U.S. Supreme Court
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE v. REID, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
490 U.S. 730
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE ET AL. v. REID
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 88-293.
Argued March 29, 1989
Decided June 5, 1989
In the fall of 1985, petitioners - the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a
Washington, D.C., organization dedicated to eliminating homelessness, and one of its trustees
- entered into an oral agreement with respondent Reid, a sculptor, to produce a statue
dramatizing the plight of the homeless for display at a 1985 Christmas pageant in
Washington. While Reid worked on the statue in his Baltimore, Md., studio, CCNV members
visited him on a number of occasions to check on his progress and to coordinate CCNV's
construction of the sculpture's base in accordance with the parties' agreement. Reid accepted
most of CCNV's suggestions and directions as to the sculpture's configuration and
appearance. After the completed work was delivered to Washington, CCNV paid Reid the
final installment of the agreed-upon price, joined the sculpture to its base, and displayed it.
The parties, who had never discussed copyright in the sculpture, then filed competing
copyright registration certificates. The District Court ruled for CCNV in its subsequent suit
seeking, inter alia, a determination of copyright ownership, holding that the statue was a
"work made for hire" as defined in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101, and was
therefore owned exclusively by CCNV under 201(b), which vests copyright ownership of
works for hire in the employer or other person for whom the work is prepared, unless there is
a written agreement to the contrary. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sculpture
was not a "work made for hire" under the first subsection of the 101 definition (hereinafter
101(1)), since it was not "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment" in light of Reid's status as an independent contractor under agency law. The
court also ruled that the statue did not satisfy the second subsection of the 101 definition
(hereinafter 101(2)), since sculpture is not one of the nine categories of "specially ordered or
commissioned" works enumerated therein, and the parties had not agreed in writing that the
sculpture would be a work for hire. However, the court remanded for a determination whether
the statue was jointly authored by CCNV and Reid, such that they were co-owners of the
copyright under 201(a). [490 U.S. 730, 731]
Held:
1. To determine whether a work is a "work made for hire" within the 101 definition, a
court should first apply general common law of agency principles to ascertain whether the
work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor, and, depending upon the
outcome, should then apply either 101(1) or 101(2). Although the Act nowhere defines
"employee," "employment," or related terms, it must be inferred that Congress meant them in
their settled, common-law sense, since nothing in the text of the work for hire provisions
indicates that those terms are used to describe anything other than the conventional relation of
employer and employee. On the contrary, Congress' intent to incorporate agency law
definitions is suggested by 101(1)'s use of the term "scope of employment," a widely used
agency law term of art. Moreover, the general common law of agency must be relied on,
rather than the law of any particular State, since the Act is expressly intended to create a
federal law of uniform, nationwide application by broadly pre-empting state statutory and
common-law copyright regulation. Petitioners' argument that a work is "prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment" whenever the hiring party retains the
right to control, or actually controls, the work is inconsistent with the language and legislative
history of the work for hire provisions, and would distort the provisions' structure, which
views works by employees and commissioned works by independent contractors as mutually
exclusive entities. Pp. 737-751.
2. The sculpture in question is not a "work made for hire" within the meaning of 101.
Reid was an independent contractor rather than a 101(1) "employee" since, although CCNV
members directed enough of the work to ensure that the statue met their specifications, all
other relevant circumstances weigh heavily against finding an employment relationship. Reid
engages in a skilled occupation; supplied his own tools; worked in Baltimore without daily
supervision from Washington; was retained for a relatively short period of time; had absolute
freedom to decide when and how long to work in order to meet his deadline; and had total
discretion in hiring and paying assistants. Moreover, CCNV had no right to assign additional
projects to Reid; paid him in a manner in which independent contractors are often
compensated; did not engage regularly in the business of creating sculpture or, in fact, in any
business; and did not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or
contribute to unemployment insurance or workers' compensation funds. Furthermore, as
petitioners concede, the work in question does not satisfy the terms of 101(2). Pp. 751-753.
3. However, CCNV nevertheless may be a joint author of the sculpture and, thus, a coowner of the copyright under 201(a), if, on remand, [490 U.S. 730, 732] the District Court
determines that the parties prepared the work with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. P. 753.
JOHN CARTER, JOHN SWING and JOHN VERONIS,
Plaintiffs-Counter-Claim-DefendantsAppellees-Cross-Appellants ,
v.
HELMSLEY-SPEAR, INC. and 474431 ASSOCIATES,
Defendants, owner and managing agent of a building, appeal from an order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Edelstein, J.) enjoining them
from modifying, destroying, and removing a work of visual art incorporated into the building
by plaintiffs, artists commissioned by a former tenant to install the work, and dismissing
defendants' counterclaim for waste. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the dismissal of their claim for
tortious interference with contractual relations and denial of their requests to complete the
work and for attorney's fees and costs.
Reversed and vacated, in part, affirmed, in part.
CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge :
Defendants 474431 Associates and Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (defendants or
appellants), as the owner and managing agent respectively, of a commercial
building in Queens, New York, appeal from an order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Edelstein, J.),
entered on September 6, 1994 following a bench trial. The order granted
plaintiffs, who are three artists, a permanent injunction that enjoined
defendants from removing, modifying or destroying a work of visual art that
had been installed in defendants' building by plaintiffs-artists
commissioned by a former tenant to install the work. See Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Defendants also
appeal from the dismissal by the trial court of their counterclaim for
waste. Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the dismissal of their cause of action
for tortious interference with contractual relations and from the denial of
their requests to complete the work and for an award of attorney's fees and
costs.
