Graduate School
Negative Effects of Humanitarian Aid
in Civil War:
The Case of Operation Life Line Sudan
Masters’ Thesis One Year
In Development Studies
Spring Term 2011
Supervisor: Isabelle Cote
Yosra El Gendi
Abstract
It is assumed that humanitarian aid in civil war does good by relieving the
suffering of the civilians undergoing hardship. However, some authors claim that
aid can also lead to the exasperation and prolongation of conflict. In this paper we
test the hypothesis that humanitarian aid can lead to the exasperation of conflict in
civil wars. Taking Operation Life line Sudan as an example this thesis present
different ways in which humanitarian aid interacted negatively with the Second
Sudanese Civil war 1983- 2005. Three theories are applied: capacity building
theory, structural conflict and conflict dynamics theory. Each of these theories
present a perspective on how the conflict was exasperated. We argue that the
separation of the OLS into different sectors and the different ways they applied
relief strategies aided the structural division between both sides. Aid help increase
the conflict, both in a latent way via increasing the institutionalized repression of
certain groups in society and in a manifest way through interacting with the war
dynamics. We also argue that OLS aided the factionalization of the Southern
Movement as well as increasing repression over the Nuba Mountains inhabitants
and displaced population around Khartoum. We end this paper with a comparison
with the different effects of aid in the North and South based on the three theories
named above.
Key words: Operation Lifeline Sudan, conflict dynamics, structural violence,
capacity building, Sudan civil war
Words: 9,659
Table of contents
A
Thesis........................................................................................................................ 1
1. Introduction............................................................................................................ 1
2. Method .................................................................................................................. 4
3. Theory ................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 Capacity Building and Vulnerability Reduction 6
3.2 Structural Violence 7
3.3 Conflict Dynamics 9
4. Civil war In Sudan .............................................................................................. 11
5. Operation LifeLine Sudan .................................................................................. 12
6. Analysis The effect of Aid on Conflict ................................................................ 14
6.1 Capacity Building and Vulnerability Reduction 18
6.2 Structural Violence 18
6.3 Conflict Dynamics 19
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 20
B.
References .............................................................................................................. 22
A. Thesis
A.1 Introduction
On average, $7.6
billion are given yearly in humanitarian aid to states
undergoing emergencies since 1990 till the present time (Walmsley, 2010).
Humanitarian aid, has been on the rise over the last 20 years, from a 3.4 billion
dollars in 1990 reaching a peak in 2008 of 11.8 billion (Walmsley, 2010).
Similarly, humanitarian agencies have boomed since the end of the Cold War (
Shearer). It is assumed that aid can help to reduce and prevent suffering by
providing treatment, food, clean water and other vital necessities to people
undergoing hardships due to disasters ( Anderson: 1998, 117).
But can
humanitarian aid be a cause of prolongation and the exasperation of natural or
human made disasters? Can it be a cause of increasing the suffering of people
rather than alleviating their hardships?
Total humanitarian aid, 1990-2009. (Walmsley, 2010)
Humanitarian aid is aid in emergency situations such as natural or man made (eg
wars) disasters that aim at alleviating the suffering of people and maintaining their
human dignity (Rose et al, 2008, 458) It is differentiated from development aid
that aims at developing sustainable systems and propelling growth. (Macrea et al,
1997, 224 ). It usually includes basic requirements of water, sanitation, nutrition,
shelter, healthcare, amongst other things (Ojaba et al:2002, 667). According to
Mary Anderson (1998), there is a moral problematique that presents itself when
humanitarian aid, supposed to do good by reducing human suffering, has little
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systematic positive effects and does harm by weakening livelihood systems
already weakened by the disaster. By failing to acknowledge the decision making
and management capacities of those people affected by the crisis and viewing
them as passive victims, these capacities are not utilized and thus weakened.
Thus systematically, aid can lead to more harm than good. (137-141)
Our research deals particularly with the effects of humanitarian aid in the case of
civil wars. Civil war remain today one of the causes of humanitarian sufferings as
can be seen in the Somalia. A general definition of civil war is a violent conflict
between organized groups within a country. (Fearon, 2006) A quantitative
definition qualifies the former definition by putting a minimum limit of 1000
deaths, after which the civil conflict can be called a ‘civil war’. (Nkurunziz, 2008,
1)Thus, a civil war is usually accompanied by high civilian causalities. This
usually triggers the intervention of international humanitarian agencies in order to
provide help to the people undergoing such hardships through their provision of
humanitarian aid. ( Rose et al, 2008, 458)
Principles of humanitarian aid in war have been outlined in international
guidelines. These include nondiscrimination in distribution of aid, neutrality of aid
(that it does not further any political or religious viewpoint), that the aid operation
will respect culture and customs and that it is accountable to both beneficiaries
and donors. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 672) ( Rose et al, 2008, 458) Yet, in practice, the
effect of humanitarian aid in a war is seldom neutral. In a war, aid enters the
conflict and becomes a part of it. ( Anderson, 1998, 141)Particularly, when one of
the war tactics involves attacking civilians located in the other sides territory,
trying to rescue and aid civilians becomes a political act itself. (Shearer)
Research Question and hypothesis
There are various ways in which aid may interact with conflicts. As said above,
main idea behind humanitarian aid was thus to relieve an emergency that is
thought to be quick and passing attempting to alleviate the suffering while not
affecting the economic and social mechanisms which operate, as to allow these
mechanisms to continue to operate in the future after the emergency has passed.
Thus, aid interacts with the same political, economic and social institutions that
are part of the problem itself that has led to the conflict. (Anderson, 1998, 140)
But, humanitarian aid does not aim to build institutional capacity. ( Macrea: 1997,
226). Therefore, it maintains the same vulnerabilities that have led to crisis
(conflict) ( Degnbol-Martinussen et al, 1999, pp 200).
Yet this understanding of how aid strengthens the structural vulnerabilities in
political systems fails to explain how aid, as a material resources can be helpful to
warring parties in waging their war. Aid leakage can reach warring parties, which
can be utilized for military reinforcement. In addition, humanitarian aid,
particularly food aid can become a resource to be fought over. Blocking aid or
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allowing aid to pass to the enemy’s territory can be a political or military tactic.
This could exasperate the conflict, and with it the sufferings of the civilians.
(Walters),(Anderson, 1998, 141-142).
