Gender Policy Innovation and Diffusion (Policy Learning) in the Mexican
Federal System: The Case of Abortion
Caroline Beer
Associate Professor
University of Vermont
What explains the diversity of gender policies at the subnational level and the varying
patterns of policy adoption in federal systems? Where do new policies originate and how do
they spread? What is the relationship between national and local forces in the policymaking
process? The classic understanding of federalism in Mexico contrasts sharply with subnational
policymaking models developed in the United States. The prominent explanation in U.S. public
policy research emphasizes the incremental bottom-up process of policy diffusion among
subnational “democratic laboratories”. Mexican federalism, in contrast, has been characterized
by the top-down centralization of “hyperpresidentialism”. These differences mirror differing
conceptions about federalism and subnational policy diversity. In the United States, subnational
policy diversity is usually viewed as a way to promote policies that more closely match the
public’s preferences. In Mexico, in contrast, policy consistency is widely considered the goal
while diversity is often thought of as dysfunctional.
As Mexico has transitioned from one-party authoritarianism to multiparty democracy, the
subnational policy process shifted from “hyperpresidentialism” towards a more decentralized and
diverse process. By bringing together the insights of the Mexican model of centralized
policymaking and the U.S. model of bottom-up innovation, this paper attempts to more fully
explain the process of subnational policymaking in Mexico’s new democratic era. This research
shows how national and local forces interact to produce subnational policy diversity. In
1
particular, I argue that the presence of national attention will lead to predictable diversity among
subnational units whereas the lack of national attention will result in idiosyncratic diversity.
This research focuses on gender policy in the Mexican states to test models of the policy
process in newly democratic Mexico. Gender policy in Mexico provides an important
opportunity to study subnational policymaking because there has been substantial policy
innovation in gender policies over the past two decades. Relatively little systematic comparative
research has been carried out on gender policy in Mexico. Gender policies allow us to focus on a
subset of policy, but do not restrict us to a single policy or even a single type of policy. Some
gender policies are morality policies, but others are more accurately described as governance or
regulatory policy.
Policy adoption is obviously not equivalent to policy implementation. Policies may be
adopted and not implemented. And implementation may vary within and across subnational
units. While implementation is clearly an important question for scholars of gender equality, this
paper focuses on policy adoption as a first step to understanding broader questions of policy
diversity across subnational units.
This paper is part of a broader project comparing gender quotas, violence against women
laws, gay rights and reproductive rights across the states of Mexico. This article uses data on
reproductive rights to examine the dynamics of policymaking in Mexico’s federal system.
Classic models of subnational policymaking: The USA versus Mexico
The classic model of US state policy making builds upon a vision of U.S. federalism as a
set of “democratic laboratories” where new ideas spring up in different states or cities, and
governments learn from one another through a process known as “policy diffusion” (Gray 1973;
Walker 1969). The use of the word “laboratory” suggests a scientific process of innovation,
2
experimentation, evaluation, and replication (Karch 2007, 5). Successful ideas are replicated by
neighboring states or cities, and unsuccessful ideas are abandoned (Berry and Berry 1990;
Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; 2007; Mintrom 1997; Patton 2007; Shipan and Volden 2006,
2008). The “laboratories of democracy” is an idealized model of U.S. policy making and
obviously not all policy is produced this way. Many policies are adopted at the national level
against the preferences of some state governments. Yet this bottom-up policy-learning model is
the dominant approach for explaining state policy-making in the U.S.
Diffusion is a process of incremental policy learning. According to Karch (2007, 3),
“Diffusion occurs when the likelihood that an innovation will be adopted in
jurisdiction A is significantly affected by the existence of the innovation in
jurisdiction B. Diffusion does not occur when officials in multiple jurisdictions
adopt the same innovation completely independently, nor does it occur when later
adopters are unawarei of the existence of innovation elsewhere… Diffusion
occurs, in sum, when decision makers draw on others’ experiences to evaluate the
effectiveness of a new political form or idea.”
According to the idealized diffusion model, policy makers identify problems, investigate
potential solutions by looking to neighboring states, and then choose the best solution. Classic
studies of diffusion imply a slow and gradual geographic expansion of ideas, in the way that a
drop of water on a paper towel gradually expands outward. While some ideas may spread
through this type of regional diffusion, policies with national salience spread beyond
geographically contiguous states across the country. Many studies of U.S. state policy measure
diffusion by the number of contiguous states that have adopted the same policy. But what looks
like geographic diffusion could be regional effects. It may be that a policy is more likely to be
adopted in the Northeast and not the South because of structural similarities among the states in
the Northeast. Thus we need a new way to operationalize diffusion beyond the contiguous state
indicator. A key variable is national media attention. An issue that is nationally salient and
3
garners substantial attention in the national media should see policy innovation replicated
nationally, whereas issues with only local or regional salience may have regional diffusion.
When a large number of states enact the same policy in a short period of time, traditional
conceptions of diffusion are inadequate because the later adopters would not have had time to
evaluate the outcome of the policy before adopting it. Boushey (2010) refers to these rapid
adoptions of similar policies as “outbreaks” rather than “diffusion.”
He defines an outbreak as
“a process characterized by a positive feedback cycle leading to the extremely rapid adoption of
policy innovation across states” (Boushey 2010, 5).
According to the diffusion model, policy adoption can be explained in terms of the
internal characteristics of individual states, the influence of neighboring states, national forces
(Berry and Berry 1990), as well as the type of policy (Boushey 2010). The social, political and
economic characteristics of different states influence the adoption of policy innovations.
Scholars have focused on wealth (Dye 1966), public opinion and political ideology (Erikson,
Wright, and McIver 1993), the severity of the “problem”, and religious or ethnic makeup
(Mooney and Lee 1995) .
While the diffusion model is clearly a bottom-up theory of policy change, national factors
play an important role. National forces are especially influential as the agents of diffusion in the
agenda-setting stage (Karch 2007). National forces or actors that operate across state borders
play an important role in carrying policy innovations from one jurisdiction to another. These
national forces include media attention on state innovation, active national associations of state
officials (Berry and Berry 1990), national political party leaders, policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom
1997), and national interest groups (Haider-Markel 2001). National debates raise the visibility of
issues and increase the likelihood of an issue getting on states’ agendas (Karch 2007). National
4
forces such as the Supreme Court and federal legislation set the limits of possible subnational
government action (Patton 2007).
The U.S. policy diffusion literature has a technocratic tone that focuses on “problems”
and “solutions,” strangely omitting reference to ideological conflict. In this view, there is a
problem, states innovate and adopt laws to solve the problem, other states look around to see
how others have solved the problem and then choose the “best” solution. “Policy Innovation”
suggests a new idea to solve a persistent problem. While this technocratic language may be
appropriate in some policy domains such as fiscal crises and innovations for new revenues
(Berry and Berry 1990), in other contexts, this language is clearly unsatisfying. Karch’s (2007,
8) discussion of the impact of time constraints on information gathering and “available
heuristics” suggests that if every policymaker had time to fully research each issue, everyone
would come to the same conclusion. Clearly in the highly polarized political domains of
morality policy such as gay marriage or abortion, a lack of good research is not what is driving
policy disagreements. Rather, disagreement is driven by conflicting world views.
