ($8 million), beef, pork, edible offal ($6.3 million), miscellaneous
processed foods ($5.5 million), flour/malt ($3.3 million), dry milk/cheese ($3 million), canned
fruits/vegetables ($2.9 million), soft drinks ($2.5 million), distilled spirits/wines/beer ($2.4 million), fruits
($2.4 million), fats/oils ($2 million). Other exports include condiments, vegetables/melons, snack foods,
refined sugar, seafood, and frozen desserts.
The additional $48.4 million in exports would be expected to require $116.7 million in additional
business activity, creating a total economic impact of $165.1 million and 786 new jobs. About 38
percent of the economic impact would be attributable directly to new exports. The largest share of
new economic activity (62 percent, or $102 million), would result from input purchases and household
spending in sectors that support exports, but do not actually export. About $14 million of this new total
business activity is agriculturally related activities such as grain and oilseed production, ranching,
forestry, fishing, and corn milling. Together, these sectors require 153 new jobs to support new U.S.
exports to Cuba.
Business services, such as legal, accounting and technical consulting require $11 million in business
activity and 84 new jobs. Additional food processing supports $8 million in business activity, while real
estate, wholesale trade and finance require $7.3 million, $7 million, and $6.4 million in business activity,
respectively. These sectors also require 89 new jobs. Other sectors required to support new exports
include: petroleum ($8.8 million), transportation ($4.8 million), wood processing ($3 million), and retail
trade and food/drink establishments ($4.7 million).
Removal of solely travel restrictions solves the economy – they boost export and
other industries
Rosson 10 – Extension Economist and Director at the Center for North American Studies (Parr,
“Estimated Economic Impacts of the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2010”,
March 11, 2010,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/TX_AM_Estimated_Impacts_of_HR_4645.pdf)//eek
Assuming new tourists stay 4.5 days, U.S. exports are estimated to increase by $180 million/year million
to meet the increased demand for high value foods/drink products (table 1). This would lead to a total
economic impact of $614 million in business activity and 2,923 new jobs. As was the case in Scenario 1,
slightly more than one-third of the economic impact would occur in sectors that are exporting products
to Cuba. Slightly more than half ($200 million) of the non-export related business activity is expected to
occur in other agriculture activities, business services, food production, real estate, wholesale trade
and finance. About 55 percent of the new jobs associated with increased exports, 2,252, would occur in
the previously noted non-export sectors of the economy. The remainder of the new jobs, 671, would be
in petroleum, transportation, health care, food/drink establishments, retail trade and other sectors.
Assuming U.S. visitors remain in Cuba for a 7.0 day stay and spend $60/day on food results in additional
U.S. exports of $336 million/year (table 1). These additional exports would require $810.5 million in
business activity, for a total economic impact of $1.15 billion, which would support 5,456 new jobs.
Removing travel restrictions solves the economy – information exchange,
privatization, tourism, and licensing
Peters, 8 – Vice President of the Lexington Institute (Philip, “CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. RESTRICTIONS
ON CUBAN-AMERICAN TRAVEL”, Congressional Testimony, September 19, 2008, lexis)//eek
If we were to end the travel ban as it applies to all Americans - thus heeding the call of Pope John Paul
II, to "open the doors to Cuba" - we would realize several benefits for our foreign policy and
humanitarian interests. American universities, charities, churches, and citizens - left, right, and center would be able freely to exchange information, ideas, and arguments with Cubans in and out of
government. We would no longer rely only on government programs, government grantees, and
government-licensed travelers to communicate with the Cuban people whom we want to influence.
An increase of American travelers would boost the incomes of average Cubans in the tourism industry
and in private businesses, both legal and black market, improving their living standards and their
independence. It would enable lots more Cubans to enter private business, such as the thousands that
legally rent rooms to travelers from abroad. An end to the travel ban would do away with the federal
government licensing processes that require, for example, that an American that wants to donate
Bibles or baseballs to a Cuban church, must obtain a license from one federal agency to travel, and a
second license from another agency to "export" the donation. And it would end the practice of
regulating visits and acts of charity between Cuban Americans and their loved ones in Cuba.
The travel ban is part of an economic sanctions regime that the Bush Administration believed would
bring about political change in Cuba. It has failed to do that during President Bush's two terms, it failed
in the nearly two decades since Cuba suffered the loss of Soviet subsidies, and it has no prospect of
doing so now. It serves mainly as an embargo on American influence in Cuba, and today the Bush
Administration's family sanctions serve as an embargo on American compassion toward hurricane
victims in Cuba. Congress would be wise to examine this policy, and would be wiser still to end it.
Removal of travel restrictions has massive economic benefits – hotels and arlines
Clark, 9 – Writer for McClatchy Newspapers (Lesley, “Cuban officials try to sell U.S. travel operators on
tourism”, December 16, 2009, lexis)//eek
Jones asked the Cuban officials about complaints from some supporters of the travel ban that Cubans on
the island aren't allowed to stay in hotels there. Figueras said it wasn't true.
He said Cuba had built more than 100 hotels in the last two decades, as tourist arrivals jumped 11
percent each year. He noted, however, that it took the island 30 years to get back to the volume it had
enjoyed before the Eisenhower administration broke off relations with Cuba in 1961. Figueras said Cuba
was looking to build 30 more hotels with 10,000 rooms over the next five years, but he acknowledged
that it needs more golf courses.
He said the country estimated that since 1961, the travel ban had prevented 30 million Americans from
visiting Cuba, at a price tag of $20 billion. He quoted congressional testimony from the American
Society of Travel Agents to estimate that 1.8 million Americans would visit Cuba if the restrictions were
lifted. He said that it could mean more than $1 billion for U.S. airlines, tour operators and travel
agencies.
Whitley, who said his group passed a resolution in 1981 that advocated "open borders," said American
tourists were eager to travel to Cuba.
"Americans want to see Cuba. They really, really want to see it," he said. "Every cruise ship that leaves
Miami and Fort Lauderdale, the market is going to demand a port of call include Havana."
Solves agriculture
Removing travel restrictions solves agriculture – it eases the regulation process
Grodine and Thorton, 9 – director of media relations at the American Farm and the deputy director
of PR for the American Farm Bureau Federation (Tracy and Mace, “AFBF Calls for Lifting Cuba Travel
Ban”, March 31, 2009,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/American_Farm_Bureau_Federation_Statement.pdf)
“This legislation is an important step in easing trade restrictions on Cuba,” Stallman said. “Allowing
unrestricted travel to Cuba will increase U.S. agricultural sales and boost tourism.”
U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba have been on average $400 million annually since 2000, with top
commodity sales including poultry, wheat, soybeans, rice and dairy. With passage of S. 428, AFBF
expects sales to increase.
In addition, language in the omnibus appropriations bill further aids U.S. agriculture by allowing travel
on a general license for those making agricultural sales to Cuba rather than the specific license
currently needed. This would ease delays that significantly impact the ability to transact commercial
sales with Cuba, which in some cases, have been lost to U.S. competitors because of the restriction.
Other priorities for AFBF in regard to Cuba include commercially defining “cash payments in advance” as
intended by Congress in the 2000 Trade Sanctions and -2- Reform Act; allowing the country to directly
wire payment to U.S. banks instead of going through a third-country bank as it does now; and issuing
visas for Cuban inspectors to travel to the U.S. to meet with suppliers, inspect facilities and verify
procedures and standards associated with the sale of U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba.
Lifting travel restrictions increases US agricultural exports to Cuba
Arnson 2010- Ph.D., International Relations, and M.A., Latin American Studies, The Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies
(Cynthia J., “The United States and Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship”, 5/24/10,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-united-states-and-cuba-implications-economic-relationship
Wilson center)//KW
In terms of specific U.S. industries, agribusiness is pushing for a lifting of certain restrictions in the U.S.
embargo in order to increase its participation and ensure that U.S. firms can better compete in the
Cuban market, explained Chris Garza, senior director of congressional relations at the American Farm
Bureau. Garza highlighted how U.S. businesses can sell agricultural products to other U.S.-sanctioned
countries and U.S. citizens can travel to such countries and saw the elimination of travel restrictions to
Cuba as intrinsic to the interests of American agribusiness. A lifting of travel restrictions on U.S. citizens
would increase the overall demand for food consumption on the island, spur U.S. agricultural exports
there, and shift the demand from bulk commodity imports to higher valued and more processed
products in Cuba. Likewise, a lifting of restrictions on the financial services available to U.S. citizens
traveling to Cuba would return money spent by visitors to Cuba back to the U.S. in the form of
agricultural purchases.
