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LEXSTAT 18 USC SECTION 1001
UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
Copyright © 2010 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group (TM)
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*** CURRENT THROUGH PL 111-193, WITH A GAP OF PL 111-192, APPROVED 6/28/2010 ***
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I. CRIMES
CHAPTER 47. FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS
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18 USCS § 1001
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully-(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331 [18 USCS § 2331]), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If the matter relates to an
offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or 117, or section 1591 [18 USCS §§ 2241 et seq., 2250, 2251 et seq., 2421 et
seq., or 1591], then the term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be not more than 8 years.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, for statements, representations,
writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to-(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services,
personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted
to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or
office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.
HISTORY:
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 749; Sept. 13, 1994, P.L. 103-322, Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(L), 108 Stat. 2147;
Oct. 11, 1996, P.L. 104-292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459; Dec. 17, 2004, P.L. 108-458, Title VI, Subtitle H, § 6703(a), 118 Stat.
3766.)
(As amended July 27, 2006, P.L. 109-248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 141(c), 120 Stat. 603.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
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18 USCS § 1001
Prior law and revision:
Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 80 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095; Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat.
1015; June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996; Apr. 4, 1938, ch. 69, 52 Stat. 197).
Section 80 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., was divided into two parts.
The provision relating to false claims was incorporated in section 287 of this title.
Reference to persons causing or procuring was omitted as unnecessary in view of definition of "principal" in section 2
of this title.
Words "or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder" in said section 80 were omitted as
unnecessary in view of definition of "agency" in section 6 of this title.
In addition to minor changes of phraseology, the maximum term of imprisonment was changed from 10 to 5 years to be
consistent with comparable sections. (See reviser's note under section 287 of this title.)
Amendments:
1994. Act Sept. 13, 1994, substituted "under this title" for "not more than $ 10,000".
1996. Act Oct. 11, 1996, substituted the text of this section for text which read: "Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes
or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.".
2004. Act Dec. 17, 2004, in subsec. (a), in the concluding matter, substituted "be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned
not more than 8 years, or both" for "be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both".
2006. Act July 27, 2006, in subsec. (a), in the concluding matter, added the sentence beginning "If the matter relates . . .".
Short titles:
Act Dec. 31, 1982, P.L. 97-398, § 1, 96 Stat. 2009, provides: "This Act may be cited as the 'False Identification Crime
Control Act of 1982'.". For full classification of this Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
Act Oct. 12, 1984, P.L. 98-473, Title II, Ch XVI, § 1601, 98 Stat. 2183, provides: "This chapter may be cited as the
'Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984'.". For full classification of such Chapter, consult USCS Tables volumes.
Act Oct. 12, 1984, P.L. 98-473, Title II, Ch XXI, § 2101, 98 Stat. 2190, provides: "This chapter may be cited as the
'Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984'.". For full classification of such Chapter, consult
USCS Tables volumes.
Act Oct. 16, 1986, P.L. 99-474, § 1, 100 Stat. 1213, provides: "This Act may be cited as the 'Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986'.".
Act Nov. 19, 1988, P.L. 100-700, § 1, 102 Stat. 4631, provides: "This Act may be cited as the 'Major Fraud Act of
1988'.". For full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes.
Act Oct. 23, 1989, P.L. 101-123, § 1, 103 Stat. 759, provides: "This Act may be cited as the 'Major Fraud Act
Amendments of 1989'.". For full classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
Act Nov. 29, 1990, P.L. 101-647, Title XXV, § 2500, 104 Stat. 4859, provides: "This title may be cited as the 'Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990'.". For full classification of such title,
consult USCS Tables volumes.
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18 USCS § 1001
Act Sept. 13, 1994, P.L. 103-322, Title XXIX, § 290001(a), 108 Stat. 2097, as amended by Act Oct. 11, 1996, provides: "This section [amending 18 USCS § 1030] may be cited as the 'Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994'.".
Act Oct. 11, 1996, P.L. 104-292, § 1, 110 Stat. 3459, provides: "This Act [amending 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1515, and
6005, and 28 USCS § 1365] may be cited as the 'False Statements Accountability Act of 1996'.".
Act April 24, 1998, P.L. 105-172, § 1, 112 Stat. 53, provides: "This Act [amending 18 USCS § 1029 and appearing in
part as a note to 28 USCS § 994] may be cited as the 'Wireless Telephone Protection Act'.".
Act Oct. 30, 1998, P.L. 105-318, § 1, 112 Stat. 3007, provides: "This Act may be cited as the 'Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998'.". For full classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
Act Dec. 28, 2000, P.L. 106-578, § 1, 114 Stat. 3075, provides: "This Act [amending 18 USCS § 1028, repealing 18
USCS § 1738, and appearing in part as 18 USCS § 1028 note] may be cited as the 'Internet False Identification Prevention
Act of 2000'.".
Act April 30, 2003, P.L. 108-21, Title VI, § 607(a), 117 Stat. 689, provides: "This section [amending 18 USCS § 1028]
may be cited as the 'Secure Authentication Feature and Enhanced Identification Defense Act of 2003' or 'SAFE ID Act'.".
Act July 15, 2004, P.L. 108-275, § 1, 118 Stat. 831, provides: "This Act may be cited as the 'Identity Theft Penalty
Enhancement Act'.". For full classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
NOTES:
Code of Federal Regulations:
Department of the Army--Entry authorization regulation for Kwajalein Missile Range, 32 CFR 525.1 et seq.
Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior--Location, recording, and maintaining mining claims or sites;
general provisions, 43 CFR 3830.1 et seq.
Related Statutes & Rules:
Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 18 USCS Appx § 2B1.1.
Conspiracy to defraud Government in regard to false claims, 18 USCS § 286.
Fraudulent claims, generally, 18 USCS § 287.
False claims for postal losses, 18 USCS § 288.
False claims for pensions, 18 USCS § 289.
Conspiracy to defraud United States, 18 USCS § 371.
Passports, false statements in application, 18 USCS § 1542.
Falsification of postal returns to increase compensation, 18 USCS § 1712.
False entry or certificate by revenue officer or agent, 26 USCS § 7214.
Patent declaration in lieu of oath; warning in document of punishment for willful false statements and the like under
this section, 35 USCS § 25.
Public buildings, section as applicable to statements by contractors, 40 USCS § 3145.
National Science Foundation scholarships or fellowships, applicability of section to loyalty affidavits, 42 USCS §
1874.
This section is referred to in 2 USCS § 437g; 7 USCS §§ 12a, 136h, 511r, 1314i, 5662, 6519; 8 USCS § 1324a; 12
USCS § 1833a; 15 USCS §§ 637, 657a, 6003; 17 USCS § 1312; 18 USCS §§ 24, 981, 982, 1345; 19 USCS §§ 2515, 3391,
3432; 21 USCS § 374; 22 USCS §§ 1623, 3622; 35 USCS § 25; 40 USCS § 3145; 42 USCS §§ 2000b-3, 2000c-6, 3795a;
43 USCS § 1212; 49 USCS §§ 5307, 30170.
Research Guide:
Federal Procedure:
26 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 632, Sentencing and Judgment § 632.20.
26 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 635, Correcting or Reducing a Sentence § 635.02.
28 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 672, Motion Attacking Sentence § 672.06.
3 Fed Proc L Ed, Armed Forces, Civil Disturbances, and National Defense § 5:551.
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18 USCS § 1001
4 Fed Proc L Ed, Aviation and Space §§ 7:119, 792, 796.
4A Fed Proc L Ed, Banking and Financing §§ 8:595, 607.
4B Fed Proc L Ed, Banking and Financing §§ 8:1368, 1978, 1980, 1986.
6 Fed Proc L Ed, Civil Rights §§ 11:387, 441.
8A Fed Proc L Ed, Criminal Procedure § 22:74.
9A Fed Proc L Ed, Criminal Procedure §§ 22:1462, 1685.
10B Fed Proc L Ed, Elections and Elective Franchise §§ 28:270, 331.
11A Fed Proc L Ed, Environmental Protection §§ 32:600, 660.
11B Fed Proc L Ed, Environmental Protection §§ 32:1613, 1675.
13 Fed Proc L Ed, Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics § 35:1.
13A Fed Proc L Ed, Foreign Relations §§ 36:18, 21, 41.
15A Fed Proc L Ed, Government Contracts § 39:383.
16 Fed Proc L Ed, Government Office and Employees §§ 40:102, 135, 230, 438.
17A Fed Proc L Ed, Health, Education, and Welfare § 42:1313.
18 Fed Proc L Ed, Highways and Bridges §§ 43:77, 164.
18 Fed Proc L Ed, Housing and Urban Development § 44:713.
18B Fed Proc L Ed, Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality §§ 45:2247, 2563, 2565-2567, 2572, 2573.
19 Fed Proc L Ed, Injunctions and Restraining Orders § 47:141.
20A Fed Proc L Ed, Internal Revenue §§ 48:1574, 1588.
22 Fed Proc L Ed, Labor and Labor Relations § 52:710.
23A Fed Proc L Ed, Natural and Marine Resources §§ 56:34, 66.
24A Fed Proc L Ed, Natural and Marine Resources § 56:2394.
25 Fed Proc L Ed, Navigable Waters § 57:427.
26 Fed Proc L Ed, Patents §§ 60:68, 73.
31 Fed Proc L Ed, Telecommunications § 72:522.
31 Fed Proc L Ed, Tort Claims Against the United States §§ 73:2, 5.
32 Fed Proc L Ed, Trademarks § 74:67.
33A Fed Proc L Ed, Witnesses §§ 80:321, 350.
Am Jur:
3C Am Jur 2d, Aliens and Citizens §§ 2661, 2683-2686.
9 Am Jur 2d, Bankruptcy § 605.
15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 279.
17 Am Jur 2d, Contempt § 92.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 475.
26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 471.
32 Am Jur 2d, False Personation § 5.
32 Am Jur 2d, False Pretenses §§ 9, 76, 79, 81-84.
35A Am Jur 2d, Federal Tax Enforcement §§ 1198, 1215.
37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit §§ 19, 107, 116.
45B Am Jur 2d, Job Discrimination § 1657.
54 Am Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 252.
58 Am Jur 2d, Obstructing Justice §§ 31, 33.
59A Am Jur 2d, Partnership §§ 512, 514.
59A Am Jur 2d, Passports § 54.
60 Am Jur 2d, Patents § 64.
61B Am Jur 2d, Pollution Control §§ 579, 630.
61C Am Jur 2d, Pollution Control §§ 1791, 1853.
69 Am Jur 2d, Securities Regulation--Federal § 549.
70B Am Jur 2d, Social Security and Medicare §§ 1380, 1389.
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18 USCS § 1001
Am Jur Trials:
13 Am Jur Trials, Defending Federal Tax Evasion Cases, p. 1.
14 Am Jur Trials, Representing the Government Contractor, p. 437.
Am Jur Proof of Facts:
23 Am Jur Proof of Facts, Confidence Games and Swindles, p. 1.
Forms:
16 Bender's Federal Practice Forms, Form CrR7:23, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
16 Bender's Federal Practice Forms, Form CrR11:10, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
17 Bender's Federal Practice Forms, Form CrR30:86, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Transportation (2007) § 66:107.
2 Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Appeal, Certiorari, and Review § 3:338.
3 Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Armed Forces, Civil Disturbances, and National Defense (2009) §§ 5:241-244.
10 Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Foreign Trade and Commerce § 33:286.
13A Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Patents (2005) §§ 52:49, 157, 159-163, 165-168.
15B Fed Procedural Forms L Ed, Trademarks (2010) §§ 64:217, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227, 229, 231, 233, 235-239, 241,
243, 245, 247, 249, 251, 253, 255-261, 263-265.
3 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Atomic Energy § 28:10.
7 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d (2006), Customs Duties and Import Regulations §§ 82:94-96.
8A Am Jur Legal Forms 2d (2007), Federal Tort Claims Act, § 113:6.
9B Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Housing Laws and Urban Redevelopment §§ 138:11-13.
17 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Telecommunications §§ 245:95, 97, 100-106, 108-115.
17A Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Telecommunications §§ 245:119, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128-130.
17A Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Trademarks and Tradenames §§ 247:6-9, 11.
20 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d (2009), War, § 257:12.
20 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d (2009), Welfare Laws, § 264:8.
12 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (2008), Fish and Game, § 38.
23A Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Trademarks and Tradenames §§ 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 41, 43,
45.
Intellectual Property:
4 Chisum on Patents (Matthew Bender), ch 11, Patent and Trademark Office Procedures § 11.03.
6 Chisum on Patents (Matthew Bender), ch 19, Defenses § 19.03.
4 Gilson on Trademarks (Matthew Bender), ch 21, Declaration and Verification Forms for Applications, Amendments
to Allege Use and Statements of Use § 21.01.
4 Nimmer on Copyright (Matthew Bender), ch 15, Criminal Actions § 15.03.
Commercial Law:
1 Goods in Transit (Matthew Bender), ch 5, Carrier Litigation § 5.11.
Criminal Law and Practice:
2 Criminal Constitutional Law (Matthew Bender), ch 6, Grand Jury Procedures § 6.03.
3 Criminal Constitutional Law (Matthew Bender), ch 14, Trial by Jury § 14.04.
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1A Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 12, Misjoinder and Prejudicial Joinder of Offenses and Defendants § 12.03.
3 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 56, Defense of a Securities Case §§ 56.02, 56.03, 56.06.
3 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 56A, Defense of a Tax Case §§ 56A.06, 56A.08.
3 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 60A, Defending Aliens in Criminal Cases §§ 60A.07, 60A.10.
3A Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 71, Representing A Witness Before A Congressional Committee § 71.05.
4 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 85, Essentials for the Prosecution and Defense of Federal
Program Fraud §§ 85.02, 85.04, 85.10.
4 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 88, Defense of Bank Crimes § 88.03.
1 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 4, Pretrial Motions Directed at Indictment PP 4.07, 4.12, 4.13.
2 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 6A, Preventing Corporate Criminal Liability P 6A.01.
4 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 15, Appellate Practice P 15.05.
4 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 17, Securities Fraud PP 17.11, 17.14.
4 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 18A, Corporate Criminal Responsibility--Conducting an Internal Investigation P 18A.02.
5 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 19, Criminal Antitrust P 19.02.
5 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 20, Bank Fraud P 20.02.
5 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 27, Tax Fraud PP 27.01, 27.05, 27.08.
6 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 31, Environmental Law Violations P 31.06.
6 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 36, Insurance Fraud P 36.03.
6 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 38A, Representing Businesses Abroad: The Bank Records and Foreign
Transaction Act P 38A.06.
6 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 35, 18 U.S.C. § 1001: The General False Statements Statute PP 35.01-35.05.
Bankruptcy:
1 Collier on Bankruptcy (Matthew Bender 15th ed. rev), ch 7, Bankruptcy Crimes P 7.08.
Immigration:
6 Immigration Law and Procedure (rev. ed.), ch 71, Grounds for Deportation § 71.07.
8 Immigration Law and Procedure (rev. ed.), ch 111, Civil Liabilities and Criminal Offenses §§ 111.07, 111.08.
Corporate and Business Law:
5 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation, 2nd Edition (Matthew Bender), ch 92, Full-Scale Investigations by the Department of Justice § 92.06.
1 Antitrust Counseling and Litigation Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 3, Information Management and Document
Control § 3.07.
5 Antitrust Counseling and Litigation Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 53, Responding to a Grand Jury Investigation
§ 53.04.
5 Antitrust Counseling and Litigation Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 55, Defending a Subject or Target of an
Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation § 55.01.
1 Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors (Matthew Bender), ch 8, Criminal Liability § 8.09.
6 Securities Law Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 82, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 82.03,
82.08.
6 Securities Law Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 88, Securities Enforcement Investigations §§ 88.07-88.09.
Federal Taxation:
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5 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal, Income, Gift and Estate Taxation (Matthew Bender), ch 88, Criminal Penalties and
Procedures § 88.01.
Annotations:
Supreme Court's views as to validity, construction, and application of 18 USCS § 1001 (and similar predecessor provisions), making it a criminal offense to falsify material facts or to make false statements on any matter under jurisdiction
of any department or agency of United States. 131 L Ed 2d 1103.
Construction and Application of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea--Global Cases. 21 ALR Fed 2d
109.
What constitutes a "material" fact for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, relating to falsifying or concealing facts in matter
within jurisdiction of United States department or agency. 49 ALR Fed 622.
What statements fall within exculpatory denial exception to prohibition, under 18 USCS § 1001, against knowingly and
willfully making false statement which is material to matter within jurisdiction of department or agency of United States.
102 ALR Fed 742.
Giving false information to federal department or agency as violation of 18 USCS § 1001, making it criminal offense to
make false statements in any matter under jurisdiction of department or agency of United States. 111 ALR Fed 295.
Liability Under Common Law for Wrongful or Retaliatory Discharge of At-Will Employee for In-House Complaints
or Efforts Relating to Health or Safety. 93 ALR5th 269.
Common-Law Retaliatory Discharge of Employee for Refusing to Perform or Participate in Unlawful or Wrongful
Acts. 104 ALR5th 1.
Common-Law Retaliatory Discharge of Employee for Disclosing Unlawful Acts or Other Misconduct of Employer or
Fellow Employees. 105 ALR5th 351.
Filing of false insurance claims for medical services as ground for disciplinary action against dentist, physician, or
other medical practitioner. 70 ALR4th 132.
What constitutes a public record or document within statute making falsification, forgery, mutilation, removal, or other
misuse thereof an offense. 75 ALR4th 1067.
Texts:
1 Banking Law (Matthew Bender), ch 3, Creation, Organization, and Reorganization of Banks § 3.07.
2 Banking Law (Matthew Bender), ch 22, Organization of a National Bank § 22.03.
2 Banking Law (Matthew Bender), ch 45, Enforcement Powers § 45.10.
7 Banking Law (Matthew Bender), ch 156, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act § 156.07.
13 Banking Law (Matthew Bender), ch 255, National Bank Regulatory Forms §§ 255.01, 255.07, 255.11, 255.17.
13 Banking Law (Matthew Bender), ch 256, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regulatory Forms § 256.03.
3 Benedict on Admiralty, Marine Oil Pollution § 114.
2A Environmental Law Practice Guide (Matthew Bender), ch 12C, Criminal Enforcement §§ 12C.03, 12C.04.
4 Environmental Law Practice Guide (Matthew Bender), ch 18, Water Pollution § 18.15.
4 Environmental Law Practice Guide (Matthew Bender), ch 20, Safe Drinking Water Act § 20.03.
5 Environmental Law Practice Guide (Matthew Bender), ch 34A, Agricultural Environmental Law § 34A.03.
5A Environmental Law Practice Guide (Matthew Bender), ch 37, Used Oil Management § 37.02.
4 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability (Matthew Bender), ch 35, Manufacturers' Liability § 35.01.
1B Government Contracts: Law, Administration & Procedure (Matthew Bender), ch 10, Procurement by Sealed Bidding § 10.240.
2 Government Contracts: Law, Administration & Procedure (Matthew Bender), ch 14, Fraud, Conflicts of Interest and
Gratuities § 14.40.
2 Government Contracts: Law, Administration & Procedure (Matthew Bender), ch 23, Allowable Costs § 23.140.
7 Government Contracts: Law, Administration & Procedure (Matthew Bender), ch 46, Industrial Security § 46.30.
Homeland Security Deskbook (Matthew Bender), ch 16, Food and Drug Protective Measures § 16.03.
1 The Law of Advertising (Matthew Bender), ch 11, Federal Remedies Available to Competitors § 11.03.
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Law Review Articles:
Sanchirico. Detection Avoidance. 81 NYU L Rev 1331, October 2006.
Interpretive Notes and Decisions:
I.IN GENERAL 1. Generally 2. Constitutionality 3. Purpose 4. Nature of crime and moral turpitude 5. Civil actions and
liability
II.RELATION TO OTHER LAWS 6. Generally 7. Title 10 8.--Uniform Code of Military Justice 9. Title 15 10.
Title 16 11. Title 18 12.--Sections 1010 and 1012 13.--Section 1341 14. Title 19 15. Title 26 16.--Section 7207 17. Title 31
18.--Section 3729 19.--Section 5322 20. Title 42 21.--Section 408 22. Title 49 23. State laws 24. Miscellaneous
III.ELEMENTS OF OFFENSES
A.In General 25. Generally
B.Matters Within Jurisdiction of Executive, Legislative or Judicial Branch of Federal Government
1.In General 26. Generally 27. Jurisdiction 28. "Matter within the jurisdiction" 29. Submission or presentation to
federal entity 30. Action by federal entity 31. Miscellaneous
2.Particular Departments, Agencies or Entities 32. Congress 33. Courts 34.--During judicial proceeding exception
35. Custom authorities 36. Environmental Protection Agency 37. Federal Bureau of Investigation 38. Grand jury 39.
Health, education and welfare 40.--Medicare 41. Housing 42. Immigration, naturalization and citizenship 43. Internal
Revenue Service 44. Labor Department 45.--National Labor Relations Board 46. Military authorities 47. Postal Service
48. Small Business Administration 49. State agencies 50. United States Attorney 51. Veteran's Administration 52. Wartime agencies 53. Miscellaneous
3.Particular Matters and Transactions 54. Answers to inquiries, questionnaires and forms 55.--Particular cases 56.
Currency transaction reports 57. Negotiations with government 58. Reports of federal employees 59. Miscellaneous
C.State of Mind 60. Generally 61. Intent, knowledge and willfulness 62. Recklessness
D.False Statements, Writings or Documents and Concealments
1.In General 63. Generally 64. "False" 65.--Literally or facially true
2.Particular Cases 66. Applications 67. Checks 68. Exculpatory statements 69.--Custodial interrogation
70.--Customs matters 71.--Tax matters 72.--Miscellaneous 73. Investigations 74. Negative answers 75. Omissions or
leaving blanks 76. Oral and/or unsworn statements 77.--Tax matters 78. Self-incrimination 79. Voluntary statements 80.
Miscellaneous
E.Materiality
1.In General 81. Generally 82. Tendency to influence, or capacity to affect or influence, governmental function as
test to determine materiality 83. Damage, injury or loss to government 84. Reliance
2.Particular Cases 85. Assistance and grant programs 86. Criminal record concealment 87. Customs matters
88.--Export declarations 89. Government contracts and contractors 90. Government employees 91. Housing matters 92.
Immigration, naturalization and citizenship 93. Labor Department 94. Loans 95.--Guarantees for loans 96. Tax matters
97.--Affidavits 98. Miscellaneous
IV.PERSONS LIABLE 99. Generally 100. Aiders and abettors 101. Corporations 102. Miscellaneous
V.PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT
A.In General 103. Jurisdiction and venue 104. Single or separate offenses and multiple violations 105. Estoppel and
res judicata 106. Statute of limitations 107. Comments of prosecutor 108. Verdict 109. Appeal and review 110. Search and
seizure 111. Miscellaneous
B.Indictment or Information
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18 USCS § 1001
1.In General 112. Duplicity and multiplicity 113. Joinder and severance 114. Bill of particulars 115. Dismissal of
indictment or counts 116. Miscellaneous
2.Sufficiency and Particular Allegations 117. Language of statute 118. Substantive offenses 119. Falsity of
statement 120. Intent, knowledge and willfulness 121. Jurisdiction of federal entity 122. Materiality 123. Trick, scheme or
device 124. Use, presentation or filing of statement or document 125. Miscellaneous
C.Defenses 126. Authority 127.--Federal entity 128. Double jeopardy 129. Entrapment 130. "Exculpatory no" defense 131. Immunity 132. Invalidity or unconstitutionality of statutory requirement 133. Reliance 134.--Expert advice
135. Miscellaneous
D.Evidence
1.In General 136. Variance between indictment and proof 137. Self-incrimination 138. Perjury rule 139. Inferences
140. Miscellaneous
2.Burden of Proof 141. Falsity 142. Intent, knowledge and willfulness 143. Materiality 144. Miscellaneous
3.Admissibility or Exclusion of Evidence 145. Confessions and admissions 146. Materiality 147. Prior or other acts
148. Relevant evidence 149. State of mind 150.--Intent, knowledge and willfulness 151.--Motive 152. Miscellaneous
4.Sufficiency of Evidence 153. Aiding and abetting 154. Circumstantial evidence 155. Concealment 156. Conspiracy 157. Corroborative evidence 158. Falsity 159. Intent, knowledge and willfulness 160.--Currency transaction reports
161.--Customs matters 162.--Tax matters 163.--Miscellaneous 164. Materiality 165.--Customs matters 166.--Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation 167.--Payments or disbursements 168. Miscellaneous 169.--Cases where evidence found
sufficient 170.--Cases where evidence not found sufficient
E.Questions of Law or Fact 171. Intent, knowledge and willfulness 172. Materiality 173. Miscellaneous
F.Instructions to Jury 174. Generally 175. Evidence 176.--Character evidence 177. Intent, knowledge and willfulness 178.--Good faith 179.--Willful blindness instruction 180. Materiality 181.--Failure to instruct on issue of materiality 182.--Instruction on issue of materiality as matter of law 183. Miscellaneous
G.Sentence and Punishment 184. Discretionary matters 185. Debarment or disbarment 186.--Attorneys 187. Cumulative punishment 188. Miscellaneous
I.IN GENERAL 1. Generally
Term "serious harm" found in language of 18 USCS § 1589, encompassed more than physical violence, including
more subtle psychological methods of coercion; therefore, appellate court found that district court properly charged those
words and affirmed two defendants convictions of violating 18 USCS §§ 371, 1589, 1594, 1590, and 1592, as well as 18
USCS §§ 1343 and 1001, when defendants lured Jamaican laborers to New Hampshire through fraud, mistreated them
during their employ, and coerced them to stay. United States v Bradley (2004, CA1 NH) 390 F3d 145.