The language of “problems” and “solutions,” therefore, is problematic for studying
gender policies and other issues where there is not wide agreement on the problem. This
language obscures the role of ideological conflict and the important reality that one person’s
problem may be another person’s solution. Defining problems is particularly difficult in the
politically charged and polarized terrain of gender politics and morality politics. To those who
see abortion as a sin, a high abortion rate is a problem and access to safe, legal abortions is a
problem. For others, the problem may be maternal mortality or unwanted pregnancy, and access
to safe, legal abortions is a potential solution. So merely identifying “problems” for which
policy innovation is necessary is a political dilemma. The policy diffusion model seems to
5
assume broad consensus across individuals or states on the definition of problems. That may be
the case for some narrowly defined policy issues, but in the politics of gender policy, it is clearly
not the case.
In contrast to the classic characterization of US state policy making as decentralized
diffusion, Mexican subnational policy making has been highly centralized. During the period of
Mexico’s one-party hegemony (1929-1988) policymaking was tightly controlled by the president
and the national bureaucracy in a system that has been referred to as “hyperpresidentialism”
(Carpizo 1978; Garrido 1989). State governments operated with relatively little autonomy from
the central government, and the general understanding of state policymaking was that states
replicated at the subnational level legislation that had already been approved at the national level.
In many policy areas state legislation was similar across states because state governments
reformed state laws to mirror the national changes. This process is referred to as legislative
“harmonization” or “homogenization”. In electoral law, for example, the 1977 federal electoral
reform added proportional representation seats to both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
Shortly after the federal reform, most states also added proportional representation seats to their
legislatures (Crespo 1996).ii Similarly, the federal judicial reform of 1994 was followed by a
flurry of state judicial reform (Beer 2006). An ability to rein in the excesses of subnational
autocrats through policy harmonization was key to the longevity of the PRI one-party system.
In terms of gender policy, a publication of the Mexican National Human Rights
Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2009, 46-47) discusses state level antidiscrimination laws under the subheading “Legislative Harmonization.” It then states,
“Las tareas de homologación juridical de las normas estatales con la Constitutión
general del país y los instrumentos internacionales suscritos y ratificados por
México en material de igualdad han sido una constante desde hace poco más de
tres decenios.”
6
Thus, in view of the National Human Rights Commission, state policymaking is not so much
about independent states making distinct policy decisions to meet the varying needs of their own
state constituents, but rather it is a process of harmonizing, coordinating, reconciling, and
bringing into line state laws with national laws. This language reflects the centralized view of
Mexican policymaking that all important policy decisions are taken at the national level, and the
job of provincial politicians is to implement those decisions at the state and local level. Rather
than a diversity of laws across the states being a natural consequence of federalism, in which
different states choose different policies to reflect the interests and demands of their constituents,
instead the implicit norm is homogenous legal codes across the states.
The president exerted power over state politics through his control of ruling party
nominations. Because of one-party control, the president essentially chose the governors, while
the governors essentially chose the members of the state legislatures. Even at the height of oneparty rule there was of course some variation across the states. In electoral law, for example, the
details of how the proportional representation seats were distributed varied across states (Solt
2004). And governors had substantial discretion within their states as long as they complied with
the president’s most important initiatives, maintained stability, and delivered the vote for the PRI
(Hernández-Rodríguez 2003).
As democratization and decentralization began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s,
the hyperpresidentialist model of Mexican politics no longer accurately captured the dynamics of
Mexican policymaking (Beer 2003). The role of subnational governments changed dramatically,
state governments took on greater importance in the policymaking process, and policy outcomes
among the states began to diverge substantially. These patterns can be seen quite clearly in
electoral law (Eisenstadt 2004). States with greater levels of electoral competition and post
7
electoral conflict created new electoral institutions and practices. These innovations were
replicated in other states and at the federal level.
The main argument of this research is that policy making in contemporary Mexico
resembles in some important ways the diffusion model, but looking at the diffusion model from a
comparative perspective also requires some important revisions to that model. As a consequence
of the transition to democracy and the growing influence and autonomy of state governments in
Mexico, policy-making in Mexico is moving towards a model that resembles in some ways the
“laboratories of democracy” model of the United States. But, Mexico still retains some of its
traditional centralization and demonstrates a hybrid style of policymaking.
A Model of Subnational Policymaking
The policy making process starts when individual states propose and implement new
policies. These innovations may go unnoticed by other states for many years. There may be
some regional diffusion as neighboring states implement similar policies. Other states
confronting similar problems may implement similar policies without being aware of earlier
reforms. Without national attention focused on the policy, idiosyncratic policy diversity is likely
to emerge. It will be hard to predict which states implement the policy by examining internal
state characteristics because policy enactment will depend on a few highly motivated individuals
getting the issue on the agenda and pushing it through the legislature. Some states that might be
ideologically amenable to the policy may never have it on the agenda. This idiosyncratic
diversity will likely emerge in federal systems with both high and low levels of subnational
autonomy. In contexts of low subnational autonomy, local governments are likely to maintain
control over issues with low national salience, since the issues are not important to the national
elite.
8
A report on Gender Equality in Mexico published by the National Human Rights
Commission suggests how the idiosyncratic policy process takes place in Mexico:
“Las tareas de armonización del marco jurídico han sido muy diversas y en
muchas ocasiones han dependido más del interés de una diputada que ha logrado
hacer las tareas de cabildeo y proselitismo con relativo éxito, que de una
planeación elaborada de acuerdo con las prioridades del estado en cuestión. En
otras palabras, la igualdad de género no ha logrado ganarse un sitio en las listas de
prioridades que conforman las agendas legislativas.” (Comisión Nacional de
Derechos Humanos 2009, 50).
Because the gender equality policies have not found their way onto the legislative agendas of
many states, their progress depends on the interest of a deputy (female!) to take on the cause.
The internal characteristics of the state do not drive the policy, but rather the success of the
policy depends on the personal interest of an individual member of the state legislature.
If there is a national attention-focusing event then emulation and/or backlash is likely to
take place. How widespread the diffusion is will depend on the resources and effectiveness of
national actors pushing for reform (or status quo). In the aftermath of the national debate state
characteristics come into play if there is sufficient local autonomy. If there is low local
autonomy then national elites will push for similar reforms across the country.
Thus, the policymaking process in subnational units depends on two key variables: the
level of subnational policy autonomy and the national salience of the issue.iii Scholars of US
state politics assume that the level of subnational policy autonomy is constant, but when looking
at policy diffusion in a comparative context it is clear that subnational policy autonomy varies
across countries. Moreover, subnational policy autonomy may vary within a country through
time and even across subnational units. Policy autonomy also varies across different policies.
States have autonomy over some policy areas and not others.iv Policies with low national
salience have idiosyncratic diversity in the context of high and low subnational autonomy.
9
Policies with high national salience will have predictable diversity in contexts of high
subnational autonomy, but very little diversity in contexts of low subnational autonomy. See
Figure 1.
Figure 1. The interaction of national salience and subnational policy autonomy.
Low national salience/ no
High national salience/
national policy carrier
effective national carriers
High subnational policy
Idiosyncratic diversity: Issue Predictable diversity: Issue
autonomy
may not be on agenda,
is on agenda. Subnational
depends on local groups or
innovation and replication,
USA
individuals to get issue on
“diffusion”. Internal
Mexico after 2000
agenda, possible regional
characteristics matter.
effects. Internal
Outbreaks possible.
characteristics may not matter.
Incremental change.
Low subnational policy
No diversity: Issue is on
Idiosyncratic diversity:
autonomy
Issue may not be on agenda,
agenda. National action,
depends on local groups to get “harmonization” of state
Mexico before 1988
issue on agenda, similar to
policy, no regional effects.
high autonomy because
Internal characteristics do not
national forces don’t care, in
matter. Outbreaks likely.
effect giving local autonomy.
Internal characteristics may
not matter.