In addition, conflicts may be manifest as well as latent, behavioral and
structural.(Galtung, 1969, 170-172) Thus, aid can interact with conflict in a
manifest way (through war) or in a latent way (through repressive laws and
regulations). In this sense, we see that aid has the potential of interacting with
repressive systems in such a way as to increase repression and marginalization of
certain communities. This provides a third dimension to our analysis of the
relationship of aid to conflicts.
We ask in what ways can aid interact negatively with civil conflict as to
exasperate it? We propose that there are several ways in which aid interacts with
conflicts: first, structurally through supporting the same repressive and exclusive
institutions that have led to the conflict, secondly, it interacts directly with the
conflict dynamics as allowing aid or its blockage becomes part of the war tactics
itself. We hold that aid does not necessarily have a negative effect on conflicts but
we wish to focus on the negative aspects of aid on conflict to see how do they lead
to their negative effects.. Taking Operation Lifeline Sudan as an example, we will
show how OLS exasperated the conflict in the North, the South of Sudan and
between the North and South.
Operation Lifeline Sudan
Operation Lifeline Sudan is a relief operation that started in 1989 as a response to
the humanitarian crisis due to the civil war in Sudan. It is mainly a UN umbrella
organization providing the diplomatic and operational support aimed at delivering
humanitarian assistance to both sides of the conflict. (Robinson, 2002, 49) This
operation has been one of the largest humanitarian operations in term of amounts
of beneficiaries. In 1998, it was ranked as the largest relief operation supporting
2.6 million people (Ojaba et al, 2002, 673). Several UN agencies took part in the
relief operations including WFP, UNICEF and UNDP in addition to a number of
international NGOs such as Save the Children, Oxfam and Medecins sans
frontiers among others. (Robinson, 2002, 49) Its targets and programs saw
changes in its course throughout the civil war as the humanitarian situation
changed. It has had both relief and relief-development aid applied (Robinson,
2002, 50). 1
1
Humanitarian aid have been elsewhere conceived as a first step on a relief-development continuum. This
model is taken from natural disasters model sees that going out from crisis is done in a linear fashion via
relief to rehabilitation to development. Through relief, the stress of the emergency is overcome paving the
way for rehabilitation through which the normal life processes come back to operation. Finally, growth can
3
In assessing the OLS different views have been put forth. On the humanitarian
domain different evaluations exist. Whereas Macrea sees that it has “negatively
affected the welfare of the conflict affected populations”(1997, 223) . Others see
that it has saved millions of lives from death in conflict related famine and
drought. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 673) According to Robinson, that OLS has served as
a model for the distribution of humanitarian aid to the other war torn parts of the
world 2002, 49). According to African Rights, it supported the peace process
when the political context was supportive of peace, later on it integrated with the
dynamics of war and aided the deterioration of the conflict. (1997, 129). We ask:
how could it have interacted with the conflict in such a way as to exasperate it?
A.2 Method
We will test the hypothesis and examine the modalities of aid having a
negative effect over conflict. This study will be a mainly qualitative study, using
comparative case studies within a single case that of the OLS held in Sudan in
which aid had a negative effect on the conflict. We shall follow the method of
structured focused comparison within a single case. Accordingly, we shall
standardize data collection and make systematic comparisons (George et al., 2005,
68) The comparison will be around the effects of the operation on the North and
the South of Sudan (the parties to the conflict) structured around three main areas.
1. We shall examine how the operation had different effects on the North and
South that led to the polarization of the parties; 2. We shall see how aid
strengthened the structural violence on which the conflict is built; 3. Also we shall
examine the effect of aid on conflict dynamics as a result of the operation. This
will allow us to see different cases of how aid interacts with conflictive situations
negatively and differently according to their very context.
Also our research will deal with certain aspects of the case examined. (George et
al. , 2005, 68) Since our research deals with the negative effects of aid, this shall
be our main focus. Thus we shall not aim at a complete assessment of the OLS in
space or time. Also our focus is on the internal effects of humanitarian aid on
conflict dynamics and institutions and structural violence. Thus we do not aim to
examine the aims of external powers in distributing aid and whether or whether
not they have other motives than purely humanitarian ones, we will focus on the
internal interaction of the aid with the institutions and parties to the conflict.
take place via development. Applying this model taken from natural disasters to conflict has been far from
unproblematic. ( Macrea, 1997, 225), ( Degnbol-Martinussen et al, 1999, pp 200, 206)
4
Our selection of case of Sudanese civil war is that it contains the “variation as
required by the research problem”. (Ibid, 83). The Sudanese Civil war has been
one of the longest running civil wars. Starting 1955, the civil war ran till 2005
paused for 11 years resuming and finally ending in 2005. (BBC, 2011(1)) It has
had strong structural roots based on divide and conquer policies going back to
colonial times as the North had discriminatory policies against the Southern
regions. (Idris, 2000, 17) These inequalities and differences have institutionalized
in social, political and economic institutions. Aid operations interacting within
these institutions are opt to carry with them the same inequalities and lead to
structural violence. Yet also the Sudanese war was one of the bloodiest civil wars
in which approximately 2 million were killed. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 665). Thus the
war has also been one in which violence has taken a manifest form on a large
scale.
We have chosen Operation Life line Sudan which is an example of which
humanitarian aid was diverted to support the belligerents in the conflicts, directly
or indirectly to the detriment of the civilian population. First, Operation lifeline
Sudan is one of the biggest relief operations that took place in the post cold war
era. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 673)Secondly, in Sudan OLS had been one of the most
successful relief operations that it has been seen by some as a model for aid
distribution to other areas torn by civil conflict. (Robinson, 2002, 49)
We have basically relied on secondary material particularly books and journal
articles written about OLS and relief operations in Sudan. We have encountered
the difficulty that many of these material are written in the early 90s. This has
prevented us from a complete analysis of the operation up till the next decade. Yet
also, many of these material were written as a developmental and economic
rather than a political assessment of the operation. Yet, particularly the book by
African Rights Food and Power in Sudan has given a critical insight into the
effects of aid on conflict, albeit the fact that it lacks structure and theory but rather
focuses a narrative exposition. In this sense, we hope that our contribution lays in
the theoretical insight through which to understand the effects of aid on conflict in
our case.