18 USCS § 1001 is not to be interpreted narrowly or technically. United States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F
Supp 1120.
18 USCS § 1001 does not establish 3 separate offenses, but represents alternative means of committing single offense.
United States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F Supp 1120.
When Congress empowered Attorney General to prosecute members of Congress who knowingly and willfully falsified or knowingly and willfully failed to file financial disclosure statement, pursuant to 5 USCS App. § 104 and 18 USCS
§ 1001, Congress indicated its intent not to be exclusive interpreter of particular rules of U.S. House of Representatives
implicated by required answers to financial disclosure statements. United States v Jefferson (2009, ED Va) 623 F Supp 2d
678, 79 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1017.
2. Constitutionality
Predecessor to 18 USCS § 1001 was upheld against attack on ground of vagueness; affidavits and reports required had
been sufficiently described and duty enjoined had been adequately defined, so that anyone presenting such affidavits and
reports to board set up under pertinent regulations was suitably charged with notice of consequence of knowingly and
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18 USCS § 1001
willfully including therein any false and fraudulent statements. United States v Gilliland (1941) 312 US 86, 85 L Ed 598,
61 S Ct 518.
18 USCS § 1001 is not unconstitutional on ground that its language is unclear and indefinite. United States v
Matanky (1973, CA9 Cal) 482 F2d 1319, cert den (1973) 414 US 1039, 38 L Ed 2d 329, 94 S Ct 539, reh den (1974) 414
US 1138, 38 L Ed 2d 764, 94 S Ct 885.
18 USCS § 1001 is not overly broad because it punishes unsworn oral statements. United States v Des Jardins
(1985, CA9 Cal) 772 F2d 578.
18 USCS § 1001 is not unconstitutional as improperly delegating legislative authority to executive branch of government, and it is not void for indefiniteness or vagueness. United States v Houcks (1963, WD Mo) 224 F Supp 778.
18 USCS § 1001 gives sufficient notice as to what is proscribed conduct and is not void for vagueness. United States
v Moller-Butcher (1983, DC Mass) 560 F Supp 550.
Indictment counts for presidential aide's making false statements to Congress are proper under 18 USCS § 1001,
notwithstanding argument that President's primacy in foreign affairs precludes aide's prosecution; Congress may properly
inquire into President's conduct of foreign affairs and presidential aides may not intentionally mislead Congress during
inquiry. United States v North (1988, DC Dist Col) 708 F Supp 380.
3. Purpose
18 USCS § 1001 was intended to serve vital public purpose of protecting governmental functions from frustration and
distortion through deceptive practices. Ogden v United States (1962, CA9 Cal) 303 F2d 724.
18 USCS § 1001 serves as catch-all, reaching those false representations that might substantially impair basic functions entrusted by law to particular agency, but which are not prohibited by other statutes. United States v Rose (1978,
CA9 Wash) 570 F2d 1358 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv
494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35) and (criticized in United
States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5) and (criticized in United States v Huber (2002, DC ND) 2002
US Dist LEXIS 306).
18 USCS § 1001 is designed to protect authorized functions of government departments and agencies from perversion
which might result from deceptive practices enumerated. United States v Shanks (1979, CA2 NY) 608 F2d 73, cert den
(1980) 444 US 1048, 62 L Ed 2d 736, 100 S Ct 740.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1001 is clearly to protect Government from fraud and deceit and reach of § 1001 covers all
materially false statements, including non-monetary fraud, made to any branch of Government. United States v Fern
(1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1001 is to protect United States Government from fraud or deceit. Lee v Denro, Inc. (1992)
91 Md App 822, 605 A2d 1017, 7 BNA IER Cas 720, 126 CCH LC P 57549.
In denying federal employee's motion to dismiss count of indictment for making false statement when seeking ethics
advice, court rejected employee's argument that his prosecution was "unprecedented" because, however wise or unwise it
may have been to prosecute federal employee for allegedly making false statements in connection with seeking ethics
opinion, 18 USCS § 1001 itself did not contemplate any exceptions of that sort nor suggest that such policy rationale
provided basis for barring prosecution; matter of whether such exception to statute should have existed was one for
Congress, not for court. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 429 F Supp 2d 156.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1001 is to punish those who render positive false statements designed to pervert or undermine
functions of governmental departments and agencies. United States v Harrison (1985, ACMR) 20 MJ 710.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Former employer, biotechnology and drug company, was properly granted summary judgment on
former employee's employment discrimination claim because employee's termination did not fall under public policy
exception to Pennsylvania's at-will employment doctrine as neither 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001, nor 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4911
imposed directly on employee affirmative duty to report his employer's non-compliance with prescription drug's risk
management program (RMP), and while RMP required that employer disclose certain compliance indicators, it mandated
neither audit nor disclosure of report containing findings of audit; in absence of clear and direct duty of disclosure, stat-
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18 USCS § 1001
utorily imposed duty prong of exception did not apply. Brennan v Cephalon, Inc. (2008, CA3 NJ) 2008 US App LEXIS
21120.
4. Nature of crime and moral turpitude
Crime of making false and fraudulent statements under predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001 was not crime involving
moral turpitude. Hirsch v INS (1962, CA9) 308 F2d 562 (criticized in Omagah v Ashcroft (2002, CA5) 288 F3d 254).
Making false statement to government conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a) constitutes crime of moral turpetitude
that renders convicted alien ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 USCS § 1229b(b) as matter of law. Ghani v
Holder (2009, CA7) 557 F3d 836.
Even if alien's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as to claim were excused, alien could not succeed on his
challenge to IJ's finding that his conviction for violating 18 USCS § 1001(a) rendered him ineligible for cancellation of
removal under 8 USCS § 1229b(b); alien was convicted under 18 USCS § 1001(a) for knowingly and willfully making
false statement to government, which constituted crime of moral turpitude for cancellation of removal purposes as matter
of law. Ghani v Holder (2009, CA7) 557 F3d 836.
BIA properly determined that petitioner alien's convictions for violations of 18 USCS §§ 371,1001, constituted
crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under 8 USCS § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); because 18 USCS § 1001 contained some
offenses that constituted CIMT and others that did not, court looked to indictments which clearly showed that alien was
convicted of crimes involving fraud. Kellermann v Holder (2010, CA6) 592 F3d 700, 2010 FED App 10P.
Although alien who testified she had made false statement to immigration inspector admitted essential elements of
offense under 18 USCS § 1001, where it was not clear alien had not admitted that there was any fraudulent statement or
representation, crime which she had admitted committing was not crime involving moral turpitude. In re B---- M---(1955, BIA) 6 I & N Dec 806.
Crime of abetting foreign visitor to make false and fraudulent statement in application for extension of stay, resulting
in alien's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001, was not crime involving moral turpitude, since conviction under § 1001
would be possible without element of fraudulent intent. In re Espinosa (1962, BIA) 10 I & N Dec 98.
Since minimum element for conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 did not necessarily involve moral turpitude, evidence
of physician's conviction for violation of § 1001 for submitting Medicare claim forms to private insurance carriers who
were under contract with Federal Government to process and pay Medicare claims, could not, in and of itself, establish
moral turpitude; however, offense that does not necessarily involve moral turpitude may nonetheless be committed by acts
involving moral turpitude; where physician charged Medicare for services he did not render, it is clear that physician was
charged with, and convicted of, nothing less than attempting to defraud and cheat Federal Government by false pretenses,
and Board of Medical Examiners was entitled to consider fact of such moral turpitude in fixing degree of discipline.
Matanky v Board of Medical Examiners (1978, 2nd Dist) 79 Cal App 3d 293, 144 Cal Rptr 826.
5. Civil actions and liability
Despite fact that criminal provisions of False Claims Act (18 USCS §§ 287, 1001; former 31 USCS § 231 and note)
were altered and codified in this title, insofar as civil liability is concerned, version of these provisions contained in R.S. §
5438 [31 USCS § 231 note] continues to be official one. United States v Neifert-White Co. (1968) 390 US 228, 19 L Ed
2d 1061, 88 S Ct 959.
There is no implied civil remedy for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, since there is no affirmative indication that Congress intended to furnish one. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v Reeves (1987, CA4 Md) 816 F2d 130.
There is no civil cause of action for violation of 18 USCS §§ 241, 242, 371 or 1001. Fiorino v Turner (1979, DC
Mass) 476 F Supp 962.
Alleged breach of 18 USCS § 1001 cannot serve to provide private citizen with cause of action in civil case arising out
of prior eminent domain proceeding. Johl v Johl (1981, DC Conn) 556 F supp 5, affd without op (1982, CA2 Conn) 697
F2d 291, cert den (1983) 459 US 1219, 75 L Ed 2d 459, 103 S Ct 1224, reh den (1983) 460 US 1105, 76 L Ed 2d 370, 103
S Ct 1807.
Black female former postal employee lacked standing to sue individual under 18 USCS § 1001, where nothing in
statute provided private right of action or civil remedies for private person affected by false statements made to government. Daniels v Am. Postal Worker Union (2001, ND Ill) 167 F Supp 2d 999, 145 CCH LC P 11189.
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18 USCS § 1001
Private causes of action are precluded for criminal statutes located at 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 241. Anderson v Wiggins
(2006, DC Dist Col) 460 F Supp 2d 1.
Complaint and declarations therein, submitted in opposition to summary judgment motion, were not subscribed under
penalty of perjury within meaning of 28 USCS § 1746 because reference to 18 USCS § 1001 did not make declaration
criminally punishable. Bloodstock Research Info. Servs. v edbain.com, LLC (2009, ED Ky) 622 F Supp 2d 504.
Veteran did not have private right of action against various government agencies for alleged violations of 18 USCS §§
1001, 1503, 1505, 1512, and 1519, because criminal statutes did not provide basis for cause of action for civil liability.
Peavey v Holder (2009, DC Dist Col) 657 F Supp 2d 180.
II.RELATION TO OTHER LAWS 6. Generally
18 USCS § 1001 does not limit its prohibition of falsification to matters which another statute or regulation requires
be provided. United States v Olson (1985, CA9 Wash) 751 F2d 1126.
7. Title 10
Defense contractor had duty to disclose complete, current, and accurate data to Department of Defense, arising under
10 USCS § 2306, which was applicable to defendant's prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Poarch (1989,
CA11 Fla) 878 F2d 1355, 35 CCF P 75700.
8.--Uniform Code of Military Justice
Mere fact that, in proof of acts of accused of wrongful importation, specific acts of accused were proved that may
have violated 18 USCS § 1001 or any other federal civilian criminal statute, would not mean that such other specific
criminal offense was or became offense against Uniform Code of Military Justice that was charged; assuming that violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was proved by evidence as to how accused accomplished his offense, that violation would not
become offense charged so that two could be said to be same, and therefore, accused could not be tried by federal civil
court under 18 USCS § 1001 for offense alleged and proved under Uniform Code of Military Justice. United States v
Rubenstein (1954, US) 19 CMR 709.
Violation of 18 USCS § 1001 will support conviction under Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, even
where Article 132 violation fails of proof, when accused was charged with using false writing for purpose of obtaining
payment of claim against United States. United States v Hill (1974, US) 49 CMR 230.
Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, which relates to false statements, and 18 USCS § 1001, which relates
to false statements in any matter within jurisdiction of department or agency of United States, are so closely related that
one year maximum confinement prescribed as punishment for violation for Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military
Justice must be regarded as maximum punishment for violation of § 1001, when laid as offense under Article 134 of
Uniform Code of Military Justice. United States v Middleton (1960) 12 USCMA 54, 30 CMR 54.
10 USCS § 907, which criminalizes act of making false official statement, is similar in its scope and purpose to 18
USCS § 1001. United States v Harrison (1985, ACMR) 20 MJ 710.
False statements are broadly criminalized through Unif. Code Mil. Justice art. 107, 10 USCS § 907, which is more
expansive than its federal counterpart in 18 USCS § 1001 because purpose of military law, which is to maintain morale,
good order, and discipline, has no parallel in civilian criminal law. United States v Harris (2009, AFCCA) 67 MJ 611,
2009 CCA LEXIS 27.
Though military courts that are considering scope of offense defined in Unif. Code Mil. Justice art. 107, 10 USCS §
907, routinely cite to 18 USCS § 1001, which is its civilian counterpart, scope of military offense is more expansive than
civilian offense because primary purpose of military criminal law--to maintain morale, good order, and discipline--has no
parallel in civilian criminal law; even with this more expansive definition and purpose, however, not every false statement
by service member rises to level of false official statement, as circumstances surrounding making of such statement assist
in determining whether service member was in line of duty while making statement. United States v Caballero (2007,
CGCCA) 65 MJ 674, 2007 CCA LEXIS 242.
Scope of offense of making false official statement as defined in Unif. Code Mil. Justice art. 107, 10 USCS § 907 is
more expansive than that of its civilian counterpart in 18 USCS § 1001 because primary purpose of military criminal
law--to maintain morale, good order, and discipline--has no parallel in civilian criminal law. United States v Morgan
(2007, NMCCA) 65 MJ 616, 2007 CCA LEXIS 138.
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18 USCS § 1001
Scope of Unif. Code Mil. Justice art. 107, 10 USCS § 907, and what constitutes official statement thereunder, is more
expansive than scope of official statements under 18 USCS § 1001 because of nature of military law to maintain good
morale, order, and discipline. United States v Day (2008, CAAF) 66 MJ 172, 2008 CAAF LEXIS 404.
9. Title 15
15 USCS § 645(a), dealing with false statements contained in applications to Small Business Administration, does not
impliedly repeal 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Carter (1976, CA5 Ga) 526 F2d 1276, reh den (1977, CA5 Ga) 550
F2d 1285.
Securities and Exchange Commission's denial of evidentiary hearing in broker's disciplinary proceedings did not
violate due process because 17 CFR § 201.250(b), which permitted summary disposition, was based on permissible
reading of 15 USCS § 80b-3(f), and his scienter, intent to defraud, had been established by his guilty plea to charge of
making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001(a). Kornman v SEC (2010, App DC) 592 F3d 173, CCH Fed Secur L Rep
P 95574.
Government can prosecute alleged corporate insiders under 18 USCS § 1001 for alleged false statements concerning
corporation's income and expenses in quarterly reports required under 15 USCS § 78m(a)(2), despite existence of 15
USCS § 78ff(a) which imposes criminal penalties for violations of reporting requirements, because § 1001 contains broad
language and it was intended to overlap and coexist with--not to preempt--more specific false statement statutes. United
States v Lang (1991, DC Md) 766 F Supp 389, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95858, 33 Fed Rules Evid Serv 96.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's convictions for violating 18 USCS § 371, 18 USCS § 1001, 21 USCS § 846, 21 USCS §
963, and 21 USCS § 841 were supported by sufficient evidence; rational juror drawing all permissible inferences could
have found beyond reasonable doubt that defendant made materially false writing to U.S. Customs Service on matter
within agency's jurisdiction, and jury could have found that Customs agents actually received letters given evidence that
Customs seized, and therefore inspected, five of defendant's drug shipments with forged letter attached. United States v
Finze (2007, CA9 Nev) 2007 US App LEXIS 17384.
10. Title 16
Magnuson Act's criminal false statement provision, 16 USCS § 1857(1)(I), does not preempt 18 USCS § 1001, general federal criminal false statement provision. United States v Tomeny (1998, CA11 Fla) 144 F3d 749, 11 FLW Fed C
1513.
Count which is based on 18 USCS § 1001 is not controversy arising under any title of Stabilization Act or under
regulations or orders issued thereunder. United States v Zang (1981, Em Ct App) 645 F2d 999.
Defendant two's argument that perjury and false statement charges against her were multiplicitous had merit as
perjury counts duplicated three additional charges of making false statements; there was no basis to conclude that Congress intended 18 USCS § 1001 to penalize false grand jury testimony at all, let alone to permit cumulative punishment or
cumulative prosecution for such testimony under 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 1623. United States v Butler (2004, SD NY) 351 F
Supp 2d 121.
11. Title 18
That similar misconduct involving proof of other elements is covered by 18 USCS § 1723 which provides more lenient penalty, does not bar prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Baumgarten (1962, CA2 NY) 300 F2d
807, cert den (1962) 370 US 917, 8 L Ed 2d 499, 82 S Ct 1556.
Defendants' contention that they should have been charged under 18 USCS § 1919, which prohibits false statements
to obtain unemployment benefits for prior federal service, and not under the general fraudulent statement provision, 18
USCS § 1001, which carries a greater penalty, is without merit, there being no indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended to bar application of § 1001 to conduct also punished by § 1919. United States v Burnett (1974, CA9
Cal) 505 F2d 815, cert den (1975) 420 US 966, 43 L Ed 2d 445, 95 S Ct 1361.
18 USCS §§ 287, 1001, 1341, and 1343 are not mutually exclusive insofar as prosecution is concerned. United
States v Computer Sciences Corp. (1982, CA4 Va) 689 F2d 1181, 68 ALR Fed 783, cert den (1983) 459 US 1105, 74 L Ed
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18 USCS § 1001
2d 953, 103 S Ct 729 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by Busby v Crown Supply (1990, CA4 Va) 896 F2d 833, 114
CCH LC P 12032).
Conviction under both 18 USCS § 1001 and 18 USCS § 1542 for same conduct is proper where each provision requires proof of one fact that other does not. United States v Ramos (1984, CA11 Fla) 725 F2d 1322, 14 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 1537.
Although funds involved are CETA funds and 18 USCS § 665 deals specifically with CETA fund fraud, failure to use
more specific statute is not ground for reversal of conviction under statute prohibiting willful false statements in matters
within jurisdiction of any department or agency of United States (18 USCS § 1001). United States v Suggs (1985, CA11
Ga) 755 F2d 1538.
In prosecution for making false statement on Farmers Home Administration loan application, 18 USCS § 1001 was
not pre-empted by 18 USCS § 1014; government had discretion to prosecute under either statute. United States v
Hartness (1988, CA8 Ark) 845 F2d 158, cert den (1988) 488 US 925, 102 L Ed 2d 326, 109 S Ct 308.
18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to false statements subject to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1920. United States v
Richardson (1993, CA9 Cal) 8 F3d 15, 93 CDOS 7964, 93 Daily Journal DAR 13613.
Presence of 18 USCS § 2 allegation does not transform § 1001 into offense requiring multiple actors. United States
v Brown (1981, WD Wis) 521 F Supp 511.
Conspiracy to conceal by trick material facts within jurisdiction of treasury department in violation of 18 USCS §
1001 may be prosecuted as conspiracy to defraud United States in violation of 18 USCS § 371. United States v Richter
(1985, ND Ill) 610 F Supp 480, affd without op (1986, CA7 Ill) 785 F2d 312 and affd without op (1986, CA7 Ill) 793 F2d
1296, cert den (1986) 479 US 855, 93 L Ed 2d 124, 107 S Ct 191.
Defendant, agent with Federal Bureau of Investigation, was convicted under 18 USCS § 1001, but conduct could have
supported conviction for perjury under 18 USCS § 1621 when agent knowingly made false statements to investigators
about agent's conduct with alleged murderer, and thus, court determined that USSG § 2J1.3 (2002) was "more apt"
guideline for defendant's offense. United States v Anderson (2003, DC Mass) 260 F Supp 2d 310.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's 18 USCS § 1503(a) obstruction of justice conviction on basis
of false statements that she gave to Federal Bureau of Investigation, violation of 18 USCS § 1001, where she did not
contest that she stated that she believed employee's reported working hours were correct, when in fact she knew of
standing order to pay employee for 35 hours regardless of whether she worked zero hours; moreover, defendant also stated
that she did not know of any preferential treatment when she knew that employee had not been required to repay loan;
such false statements were material; if defendant had been truthful, investigation could have been significantly shortened.
United States v Dwyer (2007, CA1 Mass) 2007 US App LEXIS 20259.
Unpublished: Where plain language of witness tampering statute, 18 USCS § 1512(b)(3) made clear that conviction
was not required, court rejected defendant's argument that his witness tampering conviction had to be vacated because
district court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on underlying charge that defendant made false statement in
violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Davis (2008, CA9 Cal) 2008 US App LEXIS 12861.
12.--Sections 1010 and 1012
One who, not being veteran, ostensibly assisted veterans to purchase homes, but actually purchased houses for his
own benefit in veterans' names, concealing facts from housing authorities, was properly convicted of violation of 42
USCS § 1524 and 18 USCS § 1001, and could not complain because he had been charged under 18 USCS § 1001 rather
than 18 USCS § 1012, because, in prosecution resulting from single act which violates more than one statute, government
may elect to prosecute under either. Ehrlich v United States (1956, CA5 Ga) 238 F2d 481.
Indictments charging defendant with knowingly making false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and representations in the submission of several fictitious bids for construction on property owned by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) were properly brought under 18 USCS § 1001 even though such indictments could have also
been brought under either 18 USCS § 1010 or 1012; there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress, by
creating the specific HUD false claim statutes, that is §§ 1010 and 1012, intended to disallow use of the more general false
statement statute, § 1001, with its harsher penalties. United States v Brown (1973, CA9 Wash) 482 F2d 1359.
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18 USCS § 1001
Defendant's contention that he should have been charged and sentenced under 18 USCS § 1012, a misdemeanor
statute expressly proscribing frauds against HUD, rather than under the general felony fraud statute, 18 USCS § 1001, was
without merit; § 1012 was not intended to serve as exclusive criminal remedy for frauds against HUD so as to prevent use
of the harsher general statute, § 1001, where applicable. United States v Librach (1975, CA8 Mo) 520 F2d 550.
Although false statement made to Department of Housing and Urban Development is actionable under both 18 USCS
§§ 1010 and 1001, only § 1001 governs fraudulent schemes. United States v Waechter (1985, CA6 Mich) 771 F2d 974.
Violation of 18 USCS § 1010 is not a lesser included offense of 18 USCS § 1001 even though it carries a lesser
sentence, since there is no element of violation under § 1001 that is not also found in violation of § 1010; 18 USCS § 1010
is merely another statute under which same conduct prohibited by § 1001 can be punished. United States v Corsino
(1987, CA1 Puerto Rico) 812 F2d 26 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
Indictment which, in effect, charged that FHA mortgage insurance was obtained as result of certifications submitted
to the FHA by defendant which falsely represented condition of the properties in question, was not faulty on the theory
that it charged defendant under a statute of general application, that is, 18 USCS § 1001, whereas a statute of specific
application carrying lesser penalty, that is, 18 USCS § 1010, was available. United States v Clearfield (1973, ED Pa) 358
F Supp 564.
13.--Section 1341
There is nothing in either language or legislative history of false statements statute, 18 USCS § 1001, reflecting any
Congressional intent to create hierarchy of sanctions that would preempt application of mail fraud statute, 18 USCS §
1341, to submission of false statements to government agency through use of mails; mail fraud statute proscribes different
conduct and requires proof of different elements than false statements statute and government may prosecute defendant
under both statutes. United States v Weatherspoon (1978, CA7 Ill) 581 F2d 595 (criticized in Truck Ins. Exch. v Kafka
(1995, ND Ill) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8873).
18 USCS §§ 287, 1001, 1341, and 1343 are not mutually exclusive insofar as prosecution is concerned. United
States v Computer Sciences Corp. (1982, CA4 Va) 689 F2d 1181, 68 ALR Fed 783, cert den (1983) 459 US 1105, 74 L Ed
2d 953, 103 S Ct 729 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by Busby v Crown Supply (1990, CA4 Va) 896 F2d 833, 114
CCH LC P 12032).
Fact that certain acts may be subject to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 does not bar prosecution of frauds against
government under 18 USCS § 1341 since to obtain conviction under mail fraud statute government must prove elements
not required under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v La Bar (1981, MD Pa) 506 F Supp 1267, affd without op (1982,
CA3 Pa) 688 F2d 826, cert den (1982) 459 US 945, 74 L Ed 2d 202, 103 S Ct 260, reh den (1982) 459 US 1093, 74 L Ed
2d 941, 103 S Ct 583.