On this appeal we deal with an Act of Congress that protects the rights of
artists to preserve their works. One of America's most insightful thinkers
observed that a country is not truly civilized "where the arts, such as
they have, are all imported, having no indigenous life." 7 Works of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Society and Solitude, Chapt. II Civilization 34 (AMS. ed.
1968). From such reflection it follows that American artists are to be
encouraged by laws that protect their works. Although Congress in the
statute before us did just that, it did not mandate the preservation of art
at all costs and without due regard for the rights of others.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse and vacate the grant of injunctive
relief to plaintiffs and affirm the dismissal by the district court of
plaintiffs' other claims and its dismissal of defendants' counterclaim for
waste.
BAKER v. SELDEN, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States
Charles Selden, the testator of the complainant in this case, in the year 1859 took the
requisite steps for obtaining the copyright [101 U.S. 99, 100] of a book, entitled 'Selden's
Condensed Ledger, or Book-keeping Simplified,' the object of which was to exhibit and
explain a peculiar system of book- keeping. In 1860 and 1861, he took the copyright of
several other books, containing additions to and improvements upon the said system. The bill
of complaint was filed against the defendant, Baker, for an alleged infringement of these
copyrights. The latter, in his answer, denied that Selden was the author or designer of the
books, and denied the infringement charged, and contends on the argument that the matter
alleged to be infringed is not a lawful subject of copyright.
Recurring to the case before us, we observe that Charles Selden, by his books, explained and
described a peculiar system of book-keeping, and illustrated his method by means of ruled
lines and blank columns, with proper headings on a page, or on successive pages. Now,
whilst no one has a right to print or publish his book, or any material part thereof, as a book
intended to convey instruction in the art, any person may practise and use the art itself which
he has described and illustrated therein. The use of the art is a totally different thing from a
publication of the book explaining it. The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure
the exclusive right to make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in
such book. Whether the art might or might not have been patented, is a question which is not
before us. It was not patented, and is open and free to the use of the public. And, of course, in
using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must necessarily be used as incident to
it.
Another case, that of Page v. Wisden (20 L. T. N. S. 435), which came before ViceChancellor Malins in 1869, has some resemblance to the present. There a copyright was
claimed in a cricket scoring-shett, and the Vice- Chancellor held that it was not a fit subject
for copyright, partly because it was not new, but also because 'to say that a particular [101 U.S.
99, 107] mode of ruling a book constituted an object for a copyright is absurd.'
These cases, if not precisely in point, come near to the matter in hand, and, in our view,
corroborate the general proposition which we have laid down.
In Drury v. Ewing (1 Bond, 540), which is much relied on by the complainant, a copyright
was claimed in a chart of patterns for cutting dresses and basques for ladies, and coats,
jackets, &c., for boys. It is obvious that such designs could only be printed and published for
information, and not for use in themselves. Their practical use could only be exemplified in
cloth on the tailor's board and under his shears; in other words, by the application of a
mechanical operation to the cutting of cloth in certain patterns and forms. Surely the
exclusive right to this practical use was not reserved to the publisher by his copyright of the
chart. Without undertaking to say whether we should or should not concur in the decision in
that case, we think it cannot control the present.
The conclusion to which we have come is, that blank account-books are not the subject of
copyright; and that the mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer upon him the
exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled and arranged as designated by him and
described and illustrated in said book.
The decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to
dismiss the complainant's bill; and it is
So ordered
SATAVA v. LOWRY, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003)
Plaintiff Richard Satava is a glass artist from California. In the late 1980s, Satava was
inspired by the jellyfish display at an aquarium. He began experimenting with jellyfish
sculptures in the glass-in-glass medium and, in 1990, began selling glass-in-glass jellyfish
sculptures. The sculptures sold well, and Satava made more of them. By 2002, Satava was
designing and creating about three hundred jellyfish sculptures each month. Satava’s
sculptures are sold in galleries and gift shops in forty states, and they sell for hundreds or
thousands of dollars, depending on size. Satava has registered several of his works with the
Register of Copyrights.
During the 1990s, defendant Christopher Lowry, a glass artist from Hawaii, also began
making glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures. Lowry’s sculptures look like Satava’s, and many
people confuse them:
We do not mean to suggest that Satava has added nothing copyrightable to his jellyfish
sculptures. He has made some copyrightable contributions: the distinctive curls of particular
tendrils; the arrangement of certain hues; the unique shape of jellyfishes’ bells. To the extent
that these and other artistic choices were not governed by jellyfish physiology or the glass-inglass medium, they are original elements that Satava theoretically may protect through
copyright law. Satava’s copyright on these original elements (or their combination) is “thin,”
however, comprising no more than his original contribution to ideas already in the public
domain. Stated another way, Satava may prevent others from copying the original features he
contributed, but he may not prevent others from copying elements of expression that nature
displays for all observers, or that the glass-in-glass medium suggests to all sculptors. Satava
possesses a thin copyright that protects against only virtually identical copying. See EtsHokin, ___ F.3d at ___ (9th Cir. 2003) (“When we apply the limiting doctrines, subtracting
the unoriginal elements, Ets-Hokin is left with . . . a ‘thin’ copyright, which protects against
only virtually identical copying.”); Apple, 35 F.3d at 1439 (“When the range of protectable
expression is narrow, the appropriate standard for illicit copying is virtual identity.”).
[20] We do not hold that realistic depictions of live animals cannot be protected by copyright.