Incremental change.
Interest groups and professional organizations carry innovations across state borders, so
patterns of diffusion will depend on the resources, lobbying strategy and membership of interest
groups. Outbreaks are more likely if interest groups have enough resources and organizational
ability to pressure all states at once, rather than work state by state. Policy entrepreneurs can also
carry innovations across borders (Gray 1973; Mintrom 1997).
As shown in Figure 1 internal state characteristics are most important when there is high
national salience and high subnational autonomy. Internal state characteristics are not important
when there is high national salience and low subnational autonomy because national elites will
intervene to determine policy. State characteristics are also less important when there is low
10
policy salience because when most people are not paying attention, policy adoption depends on
the actions of individual legislators and highly motivated actors, rather than overall public
opinion. Policy salience also likely affects the pace of policy diffusion. High salience issues
may experience outbreaks, whereas low salience issues are likely to see incremental change.
Morality policy is especially prone to outbreaks (Mooney and Lee 1995).
Different internal state characteristics are likely to matter depending on the type of
policy. Following the logic of Lowi (1964, 1972), a central insight of the gender policy research
is that different aspects of gender policy follow different policy processes and should be studied
separately (Htun and Weldon 2010). Scholars of U.S. public policy have focused on “morality
policies” as an important and distinct subset of policy (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Mooney
and Lee 1995; Patton 2007). Morality policies seek to regulate social norms and elicit moral
responses and involve issues defined as “sin” by influential religious groups. Conflict over
morality policy tends to be more ideological, more polarized, and less prone to compromise than
other types of policy. Morality policies differ from other types of policies because they are 1)
technically simple, 2) highly salient, and 3) elicit higher levels of citizen participation (Patton
2007). As a result elected representatives tend to be more responsive to public opinion for
morality policies. Some gender policies such as abortion and gay marriage are morality policies,
while others, such as gender quotas and violence against women laws are not. Patton (2007, p.
469) argues that morality policies tend not to be driven by socioeconomic variables as much as
religious forces, public opinion, party affiliation and electoral competition. Similarly, Htun and
Weldon (2010) emphasize the role of religious doctrine in distinguishing different types of
gender policy. Boushey (2010, 18) argues that morality policy depends on state political
competition, political ideology, and religious makeup; regulatory policy depends on the
11
professionalization of the legislature; and governance policy depends on availability of citizen
initiatives.
Comparative gender policy research has categorized policies in terms of an economic
dimension and a gender dimension (Blofield and Haas 2005; Htun and Weldon 2010). The
economic dimension refers to whether or not the policy requires resource redistribution.
According to this research, if a policy requires redistribution of resources from the wealthy to the
poor, then leftist parties are the most important actors involved in reform. The gender dimension
refers to whether the policy challenges tradition cultural or religious norms about gender roles.
Reform will be difficult if the dominant religion in the country is doctrinally opposed to the
reform. Htun and Weldon (2010) leftist parties are hypothesized to be most important in gender
issues with redistributional consequences while religious parties and the religiosity of the
population are the main explanatory variables for doctrinal (or morality) issues (Htun and
Weldon 2010) v. But as Blofield (2006, 2008) argue, some morality policies may also have a
class dimension. Liberalizing abortion laws in Latin America is a class issue because poor
women are the most likely to suffer from unsafe abortions. Middle and upper class women are
much more likely to have the financial resources and personal contacts to find doctors who
provide safe clandestine abortions.
Blofield and Hass (2005) find that in Chile, policies that do not threaten the dominant
definitions of gender roles, and policies that do not require economic redistribution are much
more likely to be successful than other types of gender policy. They also find that bills initiated
by the National Women’s Ministry are more likely to be successful. Cross party coalitions of
women have been successful in Latin America in passing new laws for domestic violence, rape,
and gender quotas. On other issues, though, women are often as polarized as men. Htun and
12
Power (2006) find that in the Brazilian Congress, women are more likely than men to support
gender quotas and gender equality in the labor market, but not more likely than men to support
legal abortion or gay rights. Members of leftists parties are the most consistent supporters of all
four of their policy clusters (gender quotas, labor market equality, abortion rights, and gay
rights). The correlations between Htun and Powers different indices are fairly low. The highest
correlation (0.48) is between abortion and gay rights. Cowell-Meyers and Langbein (2006)
similarly show that various aspects of the women’s agenda as measured across the U.S. states do
not cohere together as a single dimension. Adopting one type of women friendly policy is not
significantly related to adopting other types of women friendly policies. Different factors seem
to cause different policy outcomes depending on what type of women’s issue is involved.
Similar to Htun and Powers findings in Brazil, the only policies across the U.S. states that
Cowell-Meyers and Langbein found to be correlated were six policies related to sexual
orientation and abortion.
Testing the Model: Gender Policy in the Mexican States
To test this model, the broader project will employ case studies and event history analysis
to predict the probability of states adopting policies related to abortion, gay rights, violence
against women, and gender quotas. I expect to find idiosyncratic and unexplainable diversity
across the states in these policy areas before the transition to democracy (when states gained
policy autonomy) and before the policy receives national media attention. After 2000 and in the
wake of national media attention I expect to find explainable variance across the states. The
particular state characteristics that are significant in predicting the adoption of new policy will
vary with each policy. These state characteristics are likely to include social characteristics
(such as religion, indigenous population, state public opinion, educational levels), political
13
characteristics (such as electoral competition, political parties, interest groups), and economic
characteristics (such as state per capita income, poverty).
(I am still working on the dataset for the event history analysis, but I hope to have some
preliminary findings ready for the conference).
In this section I provide a qualitative overview of the policy process for abortion
legislation to show how it conforms to the expectations outlined above. Abortion laws are
determined by state penal codes, and therefore vary considerably from state to state. As of 2013,
all 32 states allow abortion in the case of rape. Twenty-nine allow abortion if the woman’s life is
at risk. Thirteen allow abortion if there is serious threat to the woman’s health. Fourteen allow
abortion in the case of fetal abnormalities. Yucatán allows abortion if the mother is poor and
already has at least three children. The Federal District allows abortion for any reason during the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Most states, however, provide no access to abortion even when
it is legal (GIRE 2013). The penalties for women who willingly consent to abortion also vary
from state to state, with the penalty in Veracruz merely “tratamiento en libertad, consistente en la
aplicación de medidas educativas y de salud” and only two weeks in prison in Tlaxcala, to as
much as six years in prison in Sonora. In most states the punishment for abortion providers is
the same or somewhat greater than the punishment for the women having the abortion.
Punishments are substantially higher if the abortion is carried out without the permission of the
mother.
Abortion was illegal in Mexico since colonization. The 1871 Penal Code of the Federal
District established the punishment for abortion as half that of the punishment for infanticide,
establishing a legal distinction between a fetus and an infant (Ortiz-Ortega 2007). Abortion was
also permitted when the mother’s life was in danger. After the Revolution, new penal codes
14
were written across the states. The 1931 Penal Code of the Federal District continued to outlaw
abortion in most cases, but allowed abortion in the case of rape.vi In practice these early laws
banning abortion were rarely enforced and women were rarely punished even though abortion
was practiced widely. Stevenson (2000, 274) cites evidence that in 1989 in the Federal District
only 2 women were sentenced to prison for abortion. In 1990 six were. Another study of women
in prison in Mexico City in the early 1990s found only one out of 600 inmates were imprisoned
for abortion (González M. 1992). More often than not, women who illegally abort are subjected
to extortion by doctors or local police rather than processed through the judicial system.