Lifting travel and financing restrictions is key to agricultural competiveness – other
countries are exploiting weak US engagement in key markets
Rosson 10 – Extension Economist and Director at the Center for North American Studies (Parr,
“Estimated Economic Impacts of the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2010”,
March 11, 2010,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/TX_AM_Estimated_Impacts_of_HR_4645.pdf)//eek
Allowing U.S. citizens/permanent residents to travel to Cuba and U.S. firms to utilize modified
financing methods will improve the U.S. competitive position in the Cuban market. New financing
provisions would allow U.S. exporters to recover lost markets for rice and forest products, for example,
creating new jobs and economic activity. It is also important to maintain the U.S. competitive position
for wheat, corn, and soybean meal and oil. Through February 2010, U.S. exports of corn to Cuba were
down 47 percent compared to 2009, while wheat exports are off 69 percent and soybean meal exports
had fallen 55 percent. The majority of these declines in exports are attributed to increased costs
associated with financial restrictions, demurrage on vessels, currency conversion costs, and higher
costs associated with using letters of credit (ALIMPORT staff, 3/2/2010). Recently implemented cash in
advance rules resulting from the FY 2010 Omnibus Appropriations Act will provide some temporary
respite, but will not alleviate the problem entirely.279 Consequently, Cuba appears to be diversifying its
suppliers by shifting away from U.S. firms in favor of Brazil, Canada, China and Vietnam. Credit terms
are often offered by these countries, allowing ALIMPORT (Importada de Alimentos-the Cuban Food
Import Agency) to conserve its hard currency and use credit to make larger purchases over a longer
period of time. The net result is a loss of U.S. competitiveness and market share, followed by declining
exports. If conditions do not improve and if alternative markets are not developed, negative economic
impacts will occur in terms of lost business activity and employment.
Background
The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, allows certain exceptions for the
exportation of U.S. agricultural products and medicines to Cuba. Since passage of the TSREEA, U.S.
exports to Cuba have expanded, reaching a record $711 million in 2008. This was almost two-thirds
higher than 2007. Last year (2009) was quite different however, as U.S. exports to Cuba declined 26
percent to $528 million. This large drop-off was attributed to an 18 percent decline in Cuba’s per capita
tourist earnings, a 30 percent drop in Cuban export earnings from nickel sales, and weak export sales of
sugar and tobacco. Another major set of factors was the relative high cost of U.S. products due to
somewhat onerous U.S. financial requirements. Together, these factors severely limited the ability of
ALIMPORT to purchase U.S. products on a cash basis. Despite this decline, Cuba remains the sixth
largest U.S. agricultural market in the Latin American/Caribbean region.
The Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act solves the economy and
agriculture – it helps multiple sectors and allows for the US to maintain key resources
Rosson 10 – Extension Economist and Director at the Center for North American Studies (Parr,
“Estimated Economic Impacts of the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2010”,
March 11, 2010,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/TX_AM_Estimated_Impacts_of_HR_4645.pdf)//eek
If H.R. 4645, the Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act, is implemented as proposed,
it is estimated that it would have substantial positive economic impacts on the U.S. economy. Exports
to Cuba would increase by $365 million/year and would support $739 million in additional business
activity for a total economic impact of $1.1 billion, requiring 6,000 new jobs. While there are major
economic gains for U.S. agriculture, there are also important economic gains for non-agricultural
sectors such as business services, financial institutions, real estate, wholesale and retail trade,
petroleum and health care services.
If only the travel restrictions are removed, it is estimated that U.S. exports would increase by $48.4
million/year in the short run and by $336 million/year over the long run, requiring 5,456 new jobs.
Alternatively, if only the payment and financial restrictions are modified, U.S. exports are estimated to
increase by $271.2 million/year, requiring an additional $561.9 million in business activity for a total
economic impact of $833.1 million and supporting 4,478 new jobs.
The results of these analyses indicate that U.S. agricultural producers, input suppliers, agribusiness
firms, food processors, business services suppliers, the financial sector, real estate, health care, oil, gas
and petroleum suppliers, transportation companies, trade facilitators, and port authorities in many
parts of the United States can expect additional economic gains if H.R. 4645 is implemented and U.S.
exports to Cuba expand. Improved access to the Cuban market is more important now that new
competition has emerged and the U.S. market share is threatened, especially for dominant U.S.
products such as soybean meal, corn, wheat, rice, poultry and dry milk. Increased access for U.S.
travelers is also important for stimulating demand for U.S. foods in Cuba over the next few years as
economic recovery occurs and U.S. firms become better positioned to respond to global market
opportunities.
Removing the restrictions is key to the US wheat industry – it is a massive
underutilized export market
Kessler, 9 – is the NAWG’s director of communications (Melissa, “U.S. Wheat Industry Supports
Increased Trade With Cuba”, March 30, 2009, http://www.democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/US-WheatIndustry-Supports-Increased-Trade-With-Cuba.pdf)//eek
The U.S. wheat industry urges Congress and the Obama Administration to immediately ease trade and
travel restrictions with Cuba to allow U.S. wheat growers to fully realize potential sales.
As members of an industry that exports more than half of its production in a typical year, U.S. wheat
growers rely on the ability to open and expand international markets. Cuba represents substantial
potential for future sales of U.S. wheat with a population of more than 11 million that consumes close
to 1 MMT of wheat per year. Cuba is the largest importer of wheat and wheat products in the
Caribbean.
Though proximity and historical ties should provide a competitive advantage for U.S. wheat, the U.S.
holds a less than 50 percent market share in Cuba, compared to a more than 85 percent market share
in other Caribbean areas. Over the past ten years, Cuba has imported greater quantities of wheat from
the European Union, Canada and Argentina, with an estimated cost to the U.S. wheat industry of the
continued trade restrictions at upwards of $40 million per year.
Decreasing travel restrictions helps the dairy industry – travelers will convince Cubans
to buy American dairy
U.S. Dairy Export Council and the National Milk Producers Federation, 9 – Coalitions of
Dairy companies (“U.S. Dairy Industry Support for HR 874 and S 428”,
http://www.democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Dairy-Industry-Support-for-HR874-and-S428.pdf)//eek
The U.S. Dairy Export Council and the National Milk Producers Federation support the passage of HR 874
and S. 428. These bills would open up new opportunities for our members to more easily travel to
Cuba to further encourage sales of U.S. dairy products there and to develop enhanced ties between the
American and Cuban people.
This facilitation of the travel of U.S. firms to Cuba would help develop exports of chronically short
supplies of nutritiously necessary dairy products. Therefore, USDEC and NMPF encourage the
enactment during this Congress of these two bills, as well as other legislation that would enhance
relationships with the Cuban people and open up the opportunity to provide a neighboring market
with high quality American agricultural products at affordable prices.
Removal of the embargo helps the rice industry – Cuba is empirically a good market
however restrictions give advantages to US competitors
Langley, 9 – is the Vice President of Government Affairs for the USA Rice Federation (Reece, “Senate
Cuba Travel Bill ‘Important and Necessary,’ USA Rice Chairman Says”, March 31 2009,
http://www.democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/USA-Rice-Statement-on-Travel.pdf)//eek
“Reestablishing normal commercial relations with Cuba is an important priority for the U.S. rice
industry as that market could again become a top export destination for U.S. rice. We believe there is
great opportunity for advancing trade and travel policies regarding Cuba during this Congress.”
Prior to the embargo, Cuba — potentially a 400,000 -600,000 MT market for Southern long-grain rice
producers — was the largest export market for U.S. rice. Trade resumed in 2002 after Congress passed
the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA). However, with the Treasury
Department’s reinterpretation of TSREEA in 2005, U.S. rice exports declined from 157,538.8 metric
tons (MT) in 2006 to less than 13,000 MT in 2008. Vietnam and China were the chief beneficiaries of
the reinterpretation.
Solves US-Cuban relations
Giving visas to Cuban academics solves relations and democratization – allows
information flow
Thale, 13 – a Program director at WOLA (Geoff, “Denying Visas to Prominent Cuban Academics
Undercuts Policy of Academic Exchanges", 21 May 2012,
http://www.wola.org/commentary/denial_of_visas_to_prominent_cuban_academics_is_shameful_har
mful_to_us_interests)//eek
The Obama administration has denied visas to several prominent Cuban scholars—including Rafael
Hernandez, Carlos Alzugaray, and Soraya Castro—who were scheduled to speak on panels at the Latin
American Studies Association (LASA) conference from May 23-27. It is unclear what criteria the
administration used in denying visas to these scholars. Several of them have visited the United States
frequently, have done fellowships at some of the nation’s most prestigious universities (including
Harvard and Columbia), have met with high-level officials at the State Department, and have been
instrumental in fomenting strong academic partnerships between Cuba and the United States. The
decision to deny visas to these renowned scholars appears even more erratic coming in the wake of the
administration’s approval of a visa for Mariela Castro, daughter of Cuban President Raul Castro, who is
also scheduled to speak on a panel at the LASA conference.