As matter of statutory construction, more general mail fraud statute, 18 USCS § 1341, supplants 18 USCS §§ 287 and
1001 insofar as fraudulent claims against United States are concerned. United States v La Bar (1981, MD Pa) 521 F
Supp 203, 8 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1704, affd without op (1982, CA3 Pa) 688 F2d 826, cert den (1982) 459 US 945, 74 L Ed
2d 202, 103 S Ct 260, reh den (1982) 459 US 1093, 74 L Ed 2d 941, 103 S Ct 583 and affd without op (1985, CA3 Pa) 770
F2d 1076 and affd without op (1985, CA3 Pa) 770 F2d 1076 and affd without op (1985, CA3 Pa) 770 F2d 1076 and affd
without op (1985, CA3 Pa) 770 F2d 1077.
14. Title 19
Defendants are summarily liable in violation of 19 USCS § 1592 with regard to intentional submission of fraudulent
information to Customs Service in attempt to enter foreign orange juice concentrate into United States commerce, because
material facts established by defendants' own admissions in plea bargaining criminal charge under 18 USCS § 1001 are
binding in this action, and government's receipt of restitution under 18 USCS § 3663 does not exhaust its right to pursue
additional civil penalties. United States v Loesche (1988) 12 CIT 599, 688 F Supp 649.
Importers are collaterally estopped from denying their civil liability for fraudulent entries under 19 USCS § 1592,
where (1) they previously entered guilty pleas in criminal action involving same entries under 18 USCS § 1001 and (2)
facts admitted in pleas satisfy elements of fraudulent violation of § 1592. United States v Daewoo Int'l (America) Corp.
(1988) 12 CIT 889, 696 F Supp 1534, mod on other grounds (1988) 13 CIT 76, 704 F Supp 1067.
Although United States Department of Labor ultimately certified employees for trade adjustment assistance benefits,
United States Court of International Trade criticized Labor for its perfunctory investigation, for its reliance solely on
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18 USCS § 1001
employer's official in its investigation whose statements proved to be false or inaccurate; while not imposing any sanction,
United States Court of International Trade noted that company officials and displaced workers alike could be held liable
for material false statements made to United States Department of Labor whether those statements were oral or in writing,
and even if they were not made under oath, 18 USCS § 1001 subjected to fine and/or imprisonment for up to five years
anyone who in any matter within jurisdiction of executive, legislative, or judicial branch of Government of United States,
knowingly and willfully makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation. Former Emples.
of BMC Software, Inc. v United States Sec'y of Labor (2006, CIT) 454 F Supp 2d 1306.
15. Title 26
Indictment under tax law charging willful attempt to evade and defeat taxes by making false and fraudulent statements to treasury department is good in spite of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Beacon Brass Co. (1952) 344 US 43,
97 L Ed 61, 73 S Ct 77, 52-2 USTC P 9528, 42 AFTR 654.
Enactment of 26 USCS § 7206 did not repeal by implication 18 USCS § 1001 as to internal revenue matters. Cohen
v United States (1953, CA9 Cal) 201 F2d 386, 53-1 USTC P 9165, 43 AFTR 161, cert den (1953) 345 US 951, 97 L Ed
1374, 73 S Ct 864.
Simultaneous conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, derived from filing of falsified labor reports, and under 26
USCS § 7204 for falsely filing W-2 forms did not violate double jeopardy, although there was some statutory overlap,
since 2 prosecutions were for separate courses of conduct, for which separate and discreet sanctions and punishment were
applicable. United States v Hughes (1992, CA6 Ohio) 964 F2d 536, 122 CCH LC P 10306, 70 AFTR 2d 5059, reh, en
banc, den (1992, CA6) 1992 US App LEXIS 17659 and cert den (1993) 507 US 909, 122 L Ed 2d 653, 113 S Ct 1254, 124
CCH LC P 10559 and cert den (1994) 510 US 1165, 127 L Ed 2d 541, 114 S Ct 1191, 127 CCH LC P 11026.
16.--Section 7207
Defendants who submitted to Internal Revenue Service false writings, in form of altered checks and other documents,
to substantiate improper deductions in their income tax returns, were properly charged under 18 USCS § 1001 instead of
under 26 USCS § 7207 which is misdemeanor statute specifically dealing with delivering any document to IRS known to
be fraudulent or false. United States v Bettenhausen (1974, CA10 Kan) 499 F2d 1223, 74-2 USTC P 9544, 34 AFTR 2d
5415.
Government could prosecute practicing accountant, who made false statement to IRS auditor regarding charitable
contribution by client, for felony under 18 USCS § 1001, rather than for misdemeanor under 26 USCS § 7207. United
States v Fern (1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.
17. Title 31
Congress did not intend to preempt prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 by enacting 31 USCS § 1058. United States
v Fitzgibbon (1978, CA10 Colo) 576 F2d 279, cert den (1978) 439 US 910, 58 L Ed 2d 256, 99 S Ct 279.
Violation of 18 USCS § 1001 in making materially false statement to federal official is included offense within
conviction under Reporting Act contained in 31 USCS §§ 5316, 5322, and may not be used to enhance penalty under §
5322. United States v Booky (1984, CA9 Hawaii) 733 F2d 1335.
Proceedings under False Claims Act (former 31 USCS §§ 231 et seq.) are civil in nature and did not subject defendant
who had pled guilty to violation of 18 USCS § 1001 to double jeopardy. United States v Annicchiarico (1963, DC NJ)
238 F Supp 339.
18.--Section 3729
When top officers of corporate defense subcontractor plead guilty to submitting false statements in violation of 18
USCS § 1001, officers are collaterally estopped from denying civil liability under False Claims Act (31 USCS § 3729); nor
may corporation deny its liability. United States v Di Bona (1984, ED Pa) 614 F Supp 40.
Defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 for filing false statement does not prove that government relied on his
false statements by collateral estoppel so as to subject him to civil liability under 31 USCS § 3729(a)(1), where relevant
false statement was that federally guaranteed loan applicant had never been criminally charged or convicted when in fact
he had, because Small Business Administration's (SBA) independent knowledge of applicant's criminal record predated
its approval of secondary participation agreement, applicant's criminal record did not necessarily disqualify him from
acquiring loan, and SBA's choosing not to raise material misrepresentation before approving secondary purchase of loan
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18 USCS § 1001
implies that SBA did not rely on misinformation regarding applicant's criminal record. United States v Hill (1987, ND
Fla) 676 F Supp 1158.
Defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 for filing false statements also supports his civil liability for violating
31 USCS § 3729(a)(1) on basis of collateral estoppel, where false statements concerned prospective borrowers' down
payments in transactions for which government loans were to issue and his own net worth as personal guarantor of one
loan, because no reasonable jury could determine other than that government agencies relied on such statements in approving loans. United States v Hill (1987, ND Fla) 676 F Supp 1158.
Where defendant president of defendant contractor was convicted under 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001, 1341 of submitting
false claims, and convictions were affirmed, convictions established that president knowingly presented false records to
get claim paid or approved in government housing project; estoppel applied in False Claims Act, 31 USCS §§ 3729-3733,
qui tam action filed by plaintiff housing authority under 31 USCS § 3729(a)(1), (2), in which U.S. intervened. United
States ex rel. V.I. Hous. Auth. v Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp. (2004, DC VI) 45 VI 428, 299 F Supp 2d 483.
19.--Section 5322
Violation of 18 USCS § 1001 in making materially false statement to federal official is included offense within
conviction under Reporting Act contained in 31 USCS §§ 5316, 5322, and may not be used to enhance penalty under §
5322. United States v Booky (1984, CA9 Hawaii) 733 F2d 1335.
Conviction under 31 USCS § 5322(a) for failing to report currency, does not preclude prosecution under 31 USCS §
1001 for making false statement even though same conduct caused violation of both statutory provisions, because proof of
currency report violation does not necessarily include proof of trick, scheme or device to conceal material information.
United States v Salinas-Ceron (1985, CA9 Cal) 755 F2d 726.
20. Title 42
One who, not being veteran, ostensibly assisted veterans to purchase homes, but actually purchased houses for his
own benefit in veterans' names, concealing facts from housing authorities, was properly convicted of violation of 42
USCS § 1524 and 18 USCS § 1001, and could not complain because he had been charged under 18 USCS § 1001 rather
than 18 USCS § 1012, because, in prosecution resulting from single act which violates more than one statute, government
may elect to prosecute under either. Ehrlich v United States (1956, CA5 Ga) 238 F2d 481.
Enactment of 42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq. subsequent to 18 USCS § 1001 was not designed to repeal § 1001, nor was §§
1395 et seq. designed to be exclusive remedy for making of false and material statements; so that prosecution under §
1001 is permissible even in view of other overlapping and more specific false statements statutes. United States v
Gordon (1977, CA8 Ark) 548 F2d 743.
Defendant physician may be prosecuted for making false statement on claims submitted under Medicaid and Medicare programs under 18 USCS §§ 287 and 1001 rather than under specific provisions of 42 USCS § 1395nn which covers
Medicare fraud. United States v Adler (1980, CA8 Mo) 623 F2d 1287.
Insurer properly denied insured's claim under Standard Flood Insurance Policy issued pursuant to National Flood
Insurance Act, 42 USCS §§ 4001 et seq., because insured did not submit sworn proof of loss as required under 44 CFR §
61.4, app. A(2)(J)(4); signed proof of loss was not rendered "sworn" due to possibility of criminal penalties for false
statements under 18 USCS § 1001. Evanoff v Std. Fire Ins. Co. (2008, CA6 Ohio) 534 F3d 516, 2008 FED App 260P.
In Medicaid fraud context, 42 USCS § 1396h does not preempt applicability of more general criminal statutes such as
18 USCS § 1001. United States v Simon (1981, ED Pa) 510 F Supp 232.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: To sustain conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), government must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that: (1) defendant made statement; (2) statement was false; (3) defendant knew statement was false; (4) false statement
was material; and (5) statement related to any matter within jurisdiction of executive, legislative, or judicial branch of U.S.
Government. United States v Walls (2005, CA6 Tenn) 134 Fed Appx 825.
Unpublished: Congressional intent does not foreclose prosecutions under 18 USCS § 1001 where 18 USCS §
7413(c)(2)(A) may also apply; where defendant allegedly concealed presence of asbestos at oil refinery, defendant was
properly charged under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) because 42 USCS § 7413(c)(2)(A) was not sole and exclusive means by
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18 USCS § 1001
which Government could prosecute making false statement to EPA in violation of Clean Air Act, 42 USCS § 7401 et seq.
United States v Shaw (2005, CA10 Kan) 150 Fed Appx 863, 61 Envt Rep Cas 1363.
21.--Section 408
Where a doctor was accused of filing false and fraudulent applications for payment for professional services rendered
Medicare patients, the alleged offense fell within the terms of either 18 USCS § 1001 or 42 USCS § 408(c), and prosecution could be had under either at the discretion of the prosecutor. United States v Chakmakis (1971, CA5 Fla) 449 F2d
315.
Prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 for submission of false Medicare claims was proper, and not barred by enactment
of 42 USCS § 408. United States v Radetsky (1976, CA10 Colo) 535 F2d 556, cert den (1976) 429 US 820, 50 L Ed 2d
81, 97 S Ct 68 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994).
Fact that Social Security Act and the penal provisions thereof (42 USCS § 408) was passed subsequently to the fraud
and false statements provisions (18 USCS § 1001) and both cover the same acts does not prevent prosecution under the
earlier, fraud and false statements, provision. United States v Matanky (1972, CD Cal) 346 F Supp 116, affd (1973, CA9
Cal) 482 F2d 1319, cert den (1973) 414 US 1039, 38 L Ed 2d 329, 94 S Ct 539, reh den (1974) 414 US 1138, 38 L Ed 2d
764, 94 S Ct 885.
22. Title 49
Since 18 USCS § 1001 has no maximum sentence, and there is nothing in 49 USCS § 521 suggesting intent to repeal
or supersede 18 USCS § 1001, government may prosecute under § 1001 even if Motor Carrier Safety Act provided another
basis for prosecuting same conduct. United States v McCord, Inc. (1998, CA8 Ark) 143 F3d 1095 (criticized in United
States v Johansson (2001, CA9 Cal) 249 F3d 848, 2001 CDOS 3515, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 4345) and (criticized in
United States v Lucien (2003, CA2 NY) 347 F3d 45).
District court erred in dismissing two indictments under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) for making materially false statements
on applications for secure identification display area (SIDA) badges, as defendants' failure to disclose convictions for
misdemeanor firearms offenses was material; Federal Aviation Administration did not exceed its authority under 49
USCS § 44936(b)(2) by designating misdemeanor firearms use as factor precluding eligibility for SIDA badge. United
States v Baer (2003, CA4 Va) 324 F3d 282, dismd (2003, ED Va) 274 F Supp 2d 778, affd (2004, CA4 Va) 92 Fed Appx
942.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Pilot's defamation claim against air carrier did not fall within exception to limitations on liability set
forth in 49 USCS § 44703(i)(3) because, although pilot alleged that air carrier knew information maintained by air carrier
was false and that maintaining it was violation of 18 USCS § 1001, § 1001 did not apply because pilot did not allege in his
defamation claim that air carrier provided false information to any branch of United States government; instead, pilot
alleged that air carrier provided false information to another carrier. Borodkin v Omni Air Int'l (2008, CA9 Nev) 2008 US
App LEXIS 11432.
23. State laws
18 USCS § 1001 may be used as basis for retaliatory discharge claim in case involving state which adheres to terminable-at-will doctrine, but which has adopted public policy exception (discharge of employee for his refusal to violate
law in course of employment) to such doctrine. Bell v Ashland Petroleum Co. (1993, SD W Va) 812 F Supp 639, 8 BNA
IER Cas 358, 126 CCH LC P 57464.
Statutory requirement of veracity in context of federal investigations, 18 USCS § 1001, can support allegation by
former employee under public policy exception to state at-will employment doctrine, because adherence to federal law by
states is in best interest of citizens of state and because state courts allow that federal law may state public policy cognizable in state common law. Hanson v Gichner Sys. Group, Inc. (1993, MD Pa) 831 F Supp 403, 8 BNA IER Cas 1258.
Missouri recognizes public policy exception to employment at will doctrine where employee is discharged because
he refused to commit unlawful act or actions in violation of clear mandate of public policy, and alleged violation of 18
USCS § 1001 is sufficient to support cause of action for purposes of such exception. Petersimes v Crane Co. (1992, Mo
App) 835 SW2d 514, 7 BNA IER Cas 1014, 127 CCH LC P 57594.
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18 USCS § 1001
24. Miscellaneous
Defendant is not denied due process by virtue of fact that he is prosecuted under 18 USCS § 1001 for felony, rather
than under overlapping misdemeanor statute, as prosecution may be brought under either statute at discretion of prosecutor. United States v Smith (1975, CA5 Fla) 523 F2d 771, cert den (1976) 429 US 817, 50 L Ed 2d 76, 97 S Ct 59, reh
den (1976) 429 US 987, 50 L Ed 2d 599, 97 S Ct 509.
Defendant was properly indicted under 18 USCS § 1001 for failing to report disability payments to Labor Department, even though 5 USCS § 8105 makes no mention of reporting of disability compensation requirements, since 18
USCS § 1001 is catch-all, reaching those false representations that might substantially impair basic functions entrusted by
law to particular agency which are not prohibited by other statutes. United States v Kappes (1991, CA6 Ky) 936 F2d 227,
reh den (1991, CA6) 1991 US App LEXIS 15277 and (criticized in United States v Shafer (1999, CA6 Mich) 199 F3d 826,
5 BNA WH Cas 2d 1426, 1999 FED App 427P).
In defendant's trial for violating 18 USCS §§ 287 and 1001, defendant's stipulation to proceed with jury of fewer than
12 members pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(2)(A) did not constitute violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 31 requirement that
verdict be unanimous notwithstanding some indication that juror who "refused to deliberate" was actually holdout against
conviction; because defendant knowingly and intelligently stipulated to dismissing juror and receiving unanimous verdict
by remaining 11 jurors, district court did not abuse its discretion in denying new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). United
States v Murphy (2007, CA9 Cal) 483 F3d 639.
Defendant's 96-month sentence based on unlawful distribution of prescription drugs, 21 USCS §§ 331(b) and
333(b)(1)(D), monetary transactions from unlawful activity, 18 USCS § 1957(a); and false statements, 18 USCS §
1001(a)(3), was proper because there was no bad faith or impermissible motive in prosecution's decision not to request
downward departure for cooperation under USSG § 5K1.1, and loss calculation, which included stolen drugs, was appropriate. United States v Marti-Lon (2008, CA1 Puerto Rico) 524 F3d 295.
While appellee National Marine Fisheries Service's "reasonable and prudent alternative" (RPA) on fishing and
leatherback turtle takings under 16 USCS § 1536 was prediction, in light of regulations under 50 CFR §§ 648.7(b)(1)(I),
648.14(a)(4), and enforcement and penalty provisions of 16 USCS §§ 1857(1)(A), 1858(a), and 18 USCS § 1001, Service's
judgment that it was justified in concluding that vessels would reach lower 13.1 percent mortality rate as planned in RPA
schedule was affirmed over objection by appellant environmental groups. Oceana, Inc. v Gutierrez (2007, App DC) 488
F3d 1020, 64 Envt Rep Cas 1577, 37 ELR 20124.
In absence of proof that Federal Water Pollution Control Act required corporate defendant to file reports with governmental agencies, Act did not preclude government from charging corporation with violating 18 USCS § 1001. United
States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F Supp 1120.
Petitioners were properly deemed extraditable under "double criminality" requirement, where Hong Kong crimes
they are charged with committing are substantially similar to United States crimes under 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1005 and
1006, because petitioners are accused of large-scale fraudulent loans scheme using international telephone and telegraph
services. Tang Yee-Chun v Immundi (1987, SD NY) 686 F Supp 1004.
Conviction for making false statements under 18 USCS § 1001 may be used to impeach defendant in prosecution for
extortion and other offenses, because conviction is admissible under FRE 609(a)(2), notwithstanding argument that circumstances are unrelated and admission would be prejudicial. United States v Finley (1989, ND Ill) 708 F Supp 906.
Plaintiff did not have private right of action against various government agencies and representatives for alleged
violations of 18 USCS §§ 241 and 1001. Abou-Hussein v Gates (2009, DC Dist Col) 657 F Supp 2d 77.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's case was transferred, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b), from United States District Court
of New Hampshire to Southern District of New York for convenience of defendant and witnesses, and in interest of
justice; defendant lived with his family and maintained small business in New York, defendant would have been financially burdened defending himself in New Hampshire, defense witnesses were in New York, Government could present
its case in New York, and defendant would have much easier, convenient, and effective access to counsel where he lived.
United States v Mamadou (2005, DC NH) 2005 DNH 72.
III.ELEMENTS OF OFFENSES
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18 USCS § 1001
A.In General 25. Generally
It constitutes violation of 18 USCS § 1001 for anyone willfully to make or use false writing or document, knowing
that it contains false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, and intending that it shall bear relation or purpose as to
source matter which is within jurisdiction of department or agency of United States, and with false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry which it contains having materiality on department or agency matter. Ebeling v United States
(1957, CA8 Mo) 248 F2d 429, cert den (1957) 355 US 907, 2 L Ed 2d 261, 78 S Ct 334; Gilbert v United States (1966, CA9
Cal) 359 F2d 285, 66-1 USTC P 9386, cert den (1966) 385 US 882, 17 L Ed 2d 109, 87 S Ct 169.
Five elements necessary to sustain conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 are: (1) statement, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4)
specific intent, and (5) agency jurisdiction. United States v Godwin (1978, CA5 Ga) 566 F2d 975.
Elements of 18 USCS § 1001 violation include: (1) knowingly making false statements; (2) which is material; and (3)
made with regard to any matter within jurisdiction of any department or agency of United States. United States v Rose
(1978, CA9 Wash) 570 F2d 1358 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35) and (criticized in
United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5) and (criticized in United States v Huber (2002, DC
ND) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 306).
Elements of violation of 18 USCS § 1009 are (1) statement, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) specific intent, and (5)
agency jurisdiction. United States v Gilbertson (1978, CA8 Minn) 588 F2d 584.
18 USCS § 1001 imposes criminal penalties on one who: (1) makes statement that, (2) was false, (3) was material, (4)
was made knowingly and willfully, and (5) was made in matter within jurisdiction of any department or agency of United
States. United States v Brantley (1986, CA7 Ill) 786 F2d 1322, 20 Fed Rules Evid Serv 302, cert den (1986) 477 US 908,
91 L Ed 2d 572, 106 S Ct 3284 and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Pearson (1995, CD Ill) 897 F Supp
1147) and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
Elements of an offense under 18 USCS § 1001 are: (1) that defendant made a statement; (2) that statement was false
and defendant knew it was false; (3) that statement was made knowingly and willfully; (4) that statement was within
jurisdiction of a federal agency; and (5) that statement was material. United States v Clearfield (1973, ED Pa) 358 F
Supp 564.
In order to be convicted under 18 USCS § 1001, defendant must be shown to have made statement or representation
that was false, material, made knowingly and willfully, and made in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency. Lee v
Denro, Inc. (1992) 91 Md App 822, 605 A2d 1017, 7 BNA IER Cas 720, 126 CCH LC P 57549.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: To establish conviction for making false statement to law enforcement officials, government must
prove five elements: (1) statement, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) specific intent, and (5) agency jurisdiction. United States
v Tureaud (2006, CA11 Fla) 2006 US App LEXIS 3240.
B.Matters Within Jurisdiction of Executive, Legislative or Judicial Branch of Federal Government
1.In General 26. Generally
Under 18 USCS § 1001, fraud need not be perpetrated directly on or to governmental agency or department involved;
false statement need only relate to and affect a relationship within the jurisdiction of agency or department of United
States. United States v Munoz (1974, ED Mich) 392 F Supp 183, affd without op (1975, CA6 Mich) 529 F2d 526.
Legislative history of 18 USCS § 1001, which is analogous to Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military Justice,
demonstrates that, while false statements do not necessarily have to involve act of cheating or swindling government, they
must be about and pertain to matter within jurisdiction of department or agency of United States. United States v
Hutchins (1955) 5 USCMA 422, 18 CMR 46; United States v Disher (1957) 25 CMR 683.
27. Jurisdiction
As used in 18 USCS § 1001, term "jurisdiction" is not limited to its technical sense and means "power to deal or act"
on subject matter, and term "agency" includes "the military." United States v Smart (1956, US) 23 CMR 454.
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18 USCS § 1001
Because there is valid legislative interest in protecting integrity of official inquiries, term "jurisdiction" should not be
given narrow or technical meaning for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001; statutory basis for agency's request for information
provides jurisdiction enough to punish fraudulent statements under § 1001. Bryson v United States (1969) 396 US 64, 24
L Ed 2d 264, 90 S Ct 355, 72 BNA LRRM 2833, 61 CCH LC P 10510.
Term "jurisdiction" as used in 18 USCS § 1001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully make false
statement "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States," should not be given
narrow or technical meaning; limiting such term to "the power to make final or binding determinations. United States v
Rodgers (1984) 466 US 475, 80 L Ed 2d 492, 104 S Ct 1942.
The word "jurisdiction" as used in 18 USCS § 1001 means power to act upon information when received. United
States v Adler (1967, CA2 NY) 380 F2d 917, cert den (1967) 389 US 1006, 19 L Ed 2d 602, 88 S Ct 561.
Term "jurisdiction" should not be given narrow or technical meaning for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United States
v Fern (1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.
Term "jurisdiction" was different term than "jurisdiction" as used in connection with courts; it was synonymous with
word "power." United States v White (1946, DC Cal) 69 F Supp 562.
28. "Matter within the jurisdiction"
Critical language of 18 USCS § 1001 stating "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States" is not sufficiently ambiguous to permit rule of lenity to control in construing statute. United States v
Rodgers (1984) 466 US 475, 80 L Ed 2d 492, 104 S Ct 1942.
Phrase "matter within the jurisdiction" of federal agency in 18 USCS § 1001 must be given broad, nontechnical
meaning. United States v Lambert (1974, CA5 Fla) 501 F2d 943 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v
Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040).
For purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, a false statement is deemed to have been made in a manner within the jurisdiction of
the federal agency even if it was not made to the agency itself, if inevitably agency had been deceived. United States v
Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.
In order to determine when matter is "within the jurisdiction" of agency or department of United States, it is necessary
to examine statute governing particular transaction with department or agency of United States. United States v Herberman (1978, CA5 Tex) 583 F2d 222.
There was sufficient evidence to prove federal jurisdictional element supporting defendant's 18 USCS § 1001 convictions; evidence revealed pattern of improper payments of Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits to
claimants who were not in fact deprived of living as direct result of typhoon. United States v Atalig (2007, CA9) 502 F3d
1063.
Because state agency disaster relief funds came from Federal Emergency Management Agency, federal agency with
oversight authority over state program and defendant's state agency application stated it was made to applicable federal
and state agencies, defendant's false statements to state agency were made in matter within federal agency's jurisdiction,
and district court's exercise of jurisdiction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) was proper. United States v Taylor (2009, CA5
Miss) 582 F3d 558.
