Advanced Topics in Social Institutions
PS 716
Geoffrey Brennan
( Geoffrey.Brennan@anu.edu.au )
and
Michael Munger
(Michael.Munger@duke.edu)
Spring 2013
Social Sciences 109
10:05 am – 12:20 pm
(Draft: Revisions to be made after first class meeting and discussion!)
Philosophy and Approach:
The idea underlying this course is that basic principles of analysis developed with particular
problems and settings in mind can often be better understood by seeing those principles in action
outside the original contexts. “Institutional analysis” largely developed out of the application of
techniques used in the analysis of the ‘market order’ to the analysis of democratic political processes. In
this course, we want to extend such applications to the analysis of the “institutions of civil society” – ie
to non-market, non-political institutions. We have in mind arenas like: the law; academia; sport; the
arts; religion – and the organizations that go with them: courts; universities; the NCAA (for example);
the French academy (for example); the church(es). We want to take these arenas and their institutional
structures as objects of interest in their own right. But we also want to test out how well (or badly) the
standard methods of analysis we use in relation to political institutions perform in illuminating the
analysis of institutions in these alternative settings. The thought is that foregrounding these less
common social institutions there might be some insight gained for the study of markets and politics –
lending a broader range of considerations to, and hence greater nuance in, our treatment of these more
familiar sites.
This course has a matrix structure. The rows deal with the analytic tools that are to be mobilized in
institutional analysis – and the columns with different arenas within which those tools can be animated
and applied to human social organization. So, for the rows we have incentives, selection devices,
norms—and pieces of motivational apparatus that might serve to support them such as esteem,
publicity, and shame. And for columns we will focus not (primarily) on markets and politics but rather
on institutions of civil society – academia, the arts, sport, religious worship, and the law.
1. Principles of Institutional Analysis
Issues of definition
Explanans vs explanandum
Institutional design vs ‘spontaneous order’
2. Mechanics of Institutional Effects
a. Incentives
b. Selection
c. Second level incentives and signaling
d. Endogenous preferences
e. Organizational structure
3. Esteem and esteem incentives
4. Behavioral Constitutionalism
5. Specific Institutions:
a. Markets
b. Electoral politics
c. The Law
d. Religious rites and worship
e. The arts
f. Sport
g. Academia
Mechanism
incentives
selection
Esteem
effects
Organizational
structure
market
politics
Firms
Unions?
parties
Institution
law
academia
Courts,
police
universities
arts
religion
sport
salon
church
NCAA
Olympic
Committee
Outline, Schedule, and Readings (Subject to Change)
(Please read selections before the assigned class!)
A. Institutions
1. January 9: What institutions are (and aren’t!)
a. Buchanan and Tullock. 1965. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press.
Chapter 5 (link), Chapter 6 (link)
b. Danto, Arthur (1964). "The Artworld." Journal of Philosophy 61 (19): 571–584. (link)
c. Mackie, 1996. “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation,” American Sociological Review.
61: 999-1017. (link)
d. Munger, Michael. 2010. "Endless Forms Most Beautiful and Most Wonderful.” Public
Choice, volume 43: 263-268. (Introduction to edited volume on the contributions of
Elinor Ostrom on the occasion of her Nobel Prize). (Sakai resource)
e. Myerson, Roger. 2004. "Justice, institutions, and multiple equilibria," Chicago Journal
of International Law. 5: 91-107. (link)
f. North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) “A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded
Human History” NBER (link)
g. Ringel, Gail. 1979. “The Kawkiutl Potlatch: History, Economics, and Symbols.”
Ethnohistory. 26(4): 347-362. (link)
2. January 14: Explaining Institutions
a. Demsetz (1967) “Towards a theory of Property Rights” American Economic Review.