This seemingly inexplicable behavior is particularly offensive given that this year the LASA conference
had returned to the United States after being held in other countries for several years. Cuban scholars
have attended LASA meetings for over two decades, but in 2004 the Bush administration unexpectedly
denied visas to every Cuban scholar seeking to attend, and the organization subsequently decided to
move its conference outside the United States in protest. This year, the conference returned to the
United States, as LASA had come to believe that the Obama administration was committed to permitting
academic exchanges and that it would allow Cuban academics to attend LASA conferences.
Moreover, these visa denials undermine the administration’s policy of promoting academic exchange
with Cuba, which has been one of the most positive and successful changes in U.S. policy towards Cuba
in recent years. These exchanges have helped promote the free flow of ideas, information, and
dialogue and have helped feed the desire for greater openness in Cuba. The visa denials are damaging
to U.S.-Cuban relations, they are harmful to the interests of the United States, and they hurt Cubans
who are supporting increased engagement with the United States. WOLA condemns the denial of visas
to Cuban academics in the strongest terms.
Easing the travel ban will substantially boost U.S.-Cuban relations
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
When Copernicus first claimed that the Sun, rather than the Earth, was the center of the solar system,
he did not suddenly lose sight of our planet. Policymaking circles in the U.S. could use a Copernican shift
of their own when analyzing the travel ban debate. Given the Cuban government's totalitarianism, its
legitimacy and credibility should be questioned at all times, but simply preventing Americans from
visiting the island does not chip away at Cuba's totalitarian pillars. We should reframe the issue by
searching for other ways to delegitimize the regime. One possible solution is to facilitate the flow of
visitors to and from the island, which would give the Cuban people access to the outside world, and
provide them with the very unpropagandized information that the Cuban government would
otherwise deny them. This Copernican shift - that is, placing travel within the orbit of change - would
not lose sight of our end goal (an open Cuba), but would simply shift the emphasis away from breaking
the Cuban regime with isolation. It instead would use travel to do an end-run around Cuba's selfimposed information blockade. Once travel to Cuba is properly seen as a way to pierce the Cuban
government's totalitarian veil, and is no longer seen as a hindrance to reform on the island, a more
pragmatic travel policy can then be crafted.
As mentioned above, the Obama Administration recently removed many of the restrictions on travel
and remittances imposed during the Bush presidency, n36 however it should not stop there. Our initial
backchannel and unofficial discussions with the Cuban Government should go hand-in-hand with an
increased American presence on the island. To that end, the U.S. should encourage more travel to Cuba
by easing the travel ban as much as [*202] possible. The President has the authority to ease travel
restrictions on "family visits, people-to-people educational activities, academic educational activities
(including for secondary schools), and participation in amateur or semi-professional sports
competitions." n37 By doing so, America can dip into its deep reserve of citizen-diplomats before it
reestablishes state-to-state diplomatic relations with Havana.
Effective public diplomacy establishes contacts directly with the people, not the government, of a
foreign country, providing foreign populations with a deeper understanding of American values. n38
The U.S. had great success with public diplomacy during the Cold War, where the tactic was used as a
means to improve Americans' understanding of populations living under closed regimes. Every U.S.
citizen can serve as a public diplomat when traveling abroad, helping to influence groups of individuals
and institutions, and to shape public opinion in other countries. Although the Interests Section in
Havana has career diplomats who work on "public diplomacy" in another sense - that is, establishing
nongovernmental contacts for the State Department - this notion of public diplomacy emphasizes
nongovernmental contact on both sides.
Effectively engaging Cuba will require a much higher degree of cultural and historical understanding
by Americans in both the public and private sectors. Public diplomacy is not very useful if it is confined
to government-sponsored propaganda (which is seen as inauthentic) or official activity conducted within
an embassy's walls (which is inaccessible to the general population). In Cuba, however, the United States
has no official embassy, just a leanly-staffed Interests Section. Moreover, America's diplomatic efforts in
Cuba are further handcuffed by the mutually restrictive measures the U.S. and Cuba each impose on one
another's diplomats. n39 Encouraging more diplomacy by citizens is a relatively costless endeavor that
is not only genuine, but also avoids the trappings of officialdom.
A major impediment to public diplomacy efforts, however, will be the travel ban, in place in one form
or another, since January 16, 1961, when the State Department declared that travel to Cuba would be
contrary to the foreign policy and national interest of the United States. Since 1967, the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control has enforced the travel ban under the auspices of a
currency regulation. n40
Removing travel restrictions is a prerequisite to later action – we need info on what’s
in the country
WERNER, 10 – editor of the Cuba Standard (JOHANNES, “WINDOW OPENS TO LIFT CUBA TRAVEL
BAN”, July 11, 2010, lexis)//eek
There was considerable concern about the United States’ lack of information about internal events in
Cuba. Greater regional collaboration was viewed as a crucial avenue for gaining more insight into
developments on the ground. Players also suggested relaxing current travel restrictions on U.S. and
Cuban diplomats and facilitating greater official contact between diplomats and the respective
governments, especially on matters of serious concern such as migration, crime, and the environment.
More contact with Cuban civil society by USINT diplomats as well as Cuban Americans could also help
prepare the Cuban people to become “champions of democracy” by empowering civil society, grass
roots groups, and human rights activists. Nonetheless, our efforts to empower the Cuban people should
take care to avoid taking sides among competing groups.
Solves US-Latin American relations
The travel ban alone solves US-Latin American relations
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
The embargo and the travel ban have sometimes been grouped together as the same policy, but
should instead be dealt with separately. Although most Cuban-Americans endorse the embargo, almost
all are opposed to the restrictions on family travel. n50 Separating the travel ban from the embargo
would give the U.S. more flexibility as it considers the long-term viability of our current Cuba policy. By
adopting this Copernican shift, policymakers could then envision a policy that promotes human rights by
loosening the travel restrictions, but maintaining significant elements of the embargo.
That being said, not all travel by U.S. citizens is helpful to our interests. Any loosening of the travel ban
should first focus on those restrictions that undermine family unity and academic exchanges. For
example, the U.S. has no immediate interest in seeing its high school and college students travel to Cuba
for spring break trips, and therefore should not prioritize travel licenses for purely tourist reasons.
However, the U.S. does have an interest in sending researchers, study abroad students, graduate
professionals, and other academics to the island. Although complete normalization is the ultimate end
of any responsible Cuba policy, in the short run the travel ban should be maintained, but loosened
considerably, to accommodate more family visits as well as far more academic and cultural
exchanges.
Loosening the travel ban is not without precedent; family travel has ebbed and flowed in response to
different administrations. For example, [*206] President Carter lifted the ban entirely in 1977,
President Reagan tightened restrictions to only allow certain family travel to the island, President
Clinton vacillated between suspending family travel and encouraging it, and President Bush tightened
the ban to its strictest level in decades in 2004. n51 Additionally, a policy that loosens the travel ban
would have the support of a majority of Cuban-Americans in Florida. By loosening its travel restrictions,
the U.S. can once again starkly contrast its policy with the Cuban regime by comparing their respective
travel bans. This would translate into an important coup de image for an administration in desperate
need of repairing its perception in Latin America.
Solves Cuban democracy
Removal of travel restrictions solves freedom and regime change – it allows for
freedom and information to spread into Cuba
Freedom House, 9 – is an organization dedicated to expansion of freedom (“Is it Time to Lift the Ban
on Travel to Cuba? Statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives”,
Freedom House, November 19, 2009,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/FreedomHouseCubaTravelBan.pdf)//eek
East Germany, at the time of its collapse, was as repressive as Cuba is today. Both countries received
the lowest rating for political rights in the Freedom in the World survey (for 1989 and 2009 respectively)
and the next lowest rating, 6 out of 7, for civil liberties. Cuba’s restrictions on travel are among the
tightest of any country. Cuban citizens may travel outside their country only with explicit government
permission. These travel restrictions, along with strict controls on the flow of information, greatly
limit the exposure of Cuban citizens to the outside world, particularly to the values and experiences of
freedom that will point Cuba toward a brighter future.
