UN Peacekeeping Missions and Human Trafficking
Maria Hamdouchi & Annalise McGrail
ABSTRACT: Does the presence of UN peacekeeping missions provoke the subsequent
creation of a sex trafficking market? While the United Nations seeks to promote the
peaceful resolution of conflict, observers have alleged that the presence of UN personnel
may exacerbate weak governance, corruption and poverty, leading to the increased
exploitation of women and children (Agathangelou & Ling. 2003; Ferstman 2013;
Murray 2002). Much of the existing literature supporting these claims relies heavily on
qualitative analysis. Our study examines a dataset of 179 countries over the period 20002011 to demonstrate that the presence of UN missions in fact decrease levels of human
trafficking within two years. Our results are statistically significant at the 5% level, even
after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as country-fixed effects.
1
UN Peacekeeping Missions and Human Trafficking
Maria Hamdouchi & Annalise McGrail
1. Introduction
“[Sex trafficking] is the dirty secret of UN interventions around the world – the
nasty underbelly that no one wants to confront."
~ Martina Vandenberg of Human Rights Watch1
Since 1995, the United Nations has been the target of incessant allegations of
increasing levels of human trafficking abroad. Critics tend to argue one of two claims:
either the influx of foreign personnel creates a demand for the trafficking industry, which
is then satisfied through illicit means, or the presence of UN missions has a destabilizing
effect on local governments, thereby indirectly creating suitable conditions for a thriving
sex trafficking market.
As observers have noted, there seems to be a positive trend between the presence
of UN missions and the emergence or growth of a domestic trafficking industry. We
believe, however, that this may be the result of an inherent selection problem: UN
missions tend to exist mainly in destabilized or war-torn countries, so it should come as
no surprise that countries experiencing a mission exhibit higher levels of trafficking.
While some scholars focus on isolated incidents in which UN personnel directly
engaged in the trafficking industry, these accusations are often broadened to criticize the
institutions of foreign intervention and peacekeeping as a whole (Agathangelou & Ling.
2003; Ferstman 2013). It is while investigating the latter that we begin to question
whether or not these claims may be validated through statistical analysis. When analyzed
1 Extracted from Bolkovac 2011: 177
2
in context, does the mere presence of UN personnel exacerbate weak governance,
corruption and poverty, and lead to the increased exploitation of women and children, as
scholars have suggested?
We claim that the defamation of UN peacekeeping missions is due to isolated
incidents of trafficking, and once the dynamics are viewed in context, these missions in
fact diminish the rate of human trafficking. Although the influx of UN personnel may
fuel the demand for sex trafficking temporarily, its effect of reducing the supply (either
directly or indirectly) is more durable.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we explain the
connection between the United Nations peacekeeping mission and human trafficking.
Section 3 introduces our study’s variables of interest and lays the context for why we
selected each variable. Section 4 presents our methodology in approaching the study. We
discuss our results in Section 5, including the analysis of significant control variables.
Our findings support our hypothesis and suggest that countries that experienced UN
peacekeeping missions are less likely to house a human trafficking industry during the
years following the year of intervention. The final section discusses the significance of
our findings in context of recommendations for future United Nations peacekeeping
policy and strategy.
2. Background: United Nations peacekeeping missions and human trafficking
Human trafficking, like any other illicit network, is driven by motives for
economic profit (Telleyrand 2007). Military intervention creates the monetary incentive
needed for the formation of human trafficking networks by increasing the inflow of both
foreign money and individuals willing to engage in the prostitution industry (Biman et al.
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2000; Schloenhardt 1999; Salt & Stein 1997). As a result, where there is military conflict
there is usually a rampant sex industry residing alongside it (Smith 2011).
Scholars argue that there are two primary models by which illicit sex industries
emerge in the military sphere. The first is as a war tactic where women are held captive,
forced into the industry, and used as sex slaves for soldiers. The second form develops as
a government-regulated sex industry—created by the new demand of soldiers— that
functions as a means for soldiers to “rest and relax.” In this second model, the military
personnel do not directly hold the women captive or traffic the women themselves; they
do, however, create the demand that incentivizes the criminal behavior of sex trafficking
(Telleyrand 2007).