In fact, we have held to the contrary. See Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 657 F.2d
1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981). We recognize, however, that the scope of copyright protection in
such works is narrow. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741
(9th Cir. 1971) (“Any inference of copying based upon similar appearance lost much of its
strength because both [works] were lifelike representations of a natural creature.”). Nature
gives us ideas of animals in their natural surroundings: an eagle with talons extended to
snatch a mouse; a grizzly bear clutching a salmon between its teeth; a butterfly emerging
from its cocoon; a wolf howling at the full moon; a jelly-fish swimming through tropical
waters. These ideas, first expressed by nature, are the common heritage of humankind, and no
artist may use copyright law to prevent others from depicting them.
[21] An artist may, however, protect the original expression he or she contributes to these
ideas. An artist may vary the pose, attitude, gesture, muscle structure, facial expression, coat,
or texture of animal. An artist may vary the background, lighting, or perspective. Such
variations, if original, may earn copyright protection. Because Satava’s jellyfish sculptures
contain few variations of this type, the scope of his copyright is narrow.
[22] We do not mean to short-change the legitimate need of creative artists to protect their
original works. After all, copyright law achieves its high purpose of enriching our culture by
giving artists a financial incentive to create. But we must be careful in copyright cases not to
cheat the public domain. Only by vigorously policing the line between idea and expression
can we ensure both that artists receive due reward for their original creations and that proper
latitude is granted other artists to make use of ideas that properly belong to us all.
[23] REVERSED.
MAZER ET AL., DOING BUSINESS AS JUNE LAMP MANUFACTURING CO., v.
STEIN ET AL., DOING BUSINESS AS REGLOR OF CALIFORNIA
No. 228
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners manufacturers and sellers of lamps sought review
of a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, concluding that
respondents held a valid copyright in statuettes it copyrighted as works of art and,
subsequently, used as bases for table lamps it manufactured and sold.
OVERVIEW: Petitioners manufacturers and sellers of lamps sought review of a judgment of
the lower court, concluding that respondents held a valid copyright in statuettes it copyrighted
as works of art and used as bases for table lamps it manufactured and sold. The court
affirmed and held that subsequent use of copyrighted work of art in the manufacturing of
lamps did not affect respondent's right to be protected against infringement of the work of art
itself. Legislative history of the copyright act and the practice of the copyright agency
showed that works of art and reproductions of works of art were intended by Congress to
include the authority to copyright respondent's statuettes. The statuettes were original
tangible expression of author's ideas. The court further held that the reproduction of statuettes
as lamps did not bar or invalidate the statuettes registration. Nothing in copyright statute
supported argument that intended use of an article barred or invalidated registration. The
court also held that use of work of art as an element in a manufactured article was not a
misuse of the copyright.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed and held that copyright was valid because statuettes were
original expressions of author's ideas and subsequent use of statuettes as lamps did not
invalidate registration. Copyright statute did not declare use of statuette in a manufactured
article as a misuse of copyright; thus, copyright was valid and protected respondent's right to
be protected against infringement of the statuettes.
SYLLABUS:
Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of electric lamps. One of the
respondents created original works of sculpture, from the models of which china statuettes
were made. The statuettes were used as bases for fully equipped electric lamps, which
respondents sold. Respondents submitted the statuettes, without any lamp components added,
for registration under the copyright law as "works of art" or reproductions thereof. Held: The
statuettes were copyrightable. Pp. 202-219.
(a) The successive Copyright Acts, the legislative history of the 1909 Act, and the practice of
the Copyright Office show that "works of art" and "reproductions of works of art" were
intended by Congress to include the authority [***2] to copyright such statuettes. Pp. 208214.
(b) That the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, may be patentable does not bar their
copyright as works of art. Pp. 215-217.
(c) The intended or actual use in industry of an article eligible for copyright does not bar or
invalidate its registration. P. 218.
(d) The subsequent registration of a work of art published as an element in a manufactured
article is not a misuse of the copyright. Pp. 218-219.
FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. RURAL TELEPHONE
SERVICE CO., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and
WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the judgment.
[p*342] JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
[1] This case requires us to clarify the extent of copyright protection available to telephone
directory white pages.
I
[2] Rural Telephone Service Company is a certified public utility that provides telephone
service to several communities in northwest Kansas. It is subject to a state regulation that
requires all telephone companies operating in Kansas to issue annually an updated telephone
directory. Accordingly, as a condition of its monopoly franchise, Rural publishes a typical
telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages. The white pages list in
alphabetical order the names of Rural's subscribers, together with their towns and telephone
numbers. The yellow pages list Rural's business subscribers alphabetically by category and
feature classified advertisements of various sizes. Rural distributes its directory free of charge
to its subscribers, but earns revenue by selling yellow pages advertisements.
[3] Feist Publications, Inc., is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone
directories. Unlike a typical [p*343] directory, which covers only a particular calling area,
Feist's area-wide directories cover a much larger geographical range, reducing the need to call
directory assistance or consult multiple directories. The Feist directory that is the subject of
this litigation covers 11 different telephone service areas in 15 counties and contains 46,878
white pages listings -- compared to Rural's approximately 7,700 listings. Like Rural's
directory, Feist's is distributed free of charge and includes both white pages and yellow
pages. Feist and Rural compete vigorously for yellow pages advertising.