A.3 Theory
Out theoretical Framework is composed of three intertwined elements: the
capacity building approach, structural violence and conflict dynamics theory. The
first is a framework of theorizing about how humanitarian aid interacts with
conflicts. It theorizes about the different ways on which aid can be an agent in
supporting the capacities of peace or the vulnerabilities of separation and tension.
We elaborate this general theory with two theories: Structural violence theory and
conflict dynamics theory.
5
We differentiate between structural aspects of conflict, the deep rooted causes that
lead to conflict and the conflict dynamics in which the parties of the conflict
respond to the actions of one another, that drive the conflicts. These two theories
see conflicts from two perspectives in a complementary approach. In the case of
Sudan, civil conflicts have a strong structural aspect tied to divide and rules
policies of colonial powers, deficiencies of governance..etc. (Giroux et al, 2009)
Thus interpretation of conflict will be incomplete without seeing the structural
factors that set the stage for conflicts to erupt and how they result in repression.
But neither will our analysis be complete without an agent- based view of how
the warring parties themselves sought to interact. The relationship between those
theories can best be depicted by the following graph.
STRUCTURE
modified from (Giroux et al, 2009)
Triggers
Leads to
Conflict Dynamics
Outcome 1
Structural Violence
Outcome 2
We hold that aid can affect both the structural factors (social, political, economic
systems/ institutions that are at the root of the conflict ) that set the stage and
allow the dynamics of the conflict ( the interaction between the parties to the
conflict) to take place and can lead to a structural violence. Aid as an agential
factor, acts within certain institutions and structures thus strengthens it in the
process. This agent- structure debate is at the core of the paper and is considered it
backbone.
A.3.1 Capacity Building and vulnerability reduction.
This part of the theoretical framework gives a lead into our theoretical base. Mary
Anderson (1999) provides a framework through which to analyze the impact of
aid in conflict situation. Anderson sees that aid can have the potential of defusing
the conflict, as it can be used to exasperate and prolong conflicts. (Anderson 1999,
1) To her, the impact of aid on conflict depends on how it is directed. (Anderson
1998, 141) Thus humanitarian aid can be given in a way that feeds intergroup
tensions and weakens connections or it can lessen intergroup tensions and
strengthen intergroup connections. (Anderson 1999, 69) According to Anderson, a
good emergency program is that refrains from strengthening the war capacities in
society and strengthens peace capacities instead. (Anderson 1999, 69) Aid has to
6
be given in such a way that strengthens the capacities for peace and reduce those
of conflict and tension. (Anderson 1999, 69)
Anderson bases her framework on the concept of capacity building. Capacity
building starts with the dispositions available in society rather than with what
could be offered to help by external agents (Moore). It is a way of trying to
develop the abilities of a society to enable it to face future problems. (Moore)
Therefore, it does not attempt to impose any new value or institution, but uses
those available in the community itself. This itself is a positive aspect as it avoids
the critique that aid agencies are trying to reshape societies in the way they see fit.
This framework of capacity building developed as a response to disasters of both
natural ( environmental ) and the man made ( war) type starts from the proposition
that aid operations that tackle the symptoms of the crisis but leave its structure
intact will lead to the recurrence of the crisis again. (Anderson, 1998, 140)
Capacity building as a way of countering disasters strengthens the abilities of
people to counter crisis and reduces those that disable people from confronting
them. (Anderson 1999, 69) This is a nontraditional way of looking at relief aid.
Traditional humanitarian aid attempts to remedy the humanitarian symptoms of
the disaster , but it leaves the vulnerabilities that has led to the crisis intact. (
Degnbol-Martinussen et al, 1999, pp 200). On the other hand, capacity building
approaches in humanitarian aid attempt to reshape social, economic and political
weaknesses that have led the crisis to unravel, at the same time healing its
humanitarian cost.
Capacity building is used differently by different authors. Moore for example uses
it synonymously with institution building or institutional development. However,
Anderson uses the term with more differentiation. According to Anderson, in her
book Do No Harm: How can aid support Peace or War capacity building may
include strengthening:
systems and institutions (such as markets and infrastructure)
attitudes and actions (tolerance and acceptance or prejudice, competition)
values and interests
common experiences
symbols (Symbols such as national symbols )
(Anderson , 1999, 23ff)
Thus, according to Anderson the concept of capacity building involves much
more than institution building, it also involves the perpetuating of culture,
attitudes and the actions of the people. (Anderson, 1999, 23ff)
This framework has many positive aspects. Mainly, this framework is a practical
guide for aid workers to engage in planning humanitarian aid programs. The
analysis of how aid interacts with conflict is down to earth. It also stems from the
question what divides and what unites people rather than what was the situation
prior to the eruption of the conflict, which as many commentators have made it
clear, also includes the same structural vulnerabilities that has led the conflict to
7
erupt in the first place. Also, aid operations do not only entail the distribution of
goods or peoples actions. Aid operations also interact in different ways with
national institutions and structures of power that strengthen them or weaken
them. Thus, aid operations are seen in both structural and agential lights.
Our coming two sections will stem from this overarching theory in two ways. The
structural violence approach is latent way of how aid interacts with conflict
whereas the conflict dynamics is a manifest way of how conflict can be
exasperated.
A.3.2 Structural Violence Approach
Johan Galtung’s theory of structural violence provides a structural explanation of
conflict beyond individual agency.( Jacoby , 2008, 34) Galtung came to
reconceptualize violence to differentiate between the direct manifest type and the
indirect latent one. (Galtung, 1969, 169-172) To him violence is not necessarily
manifest, that can be assessed in a positivist fashion. ( Jacoby , 2008, 39) To
Galtung, violence is structurally defined as the “cause of the difference between
the potential and the actual” (Galtung, 1969, 168). If this gap is known to be
avoidable, such as ability to cure tuberculosis today, rather than 200years ago,
then not preventing it is due to unequal access to resources. ( Jacoby , 2008, 39)
To Galtung then a conflictive situation arises when damage “occurs to individuals
or groups due to differential access to social resources and which is due to the
normal operation of the social system.” ( Jacoby , 2008, 39) A clear example of
this violence is the denial of rights such as heath and education.. etc to certain
groups in society.
