Christine Hill
Dr. Monica Torres
Eng 555
May 4, 2010
I can only describe my experience in The Rhetoric of Science class as a journey that
eventually came full-circle. With each reading throughout the semester I found myself more and
more intrigued by the ideas of how knowledge is constructed and what is considered “objective”
in scientific discoveries. How has science uncovered certain “truths” and how has that
knowledge been conveyed? Each reading strengthened and reinforced by understanding of
epistemology.
We began our readings with Donna Haraway’s Situated Knowledges: The Science
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. Having no background in the
sciences I read the piece and appreciated Haraway’s argument, but had nowhere to place it in my
repertoire of feminist understanding . As we continued to read, however, about the social
construction of certain types of “truths”, Haraway’s article kept creeping back to me. The fact
that science has been a “man’s game” for centuries was hard to get around. It seemed to me that
a man’s “situation” or place in the world inevitably influenced him as a scientist and his
“objective” knowledge had to be bias given his position. As Simone de Beauvoir said,
“Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their
own point of view, which they confuse with the absolute truth” (de Beauvoir 143).
It wasn’t until we read The Rhetoric of Risk by Beverly Sauer that I realized I wanted to
investigate further the ideas of feminist epistemology and the possible influence more “feminist
sciences” would have on the scientific community. Sauer’s discussion in Chapter 5 of “The
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Rhetoric of Risk” focuses on multiple viewpoints or standpoints and she references Haraway
when she says “theories of knowledge production must take into account the situated viewpoints
of individuals within economic and social communities” (179). She continues with different
arguments that uphold the importance of feminism in rhetorical theory and translates the
necessity of feminist theory to the sciences. This chapter more or less solidified my interest in
further exploring the ideas of feminist epistemology.
What I would like to explore in this paper and in the literature I’ve chosen to discuss1 are
varying ideas and theories with regard to feminist epistemology. As I tend to lean toward a more
postmodern view of the world I do not place notions of “objectivity” or “truth” as things that are
commonly “discovered”. On the other hand, I am not a relativist, and I do acknowledge that
science has brought forth discoveries that certainly I cannot argue with given my complete lack
of scientific understanding. What I want to uncover are the ways in which “objective”
knowledge in science, which has been a traditionally male-dominated field, have been biased,
and how feminist epistemology can “un-do” and “re-do” some of the “damage” - damage that
has propagated the subjugation of women and other marginalized others.
The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on Stereotypical
Male-Female Roles by Emily Martin
This article originally appeared in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society in
1991. I begin with this article because it addresses some fundamental issues with regard to
I am indebted to Lauren Pressley’s annotated bibliography in finding many of
these articles. I have cited her bibliography on my Works Cited page.
1
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ideological bias in producing “objective” scientific knowledge and how the metaphors used in
transmitting this knowledge propagates gendered stereotypes about men and women/boys and
girls. The article discusses the metaphors that are used when discussing the reproductive
systems of men and women and, primarily, the egg and the sperm. Traditionally and, as the
article argues, well into the present, even after new scientific discoveries of the natures of the egg
and the sperm have been disclosed, these metaphors persist.
Martin gives the histories of how the reproductive system of women have been
surrounded by metaphors of death or failure (486). Menstruation has been described as the result
of the “death” of the tissue and the “debris” of the uterine lining. Male reproductive systems, on
the other hand have been described as “remarkable”, “amazing” and “productive” (486). The
roles of the egg and sperm have been translated in textbooks and scholarly articles using much
the same rhetoric. The egg, “passive”, the “damsel in distress”, waiting to be “rescued”, “drifts
along the fallopian tube”. The sperm on the other hand, undertake a remarkable journey through
the deep, dark vaginal passage. The sperm are streamlined, and have an amazing “velocity” that
“propels” them along in order to “penetrate” the egg (489). Even when more recent studies in
the 1980s revealed the egg’s role as quite active and the sperm’s “velocity” and “strength” not
exactly what was originally thought, the metaphors persisted. The egg, with its new active role,
was given a Black Widow, spider-like metaphors. The egg “captures and tethers” the sperm and
has membrane-bound projections that “reach out and clasp the sperm” (498).
Martin argues that we need more egalitarian metaphors and that this is clearly a feminist
challenge: to “wake up sleeping metaphors in science”. By doing so, she argues, we can
“become aware of their implications” and diminish their power to “naturalize our social
conventions about gender”.
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Martin’s article about uncovering basic, fundamental biases begins my journey into the
exploration of finding out how feminist epistemology can aid in uncovering more complex
systems of bias and subjugation that exist in the production of scientific “objective” knowledge.