Freedom House wants to see the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba lifted, so that the flow of information to
Cuban citizens will increase and the spread of the ideas of liberty will be far more difficult for the
Cuban government to contain. Removal of this travel ban, as Freedom House declared in its January 7,
2009 statement, will reinvigorate efforts to advance human rights and democracy in Cuba. Moreover,
freedom of movement is a fundamental right . Repeal of the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba will reaffirm
the right of all Americans to travel wherever they want.
Cuba remains one of the most repressive countries on earth. It is among the 17 countries worldwide
labeled by Freedom House as the Worst of the Worst in 2009. The Communist Party of Cuba, under the
leadership of Raul Castro, maintains a monopoly on political power. There is no tolerance for any
political organization outside of the Communist Party. Neighbor-watch groups, known as Committees
for the Defense of the Revolution, extend the regime’s reach throughout society to monitor and limit
opposition activity. The unauthorized assembly of more 286 than three people is punishable by law with
up to three months in prison. Critics of the regime risk arrest or physical assault. Press freedom is
sharply curtailed, and access to the internet is tightly controlled. In Freedom House’s survey of
Freedom on the Net in 15 countries, released earlier this year, Cuba received the lowest rating for
internet and digital media freedom, even below China, Tunisia, and Iran.
Although Raul Castro has introduced modest reforms, they are primarily aimed at improving Cuba’s
macroeconomic performance and have had a minimal effect, if any, in loosening the Communist
regime’s grip on society. The reforms have done nothing to loosen constraints on political rights in
Cuba. The regime continues to crack down brutally on dissent. Just two weeks ago, for instance,
prominent bloggers Yoani Sanchez, Orlando Luis Pardo, and Claudia Cadelo were thrown into the back
of a car by plain clothes government security agents while they were walking to participate in a peaceful
march in downtown Havana. They were punched in the head, chest, and kidneys and were taken to a
place 20 minutes away, where they were thrown out of the car.
Easing it spurs Cuban political reform
Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for
the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis)
A steady flow of information would help highlight the cracks in Cuba's system of government. For
example, public outrage over Cuba's economic decline has been muted because the public has a limited
perception of their relative poverty since global interaction is so restricted. Highlighting relative
economic disparities increases the potential for popular discontent. n151
The best way the U.S. can facilitate the flow of information into the island is by encouraging more travel
to Cuba. Easing the travel ban could go a long way toward puncturing the Cuban regime's stranglehold
on public perception of the outside world. Since the U.S. remains the only country that bans its citizens
from visiting the island, citizens from other countries have been visiting the island for decades,
especially since the fall of the Soviet Union.
These visits, for business, family, and tourism, have helped expose millions of Cubans to life outside the
island. Nevertheless, most tourist visits have had a limited effect since tourists tend not to have personal
contacts on the island, and are thus relegated to isolated resorts, and minimal interaction with the
public. Moreover, those who visit the island for business purposes usually meet with government
bureaucrats in charge of a particular project or investment. Although these relationships are important,
there is a qualitative difference between visits for the purposes of tourism, and visits for academic,
business, and familial purposes.
American academics and students bring powerful ideas, as well as alternative thoughts and paradigms
about life outside Cuba. Even the most prestigious Cuban academics are regularly denied exit visas, and
thus are unable to travel to international conferences, or develop academic contacts outside the island.
The U.S. can get around this restriction by encouraging more academic travel to the island.
Cuban doctors, economists, intellectuals, lawyers, scientists, professors, and especially students, will
populate the vanguard of any future reform movement. Promoting contact between their American
counterparts will expose these individuals to the requisite ideas that they can later use to articulate
their demands for change. Indeed, today's young students represent America's greatest public
diplomacy assets since they tend to view themselves as global citizens, and favor "wiser
internationalism." n152
Increased family visits will also help puncture the regime's legitimacy. The vast majority of Cuban exiles
live in the United States, and most have family that remained on the island. When they visit they tend to
stay with their families, rather than in isolated resorts. As a result, the conversations and interactions
they have are more personal, more intimate, and ultimately more consequential.
[*233] The stories visitors bring with them from the U.S. and the rest of the world hold more credibility
than the radio signals sent in from southern Florida. n153 This is a form of communication that the
regime cannot control since the messages brought by family members are not easily spun in the
government's favor. In this way, "increased people-to-people flows thus add to the pressures for change
in Cuba." n154 Even when weighed against the drawbacks of increased travel to Cuba, namely
increasing the amount of hard currency available to the government, the benefits of a policy that eases
the travel ban still justify its implementation.
Totalitarian regimes thrive by not only concentrating power in the central government, but also by
removing the people's ability to exercise influence or engage in real learning independent of
government interference. A larger flow of information would be impossible to manage, empowering
each person with access to it. A steady stream of information would help dissidents, proto civil society
groups, and other organizations work around the Cuban government's restrictions. Moreover, this
information invasion would not only make Cuban society more permeable, but would also make the
regime more malleable.
Removal travel restrictions is key to Cuban democracy – the regime is weak and new
ideas would spur revolution
Chepe, 9 – (Oscar, Independent Journalist “U.S. Tourism Welcome”, April 21st, 2009,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/US_Tourism_Welcome_Espinosa_Chepe.pdf)//eek
US tourism would undoubtedly have favorable implications for Cuba. It is estimated that in the first
year after the restrictions are lifted, at least one million tourists could be expected to travel to Cuba. It
could also have a major political influence, since it would significantly reduce the current levels of
hostility between both countries which has been used to the benefit of the enemies of change inside
the Cuban government.
Furthermore, the arrival of an important number of US citizens with high democratic culture shall
represent a large influence in the ideological aspect. We cannot forget that Cubans have always shown
high respect for US traditions and culture, increased now because a large percentage of the Cuban
population has relatives in the US and the fact that lately the Obama Administration has developed a
more intelligent and rational policy that has intensified a close relationship.
Instead, in Cuba after 20 years of a general crisis, the big political following has disappeared leaving a
considerable emptiness that could be occupied by new ideas that offer a prosperous future with
creative possibilities for the population, for freedom and democracy. Obviously, the passing of these
bills that offer the possibility of a better future continue to face many enemies inside the Cuban
government and abroad. Such opposition comes mainly from those who maintain a conservative
position opposed to any changes in US-Cuba relationships and shall continue to place obstacles in the
road to the understanding between these two nations.
The arrival of Cuban-Americans and the possible addition of the US tourism, as well as the
strengthening of scientific, cultural, sports, religious and areas, shall take place at a very special
moment, when the totalitarian regime is suffering a strong debacle. 288We can already see serious
cracks in the regime through the abrupt separation of individuals who used to hold very solid
positions, but have been accused of indignity without any explanation. In addition, there are
corruption scandals attributed by the people to high dignitaries. At the same time several artists,
musicians and intellectuals using different methods have criticized the current situation, sickened by
the prevailing social environment. Today only the most mediocre sector of society remains silent or
offers supports, aware that their lack of talent finds in the regime the guarantee to remain at an
intellectual level that they have not earned. We must clarify that it would be naive to think that with the
arrival of our compatriots and US tourists the totalitarian regime would disappear. These factors may
create a new environment more conducive to the conquest of democracy and individual rights, but it
will first be the decision of the Cuban people to overcome their apathy that will help to reach freedom.
International solidarity and the support of other nations will undoubtedly provide encouragement,
but it must be us Cubans, who with our efforts and sacrifices will end this sad totalitarian era and
conquer the right to built a new country.
Removing the travel ban solves freedom and democracy – it allows counterpropaganda to flow into Cuba
Freedom House, 9 – is an organization dedicated to expansion of freedom (“Is it Time to Lift the Ban
on Travel to Cuba? Statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives”,
Freedom House, November 19, 2009,
http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/FreedomHouseCubaTravelBan.pdf)//eek
The restrictions on travel, independent media, and internet access have left Cubans isolated from the
outside world. Cubans are cut off from news and views that challenge the warped “reality” presented
in official propaganda. This isolation is reflected in the bleak outlook of Cubans, as 289 reported in two
Freedom House studies on How Citizens View Their Country’s Future, entitled Change in Cuba
(September 14, 2008) and Another “Special Period” in Cuba? (March 25, 2009). Each study was based on
more than 160 in-depth interviews with a broad range of Cuban citizens in five provinces.
These studies found that while many Cubans expect the communist system to collapse eventually, they
view change in Cuba as a distant prospect, and they have difficulty envisioning a better future for their
country. They are uninformed or misinformed about Cuba’s democracy movement, and they seem
incapable of organizing a popular response to government oppression.