This dynamic is complicated in context of United Nations peacekeeping missions.
On the one hand, UN peacekeeping intervention bears the same characteristics as any
military intervention that might cause human trafficking would: demand for sex and the
money needed to pay for it. What differentiates UN peacekeeping missions is its intent to
bring peace, stability, and protection of civilians to insecure regions. The question then
becomes: how does this intent influence human trafficking industries in the countries of
intervention?
The United Nations peacekeeping missions were first criticized for sexual
misconduct against civilian populations during an operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)
from 1992-1994 (Fleshman 2005: 16). Following the exposure of this operation, reports
were released revealing forced prostitution related to UN missions in Somalia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Cambodia (Lupi 1998; Amnesty International 2004;
Martin 2005; Phal 1995).
4
In response to these allegations, the United Nations instituted a zero tolerance
policy in 2003 entitled “Special Measure for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and
Sexual Abuse” (ST/SGB/2003/13). The zero tolerance policy applies to all United
Nations staff, including those under the administration of programs separate from the
United Nations. This is critical, because even though the United Nations contracts out a
number of its services, all individuals serving on behalf of the missions are protected by
immunity within the country of intervention. The document outlines that, “United
Nations force conducting operations under United Nations command and control are
prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, and have a
particular duty to care towards women and children.”
Despite this zero tolerance policy, allegations against the United Nations have
persisted. Jordan’s Ambassador to the United States, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein,
released a report in 2005 titled A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, which exposed the
alarming extent to which sexual abuse and engagement in human trafficking were
widespread among UN missions.
As a result of these multiple allegations, scholars have reached the consensus that
United Nations peacekeeping troops are at fault for directly increasing human trafficking
within the country of intervention. Existing literature, however, has so far limited itself to
focusing exclusively on the direct effect of UN intervention on isolated incidents of
demand, but has yet to explore the stabilizing impact of the presence of the missions on
quelling the strength of the industry on balance.
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3. The Theory: Human Trafficking
There is an inherent problem in analyzing human trafficking data due its illegality
and focus on “hidden populations.” Human trafficking is by nature an illegal and
clandestine activity, so it is only documented when there is a specific incident report.
Individuals exploited by the industry are often incapable of reporting and bystanders lack
the incentive; therefore, in reality, trafficking flows far exceed reported numbers. In
addition, human trafficking involves transactions between “hidden populations,” which
Tyldum and Brunovskis (2005) define as “a group of individuals for whom the size and
boundaries are unknown, and for whom no sampling frame exists.” Consequently, many
of those engaged in human trafficking exist under the radar and remain undetected.
Despite the difficulties presented in measuring the true scope of human
trafficking, there have been extensive efforts to collect, record, and analyze the available
data. Therefore, even if it may not be possible to measure the exact change in human
trafficking flows, it is possible to observe trends.
The study of human trafficking can be divided into two categories: push and pull
factors. Push factors relate to the elements that cause individuals to be trafficked from
their country of origin, whereas pull factors are those that drive trafficking inflows to a
specific location. As we intend to analyze the effects of United Nations Peacekeeping
missions on the demand for human trafficking, we will address the appropriate pull
factors.
Cho contends in, “Modelling for Determinants of Human Trafficking,” that the
literature has suggested more than 60 potential human trafficking pull factors (Cho 2012).
She tests each of these factors in order to identify the “true” variables influencing human
6
trafficking, and finds that there are three variables that prove robust: (log) GDP per
capita; language fraction; and information flows (Cho 2012: 20).
Human trafficking is driven by the potential for economic profit (UNODC
2009*****). Traffickers stand to profit in countries with large markers and wealthy
customers, therefore a large GDP per capita is a pull factor (Jakobsson and Kotsdam
2011: 92***). Second, linguistically divided countries experience greater human
trafficking. Akee et al. (2010) suggests that this is likely due to the fact that countries
with a large number of minorities are more likely to host informal and exploitive labor
markets. Lastly, Cho argues that information flows decrease human trafficking,
suggesting that better information flows may increase the awareness of human
trafficking, and lessen the likelihood that individuals are exploited (Cho 2012: 21).