Abortion laws were fairly uniform across the states during the first half of the PRI’s rule.
In the 1970s new national attention was focused on the issue of reproductive rights. President
Echeverria reformed the constitution in 1974 to guarantee legal equality between men and
women and the right to decide the number and spacing of children. Together with this
constitutional reform, he also legalized contraception, passed the “General Law on Population”
and established the National Population Council (CONAPO) to implement the new policies to
promote birth control, smaller families, and slower population growth (Ortiz-Ortega and Barquet
2010; Sánchez Olvera 2009)vii. This new national debate about reproductive rights and the
influence of the emerging women’s movement emboldened a small group of feminists and
leftists to push for legal abortion. The Coalition of Feminist Women (CMF) presented bills to
legalize abortion in the Federal Congress in 1976, 1977, and 1979 (GIRE 2009). In response to
this new policy innovation (and with resources and advice from the ProLife movement in the
United States) the Archbishop of Mexico City helped to establish the Comité ProVida in 1978 to
prevent abortion and promote abstinence (Ortiz-Ortega 2007). ProVida and the PAN responded
to the efforts to legalize abortion with bills to guarantee the life of the unborn. The PRI blocked
15
both sides and tried to carve out a middle ground between the two (Bartra 1994; Stevenson 2000,
281-282).
During the 1970s there were new legal exemptions to the general ban on abortion added
to many state penal codes. Exclusions for rape, the life of the mother, and fetal abnormality were
added in some states. These new exemptions were idiosyncratic resulting from the actions of
individuals in particular states. They were enacted with little media attention (Stevenson 2000,
291). While there was extensive national debate about reproductive rights, the national elite (the
PRI leadership) did not have a clear policy preference. If the PRI had a clear policy preference,
we would expect to see harmonization of policy, with most states enacting similar policies.
Instead we see idiosyncratic policy diversity across the states.
Table 1. Legal Exemptions to the Ban on Abortion.
Reforms to permit abortion in cases of fetal
Reforms to permit abortion to protect the
impairment
woman’s health
Oaxaca 1979
Tlaxcala 1980
Quintana Roo 1979
Nuevo León 1981
Veracruz 1980
Michoacán 1981
Coahuila 1983
Jalisco 1982
Chiapas 1984
San Luis Potosí 1984
Colima 1985
Zacatecas 1986
Guerrero 1986
Yucatán 1987
Puebla 1986
Data from (Ortiz-Ortega 2007, footnote 26 and 28)
It is hard to detect any meaningful pattern among the states in Table 1. If some states
were more likely than others to liberalize abortion, then we would expect to see those states add
exemptions for both fetal impairment and to protect the woman’s health. Instead, none of the
states that provided an exemption to protect the woman’s health also provided an exemption in
the case of fetal impairment or vice versa. Moreover, two of the most conservative and religious
states in the country (Jalisco and Puebla) are among those that made liberalizing reforms to
abortion laws. Thus, I see this period of reform as characterized by idiosyncratic diversity.
16
There may be some geographic diffusion. Most of the states that added exemptions for fetal
impairment are in the south, whereas most of the states with exemptions for the woman’s health
are in the north. (Map this.)
This period of liberalization of reproductive rights peaked in 1983 when President de la
Madrid proposed a bill to decriminalize abortion in the case of fetal deformity, economic
reasons, and unwanted artificial insemination in the penal code of the Federal District.
Confronted with intense opposition from the Catholic Church, the government eventually
decriminalized abortion only in the case of “unwanted artificial insemination” – but no one
seemed know what that actually meant (Stevenson 2000, 282-83). This exemption has been
replicated in ten other state codes, providing a strange example of diffusion (GIRE 2013).viii It is
complicated to categorize legislation in the Federal District in this era as either local or national
because the Federal District did not have the autonomy to make its own laws until 1994. Thus,
the reforms to the penal code were carried out by the President and the Federal Congress, not a
local government. In 1983 de la Madrid created the Programa Nacional de Población and
decentralized family planning efforts to Consejos Estatales de Población.
During the years after 1983, we continue to see idiosyncratic policy innovation in the
states. Policies emerged because of specific conditions in individual states, but not in a broadly
predictable way. In 1990 the Chiapas state legislature (controlled by the PRI) unanimously
passed a bill proposed by the governor José Patrocinio González Garrido (and supported by five
prominent feminists from San Cristóbal) to decriminalize abortion during the first 90 days of
gestation for the purpose of family planning (with the agreement of the husband), by single
mothers, and economic reasons. Again the Catholic Church strongly opposed the bill and intense
conflict erupted between feminists and the church. In the face of intense opposition the local
17
congress suspended the bill and sent it to the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) for
review (Lamas 1992). The CNDH never reviewed the bill, claiming it was outside of its
jurisdiction, and in 1994 the new governor of Chiapas, Javier López Moreno, threw out the
reform and put forth a bill to increase the penalties for abortion in the state (Rodríguez 2000).
Bishop Samuel Ruíz of San Cristobál de las Casas led a protest march against the bill and
threatened to excommunicate the legislators who supported the bill (Lamas 1992). He argued
that the law would be used to force indigenous women to end their pregnancies to control
population in indigenous communities (Blancarte 2009, 249). It was speculated in the media that
the PRI pushed the legislation in Chiapas as a “trial balloon” to see what the reaction of the
country would be (Lamas 1992). It was also suggested that it was an attempt by the PRI to drive
a wedge between Bishop Samuel Ruíz and other progressive groups that were working together
to organize the indigenous population in Chiapas (Rojas 1994, 139-145).ix
In 1991 a year after the Chiapas abortion debate, Quintana Roo passed a less radical bill
to decriminalize abortion in some instances (Lamas 1992). Also the PRD voted unaminously to
promote the decriminalization of abortion (Lamas 1992), and Salinas proposed a bill to allow
abortion for economic reasons, but it was rejected by the Congress (GIRE 2009). Congress did
approve a new exemption for abortion in 1991 in the case of fetal abnormality in the Federal
District’s penal code. In 1994 in Chihuahua, the newly elected PAN government rewrote the
state constitution. The new constitution included language establishing that life begins at the
moment of conception, but there was little media coverage of this change. Thus we see radically
different policy innovation emerging in different states during the early 1990s, setting the stage
for the polarizing conflicts over abortion after 2000.
18
In 1999 there was new national attention to the issue of abortion because of the highly
publicized case of Paulina, a 13 year old girl from Mexicali who had been raped and was denied
access to a legal abortion (Poniatowska 2000). In the same year in Nuevo Leon an amendment
guaranteeing life from the moment of conception was proposed but did not pass. In 2000 the
state legislature in Guanajuato passed a law to remove all legal exemptions from the ban on
abortion, including rape; but after extensive protests against the measure the governor did not
sign the bill. In the early 2000s there was a new round of state policy reform to increase legal
exemptions to the abortion ban. In 2000 the “Robles Law” in Mexico City and a similar law
enacted in Morelos allowed abortion when the health of the mother was at risk and in the case of
fetal impairment (Ortiz-Ortega 2007). Both states also enacted regulations to guarantee access to
legal abortions (Human Rights Watch 2006). The “Robles Law” was challenged in the Supreme
Court, but upheld in a decision in February 2002. According to MacDonald and Mills (2010,
193) Robles promised pro-choice NGOs she would liberalize the abortion law if the PRD lost the
presidential election in 2000. MacDonald and Mills argue that a similar dynamic took place
around the 2006 presidential elections and that the PRD focused on legislative change at the
subnational level because of its failure in national elections. There were also liberalizing reforms
in Baja California in 2004 and 2005 and in Hidalgo in 2007 (GIRE 2009).