Structural violence according to Galtung has certain characteristics. This violence
is not necessarily bodily violence, it can be mental and institutional violence that
prevents people from reaching their potential. (Galtung, 1969, 169) It can be
impersonal and indirect. There may no direct subject object relation. The
perpetrator may be the political system or the regime. This diffuses the subject
and makes it difficult to perceive. (Galtung, 1969, 170) It is also latent as well as
manifest. Thus, it can also be the hidden potential for violence that can be a cause
of inhibiting people’s potential. (Galtung, 1969, 172) Most importantly is the
ability of structural violence to lead to behavioral violence. That is due to
inhibiting the potential of people, this might lead to their active violent reaction
against the system of repression or their repressors (Galtung, 1969, 178) ( Jacoby ,
2008, 48). This allows us to link the structural violence approach to that of
conflict dynamics which is based on behavioral view of violence.
According to Galtung, structural violence is usually accompanied by cultural
violence which makes it seem right and feel right. This prevents its subjects from
seeing the situation as a violent situation. Both religious discourses and secular
ideologies can be used to rule out a category of people and make it righteous to
8
contain or marginalize them. ( Jacoby , 2008, 41)Thus, many religions have a
distinction between chosen/lost, believer /infidel…etc. ( Jacoby , 2008, 41)On the
other hand, secular ideologies have a similar dichotomy between self and other
that plays a similar role of excluding or legitimizing the exploitation of a group by
another. ( Jacoby , 2008, 41)
It is important thus to apply this part on humanitarian aid in situations of civil war.
If aid is dispersed through social or political institutions that themselves have
institutionalized inequality and repression, or operate on principles other than that
of the humanitarian ones then humanitarian aid may increase the level of
“structural violence” rather than mitigate it. This can actually feed the structures
of the conflict and its dynamics. On the other hand, aid being distributed through
such an institution empowers the institution more. On the other hand denying a
group aid can increase the feeling of marginalization in that group. This may
increase the level of hostility to the repressive institution and thus increase
behavioral violence. It is vital to pay attention to the channel of distributing aid
and its institutionalized norms.
Galtung’s conception of structural violence has many positive aspects. On the
one hand, it provides a different view of violent and conflict, which deals with
the root causes of violence and conflict rather than just its external symptoms. On
the other hand, it also has its shortcomings. First, there comes the difficulty of
understanding violence as the difference between the potential and the actual. In
this definition thus, quantifying or measuring violence becomes a problem.
People’s potential is individually different, so how can their potential be measured
and quantified? On the one hand, his notion of structure is static, abstract and
nonchanging ( Jacoby , 2008, 41). Thus his conception does not show a way of
possible change of the structural conflict. Thus unlike Marx whose dialectical
materialism shows a way of change of the structures of repression and
exploitation, Galtung on the other hand does not have such a dynamic
understanding of structural change. Also, Galtung’s understanding of structure is
seems to suggest that the relationship between structure and agent is one way
only. ( Jacoby , 2008, 43) He fails to take the agent into consideration in his
conception of structural violence. ( Jacoby , 2008, 43)This shortcoming is
resolved by the conflict dynamics approach.
A.3.3 Conflict Dynamic Approach
The conflict dynamics approach, according to Peter Wallensteen (2004) sees the
conflict as a “dynamic phenomenon in which one actor is reacting to what another
actor is doing which leads to further action”.(34) These dynamics give the conflict
a “life of its own” as actors are caught up in the conflict spiral. Analysts try to
make sense of the dynamics of the conflict by inducing rules which the conflict
may follow. Game theory, by way of example, is one such set of rules. Yet these
9
rules of the game are not stable. They can change with the development of the
conflict or with the planning of the actors. As a conflict may intensify with the
escalation by one of the actors, it may also lead to positive responses if one actor
takes steps to deescalate. In that way the dynamics may change responses from
war and conflict to resolution. (Ibid)
According to this approach, the way that a conflict transforms is never ending. (
Ibid, 35) When parties to the conflict agree to a political agreement, it is usually
due to a prior event that has transformed the conflict’s dynamics and led both to
seek this agreement. How actors change their interactions towards one another, is
more important than making agreements. (Ibid)
This theoretical approach has many positive aspects. First, in viewing the way the
conflict changes and transforms as an interaction between parties to the conflict
in recognizes that conflicts can yet exist albeit in a latent form. Conflicts are not
finished by completing a political agreement, rather they may remain in a
different form.(Ibid, 35) It is thus possible to understand why political agreements
are not honored or ceasefires violated. Sometimes this takes place as soon as the
agreement has taken force.
However, this approach is also problematic. It is unclear as to why a conflict
arises in the first place. What causes a conflict is unclear if it is seen as action and
reaction of warring parties that change their strategies in relation to one another
rather than for a solid fixed cause such as a piece of land or political rights. ( Ibid,
38) Dynamic approach theoreticians respond to this problem by emphasizing the
development of the conflict, which may have several causes to start with but
evolve based on the actions of the parties. Also, this approach to conflict analysis
does not see the structure behind the conflict and maintaining it. Thus, that a state
has devolved into civil war views the conflict as the interaction of the warring
parties themselves rather than as a symptom of a deeper structural weakness in the
organization of the state itself and the social structure. ( Ibid, 35)
Humanitarian aid in the case of a civil conflict enters the conflict and takes part in
its dynamics. Even though that humanitarian agencies try to maintain their
neutrality and impartiality in distributing humanitarian aid, however, aid is seldom
neutral in its impact. Aid may have a range of implications on the conflict ranging
from exasperating the conflict by prolonging its duration or increasing its intensity
to actually aiding the descalation of the conflict depending on how it interacts
with the conflict dynamics.(Perrin, 1998, 6-7)
Even though the conflict dynamic approach is mainly based on the actors and
their interaction in conflict, we have noted that it lacks a focus on how structures
ie, the deficiencies in the economic social and political systems that initially cause
the conflict to start. This is complemented by the other two approaches. Put
together, these approaches can provide us with a new framework for analyzing
how humanitarian aid interacts with conflicts. Aid primarily interacts with the
10
actors to the conflict by strengthening their interest, value or strengthening their
attitudes in continuing the conflict. But it also strengthens or weakens the
economic, social and political structures. The continuation of the conflict means
that the structure of the conflict has not been dismantled. We see these structures
as a vital component of any analysis on the impact of aid on society particularly in
a situation of a civil war. First, we are to overview the civil war in Sudan and its
main causes and turns. Then, we shall review how OLS interacted with the war.