Fact that air-monitoring reports in connection with project were sent to Virgin Islands Housing Authority did not
mean that reports did not pertain to matter within jurisdiction of federal government; federal agency funded project and
had power to exercise authority over it. United States v Starnes (2009, CA3 VI) 583 F3d 196.
29. Submission or presentation to federal entity
Violation of 18 USCS § 1001 does not require that false statement must actually have been submitted to a department
or agency of the United States, but rather that it was contemplated that statement was to be utilized in a matter which was
within the jurisdiction of such department or agency. United States v Candella (1973, CA2 NY) 487 F2d 1223, cert den
(1974) 415 US 977, 39 L Ed 2d 872, 94 S Ct 1563.
Affidavit need not have been submitted directly to government agency for 18 USCS § 1001 to apply. United States
v Lange (1976, CA5 La) 528 F2d 1280.
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18 USCS § 1001
False statement need not be made directly to federal agency to sustain 18 USCS § 1001 conviction as long as federal
funds are involved. United States v Wolf (1981, CA10 Okla) 645 F2d 23.
False statement may fall within 18 USCS § 1001 even when it is not submitted to federal agency directly and federal
agency's role is limited to financial support of program it does not itself directly administer; in emergency relief context it
should be authorization of federal assistance that triggers federal jurisdiction under § 1001. United States v Petullo
(1983, CA7 Ill) 709 F2d 1178.
There is no requirement under 18 USCS § 1001 that false document be presented to agency or department of United
States, only requirement being that false document shall be made in matter within jurisdiction of such department or
agency. United States v Myers (1955, DC Cal) 131 F Supp 525.
30. Action by federal entity
Statutory basis for agency's request for information provides jurisdiction of agency enough to punish fraudulent
statements under 18 USCS § 1001. Bryson v United States (1969) 396 US 64, 24 L Ed 2d 264, 90 S Ct 355, 72 BNA
LRRM 2833, 61 CCH LC P 10510.
False statement is submitted in matter within jurisdiction of department or agency within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001
if it relates to matter as to which department had power to act. Ogden v United States (1962, CA9 Cal) 303 F2d 724.
When false statement is made to agency with power to allow privilege or grant award, jurisdiction of agency is established so as to warrant prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001; if agency has power to enact binding regulatory requirements and determine if and to what extent individual comes within regulatory proscriptions, this agency, too, has jurisdiction. Friedman v United States (1967, CA8 Mo) 374 F2d 363, 1 ALR Fed 348.
18 USCS § 1001 is violated even if only agency involvement is reimbursement of expenditures and statement is not
submitted directly to agency. United States v Stanford (1978, CA7 Ill) 589 F2d 285, 50 ALR Fed 656, cert den (1979)
440 US 983, 60 L Ed 2d 244, 99 S Ct 1794.
Prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 was proper, even though false statements in deposition were presented during
federal judicial proceeding, since defendant was trying to deceive government by attempting to extract more money for
property restoration then he deserved from city housing authority which had annual contributions contract with U.S.
HUD, although U.S. government was not party to proceedings. United States v Lawson (1987, CA11 Fla) 809 F2d 1514,
reh den, en banc (1987, CA11 Fla) 815 F2d 717.
False statements which trading company made, when applying for license for release of its bank deposit, to Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, were actionable under 18 USCS § 1001, even though statements did not
prompt any official action, as that office told company, albeit erroneously, that no license was necessary, since prompting
of agency action is not element of 18 USCS § 1001 offense. United States v Arch Trading Co. (1993, CA4 Va) 987 F2d
1087 (criticized in United States v Hersch (1996, CA4 Va) 1996 US App LEXIS 26640).
Indictment alleging that defendant made false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements under 18 USCS § 1001 was not
subject to dismissal for "failure to allege elements" because defendant's premise that Federal Elections Commission
(FEC) was not within executive branch of government was entirely unfounded; FEC is independent agency within executive branch of federal government. United States v Rosen (2005, CD Cal) 365 F Supp 2d 1126.
31. Miscellaneous
In case where state official prepared false invoices pertaining to funds paid to state for work already completed on a
federally-funded project, the government retains jurisdiction under 18 USCS § 1001 to protect its interest in seeing to the
proper and lawful application of specially designated funds. United States v Jones (1972, CA8 Ark) 464 F2d 1118, cert
den (1973) 409 US 1111, 34 L Ed 2d 692, 93 S Ct 920.
18 USCS § 1001 offense, once committed in presence of representative of one agency, does not preclude other agency
from pursuing its statutory duties; thus, where probable cause existed to arrest defendant for falsely stating her citizenship
to immigration service, appellant's misstatement regarding her citizenship did not preclude customs service from ascertaining whether defendant had further items to declare. United States v Silva (1983, CA2 NY) 715 F2d 43.
Whether government agency had authority to seek employment and self-employment data from defendant was irrelevant to validity of his convictions under 18 USCS § 1001, since § 1001 applies to other false statements made to
federal agencies besides those required to be filed by law. United States v Arcadipane (1994, CA1 Mass) 41 F3d 1.
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18 USCS § 1001
2.Particular Departments, Agencies or Entities 32. Congress
18 USCS § 1001 did not apply to Congresswoman's filing of her 1991 financial disclosure form with House Clerk,
since Congress did not intend to create Executive Branch jurisdiction under 18 USCS § 1001 but rather, at least until 1996,
plainly intended to vest primary authority for ensuring § 1001 compliance with congressional ethics committees and other
analogous entities. United States v Oakar (1997, App DC) 324 US App DC 104, 111 F3d 146.
18 USCS § 1001 embraces false statements made to House of Representatives by Congressmen. United States v
Hansen (1983, DC Dist Col) 566 F Supp 162.
33. Courts
Tax Court is agency within contemplation 18 USCS § 1001. Stein v United States (1966, CA5 Tex) 363 F2d 587,
66-2 USTC P 9518, 18 AFTR 2d 5725, cert den (1966) 385 US 934, 17 L Ed 2d 214, 87 S Ct 294.
Phrase "matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency" includes judicial branch of government. United
States v Abrahams (1979, CA5 Tex) 604 F2d 386 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994,
CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040) and (criticized in Hubbard v United States (1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed 2d 779, 115 S Ct 1754, 95
CDOS 3581, 95 Daily Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3).
Bankruptcy Court is department of United States within intendment of 18 USCS § 1001 since "department or
agency," as used in § 1001, was intended to describe executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; thus,
filing false performance bond in defendant's personal and corporate bankruptcy proceedings constituted violation of 18
USCS § 1001. United States v Rowland (1986, CA5 Miss) 789 F2d 1169, cert den (1986) 479 US 964, 93 L Ed 2d 409,
107 S Ct 464.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1001 by concealing his name, identity, and nonadmission to bar before the United
States district court for District of Columbia. Morgan v United States (1962, App DC) 114 US App DC 13, 309 F2d 234,
cert den (1963) 373 US 917, 10 L Ed 2d 416, 83 S Ct 1306, reh den (1963) 374 US 858, 10 L Ed 2d 1084, 83 S Ct 1879 and
(criticized in Hubbard v United States (1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed 2d 779, 115 S Ct 1754, 95 CDOS 3581, 95 Daily
Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3) and (criticized in United States v Butler (2004, SD NY) 351 F Supp 2d 121).
34.--During judicial proceeding exception
18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to the introduction of false documents as evidence in a criminal proceeding. United
States v Erhardt (1967, CA6 Ky) 381 F2d 173.
18 USCS § 1001 is not proper basis for charging defendant with making false statement in judicial proceeding, that is
bail hearing. United States v Abrahams (1979, CA5 Tex) 604 F2d 386 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v
Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040) and (criticized in Hubbard v United States (1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed
2d 779, 115 S Ct 1754, 95 CDOS 3581, 95 Daily Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3).
Fraudulent letters of recommendation submitted to sentencing judge by convicted defendant with intent to influence
judge in sentencing are part of trial court's adjudicative functions to which 18 USCS § 1001 does not apply, without regard
to whether letters are submitted to court in courtroom or in chambers. United States v Mayer (1985, CA9 Ariz) 775 F2d
1387 (criticized in Hubbard v United States (1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed 2d 779, 115 S Ct 1754, 95 CDOS 3581, 95 Daily
Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3).
35. Custom authorities
When defendant was asked if he didn't have more money and if he wanted to declare more that was his opportunity,
and he replied that all money he had was declared, but in fact he had additional $ 19,500 in currency, defendant caused
false representation to be made to customs authorities in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Zavala (1944,
CA2 NY) 139 F2d 830.
Where clearance of exports was required to be passed upon by collector of customs for purpose of economic information, false statement concerning exports to collector was matter within jurisdiction of bureau of customs. United
States v Leviton (1951, CA2 NY) 193 F2d 848, cert den (1952) 343 US 946, 96 L Ed 1350, 72 S Ct 860, reh den (1952) 343
US 988, 96 L Ed 1375, 72 S Ct 1079.
Transportation of gems into United States is matter within jurisdiction of United States Customs. United States v
Masters (1979, CA9 Cal) 612 F2d 1117, cert den (1980) 449 US 847, 66 L Ed 2d 57, 101 S Ct 134.
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18 USCS § 1001
Export shipper who fraudulently lists, on Shipping Export Declaration form, West Germany as final destination of
aircraft parts which shipper knows to be bound for Libya may be convicted of filing false statement with government.
United States v Malsom (1985, CA7 Ill) 779 F2d 1228.
United States Customs Service had jurisdiction over shippers' export declarations, despite fact that they were not
generated by it, since they are commonly used by Service in performance of its regularly conducted activities. United
States v Gafyczk (1988, CA11 Fla) 847 F2d 685.
36. Environmental Protection Agency
False water quality data reports which water treatment plant manager filed with state health department were matters
within jurisdiction of EPA, even though it had granted primary authority for safe drinking water standards to state, since
such grant was not exclusive, EPA having retained authority to enforce its regulations, and since EPA's funding of state
public water program is conditioned, in part, on results of its annual evaluations of that program. United States v Wright
(1993, CA10 Okla) 988 F2d 1036.
False statements which employees of county water district made to state water agency regarding drinking water
turbidity levels came within jurisdiction of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for purposes of prosecution under 18
USCS § 1001, since EPA retained authority to enforce its regulations and actively assure state compliance with national
safe water standards. United States v White (2001, CA6 Ky) 270 F3d 356, 53 Envt Rep Cas 1946, 32 ELR 20298.
Making of false water turbidity reports for water treatment plant, as required by regulations promulgated by EPA
pursuant to Safe Water Drinking Act (42 USCS §§ 300f et seq.), in state that had been given primary enforcement responsibility over drinking water standards (42 USCS § 300g-2), is matter within jurisdiction of EPA for purposes of 18
USCS § 1001, which makes it crime to make false written report in any matter within jurisdiction of any department or
agency of United States. United States v Moseley (1991, ED Mo) 761 F Supp 90, 23 ELR 20969.
37. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Language of 18 USCS § 1001 making it criminal to knowingly and willfully make false statement "in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" encompasses criminal investigations conducted
by FBI and Secret Service; criminal investigation falls within meaning of "any matter," and FBI and Secret Service
qualify as departments or agencies of United States. United States v Rodgers (1984) 466 US 475, 80 L Ed 2d 492, 104 S
Ct 1942.
Statements to FBI falsely pointing to possible criminal conduct that it within power of FBI to investigate is matter
within jurisdiction of FBI under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Massey (1977, CA5 Fla) 550 F2d 300.
Investigation made by Federal Bureau of Investigation of alleged bribery of Federal Housing Administration officials
was "matter" within meaning of that term in 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Stark (1955, DC Md) 131 F Supp 190.
Federal Bureau of Investigation is an "agency" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Chevoor (1975,
DC Mass) 392 F Supp 436, revd on other grounds (1975, CA1 Mass) 526 F2d 178, cert den (1976) 425 US 935, 48 L Ed
2d 176, 96 S Ct 1665 and (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv
494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5).
18 USCS § 1001 may punish false statements made to agents of Department of Justice including Antitrust Division
attorneys, as well as false statements made to agents of FBI, so that order sought by corporation in course of antitrust suit,
to prohibit use of FBI agents to interview its employees while conceding that attorneys from Department of Justice could
interview, on grounds that introduction of Bureau subjected its potential witnesses to threat of perjury sanctions not
otherwise present, did not issue. United States v International Business Machines Corp. (1976, SD NY) 415 F Supp 668,
1976-2 CCH Trade Cases P 61170.
Defendant could be charged under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statements to federal agent when federal agent
was officer of Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States v Grossman (2003, ND Ill) 272 F Supp 2d 760.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Record demonstrated that FBI was legitimately investigating potential violations of Hobbs Act, 18
USCS § 1951, committed by local district attorney based on his alleged extortion of money from criminal defendants with
regard to plea agreement negotiations, pursuant to its statutory authority, when it interviewed defendant; thus, FBI had
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18 USCS § 1001
statutory basis upon which to inquire information from defendant, establishing 18 USCS § 1001's jurisdictional element.
United States v Richey (2008, CA11 Ala) 2008 US App LEXIS 11503.
38. Grand jury
Witness who previously gave false negative responses to government-initiated inquiries will not incriminate himself
by answering same questions truthfully in subsequent grand jury proceeding as earlier falsehoods are not construed as
criminal acts under 18 USCS § 1001; statute covers only two categories of false statement: those in support of false claims,
and those tending to pervert authorized functions of department and agencies. United States v Chevoor (1975, CA1
Mass) 526 F2d 178, cert den (1976) 425 US 935, 48 L Ed 2d 176, 96 S Ct 1665 and (criticized in United States v LeMaster
(1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Solis
(1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5).
Affidavit of compliance with grand jury subpoena, which government alleged to be false due to defendants' intentional withholding of production of certain documents, was not within ambit of 18 USCS § 1001, since Congress did not
intend statute to have such sweep, and there are other statutes under which perjury or obstruction of grand jury's processes
may be prosecuted. United States v Deffenbaugh Industries, Inc. (1992, CA10 Kan) 957 F2d 749, 1992-1 CCH Trade
Cases P 69736 (criticized in United States v Tracy (1997, CA2 NY) 108 F3d 473).
Defendants' statements were exempt from prosecution pursuant to "judicial function" exception to 18 USCS § 1001,
where they were made to FBI agents acting under authority of grand jury, as specifically stated by indictment, and as
demonstrated by fact that they served subpoena duces tecum on defendants' business records for that grand jury. United
States v Wood (1993, CA10 NM) 6 F3d 692 (criticized in Hubbard v United States (1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed 2d 779,
115 S Ct 1754, 95 CDOS 3581, 95 Daily Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3).
Defendant had been improperly indicted under 18 USCS § 1001 because federal grand jury is not "agency of the
United States" within meaning of section, and because section was not intended to cover situation in which defendant is
accused of having made false and fraudulent reply when interrogated by grand jury. United States v Allen (1961, SD Cal)
193 F Supp 954.
39. Health, education and welfare
False statements made in connection with audit of HEW program were within jurisdiction of that agency where it had
statutory authority to conduct such audit. United States v Beasley (1977, CA5 La) 550 F2d 261, reh den (1977, CA5 La)
553 F2d 100 and reh den (1977, CA5 La) 553 F2d 101 and cert den (1977) 434 US 863, 54 L Ed 2d 138, 98 S Ct 195, reh
den (1977) 434 US 961, 54 L Ed 2d 323, 98 S Ct 496 and cert den (1977) 434 US 938, 54 L Ed 2d 297, 98 S Ct 427 and
(criticized in United States v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953).
There is no merit in defendant physician's argument that no jurisdiction exists in prosecution for making false, fictitious and fraudulent statements in Medicaid and Medicare claims, matter within jurisdiction of Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, because Blue Cross and Blue Shield are not "departments or agencies" of government for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001; contractual relationship whereby Blue Cross and Blue Shield pay Medicare claims will not
prevent prosecution under § 1001. United States v Herberman (1978, CA5 Tex) 583 F2d 222.
Stipend rosters maintained by university as part of upward bound program funded under Department of Health,
Education and Welfare were matters within jurisdiction of United States agency within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001.
United States v Hooper (1979, CA7 Wis) 596 F2d 219, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1306.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare is department or agency of United States within meaning of 18 USCS §
1001; Medicaid statement submitted to state agency for ultimate transmittal to Department was within jurisdiction of
federal agency. United States v Braunstein (1978, DC NJ) 474 F Supp 1.
Government was granted injunctive relief against defendants for violations of 18 USCS § 1345 because defendants,
inter alia, directed sales efforts at selling Botulinum Toxin Type A to non-research physicians, knowing that Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) had not approved it for human use; FDA investigators found copies of invoices and completed order forms reflecting interstate sales. United States v Livdahl (2005, SD Fla) 356 F Supp 2d 1289, 18 FLW Fed D
479.
40.--Medicare
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18 USCS § 1001
The jurisdictional requirement of 18 USCS § 1001 was satisfied where defendant submitted false request for Medicare payments to an insurance company which was acting as the paying agent for the Social Security Administration.
United States v Kraude (1972, CA9 Cal) 467 F2d 37, cert den (1972) 409 US 1076, 34 L Ed 2d 664, 93 S Ct 684.
Private insurance carriers under contract with the federal government to process and pay Medicare claims are government paying agents for the purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Matanky (1973, CA9 Cal) 482 F2d 1319,
cert den (1973) 414 US 1039, 38 L Ed 2d 329, 94 S Ct 539, reh den (1974) 414 US 1138, 38 L Ed 2d 764, 94 S Ct 885.
Prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 for submission of false Medicare claims was proper, and not barred by enactment
of 42 USCS § 408. United States v Radetsky (1976, CA10 Colo) 535 F2d 556, cert den (1976) 429 US 820, 50 L Ed 2d
81, 97 S Ct 68 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994).
Fraudulent notations in opthalmologist's own files concerning authorized functions of Medicare which prevented
review of payments made to physician were within federal jurisdiction under 18 USCS § 1001, since statute not only
criminalizes false statements or representations to federal agency, but each false entry made to conceal material facts.
United States v Rutgard (1997, CA9 Cal) 108 F3d 1041, 97 CDOS 1698, 97 Daily Journal DAR 3185, app dismd (1997,
CA9 Cal) 1997 US App LEXIS 6706 and op replaced (1997, CA9 Cal) 116 F3d 1270, 97 CDOS 4197, 97 Daily Journal
DAR 7048.
Because doctors could submit claims for athletic trainers' services and disclose they were not Medicare benefit, and
appeal denial, exception to 42 USCS § 405(h) did not apply, dismissal of plaintiff athletic trainers' association's claim,
challenging defendant Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services' new Medicare Part B rule, 69 Fed. Reg.
66,236, 66,352 (Nov. 15, 2004), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, was affirmed; criminal liability under 18 USCS §§
287, 1001, 1035, 1341, 1343, 1347, 1963(a), 42 USCS § 1320a-7b(a), required knowing or intentional false statement;
consequently, disclosure that services were not Medicare benefit diminished disincentive to challenge rule administratively. Nat'l Ath. Trainers' Ass'n v United States HHS (2006, CA5 Tex) 455 F3d 500.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Because reasonable jury could have found that Medicare claims were fraudulent because there was
insufficient supervision of technicians by physician, motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 was
improperly granted. However, since this conspiracy theory was supported only by tenuous inference, new trial was appropriate. United States v Mitchell (2006, CA11 Ga) 2006 US App LEXIS 2679.
Unpublished: Rational trier of fact could have found husband and wife guilty of 18 USCS § 1001 beyond reasonable
doubt, as they made false statements to private contractor who administered Medicare program in state; contractor's
contractual responsibilities included receiving, adjudicating, and paying Medicare claims with government money.
United States v Hames (2006, CA5 Tex) 2006 US App LEXIS 14494.
41. Housing
Executive officer of municipal housing agency who concealed fact that he was partner in architectural firm which
benefited from contract with municipal agency incidental to construction of municipal housing project entirely financed
by loan from federal housing and home finance agency violated 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Kenny (1956, CA3 NJ)
236 F2d 128, cert den (1956) 352 US 894, 1 L Ed 2d 87, 77 S Ct 133.
Affidavits executed by defendants for services rendered in moving property of tenants who were forced to move
because of federally funded urban renewal projects, were within purview of 18 USCS § 1001 even though they were
executed on forms prepared by city and not by HUD, since defendants not only knew that city would make the affidavits
available to HUD for reimbursement of moving expenses it paid to defendants, but that any false statements contained
therein would constitute violations of United States Code subjecting them to criminal sanctions. United States v Candella (1973, CA2 NY) 487 F2d 1223, cert den (1974) 415 US 977, 39 L Ed 2d 872, 94 S Ct 1563.
Although false statement made to Department of Housing and Urban Development is actionable under both 18 USCS
§§ 1010 and 1001, only § 1001 governs fraudulent schemes. United States v Waechter (1985, CA6 Mich) 771 F2d 974.
Jurisdiction lies under 18 USCS § 1001, where defendant made false statements in deposition during state court
proceeding, although named party, city housing authority, was only agent of federal agency, U.S. HUD, since U.S. HUD
was actively concerned with outcome of litigation and had power to act upon results of state court action. United States
v Lawson (1987, CA11 Fla) 809 F2d 1514, reh den, en banc (1987, CA11 Fla) 815 F2d 717.
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18 USCS § 1001
Court found that sufficient evidence existed to convict appellant of violating 18 USCS § 1001; appellant engaged in
scheme to conceal material facts from city, in its role as administrator of federal block grant funds, specifically withholding material facts from city and consequently HUD about family's violation of conflict-of-interest rules found at 24
C.F.R. § 570.611(b). United States v Moore (2006, CA7 Wis) 446 F3d 671.
Conviction of defendant for making or causing to be made false statements to Federal Housing Administration for
purpose of inducing agency action in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 estopped him from disputing that he caused false
certifications to be submitted to FHA, thereby inducing it to insure certain mortgages, in suit arising from same facts by
United States under False Claims Act (former 31 USCS §§ 231 et seq.), after mortgagors defaulted and United States was
called upon to honor claims of mortgagee. United States v Hibbs (1976, ED Pa) 420 F Supp 1365, vacated on other
grounds (1977, CA3 Pa) 568 F2d 347.
Action alleging false statements by principals of construction company was properly brought under 18 USCS § 1001,
even though company dealt directly with Virgin Islands Housing Authority, where Authority operates using funds provided by HUD, because allegedly false statements were clearly made in matter within jurisdiction of department of executive branch of U.S. United States v Koenig (1999, DC VI) 40 VI 440, 53 F Supp 2d 803, affd without op (2001, CA3
VI) 281 F3d 225.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: For purposes of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), statements of nature made by defendant, or aided and abetted
by him, during application and grant process of loans under Direct Endorsement Program were made in connection with
matters within United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's jurisdiction, even if made to qualified and
participating lenders during pre-approval and authorization process. United States v Reynolds (2005, CA5 Tex) 152 Fed
Appx 416.
42. Immigration, naturalization and citizenship
Defendant's participation in false statements made to state agency for purpose of establishing children's citizenship in
proceedings before federal agency may factually be held to be matter within jurisdiction of federal agency even though
false statements were not made directly to federal agency itself. United States v Montemayor (1983, CA5 Tex) 712 F2d
104, 13 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1575.
Giving of false identification at United States border is punishable under 18 USCS § 1001, since it is both material
and within jurisdiction of federal agency. United States v Popow (1987, CA8 Minn) 821 F2d 483, 23 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 769.
For purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, statement is material if it has natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing government agency or official; with regard to statements made to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS);
(1) test is not whether false statement was determinative factor in INS decision but, rather, whether statement has natural
tendency to influence INS; and (2) INS views violent crime as "elevating circumstance" in determining whether to devote
resources to visa fraud investigation and allegation of forced sex will, therefore, tends to influence government agency by
making INS more likely to pursue investigation arising out of allegation. United States v Mitchell (2004, CA8 Ark) 388
F3d 1139.
When alien entered U.S. at California checkpoint by using another person's permanent resident alien card, alien's
entry into U.S. was unlawful given that it was federal crime under 18 USCS § 1001(a) to use any false document knowing
that it contained any false statement and that 18 USCS § 1028(a)(7) prohibited individual from using another person's
identification with intent to violate federal law; alien's argument that his entry, while criminal, was lawful for purposes of
adjustment of status under 8 USCS § 1255(a) on ground that he presented himself for inspection and admission and was
allowed to enter U.S. lacked merit because § 1255(a) and 8 USCS § 1101(a)(13)(A) required that alien's entry into United
States be lawful in order for him to qualify for adjustment of status under 8 USCS § 1255(a). Orozco v Mukasey (2008,
CA9) 521 F3d 1068.