[4] As the sole provider of telephone service in its service area, Rural obtains subscriber
information quite easily. Persons desiring telephone service must apply to Rural and provide
their names and addresses; Rural then assigns them a telephone number. Feist is not a
telephone company, let alone one with monopoly status, and therefore lacks independent
access to any subscriber information. To obtain white pages listings for its area-wide
directory, Feist approached each of the 11 telephone companies operating in northwest
Kansas and offered to pay for the right to use its white pages listings.
[5] Of the 11 telephone companies, only Rural refused to license its listings to Feist. Rural's
refusal created a problem for Feist, as omitting these listings would have left a gaping hole in
its area-wide directory, rendering it less attractive to potential yellow pages advertisers. In a
decision subsequent to that which we review here, the District Court determined that this was
precisely the reason Rural refused to license its listings. The refusal was motivated by an
unlawful purpose "to extend its monopoly in telephone service to a monopoly in yellow
pages advertising." Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610,
622 (Kan. 1990).
[6] Unable to license Rural's white pages listings, Feist used them without Rural's consent.
Feist began by removing several thousand listings that fell outside the geographic range of its
area-wide directory, then hired personnel to investigate the 4,935 that remained. These
employees verified [p*344] the data reported by Rural and sought to obtain additional
information. As a result, a typical Feist listing includes the individual's street address; most of
Rural's listings do not. Notwithstanding these additions, however, 1,309 of the 46,878 listings
in Feist's 1983 directory were identical to listings in Rural's 1982-1983 white pages. App. 54
(para. 15-16), 57. Four of these were fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its
directory to detect copying.
[7] Rural sued for copyright infringement in the District Court for the District of Kansas
taking the position that Feist, in compiling its own directory, could not use the information
contained in Rural's white pages. Rural asserted that Feist's employees were obliged to travel
door-to-door or conduct a telephone survey to discover the same information for themselves.
Feist responded that such efforts were economically impractical and, in any event,
unnecessary because the information copied was beyond the scope of copyright protection.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural, explaining that "courts have
consistently held that telephone directories are copyrightable" and citing a string of lower
court decisions. 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (1987). In an unpublished opinion, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed "for substantially the reasons given by the district
court." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a, judgt. order reported at 916 F. 2d 718 (1990). We granted
certiorari, 498 U.S. 808 (1990), to determine whether the copyright in Rural's directory
protects the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist.
II
A
[8] This case concerns the interaction of two well-established propositions. The first is that
facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are. Each of these
propositions possesses an impeccable pedigree. That there can be no valid copyright in facts
is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that [p*345] "no
author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). Rural wisely concedes this point, noting in its
brief that "facts and discoveries, of course, are not themselves subject to copyright
protection." Brief for Respondent 24. At the same time, however, it is beyond dispute that
compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright. Compilations were expressly
mentioned in the Copyright Act of 1909, and again in the Copyright Act of 1976.
Making matters worse, these courts developed a new theory to justify the protection of
factual compilations. Known alternatively as "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection,"
the underlying notion was that copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into
compiling facts. The classic formulation of the doctrine appeared in Jeweler's Circular
Publishing Co., 281 F., at 88:
"The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its preparation
does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected consist or not of matters
which are publici juris, or whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in
thought or in language, or anything more than industrious [p*353] collection. The man who
goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with
their occupations and their street number, acquires material of which he is the author"
(emphasis added).
Decisions of this Court applying the 1909 Act make clear that the statute did not permit the
"sweat of the brow" approach. The best example is International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). In that decision, the Court stated unambiguously that the 1909
Act conferred copyright protection only on those elements of a work that were original to the
author. Associated Press had conceded taking news reported by International News Service
and publishing it in its own newspapers. Recognizing that § 5 of the Act specifically
mentioned "periodicals, including newspapers," § 5(b), the Court acknowledged that news
articles were copyrightable. Id., at 234. It flatly rejected, however, the notion that the
copyright in an article extended to [p*354] the factual information it contained: "The news
element -- the information respecting current events contained in the literary production -- is
not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is
the history of the day." Ibid. [n1]
At first glance, the first requirement does not seem to tell us much. It merely describes what
one normally thinks of as a compilation -- a collection of pre-existing material, facts, or data.
What makes it significant is that it is not the sole requirement. It is not enough for copyright
purposes that an author collects and assembles facts. To satisfy the statutory definition, the
work must get over two additional hurdles. In this way, the plain language indicates that not
every collection of facts receives copyright protection. Otherwise, there would be a period
after "data."
[38] The third requirement is also illuminating. It emphasizes that a compilation, like any
other work, is copyrightable only if it satisfies the originality requirement ("an original work
of authorship"). Although § 102 states plainly that the originality requirement applies to all
works, the point was emphasized with regard to compilations to ensure that courts would not
repeat the mistake of the "sweat of the brow" courts by concluding that fact-based works are
treated differently and measured by some other standard. As Congress explained it, the goal
was to "make plain that the criteria of copyrightable subject matter stated in section 102 apply
with full force to works . . . containing preexisting material." H. R. Rep., at 57; S. Rep., at 55.
[39] The key to the statutory definition is the second requirement. It instructs courts that, in
determining whether a fact-based work is an original work of authorship, they should focus
on the manner in which the collected facts have been selected, coordinated, and arranged.
This is a straightforward application of the originality requirement. Facts are never original,
so the compilation author can claim originality, if at all, only in the way the facts are
presented. To that end, the statute dictates that the principal focus should be on whether the
selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit protection.