Even younger Cubans express little if any interest in participating in a future transition. Many of the
respondents in Freedom House’s surveys are so absorbed with day-to-day survival that they think it is a
luxury to image what life might be like in a year or two, let alone whether they could be free. A 37-yearold doctor in Santiago, for example, said that all he could do was to “be resigned and try to live better.
Two students, when asked what they thought about life in Cuba, responded sarcastically, “We have to
like it. It’s our country and we can’t leave.” Moreover, while Cubans see little prospect for change, even
that prospect seems to give them more anxiety than hope. There is significant fear that political
change will bring crime and insecurity to Cuba.
Some of the respondents to Freedom House’s surveys expressed a desire for freedom. Among the
three reforms they specifically want to see is the freedom of movement. The bleak outlook of Cubans
reported in Freedom House’s surveys has taken root over decades of government propaganda and
intimidation. Cubans are unlikely to gain hope for a better future unless they begin to see real
alternatives to Communist-party rule and to hear first-hand about the benefits of free markets and
open political systems. Such hope is critical to give Cuban citizens a sense of empowerment and to
inspire them to assert their rights and demand freedom for Cuba.
Removal of the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba offers the prospect of greatly expanding the flow of
information to Cuban citizens about the outside world, particularly the values and experiences of
democracy. American travelers can explain the benefits our vibrant civil society and our open system
of government, counteract the propaganda that the Castro regime uses to make Cubans afraid of
change, and convey the promise to Cuban citizens of political alternatives. Lifting the travel ban is
expected to lead to a huge increase in the number of American travelers to Cuba, which in turn will
greatly complicate the Cuban government’s efforts to block interaction between U.S. and Cuban citizens
and to keep Cubans isolated.
People to people contact key to impelling change in Cuba
Huddleston 2007- Principal Officer at the United States Interest Section (USINT) Havana, Cuba,
Masters from Johns Hopkins School Advanced Internationals Studies
(Vicki, “Post-Fidel Cuba” 2/6/7, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/02/06latinamericahuddleston, brookings institute)//KW
In the spring of 2002, I picked up a group of young Cubans along Quinta Avenida headed toward central
Havana to hang out and treat themselves to ice cream and cakes. When they asked me where I got the
beautiful black Crown Victoria sedan I was driving, I told them that I was the chief of the U.S. Interests
Section, our diplomatic mission in Cuba. Delighted, they exclaimed, "Be our mother and take us to
Miami!"
Forty-five years ago on Feb. 3, 1962, 10 months after the Bay of Pigs and eight months before the Cuban
missile crisis, President Kennedy announced a total embargo on trade with Cuba. President Eisenhower,
fearing Communists were gaining the upper hand, had already put in place sanctions in retaliation for
the seizure of American properties shortly after Fidel Castro took power on Jan. 1, 1959.
Now, almost a half-century later, the long era of Mr. Castro is over. The brief era of his brother, Raul,
who at 75 cannot rule Cuba for long, has begun. But very little change will take place in Cuba as long as
the Cuban people are isolated from their loved ones and from the ideas and influences of the outside
world. If we want to give those kids a chance to build a prosperous and democratic future in Havana -not Miami -- we will have to change tactics.
To start the ball rolling, President Bush should reinstitute the "People-to-People" program and the
annual Cuban American family visits that were in place during the first two years of his administration.
These policies were opening doors in Cuba.
Under the People-to-People program, licensed groups from churches, universities and theaters
throughout the United States were carrying out their own brand of grass-roots diplomacy by
connecting with Cuban doctors, teachers and religious leaders. They were helping Cubans live better
lives and to begin preparing for a better future. Cuban Americans were visiting their families in Cuba,
bringing much need medicines and giving their children a chance to hug their grandparents and learn
firsthand about what happened in Cuba.
Cubans from Santiago de Cuba in the East to Pinar del Rio in the West were beginning to believe that
freedom was not a distant dream. They were learning firsthand about life in our country by listening to
AM-FM shortwave radios and reading books handed out by an intrepid band of diplomats assigned to
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.
Mr. Bush can make these changes now. No congressional action is needed and they will make a
difference as they did five years ago, when they helped create a "Cuban Spring."
But more needs to be done, it isn't all up to Mr. Bush. Congress will have to act if the president is to
have the flexibility he needs in the coming months and years to respond to the challenges and
opportunities Fidel Castro's death and Raul Castro's succession will bring. Until the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity legislation, known as Helms-Burton, is revised or abrogated the president cannot
lift the embargo unless both both Castros are out of power and a new Cuban government is well on its
way toward a multiparty democracy.
Congressional action does not end the embargo. The president by executive action can keep the
embargo in place. But if Congress abrogates or revises Helms-Burton, the president will have the
opportunity to respond should Raul Castro begin to carry out reforms. For example, should Raul Castro
allow Cubans to open their own businesses, in order to meet the pent up expectations of Cuba's youth
for jobs and better pay, Mr. Bush could remove restrictions that block the sale of computers, televisions
and radios, thereby enhancing the flow of information and ideas that would prompt more and faster
political as well as economic reform.
Forty-five years later, isn't it time to clear the way for a new relationship?
US should remove travel restrictions- people to people contact key to reform
Pascual and Huddleston 2007- * M.P.P. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University in 1982, **Principal Officer at the United States Interest Section (USINT) Havana, Cuba,
Masters from Johns Hopkins School Advanced Internationals Studies
(Carlos, Vicki, “Play a Part in Cuba's Future”, Miami Herald, 4/20/07,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/04/20latinamerica-pascual, brookings
institute)//KW
Whether it's Fidel or Raúl Castro—or some combination of the two—time is running out on U.S. policy
on Cuba. During the next five years, there will be an ongoing political transition in Cuba. Fidel may
return to power, only to be followed once again by Raúl if Fidel's health again deteriorates. And, Raúl at
75, is unlikely to rule long. As the inherently unstable situation continues, the United States can sit on
the side lines, allowing the Revolution to regenerate and renew itself, or we can encourage reform by
reducing Cuba's isolation.
Oil reserves
If we continue to stubbornly insist that Cuba must first magically transform itself into a functioning
democracy before we talk, we will be out of luck. The appeal of our aid, trade and investment will slip
away. We will become irrelevant because Cuban, Venezuelan and other foreign companies are now
developing huge offshore oil reserves. When the oil begins to flow, the income it generates will
reinforce the ruling elite by creating jobs for Cuba's restless youth and by improving lives. Cubans will
no longer need the investment and jobs that Americans—especially Cuban Americans—could provide.
Perhaps it is time for American oil companies to lead the way in opening up Cuba? After all, the
expropriation of these companies led President Eisenhower to impose the first comprehensive
sanctions.
It will take courage and vision to change course, but the alternative is that neither the United States
nor Cuban Americans will play a part in Cuba's future. In Poland, Hungry, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union before the fall of the Iron Curtain, our contacts spread the idea that there was an alternative way
of life and helped reinforce internal discontent with communism's failure. The following actions,
although modest, would allow the administration to seize the initiative after a half-century siesta:
Modify our isolationist policies—allow family and people-to-people visits—as their out-reach will
reduce social tensions, allowing for some reforms during the ongoing and uncertain transitional years.
Renew bilateral cooperation on anti-narcotics, crime, migration and preservation of the environment.
These objectives are as much in our interest as they are in Cuba's.
Offer incentives for internal reform, such as permitting direct telecommunications links and the sale of
communications equipment.
Encourage the Organization of American States to begin a dialogue with the Cuban government about
the political and economic reforms that Cuba must undertake to again become an active member.
When Ronald Reagan challenged Mikhail Gorbachev to ''tear down that wall,'' he did so from a position
of moral superiority. He believed that the values of democracy and a market economy would prevail
over authoritarianism and communism when people had a chance to be exposed to both. If, as a
nation, we still believe in these core values, the implication should be clear—we should seek contact
with the Cuban people to empower them to take charge of their future.
The price of partisan politics will be to persist in a failed policy that will continue to give life to Castro's
legacy, thereby preventing the contacts that would empower the Cuban people to take charge of their
future.
Solves US soft power
It expands US soft power
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (Douglas, “Changing Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”,
Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
Travel between the United States and Cuba is highly constrained by restrictions imposed and enforced
by the governments of both countries. With Cuba listed by the State Department among a handful of
countries considered international sponsors of terrorism, its citizens face heightened scrutiny in
obtaining travel visas to the United States.103 Cuba‟s policy is equally, if not more rigid in this regard.