18 USC § 1001 did not apply where false information was given to state highway patrolman, even though in matter
clearly within jurisdiction of federal immigration authority, since deception had not been practiced directly on federal
agency involved; where indictment alleged that defendants willfully and knowingly represented to California State
Highway Patrol officers that van was empty, whereas, in truth, as defendants knew, this van contained 49 Mexican aliens
illegally in United States, predecessor to 18 USC § 1001 used term "jurisdiction" as synonymous with "power," and
therefore statute was inapplicable since deception was not practiced upon federal department or agency, even though it
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18 USCS § 1001
was recognized that representation was made in matter within jurisdiction of Immigration and Naturalization Service of
United States Department of Justice. United States v White (1946, DC Cal) 69 F Supp 562.
In prosecution for making false statements as to misrepresenting what aliens wanted and were trying to accomplish,
neither verbatim transcript of INS hearings, nor statement to officer with final authority is necessary where whole purpose
of application procedure was to establish truth of certain facts on basis of which alien would be allowed or would be
denied permission to stay in United States and no one could have reasonably supposed that truth was not essence of
application procedure. United States v Endow (1982, ED Pa) 553 F Supp 773, affd (1983, CA3 Pa) 723 F2d 1120, 14
Fed Rules Evid Serv 1424, cert den (1984) 467 US 1251, 82 L Ed 2d 839, 104 S Ct 3533.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Denial of motion for judgment of acquittal was proper in prosecution for violations of 8 USCS §
1326(a) and 18 USCS § 1001 where defendant possessed current, valid passport issued by foreign country and lied to
immigration agent concerning location of passport and his possession of it and where evidence showed that several removal orders had previously been entered against defendant and that he was in U.S. without having received prior approval to enter country. United States v Ntreh (2005, CA3 VI) 142 Fed Appx 106.
Unpublished: Defendant's conviction and sentence for uttering counterfeit check, violation of 18 USCS § 513(a),
falsely representing himself to be U.S. citizen, in violation of 18 USCS § 911, and making false statement in matter within
jurisdiction of U.S. government, violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), were affirmed because (1) district court did not err in
denying defendant's motion to quash his waiver of speedy-trial rights, and it fully complied with Speedy Trial Act under
18 USCS § 3161(h)(8)(A); (2) district court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, or res judicata because finding by ALJ that he was U.S. citizen, and that he served in U.S. Air Force, did
not preclude subsequent related criminal prosecution, and nothing in record established that defendant had previously
been prosecuted for any of same offenses, or that he was required to be U.S. citizen to enlist in Air Force; (3) district court
did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on counts charging him with impersonating U.S.
citizen and making false statement in matter within government's jurisdiction because it was reasonable for jury to infer
from evidence that defendant falsely stated to federal immigration enforcement agent that he was U.S. citizen, and that he
was born in U.S.; (4) those two counts were not multiplicitous; and (5) district court did not err in applying 10-level
upward adjustment based upon amount of intended loss resulting from defendant's counterfeiting offense under USSG §
2B1.1, cmt., application n. 3(A). United States v Bustamante (2007, CA8 Mo) 2007 US App LEXIS 23119.
43. Internal Revenue Service
False tax forms filed with Internal Revenue Service pursuant to 26 USCS § 4412 are filed "in any matter within jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Knox
(1969) 396 US 77, 24 L Ed 2d 275, 90 S Ct 363, 70-1 USTC P 15925, 27 AFTR 2d 1902.
Statement to internal revenue agent in course of authorized inquiry into correctness of taxpayer's returns is statement
made "within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." Knowles v United States (1955, CA10
Colo) 224 F2d 168, 55-1 USTC P 9481, 47 AFTR 1371.
Statement taken in affidavit form by internal revenue agent investigating charges brought by taxpayer against activities of defendant concerned subject matter within jurisdiction of agency of United States within 18 USC § 1001, where
defendant had denied that former revenue agent stated that he was willing to disclose government's case against taxpayer
for income tax evasion in effort by defendant and former agent to represent taxpayer in this matter; Internal Revenue
Service is part of Treasury Department of United States which, in addition to seeing that all internal revenue taxes are
properly collected, is further required to "aid in the prevention, detection, and punishment of any frauds in relation
thereto." Brandow v United States (1959, CA9 Cal) 268 F2d 559, 59-2 USTC P 9699, 4 AFTR 2d 5489.
18 USCS § 1001 applies to statements made to Internal Revenue agents, consisting of affirmatively tendering fictitious documents to IRS investigator to preserve defendant's claimed tax deductions. United States v Schmoker (1977,
CA9 Nev) 564 F2d 289, 78-1 USTC P 9109, 41 AFTR 2d 399.
False material oral statement made to tax auditor falls within purview of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Fern
(1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.
Conspirators who devised plan to avoid triggering reporting provisions of federal law requiring banking institution to
report to Internal Revenue Service name and address of individual dealing in amounts of cash in excess of $ 10,000 by
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18 USCS § 1001
going to different banks on same day and purchasing cashier's checks in amounts less than $ 10,000 could be convicted
under 18 USCS § 1001 for devising scheme to conceal or cover up material facts within jurisdiction of agency of government. United States v Massa (1984, CA8 Mo) 740 F2d 629, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 339, cert den (1985) 471 US
1115, 86 L Ed 2d 258, 105 S Ct 2357.
Submission of false affidavits which impaired legitimate investigatory function of IRS violates 18 USCS § 1001 even
if misstatements did not disquise any tax obligation. In re Sealed Case (1982, App DC) 219 US App DC 195, 676 F2d
793, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 98647, 82-1 USTC P 9335, 10 Fed Rules Evid Serv 490, 33 FR Serv 2d 1778, 50 AFTR 2d
5637 (criticized in Frontier Ref. v Gorman-Rupp Co. (1998, CA10 Wyo) 136 F3d 695, 39 FR Serv 3d 1236) and (criticized
in Bank of Am., N.A. v Terra Nova Ins. Co. (2002, SD NY) 212 FRD 166).
Internal revenue service is "agency" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Braunstein (1978, DC NJ)
474 F Supp 1.
44. Labor Department
False statements made to state division of employment were within jurisdiction of Department of Labor within
meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, since this and other federal agencies have authority to request information regarding
number, identity, and status of claimants to state programs. United States v Facchini (1987, CA9 Or) 832 F2d 1159.
Federal criminal liability was improperly imposed under 18 USCS § 1001 upon claimants to state unemployment
insurance program who made misrepresentations on claim for benefits, since Department of Labor involvement in state
program was administrative and minimal, where no federal unemployment benefits were received, and there was no direct
relation between false statements and any authorized function of Department. United States v Facchini (1989, CA9 Or)
874 F2d 638, CCH Unemployment Ins Rep P 21916 (criticized in United States v Salman (2002, ED Va) 189 F Supp 2d
360).
Department of Labor had jurisdiction over not-for-profit corporation president's false statements, even though he did
not physically deliver them to any person or entity but filed them, since 18 USCS § 1001 does not require physical delivery, his purpose was to deceive those who would look at files, and DOL had power to exercise authority over them as
they were subject to audit. United States v Frazier (1995, CA10 Utah) 53 F3d 1105, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 96 (criticized in United States v Ferrera (1997, CA7 Ill) 107 F3d 537) and (criticized in United States v Maher (1998, CA4 Va)
1998 US App LEXIS 27771) and (criticized in United States v Kinney (2000, CA2 NY) 211 F3d 13).
45.--National Labor Relations Board
Section 9(h) of amended National Labor Relations Act (29 USCS § 159(h)), which requires union officers to file
noncommunist affidavits with National Labor Relations Board and makes officer who files false affidavit subject to
penalties provided in 18 USCS § 1001, seeks to deter union officers who are communists from filing any affidavits.
Leedom v International Union of M., M. & S. W. (1956) 352 US 145, 1 L Ed 2d 201, 77 S Ct 154, 39 BNA LRRM 2146, 31
CCH LC P 70349.
False statement denying affiliation with Communist Party in affidavit filed with NLRB, pursuant to explicit authority
of former § 9(h) of Taft-Hartley Act, is in "matter within the jurisdiction" of NLRB within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001,
where constitutionality of § 9(h) was upheld by United States Supreme Court only short time before filing of affidavit,
irrespective of whether that Supreme Court decision would be reaffirmed today. Bryson v United States (1969) 396 US
64, 24 L Ed 2d 264, 90 S Ct 355, 72 BNA LRRM 2833, 61 CCH LC P 10510.
Actual filing of false non-Communist affidavit with National Labor Relations Board is necessary to constitute crime
denounced by 18 USCS § 1001, and constructive filing by delivery to post office is not enough. United States v Valenti
(1953, CA3 NJ) 207 F2d 242, 32 BNA LRRM 2655, 24 CCH LC P 67827.
Materiality of non-Communist affidavit is not dependent upon use of national labor relations board facilities by
union; test is not use but right to use. Sells v United States (1958, CA10 Colo) 262 F2d 815, 43 BNA LRRM 2476, 36
CCH LC P 65189, cert den (1959) 360 US 913, 3 L Ed 2d 1262, 79 S Ct 1298.
Unsworn responses of defendant, a union's international vice-president, to questions propounded by a NLRB hearing
officer at fact-finding hearing constituted a "statement" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Krause
(1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.
46. Military authorities
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18 USCS § 1001
Although not stating offense of forgery, specification that alleged that accused, with intent to defraud, made certain
false signatures to certain USAFE Special Activities Permit and Ration Card, which instrument, if genuine, would apparently operate to legal prejudice of another, would sufficiently state violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v
Smart (1956, US) 23 CMR 454.
Exclusion board established under executive order authorizing military commanders to designate certain areas from
which certain persons could be excluded had at least colorable authority so that making of false or fraudulent statements or
misrepresentations before it could be prosecuted. United States v Meyer (1944, CA2 NY) 140 F2d 652.
Military post exchange, although created by regulations, is arm of the United States and agency within meaning of 18
USCS § 1001. Brethauer v United States (1964, CA8 Mo) 333 F2d 302.
Navy has legitimate interest in maintaining security of installations; to protect that interest, security personnel may
require visitor to identify himself whether or not there are indications he has committed criminal offense. United States v
Camacho (1974, CA9 Guam) 506 F2d 594.
Defendant, who, in order to obtain employment with corporation under contract with United States to develop and
manufacture classified military and naval arms, falsely stated in "Department of Defense Personnel Questionnaire" that
had never been arrested, and which questionnaire was, pursuant to government regulations, presented to naval department
by employer, was properly convicted under 18 USCS § 1001, as against defendant's contention that he was employed by
the corporation and questionnaire presented to it. United States v Giarraputo (1956, DC NY) 140 F Supp 831.
Right of retired member of Marine Corps to submit claim for travel performed by him and his dependents; incident to
his selection of home following his transfer to Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, is privilege directly related to active service,
even though it accrues only incident to termination of active service; and, therefore, conviction of member under 18 USCS
§ 1001 of falsifying vouchers for such travel is conviction of felony committed in exercise of member's privileges as
officer or employee of United States. (1960) 40 Op Comp Gen 176.
47. Postal Service
18 USCS § 1001 applies to Postal Service and thus was applicable in prosecution of defendant who had submitted
false sick leave request while employed as mail clerk. United States v Estus (1976, CA8 Ark) 544 F2d 934.
18 USCS § 1001 does not require that false statement be made for fraudulent purpose; thus, government was not
required to prove that defendant opened post office boxes under names other than her own with intent to defraud others by
virtue of her mail fraud scheme involving stealing merchandise from retail stores, then returning it and having refund
checks mailed to her. United States v McGauley (2002, CA1 Mass) 279 F3d 62, 58 Fed Rules Evid Serv 922.
False statement to Post Office inspectors, where defendant was charged with falsely stating to Post Office inspectors
amount of funds he had received on behalf of Infantile Paralysis Foundation and with falsely stating that he had turned
over some of funds he had received to another officer of foundation, were made in matter within jurisdiction of Post
Office Department, which is empowered to investigate commission of federal offenses on Post Office property, whether
such acts amounted to mail fraud or not. United States v Beall (1954, DC Cal) 126 F Supp 363.
48. Small Business Administration
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 of defendant who had instructed applicants for Small Business Administration
loans to answer item in application incompletely defendant would be considered to have affirmatively caused applicants
to misrepresent that complete disclosure had been made, and thus did indeed make "false" statements within meaning of
18 USCS § 1001. United States v Rapoport (1976, CA2 NY) 545 F2d 802, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 420, cert den (1977) 430
US 931, 51 L Ed 2d 775, 97 S Ct 1551.
Presenting false information to Small Business Administration, or failing to provide complete information, with intent that SBA will act on misrepresentations and issue reimbursement checks to sureties is presentation of false, material
information to federal agency in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Dick (1984, CA7 Ill) 744 F2d 546.
Contractor's statements to insurer which had given performance bond on hospital construction project were submitted
in matter "within jurisdiction" of federal agency, within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, where (1) statements were submitted for purpose of obtaining payment on construction project from insurer, (2) performance bond was guaranteed by
Small Business Administration, (3) Small Business Administration was obligated to reimburse insurer for 90 percent of
cost of contract with defendant to complete project, (4) amount of reimbursement was affected by defendant's defrauding
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18 USCS § 1001
insurer, and (5) Small Business Administration retained authority to supervise bond guarantee program. United States v
Brack (1984, CA7 Ill) 747 F2d 1142, cert den (1985) 469 US 1216, 84 L Ed 2d 339, 105 S Ct 1193.
49. State agencies
Statement made to Aid to Families of Dependent Children program operated by State of Michigan Department of
Social Services was part of fraud within jurisdiction of department or agency of United States within meaning of 18 USCS
§ 1001. United States v Lewis (1978, CA6 Mich) 587 F2d 854.
18 USCS § 1001 is proper vehicle for prosecuting individuals who make false statements on applications for state
unemployment benefits, since state department of labor receives federal funds, operates under federal law, and provides
for benefits to unemployed workers on interstate basis. United States v Herring (1990, CA11 Ala) 916 F2d 1543, CCH
Unemployment Ins Rep P 21945, cert den (1991) 500 US 946, 114 L Ed 2d 488, 111 S Ct 2248, 91 Daily Journal DAR
6141 and (criticized in United States v Holmes (1997, CA6 Mich) 111 F3d 463, CCH Unemployment Ins Rep P 22181, 46
Fed Rules Evid Serv 1455, 1997 FED App 135P).
Where, as here, federal government neither funded fraudulently-obtained state benefit payments nor had any authority to act upon discovering that state program has been defrauded, false statements made to state agency could not be
said to come "within jurisdiction of any department or agency of United States." United States v Holmes (1997, CA6
Mich) 111 F3d 463, CCH Unemployment Ins Rep P 22181, 46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1455, 1997 FED App 135P (criticized
in United States v Salman (2002, ED Va) 189 F Supp 2d 360).
18 USCS § 1001 did not cover deception of state police officer or any state agency or of individual person in connection with administration or enforcement of any of laws of government of United States. United States v White (1946,
DC Cal) 69 F Supp 562.
Although statement was physically submitted to state agency, where structure of federal law on Medicaid contemplated that states would have programs and would be reimbursed by federal funds, statement was within jurisdiction of
federal agency. United States v Braunstein (1978, DC NJ) 474 F Supp 1.
50. United States Attorney
Defendant could be prosecuted under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statements to Assistant United States Attorney with respect to matters within jurisdiction of United States Attorney's Office. New York v Sokol (In re Sokol) (1997,
CA2) 108 F3d 477, reported in full (1997, CA2 NY) 1997 US App LEXIS 6291.
Affirmative false statement by defendant to Assistant United States Attorney to induce that office to take action
against third person involved governmental action within jurisdiction of office of United States Attorney. United States
v Van Valkenburg (1958, DC Alaska) 17 Alaska 450, 157 F Supp 599.
Defendant violated 18 USC § 1001 when he stated to assistant United States Attorney that certain person had stolen
two checks from him and that by means of forgery had cashed same, knowing at time he made this statement that it was
untrue; because indictment alleged affirmative false statement to assistant United States Attorney to induce his office to
take action against third person, such governmental action being clearly within jurisdiction of office of United States
Attorney, this was matter within jurisdiction of Department of Justice. United States v Van Valkenburg (1958, DC
Alaska) 17 Alaska 450, 157 F Supp 599.
51. Veteran's Administration
Defendant was properly convicted under 18 USCS § 1001 where cost analysis submitted by him to Veterans' Administration differed materially from cost as shown on his books after such books had been adjusted by government to
reflect his costs accurately. Stevens v United States (1953, CA6 Tenn) 206 F2d 64.
Making and presentation of false affidavits by committee for incompetent veterans were not within jurisdiction of
veterans' administration as used in 18 USCS § 1001, suit to compel an accounting and settlement of accounts being exclusively within jurisdiction of state court. United States v Crittenden (1938, DC NY) 24 F Supp 84.
Presentation of fraudulent accounts by attorney for veteran's guardian to veterans' administration was matter within
jurisdiction of veterans' administration and was offense punishable under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Sanders
(1941, DC Tex) 42 F Supp 436.
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18 USCS § 1001
Defendant was properly tried and convicted under 18 USCS § 1001 when evidence showed that defendant and not
another had willfully and knowingly caused lending institution to submit to veterans administration application for home
loan guaranty or insurance containing false income statements regarding such other, even though veterans administration
rejected application for another reason and was not deceived by false statements. United States v Quirk (1958, DC Pa)
167 F Supp 462, affd (1959, CA3 Pa) 266 F2d 26.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Court granted counsel's motions to withdraw and dismissed both appeals where disputing sufficiency
of evidence would have been frivolous given overwhelming evidence produced at trial that defendant husband and wife
lied to Department of Veterans Affairs and Social Security Administration about being wheelchair-bound. United States v
Rennicke (2005, CA7 Ill) 132 Fed Appx 652.
52. Wartime agencies
War assets administration being agency of United States, false representations, made by veteran in his application to
purchase surplus trucks, pertained to matters within its jurisdiction. Todorow v United States (1949, CA9 Cal) 173 F2d
439, cert den (1949) 337 US 925, 93 L Ed 1733, 69 S Ct 1169.
During war-time suspension of competitive bid requirements, but while local policy required air force civilian contracting officer to secure informal quotations from possible suppliers, fictitious entries of supposed quotations on reverse
side of mimeographed purchase memoranda, support conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001. Wagner v United
States (1959, CA5 Fla) 263 F2d 877.
Alleged issuance of false invoices or bills concerning sales within jurisdiction of Office of Price Administration
showed violation. United States v Ganz (1942, DC Mass) 48 F Supp 323.
Applicant for sugar rationing book willfully making false statement that he had no sugar on hand was guilty of violation of predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Wright (1943, DC Del) 48 F Supp 687.
53. Miscellaneous
Defendant, employed by employer seeking access to classified material from Atomic Energy Commission, who
knowingly made false statements on such commission's security questionnaire, cannot escape conviction for violation of
18 USCS § 1001 by claiming that he had not defrauded United States of financial or proprietary interest, or that his employer and not defendant had submitted questionnaire, or that defendant did not have training required for him to have any
access to classified atomic information. Pitts v United States (1959, CA9 Cal) 263 F2d 353, cert den (1959) 360 US 935,
3 L Ed 2d 1547, 79 S Ct 1457, reh den (1959) 361 US 857, 4 L Ed 2d 97, 80 S Ct 47.
Business activities of corporation wholly owned by savings association is matter within jurisdiction of Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Cartwright (1980, CA5 Tex)
632 F2d 1290.
Jurisdiction existed within Food and Drug Administration to regulate "overbleeding" by plasmapheresis centers,
notwithstanding that agency did not promulgate final regulation concerning matter until after events constituting mislabeling of blood shipments occurred. United States v Diaz (1982, CA11 Fla) 690 F2d 1352.
Statements made on forms filed with Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) are matters "within jurisdiction" of
SEC, since Exchange Act provides statutory basis for SEC's request for information, and SEC has authority to regulate
disclosure required under securities law; government may prosecute making false statements on forms filed with SEC
under either 18 USCS § 1001 or more specific securities law provisions, even though less proof is required under § 1001,
since general rule that criminal statutes may overlap controls. United States v Bilzerian (1991, CA2 NY) 926 F2d 1285,
CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95701, 31 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1185, cert den (1991) 502 US 813, 116 L Ed 2d 39, 112 S Ct 63
and (criticized in In re Grand Jury Proceedings October 12, 1995 (1996, CA6 Ohio) 78 F3d 251, 1996 FED App 90P).
False statements made to United States Probation Office were matters within jurisdiction of department or agency of
United States within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, since § 1001 is statute of general applicability which should be given
unrestricted interpretation, and duties of probation officer in supervising probationer were clearly administrative, not
adjudicative, in nature. United States v Inserra (1994, CA2 NY) 34 F3d 83, 41 Fed Rules Evid Serv 40.
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18 USCS § 1001
Even if Drug Enforcement Administration failed to comply with its own internal procedures requiring its agents to
obtain authorization to use informant with prior felony convictions, informant's false reports which led to groundless
federal investigations were matters within agency jurisdiction, since "jurisdiction" should not be given narrow or technical
meaning. United States v Edmonds (1996, CA9 Cal) 103 F3d 822, 96 CDOS 9288, 96 Daily Journal DAR 15306.
False statements that were made by defendants concerned their compliance with terms of their contract with contractor, contract over which Department of Transportation neither had nor exercised any supervisory power; consequently, false statements concerned matter that was outside jurisdiction of federal government. United States v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953.
False statements that were made by defendants concerned their compliance with terms of their contract with contractor, contract over which Department of Transportation neither had nor exercised any supervisory power; consequently, false statements concerned matter that was outside jurisdiction of federal government. United States v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953.
Section 104.8 of Federal Election Commission (FEC) adequately put defendant on notice that reporting name of
signer of check as donor where there was evidence to contrary and participating in conduit transaction by signing check
himself or conspiring with another to do so would constitute "causing" false statement to be made to FEC in violation of
18 USCS §§ 2(b), 1001. United States v Kanchanalak (1999, App DC) 338 US App DC 200, 192 F3d 1037.
Submission of fraudulent documents to Governor of Virgin Islands to justify open market purchase of equipment
involves matters within jurisdiction of US Department of Interior where such submission of fraudulent document interferes with lawful functions of US government controller, whose duties include accounting for and auditing territorial
revenues. United States v Canel (1982, DC VI) 569 F Supp 926, affd (1983, CA3 VI) 708 F2d 894, cert den (1983) 464
US 852, 78 L Ed 2d 151, 104 S Ct 165, 104 S Ct 166.
Defendant's false statement to agent of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is matter within "jurisdiction" of
bureau for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 prohibition of knowingly making false statement to government agency concerning matter within jurisdiction, because defendant's statements concerning purchase of shotgun by her rather than
former husband, convicted felon, clearly fall within "any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency"
where ATF is charged with enforcement and administration of Gun Control Act. United States v Barrett (1986, DC Vt)
639 F Supp 1342.
Count charging CIA officer with making false statements to Tower Commission in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 need
not be dismissed, where officer contends that unless Congress designates entity as "agency," "commission," or "board,"
false statements made to that entity do not violate § 1001, because argument is specious since (1) 18 USCS § 6 defines
"agency" as "any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board, or bureau" of
U.S., (2) nothing in law requires formal act of Congress to create "commission" for purposes of § 1001, and (3) Tower
Commission--officially established as "Special Review Board to review activities of National Security Council"--must be
considered "agency" under 18 USCS §§ 6 and 1001. United States v Clarridge (1992, DC Dist Col) 811 F Supp 697
(criticized in United States v Watt (1995, DC Dist Col) 911 F Supp 538).
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant, upon boarding flight to Europe with his wife, falsely stated to Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) agents that his wife was carrying $ 6,500 and he had only $ 356, jury rationally concluded that
his false statements pertained to activity within jurisdiction of DHS, required element to support conviction for violating
18 USCS § 1001, because DHS' jurisdiction included enforcing federal-currency-reporting requirements. United States v
Odunze (2008, CA6 Tenn) 2008 FED App 278N.
Unpublished: Former employee stated claim that he could have faced criminal liability pursuant to 18 USCS § 1001
had he knowingly falsified his audit report at his former employer's direction, as alleged, because (1) Risk Management
Program (RMP) indicated that employer was to provide regular reports to United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and, thus, employee's audit report was within jurisdiction of FDA for purposes of § 1001; (2) employee's audit
report could influence FDA as it analyzed whether employer was in compliance with its RMP, which was created in order
to obtain FDA approval of drug and to ensure safe use of drug; and (3) it was clear that discovery was required to flesh out
RMP requirements and manner of reporting to FDA; thus, employee stated claim against employer for wrongful discharge
pursuant to Pennsylvania's commit crime exception to at-will employment that was sufficient to withstand Fed. R. Civ. P.
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18 USCS § 1001
12(b)(6) motion, employee's motion for leave to amend that claim was granted, and employer's and co-workers' motion to
dismiss that claim was denied. Brennan v Cephalon, Inc. (2005, DC NJ) 2005 US Dist LEXIS 25170.