As § 103 makes clear, copyright is not a tool by which a compilation author may keep others
from using the facts or data he or she has collected. "The most important point here is one
that is commonly misunderstood today: copyright . . . has no effect one way or the other on
the copyright or public domain status of the preexisting material." H. R. Rep., at 57; S. Rep.,
at 55. The 1909 Act did not require, as "sweat of the brow" courts mistakenly assumed, that
each subsequent compiler must start from scratch and is precluded from relying on research
undertaken by another. See, e. g., Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co., 281 F., at 88-89. Rather,
the facts contained in existing works may be freely copied because copyright protects only
the elements that owe their origin to the compiler -- the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of facts.
We conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original
to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and
yellow pages directory. As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent
elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. Rural's white
pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall short of the
mark. As a statutory matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101 does not afford protection [p*364] from copying
to a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks
originality. Given that some works must fail, we cannot imagine a more likely candidate.
Indeed, were we to hold that Rural's white pages pass muster, it is hard to believe that any
collection of facts could fail.
[55] Because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings
cannot constitute infringement. This decision should not be construed as demeaning Rural's
efforts in compiling its directory, but rather as making clear that copyright rewards
originality, not effort. As this Court noted more than a century ago, "'great praise may be due
to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law does not
contemplate their being rewarded in this way.'" Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S., at 105. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
[56] Reversed.
BELLSOUTH ADVERTISING & PUBLISHING CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Counterclaim
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
DONNELLEY INFORMATION PUBLISHING, INC.
and The Reuben H. DONNELLEY Corp.,
In this appeal, we must decide whether acts of copying infringed the compilation copyright registered in a
"yellow pages" classified business directory. The parties have stipulated that the directory, which is a typical
yellow pages directory, qualifies for compilation copyright protection. Thus, we are called upon to apply Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991), which
addressed copyright protection for a "white pages" telephone directory, to resolve the infringement claims
presented to us concerning a directory of a different color.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether that which was copied by the alleged infringer was protected by the
registered claim of compilation copyright. The parties agree that the only elements of a work entitled to
compilation copyright protection are the selection, arrangement or coordination as they appear in the work as a
whole. The parties dispute what elements of a classified directory constitute such selection, arrangement or
coordination. Mindful that the protection afforded to a whole work by a compilation copyright is "thin," [FN1]
the determination as to whether an infringement of a compilation copyright has occurred is particularly difficult
where less than the entire work is copied.
BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corporation ("BAPCO") is a wholly owned subsidiary of BellSouth
Corporation ("BellSouth") created for the purpose of preparing, publishing and distributing telephone
directories. Using telephone listing information supplied by Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company
("Southern Bell"), another wholly owned subsidiary of BellSouth, BAPCO publishes a classified, "yellow
pages," advertising directory for the Greater Miami area. The BAPCO directory is organized into an
alphabetical list of business classifications. Each business-rate telephone service subscriber is listed in
alphabetical order under one appropriate heading without charge. A subscriber may purchase cross listings
under different business classifications or advertisements to appear along with its business listing. After BAPCO
published its 1984 directory for the Greater Miami area, Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc. and Reuben H.
Donnelley Corp. (collectively "DONNELLEY") began promoting and selling classified advertisements to be
placed in a competitive classified directory for the Greater Miami area. To generate a list of business telephone
subscribers to be solicited for placement in its directory, DONNELLEY gave copies of BAPCO's directory to
Appalachian Computer Services, Inc. ("ACS"), a data entry company. DONNELLEY first marked each listing
in the BAPCO directory with one alphanumeric code indicating the size and type of advertisement purchased by
the subscriber [FN2] and a similar code indicating the type of business represented by the BAPCO heading
under which the listing appeared. For each listing appearing in the BAPCO directory, ACS created a computer
data base containing the name, address, and telephone number of the subscriber as well as the codes
corresponding to business type and unit of advertising. From this data base, DONNELLEY printed sales lead
sheets, listing this information for each subscriber, to be used to contact business telephone subscribers to sell
advertisements and listings in the DONNELLEY directory. Relying on this information copied from the
BAPCO directory, DONNELLEY ultimately prepared its own competitive directory for the Greater Miami area.
BAPCO sued DONNELLEY for alleged copyright infringement, [FN3] trademark infringement, and unfair
competition. After the district court denied BAPCO's motion for a preliminary injunction, DONNELLEY
answered and counterclaimed against BAPCO, Southern Bell and BellSouth, for alleged violations of federal
antitrust law. On the copyright infringement claim, the district court granted summary judgment to BAPCO and
denied DONNELLEY'S motion seeking partial summary judgment in its favor, [FN4] BellSouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, Inc., 719 F.Supp. 1551 (S.D.Fla.1988).
We note that DONNELLEY did not copy, nor was alleged to have copied, the text or graphic material from the
advertisements in the BAPCO directory, the positioning of these advertisements, the typeface, or the textual
material included by BAPCO to assist the user. Unlike the infringer in Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir.1985), DONNELLEY did not photocopy, or
reproduce by any equivalent means, the page by page arrangement or appearance of its competitor's directory in
the process of creating its own work. Although the amount of material taken from the BAPCO directory was
substantial in a purely quantitative sense, DONNELLEY did not, by this process, appropriate whatever original
elements might arguably inhere in the BAPCO directory. Given that the copyright protection of a factual
compilation is "thin," a competitor's taking the bulk of the factual material from a preexisting compilation
without infringement of the author's copyright is not surprising. FEIST, 499 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1289.