Emergency contraception (also known as the morning after pill) generated significant
national debate in the early 2000s. In 2005 the Fox administration allowed pharmacies to sell the
morning after pill (Levonorgestrel) without a prescription, ordered public health clinics to stock
the drug, and required rape victims be offered the pill. In Jalisco in 2005 PANista diputada
Cecilia Carreón together with PRIista diputada María del Rocío Corona Nakamura led an effort
to get the secretary of health to take emergency contraception out of public health clinics. They
19
presented an amparo to the Supreme Court to declare the pill illegal, but were unsuccessful. The
Jalisco legislature did not act on the proposal because it was federal jurisdiction (Ochoa Ávalos
2007, 320-21). In 2007 in Jalisco the PRD diputado Carlos Orozco proposed a public
consulation about abortion. The PAN and the some members of the PRI declared that there
would be no debate about abortion in Jalisco, but there was a march in favor of legalizing
abortion in 2007 with a counter protest by those opposed (Ochoa Ávalos 2007, 326).
This new period of liberalization of abortion peaked in 2007 with bottom-up policy
innovation in Mexico City. Mexico City legalized all abortion during the first 12 weeks of
pregnancy and also established regulations to provide for free abortions in government clinics.
The policy innovation in Mexico City, however, did not lead to the diffusion of this new policy
across the states in Mexico. Instead it resulted in a backlash against the policy and the rapid
diffusion of policies to counteract the legalization of abortion – what Boushey (2010) would call
an “outbreak”. The National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) and the Attorney General’s
Office (PGR), both controlled by the PAN, challenged the constitutionality of the Mexico City
law in the Supreme Court. In 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of legalized
abortion.
Within a few days of the Supreme Court’s decision, bills to amend state constitutions to
protect life from the moment of conception were proposed in state legislatures across the
country. Giving legal rights to a fetus from the moment of conception has significant legal
consequences, possibly outlawing the use of emergency contraception, inter-uterine devices, and
reproductive technologies, moreover abortion becomes legally equivalent to murder. Chihuahua
had added this anti-abortion provision to its constitution in 1994 after the PAN won the
gubernatorial elections and rewrote the entire constitution. The PAN proposed to amend the
20
constitution of Nuevo León in 1999 in the same way, but could not garner the two-thirds
majority needed. No other state had this provision until 2008. By the end of 2009 fifteen states
had adopted this constitutional amendment. Another state approved the amendment in 2010. As
of 2013 there are seventeen states with this constitutional amendment. There are bills still
pending in eight other states to establish that life begins at the moment of conception (GIRE
2013). The Supreme Court heard challenges to these amendments but did not find them
unconstitutional.
Since the transition to democracy in Mexico, when state governments gained greater
autonomy over policy making, tremendous diversity emerged across the states of Mexico on this
policy issue. In Mexico City abortion is legal and available free in public clinics. In 17 other
states, abortion is not only banned, but is legally equivalent to murder because a fetus has the
same legal rights as a human being. In the state of Guanajuato a number of women who had
abortions were prosecuted for murder. During this period of high national salience and increased
subnational autonomy, abortion policy was more predictable than in the earlier period examined
above. While data in Table 1 suggest that the liberalization of abortion laws in the 1970s and
1980s was largely idiosyncratic, we can see from the simple regressions presented in Table 2 that
abortion policy after the transition to democracy in 2000 is more predictable.
Table 2. Regression results for abortion policy
Abortion
Exemptions
Model
Ordered
Probit
%PAN in state legislature
-0.023
(1.45)
%PRD in state legislature
0.044
(2.15)*
Female laborforce participation 0.082
(1.56)
State per capita income
0.003
Pro-life
Amendment
Probit
0.020
(0.90)
-0.086
(2.02)*
0.123
(1.74)
-0.038
21
%fem municipal presidents
%fem state legislators
(0.39)
19.227
(2.89)**
-0.181
(2.97)**
Constant
Observations
31
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(2.07)*
-7.387
(0.82)
-0.057
(0.19)
-1.369
(0.55)
31
Abortion exemptions are coded as follows:
Table 3. Legal exemptions for abortion
Rank
Description
6
Abortion is legal for any reason during
first 12 weeks of gestation
5
Abortion is allowed for economic
reasons, as well as those below
4
Abortion allowed if serious threat to
mother’s health and also allowed if
serious fetal impairment
3
Abortion allowed if serious threat to
mother’s health or if serious fetal
impairment (but not in both instances)
2
Abortion allowed only to save the life
of the mother and in case of rape
1
Abortion allowed only in case of rape
#of states
1
1
2
17
8
3
The main predictor for abortion policy in the regressions presented in Table 2 is the
strength of the leftist party PRD in the state legislature. States with more representation of the
PRD in the state legislature are significantly more likely to have more liberal abortion laws and
significantly less likely to have a pro-life constitutional amendment. States with more women
municipal presidents are more likely to have more exemptions to the abortion ban, but states with
more women in the legislature are less likely to have more exemptions to the abortion ban. Most
states have gender quotas for the members of the state legislature, but no state has gender quotas
for executive positions. Thus while municipal presidents do not have any direct role in
22
producing state legislation, the percentage of female municipal presidents is probably a better
measure of the actual influence of women in politics, whereas the percentage of women in the
legislature reflects the quotas.
An event history analysis is a more appropriate method to analyze the adoption of these
policies. I am working to put the data together to test with an event history analysis…
National and International forces working as “carriers” of abortion policy in Mexico
In trying to explain how policies spread across subnational units, scholars of U.S. state
politics have focused on various national forces and interstate actors as “carriers” of policy
across state borders (Boushey 2010; Karch 2007). In Mexico actors that “carry” innovations
from one state to another include the Catholic Church (both the hierarchy and lay organizations),
national political parties, national interest groups (including women’s organizations and human
rights organizations), and national associations of state officials (such as CONAGO Conferencia
Nacional de Gobernadores and ANOMAC Asociación Nacional de Oficiales Mayores de los
Congresos de los Estados y el Distrito Federal). The Supreme Court rulings and federal
legislation are also important national forces that exert influence over state policy making.
The Catholic Church became active in the 1970s to oppose reforms to increase
reproductive rights. In response to the legalization of birth control in 1974, the Church accused
the government of giving in to the pressure from “dominant countries”. The church similarly
opposed the introduction of sex education in national textbooks. Opposition to birth control and
sex education became central issues for the church from the 1970s onward (Blancarte 2009,
250). In 1978 (with resources and advice from the ProLife movement in the United States) the
Archbishop of Mexico City helped to establish the Comité ProVida to prevent abortion and
promote abstinence (Ortiz-Ortega 2007). ProVida put forth proposals to guarantee the life of the
23
unborn. In defiance of the Catholic hierarchy, other Catholics worked to promote greater
reproductive choices. Following the tradition of Catholics for a Free Choice in the USA,
Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir (CDD) emerged first in Uruguay and Brazil, and then in
Mexico in 1987. It opened its first offices in Mexico in 1994 to promote legal abortion (Sánchez
Olvera 2009, 229-231). Pope John Paul II visited Mexico in 1990 and made clear the church’s
opposition to abortion.