Its government forbids citizens from traveling to the United States without “official authorization” and
exit permits are regularly denied.104 Despite these current circumstances, however, there are
strategies by which the U.S. may be able to incite a more robust exchange of travelers, an outcome
that would hold great promise for enhancing American soft power in Cuba. Cuban visitors to the U.S.
would return home with a unique personal perspective, one that might run counter to that which they
have been taught in school, and which they would be expected to share with relatives, peers, and social
networks. There is no guarantee of course that all Cuban travelers would be enchanted by all American
cultural and social mores (in fact, they might be offended by some) but at least they would have the
opportunity to experience some of them first hand and to meet and perhaps converse with Americans,
possibly for the first time in their lives, and thereby form their own opinions about the U.S. This alone
would seem likely to undermine the impressions of America that most Cuban are prone to form if
exposed only to official government information sources, and could over time help reformulate those
impressions in a way more sympathetic to the United States, thereby enhancing U.S. soft power on
the island
The challenge for U.S. policymakers, therefore, is to entice the Cuban government to reassess its
policies on travel abroad. A vast majority of Cuban citizens favor lifting the current restrictions,105 but
public sentiment has thus far not prodded Havana to act. One observer argues that “there are no laws
or clearly written regulations [in Cuba] covering these [travel abroad] processes,”106 which only
complicates the challenge for the United States. Yet there are tremendous economic incentives for the
Cubans to open travel channels with the U.S. and it would therefore seem to be in their best interest to
do so.107 In recent years, Cuba has lifted restrictions limiting visitors from many other Western
countries and may be inclined to continue that trend. The United States would serve as a lucrative
market for Cuba‟s burgeoning tourism industry, considering its relative wealth and proximity to the
island, so it is reasonable to assume that the Cuban government will consider ways to tap into that
market as a means to bolster the economy. For these reasons, lawmakers in Havana might well be
prone to liberalize their policies on travel abroad, particularly if the U.S. State Department were to
signal its intention to reciprocate.
Increased exchange increases soft power
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (Douglas, “Changing Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”,
Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
Another means by which U.S. ideas could serve as a valuable source of soft power in Cuba is through
the proliferation of bilateral educational exchange programs. After all, these programs serve as a
conduit for the exchange of ideas between academics and scholars of both countries. Currently there
are limited bilateral educational exchange programs, and therefore their capacity to influence Cuban
opinion about the U.S. is quite negligible. But through the expansion of these programs, the United
States could open new avenues for significant academic collaboration, allowing scholars opportunities
to develop professional and personal relationships and networks, thereby forming potentially highly
constructive channels of communication between important and influential citizens of the two
countries. Such a policy would be relatively simple to implement and could provide tremendous
diplomatic benefits for the United States, which has continued to strictly limit these types of exchanges
since the early 1960s.
Educational exchanges increase soft power, bilateral relations, and improve
policymaking
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of
Government (Douglas, “Changing Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”,
Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
This analysis also demonstrated the tremendous soft power value of educational exchange programs.
The evidence suggests that the risks for such exchange would be low and the potentially payoffs could
be quite high. Universities and think tanks in both nations would be inclined to participate (or not)
based on their own interests without requiring or necessarily prompting the direct involvement of
either government. (Academics would argue that government involvement would equate to
interference and would therefore be inclined not to participate under such circumstances.) But the
scholar-to-scholar academic dialogue and interchange that would result from educational exchange and
cooperation would serve as a bridge between the two cultures and could create myriad opportunities
for the development of important scholarship of benefit to academics and students, issue advocates,
and policymakers. The research produced by these cooperative ventures would likely serve to clarify
important policy issues of interest to both countries, furthering mutual understanding, thereby serving
to enhance prospects for bilateral relations. The analysis revealed no identifiable downsides for U.S.
foreign policy in the development of educational exchange; in fact, the evidence suggests that our policy
objectives in the region can only be strengthened by greater understanding of those issues that jointly
affect the U.S. and Cuba.
Nongovernmental engagement solves
Nongovernmental engagement solves better – it raises living standards and decreases
governmental legitimacy
Purcell, 8 – Ph.D. Director at Center for Hemispheric Policy University of Miami (Susan, “CUBA'S
FUTURE”, Congressional Testimony, March 5, 2008, lexis)//eek
If, on the other hand, the Raul Castro government were to begin to take significant steps in the direction
of a political and economic opening, and the next U.S. president and/or Congress wanted to respond
positively to such reforms by increasing U.S. engagement with Cuba, I believe that any increased
engagement should be aimed toward leveling the playing field between the Cuban government and the
Cuban people. Stated differently, whatever money might enter Cuba as a result of increased U.S.
engagement should go overwhelmingly to the Cuban people rather than to the Cuban government.
For example, allowing increased U.S. tourism to Cuba would mainly benefit the Cuban government,
and particularly the military, which controls the tourist industry, as opposed to the Cuban people. In
contrast, engagement that allows Cuban-Americans to send more funds directly to their relatives in
Cuba would not only improve their living standards but, in the process, decrease their dependence on
the Cuban government. Obviously, these remittances would ultimately find their way into government
coffers, but at least they would first improve the living standards of Cuban citizens and while making
them less dependent on the government.
Allowing NGO’s and people to transfer money to Cuba solves democratization and the
economy – it allows information and money to flow into Cuba
Pascual et. Al. 9 – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy at Brookings (Carlos, Vicki
Huddleston, Gustavo Arnavat, Ann Bardach, Ramon Colas, Jorge Dominguez, Daniel Erikson, Mark
Falcoff, Damian Fernandez, Andy Gomez, Jesus Gracia, Paul Hare, Francisco Hernandez, William
LeoGrande, Marifeli Perez-Stable, Jorge Pinon, Archibald Ritter, Andres Rozental, Carlos Saladrigas,
“CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, Brookings, April 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)//eek
The U.S. government should act to enhance the flow of resources to the Cuban people, it should
license U.S. non-governmental organizations and private individuals to transfer funds to individuals
and civil society organizations in Cuba that work to foster a more open society. The United States
should also encourage the creation of multilateral funds that promote the same objective. Such
assistance should not be subject to an ideological test but rather be available to Cuban civic entities in
the form of microcredit for small businesses and for salaries of persons engaged by civil society to
provide community services, among others. Although the U.S. government currently manages an
assistance program for Cuba, it is limited by sanctions regulations and is narrowly focused. Much of
the assistance—amounting principally to in-kind goods—is difficult to deliver due to the opposition of
the Cuban government either to the type of assistance or to the groups or individuals receiving it. in
order to better serve the needs of civil society in Cuba, the U.S. government should seek to obtain the
approval of the Cuban government for an assistance program that would provide financial and in-kind
assistance for activities that advance human rights and the rule of law, encourage microenterprise,
and promote educational, and professional exchanges.
AT: CP is the Squo / Obama reforms
Previous Obama travel reforms don’t go far enough
Burns, 9 – writer for the Associated Press (Robert, “Obama Lifting Cuba Travel Restrictions”,
Huffington Post, 04/13/09, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/13/some-cuba-travelrestrict_n_186197.html)//eek
WASHINGTON — In a measured break with a half-century of U.S. policy toward communist Cuba, the
Obama administration lifted restrictions Monday on Cuban-Americans who want to travel and send
money to their island homeland.
In a further gesture of openness, U.S. telecommunications firms were freed to seek business there, too.
But the broader U.S. trade embargo remained in place.
The White House portrayed its changes, which fulfilled one of President Barack Obama's campaign
promises, as a path to promoting personal freedom in one of the few remaining communist nations.
They also marked another major step away from the foreign policy priorities of the Bush administration.
But the moves fell far short of the more drastic policy adjustments that some _ including Republican
Sen. Richard Lugar _ have argued are required to promote U.S. interests in Latin America and to bring
about change in Cuba. For most Americans, Cuba remains the only country in the world their
government prohibits them from visiting _ a barrier to potential travelers as well as to the Cuban
tourist industry that would like to see them.
Cubans welcomed the changes but said more should be done.
"It's help that the people really need," Fermina Gonzalez, a 46-year-old housewife in the leafy Havana
neighborhood of Vedado, said of the ending of limits on money sent by Cuban-Americans. "Right now,
we have to work lots of jobs just to make ends meet."
But few Cubans expect Obama to end the trade embargo or allow American tourists to visit the island
without limits.
"He should do more and lift travel restrictions for all Americans," said Alberto Sal, a 68-year-old
retiree. "Until he does that, I don't think he's doing much."
Unconditional CP
1nc – unconditional
The United States federal government should lift the Cuban embargo without conditions.