While it may seem unfair for a compiler's labor to be used by a competitor without compensation, the Court
noted in FEIST that "[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' " 499 U.S. 1446 at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1290 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, s
8, cl. 8). "To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to
build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." Id. (emphasis added); see also Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 545-46, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2223, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985).
IV. CONCLUSION
By copying the name, address, telephone number, business type, and unit of advertisement purchased for each
listing in the BAPCO directory, [FN23] DONNELLEY copied no original element of selection, coordination or
arrangement; DONNELLEY thus was entitled to summary judgment on BAPCO's claim of copyright
infringement. [FN24] We REVERSE the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to BAPCO
on its claim of copyright infringement and enter judgment in favor of DONNELLEY on this claim.
U.S. Supreme Court
HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
471 U.S. 539
HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC., ET AL. v. NATION ENTERPRISES ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT
No. 83-1632.
Argued November 6, 1984
Decided May 20, 1985
In 1977, former President Ford contracted with petitioners to publish his as yet unwritten
memoirs. The agreement gave petitioners the exclusive first serial right to license
prepublication excerpts. Two years later, as the memoirs were nearing completion,
petitioners, as the copyright holders, negotiated a prepublication licensing agreement with
Time Magazine under which Time agreed to pay $25,000 ($12,500 in advance and the
balance at publication) in exchange for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's
account of his pardon of former President Nixon. Shortly before the Time article's scheduled
release, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished Ford
manuscript. Working directly from this manuscript, an editor of The Nation produced a
2,250-word article, at least 300 to 400 words of which consisted of verbatim quotes of
copyrighted expression taken from the manuscript. It was timed to "scoop" the Time article.
As a result of the publication of The Nation's article, Time canceled its article and refused to
pay the remaining $12,500 to petitioners. Petitioners then brought suit in Federal District
Court against respondent publishers of The Nation, alleging, inter alia, violations of the
Copyright Act (Act). The District Court held that the Ford memoirs were protected by
copyright at the time of The Nation publication and that respondents' use of the copyrighted
material constituted an infringement under the Act, and the court awarded actual damages of
$12,500. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that The Nation's publication of the 300 to
400 words it identified as copyrightable expression was sanctioned as a "fair use" of the
copyrighted material under 107 of the Act. Section 107 provides that notwithstanding the
provisions of 106 giving a copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted
work and to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, the fair use of a
copyrighted work for purposes such as comment and news reporting is not an infringement of
copyright. Section 107 further provides that in determining whether the use was fair the
factors to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the [471 U.S.
539, 540] copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect on the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
Held:
The Nation's article was not a "fair use" sanctioned by 107. Pp. 542-569.
(a) In using generous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished expression to lend
authenticity to its account of the forthcoming memoirs, The Nation effectively arrogated to
itself the right of first publication, an important marketable subsidiary right. Pp. 545-549.
(b) Though the right of first publication, like other rights enumerated in 106, is expressly
made subject to the fair use provisions of 107, fair use analysis must always be tailored to the
individual case. The nature of the interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is
fair. The unpublished nature of a work is a key, though not necessarily determinative, factor
tending to negate a defense of fair use. And under ordinary circumstances, the author's right
to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim
of fair use. Pp. 549-555.
(c) In view of the First Amendment's protections embodied in the Act's distinction
between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, there is no warrant for expanding,
as respondents contend should be done, the fair use doctrine to what amounts to a public
figure exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a public figure's manuscript in
a given case is or is not fair must be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.
Pp. 555-560.
(d) Taking into account the four factors enumerated in 107 as especially relevant in
determining fair use, leads to the conclusion that the use in question here was not fair. (i) The
fact that news reporting was the general purpose of The Nation's use is simply one factor.
While The Nation had every right to be the first to publish the information, it went beyond
simply reporting uncopyrightable information and actively sought to exploit the headline
value of its infringement, making a "news event" out of its unauthorized first publication. The
fact that the publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor tending
to weigh against a finding of fair use. Fair use presupposes good faith. The Nation's
unauthorized use of the undisseminated manuscript had not merely the incidental effect but
the intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holders' commercially valuable right of
first publication. (ii) While there may be a greater need to disseminate works of fact than
works of fiction, The Nation's taking of copyrighted expression exceeded that necessary to
disseminate the facts and infringed the copyright holders' interests in confidentiality and
creative control over the first public appearance of the work. (iii) Although the verbatim
quotes [471 U.S. 539, 541] in question were an insubstantial portion of the Ford manuscript,
they qualitatively embodied Mr. Ford's distinctive expression and played a key role in the
infringing article. (iv) As to the effect of The Nation's article on the market for the
copyrighted work, Time's cancellation of its projected article and its refusal to pay $12,500
were the direct effect of the infringing publication. Once a copyright holder establishes a
causal connection between the infringement and loss of revenue, the burden shifts to the
infringer to show that the damage would have occurred had there been no taking of
copyrighted expression. Petitioners established a prima facie case of actual damage that
respondents failed to rebut. More important, to negate a claim of fair use it need only be
shown that if the challenged use should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work. Here, The Nation's liberal use of verbatim
excerpts posed substantial potential for damage to the marketability of first serialization
rights in the copyrighted work. Pp. 560-569.