4. Data
Our study analyzes the effect of United Nations Peacekeeping missions on human
trafficking inflows. In order to measure this effect we use data provided by the United
Nations accounting for all missions from 1948-2013 (UN 2013)2. Country year
observations that were in the year of a mission are coded as a 1, while those without are a
0.
We analyze human trafficking data related to forced prostitution for 179 countries
from 2000-2011.3 We use the Human Trafficking Indictors (HTI) dataset, which
2
This list can be found at the following url:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf
3
There are three widely accepted data sources for human trafficking: The United Nations Office on Drug
and Crime (UNODC), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the US Department of State (Cho
2012: 10-11).The UNODC data only covers years 2006, 2009, and 2012, while the ILO data provides an
aggregate number of cases from 1995-2000.
7
compiles the US Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports.4 The
dataset uses a dichotomous indicator of 0 or 1 depending on if the country experiences a
significant level of human trafficking within the year. A significant level of trafficking as
defined by the ILO is 100 or more reported cases in a given year. It is impossible to
measure the true level of human trafficking within a country, and as a result, measuring
the change in total number of reports would be misleading and subjective. We can
determine, however, with a certain level of certainty, whether or not there was a
significant level of trafficking within the country of interest. Therefore, our study assess
the potential large scale impact UN peacekeeping missions have on human trafficking
inflows.
This study specifically focuses on trafficking related to the destination of forced
prostitution. The distinction between source and destination is important, as different
factors influence each of these in different ways (Cho 2012). As we attempt to explore
the claim that United Nations Peacekeeping missions increase the demand for forced
prostitution and therefore the demand for human trafficking, it is most appropriate to
evaluate the trafficking pull factors within a country.
The descriptive statistics of the two variables - presence of a mission and whether
or not a country is a destination for sex trafficking - are shown below.
4
This study uses the United Nations definition of human trafficking, defined as “the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN 2004).
8
5. Methodology
The descriptive statistics are alone insufficient in illustrating a causal relationship
between United Nations Peacekeeping missions and human trafficking. We employ our
baseline specification based on the model provided by Cho (2012) including GDP per
capita(log); language fractionalization; and information flows.5 While not robust among
all three widely accepted human trafficking datasets, Cho also suggests that refugees
(log), international tourism (log), and population (log) could be significant factors for
human trafficking. Therefore, we adopt these variables in our study.
In addition to the baseline specification provided by Cho, there are three other
major theoretical camps for the causes of human trafficking that we have applied to this
study: democracy, conflict level, and anti-trafficking efforts (Fein 2007; Akee et al. 2010;
Cho, Dreher, & Neumayer 2011). In order to address democracy we use the dataset
presented in Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s 2010 paper, “Democracy and Dictatorship
Revisited,6” where countries with a democracy are coded as 1 and those without as a 0.
We account for the role of conflict in the state by using the Uppsala University’s
Department of Peace and Conflict Research UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset , which
accounts for all armed conflict within a given year.7 Lastly, the Human Trafficking
5
We use the same data sources as Cho, except that our World Bank data is updated. The sources are:
World Bank (2013); Alesina et. al. (2003); and Dreher (2006)
6
Note: The original paper covers years 1946-2008. Our study extends the data out to 2011 accounting for
any major changes in democracy.
7 It defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least
9
Indicators dataset accounts for factors within the three major forms of anti-trafficking
measures: prosecution, protection, and prevention. We include the most significant
variable within each of these three categories: domestic laws, minimal protection
progress, and minimal progress in preventing human trafficking. Lastly, in order to
aggregate the data points for total anti-trafficking efforts, we also include a “minimum
standards” variable, indicating whether the government fully complies with the minimum
anti-trafficking efforts, as defined by the ILO’s TIP report.
In order to assess the impact of United Nations Peacekeeping missions on human
trafficking we employ both logit and conditional logit regressions. We use the logit
regression to analyze human trafficking within a given year of intervention. It is
important to note that we are not arguing a causal relationship in this regression; instead,
we attempt to observe the level of human trafficking at the time of intervention.
Second, we use a conditional logit model in order to control for country-fixed
effects. Within this model we show the progression from zero to three years following the
country year observation of a mission in order to account for the potential lag in
stabilizing effect of United Nations personnel on the trafficking industry.