A.4 The Civil War in Sudan
Operation lifeline Sudan was conducted in the midst of a civil war between the
South’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army – Movement ( SPLA- M) and the
North headed by the Government of Sudan (GOS). In Sudan, the conflict between
the North and the South has structural roots tied to its colonial past. The
polarization of identity of the South and the North and economic, political and
cultural marginalization of the South has had its roots in the British colonial
policies of the late 19th and early 20th Century. ( Morton, 2001, 10)These policies
complicated the relation between the various regions of Sudan and polarized them
into a Muslim- Arab North and Christian African South. “Since the 1920s, there
had been a great effort on the part of British administrators to label the people of
the South Sudan as “African” ( Idris, 2000, 17) . The British restricted the
interaction between the North and the South. ( Morton, 2001, 9)Arabic education,
language dress and lifestyle were forbidden in the South, whereas Christian
missions were allowed into the South . ( Morton, 2001, 10-11)The colonial
administration gave the south little attention for development and even
discouraged education. This eventually led to the Southerners being less fit to
engage in national politics. ( Morton, 2001, 10)
Structural violence has led to behavioral violence that took form of a civil war
that dates back to the time of Sudanese independence. The call for autonomy in
the South versus the attempt to gain control of the South by the North through
imposing their Arab- Islamic cultural framework have given way to the war. Thus
the first war was ignited when General Aboud followed a policy of Islamization
and arabization and nationalized the education system as a way of unifying the
country. ( Morton, 2001, 13)When it was clear that the federalist aim of the
Southerners was not supported, the first civil war thus took place. ( Morton, 2001,
13) This war however resolved when colonel Numeri staged a coup in 69 and
made it clear that he was for an arrangement that guarantees the south autonomy.
( Morton, 2001, 13)
Yet the peace was not to last as the North continued to pay little attention for the
South development prospects. While agricultural development funds poured to
11
North regions to support commercial farming, in the south NGOs aided the South
subsistence agriculture. ( Morton, 2001, 15)Thus the divided structure of the
economy continued to sustain the conflict. Moreover, as oil was discovered in the
South, Khartoum planned to build the refinery in the North. ( Morton, 2001, 15)
In 1983, the conflict restarted with renewed vigor. The spark this time was when
president Numeri was losing power, and wanted to consolidate it in the north by
getting closer to the anti- separationists Northern parties. He implemented Sharia
laws on the entire country. ( Morton, 2001, 16)
As a result of Numeri’s decisions, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),
led by John Garang, rebelled against the central Government. ( Morton, 2001,
17)In 1989, when a government was about to negotiate an end to the war, Omar
al-Bashir, an army officer backed by the NIF ( National Islamic Front) overthrew
the government through a bloodless coup. He favored continued Islamization and
used religious propaganda to recruit military personnel. Thus, the Popular Defense
Forces were formed and the fighting became more intense as the military regime
vowed to make Sudan an Islamic state. ( Morton, 2001, 18)
The Southern Army itself factionalized in 1991 and new leaders appeared wanting
to oust Garang. The SPLA- Nasir faction formed became directed against civilian
along ethnic lines as Garang’s SPLA lost territory. ( Morton, 2001, 18) Thus
SPLA had to rely more on the local population and NGOs in order to survive this
period. ( Morton, 2001, 18)Thus the conflict continued, as government directed
resources of oil and agricultural produce to finance the war and continue its
militia raids on the south, the south continued to rebel against the government. (
Morton, 2001, 19)
Peace talks, begun in 2003, culminated with the signed CPA ( Comprehensive
Peace Agreement) on January 9, 2005. According to the peace agreement,
southern Sudan will enjoy autonomy for six years, and after the expiration of that
period, the people of southern Sudan will be able to vote in a referendum on
independence. ( Morton, 2001, 20) Finally, oil revenues from the South were to be
evenly split between the North and South, although the entireties of northern oil
revenues are directed to Khartoum. (BBC, 2011)In the referendum in the south
held in 2011, which 99% of southern Sudanese voted to split from Sudan. In June
of the same year, a new state of South Sudan was born. (BBC, 2011)
A.5 OLS Operation
The civil war in Sudan that ran from 1983-2005 had had severe humanitarian
costs. About 2 million have died from the war, 5 million were displaced
internally, 500,000 became refuges in nearby countries. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 665)
Various economic and social crises broke peoples social and economic
entitlements. Markets and livelihoods have been destroyed and traditional social
12
networks have been broken. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 665) These have increased the
people’s vulnerabilities to both economic and psychosocial shocks. This was
intensified by a number of environmental shocks such as drought leading to
famine such as those in1988 (Ojaba et al, 2002, 670) and 1998 (Robinson, 2002,
49).
Operation lifeline Sudan started in 1989 after the UN brokered an agreement
between both sides, under a process of negotiated access, to allow humanitarian
assistance to reach both sides. ( Minear, 1990, 31) Previous assistance operations
were aborted or severely affected due to unwillingness of both parties to the
conflict to allow the humanitarian aid to pass. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 670) Earlier
attempts to allow humanitarian aid to reach both sides of the conflict have been
aborted due to lack of mutual trust by either side of the conflict. Operation
Rainbow, the first UN relief initiative in this war, similarly foundered on this
basis. (Ojaba et al, 2002, 670) (Ojaba et al, 2002, 670)
It is important thus to ask what has led to this change in position of both parties
that led to the enactment of Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1989 after a period of
mutual distrust. Both parties agreed to allow humanitarian aid to pass through to
both sides of the conflict mainly as it came to benefit militarily both belligerents.
(Minear, 1990, 66) Politically, both parties wanted to gain international sympathy
and civilian support both of which was necessary in order to justify their positions
in the war. On the one hand, the GOS, its international reputation hurt by the
famine abroad, needed to acquiesce to the aid operation to gain international
support (African Rights, 1997, 113-114). On the other hand, the SPLM had
gained politically, as it was unprecedented in UN history to have dealt directly
with a non-recognized entity. That UN agencies worked with the SPLA was a de
facto political recognition of the movement. (African Rights, 1997, 120).