Why Gender Is a Relevant Factor in the Social Epistemology of Scientific Inquiry
by Kristina Rolin
Kristina Rolin’s article is a defense of feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy
from critics’ accusations that center around theories of “noncognitive values”. I appreciate
Rolin’s extensive description of how social aspects of science are often gendered. Her article
and discussion of credibility echoed Latour’s and Woolgar’s discussion only in a more gendered
way.
Rolin’s main argument is that “1) producing gender-sensitive analyses of the social
dimensions of scientific inquiry and 2) examining the relevance of these analyses for normative
issues in the philosophy of science” (881) are the main ways in which feminist theories in the
sciences contribute to our understanding and production of knowledge.
In order to support her argument she explores existing, social, “noncognitive” aspects of
epistemology in the scientific community. She focuses on trust, the dynamics of communication,
and the distribution of research effort among theories and research programs. Gender, she says,
can be both a negative and positive aspect. In a negative light, “gender bias interferes with
scientists’ evaluations of colleagues’ trustworthiness or when the gendered dynamics of
communication function as obstacles to inclusive and critical dialogue” that make it impossible
to reach goals. On the positive side, “sensitivity to gender bias generates a distribution of
research effort, thereby increasing the likelihood that alternative theories and hypotheses will be
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developed and tested” (881). Because of these reasons, she states, gender is a relevant
methodological factor in science.
The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology by Lynn Hankinson Nelson
Lynn Hankinson Nelson undertakes another defense of feminist epistemology in her
article, only she defends it against other feminists and epistemologists. This article outlines
important aspects of disagreement among feminists. Some critics, and Nelson quotes Susan
Haack, have claimed that “feminist epistemology” is as incongruous - as incongruous as, say,
“Republican epistemology” (33). A general claim for such incongruity is “analyses or theories
of knowledge which are informed by feminism are incongruous because they constitue a mix of
politics and apolitical inquiry and knowledge” (39). Haack, says Nelson, is worried that inquiry
will become politicized.
Another critic of feminist epistemology, Lorraine Code, has said that epistemology is “a
project to construct a monolithic, comprehensive theory of knowledge” (34). Her view of
feminist epistemology is that it “would seem to require a basis in assumptions about the essence
of women” (34). Code has suggested, says Nelson, that feminist intervene in order to unmask
“claims of universality” (40), there needs to be a distance between feminism and epistemology.
Nelson, however, sees this as both unnecessary and detrimental. She believes that this would
give rise to a justification of “ignoring the insights feminist analysis afford”.
Abandoning epistemology - vowing to intervene only from the sidelines
in the role of ‘spoilers’ or whistle-blowers - threatens to minimize the
force of feminist critiques aimed at revealing these consequences and
identifying their sources and implications (41).
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Nelson argues that epistemology (in general) and feminist epistemology are both
nebulous and ambiguous, and must always change. She calls for “…less dismissiveness acrossand more skepticism concerning-the lines alleged to divide us” (45).
In Search of Feminist Epistemology by Helen Longino
Helen Longino’s article is an dense exploration on what can or should be considered
feminist epistemology and, once we have our criteria, what can be done with it? After dismissing
both standpoint theory and embodied knowledge as not epistemological she offers her view of
“doing” science and “doing” epistemology as feminists. In this way, she says, an approach may
be taken to scientific activity with a “feminist sensibility”.
Longino goes into a lengthy discussion of six criteria of epistemology and how a feminist
sensibility can enhance it. Empirical adequacy entails a general agreement on observational or
experiential claims. The standard, according to a feminist sensibility, “is one shared with raceand-class-sensitive research communities as well as with most mainstream communities” (474).
Novelty asks that we take an oppositional stance. This would be in line with the works of both
Harding and Haraway. Ontological heterogeneity rejects theories of inferiority and “permits
equal standing for different types: “difference is resource, not failure” (475). Complexity of
relationship draws from work by Evelyn Fox Keller and Anne Fausto-Sterling in that all factors
influence others. Applicability to current human needs strives to improve the material aspects of
human life (475). Diffusion of power she calls the “practical version” of complexity of
relationship.
All of these criteria, says Longino, require interpretation in order to fit into a certain
context. She advocates “treating them as components of a community set of public standards”
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that can be applied to the “assessment of theories [and] guiding theory acceptance and rejection”
(476).
As other authors on my reading list emphasize, Longino realizes that these criteria must
constantly change as the “foundations” of epistemology are not fixed (478). Much like other
critics of feminist epistemology such as Lorraine Code, to whom Nelson refers, it seems to me
that Longino is calling for more intervention by feminists in epistemology. I do not see in
Longino’s argument, however, the “dismissiveness” that Nelson sees in Code’s argument.