723 F.2d 195, reversed and remanded.
ROGERS v. KOONS, 960 F.2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1992)
The key to this copyright infringement suit, brought by a plaintiff photographer against a
defendant sculptor and the gallery representing him, is defendants' borrowing of plaintiff's
expression of a typical American scene — a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of
charming puppies. The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that defendants resolved so
long as they were significant players in the art business, and the copies they produced
bettered the price of the copied work by a thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known
artist's work would escape being sullied by an accusation of plagiarism.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
[17] Rogers brought this action against Koons and Sonnabend Gallery on October 11, 1989,
alleging copyright infringement and unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and
under state law. Both sides advised the district court at an early stage of the proceedings that,
at least as to copyright infringement, disputed factual issues were unlikely and disposition on
summary judgment would probably be appropriate. After completion of discovery, both sides
moved for that relief on July 5, 1990. Rogers' motion was limited to the copyright
infringement claim. Koons and the Sonnabend Gallery sought summary judgment dismissing
all counts in plaintiff's complaint.
[18] The district court held oral argument on November 26, 1990. In a December 10, 1990
decision, described more fully below, it found that Koons copied "Puppies" in "String of
Puppies" and that this copying was not a fair use. It therefore found infringement, 751
F.Supp. 474. Rogers' motion for an infringing profits award was denied because the trial
court believed there were disputed questions of fact concerning their computation. As to
Sonnabend Gallery, the district court concluded on February 22, 1991 that the record showed
Sonnabend's as well as Koons' liability for infringing profits. On March 27, 1991 it entered a
permanent injunction enjoining Koons and Sonnabend Gallery from making, selling, lending
or displaying any copies of, or derivative works based on, "Puppies," and, pursuant to 17
U.S.C. § 503, requiring defendants to deliver all infringing articles to plaintiff within 20 days,
including the fourth or artist's copy of "String of Puppies."
[19] When defendants failed to comply with the turn-over order, Rogers moved to hold
defendant Koons in contempt. The proceedings on that motion revealed that nine days after
the injunction was issued, Koons had loaned the fourth copy of "String of Puppies" to a
museum in Germany and arranged for its shipment out of the United States. After a hearing
on May 8, 1991 the district court held Koons in contempt, directed him to do whatever was
necessary to effect the sculpture's return from Germany, and imposed a daily fine for
continued non-compliance to commence eight days later.
[20] On May 28, 1991 we denied Koons' motion to stay the injunction and the contempt
penalty pending appeal, but delayed the commencement of the daily fine until June 7, 1991.
From the finding of copyright infringement, the granting of a permanent injunction, and the
turn-over order appellants Koons and Sonnabend appeal. Rogers cross-appeals from the
denial of an award prior to trial for infringing profits. We affirm.
Campbell
v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
510 U.S. 569
U.S. Supreme Court
Mar. 7, 1994
SOUTER, J.:
We are called upon to decide whether 2 Live Crew's commercial parody of Roy Orbison's
song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," may be a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U. S. C. § 107 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Although the District Court granted
summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the defense of
fair use barred by the song's commercial character and excessive borrowing. Because we hold
that a parody's commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry,
and that insufficient consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree
of copying, we reverse and remand.
I
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock ballad called "Oh, Pretty Woman" and
assigned their rights in it to respondent Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. . . . Acuff-Rose registered the
song for copyright protection.
Petitioners Luther R. Campbell, Christopher Wongwon, Mark Ross, and David Hobbs, are
collectively known as 2 Live Crew, a popular rap music group.1 In 1989, Campbell wrote a
song entitled "Pretty Woman," which he later described in an affidavit as intended, "through
comical lyrics, to satirize the original work . . . ." . . . On July 5, 1989, 2 Live Crew's
manager informed Acuff-Rose that 2 Live Crew had written a parody of "Oh, Pretty
Woman," that they would afford all credit for ownership and authorship of the original song
to Acuff-Rose, Dees, and Orbison, and that they were willing to pay a fee for the use they
wished to make of it. Enclosed with the letter were a copy of the lyrics and a recording of 2
Live Crew's song. . . . Acuff-Rose's agent refused permission, stating that "I am aware of the
success enjoyed by 'The 2 Live Crews', but I must inform you that we cannot permit the use
of a parody of 'Oh, Pretty Woman."' . . . Nonetheless, in June or July 1989, 2 Live Crew
released records, cassette tapes, and compact discs of "Pretty Woman" in a collection of
songs entitled "As Clean As They Wanna Be." The albums and compact discs identify the
authors of"Pretty Woman" as Orbison and Dees and its publisher as Acuff-Rose.
Almost a year later, after nearly a quarter of a million copies of the recording had been sold,
Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew and its record company, Luke Skywalker Records, for
copyright infringement. The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew,
reasoning that the commercial purpose of 2 Live Crew's song was no bar to fair use; that 2
Live Crew's version was a parody . . . to show "how bland and banal the Orbison song" is;
that 2 Live Crew had taken no more than was necessary to "conjure up" the original in order
to parody it; and that it was "extremely unlikely that 2 Live Crew's song could adversely
affect the market for the original." . . . The District Court weighed these factors and held
that 2 Live Crew's song made fair use of Orbison's original. . . .
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. [T]he Court of Appeals
thought the District Court had put too little emphasis on the fact that "every commercial use .
. . is presumptively . . . unfair," Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., . . .
and it held that "the admittedly commercial nature" of the parody "requires the conclusion"
that the first of four factors relevant under the statute weighs against a finding of fair use. . .
. Next, the Court of Appeals determined that, by "taking the heart of the original and making
it the heart of a new work," 2 Live Crew had, qualitatively, taken too much. . . . Finally, . . .
the Court of Appeals faulted the District Court for "refus[ing] to indulge the presumption"
that "harm for purposes of the fair use analysis has been established by the presumption
attaching to commercial uses." . . . In sum, the court concluded that its "blatantly
commercial purpose . . . prevents this parody from being a fair use." . . .