Both parties benefited economically also from the operation. In 1990 , the war
cost the GOS 1 million dollars daily. The government of Sudan allowed the OLS
to operate in government held areas, by that covering humanitarian costs. This
allowed the government of Sudan to export the home grown soghurum, bringing
the government the hard currency needed to continue the war. (Ojaba et al, 2002,
668) On the other hand, UN Agencies, such as UNICEF, had paid the
humanitarian wings of the South movements cash grants as a way of providing
aid to them. ( Macrea, 1997, 238) But, the humanitarian wings of the movements
also belonged to the same south movements that were leading the war.( African
Rights, 1997, 268) To claim that they had no funds to aid civilians yet continuing
the war meant that were able to free up resources for the continuation of the war. (
Macrea, 1997, 238)
OLS was structurally divided into two distinct and geographically separate
sectors. The North Sector of operation Lifeline Sudan was led from Khartoum in
the North whereas the South Sector was led from nearby Lokichoggio in Kenya. (
Ojaba et al, 2002, 670-71). Different agencies operated in both sectors. The
13
Northern sector was regulated by the UNDP in collaboration with GOS. In the
Southern sector, UNICEF was the leading agency that coordinated between both
UN agencies and NGOs (Karim: 96, 12). They had different visions and ways of
operations. UNDP for example, had a operational bias towards the government as
it is mandated to work through recognized governments. (Karim, 96: 30) On the
other hand, UNICEF capacity building approach is based on strengthening local
institutional structures. In the South, this meant strengthening NGOs and NGO
structures. ( Macrea at al, 1997: 233). Thus, the ways the agencies operated were
divided along the lines of the war.
The relationship between the OLS and the government of Sudan in the North and
the SPLA in the North was quite different. The Governmnet of Sudan had tight
control over relief operation. Initially giving concessions on the operation of
NGOs and UN agencies, in 1992, the GOS tightened its regulation over the aid
operations taking place. Thus, it legally ruled that any relief supplies once in
Sudan would belong to the government. INGO activities were tightly regulated
wheras UN agencies were knit with governmental policies. Also, in 1992 the
government decided that the emergency was over and that the relief policy
revolved around the relief development continuum. This would allow the
governmental institutions a greater role in the allocation of aid (African Rights,
1997, 143).
On the other hand, in the South the SPLA is best described as first among equals
amongst the NGOs operating there. OLS organized the relationship between the
SPLA and INGOs. When the OLS was established, INGOs were given legality to
operate in the South. The relationship between the INGOs and the SPLA was one
based on rivalry, albeit recognizing its important humanitarian role (Riehl,
2001,7). Yet the lack of a social and political ‘civilian’ strategy by the SPLA led
to lack of coordination between these organizations. (Ibid, 8) The SPLA wanted
more recognition of its political power in the South. Thus in 2000, a memorandum
of understanding was signed between the SPLA and INGOs. This memorandum
was to give the SPLA a political leverage over INGOs. (Ibid, 9)
This structural separation actually aided in the intensification of the divisions of
both sides. Important decisions were taken on a local basis in both sectors and
there were little attempts at conducting mutual projects that would benefit both
sides. Rather, the operation acquiesced to both sides needs and visions which
actually intensified the political, economic and social separation between both
parties. ( Macrea, 1997, 227ff) Thus in the coming section in the interaction of aid
with the conflict we shall examine the northern and the southern sectors
separately.
A.6 Analysis: Effect of Aid on Conflict
14
In this section we are to apply the theoretical framework discussed in above to the
OLS. We are to focus on the theories that we have put light on above: capacity
building, structural conflict and conflict dynamics.
A.6.1 Capacity Building and Vulnerability Reduction
The way aid was applied in both the Northern and Southern sectors intensified
the division between the two sides of the conflict. The aims of both sides of the
conflict was clear as to gain political ground. Whereas the government wanted to
assert its sovereignty over all Sudanese territory, the South movements, wanted to
gain autonomy from the central government. These two conflicting political aims
were actually both aided by the OLS.
In the North, the development relief strategy that the government sought was that
of mechanized agriculture. Politically, this aimed at keeping the Nuba Mountains
citizens and the Southerners displaced in Khartoum under its control. This was
done through encouraging them to work in peace camps as cheap labour rather
than give them relief aid. Also, this policy allowed GOS to utilize development
relief funds to increase the government’s control over the land. As mechanized
agriculture needed expansive areas of agricultural land, the government used
various measures to gain land including law amendments and even force. (Ibid,
147-148). The army was sent to destroy houses and villages in the Nuba
Mountains region and to appropriate the land, leaving behind impoverished and
destitute people whose livelihoods have been damaged. (Ibid, 150) Displaced
camps around Khartoum were similarly demolished and their inhabitants
forcefully dislocated. (Ibid, 157-8).
Economically, this strategy supported the economy of North Sudan to the
detriment of the South. (Ibid, 146) It actually supported the unbalanced
economic structures that was at the core of the conflict. It allowed the government
to exploit the lands and labor of the southerners as well as other marginalized
groups in the North.
In the South, the concept of development relief was applied via promoting selfreliance. This took the form of revitalizing the rural economy and supporting civil
society. (Macrae, 1997, 233) Revitalizing the rural economy was based on food
production and livelihood support rather than quick and short term based crisis
response. (Macrae, 1997, 235)However this long term development policy was
carried out in isolation from the Northern sector. (Macrae, 1997, 235)Thus the aid
operation actually strengthened the prospects for the South’s economic autonomy
by building self reliance capacities rather than building connecting capacities that
would connect the North to the South positively.
Politically, supporting civil society in the South would not only benefit the
humanitarian NGOs, but also would have a political impact in the war. (Macrae,
15
1997, 234) There is little neutrality in supporting civil society in a civil war,
particularly when the South relied on this space to fight the government and the
government retaliated by attacking and attempting to destroy civil society.
(Macrae, 1997, 238). The aid channels that the donor agencies came to use in
distributing aid were far from politically neutral.
Thus the aid allowed the development of institutions that would aid the
separation rather than linking both sectors. As the OLS decisions were locally
made in each sector catered to its needs. Whereas in the North the mechanized
agricultural policy was the basis for the relief development aid, allowing the
government to gain territory and giving the government a wide scope of authority
in distributing aid to needy, in the south it was the support given to civil society
and subsistence agriculture enabling an autonomy from government.