3.Particular Matters and Transactions 54. Answers to inquiries, questionnaires and forms
18 USCS § 1001 was not intended to embrace statements given in response to inquiries initiated by federal agency or
department, except, perhaps, where such statement would substantially impair basic functions entrusted by law to that
agency. United States v Bedore (1972, CA9 Wash) 455 F2d 1109.
18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to mere answers, including untruthful ones, to investigators' questions. United
States v Johnson (1976, CA5 Ga) 530 F2d 52, 76-1 USTC P 9398, 37 AFTR 2d 1242, cert den (1976) 429 US 833, 50 L Ed
2d 97, 97 S Ct 96.
Person who has duty to supply information on government form may be guilty of violating 18 USCS § 1001 if he in
fact has relevant information but fills in letters N/A or inserts nothing in blank space provided for his answers. United
States v Mattox (1982, CA5 Tex) 689 F2d 531.
55.--Particular cases
Party is guilty of making false statement in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 1921 where party is receiving compensation from government agency as result of death of first husband when in fact party has entered into common-law
marriage with second husband and party subsequently answered "no" to questionnaire concerning remarriage. United
States v Seay (1983, CA4 SC) 718 F2d 1279, cert den (1984) 467 US 1226, 81 L Ed 2d 873, 104 S Ct 2677.
18 USCS § 1001, by itself, requires person receiving disability payments truthfully to disclose information concerning his or her employment status and earnings to government, thus government was not required to show that defendant had independent statutory duty to answer 2 questions contained in eligibility questionnaires. United States v De
Rosa (1986, CA9 Cal) 783 F2d 1401, cert den (1986) 477 US 908, 91 L Ed 2d 571, 106 S Ct 3282.
Questions concerning convictions in form entitled "Medical History" on application for airman medical certificate
were so ambiguous that, as matter of fundamental fairness, conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 was improper, where
questions were buried in list purportedly concerned with medical conditions. United States v Manapat (1991, CA11 Fla)
928 F2d 1097.
Defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statements on Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) medical form was affirmed because: (1) FAA form, and questions at issue, dealt exclusively with applicant's
medical history, and privacy statement and detailed set of instructions attached to form explicitly stated that purpose of
form was to establish applicant's physical fitness to fly, so defendant failed to demonstrate that questions he answered
falsely were fundamentally ambiguous; (2) there was nothing inappropriate or vindictive about California Department of
Insurance's referral of potential violations of federal law to federal authorities; and (3) while FAA was competent to
determine whether applicant has made false statements on certificate form, it was squarely within province of Department
of Justice to prosecute felonies of perjury and false statements, so district court properly proceeded with defendant's
prosecution. United States v Culliton (2003, CA9 Cal) 328 F3d 1074, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 4724, cert den (2004) 540
US 1111, 157 L Ed 2d 900, 124 S Ct 1087.
Denial of judgment of acquittal motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 for convictions for making false statements to FAA
in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed because form was not fundamentally ambiguous; defendant was required to
disclose any and all operating vehicle under influence of alcohol (OUI) convictions, defendant knew that his answer was
false and that his other two OUI convictions had to have been included on form, and government proved, and rational jury
found beyond reasonable doubt, that only sensible reading of form demanded that defendant report his entire OUI history.
United States v Hatch (2006, CA1 Mass) 434 F3d 1.
Defendant was properly convicted of making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) when he applied
to work as baggage and passenger screener for Transportation Security Administration and said that he had never left job
under unfavorable circumstances or had clearance authorization suspended; defendant had been discharged from U.S. Air
Force because of his verbal support of Osama bin Laden and September 11, 2001 attacks and his access to classified
information had been terminated at that time, and it was for jury to decide whether defendant's interpretation of questions
was reasonable. United States v Ahmed (2006, CA6 Mich) 472 F3d 427, 2006 FED App 475P.
Failure of government employee to identify involvement in group automobile insurance venture when completing
Confidential Statement of Employment and Financial Interest form required by HUD subjects him to prosecution under
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18 USCS § 1001
18 USCS § 1001 since insurance venture is "business enterprise" subject to disclosure requirement. United States v
Muntain (1979, App DC) 198 US App DC 22, 610 F2d 964.
Violation of Ethics in Government Act (Public Law No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824) by congressman who omits financial
transactions required to be disclosed in financial disclosure statements, is subject to criminal penalties of 18 USCS § 1001.
United States v Hansen (1985, App DC) 249 US App DC 22, 772 F2d 940, cert den (1986) 475 US 1045, 89 L Ed 2d 571,
106 S Ct 1262, post-conviction relief gr, remanded (1995, CA9 Idaho) 1995 US App LEXIS 27043, habeas corpus den,
request den, request gr (1995, DC Dist Col) 906 F Supp 688 and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss)
96-1 USTC P 50163) and (criticized in United States v Oakar (1997, App DC) 324 US App DC 104, 111 F3d 146).
18 USCS § 1001 does not cover unsworn, oral, false exculpatory responses to questions posed by federal investigators; therefore, defendant was not guilty of violation of § 1001 where she denied knowing other defendant who subsequently turned out to be her husband. United States v Thevis (1979, DC Conn) 469 F Supp 490, affd without op (1979,
CA2 Conn) 614 F2d 1293, cert den (1980) 446 US 908, 64 L Ed 2d 260, 100 S Ct 1834.
Attorney General's investigation of National Security Council aide's activities was sufficiently formal under 18 USCS
§ 1001, in prosecution for aide's alleged obstruction of presidential investigation, where aide was summoned by Attorney
General personally to answer questions about well-publicized matter, because investigation was conducted in atmosphere
of gravity such that reasonable person would know legal consequences could result from obstruction. United States v
North (1988, DC Dist Col) 708 F Supp 364.
Failure of county sheriff to furnish United States Army with information in his files concerning army enlistee's arrest
and adjudication as youthful offender did not violate 18 USCS § 1001. Doe v County of Westchester (1974, 2d Dept) 45
App Div 2d 308, 358 NYS2d 471.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of knowingly and willfully making false statement in
matter within jurisdiction of federal agency where (1) Merchant Mariner's Document that asked whether defendant had
ever been convicted by any court defined conviction to include cases of deferred adjudication, (2) defendant's Florida
burglary case thus constituted conviction, (3) defendant's statement that he had not been convicted was demonstrably
false, and (4) he stated in writing that he had lied on form because he did not want to lose his job. United States v Boevink
(2005, CA9 Wash) 122 Fed Appx 307.
56. Currency transaction reports
18 USCS § 1001 is violated when individual willfully and knowingly causes financial institution not to "accurately"
report currency transactions that it has duty to report and would report accurately if it knew about transaction; person who
conspires to transmit false information to financial institution, with knowledge that false information will passed on to
government, violates 18 USCS § 371, 18 USCS § 1001, and 18 USCS § 2. United States v Puerto (1984, CA11 Fla) 730
F2d 627, cert den (1984) 469 US 847, 83 L Ed 2d 98, 105 S Ct 162.
Conspirators who devised plan to avoid triggering reporting provisions of federal law requiring banking institution to
report to Internal Revenue Service name and address of individual dealing in amounts of cash in excess of $ 10,000 by
going to different banks on same day and purchasing cashier's checks in amounts less than $ 10,000 could be convicted
under 18 USCS § 1001 for devising scheme to conceal or cover up material facts within jurisdiction of agency of government. United States v Massa (1984, CA8 Mo) 740 F2d 629, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 339, cert den (1985) 471 US
1115, 86 L Ed 2d 258, 105 S Ct 2357.
Conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 was proper where defendant, who met definition of financial institution, had duty
to file CTR's which he failed to do. United States v Hernando Ospina (1986, CA11 Fla) 798 F2d 1570, 21 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 878.
Defendant has violated 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 18 USCS § 2, where he purposefully structured banking transactions of
over $ 10,000 so as to avoid bank's filing of Currency Transaction Reports (CTR's), despite fact that he had no duty to
disclose and therefore could not ordinarily be guilty of concealment of material fact, since by operation of 18 USCS § 2,
defendant is liable as principle for willfully causing innocent bank to fail to file CTR. United States v Richeson (1987,
CA4 Md) 825 F2d 17.
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18 USCS § 1001
Conspiracy to cause bank to fail to file currency transaction reports is conspiracy to defraud United States in violation
of 18 USCS §§ 371 and 1001. United States v Lafaurie (1987, CA11 Fla) 833 F2d 1468, cert den (1988) 486 US 1032,
100 L Ed 2d 602, 108 S Ct 2015.
Indictment charging bank president with intentionally structuring transactions in order to avoid statutory filing requirements of 31 USCS §§ 5313 and 5322 and in violation of 18 USCS §§ 2, 371 and 1001, charging that aggregate of
individual transfers of currency he made in one day exceeded $ 10,000, sufficiently alleged facts which constituted crime
against United States, since bank was alleged to be aware of duty to report and efforts to evade duty, and president, who
controlled bank, was given fair warning that his behavior violated statute. United States v Polychron (1988, CA8 Ark)
841 F2d 833, reh, en banc, den (1988, CA8) 1988 US App LEXIS 7474 and cert den (1988) 488 US 851, 102 L Ed 2d 107,
109 S Ct 135.
Bank customers could not be convicted of scheme to conceal information from Treasury Department by structuring
transactions to cause bank to fail to file Current Transaction Reports in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and 31 USCS § 5311,
prior to amendment, since 31 USCS § 5311 failed to give customers fair notice that such structuring was criminal. United
States v Mastronardo (1988, CA3 Pa) 849 F2d 799.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1001 by application of 18 USCS § 2, where he as customer caused bank to fail to file
CTR's, despite fact that his conduct was open and neither fraudulent nor deceptive. United States v Meros (1989, CA11
Fla) 866 F2d 1304, cert den (1989) 493 US 932, 107 L Ed 2d 312, 110 S Ct 322.
Indictment charged offense under 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1002, where it alleged that attorney deposited funds for client,
structuring deposits to thwart CTR filing requirements by failing to disclose real party in interest, since bank was required
by law to report real party in interest. United States v Belcher (1991, CA11 Fla) 927 F2d 1182, cert den (1991) 502 US
856, 116 L Ed 2d 133, 112 S Ct 170.
Depositor who clearly intended to avoid bank's $ 10,000 threshold reporting requirement under 31 USCS § 5313 by
depositing $ 9,800 into two accounts on one day and $ 200 the next cannot be liable under 18 USCS § 2(b) and 18 USCS
§ 1001 for thereby causing bank innocently to violate 31 USCS § 5313 and related regulatory reporting requirement, since
only Financial institutions are subject to reporting requirement under statute and regulation. United States v Perlmutter
(1986, SD NY) 636 F Supp 219.
57. Negotiations with government
Predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001 was intended to apply to situations involving negotiations with government, and was
not limited to actual claims against government. Spivey v United States (1940, CA5 Ala) 109 F2d 181, cert den (1940)
310 US 631, 84 L Ed 1401, 60 S Ct 1079.
Submission to National Aeronautics and Space Administration for reimbursement on change order work may constitute false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and may constitute false claim in violation of 18 USCS § 287
notwithstanding claim that submission is merely estimate presented to government as opening position in process of
negotiating amount to be paid. United States v White (1985, CA11 Fla) 765 F2d 1469, 33 CCF P 73741.
Where, as here, false statements were made to department or agency of executive branch of government in course of
settlement negotiations, and where these statements were not presented to federal court, such statements were made with
respect to matter within jurisdiction of any department or agency of United States as that phrase was used in 18 USCS §
1001, notwithstanding fact that matter might also be within jurisdiction of federal court. New York v Sokol (In re Sokol)
(1997, CA2) 108 F3d 477, reported in full (1997, CA2 NY) 1997 US App LEXIS 6291.
18 USCS § 1001 applied to statements made and documents supplied during bargaining between contractor and
United States. United States v Coastal Contracting & Engineering Co. (1959, DC Md) 174 F Supp 474.
58. Reports of federal employees
Where visa clerk in customs department pursuant to conspiracy passed false export statement, false statement "was
made or caused to be made" by visa clerk. United States v Leviton (1951, CA2 NY) 193 F2d 848, cert den (1952) 343 US
946, 96 L Ed 1350, 72 S Ct 860, reh den (1952) 343 US 988, 96 L Ed 1375, 72 S Ct 1079.
18 USCS § 1001 includes reports of Internal Revenue agents who "knowingly and willfully" falsify them and is
consistent with § 7214(a)(7) of title 26, concerning agents who make a "fraudulent" entry, as opposed to making an innocent false statement. United States v Eisenmann (1968, CA2 NY) 396 F2d 565.
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18 USCS § 1001
59. Miscellaneous
The filing of a false non-Communist affidavit to comply with former § 159(h) of Title 29 was a matter within the
jurisdiction of an agency of the United States within 18 USCS § 1001 even though there was some question about the
constitutionality of such § 159(h). Bryson v United States (1969) 396 US 64, 24 L Ed 2d 264, 90 S Ct 355, 72 BNA LRRM
2833, 61 CCH LC P 10510.
18 USCS § 1001 did not extend to false oath in application for civil service examination. United States ex rel. Starr
v Mulligan (1932, CA2 NY) 59 F2d 200.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1001 where she deliberately gave wrong address to doctor in securing a drug prescription, which address was recorded by doctor. Walker v United States (1951, CA10 Okla) 192 F2d 47.
Dismissal of indictment charging violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was proper where certificates of deposit at issue did
not meet negotiability requirements set forth by Puerto Rico's Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. United States v
Gonzalez Medina (1986, CA1 Puerto Rico) 797 F2d 1109.
Blood center employee could be found guilty of violating 18 USCS § 1001, where employee had another person take
proficiency test required by government agency, because test fell within agency's jurisdiction, as required for conviction,
as it was important way of assuring quality of persons handling blood at centers. United States v Maniago (1997, SD NY)
987 F Supp 234.
Motion for new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 was denied where defendants failed to point to anything that
should have alerted prosecutors that witness was lying about participation in testing of worksheet; jury did not rely on
such testimony when it convicted defendants of making false statements, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, and of conspiracy and obstruction of agency proceeding, in violation of 18 USCS § 1505, where, one day before corporation in
which defendant client held stock made official announcement, defendant stockbroker's assistant had notified defendant
client that corporation had been denied federal approval of its cancer-fighting drug. United States v Stewart (2004, SD NY)
323 F Supp 2d 606, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 92861.
C.State of Mind 60. Generally
It is not necessary that it be at least reasonably foreseeable that defendant be involved in matter within jurisdiction of
federal agency, since no mental state is required with respect to federal involvement in order to establish violation of 18
USCS § 1001, under plain meaning of statute. United States v Bakhtiari (1990, CA2 NY) 913 F2d 1053, cert den (1991)
499 US 924, 113 L Ed 2d 252, 111 S Ct 1319 and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v
Gelzer (1995, CA2 NY) 50 F3d 1133, 41 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1038).
There is no culpability standard applicable with regard to jurisdictional element of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v
Leo (1991, CA3 Pa) 941 F2d 181, 37 CCF P 76177, 34 Fed Rules Evid Serv 715.
In prosecution of high-level manager for signing falsely-dated bill of lading for hazardous waste shipment under 18
USCS § 1001, fact that document was internal and not on preprinted government form, from which agency jurisdiction
could be inferred, was irrelevant, since there is no mental state required for jurisdictional element under 18 USCS § 1001.
United States v Heuer (1993, CA9 Nev) 4 F3d 723, 93 CDOS 6519, 93 Daily Journal DAR 11177, 23 ELR 21357, cert den
(1994) 510 US 1164, 127 L Ed 2d 540, 114 S Ct 1190.
61. Intent, knowledge and willfulness
Proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction is not required to establish violation of 18 USCS § 1001;
phrase "knowingly and willfully" in § 1001 modifies only making of "false, fictitious or fraudulent statements," and not
predicate circumstance that such statements be made in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency. United States v
Yermian (1984) 468 US 63, 82 L Ed 2d 53, 104 S Ct 2936.
Under 18 USCS § 1001, willful means no more than that person charged with duty know what he is doing--he need
not know that he is breaking the law; hence, osteopath, charged with dispensation of narcotics was performing willful act
when he dispensed same knowing that the narcotics were not being given for medical treatment and despite fact that he
thought he had legal right to so prescribe. McBride v United States (1955, CA5 Tex) 225 F2d 249, 47 AFTR 1835, cert
den (1956) 350 US 934, 100 L Ed 816, 76 S Ct 306.
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18 USCS § 1001
As used in 18 USCS § 1001, "knowingly" requires only that defendant acted with knowledge, and "willfully" means
defendant acted deliberately and with knowledge. United States v Smith (1975, CA5 Fla) 523 F2d 771, cert den (1976)
429 US 817, 50 L Ed 2d 76, 97 S Ct 59, reh den (1976) 429 US 987, 50 L Ed 2d 599, 97 S Ct 509.
Violation of 18 USCS § 1001 requires proof that defendant had specific intent to make false or fraudulent statement,
and misrepresentation must have been made deliberately, knowingly, and willfully, or at least with reckless disregard of
truth and with conscious purpose to avoid learning truth. United States v Evans (1977, CA5 Fla) 559 F2d 244, reh den
(1977, CA5 Fla) 562 F2d 1257 and reh den (1977, CA5 Fla) 565 F2d 1215 and cert den (1978) 434 US 1015, 54 L Ed 2d
759, 98 S Ct 731 and cert den (1978) 435 US 945, 55 L Ed 2d 542, 98 S Ct 1528.
Since purpose of 18 USCS § 1001 is to protect government against those who would cheat or mislead it in administration of its programs, charge that includes specific intent to deceive along with other elements, namely statement,
falsity, materiality, and agency jurisdiction, comports with § 1001; § 1001 does not require that government prove specific
intent to defraud. United States v Godwin (1978, CA5 Ga) 566 F2d 975.
Intent element of 18 USCS § 1001 precludes conviction for honest misinterpretation of government forms; not only
was government's certification form which defendant signed not so vague on its face as to violate due process, but also
jury was properly not impressed by defendant's argument that she had made understandable mistake in interpreting it.
United States v Weatherspoon (1978, CA7 Ill) 581 F2d 595 (criticized in Truck Ins. Exch. v Kafka (1995, ND Ill) RICO
Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8873).
18 USCS § 1001 does not require specific proof that person committing fraud did so with knowledge that fraudulent
statement would affect federal funds; although matter must be within jurisdiction of federal government, knowledge of
federal involvement is not necessary element of offense. United States v Lewis (1978, CA6 Mich) 587 F2d 854.
Defendant need not know of federal involvement in order to be convicted under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v
Stanford (1978, CA7 Ill) 589 F2d 285, 50 ALR Fed 656, cert den (1979) 440 US 983, 60 L Ed 2d 244, 99 S Ct 1794.
18 USCS § 1001 requires that statements be made with intent to deceive, designed to induce belief in falsity or to
mislead, but not intent to defraud. United States v Lichenstein (1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US
907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.
Knowing and willful intent requirement of 18 USCS § 1001 is satisfied if defendant knows that misrepresentations to
and concealment from government agency is necessary in order for scheme to succeed. United States v Beck (1980, CA7
Ill) 615 F2d 441.
Defendant's knowledge of federal involvement is not essential element of conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 when
false statements are made to organization which receives federal funds but which is not itself federal agency. United
States v Baker (1980, CA5 Tex) 626 F2d 512 (criticized in United States v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110,
17 FLW Fed C 953).
Congress defined crime covered by 18 USCS § 1001(a) to punish defendants who act knowingly and willfully; it is
this mental state, not amorphous "specific intent," that government is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt. United
States v Starnes (2009, CA3 VI) 583 F3d 196.
To establish knowing and willful conduct in making of false statement under 18 USCS § 1001, government must
show that defendant acted deliberately and with knowledge that representation was false: government must prove not only
that statement was false, but that accused knew it to be false; but that showing, while necessary one, may not always be
sufficient to satisfy § 1001's "knowingly and willfully" requirement; thus, government is required to show that misrepresentation was not made innocently or inadvertently. United States v Starnes (2009, CA3 VI) 583 F3d 196.
To extent it is argued that government is required to prove that defendant actually knew of 18 USCS § 1001(a), Third
Circuit rejects that argument. United States v Starnes (2009, CA3 VI) 583 F3d 196.
Natural reading of 18 USCS §§ 2(b) and 1001 is this: government may show mens rea simply by proof (1) that defendant knew that statements to be made were false and (2) that defendant intentionally caused such statements to be made
by another. United States v Hsia (1999, App DC) 336 US App DC 91, 176 F3d 517, cert den (2000) 528 US 1136, 145 L Ed
2d 929, 120 S Ct 978.
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18 USCS § 1001
Presence of seller at meeting where purchaser signed false certificate, stating that price paid for property was not in
excess of appraised value of property, did not make him guilty of filing false claim, if evidence failed to show he knew
about requirement. United States v Mignon (1952, DC Pa) 103 F Supp 20.
In prosecution for violations of 18 USCS § 1001, defendant should only be convicted if evidence shows deliberate
course of conduct with intent to violate law and not where there is mistake, inadvertence or lack of guilty knowledge.
United States v Schreiber (1978, WD Pa) 449 F Supp 856, affd (1979, CA3 Pa) 599 F2d 534, cert den (1979) 444 US 843,
62 L Ed 2d 56, 100 S Ct 86.
Fact that defendants were advised of governmental requirements and their deliberate answers were designed to avoid
compliance with that requirement disposes of contention that their statements were not knowingly and willfully false
within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Cutaia (1981, ED NY) 511 F Supp 619.
Violation of 18 USCS § 1001 requires both knowledge and willfulness. State ex rel. Kelly v Moore (1973) 156 W Va
780, 197 SE2d 106, app dismd (1974) 414 US 1118, 38 L Ed 2d 746, 94 S Ct 853.
62. Recklessness
A false statement regarding membership in the Army National Guard made with reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity would support conviction under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Gottlieb (1974, CA2 NY) 493 F2d 987.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, no impropriety was committed by trial court in its charge that term
knowingly and willfully as used in relation to making of statement means that statement must have been made voluntarily,
deliberately, and intentionally, and with knowledge of its content and falsity of its content as distinguished from making
false statement by inadvertence, mistake, carelessness or for any other innocent reason, however, person who makes
statement with reckless disregard of truthfulness of statement and with conscious purpose to avoid learning truthfulness of
statement, is deemed to have knowledge of this statement and its truthfulness or lack thereof. United States v Evans
(1977, CA5 Fla) 559 F2d 244, reh den (1977, CA5 Fla) 562 F2d 1257 and reh den (1977, CA5 Fla) 565 F2d 1215 and cert
den (1978) 434 US 1015, 54 L Ed 2d 759, 98 S Ct 731 and cert den (1978) 435 US 945, 55 L Ed 2d 542, 98 S Ct 1528.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, "reckless indifference" may be equated with "knowingly and willfully". United States v Schaffer (1979, CA5 Fla) 600 F2d 1120.
Contractor who claimed that he signed HUD form without reading it, thereby falsely asserting, among other things,
that he was not convicted felon, had specific intent necessary to violate 18 USCS § 1001, since he acted with "reckless
disregard of truth and with purpose to avoid learning truth." United States v Puente (1993, CA5 Tex) 982 F2d 156, 38 CCF
P 76533, cert den (1993) 508 US 962, 124 L Ed 2d 684, 113 S Ct 2934.
Knowledge of actual falsity is not required under 18 USCS § 1001; conviction can be based on finding that defendant
acted with reckless disregard of whether a statement was true and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.
United States v Clearfield (1973, ED Pa) 358 F Supp 564.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: While United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit had not decided whether 18 USCS § 1546 could
apply "reckless indifference" or "reckless disregard" standard if defendant also acted "with purpose to avoid learning
truth" (as had been allowed to apply under 18 USCS § 1001), and appellate court might have written jury instructions
differently in defendant's case, defendant had failed to object to instruction at trial, and, given overwhelming evidence
against her that she knew statements in visa application she prepared and submitted for informant were false, there was no
plain error. United States v Yong Ping Liu (2008, CA5 Tex) 2008 US App LEXIS 16918.
D.False Statements, Writings or Documents and Concealments
1.In General 63. Generally
Predecessor to 18 USCS § 1001 covered both use of documents to defraud government and also use of any false
statement, whether oral or written, as to any other matter within jurisdiction of any department or agency of United States.
United States v Zavala (1944, CA2 NY) 139 F2d 830.
There is no requirement in 18 USCS § 1001 that document whereby concealment of material information, to which
federal agency is entitled, is accomplished must be verified. Call v United States (1959, CA4 NC) 265 F2d 167, cert den
(1959) 361 US 815, 4 L Ed 2d 62, 80 S Ct 54.