There is indeed an issue of potential endogeneity, which we address through our
conditional logit model. By including country-fixed effects, we control for unobserved
heterogeneity across countries. In other words, each country is analyzed individually with
regards to its unique descriptive statistics, instead of in comparison to other countries.
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”
10
5. Results
Our initial regression results appear to support our hypothesis that United Nations
peacekeeping missions have a stabilizing effect on human trafficking rates related to
demand for forced prostitution.
Table 1: Sex Trafficking and Lagged UN Missions
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Column 1 shows our logit results at the year of a peacekeeping mission. Our
United Nations mission variable is statistically insignificant, but positive. As we are not
arguing a causal relationship in this first regression, the lack of a statistically significant
result is not of consequence to these authors. What is important, however, is that our
independent variable shows a positive relationship. Therefore, the United Nations tends
to intervene in countries with a market for human trafficking. This is in line with human
trafficking literature indicating that countries with greater conflict - where UN
peacekeeping missions are usually located - tend to experience greater rates of human
trafficking (Akee et al. 2010).
Columns 2 to 6 demonstrate the conditional logit results spanning from the year
of an observed mission up to a three year lag. The independent variable of a United
Nations peacekeeping mission is negative, but insignificant up until two years following
the country year observation of a mission. When lagged for two and then three years, the
independent variable is significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that UN
peacekeeping missions do in fact quell human trafficking in a country of intervention, but
the effects are not immediate.
It is important to note that the number of observations drop from 1106 to 611
when changing from the logit to conditional logit regression. This is due to the fact that
the conditional logit regressions drop all counties with observations of human trafficking
within all observed years or the lack thereof. This in fact strengthens our case as it
indicates that the strength of our results is not on account of selection bias.
Column 6 demonstrates the conditional logit results when dropping the
insignificant variables. Surprisingly, the statistical significance of United Nations
12
peacekeeping missions lessens once accounting for this change. This is likely due to the
change in number of observations from 611 to 869, and potentially indicates that the
available data was too limiting. Despite the lessening statistical significance, the variable
is still significant to the 5% level; therefore, this change is not of concern to these
authors.
The control variables in this study warrant discussion as well. The following
variables are in line with the literature explored in section 3 and 4: GDP per capita (log),
population (log), refugees (ln), minimum standards, minimal protection progress, and
minimal progress in preventing human trafficking.
We are surprised to find that information flows have the opposite effect of what
Cho’s baseline specification suggests. She argues that increased availability of
information ought to increase the awareness of human trafficking, and thereby prevent
the possibility of exploitation; however, our results suggest the opposite. This may be
explained by the fact that human trafficking in context of the intervention by United
Nations personnel, is often sourced within the country (SOURCE). While Cho (2012)
indicates that information flows are a negative pull factor they are a positive push factor,
and could potentially explain the unexpected results.
We are also surprised to find that cumulative intensity, democracy, domestic laws,
and tourism have the opposite effect as one might expect. When viewed in context the
regression results presented by Cho (2012), the effect of democracy is not entirely
surprising. She finds the effect of democracy to vary depending on what dataset she uses;
therefore no clear conclusion can be made as to the effect of democracy on human
trafficking inflows. We then turn to domestic laws, which our results indicate has a
13
positive relationship to human trafficking. It is surprising that anti-trafficking laws might
actually increase the level of trafficking within a country. This may indicate that the
illegality of the industry pushes it further underground, so that it is difficult to effectively
combat. Lastly, we are surprised by the negative result of tourism. As the logit results are
positives there may be a case for endogeneity in that it appears not to hold when
controlling for country fixed effects.
6. Conclusion
Our regressions present a contrary image of the impact of UN peacekeeping
missions on human trafficking flows that does not align itself with the majority of preexisting literature. It is important to note however, that we do not intend to directly refute
those who condemn the United Nations peacekeeping missions for trafficking abuses. We
do not argue that UN personnel have been wrongly accused of harming civilian
populations or engaging in human trafficking. Instead, our analysis focuses on extending
the discussion to involve the full scope of the dynamics at play in human trafficking.
While it may be true that some UN personnel create demand for trafficking, the
stabilizing effect of the United Nations has an overall result of lessening the rate of
human trafficking within a country.
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