Socially, the aid operation was indirectly aiding in the polarization of religious
identities as the Muslims in the north were to be identified against the Christians
of the South whereas the spread of Christianity increased in the South region. In
the North, the Mechanized Agriculture strategy aimed at maintaining the social
structure in the northern cities, particularly its Arab Muslim character. Thus it
incorporated these communities as cheap labor in what came to be called “peace
camps”. (Ibid, 152)The government wanted to be able to deal with the waves of
migration from the south without having to absorb them due to their cultural and
religious distinctiveness. (Ibid, 161) Thus this strategy was a way of using them
without having to integrate them in social fabric of the city. (Ibid, 161) Moreover,
the South Kordofan ( of which the Nuban Mountains are part) peace camps were
integrated into the governments policy of Islamic Relief, with Islamic NGOs
operating there. (Ibid, 179-80) As a result many of Southerners and Nubians
sympathized with the SPLA. Many of the SPLA volunteers were from Nuba
Mountains. (Ibid, 161) They were encouraged to challenge the commercial
farming, through sabotage of machinery as a way of government opposition. (Ibid,
149) Thus, as can be seen the aid was used to strengthen the social structures of
the conflict it self.
In the South, the experience of exile in the South Sudanese Camps in Ethiopia and
the relief aided the development of stricter religious identities and church
affiliation. Many converts to Christianity were gained.( Ibid, 79) Various
Christian groups were active in the camps particularly in the field of education. In
1991 when the camps were disbanded, many returning to South Sudan had
discovered that new churches were built where there was none. (Ibid, 79)
Thus the aid operation aided the further separation between the two sectors. This
took place on the political social and economic domains. Whereas the government
wanted to assert its sovereignty over all Sudanese territory, the South movements,
wanted to gain autonomy from the central government. The mechanized
agriculture policy allowed the government more control over the relief and
16
territory as well as labour of the marginalized communities. On the other hand,
the autonomy of the Southern movements increased thanks to the self reliance
agricultural strategy and civil society capacity building projects. Finally socially,
the religious element of the war, the Muslim versus Christian rivalry increased as
the government in control of the North inhibited Southerners from fully
integrating in the North, whereas the experience of refuge allowed the Southers to
also increase the Christian aspect of their identity.
A.6.2 Structural Conflict
As we noted before the civil war in Sudan has structural roots. Discrimination
against the ‘African’ Southerners has been a cause of a military rebellion against
the central government. First, the GOS have had a role in creating famine in the
South by denying food aid to the Southern regions (African Rights, 1997, 137)For
example, in 1991 famine in Bahr El Ghazal it denied that that there is a famine
and thus denied aid deserving constituencies food aid, while utilizing food aid to
pour in the politically important constituencies of the North. (African Rights,
1997, 137) The strategy of mechanized agriculture denied the Nuba Mouuntain
inhabitants and Southerners displaced in Khartoum humanitarian relief and
implemented the agriculture strategies encouraging these communities to seek the
government relief centers dubbed “peace camps” as to utilize them as cheap
labor. (Ibid, 147-151) Thus it used aid as a tool of political repression and control.
On the other hand, in the South structural violence was done to the civilian
population through the movements’ emphasis on militarism. (African Rights,
1997, 268) In the South the aid operation supported the military structure of the
rebellion. Military centralism was a main core of the SPLA strategy.( Ibid, 265) It
ensured that the military control over the entire movement including its
humanitarian wing the SRRA. (Ibid, 265)Thus it was the military that controlled
the distribution and allocation of supplies. Thus the movement decided to exploit
the international relief system in order to sustain the SPLA soldiers while they
underwent military training in Ethiopia under the banner of refugee camps.
(African Rights, 1997, 70-71) As a result, many of the Refugee camps in Ethiopia
also corresponded to rebel army soldiers centers. Refugee camps doubling as
SPLA military centers included Itang Bilpam, Bonga, Zinc and Tsore . (Ibid, 71)
These refugee camps acted as a attraction center for many boys as they would also
provide in addition to shelter , education and military training. Almost 110. 000
of SPLA men and boys relied on the centres. (Ibid, 72)
The aid entered into in the war economy sustaining the SPLA. According to
SPLA officers the trainees relied on food from the camps. Also, it could be taken
to the other camps as relief targeting Itang was diverted to Bonga and Biplam.
(Ibid, 72) In addition, the SPLA would tax the refugees’ supplies. It would also
resell large amounts of food on market and earn millions of Ethiopian currency
that would be used to purchase equipment and vehicles for the SPLA. The SPLA
17
would also inflate the number of refugees in order to gain more aid. (Ibid, 73) The
SRRA would exaggerate the number of accessible people in need and make up
false distribution reports.( Ibid, 74) As the movement also had control over the
territory it restricted the movement of foreigners and would not allow them to talk
to the locals without security passes.
The final control of the military movements on the distribution of relief led
civilians sufferings to increase. As SPLA taxed the refugee supplies of aid and
was able to sell large amounts of food aid and use the gains for military
reinforcements, civilians were deprived from amounts of aid that could have
helped them. In addition, civilians were used as tools to attract humanitarian aid to
the movements. It was a factor that led to structural violence against civilians.
SPLA William Nyuon’s faction used 500 children as a way of getting aid to the
military camp, but eventually let the children health situation deteriorate due to
hunger and 47 died. (African Rights, 1997, 283) It was this emphasis on
militarism, rather than on civilian needs that gave way for the factionalization of
the movement. This will be discussed below.
As we noticed in the examples above we have presented cases in which OLS led
to exasperate the divisions due to structural and institutional deficiencies in the
institutions receiving and distributing the aid. Thus, the structural weaknesses in
the GOS that led to discrimination in the distribution of aid as well as the
structural weaknesses in the SPLA that aid exasperated to the point of
factionalization are both examples in which aid interacted with the structural
vulnerabilities that enhanced the propensity of conflict and tension.
A.6.3 Conflict Dynamics
North- South
Aid has become part of the war itself. Allowing or blocking relief has became a
question of political and military strategy. After the GOS bombed Yirol in
October 89, it closed all relief flights even those in areas not controlled by
Sudanese government. It claimed that the OLS transports weapons to the rebel
sides. Army Commanders prevented relief assistance from reaching the SPLA
areas. (Minear, 1990, 97)This ban crippled the transportation of relief. In
December 1989, as the ban was in place, a duly marked MSF aircraft was shot
over Aweil, two MSF staff members and one WFP consultant were killed. As a
consequence, MSF France withdrew its expatriate staff. (Minear, 1990, 86)
As a consequence, the other side responded. In early 1990, the SPLA accordingly
seized Juba. Juba was controlled by the GOS and held the largest army post of
the GOS in the South. The SPLA mined the road around Juba to prevent military
supplies from entering. Yet it also stopped relief from entering. In January 1990
SPLA bombed Juba attacking UN buildings a displaced persons camp a hospital
and an NGO project but no military installations. That the SPLA was directing its
18
fire towards relief installations, pointed to how relief was used as a military tactic
of putting the enemy under pressure. Indeed it put the GOS under pressure of the
civilians of Juba as the lack of relief was starting to invite unrest. Thus the
government decided to suspend its flight ban to areas of the South allowing the
return of non military flights to the areas of the South and to Juba which was
undergoing food shortages(Minear, 1990, 72). As we can see the aid it self
became a part of how both parties would get back at one another.