We granted certiorari . . . to determine whether 2 Live Crew's commercial parody could he a
fair use.
The Court decides it is "fair to say that 2 Live Crew's song reasonably could be perceived as
commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree." . . . While I am not so assured
that 2 Live Crew's song is a legitimate parody, the Court's treatment of the remaining factors
leaves room for the District Court to determine on remand that the song is not a fair use. As
future courts apply our fair use analysis, they must take care to ensure that not just any
commercial take-off is rationalized post hoc as a parody.
In this opinion, we decide whether publication of The Wind Done Gone ("TWDG"), a
fictional work admittedly based on Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind ("GWTW"),
should be enjoined from publication based on alleged copyright violations. The district court
granted a preliminary injunction against publication of TWDG because it found that PlaintiffAppellee SunTrust Bank ("SunTrust") met the four-part test governing preliminary
injunctions. We VACATE the injunction and REMAND for consideration of the remaining
claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
SunTrust is the trustee of the Mitchell Trust, which holds the copyright in GWTW. Since its
publication in 1936, GWTW has become one of the best-selling books in the world, second in
sales only to the Bible. The Mitchell Trust has actively managed the copyright, authorizing
derivative works and a variety of commercial items. It has entered into a contract authorizing,
under specified conditions, a second sequel to GWTW to be published by St. Martin's Press.
The Mitchell Trust maintains the copyright in all of the derivative works as well. See 17
U.S.C. � 103. (1)
Alice Randall, the author of TWDG, persuasively claims that her novel is a critique of
GWTW's depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South. To this end, she
appropriated the characters, plot and major scenes from GWTW into the first half of TWDG.
According to SunTrust, TWDG "(1) explicitly refers to [GWTW] in its foreword; (2) copies
core characters, character traits, and relationships from [GWTW]; (3) copies and summarizes
famous scenes and other elements of the plot from [GWTW]; and (4) copies verbatim
dialogues and descriptions from [GWTW]." SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 1357, 1364 (N.D.Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001). DefendantAppellant Houghton Mifflin, the publisher of TWDG, does not contest the first three
allegations, (2) but nonetheless argues that there is no substantial similarity between the two
works or, in the alternative, that the doctrine of fair use protects TWDG because it is
primarily a parody of GWTW.
After discovering the similarities between the books, SunTrust asked Houghton Mifflin to
refrain from publication or distribution of TWDG, but Houghton Mifflin refused the request.
Subsequently, SunTrust filed an action alleging copyright infringement, violation of the
Lanham Act, and deceptive trade practices, and immediately filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
After a hearing, the district court granted the motion, preliminarily enjoining Houghton
Mifflin from "further production, display, distribution, advertising, sale, or offer for sale of"
TWDG. SunTrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1386. In a thorough opinion, the court found that
"the defendant's publication and sale of [TWDG would] infringe the plaintiff's copyright
interests as protected under the copyright laws." Id. Houghton Mifflin appealed. At oral
argument, we issued an order vacating the injunction on the grounds that it was an
unconstitutional prior restraint. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F. 3d 1165
(11th Cir. 2001). We now vacate that order and issue this more comprehensive opinion.
B. Standard of Review
"We review the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion."
Warren Pub., Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1516 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
We review decisions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Mitek Holdings, Inc.
v. Arce Eng'g Co., Inc., 89 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1996).
Fair Use
First Amendment privileges are also preserved through the doctrine of fair use. (15) Until
codification of the fair-use doctrine in the 1976 Act, fair use was a judge-made right
developed to preserve the constitutionality of copyright legislation by protecting First
Amendment values. Had fair use not been recognized as a right under the 1976 Act, the
statutory abandonment of publication as a condition of copyright that had existed for over
200 years would have jeopardized the constitutionality of the new Act because there would
be no statutory guarantee that new ideas, or new expressions of old ideas, would be
accessible to the public. Included in the definition of fair use are "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research." � 107. The exceptions
carved out for these purposes are at the heart of fair use's protection of the First Amendment,
as they allow later authors to use a previous author's copyright to introduce new ideas or
concepts to the public. Therefore, within the limits of the fair-use test, (16) any use of a
copyright is permitted to fulfill one of the important purposes listed in the statute.
Because of the First Amendment principles built into copyright law through the
idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use, courts often need not entertain related
First Amendment arguments in a copyright case. See, e.g., Eldred, 239 F.3d at 376 (where the
works in question "are by definition under copyright; that puts the works on the latter half of
the 'idea/expression dichotomy' and makes them subject to fair use. This obviates further
inquiry under the First Amendment."); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data,
Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We have repeatedly rejected First Amendment
challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground that First Amendment
concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine."); Los Angeles News
Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) ("First Amendment concerns are also
addressed in the copyright field through the 'fair use' doctrine."). (17)
The case before us calls for an analysis of whether a preliminary injunction was properly
granted against an alleged infringer who, relying largely on the doctrine of fair use, made use
of another's copyright for comment and criticism. As discussed herein, copyright does not
immunize a work from comment and criticism. Therefore, the narrower question in this case
is to what extent a critic may use the protected elements of an original work of authorship to
communicate her criticism without infringing the copyright in that work. As will be discussed
below, this becomes essentially an analysis of the fair use factors. As we turn to the analysis
required in this case, we must remain cognizant of the First Amendment protections
interwoven into copyright law.