Other Women’s Organizations formed to promote greater reproductive rights. In the
1970s the Coalition of Feminist Women (CMF) worked to legalize abortion. Salud Integral para
la Mujer (SIPAM) started giving workshops on sexuality and providing gynecological care in the
Federal District in 1987. In 1992, in the aftermath of the Chiapas effort to legalize abortion and
the Constitutional Reforms to grant legal recognition to the Catholic Church, Marta Lamas and
Patricia Mercado formed El Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida (GIRE) to spread
information about reproductive health and sexual rights from a feminist perspective and promote
the decriminalization of abortion in a professional way (Sánchez Olvera 2009, 224). GIRE was
originally funded with a grant from the McArthur Foundation.
International forces have also been important. These include UN commissions and
conferences (especially Beijing 1995), human rights groups (see Human Rights Watch 2006),
and the US government. The 1974 United Nations Conference on Population and Development
in Bucharest, Hungary may have played a role in Echeverría’s decision to legalize birth control
in 1974. Mexico approved CEDAW in 1982. In 1984 the second International Conference on
Population and Development took place in Mexico City. The United States representative issued
the “gag rule” in which the United States refused to fund any organizations that discussed or
provided abortion. Clinton suspended the “gag rule” in 1993, Bush reimposed, Obama
24
suspended it. The Third UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 was a
partial victory for the pro-choice movement in that it kept safe and legal abortion on the
international agenda.
Scholars of gender policy in Mexico tend to accept a centralized view of policymaking
and also tend to focus on national politics rather than state and local politics. Policy innovation
is often assumed to take place in Mexico City. When important policy innovations emerge in the
provinces, observers tend to explain them in terms of the interests of national issues. For
example in the coverage of Chiapas’ 1990 attempt to decriminalize abortion, commentators
suggested that it was a “trial balloon” sent up by the national PRI to see how the country would
react (Lamas 1992). Others speculated that it was an attempt by the national elite to drive a
wedge between the Catholic Church and the progressive groups that were working together to
organize indigenous groups in Chiapas. Thus, in this view, the abortion debate in Chiapas was
about national issues, not local politics. It is clear, however, with the abortion debate that began
in 2007 that policymaking is not always a process of the peripheral states harmonizing laws with
those of the center. In fact, we see just the opposite, with over half the states in the country
enacting anti-abortion reforms as a backlash to progressive changes in Mexico City.
Conclusions
In this paper I have outlined a model for understanding the spread of gender policy across
the states of Mexico. I argue that before the transition to democracy and the increase in political
autonomy of state governments that accompanied that transition, policy across the states was
marked by either idiosyncratic diversity or uniformity. Where policies lacked national salience
and the national elite were disinterested, state governments had defacto policy autonomy and
therefore idiosyncratic diversity emerged. When the PRI leadership had clear policy preferences,
25
states were pressured to adopt the policies preferred by the national elite and uniformity
emerged. After the transition to democracy, idiosyncratic diversity continued if there was no
national attention-focusing event. But in the aftermath of an attention-focusing event,
predictable policy diversity emerges and can be explained by the political and social
characteristics of the states.
In the case of abortion policy, there was policy uniformity until the 1970s. After national
debates on abortion and reproductive rights, it became apparent that the PRI did not have a clear
preference on abortion policy, and thus did not act to impose similar reforms across the country.
Instead, idiosyncratic diversity emerges. After the transition to democracy and the emergence of
national debates about abortion (related to the case of Paulina in 1999 and culminating with the
legalization of abortion in Mexico City in 2007) explainable diversity emerged, wherein the
states with a strong leftist party were more likely to support abortion rights than those where the
left was weak.
EXTRA STUFF
Case Study: Women’s Institutes in Mexico
María Luisa Tarrés’ description of the development of state level women’s institutes
across Mexico provides evidence of how the policy making process works. Inspired by the “Plan
Regional de Acción para Mujeres de América Latin y el Caribe” to promote gender equality in
the region developed at the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing, the
women’s movement began to press for the institutionalization of women’s interests. But only
after the presidential elections of 2000 did the idea for women’s institute make it onto the
national agenda. In the words are María Luisa Tarrés (2010, 237) “Mexico had not abstained
26
from this accord and, following some isolated local and state level initiatives to create programs
and government offices to implement the Plan de Acción, it was included in the national
agenda.” After the first fully democratic elections in modern Mexico in 2000, the PAN’s 20002006 National Development Plan included the development of a National Women’s Institute
(INMUJERES) and the National Program for Equality of Opportunity and against
Discrimination against Women (PROEQUIDAD).
How did these new institutions emerge across the states? Again in the words of Tarrés
(2010, 249) “Following several isolated attempts in different parts of the country to set up bodies
to this end, INMUJERES was created by a presidential decree on January 12, 2001.” Thus a few
states were at the forefront of innovating these new institutions, but the replication and diffusion
really took off after the development of these new institutions was placed on the national agenda.
Tarrés states (2010, 240) “The rate at which these bodies were set up was largely a function of
the political opportunities that opened as a gender perspective was legitimized by the advent of a
new democratic government and the publication of the PAN’s National Development Plan.” Ten
states had established women’s institutes before 2000 (another 8 in 2000 – so that’s 18 before the
PAN’s plan…). Demonstrating the idiosyncratic nature of early innovators, the state of Guerrero
established a Secretariat for Women in 1987, seven years before the Beijing meeting. Then in
the few years after Beijing a handful of other states established women’s institutes. By the
PAN’s decree of 2001, eighteen of the 32 subnational units had women’s institutes, then the rest
of the states followed suit afterwards. Conflict between state institutes and the national
INMUJERES. “Although the states were interested in such projects, there were frictions because
the state Institutes rarely participated in the design of the projects and felt that they did not reflect
regional or state-level realities. INMUJERES did not consult with the state Institutes on matters
27
such as time constraints and the local alliances that were needed to carry out the projects.
Therefore, the Institutes viewed INMUJERES as little more than an instrument and an
imposition of the federal government and saw its initiatives as limiting their input to only
carrying out decisions and directives. This widespread reaction makde the state-level officials
uncomfortable and hostile to INMUJERES’s activities.” (Tarres 2010, 244)
“Customization.” See Tarres (p. 240, 245) for variation of implementation and status
within administration. The director of the national INMUJERES was selected by the President
while the directors of the state institutes were appointed by the governor and therefore tended to
reflect the partisan preferences of the state’s government. At first feminist groups were critical
of the people chosen to lead the institutes (Tarrés 2010, 252). The national INMUJERES
provided more financial support to the state institutes were the PAN was in power (Tarres 2010,
245-246).
Instituto de la Mujer Oaxaqueña (IMO) See Tarrés 2006. Governor was PRI, but
Director was PRD. The two parties worked together to promote secular view of state and in
opposition to PAN. IMO targeted the public administration to introduce gender concerns into
policymaking. INMUJERES-DF in contrast targeted low income, vulnerable women to increase
their political participation through social programs. “In the end, a less modern way of thinking
about gender relations seemed to prevail in INMUJERES-DF under the 2000-2006
administration, compared to Oaxaca’s Institute during the same period. It is a paradox of
political life, considering that scientists and analysts make claims about the postmodernity of
Mexico City, and Oaxaca is seen as a less developed state.” (Tarrés, 248)
We can see this same pattern of early innovators, national action, then diffusion in the
implementation of gender quotas.
28
(Karch 2007) asks what factors facilitate or hinder the spread of policy innovations?
Does the impact of these factors vary across stages of the policy-making process? According to
Karch’s model, the two main constraints on policymaking are time constraints and electoral
constraints. Time constraints are most important during agenda setting and information
gathering. Electoral constraints are most important in later stages of policymaking.
Mohr’s (1969) theory of propensity to innovate is a function of: the motivation to
innovate, obstacles to innovation, available resources to overcome obstacles.