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18 USCS § 1001
18 USCS § 1001 was not intended to reach all false statements made to governmental agencies and departments, but
only those false statements that might support fraudulent claims against the Government, or that might pervert or corrupt
the authorized functions of those agencies to whom the statements were made. United States v Bedore (1972, CA9 Wash)
455 F2d 1109.
Defendant's false statements made in his Criminal Justice Act 23 Financial Affidavit were excluded from liability
under statute by 18 USCS § 1001(b) because defendant had already been indicted for crime and, thus, false statements
were part of judicial proceeding. United States v McNeil (2004, CA9 Mont) 362 F3d 570.
Defendant's false statements made in his Criminal Justice Act 23 Financial Affidavit were excluded from liability
under statute by 18 USCS § 1001(b) because defendant had already been indicted for crime and, thus, false statements
were part of judicial proceeding. United States v McNeil (2004, CA9 Mont) 362 F3d 570.
18 USCS § 1001 did not limit offense to formal statements, to written statements, or to statements under oath.
Marzani v United States (1948, App DC) 83 US App DC 78, 168 F2d 133, affd (1948) 335 US 895, 93 L Ed 431, 69 S Ct
299.
64. "False"
Word "false" as used in 18 USCS § 1001 means more than simply incorrect or untrue; intent to deceive or mislead is
required. United States v Lange (1976, CA5 La) 528 F2d 1280.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, statements must be false under any reasonable interpretation.
United States v Adler (1980, CA8 Mo) 623 F2d 1287.
If there remained doubt as to whether term "false" in 18 USCS § 1001 should be interpreted as extending to contractual promises, rule of lenity construed court to rule in favor of defendants and construe statute narrowly. United States
v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953.
If there remained doubt as to whether term "false" in 18 USCS § 1001 should be interpreted as extending to contractual promises, rule of lenity construed court to rule in favor of defendants and construe statute narrowly. United States
v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Following plea of guilty to violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), district court's reliance on USSG §
2K1.3(a)(3) was not clearly proper based on offense conduct; thus, remand was required for resentencing. United States v
Malike (2005, CA2 NY) 141 Fed Appx 25.
65.--Literally or facially true
Principle articulated in Bronston holds true for convictions under 18 USCS § 1001; appellate court cannot uphold
conviction where alleged statement forming basis of violation of § 1001 is true on its face, and prosecution for false
statement under § 1001 or under perjury statutes cannot be based on ambiguous question where response may be literally
and factually correct. United States v Good (2003, CA4 Va) 326 F3d 589.
On defendant's convictions for violations of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1), which arose from his overseas golf trip with high
profile lobbyist, where charges concerned alleged false statements that lobbyist had no business with Government Services Administration (GSA) at time of trip, district court abused its discretion in excluding defendant's favorable expert
testimony concerning how government contracting professionals view having business or working with GSA; exclusion
was not harmless, as literal truth would have been complete defense. United States v Safavian (2008, App DC) 528 F3d
957.
Defendant charged with making false statement on naturalization form is entitled to acquittal on count charging violation of 18 USCS § 1001, where question about crimes committed, arrests, and convictions that formed basis of indictment asked 2 separate and distinct questions, yet form provided space for only one "yes" or "no" answer, because
defendant's "no" response is literally and factually correct as to first part of question, and government failed to establish
element of falsity. United States v Rendon-Marquez (1999, ND Ga) 79 F Supp 2d 1361, affd without op (2000, CA11 Ga)
228 F3d 416.
Where defendant was convicted of crime of brandishing firearm, which was not specifically enumerated as listed
offense on Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) form, defendant's negative response to question 20 of SIDA form
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18 USCS § 1001
was literally true, and indictment charging violation of 18 USCS § 1001 had to be dismissed. United States v Baer (2003,
ED Va) 274 F Supp 2d 778, affd (2004, CA4 Va) 92 Fed Appx 942.
2.Particular Cases 66. Applications
Meaning of term "application" may reasonably include any document used in connection with application to obtain
approval of loan, not just initial document requesting its approval. United States v Grugette (1982, CA5 Tex) 678 F2d
600.
Defendant who files application for registration as broker dealer with Securities and Exchange Commission stating
that capital, membership and profits in business belong to him alone violates 18 USCS § 1001 where on date of application
defendant's account contains funds of investors in defendant's business, and profits from business are to accrue to limited
partners investing in business. United States v Kuna (1985, CA7 Ill) 760 F2d 813.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1001 when she prepared application for housing loan with Farmers Home Administration falsely projecting future earnings, since putting false earnings information into equation necessarily led to false
projection, even though statement turned out to be correct, since statement was false when made. United States v
Hartness (1988, CA8 Ark) 845 F2d 158, cert den (1988) 488 US 925, 102 L Ed 2d 326, 109 S Ct 308.
Dismissal of indictment against defendant for denying convictions of burglary, theft, armed robbery, possession or
distribution of stolen property, dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, when she had pleaded guilty to embezzlement,
was affirmed as answers given to questions on her application for airport security badge were literally true. United States
v Good (2003, CA4 Va) 326 F3d 589.
67. Checks
18 USCS § 1001 contains no requirement that defendants' misrepresentations be successful, thus, defendants' contention that he could not be convicted under § 1001 because FBI agents already knew purpose of checks about which he
had lied and therefore his lies did not mislead them had no merit. United States v Capo (1986, CA2 NY) 791 F2d 1054,
105 CCH LC P 12023, vacated on other grounds, in part, on reh, in part, en banc (1987, CA2 NY) 817 F2d 947.
Check drawn on nonexistent bank is false statement within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, since representation of
nonexistent bank cannot have innocent explanation, but is designedly untrue. United States v Worthington (1987, CA2
NY) 822 F2d 315, cert den (1987) 484 US 944, 98 L Ed 2d 358, 108 S Ct 331.
68. Exculpatory statements
"Exculpatory no" doctrine is limited to simple negative answers without affirmative discursive falsehoods which are
made while accused is unaware that he is under investigation. United States v King (1980, CA7 Ill) 613 F2d 670, 5 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 720, 56 ALR Fed 159 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35).
"Exculpatory no" doctrine is not rule of evidence, but rather defines reach of 18 USCS § 1001; doctrine holds that to
impose severe penalty under § 1001 for mere denials in face of investigator's questioning would circumvent perjury
statute. United States v Cole (1980, CA4 Va) 622 F2d 98, 6 Fed Rules Evid Serv 203, cert den (1980) 449 US 956, 66 L
Ed 2d 221, 101 S Ct 363.
Exculpatory denials made to officer conducting criminal investigation were not within reach of 18 USCS § 1001,
since need for protecting basic functions of government agencies must be balanced with protection from
self-incrimination. United States v Cogdell (1988, CA4 NC) 844 F2d 179 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995,
CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Solis (1997,
CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5).
18 USCS § 1001 should not be limited to those statements that pervert governmental functions but should be determined by text and not by judicial reconstruction of its purpose, and therefore, "exculpatory no" doctrine is retroactively
abolished. United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995,
CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 1995 FED App 157P, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494).
69.--Custodial interrogation
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18 USCS § 1001
18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to criminal defendant's responses to investigative officers during post-arrest interrogation since, when government agents are acting as "police investigators" rather than "administrators", pre-requisite for
invocation of "exculpatory no" doctrine is met. United States v Medina De Perez (1986, CA9 Cal) 799 F2d 540.
"Exculpatory 'no' " exception to 18 USCS § 1001 did not apply to statements defendant made to secret service agents,
where defendant was not in custody during interviews with agents, statements made did relate to his claim against government, defendant was not responding to inquiries initiated by government, and his statements did impair basic function
of Treasury Department. United States v Olsowy (1987, CA9 Cal) 819 F2d 930, 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 272, reported at,
amd (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 439, cert den (1988) 485 US 991, 99 L Ed 2d 509, 108 S Ct 1299.
70.--Customs matters
Trial judge properly refused to dismiss indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 under "exculpatory no" doctrine where
false statement was within jurisdiction of Customs Department and was material to legitimate government function.
United States v Grotke (1983, CA2 NY) 702 F2d 49.
Under "exculpatory no" doctrine, government proved that individual who brought $ 200,000 into United States but
stated on form that he was not carrying more than $ 5,000 knew at that time that entering United States with more than $
5,000 is not illegal, where defendant had once before filled out similar form that contained statement that bringing more
than $ 5,000 into United States is not illegal, and where, when discovered, defendant expressed unconcern and demanded
opportunity to fill necessary form. United States v Palzer (1984, CA11 Fla) 745 F2d 1350.
False statement made to customs officials in denial of car ownership was not exculpatory, since statement was made
in context of routine customs interrogation which was administrative rather than investigative. United States v Becker
(1988, CA9 Cal) 855 F2d 644 (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35).
Statement to Customs official that defendant was not transporting more than $ 2200 was not within "exculpatory no"
exception to 18 USCS § 1001, since statement was made in response to pre-arrest noncustodial inquiry in routine "administrative context" by officials monitoring compliance with federal law. United States v Alzate-Restreppo (1989, CA9
Cal) 890 F2d 1061.
"Exculpatory no" exception to 18 USCS § 1001 does not apply, where defendant continued to falsely assert to Customs that he had less than $ 10,000 on his person, since he continued to assert it even after being disabused of any potential
belief that carrying large sum of money was itself illegal. United States v Berisha (1991, CA5 Tex) 925 F2d 791, reh, en
banc, den (1991, CA5 Tex) 930 F2d 914.
"Exculpatory no" exception applied to defendant who originally reported to customs that he carried with him "about $
1000," even though he refused to recant his original misstatement after he was informed of reporting requirement, since he
did not aggressively and deliberately initiate positive or affirmative statement calculated to pervert legitimate functions of
government. United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1993, CA5 Tex) 991 F2d 167, reh, en banc, gr (CA5) 1993 US App LEXIS
16100.
Even if "exculpatory no" doctrine were available in appropriate circumstances, defendant was not entitled to its
benefit, where, in addition to his simple denial that he was transporting regulated items, he stated that his luggage contained some clothing, VCR, and some liquor. United States v Ali (1995, CA2 NY) 68 F3d 1468, on reh, remanded on other
grounds (1996, CA2) 86 F3d 275.
Defendant's negative response to inquiry by Customs agents as to whether he had anything to declare was not exculpatory no question within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001; critical to determination that statement falls within protection
of exculpatory no exception is finding of possible self-incrimination, and defendant's statement was clearly not exculpatory in that no criminal sanctions would have ensued from declaring amount of money. United States v Pereira (1978,
ED NY) 463 F Supp 481.
71.--Tax matters
Defendant was not entitled to "exculpatory no" exception to 18 USCS § 1001, since statements he made to Secret
Service agent regarding fraudulent tax refund claim he filed did relate to his claim, he put into motion chain of events
leading to his questioning by filing claim, and his statements impaired Treasury Department functioning. United States v
Olsowy (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 439, cert den (1988) 485 US 991, 99 L Ed 2d 509, 108 S Ct 1299.
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18 USCS § 1001
"Exculpatory 'no'" exception to 18 USCS § 1001 would not be applicable to defendant who submitted materially false
tax information to IRS, since, unlike mere denial of guilt by suspect, government would be very likely to rely on documents submitted by defendant. United States v Steele (1991, CA6 Ohio) 933 F2d 1313, 67 AFTR 2d 1154, cert den
(1991) 502 US 909, 116 L Ed 2d 246, 112 S Ct 303 and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35)
and (criticized in State v Marshall (1998, Ohio App, Fairfield Co) 1998 Ohio App LEXIS 1319).
Defendant's statements denying preparation of income tax returns went beyond scope of "exculpatory no" exception
to 18 USCS § 1001, since they were not mere denials of guilt but instead formed affirmatively misleading story calculated
to subvert government's investigatory efforts by inculpating another. United States v Moore (1994, CA4 Va) 27 F3d 969,
40 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1302, cert den (1994) 513 US 979, 130 L Ed 2d 367, 115 S Ct 459 and (criticized in United States
v Rutgard (1997, CA9 Cal) 108 F3d 1041, 97 CDOS 1698, 97 Daily Journal DAR 3185).
72.--Miscellaneous
False statement made by defendant, registered pharmacist, in course of inspection conducted by investigators of Drug
Enforcement Agency, who were charged with duty of investigating manner in which defendant was complying with
requirements imposed upon him by law, was type of statement 18 USCS § 1001 was intended to reach as it was related to
claim of declarant to privilege from United States; "exculpatory no" exception to section 1001 was not recognized where
exculpatory denial was given to agents of regulatory agency conducting criminal investigation legitimately within its
purview. United States v Goldfine (1976, CA9 Wash) 538 F2d 815.
"Exculpatory no" doctrine is inapplicable to situation where defendant has affirmatively applied for benefits with
government, makes false statements in order to obtain such benefits, and knows that he was under investigation. United
States v King (1980, CA7 Ill) 613 F2d 670, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 720, 56 ALR Fed 159 (criticized in United States v
LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States
v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35).
Defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 was reversed where agent, acting in police role, aggressively sought
statement from person under suspicion and not warned of investigation whose answer was essentially exculpatory "no" as
to possible criminal activity. United States v Tabor (1986, CA11 Fla) 788 F2d 714 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States
v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5).
Defendant's response to FBI agents' questions regarding purpose of checks he had received did not fall within "exculpatory no" category where his response was not a refusal to respond or a simple "no," since affirmative misrepresentations fall outside that exception. United States v Capo (1986, CA2 NY) 791 F2d 1054, 105 CCH LC P 12023, vacated
on other grounds, in part, on reh, in part, en banc (1987, CA2 NY) 817 F2d 947.
"Exculpatory" doctrine does not apply, in prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, where defendant made false signature
on form consenting to magistrate's jurisdiction, since truthful response would not have incriminated defendant nor exposed him to criminal liability but would have exposed facts relevant to sentencing. United States v Holmes (1988, CA4
Va) 840 F2d 246, cert den (1988) 488 US 831, 102 L Ed 2d 63, 109 S Ct 87 and (criticized in Hubbard v United States
(1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed 2d 779, 115 S Ct 1754, 95 CDOS 3581, 95 Daily Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3).
Defendant's giving of false name to border guard in response to questioning was excluded under "exculpatory no"
exception to 18 USCS § 1001, since defendant could have reasonably believed that giving his true name would have led to
discovery of his prior convictions, and would have furnished link in chain of evidence that could have led to his prosecution and conviction for felony illegal entry. United States v Equihua-Juarez (1988, CA9 Cal) 851 F2d 1222, 102 ALR
Fed 729.
Grape broker's false statement made to BATF inspector in 1989 did not fall within "exculpatory no" exception to 18
USCS § 1001, since it was voluntarily made at meeting arranged by his father rather than in response to government
inquiry. United States v Licciardi (1994, CA9 Cal) 30 F3d 1127, 94 CDOS 5841, 94 Daily Journal DAR 10353, subsequent app (1996, CA9 Cal) 1996 US App LEXIS 24419.
"Exculpatory no" doctrine would not apply to false statements state senator made to FBI agent investigating allegations of corruption in Kentucky legislature, even though two of his false answers were only "no, sir," since as matter of
common sense word "no" is indeed statement, and even though senator's list of gratuities paid to him by lobbyist was not
false in and of itself, since failure to include all expenses paid represented attempt to conceal additional information
required to provide complete, accurate, and truthful response. United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42
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18 USCS § 1001
Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P, reh, en banc, den (1995, CA6 Mich) 1995 US App LEXIS 19703 and cert
den (1996) 516 US 1043, 133 L Ed 2d 657, 116 S Ct 701 and (criticized in United States v Robertson (2003, CA8 ND) 324
F3d 1028).
Judicially-created "exculpatory no" exception to 18 USCS § 1001 does not provide basis for dismissal of indictment
for making false statement to federal agent, where defendant, charged with mailing explosive device with intent to kill,
made false statement during postal inspector's questioning, since first and fourth prong were not met, of Rose-Carrier rule
requiring, for application of "exculpatory no" exception, that (1) defendant have claimed privilege at time of questioning,
(2) false statement not impair functioning of federal agency, (3) questioning involve exercise of routine administrative
responsibility, and (4) truthful response to questioning would not have implicated fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination; moreover, inability of "exculpatory no" doctrine has been called into question by U.S. Supreme Court.
United States v Marusich (1986, SD Cal) 637 F Supp 521.
Charges of false statements are dismissed in prosecution of border patrol agents for assault, where false statements
were limited to denials of guilt, because "exculpatory no" doctrine prohibits indictment (1) if false statement was denial of
guilt by suspect, was unrelated to claim to privilege from government or claim against government, and was in response to
inquiries by federal agency, (2) where truthful answer would have been self-incriminatory, (3) where agency's inquiry was
not part of administrative routine, and (4) if statement did not impair basic function entrusted by law to agency. United
States v Jarvis (1987, SD Cal) 653 F Supp 1396.
Dismissal of indictment is denied in prosecution for making false statements to federal agents where accused contended series of statements made fell under "exculpatory no" exception, because exception applies only to simple negative
answers under circumstances where individual is not aware of being under investigation and not to those statements
involving affirmative discursive falsehoods. United States v Antonucci (1987, ND Ill) 663 F Supp 243.
Denial of motion to dismiss count of indictment charging violation of 18 USCS § 1001 based upon "exculpatory no"
doctrine is proper where count is legally sufficient on its face to charge conspiracy and mail fraud defendant with making
false statements regarding theft of his van and his subsequent insurance claim, since doctrine cannot be applied to positive, affirmative statements calculated to pervert authorized functions of government. United States v Gilpin (1988, ND
Ill) 678 F Supp 1361.
Defendant convicted on mail fraud and conspiracy to defraud insurance company is granted motion to arrest judgment on count charging him with violating 18 USCS § 1001 because "exculpatory denial" doctrine is applicable where (1)
defendant did not initiate interview with special agent, sought no benefit from government, and was not informed that he
was under investigation for insurance fraud, and (2) defendant's response was not attempt to fabricate alternative set of
facts intended to pervert functioning of FBI. United States v Russo (1988, ND Ill) 699 F Supp 1344.
Indictment for making false exculpatory statement to FBI agent was improper under 18 USCS § 1001, where (1)
defendant was not pursuing claim against U.S., (2) agent initiated inquiry that led to statement, (3) FBI's basic functions
were not perverted, (4) statement was made in context of investigation rather routine agency business, and (5) truthful
answer would have incriminated defendant, because "exculpatory no" exception applies. United States v Armstrong
(1989, SD Ind) 715 F Supp 242.
"Exculpatory no" exception, to extent it would even be recognized in Second Circuit, does not afford protection to
indictee charged under 18 USCS § 1001 with falsely stating that he never met or saw target of investigation and was
unaware that his business partner was involved with harboring target, because indictee's responses to FBI agents' questioning consisted of more than simple "no." United States v Distefano (1990, ED NY) 741 F Supp 49.
Accused government witness is not entitled to dismissal of 18 USCS § 1001 false statements charges based on "exculpatory no" doctrine, where Second Circuit embraces narrow version of exception if it embraces doctrine at all, because
government has made it clear that both challenged counts--charging false statements to prosecutors regarding gambling
and representations of skimming of books of toy company--charge more than simple "no" or denial of guilt. United
States v Guariglia (1991, SD NY) 757 F Supp 259.
Fact that telephone call from General Services Administration official to defendant was, from official's perspective,
made in context of investigation rather than in routine course of administrative responsibility fulfilled requirement, for
application of "exculpatory no" doctrine in prosecution for making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001, that statement
have been made in context of investigation, rather than in routine exercise of administrative responsibility. United States v
Raether (1996, DC SD) 940 F Supp 1485, affd (1997, CA8 SD) 1997 US App LEXIS 30165, remanded on other grounds
sub nom United States v Oseby (1998, CA8 SD) 148 F3d 1016, 49 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1135.
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18 USCS § 1001
Reasoning of federal courts regarding doctrine of "exculpatory no" and 18 USCS § 1001 was also applicable to New
Jersey false statement statute; "exculpatory no" answer without affirmative, aggressive, or overt misstatement on part of
defendant does not come within proscriptions of either statute. State v Pandozzi (1975) 136 NJ Super 484, 347 A2d 1.
73. Investigations
Statements made by defendant to federal officers, which statements were allegedly false, while defendant was restricted of his liberty and pressed with questions, answers to which, if true, would have been confessions of guilt, where
purpose of agents was not to obtain information, but to obtain admissions, agents having already reached their decision to
make arrest, did not constitute violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Stoffey (1960, CA7 Ill) 279 F2d 924, 60-2
USTC P 15303, 5 AFTR 2d 2094.
While a US agent was conducting a tax fraud investigation, defendant violated 18 USCS § 1001 by intentionally and
knowingly making false statements that he did not have bank accounts in either of two cities. United States v Ratner
(1972, CA9 Cal) 464 F2d 101, 72-2 USTC P 9526, 30 AFTR 2d 5058.
Statement made by private citizen to FBI falsely pointing to possible criminal conduct that is within power of FBI to
investigate falls within prohibition of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Lambert (1974, CA5 Fla) 501 F2d 943 (ovrld in
part on other grounds by United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040).
A generally negative and exculpatory response made by a subject of a criminal investigation in reply to questions
propounded to him by investigating officers is not a crime under 18 USCS § 1001; however, statute applies to positive
statements which substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by law to a government agency. United States v
Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.
Where hedge fund broker pleaded to charge of making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001 for misleading Securities and Exchange Commission during its investigation of insider trading, Commission properly sanctioned him in
administrative proceedings by permanently barring him from association with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser
under investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 USCS § 80b-3(f), even though he had no prior infractions; sanction was
reasonable in order to protect public. Kornman v SEC (2010, App DC) 592 F3d 173, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 95574.
Claimants seeking recovery of funds lost as part of pyramid scheme had their claims rejected because they made false
statements to investigating agents that made it more difficult to conduct investigation, delayed completion of investigation, enabled defendants to defraud other people, and potentially constituted violations of federal false statement statute,
18 USCS § 1001; thus, claimants were not permitted to change their story merely because it was in their financial interest
to do so. United States v Cabe (2003, DC SC) 311 F Supp 2d 501.
Defendant was found guilty of making false statements under 18 USCS § 1001 to FBI because statements were obviously material to activities or decisions of FBI and defendant knew that statements were not true. United States v
Dongfan Chung (2009, CD Cal) 633 F Supp 2d 1134.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal was properly denied and defendant was properly
convicted of knowingly and willfully making false statements to special agent, violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), because defendant made false statements to agent from Office of Inspector General (OIG) during administrative interview of
defendant on allegations that he had violated Bureau of Prisons' code of conduct by having contact with former inmate,
defendant was aware of code of conduct and that he could be terminated for violating same, and statements were material
as they concerned investigation and had potential to lead it off track; mere fact that OIG might not have relied on false
statements and curtailed, intensified, or changed direction of its investigation was irrelevant to finding of materiality
because to be material, statement only had to have propensity or capacity to influence OIG's actions or decisions. United
States v Silva (2004, CA9 Ariz) 119 Fed Appx 892.
Unpublished: Court rejected defendant's challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for making
false statements to federal officer; defendant told Secret Service agent investigating case that he did not know about
currency in his car, but evidence showing defendant's fingerprints and palm prints on currency provided sufficient basis
for jury to conclude that defendant's denial was false, and jury could have found statement to be material, because defendant's knowledge of currency had capacity to affect government's decision to prosecute. United States v Ocampo
(2007, CA4 NC) 2007 US App LEXIS 6155.
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74. Negative answers
Where city councilman, who received free plumbing services from union in exchange for voting to place union
manager on city plumber's examining board, was convicted of making false statement to FBI agent during investigation of
matter, and where basis for conviction was answer councilman gave in interview that he had not received any improvements to real property from anyone other than his family members, and where question was complicated, and not
straightforward, councilman's one-word answer was sufficient to sustain false statement conviction under 18 USCS §
1001(a)(2) because, although it was complicated question, it was not so confusing and ambiguous that answer could be
found literally true. United States v Martin (2004, CA8 Minn) 369 F3d 1046, 174 BNA LRRM 3261, reh den, reh, en banc,
den (2004, CA8) 2004 US App LEXIS 16638.
Negative answers, even if given under oath, by contractors, to questions asked by FBI agents who were investigating
reports of alleged bribery attempt, as to whether contractors knew of money given to officials of Federal Housing Administration, were not "statements" within 18 USCS § 1001, since these answers were not volunteered to make claim upon
nor induce improper action by government against others nor were they made under legal compulsion, and matter was not
one "within the jurisdiction" of agency. United States v Stark (1955, DC Md) 131 F Supp 190.
Defendant, who while being interviewed informally by agents of FBI as to whether he knew or was named person,
gave untruthful negative answers, did not violate 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Davey (1957, DC NY) 155 F Supp
175.
False oral denial by defendant of suspected source of income made to special agent of IRS investigating and interrogating defendant for possible criminal income tax evasion did not constitute false statement within purview of 18 USCS
§ 1001. United States v Philippe (1959, SD NY) 173 F Supp 582, 59-2 USTC P 9654, 4 AFTR 2d 5365.
Defendant's negative response to Custom agents' inquiry as to whether he had anything to declare was "statement"
within scope of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Pereira (1978, ED NY) 463 F Supp 481.