Perhaps that is because throughout Longino’s article she consistently uses and references the
term “feminist epistemology”.
Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense by Elizabeth Anderson
Elizabeth Anderson’s article aims to place feminist epistemology within the branch of
“naturalized, social epistemology” in that it studies the influences of gender and gendered
experiences on the production of knowledge. She explains that naturalized epistemologists “ask
of science that it provide an account of its own activity” (54). Social epistemology, she
continues, asks what social or cultural factors contribute to knowledge production.
Because both naturalized and social epistemology ask empirical questions it is important
to Anderson that a notion of “modest” empiricism be retained and employed by feminist
epistemologists even though the very thought of this notion might seem impossible. Empiricism,
however, in the “modest” sense, says Anderson, is a “purely methodological doctrine, which
rejects a priori commitments to what the content of our theories and models must be”. In this
way, the empirical claims feminist epistemologists make about the influence of gender on
science can be supported.
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Anderson investigates certain areas gendered categories such as the “gendered division
of theoretical labor”, “gender symbolism and the hierarchy of knowledge”, and “gender
symbolism: the content of theories” and, “androcentrism”. Within each of these categories she
describes and gives examples of cases of sexism and bias within the scientific community and
the knowledge that is produced. She discusses mixed-gender schools and the disadvantages that
girls have at the hands of biased teachers and disrupting boys in classrooms; scientists such as
Barbara McClintock’s inability to get hired as a professor despite her impressive credentials; and
the bias of the literature in science text books with regard to reproduction. She has this to say
about gendered symbolism in theoretical models: the models are not sexist but the “trouble lies
rather in the extraordinary political salience and rhetorical power of sexist gender ideology,
which generates numerous cognitive distortions” (68).
In a section entitled “The Local Character of Naturalized Feminist Epistemology”
Anderson discusses that feminist epistemologists need not depend upon “global” or
“transcendental” claims that “all knowledge is gendered or that rationality as a regulatory
epistemic ideal is masculine” (80). She continues by explaining that mixed-gendered
communities must work together in their inquiries. Anderson ends her article by saying “without
claiming that women, or feminists, have a globally different or privileged way or knowing,
naturalized feminist epistemology explains how feminist theory can productively transform the
field of theoretical knowledge” (81).
By ending her article on this note I think she is simply warning that feminist researchers
and critics must take great care not to generalize or over-generalize an idea of “privileged
positioning”. This “warning” to take care is a recurrent theme in many of these articles.
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The Concept of Truth in Feminist Sciences by Geoffrey Gorham
Geoffrey Gorham’s article explores and summarizes many of the theorists on my reading
list. His article is paramount in helping to deconstruct these arguments regarding “feminist
sciences” and he sets up his own theory of how feminist sciences or feminist epistemology might
best combat traditional male-dominated scientific “objective” knowledge and “truths”. His
argument is to find a “conception of knowledge that captures the objective (epistemic)
superiority of the feminist sciences without resorting to the objectivist ‘god-trick’ of traditional
epistemology” (100).
He investigates the theories of Sandra Harding, Donna Haraway, Helen Longino and
Susan Hekman. He quotes Hekman, saying “we need to consider how the feminist sciences can
embrace epistemic progress without falling into ‘the universalism and absolutisms of the
epistemology they claim to be replacing” (104). He says that ideas of “absolute truth” and
“relative truth” are dangerous. He states “it is unclear what is to keep internal realism from
degenerating into vulgar epistemological relativism” (106).
Based on his understanding of these theorists, he advocates what he calls “truthlikeness”,
an idea or theory that is more like the “truth” than an alternative theory. He gives examples of
both a linguistic and semantic approach to “truthlinkeness”. A linguistic approach can cause
problems with regard to a truth that involve a uniqueness and a fixation that could be construed
as an “absolute truth” (107-8). We need more “semantic” alternatives that do not presume a
single “truth” and adopts Longino’s call for a “model” that can count as knowledge. “The
theories of masculinst sciences can be faulted for importing into models gender relations and
stereotypes that have no real-world structural correlate” (111). He continues by saying the
models that feminist sciences can offer are more similar to the real-world (111).
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Gorham’s article helped me to understand of some of the theorists I read, Longino, in
particular. I appreciate his ideas of “truthlikeness” and think that there are ways in which
“approaching” the “truth”, rather than claiming it, can be beneficial, however I have reservations.