(Sakai resource)
b. Grief, Avner. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition.” American Economic Review, 83(3): 525-548. (link)
c. Hodgson, Geoffrey. 2002. “The Evolution of Institutions,” Constitutional Political
Economy. (13): 111– 127. (Sakai resource)
d. Kreps, David. 1990. “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” Alt and Shepsle, eds.,
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press. (Sakai reading)
e. Shepsle, K (2005) “Rational Choice Institutionalism” (unpublished manuscript) (link)
3. January 21: No class, MLK Day
B. Methods
1. January 28: Incentives
a. Paul Gans “The Great Stirrup Controversy” [Medieval Technology Pages]
b. Brennan and Tullock (1980) “An Economic Theory of Military Tactics” JEBO
c. Brennan and Lomasky (1993) Democracy and Decision Cambridge University Press ch 2
d. Grant (2011) Strings Attached Princeton University Press ch 1
2. February 4: Selection and the Currency of Reward
a. Besley (2006) Principled Agents Oxford University Press ch 3
b. Guth and Kliemt (1994) “Competition or Cooperation” Metroeconomica
c. Brennan in Goodin (1998) The Theory of Institutional Design Oxford University Press ch
10
d. Kurt Gabel (edited by Mitchell): The Making of a Paratrooper, chapters 2-5
3. February 11: Currency of Reward
a. Brennan and Pettit (2004) The Economy of Esteem Oxford University Press chapters 1-5
4. February 18: Behavioral Constitutionalism
a. Brennan and Buchanan. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy.
(Link)
b. Brennan and Hamlin (2006) “Constitutions as Expressive Documents” in Weingast and
Wittman (eds) Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
c. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) Nudge
C. Case Studies:
1. February 25: Academia
a. Tullock The Logic of Enquiry
b. Buchanan and Develotoglou Academia in Anarchy
c. Goldman and Shaked “An Economic Theory of Scientific Activity and Truth Acquisition”
Philosophical Studies (1991)
2. March 4: Religion
a. Tollison and Bob Ekelund J Law and Econ (1989)
b. Lehman “Rational Choice and the Sociology of Religion” Handbook of the Sociology of
Religion
c. R. Heiner, “The Origin of Predictable Behavior,” American Economic Review, 1983. (Link)
d. Innaccone et al “The Economics of Religion” Faith and Economics (2005)
e. Condon, Daniel. “The ‘Price’ of Religious Participation: An Economic Model of
Contributions.” J of Applied Business & Economics
March 11: No class, Spring break!
3. March 18: Beyond Markets and States: CPR
a. McKean, Margaret. 1982 "The Japanese Experience with Scarcity: management of
traditional common lands." Enviornmental Review 6(2): 63-88.
b. Ostrom, Elinor. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. University of
Michigan Press.
c. Ostrom, Elinor. 2009. Nobel Prize Lecture: “Beyond Markets and States.” (link)
4. March 25: The Law
a. T. Tyler Why Do People Obey the Law?
b. S. Pahis (2009) “Corruption in our Courts” Yale Law Journal
c. R. McAdams (2009) “Political Economy of Criminal law and Procedure”
d. G. Tullock Trials on Trial
e. Landes and Posner “legal Precedent” (1976)
f. Landes and Posner “Rational Judicial Behaviour” J Legal Studies
g. Klein and Morrisroe (1999) “Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges” J Legal Stud
h. Spence and Cross (2000/2001) “A Public Choice case for the Administrative State”
Georgetown Law Journal
i. Cross (1997) Political Science and the New Legal Realism” Northwestern University Law
Review
5. April 1: Arts
a. De Marchi and Greene (2005) “Adam Smith and Private Provision of the Arts” HOPE
b. De Marchi and Van Miegroot (2006?) “Rules versus Play in early modern art markets”
Louvain Economic Papers
6. April 8:
a.
b.
c.
Sport
Linc Allison The Politics of Sport
Taylor Branch Atlantic Monthly
Ostrom et al Rules, Games and Common Property Resources
7. April 15: Exchange in anarchic settings
a. Radford (1945) On the Economics of a POW Camp, Economica
b. Skarbek (2011) Governance and Prison Gangs, American Political Science Review 105(4)
2011: 702-716.
c. Leeson, (2009) The Invisible Hook, Princeton.
D. Overview:
1. April 22: What have we learned?