Berry and Berry use event history analysis to bring the propensity to innovate together
with diffusion.
Karch’s analysis moves beyond Berry and Berry’s classic study by pointing more
precisely to mechanisms at work in policy diffusion.
In chapter 2 Karch finds that the active support or opposition of legislative leaders or
governors is critical for enactment of policies. Chapter 3 argues that national debates raise the
visibility of issues and increase likelihood of landing on agenda. Chapter 4 shows that interstate
professional associations and other national organizations are influential during information
gathering. Chapter 5 shows that organizations representing intrastate constituencies affect
customization, explain variety of policies across states.
The diffusion of same sex marriage bans can be best explained by national advocacy
coalitions and internal state characteristics rather than regional diffusion or communications
among policy experts (Haider-Markel 2001). National advocacy coalitions are particularly
29
important for morality policy. Haider looks only at the bans, but the push for civil unions and
same sex marriage also resulted from the Hawaii decision. (like abortion in Mexico)
Policy entrepreneurs and school choice (Mintrom 1997).
When you lose a fight on one arena, you may seek to expand conflict into another arena.
If you lose at the national level, you can take the fight to the states (Baumgartner and Jones
1993).
Interstate professional associations and other national organizations are most influential
during information gathering, whereas organizations representing internal state constituencies
affect customization and can help explain the variety of policies across states (Karch 2007).
In trying to explain policy outbreaks Boushey focuses on three clusters of causal
variables: internal state characteristics, agents of diffusion, and the type of policy.
Regional diffusion requires the existence of the innovation in a neighboring state, though
regional diffusion may also reflect similar conditions or problems among geographically
contiguous states. Regional similarities in policy may reflect regional structural and historical
differences.
Thus our main explanatory variables are:
1. state characteristics
2. national forces (especially national salience, national attention)
3. type of policy
4. political autonomy of subnational units
For example, in a review of the research on women’s suffrage in Mexico, it is very
difficult to find a definitive list of which states granted women the right to vote before the federal
30
government in 1947 (for local elections) and 1953 (for national elections). All the studies
mention that Yucatán was the first state to grant women the right to vote in 1922, but most others
either fail to mention other states that gave women the right to vote, or mentions them only
briefly in passing. It seems as though no one thinks the extension of women’s suffrage at the
state level is at all significant. There appears to be no comparative study of women’s suffrage
movement in the states at all and very little case study investigation into women’s suffrage
movements in the states.
How do we explain policy diversity across subnational units? The first obvious answer
relates to the internal characteristics of the state. The social, political, and economic
characteristics of each state are clearly central to understanding which states adopt which
policies. Key factors include political ideology, religiosity, wealth, and varying institutional
rules. But not all policy diversity can be explained simply on the basis of internal state
characteristics. The diffusion process also depends on interstate or national forces that can
“carry” the policy across state borders and constrain the actions of subnational units. Moreover,
we should expect to see different patterns of policy diversity for different types of policies. A
final variable not included in the analysis of the US state politics, but clearly important in
comparative federalism is the political autonomy of subnational governments.
Two stages of policymaking: agenda setting and enactment. Different forces at work in
each stage. Karch sees agenda setting as happening simultaneously. If issue has national
salience it simultaneously makes it onto the agenda of all states. Then there is more variance and
customization in the enactment stage. This diversity will depend on state characteristics.
Karch
31
Karch (p. 29-30), “National intervention seems to affect which policies move onto state
political agendas. National debates, even if they are not resolved, often receive substantial
newspaper coverage and thereby raise the political profile of the policy under consideration.
State lawmakers frequently respond to these national debates by submitting legislation to
establish innovation.” Karch’s research shows that policy innovations tend to move onto state
agendas virtually simultaneously, the variance comes with enactment (p.30). Karch outlines a
bottom-up process in which ideas first spring up at the state level, then national debate begins,
then a top-down process in which the national debate spurs others states to enact the innovations.
(p. 30). Customization of policy – different states customize their policy innovations. Karch
hypothesizes that electoral considerations will affect the customization process (p. 33).
Customization may be the wrong word here. Customization suggests mostly the same
policy with minor differences, and does not account for opposing policies in different states.
This part of the process is missing from Karch’s model: Elections determine the general
ideology of policymakers. The general ideology of policymakers frames the agenda setting
process which determines what issues are deemed important, what information will be accepted
and who will be allowed to influence. Then the elected leaders set the agenda, decide what
policy alternatives are on the table. Once in power political leaders will promote their own
personal preferences to the extent that electoral considerations will allow them.
Control for electoral calendar in statistical analysis – innovation depends on when
governor is elected compared to president?
32
Why did almost all the states fall in line with VAW, but not with discrimination and
equality legislation? (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2009).
I also argue that we should expand the unit of analysis to include policy emulation and
policy backlash, rather than merely focusing on the diffusion of specific policies.
Unit of Analysis
The studies of US policy diffusion tend to focus on specific policies that are traced over
time and across states. This limited scope allows for more precision, but misses important
elements of policy diffusion. A broader unit of analysis that includes both policy emulation and
policy backlash would illuminate how media focusing events and national attention can engage
and activate activist coalitions on both sides of an issue. We should therefore be looking for
policy emulation as well as policy backlash. Thus, for example, rather than examining same sex
marriage bans in isolation, we should simultaneously analyze same sex marriage bans and
recognition of same sex marriage. It may also require a longer time horizon to capture the full
consequences of the policy dynamic. In terms of gay marriage in the US, for example, by the
year 2000, it seemed as though the main consequence of the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court
decision that opened up the possibility of legal recognition of gay marriage was to activate a
backlash and the widespread promotion of gay marriage bans across the country. From the
perspective of 2013, however, we can see there was a simultaneous process of backlash and
emulation. The backlash worked through the system very quickly, whereas the recognition of
same sex marriage diffused more slowly.
33
Sources
Bartra, Eli. 1994. "Mexico: The Struggle for Life, or Pulling Off the Mask of Infamy." In
Women and Politics Worldwide, eds. Barbara J. Nelson and Najama Caudhuri. New
Haven: Yale University Press. 449-460.
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and instability in American politics.
of American politics and political economy series. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Beer, Caroline C. 2003. Electoral competition and institutional change in Mexico. Notre Dame,
In.: University of Notre Dame Press.
———. 2006. Judicial Performance and the Rule of Law in the Mexican States. Latin American
Politics & Society 48 (3): 33-61.
Berry, Frances Stokes, and William D. Berry. 1990. State Lottery Adoptions as Policy
Innovations: An Event History Analysis. The American Political Science Review 84 (2):
395-415.
Blancarte, Roberto J. 2009. "The Changing Face of Religion in the Democratization of Mexico:
The Case of Catholicism." In Religious pluralism, democracy, and the Catholic Church
in Latin America, ed. Frances Hagopian. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame
Press. 225-256.
Blofield, Merike. 2006. The politics of moral sin : abortion and divorce in Spain, Chile and
Argentina. New York: Routledge.
———. 2008. Women's Choices in Comparative Perspective: Abortion Policies in LateDeveloping Catholic Countries. Comparative Politics 40 (4): 399-419.
Blofield, Merike H., and Liesl Haas. 2005. Defining a Democracy: Reforming the Laws on
Women's Rights in Chile, 1990-2002. Latin American Politics & Society 47 (3): 35-68.
Boushey, Graeme. 2010. Policy diffusion dynamics in America. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Carpizo, Jorge. 1978. El presidencialismo mexicano. 1. ed. México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Mexico. 2009. Segundo informe especial 2008 :
sobre el derecho de igualdad entre mujeres y hombres. 1. ed. México, D.F.: Comisión
Nacional de los Derechos Humanos.