Any step short of unconditional removal means Cuba says no – the embargo
empowers the regime and it has an incentive to reject conditional removal
Vivanco 6- LLM from Harvard Law School, Americas director of Humans Rights Watch
(Jose Miguel, “Restraint, not force, will bring change to Cuba”, humans rights watch, 12/22/06,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/12/21/restraint-not-force-will-bring-change-cuba, google
scholar)//KW
This reluctance would be understandable but misguided. Most Cubans do want change. If they do not
call for it after Mr Castro's death, it will be largely for the same reason they did not during his lifetime:
the country's repressive machinery, which ruined countless lives, remains intact today.
If the international community misreads this silence, it will miss a historic opportunity. Immediately
after Mr Castro's death, the Cuban government will be more vulnerable to pressure for change than
ever before. Raúl Castro, who has already taken over the reigns of power, may wield the same old
instruments of repression. But he will not enjoy his brother's revolutionary stature, which at times has
been as vital as the repression for perpetuating the regime. This window of opportunity is unlikely to
last. Raul Castro may never match his brother's unique combination of personal charisma and political
cunning; yet, he could easily acquire the other trait that Fidel exploited so effectively: the heroic image
of the Latin American David confronting the US Goliath.
Whether Raúl Castro can claim the "David" role will depend largely on Washington. He will be virtually
guaranteed the part if the Bush administration stays the 40–year course of unilateral embargo and
unconditional ultimatum. It is hard to think of a policy that has a longer track record of failure. Cuba is
no more open now than when the embargo was first imposed four decades ago. If anything, the policy
consolidated Mr Castro's hold by giving his government an excuse for its problems and a pretext for its
abuses. Moreover, because the policy was imposed in such heavy–handed fashion, it enabled Mr
Castro to garner sympathy abroad, neutralising international pressure rather than increasing it. While
other governments may have been concerned about political repression in Cuba, they were unwilling
to be seen as siding with a bully.
To its credit, the Bush administration responded to news of Mr Castro's decline in August with surprising
restraint, with President George W. Bush saying Cuba's citizens should determine their future. But if
Washington hopes for influence in Cuba, it must do much more. First, it will need to lift the embargo.
Nothing short of this will work , not even the "calibrated response" espoused by the Clinton
administration, in which the US would ease the embargo in response to Cuban reforms. Why would
the Cuban government make concessions when the embargo helps keep it in power?
Yet, it would be naïve to think the embargo's end would prompt the Cuban government to change its
ways. Instead, a more measured and multilateral approach is needed, in which other governments in
the region take the lead in pressing Cuba to respect political freedoms. Finding allies willing to assume
this role will not be easy. But it may be the only hope for real change. By making the effort, the US could
begin to reverse the dynamic that helped keep Mr Castro in power. Only when the US stops acting like
Goliath will Cuba stop looking like David.
2nc – conditions fail
Conditions fail – Cuba says no because the embargo benefits the regime
Reinsch, 3-President of the National Foreign Trade Council, A group of businesses advocating free trade
and Co-Chairman of USA*Engage, a coalition of businesses against sanctions (William, “Statement of
William A. Reinsch, President of the National Foreign Trade Council & Co-Chairman of USA*Engage
Before the Senate Committee on Finance”, USA*Engage, 9/4/03.
http://archives.usaengage.org/literature/2003/20030904%20testimony%20to%20Senate%20Finance.ht
ml)//TL
Our basic position is simple. We believe the forty-year old U.S. economic embargo of Cuba is one of the
most dramatic failures of modern U.S. foreign policy: the regime it intended to undermine is as solidly in
power as ever; its leader rules with unchallenged arbitrary brutality; and its people remain economically
deprived and politically dispossessed
Instead, the United States is far more likely to achieve its objectives in Cuba through a policy of
engagement with Cuban society than continuing to isolate Cuba. People to people programs,
educational and cultural exchanges, and commercial engagement all hold out the promise of influencing
the future course of events in Cuba.
In contrast, the main achievement of our embargo has been to provide Fidel Castro with a blanket
excuse for his government's failures. Having chosen not to engage Cuba, the U.S. has abdicated the
possibility of influencing its development. This has resulted in a perverse dynamic that perpetuates and
deepens the stalemate: each time there is a prospect of improved relations, the Cuban government
takes an action which they know will prevent any change in U.S. policy , and each time we have
reacted exactly as Castro wants by tightening the embargo or stopping movement toward engagement.
The regime will say no if the counterplan is conditional– they’ll lose face and be less
receptive to future changes
Holmes, 10– B.A. from Georgetown, Master’s Thesis (Michael G., June 21, 2010, “Seizing the Moment”,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?seque
nce=1, pg. 53-54)//NG
However Raul doesn’t actually have to lobby for the removal of the embargo, he simply has to not
provoke ire of the United States providing a reason for it to not remove the embargo. Raul Castro is
aware that Cuba cannot continue down the road it is currently on. The United States removing the
embargo unilaterally gives Raul the freedom to reap the benefits of its removal without offering any
type of reciprocal action, allowing him and the regime to save face. The tense history between the
United States and Cuba makes it necessary to provide a neutral means to initiate any change in policy.
By allowing Cuba to save face the United States extends an olive branch to Cuba. This may make Cuba
more receptive to future changes.
Conditional offers allow the regime to refuse and maintain the embargo–
unconditional repeal is crucial to restore American influence and foster regime change
Holmes, 10– B.A. from Georgetown, Master’s Thesis (Michael G., June 21, 2010, “Seizing the Moment”,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?seque
nce=1, pg. 60-63)//NG
Another area the war highlighted is the United States position as a diplomatic entity. There is a looming
cloud of skepticism and distrust of the United States shared by many emerging nations and even
some of its peer nations, and rightfully so. What was sold to the world as a mission to bring to justice
to the people responsible for killing thousands of innocent American citizens, has evolved into an
agenda that most U.S. officials and politicians have a hard time articulating. In short the United
States’ reputation is tarnished. If the United States is ever to regain the esteem it once held, it must
address the state of its global image.
The United States has a unique opportunity to address the issue of alternative fuel and repair its
damaged image by altering its current policies toward Cuba. Cuba, as a policy issue, has likely been off
the foreign policy radar for quite sometime. However the history between Cuba and the United States
encompasses many of the issues affecting foreign policy concerns today.
It goes without saying that the U.S. will have to take the lead in order to accomplish this new
movement. The embargo and all of the successive legislation aimed at toppling the Castro regime, even
if created out of provocation, has exacerbated the situation in Cuba. The Castro regime has been able
to exploit the existence of the embargo to legitimize the relevancy of its rule.
There is no incentive for Raul Castro to seek change. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton recently
acknowledged this fact. The Castro regime’s reluctance to relinquish its embrace of the embargo has
been highlighted in the numerous quid-pro-quo approaches that have failed in the past.
President George W. Bush’s 2002 Initiative for a New Cuba is an example of the failure of this type
approach. The President proclaimed that the purpose of the initiative was to “accelerate freedom’s
progress in Cuba in everyway possible.” In his speech given on the centennial of Cuba’s independence
President Bush stated that all the things Cuba and its people need; good jobs, free trade, open
investment, an improved standard of living, a stable currency and a plethora of other social remedies,
could all be obtained if the Castro regime would adhere to the United States calls for democratic
reforms. Eight months later in January 2003, the Cuban National Assembly essentially laughed in the
face of President Bush and the U.S. government by electing regime approved candidates to each of
the 609 available seats.3
As stated previously, the sanctions imposed by the United States caused Cuba severe economic
hardship. This hardship was later exacerbated with the fall of the Soviet Union, which had provided
subsidies to the country after the U.S. cut ties. Any attempt to remedy Cuba's economic situation can
only perceived as a good faith effort. Americans and the global public alike can only interpret
removing the embargo sans conditions, as the United States government acting for the greater good.
Condition CP mechanisms
Condition on renouncing terror
Removal from the terrorist list should be explicitly conditioned on Cuba renouncing
support for terrorism – key to US credibility in the war on terror
Cárdenas 2013- senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, M.A.
from Georgetown University
(José R. , “The Cuba terrorism two-step”, foreign policy, 2/25/13,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/25/the_cuba_terrorism_two_step)//KW
Floating policy trial balloons is longstanding Washington custom. Not so common is when that balloon
gets blasted out of the sky by the "senior official" leaker's own administration. That's what happened
last week when the Boston Globe reported that, "High-level U.S. diplomats have concluded that Cuba
should no longer be designated a state sponsor of terrorism."