My understanding of pragmatism is little to none but its relationship to relativism raises a red
flag for me. I do not think, however, that Gorham is rigid in his understanding of
“truthlikeness”. It seems to me that he is simply trying to avoid what he calls “epistemological
contortions” by looking forward to theoretical progress (111).
Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial
Perspective by Donna Haraway
In this article Haraway discusses different “standpoints” from which to criticize
traditional Western claims of (objective) knowledge - scientific knowledge, in particular. She is
asking not for universal truths but for responsible and accountable theories as to how meaning is
made. How can science be objective if it simply another rhetorical practice?
Situated knowledge is what I understand to be gained more through experience - cultural
or otherwise. Haraway says “I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location,
positioning, and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to
make rational knowledge claims” (589). Knowledge is not infinite or universal.
Haraway is disturbed by a history of scientific “vision” that claims to be “universal”,
limitless - the “gaze” that objectifies everything. She suggests reclaiming the sense of vision in
order to unmask the scientific tricks in order to make objectivity more grounded and “particular”
rather than limitless and “irresponsible”. Again, she is stressing accountability. “Only partial
perspective”, she says, “promises objective vision” (583). Haraway introduces her vision for
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feminist objectivity: it is about “limited located and situated knowledge, not about
transcendence and splitting of subject and object. It allows us to become answerable for what we
learn and see” (583).
Also discussed are the different standpoints and the “preferred” positions of seeing, of
“vision”. The “standpoint of the subjugated” is one such preferred position because in principle
they are seen as “least likely to allow denial of the critical and interpretive core of all
knowledge” (584). However, “subjectivity is multidimensional; so, therefore is vision” subjugation is “not grounds for an ontology”.
Haraway also discusses the agency of the world in emphasizing her claim that humans
simply aren’t in charge. We are as finite as the knowledge we are able to produce. Rather than
trying to control what we are given I agree with Haraway that we must simply get along with it
and “structure” it as best we can.
Conclusion
The articles that I have discussed barely scratch the surface of the literature on feminist
epistemology. Many of the authors I read stress the importance of realizing the “great care” that
must be taken when doing the work of feminist epistemology. Care must be taken not to fall into
the trap of ideological bias. I was surprised to learn of the criticisms within the feminist
community but was incredibly impressed with how these authors deftly handled the criticisms.
Their arguments are valid, strong and well-articulated. Another surprise was the realization that
these articles were sort of locked within a certain time-frame. Curiously, with the exception of
Kristina Rolin’s article most on my list were written in the 1980s and 90s as were the majority of
the readings in Lauren Pressley’s bibliography. This leads me to ask several questions: Why has
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this discussion taken a “back seat” in the first decade of the twenty-first century? Was it simply
fashionable in the last two decades of last century? Are we already so entrenched in a postfeminist era that this issue has become “irrelevant”?
I look forward to investigating these questions and continuing this incredibly interesting
journey that I’ve begun. I am also looking forward to the possibly arduous task of unearthing
contemporary authors, articles and views that also discuss theories of feminist epistemology that
include other marginalized groups. This subject has become infinitely fascinating and important
to me on one level as a scholar but on another level as a mother of a young daughter. After
researching the literature on this subject I will forever be aware and try to instill in her an
awareness of the biases that are so often at the heart of what is conveyed as “objective” and
“true”.
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Works Cited
Anderson, Elizabeth. "Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense." Hypatia 10.3
(1995): 50-84. Print.
de Beauvoir, Simone. “The Second Sex. Trans. H. M Parshley. New York: Vintage, 1989. 143.
Print.
Gorham, Geoffrey. "The Concept of Truth in Feminist Sciences." Hypatia 10.3 (1995): 99-116.
Print.
Haraway, Donna. "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of
Partial Perspective." Feminist Studies 14.3 (1988): 575-99. Print.
Longino, Helen E. "In Search of Feminist Epistemology." Monist 77.4 (1994): 472-79. Print.
Martin, Emily. "The Egg and the Sperm: How Science has Constructed a Romance Based on
Stereotypical Male-Female Roles." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 16.3
(1991): 485-501. Print.
Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. "The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology." Hypatia 10.3 (1995): 3149. Print.
Pressley, Lauren. "Whose Knowledge is it Anyway? Feminist Epistemology and Science: An
Annotated Bibliography." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward Zalta. N.p.,
1 Dec. 2005. Web. 6 May 2010.
<http://laurenpressley.com/papers/feminist_epistemology.pdf>.
Rolin, Kristina. "Why Gender is a Relevant Factor in the Social Epistemology of Scientific
Inquiry." Philosophy of Science 71 (2004): 880-91. Print.
Sauer, Beverly. The Rhetoric of Risk. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003. 179.
Print.
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