Cowell-Meyers, Kimberly, and Laura Langbein. 2006. In Search of Women's Policy. Conference
Papers -- American Political Science Association: 1-29.
34
Crespo, José Antonio. 1996. Votar en los estados : analisis comparado de las legislaciones
electorales estatales en México. 1. ed. México, D.F.: Fundación Friedrich Naumann.
Dye, Thomas R. . 1966. Politics, economics, and the public; policy outcomes in the American
States Chicago: Rand McNally.
Eisenstadt, Todd A. 2004. Courting democracy in Mexico : party strategies and electoral
institutions. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy : public
opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Garrido, Luis Javier. 1989. "The Crisis of Presidencialismo." In Mexico's Alternative Political
Futures, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius, Judith Gentleman and Peter H. Smith. San Diego:
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego. 417-434.
GIRE. 2009. "Cronología de la despenalización del aborto en México." In www.gire.org.mx.
Mexico D.F.: Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida, A.C. (GIRE).
———. 2013. "Legislación en el Distrito Federal." In.
https://www.gire.org.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=407&Itemid
=1152&lang=es: Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida.
———. 2013. "Legislación Estatal." In.
https://www.gire.org.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=409&Itemid
=1154&lang=es: Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida.
González M., Lucero. 1992. La penalización del aborto en México. Política y Cultura 1
(Autumn): 49-55.
Gray, Virginia. 1973. Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study. The American Political
Science Review 67 (4): 1174-1185.
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 2001. Policy Diffusion as a Geographic Expansion of the Scope of
Political Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the 1990s. State Politics and Policy
Quarterly 1 (5): 5-26.
Haider-Markel, Donald P., and Kenneth J. Meier. 1996. The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights:
Expanding the Scope of the Conflict. The Journal of Politics 58 (2): 332-349.
Hernández-Rodríguez, Rogelio. 2003. The Renovation of Old Institutions: State Governors and
the Political Transition in Mexico. Latin American Politics & Society 45 (4): 97-127.
Htun, Mala, and Timothy J. Power. 2006. Gender, Parties, and Support for Equal Rights in the
Brazilian Congress. Latin American Politics & Society 48 (4): 83-104.
Htun, Mala, and S. Laurel Weldon. 2010. When Do Governments Promote Women's Rights? A
Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy. Perspectives on
Politics 8 (01): 207-216.
Human Rights Watch. 2006. "The Second Assault: Obstructing Access to Legal Abortion After
Rape in Mexico," http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/03/06/mexico-second-assault.
Karch, Andrew. 2007. Democratic laboratories : policy diffusion among the American states.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lamas, Marta. 1992. El feminismo mexicano y la lucha por legalizar el aborto. Política y
Cultura 1 (Autumn): 9-22.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1964. Review: American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political
Theory. World Politics 16 (4): 677-715.
———. 1972. Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice. Public Administration Review 32
(4): 298-310.
35
MacDonald, Laura, and Lisa Mills. 2010. "Gender, Democracy and Federalism in Mexico:
Implications for Reproductive Rights and Social Policy." In Federalism, Feminism, and
Multilevel Governance, eds. Melissa Haussman, Marian Sawer and Jill Vickers.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 187-198.
Mintrom, Michael. 1997. Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation. American
Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 738-770.
Mohr, Lawrence B. 1969. Determinants of Innovation in Organizations. American Political
Science Review 63: 111-26.
Mooney, Christopher Z., and Mei-Hsien Lee. 1995. Legislative Morality in the American States:
The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform. American Journal of Political Science
39 (3): 599-627.
Ochoa Ávalos, María Candelaria. 2007. "La Construcción de la Agenda de Género en el
Congreso de Jalisco." In Cuando la democracia nos alcance : sistemas de cuotas y
agendas de género en Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Colima, Durango, Guerrero,
Jalisco y Nayarit, ed. Lourdes C. Pacheco Ladrón de Guevara. Tepic, Nayarit and
México, D.F: Universidad Autónoma de Nayarit and Casa Juan Pablos.
Ortiz-Ortega, Adriana. 2007. "Law and the Politics of Abortion." In Decoding Gender: Law and
Practice in Contemporary Mexico, eds. Helga Baitenmann, Victoria Chenaut and Ann
Varley. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 197-212.
Ortiz-Ortega, Adriana, and Mercedes Barquet. 2010. Gendering Transition to Democracy in
Mexico. Latin American Research Review 45: 108-137.
Patton, Dana. 2007. The Supreme Court and Morality Policy Adoption in the American States:
The Impact of Constitutional Context. Political Research Quarterly 60 (3): 468-488.
Poniatowska, Elena. 2000. Las mil y una-- : la herida de Paulina. 1. ed of Crónica. Barcelona:
Plaza y Janés Editores.
Rodríguez, Candelaria. 2000. "El primer intento por despenalizar el aborto en México fue en
Chiapas en 1990." In CIMAC.
Rojas, Rosa. 1994. Chiapas, y las mujeres qué? 2 vols of Colección Del dicho al hecho. México:
Ediciones la Correa Feminista.
Sánchez Olvera, Alma Rosa. 2009. Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos en México: Feminismo y
construcción de la ciudadanía para las mujeres. Mexico D.F.: Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México, Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán.
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. 2006. Bottom-up Federalism: The Diffusion of
Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States. American Journal of Political Science
50 (4): 825-843.
———. 2008. The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion. American Journal of Political Science 52
(4): 840-857.
Solt, Frederick. 2004. Electoral Competition, Legislative Pluralism, and Institutional
Development: Evidence from Mexico's States. Latin American Research Review 39 (1):
12.
Stevenson, Linda S. 2000. "Gender politics and policy process in Mexico, 1968-2000 : symbolic
gains for women in an emerging democracy." Thesis (Ph D ) University of Pittsburgh,
2000.
Tarrés, María Luisa. 2010. "New Challenges in Feminist Practice: The Women's Institutes in
Mexico." In Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean, eds. Elizabeth Maier
and Nathalie Lebon. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 236-254.
36
Walker, Jack L. 1969. The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States. The American
Political Science Review 63 (3): 880-899.
How do you measure “awareness”?
Reform was announced in Chilpancingo, Gro, the center of guerilla movements, clearly a response to armed
opposition and an attempt to draw the armed opposition into the electoral arena. Get more precise details here and
Look in Eisenstadt for some more examples…
iii
Operationalize national issue salience by stories on issue in national press.
iv
Librarians versus special education teachers.
v
Htun and Weldon’s typology suggests a rigidity (static and uniform) character to religious doctrine which may not
be completely accurate. The morality policy literature in the U.S. takes a more flexible view and acknowledges that
issues can be politicized and framed in different ways.
vi
Did all states add exemption for rape at this time?
vii
Birthrate in 1974 was 6.7 children per mother, fell by almost half within ten years – find full series of data here.
viii
This provision seems to be in the Penal Code of Colombia and Peru. Look into this some more.
ix
There was an interesting argument between Marta Lamas and Subcomandante Marcos regarding abortion in
Chiapas published on the editorial page of La Jornada on April 29 and May 11, 1994. Lamas accused the EZLN of
being influenced by the church and calling for the penalization of abortion. Marcos responded that the EZLN was
not calling for the penalization of abortion, and that indigenous women were not calling for the state to build
abortion clinics in Chiapas because they did not even have clinics for giving birth yet (Rojas 1994, pp. 139-145.
i
ii
37