South -South
Aid played a role in the factionalization of the SPLA into separate factions. The
1991 separation of the SPLA high command into mainstream and Nasir faction
led by Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Koang Chol have been related to the
politics of aid. The Nasir declaration included 5 out of 13 steps in its ‘immediate
steps’ about promoting relief aid . In addition the faction soon created the RASS
Relief Association of Southern Sudan, its own relief administration. (African
Rights, 1997, 283) OLS gave the association recognition and aid assistance
poured to it through OLS and NGOs. (African Rights, 1997, 274). Thus, Riek and
Lam were able to manipulate the aid to support their plans of secession.
Politically, both Man and Riek were advanced leaders in the SPLA and promoted
by Garang and give a lot of freedom in their own spheres as to avoid competing
against him.( Ibid, 270) The Nassir relief operation was the first time that aid
arrived to their places without having to go through places controlled by Garang.(
Ibid, 274) They became more independent from him and were thus able to rebel
against him. (Ibid, 274) Commander Riek was able to make good connections
with the aid workers which facilitated their work .( Ibid, 273-4) Thus when Riek
split and established the RASS Relief Association of South Sudan, the OLS and
some NGOs cooperated and assisted it (Ibid, 274). Thus, the faction leaders
continued to manipulate relief in the same way Garang did. They would direct the
refugees coming back from Ethiopia into Nasir and disallow them from leaving.
(Ibid, 275) They were used as a way of keeping pressure on the UN for
assistance. (Ibid, 273) Thus it was thus clear how the relief was used politically to
strengthen the splinter factions.
Aid took part in the increasing of manifest violence and prolonging conflict
dynamics. In the early months of 1993, Riek Macahar managed to launch a new
campaign against the mainstream faction from a newly formed Yuai base. He
managed to form this new strategic base through directing displaced people from
Waat there and through directing relief to Yuai. From his new base he was able to
capture Panygor. Soon thereafter SPLA mainstream attacked and captured it
devastating Ayod and Yuai. As a result, many civilians died. (Ibid, 279-280)
Socially, the relief exasperated the tribal animosities between Nuer and the Dinka.
(Ibid, 275-276) As Garang was a Dinka whereas Riek was Nuer, the spit also had
a tribal element in it. (Ibid, 275-276) Garang was accused of diverting the aid
19
reached to his area to his own tribe leaving the Nuer with a feeling of oppression
and marginalization in the movement. (Ibid, 276)That the split was undertaken by
a Nuer leader, the relief was thus exasperating the tribal and ethnic animosities,
adding to the complexity of the conflict.
As a result, interactional fighting that broke out as a result of the factionalization
led to much bloodshed. The Bor Massacre from September to November 1991
was led by the Nasir faction and erupted a series of retaliation events by SPLA
mainstream. In this massacre commited against the Dinka areas of Kongor and
Bor thousand of civilians faced death while country villages were robbed of their
cattle and property. (African Rights, 1997, 275) As a reprisal attack, in mid 1992
SPLA mainstream carried out reprisal raids on the Nuer areas of Ayod and West
of Waat where SPLA Nassir faction had garrisons. This resulted in food shortages
in late1992. (African Rights, 1997, 277)
As can be seen aid has had a strong propensity to exasperate the warfare between
the north and the south and that in the south was high. Between the North and the
South, aid was seen as a way of waging warfare by blocking relief or bombing
humanitarian installations. On the other hand, in the South, aid was manipulated
by the different leaders seeking power to develop their own power bases and wage
war against one another. In both cases, aid was utilized as a tool that aided
conflict.
A.7 Conclusion
To conclude, in a number of ways OLS aided the structure of the conflict itself,
through aiding the economic, social and political institutions on which the conflict
is built as well as exasperated its dynamics. Instead of reducing the conflict
separators, the operation had aspects which intensified the division of political
structure and economic system in the North and South under the banner of
development. Not only was the OLS divided into two separate sectors delineating
the lines of the conflict itself, but it was carried out in recognition and agreement
of both warring parties, both of which aimed in increasing their political standing
and military gains. As well as exasperate the manifest violence through
exasperating the conflict dynamics it also increased the structural violence done to
population of the North and the South.
This research has been limited in both scope and in theories as well as cases
applied and compared. Yet, there are a variety of ways through which this
research can be expanded. On the theoretical domain, other agent and structural
theories (such as dependency and principle agent theories) can be applied that
tackle both the internal and international dimensions of aid. Also, the theories
applied can be applicable to other cases of aid in civil war such as Rwanda and
20
Somalia that has aid interconnected to a the violence of the civil war. A possible
comparison of these cases along those lines is thus possible.
Also, Operation Lifeline Sudan has been one of various relief operations that took
place in Sudan. It is interesting to see congruence’s between the limitation of the
OLS and other aid operations such as Operation Rainbow. This will point out the
structural weaknesses in aid operations there. OLS is an operation that has taken
place over more than a decade of time. However, we fail to tackle the effect of aid
on conflict in a decade. For space and time limitations we have focused on ways
in which it was possible that aid effected the conflict. Yet the study is far from
comprehensive, as more can be done on the matter. Also, we have restricted the
study to an examination of the effects of aid on the conflict. This does not rule
out that the relation is also dialectical for conflicts also effect how aid operations
are run and redirected.
Finally, equally important is the positive effects of aid. Our research has been
focused mainly of the exasperation of conflict through aid. But we do not rule out
tat it can actually help in managing conflicts. We have pointed out in our
overarching theory of Mary Anderson that aid may not necessarily have a
negative impact on conflict and it may also aid the connectors not only separators.
Thus our research has been restricted in that domain.
21
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