Yet the ink was barely dry on that report before both the White House and State Department utterly
repudiated (here and here) any notion that Cuba would soon be de-listed as a state sponsor of
terrorism.
As I have written in this space before, de-listing Cuba has been a long-sought goal of a die-hard cadre
of critics of the United States' Cuba policy. Why? Well, it seems that the Castro regime, which was born
in terrorist violence, aided and abetted it across four continents over three decades, and whose
training camps produced such international luminaries as Carlos the Jackal, is upset that it continues to
be listed as a state-sponsor of terrorism. And, what's more, Washington policymakers ought to be
vexed by that, because it is an "obstacle" to normalized relations.
It turns out that the Globe report was simple mischief-making by some apparently inconsequential U.S.
official, clearly meant to provide succor to the de-listing campaign. As was noted deeper in the story,
"U.S. officials emphasized that there has not been a formal assessment concluding that Cuba should be
removed from the terrorism list and said serious obstacles remain to a better relationship, especially the
imprisonment of [development worker Alan] Gross."
Still, since the subject has been raised, it's worthwhile to examine just what it has taken for other
countries to be removed from the state sponsors list. In 2007, Libya was de-listed after Muammar alQaddafi terminated his WMD program and renounced terrorism by severing ties with radical groups,
closing training camps, and extraditing terrorism suspects. He also accepted responsibility for the Pan
Am 103 bombing and paid compensation to the victims.
In 2008, in a controversial decision, the Bush administration de-listed North Korea for progress that was
being made on ending the country's nuclear program.
Clearly, removal from the list usually follows some pro-active, game-changing actions by a country.
What pro-active measures has Cuba ever adopted? The answer is none. Just being too broke to
support terrorism anymore hardly merits any action on the U.S. part.
Moreover, according to the law, before de-listing, an administration must not only certify to Congress
that a country has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month
period, but that it has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the
future.
In Cuba's case, even if relevant U.S. agencies can conclude that the Castro regime has not provided
material support for a terrorist act in the last six months -- that is, apart from its terrorizing of its own
people, which continues apace -- where is the regime's public renouncement of its past support for
international terrorism and assurance that it will not support any acts in the future?
Is even that too much to demand? Of course, it is. The Castro regime will not issue any such statement
because it doesn't believe it has done anything wrong since 1959. They maintain that they are the
victims of U.S. policy and are deserving of all the concessions, without any quid pro quo. The regime
can no more renounce terrorism than renounce their totalitarian state -- and that is why they belong
on the terrorism list until they give the U.S. government a real reason to be taken off.
Condition on compensation
New trade should be conditioned on compensating victims of expropriation
Perales, 10 – senior program associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center (Jose, “The United States and
Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship”, August,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf)
The legal ramifications of doing business with Cuban firms can hamper a deepening of the U.S.Cuban economic relationship, not to mention all forms of foreign direct investment, warned
Ignacio Sánchez, a partner at DLA Piper. Since the vast majority of the island’s current businesses were
formed as the result of uncompensated confiscation following the Cuban Revolution, the victims of
expropriation—most of whom are now U.S. citizens—must be compensated before any advances in
U.S. investment in the island. Failure to do so while investing in
Cuban firms will result in adverse legal rulings; since World War II the legal concept of no confiscation
without compensation has prevailed throughout the world. Sánchez explained that although Cuba may
not recognize these claims, the U.S. government does and this can result in protracted litigation,
especially against any foreign entities involved with the confiscated properties.
Such legal ramifications do not only stem from foreign direct investment. If and when Cuban firms start
exporting goods to the United States, the same issues will arise. For instance, where will proceeds of
Cuban rum sales go, to Cuban rum firms or to the Bacardi or Arechabala families? The same goes for
cigars and sugar. There are 5,911 U.S. citizens with claims totaling USD $1.8 billion (in 1960 dollars)
resulting from property that was confiscated from them in 1960; it would be an understatement to say
that the value of these claims has increased significantly in the ensuing 50 years. In Sánchez’s view, any
discussion of post-transition Cuba needs to address these issues.
AT: Permutations for Conditions
The aff fails and gives away a key bargaining chip for Cuban democracy
Suchlicki, 7-Professor History and Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, at the
University of Miami (Jaime, “Implications of Lifting the U.S. Embargo and Travel Ban of Cuba”, Institute
for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, 12/11/07,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/website_documents/SenateTestimony.pdf)//TL
Final considerations:
• The embargo is not the cause of Cuba’s economic misery... A failed economic system, similar to what
existed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and lack of productivity and incentives is what is stifling
the Cuban economy.
• American tourists will not bring democracy to Cuba. Over the past decades hundred of thousands of
Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic
today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been
strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars.
• Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic
contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism
and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted by Castro.
• The embargo and the travel ban should be retained as a negotiating tool with a future regime to
accelerate change in the island. If it’s given away without meaningful concessions in return, what is the
U.S. left with to influence developments in Cuba.
• The travel ban and the embargo should be retained until there is a regime in Cuba willing to provide
irreversible concessions in the areas of human rights, democratization and market economics. Providing
the Castro brothers unilateral concessions without major changes in the island is a gift they don’t
deserve and have not earned.
Loosening the embargo will be effectively irreversible – the permutation eliminates all
U.S. leverage over Cuban economic reforms
Purcell, 8 – Ph.D. Director at Center for Hemispheric Policy University of Miami (Susan, “CUBA'S
FUTURE”, Congressional Testimony, March 5, 2008, lexis)//eek
It also would be a mistake for the United States to lift the embargo unilaterally or as a first step in
response to reforms that Cuba might make in the direction of free and fair elections and a market
economy. Such Cuban reforms are reversible; a lifting of the embargo would not be. Whether or not
one supports the embargo, it can be a useful bargaining chip for promoting reform on the island. It is
true that the United States is no longer the only or even the principal game in town. Venezuela provides
about $2 billion in aid, particularly oil, each year to Cuba. The Chinese and Brazilians are providing
significant credits. Mexico is also moving toward increased economic involvement with Cuba.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Cuba does not need or want access to the U.S. market, or to loans
from international economic institutions where the U.S. has veto power. Despite reduced U.S.
economic leverage over Cuba, the benefits of refraining from a premature lifting of the embargo
exceed the costs. The argument that the United States is "losing out" to other countries that are free
to invest in, and trade with, Cuba is the same argument that was made in the initial phases of
Vietnam's economic opening. If Vietnam is any indication of what could happen in the Cuban case, the
absence of U.S. companies in the Cuban market in the early days of a Cuban economic opening would
not greatly affect the ability of U.S. companies to gain market share quickly once Cuba significantly
implemented market reforms.
The embargo is key to foreign policy negotiation leverage
Carbonell 9 – International public affairs consultant for Foreign Policy and author of And the Russians
Stayed: The Sovietization of Cuba and Luces y Sombras de Cuba (Nestor, “Think Again: Engaging Cuba,”
4/10/9, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/04/09/think_again_engaging_cuba)//SJF
Depends. Some would say the embargo hasn't worked because Cuba's totalitarian regime remains in power. But it's also exhausted and
weaker. The
regime today faces disgruntled apparatchiks, cracks within its system, a critical economic
and financial situation, and growing restlessness and dissent among the population.
The embargo is the only leverage the United States has to ensure a democratic transition, if not under the Castro
brothers, then with their successors. Why give up something for nothing? The European Union did that by unilaterally lifting its diplomatic
sanctions against the Cuban regime, but Europe's hopes for human rights improvements have so far been in vain. Despite striking out yet again
during his trip to Havana last month, European commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, Louis Michel, said that Cuba-EU relations
may go very far. He also hailed the importance of boosting collaboration between both sides. All this while more than 300 Cuban political
prisoners remain behind bars under brutal conditions.
Cuba today is virtually bankrupt, with a huge external debt it is unable to serve or repay. According to the
Paris Club group of creditors, Cuba owes close to $30 billion to its trading partners -- the second-highest level of indebtedness reported by the
group. Given the sharp decline in oil prices, it is unlikely that Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez will be able to maintain the current level of
subsidies and other financial assistance granted to Cuba (to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars annually).
Under these circumstances, the
Castro regime has embarked on a charm offensive with a single objective in
mind: a U.S. bailout. The regime is looking to Uncle Sam for additional dollars via American tourists, plus commercial lines of credit and
access to international banks and monetary funds for the renegotiation or cancellation of its external debt. That is leverage the
United States could guardedly use -- not to provide life support to a battered tyranny, but to secure
meaningful changes that will hasten the democratization of Cuba.