Where defendant was convicted of crime of brandishing firearm, which was not specifically enumerated as listed
offense on Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) form, defendant's negative response to question 20 of SIDA form
was literally true, and indictment charging violation of 18 USCS § 1001 had to be dismissed. United States v Baer (2003,
ED Va) 274 F Supp 2d 778, affd (2004, CA4 Va) 92 Fed Appx 942.
75. Omissions or leaving blanks
Prosecution for false representation cannot be grounded upon omission of explanation, which omission only carries
with it implication of state of facts which are not true. United States v Diogo (1963, CA2 NY) 320 F2d 898.
If there are facts that should be reported, leaving blank belies certification on front page of application that information therein is true and correct. United States v Irwin (1981, CA10) 654 F2d 671, cert den (1982) 455 US 1016, 72 L
Ed 2d 133, 102 S Ct 1709 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994)
and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Allemand (1994, CA10 Wyo) 34 F3d 923).
76. Oral and/or unsworn statements
18 USCS § 1001 was not intended to embrace oral, unsworn statements, unrelated to any claim of the declarant to a
privilege from the United States or to a claim against the United States, given in response to inquiries initiated by federal
agency or department, except perhaps, where such a statement will substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by
law to that agency. United States v Bedore (1972, CA9 Wash) 455 F2d 1109.
Unsworn responses of defendant, a union's international vice-president, to questions propounded by a NLRB hearing
officer at fact-finding hearing constituted a "statement" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Krause
(1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.
18 USCS § 1001 applies to oral as well as written statements. United States v Massey (1977, CA5 Fla) 550 F2d 300.
18 USCS § 1001 applies to protesters who participate in jurisdictional agency's proceedings, even though statements
are unsworn. Ecee, Inc. v Federal Energy Regulatory Com. (1981, CA5) 645 F2d 339, 69 OGR 343.
18 USCS § 1001 is not overly broad because it punishes unsworn oral statements. United States v Des Jardins
(1985, CA9 Cal) 772 F2d 578.
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18 USCS § 1001
Evidence presented by U.S. was insufficient to allow finder of fact to determine critical underlying historical facts,
and that evidence was insufficient to allow jury reasonably to find that false statements at issue were "material;" thus,
defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 was vacated. United States v Finn (2004, CA10 Colo) 375 F3d 1033.
18 USCS § 1001 is applicable to false but unsworn and untranscribed oral statement made by official of Executive
Branch to Members of Congress acting in their legislative capacity, since there is no "legislative function" exception.
United States v Poindexter (1991, App DC) 292 US App DC 389, 951 F2d 369, 34 Fed Rules Evid Serv 33, cert den (1992)
506 US 1021, 121 L Ed 2d 583, 113 S Ct 656 and (criticized in Hubbard v United States (1995) 514 US 695, 131 L Ed 2d
779, 115 S Ct 1754, 95 CDOS 3581, 95 Daily Journal DAR 6212, 9 FLW Fed S 3).
It was not necessary that false statements be under oath. United States v Dumas (1923, DC NY) 288 F 247.
18 USCS § 1001 may be applied to oral unsworn statements, and defendant need not have initiated investigation.
United States v Clifford (1976, ED NY) 409 F Supp 1070.
77.--Tax matters
False statement made orally and under oath to agents of internal revenue department constituted offenses under 18
USCS § 1001. United States v McCue (1962, CA2 Conn) 301 F2d 452, 9 AFTR 2d 1041, cert den (1962) 370 US 939, 8
L Ed 2d 808, 82 S Ct 1586, reh den (1963) 374 US 858, 10 L Ed 2d 1083, 83 S Ct 1860.
Taxpayer is guilty of making false statement where he orally denies that he maintained bank accounts at certain locations when asked by special agent, although he in fact does maintain such accounts under false names. United States v
Ratner (1972, CA9 Cal) 464 F2d 101, 72-2 USTC P 9526, 30 AFTR 2d 5058.
Oral-conversational responses given in an interview with IRS agents, while not under oath are sufficient to support a
charge of making false statements to IRS agents in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Isaacs (1974, CA7 Ill)
493 F2d 1124, cert den (1974) 417 US 976, 41 L Ed 2d 1146, 94 S Ct 3183, 94 S Ct 3184, reh den (1974) 418 US 955, 41
L Ed 2d 1178, 94 S Ct 3234.
78. Self-incrimination
Dismissal of indictment of gambler who made false statements on returns and registration application filed under §
4412 of Title 26 was not required by privilege against self-incrimination, as validity of government's demand for information is not element of 18 USCS § 1001 which prohibits making of false statements to any federal agency, and gambler
was not indicted for crime about which he had been forced to make incriminating statements. United States v Knox
(1969) 396 US 77, 24 L Ed 2d 275, 90 S Ct 363, 70-1 USTC P 15925, 27 AFTR 2d 1902.
Oral answer of "no" to customs inspector in response to question of whether person was carrying over allowable
amount of money upon reentry into United States constitutes violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where such answer is false and
person was claiming privilege of entry into United States and inspector's question was routine and did not involve possibility of self-incrimination. United States v Carrier (1981, CA9 Idaho) 654 F2d 559.
Defendant's motion for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 was denied because he waived any due process claims
since he never moved to suppress statements made to agency and ethics officers before trial; even if not waived, no prior
warning was required under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) and defendant had clear legal duty to disclose concealed information.
United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 451 F Supp 2d 232.
79. Voluntary statements
Statements for which there can be convictions under 18 USCS § 1001 are not limited to those required to be made by
law or regulation. Neely v United States (1962, CA9 Ariz) 300 F2d 67, 9 AFTR 2d 1046, 93 ALR2d 718, cert den (1962)
369 US 864, 8 L Ed 2d 84, 82 S Ct 1030.
18 USCS § 1001 should not be construed to extend to cases where false statements are made by person not under oath
and not under duty to speak, but should be limited in its application to persons under legal obligation to speak or give
information to representatives of agency or department of United States who have authority to finally dispose of matter
being investigated, and to cases where keeping of records or filing of documents are required or permitted by law. United
States v Levin (1953, DC Colo) 133 F Supp 88.
There is no necessity under 18 USCS § 1001 that "statements or representations" be made while under legal obligation to speak, where indictment charged that defendant violated § 1001 when he stated to assistant United States attorney
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18 USCS § 1001
that certain person had stolen two checks from him and that by means of forgery had cashed same, knowing at time he
made this statement that it was untrue. United States v Van Valkenburg (1958, DC Alaska) 17 Alaska 450, 157 F Supp
599.
18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to statements given to FBI voluntarily and without oath or to verbatim transcription
during interview initiated by FBI in course of criminal investigation. United States v Ehrlichman (1974, DC Dist Col)
379 F Supp 291.
18 USCS § 1001 is not applicable only to false statements initiated by persons affirmatively seeking to obtain some
benefit from government, and is applicable to false statements made to FBI agents. United States v Mitchell (1974, DC
Dist Col) 397 F Supp 166, affd, en banc (1976, App DC) 181 US App DC 254, 559 F2d 31, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1203,
cert den (1977) 431 US 933, 53 L Ed 2d 250, 97 S Ct 2641, reh den (1977) 433 US 916, 53 L Ed 2d 1103, 97 S Ct 2992.
Circumstances under which allegedly false statements were made may govern invocation of 18 USCS § 1001, so that
it was questionable whether reports of certain interviews not conducted under oath, which were voluntarily agreed to and
of which no verbatim transcript was made by interviewer, could form basis of conviction under § 1001. United States v
International Business Machines Corp. (1976, SD NY) 415 F Supp 668, 1976-2 CCH Trade Cases P 61170.
18 USCS § 1001 is not limited to statements required by law or regulation. United States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD
NY) 465 F Supp 1120.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for making false statement to government official, based on defendant's letter to Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), because (1) statement in that letter that defendant had lost letter from OFAC to which defendant was responding did not show Government did not prove defendant
acted knowingly and wilfully in making false statement as Government introduced letter to which defendant was responding, which had been discovered in file cabinets in defendant's storage space, and, (2) even if jury believed letter was
lost, record contained evidence from which reasonable factfinder could find defendant knew of relevant regulations, that
defendant went to great lengths to disguise defendant's violations of regulations, and that this was another example of that
behavior. United States v Amirnazmi (2009, ED Pa) 2009 US Dist LEXIS 74833.
80. Miscellaneous
18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to defendant's giving a false name to FBI agent because defendant's response was not
within the class of false statements that this section was designed to proscribe. United States v Bedore (1972, CA9 Wash)
455 F2d 1109.
An affidavit may be a "statement" within the meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Protch (1973, CA3 Pa)
481 F2d 647, 73-2 USTC P 9580, 32 AFTR 2d 5388.
Defendant did not commit concealment of material fact of ownership of car for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, where
he had transferred legal ownership to his girlfriend prior to completion of financial statement pertaining to his sentencing
on drug offenses, despite argument that transfer was sham. United States v Gahagan (1989, CA6 Mich) 881 F2d 1380.
Sufficient evidence supported conviction of healthcare manager for use of false document under 18 USCS §
1001(a)(3); Medicare cost report prepared under manager's direction contained false statement than healthcare facility
under his control had no "related party" costs. United States v White (2007, CA6 Ohio) 492 F3d 380, 73 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 919, 2007 FED App 215P, reh den (2007, CA6) 2007 US App LEXIS 16858.
When defendant in criminal proceeding made false statement to probation officer during defendant's presentence
interview rather than to judge directly, exemption from criminal liability in 18 USCS ' 1001(b)for false statements submitted to judge by party to judicial proceeding applied to defendant because probation officer was required by law to
include such statement in presentence report and to submit presentence report to judge. United States v Horvath (2007,
CA9 Mont) 492 F3d 1075.
Defendant's statement to probation officer that omitted mention of his $ 40,000 401(k) retirement account was
prosecutable offense under 18 USCS § 1001(a) and was not excepted under judicial function exception of 18 USCS §
1001(b) because probation officer "picked and chose" what to include and exclude in presentence report, based on his
understanding of what was expected of him and what he believed was important for court and parties to know, and thus,
process involved probation officer's exercise of his discretion, and not mere transmission of information; to hold de-
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18 USCS § 1001
fendant's false statement to probation officer within ambit of 18 USCS § 1001(a) also supported Congressional intent
because Congress did not intend to allow defendants to avoid restitution obligations through lies or misrepresentations
made to probation officer; moreover, procedure for issuance of restitution order indicated that Congress intended to
include all of defendant's assets in restitution calculation under 18 USCS § 3664(d)(3). United States v Manning (2008,
CA10 Okla) 526 F3d 611.
18 USCS § 1001 is aimed at supplying inaccurate copy of originally filed tax return or supplying of false statements
about sources of income or extent of deductible expenses but does not apply where taxpayer supplied IRS agent with true
copy of tax return, which tax return understated his income. United States v Gripentrog (1977, WD Wis) 77-2 USTC P
9629, 40 AFTR 2d 5537.
Where defendant attorney agreed to abide by special administrative measures (SAMs) governing her client's confinement and signed May Affirmation few days before she visited client in prison, and violated SAMs when she allowed
client to dictate letters to interpreter about client's decision to withdraw his support for Middle East cease-fire, attorney's
knowingly false promise, which was knowingly false statement of present intent, was false statement within meaning of
18 USCS § 1001. United States v Sattar (2003, SD NY) 272 F Supp 2d 348, motions ruled upon (2003, SD NY) 2003 US
Dist LEXIS 16164, motion den, request den (2003, SD NY) 2003 US Dist LEXIS 19770.
Former employee's wrongful discharge claim, which was premised on public policy exception to at-will employment
doctrine that existed for employees who refused to perform illegal act, failed because even if employer asked employee to
"smooth over" order, there was no evidence that this act, which was calculated to spread employee's commission over
period of months, violated any law, including 18 USCS § 1001. Hess v Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc. (2007, ED Mo) 503 F Supp
2d 1178.
Charges on invoice or other form of billing document constitutes "statement" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001.
Holmes v General Dynamics Corp. (1993, 4th Dist) 17 Cal App 4th 1418, 22 Cal Rptr 2d 172, 93 CDOS 6236, 93 Daily
Journal DAR 10701, 8 BNA IER Cas 1249.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Evidence was sufficient to affirm defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 because there was
evidence that defendant failed to accurately describe trust assets as his own and that defendant knew he was making false
statements. United States v Trupin (2005, CA2 NY) 119 Fed Appx 323.
Unpublished: Because false statement charge against defendant, predicated on lease, was legally sufficient because
lease was "statement" under 18 USCS § 1001(a), factual misrepresentations contained therein (notably, that deposit was
given when it was not, and back-dated execution date) qualified it as "false," and Government submitted ample proof as to
other elements of charged offense, district court properly denied defendant's Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion. United States v
Serag (2006, CA4 Va) 2006 US App LEXIS 13357.
E.Materiality
1.In General 81. Generally
Materiality is essential element of crime of making false statement. Paritem Singh Poonian v United States (1961,
CA9 Cal) 294 F2d 74, 61-2 USTC P 9647, 8 AFTR 2d 5400.
Materiality must be demonstrated for conviction pursuant to 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Deep (1974, CA9
Cal) 497 F2d 1316.
An essential element of offense of making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement proscribed by 18 USCS § 1001 is
that such statement relate to a material fact. United States v Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.
Materiality is essential element of every 18 USCS § 1001 violation. United States v McGough (1975, CA5 Fla) 510
F2d 598.
"Trick, scheme, or device" language of first clause of 18 USCS § 1001 implies requirement of affirmative act by
which means material fact is concealed. United States v London (1977, CA5 Ga) 550 F2d 206.
For statement to be "material" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, statement or act need not violate another statute.
United States v Masters (1979, CA9 Cal) 612 F2d 1117, cert den (1980) 449 US 847, 66 L Ed 2d 57, 101 S Ct 134.
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18 USCS § 1001
Issue of materiality may be intermixed with whether matter was within jurisdiction of agency. United States v Wolf
(1981, CA10 Okla) 645 F2d 23.
False statements made to conceal fraud are no less material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 than false statements
designed to induce fraud. United States v Brack (1984, CA7 Ill) 747 F2d 1142, cert den (1985) 469 US 1216, 84 L Ed 2d
339, 105 S Ct 1193.
Materiality is element of 18 USCS § 1001 and applies to all clauses within statute. United States v Gaudin (1994, CA9
Mont) 28 F3d 943, 94 CDOS 4632, 94 Daily Journal DAR 8593, affd (1995) 515 US 506, 132 L Ed 2d 444, 115 S Ct 2310,
95 CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v Copus (1997, CA10 Okla)
110 F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).
In order to establish violation of 18 USCS § 1001, which proscribes making of any false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement, or making or use of any false writing or document in matter within jurisdiction of any department or agency of
United States, materiality of representation must be established. United States v Dozier (1958) 9 USCMA 443, 26 CMR
223.
82. Tendency to influence, or capacity to affect or influence, governmental function as test to determine
materiality
Concerning meaning of word "material" as used in 18 USCS § 1001, test is not whether instrument actually influenced or caused department or agency of United States to act, but rather whether false statement had natural tendency to
influence, or was capable of influencing, decision of tribunal making determination required to be made. Robles v
United States (1960, CA9 Ariz) 279 F2d 401, cert den (1961) 365 US 836, 5 L Ed 2d 745, 81 S Ct 750, reh den (1961) 365
US 890, 6 L Ed 2d 201, 81 S Ct 1032.
In determining whether a false statement is material, test is whether it has a natural tendency to influence, or was
capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made. United States v
Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.
In context of 18 USCS § 1001, materiality means that false statement must have natural tendency to influence, or be
capable of affecting or influencing, government function, but such statement need not have actually influenced action of
government agency. United States v McGough (1975, CA5 Fla) 510 F2d 598.
Test to determine materiality of false statement for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 is whether statement has natural
tendency to influence decision of tribunal which makes decision. United States v Di Fonzo (1979, CA7 Ill) 603 F2d
1260, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96957, cert den (1980) 444 US 1018, 62 L Ed 2d 648, 100 S Ct 672.
Materially false statement for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 is one capable of influencing exercise of government
function; fact that government is not actually influenced by statement is of no significance. United States v Lichenstein
(1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.
Although false statements chargeable under 18 USCS § 1001 are often calculated to procure benefit or monetary
payment, test of materiality is not capability of false statement to induce payment or benefits; statement may be material
where no payments are at issue but where false statement is made in hope of influencing pending investigation. United
States v Cowden (1982, CA8 Minn) 677 F2d 417.
Materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is tested by whether false statements could have affected or influenced exercise of
governmental function; test is intrinsic capabilities of false statement itself, rather than possibility of actual attainment of
its end as measured by collateral circumstances. United States v Salinas-Ceron (1984, CA9 Cal) 731 F2d 1375, vacated
on other grounds, remanded (1985, CA9 Cal) 755 F2d 726.
There is no requirement under 18 USCS § 1001 that false statement influence decision making process of department
of United States government. United States v Norris (1984, CA4 Va) 749 F2d 1116, cert den (1985) 471 US 1065, 85 L
Ed 2d 496, 105 S Ct 2139 and (criticized in United States ex rel. Berge v Bd. of Trustees (1997, CA4 Md) 104 F3d 1453, 41
USPQ2d 1481).
Test for materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is not whether false statement actually influenced government function,
but whether it had capacity to influence government function. United States v Alemany Rivera (1985, CA1 Puerto Rico)
781 F2d 229, cert den (1986) 475 US 1086, 89 L Ed 2d 725, 106 S Ct 1469.
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18 USCS § 1001
Test for materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is whether false statement has tendency to influence or is capable of influencing federal agency. United States v Brantley (1986, CA7 Ill) 786 F2d 1322, 20 Fed Rules Evid Serv 302, cert den
(1986) 477 US 908, 91 L Ed 2d 572, 106 S Ct 3284 and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Pearson (1995,
CD Ill) 897 F Supp 1147) and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
Statement is material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 if it has natural tendency to influence or be capable of affecting
or influencing, governmental function; to be material, statements need not have exerted actual influence, so long as it had
capacity to do so. United States v Van Horn (1986, CA11 Fla) 789 F2d 1492, 20 Fed Rules Evid Serv 431, cert den
(1986) 479 US 854, 93 L Ed 2d 123, 107 S Ct 190 and cert den (1986) 479 US 855, 93 L Ed 2d 124, 107 S Ct 192 and cert
den (1986) 479 US 886, 93 L Ed 2d 255, 107 S Ct 279.
A false document was material if it has natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, official decision;
materiality is question of law. United States v Gregg (1987, CA8 Mo) 829 F2d 1430, 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1170, cert
den (1988) 486 US 1022, 100 L Ed 2d 226, 108 S Ct 1994.
For false statement to be "material" for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 it does not have to actually influence investigator
or decisionmaking body, but rather it is sufficient if statement at issue is of type that is capable of influencing reasonable
investigator or decisionmaker; standard is not whether there had been actual influence on investigator or decisionmaker,
as result of false statement having been made, but whether statement or omission would have tendency to influence
reasonable investigator or decisionmaker. United States v McBane (2005, CA3 Pa) 433 F3d 344.
Evidence supporting defendant's conviction on false statements charges was sufficient to establish materiality and
intent elements of charged offense where defendant's statement that he and co-defendant were only parties involved in
charged fraud was capable of distracting federal investigators' attention away from third person involved in fraud and thus
could be considered material; further, defendant's intent could be not be refuted by fact he later recanted to investigators.
United States v Stewart (2006, CA2 NY) 433 F3d 273.
Assuming arguendo witness was qualified to testify as expert, his proposed testimony presented erroneous understanding of 18 USCS § 1001's materiality element; to prove materiality, government needed to show only false statements
were capable of influencing Office of Comptroller of Currency's (OCC) decision; government was not required to prove
false statements actually succeeded in influencing OCC, or influenced that decision within any specific period of time.
United States v Wintermute (2006, CA8 Mo) 443 F3d 993.
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of making false statements to FBI in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 because while defendant's statements probably had very little actual influence on agents in light of information they already
had from incriminating recorded conversations, defendant's statements were aimed at misdirecting agents, and this was
enough to satisfy materiality requirement of § 1001. United States v Turner (2008, CA7 Ill) 551 F3d 657.
Test for materiality of an allegedly false statement under 18 USCS § 1001 is whether statement has natural tendency
to influence or be capable of influencing federal agency, not whether it, in fact, did so influence it. United States v
Clearfield (1973, ED Pa) 358 F Supp 564.
Materiality of statement is established as statements are proven to be capable of influencing or affecting governmental function. United States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F Supp 1120.
In case in which defendant moved for judgment of acquittal as to his conviction under Count Two of superseding
indictment, which alleged violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) and (a)(2), he argued unsuccessfully that false statement
made in request for ethics opinion could not be material as matter of law; his argument that General Services Administration's ethics officer's opinion was immaterial because it was purely advisory and hence not decision was flawed; in
any event, jury was instructed that statement, representation or fact was material not only if it had effect of influencing
particular decision of ethics officer, but also if it had effect of influencing actions or activities of agency or was capable of,
or had potential to do so. United States v Safavian (2009, DC Dist Col) 644 F Supp 2d 1.
In case in which defendant moved for judgment of acquittal as to his conviction under Count Five of superseding
indictment, which alleged violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), he argued unsuccessfully that false statement he made to
FBI agent could not have influenced agent because agent already knew, from reading certain e-mails and other background material, that statement was inaccurate at time defendant uttered it; that argument incorrectly narrowed scope of
materiality inquiry, and even assuming that only agent's decisions about whether defendant was able to help lobbyist and
whether defendant was speaking truthfully to agent about his ability to help lobbyist in that context, and further assuming
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18 USCS § 1001
that agent's views on those matters were not influenced by defendant's statement, reasonable jury still could find defendant's statement to be material. United States v Safavian (2009, DC Dist Col) 644 F Supp 2d 1.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Record demonstrated that defendant made one or more false statements to FBI during its investigation;
although his false statements apparently did not impede FBI's investigation, they could have affected FBI's decision to
continue investigation or prosecution of matter, so false statements were material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United
States v Richey (2008, CA11 Ala) 2008 US App LEXIS 11503.
Unpublished: Defendant was entitled to reversal of her conviction for making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001
because government did not establish that allegedly false statement, which was that car defendant was driving belonged to
her boyfriend, was material; evidence demonstrated only materiality of question of car ownership, and defendant admitted
that she did not own car; there was no evidence to show that defendant's statement had or could have had any bearing once
agents in question knew car did not belong to her. United States v Cuevas (2008, CA9 Cal) 2008 US App LEXIS 15337.
Unpublished: Jury could have found that defendant's false statements were material for purposes of 18 USCS §
1001(a)(2), as they were of type capable of influencing reasonable decision maker investigating scope of conspiracy and
degree of responsibility of persons who may have been involved. United States v Silman (2008, CA3 Pa) 2008 US App
LEXIS 16029.
83. Damage, injury or loss to government
It was unnecessary to show either that government lost money or that it was deceived. United States v Presser
(1938, CA2 NY) 99 F2d 819.
Loss or damage to government is not essential ingredient of those crimes proscribed by 18 USCS § 1001. Morgan v
United States (1962, CA9 Ariz) 301 F2d 272.
Whether or not the government was deceived, or suffered monetary loss because of the acts charged in the indictment,
is immaterial. United States v Jones (1972, CA8 Ark) 464 F2d 1118, cert den (1973) 409 US 1111, 34 L Ed 2d 692, 93 S
Ct 920.
Perversion of governmental body's function is hallmark of 18 USCS § 1001 offense. United States v Lambert (1974,
CA5 Fla) 501 F2d 943 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994, CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040).
18 USCS § 1001 applies to positive statements which substantially impair basic functions entrusted by law to government agency. United States v Krause (1975, CA5 Fla) 507 F2d 113, 88 BNA LRRM 2856.
Letter and fabricating estimate sent to government agency in connection with application for rent increase in government financed housing were material in deception in that they had capacity to influence determination which was to be
made. United States v Guthartz (1978, CA5 Fla) 573 F2d 225, reh den (1978, CA5 Fla) 576 F2d 931 and cert den (1978)
439 US 864, 58 L Ed 2d 173, 99 S Ct 187.
Government need not prove pecuniary loss in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 since false statement is
merely required to have capacity to impair or pervert functioning of governmental agency. United States v Lichenstein
(1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, government need not prove that false statements or misrepresentations were actually relied upon or that government suffered financial loss. United States v Hicks (1980, CA8 SD) 619
F2d 752 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
84. Reliance
It was unnecessary to show either that government lost money or that it was deceived. United States v Presser
(1938, CA2 NY) 99 F2d 819.
Submission to Veterans Administration of fraudulent application for home loan guaranty of insurance calculated to
induce agency reliance constitutes falsification of material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 even though favorable
agency action was for other reasons impossible. United States v Quirk (1959, CA3 Pa) 266 F2d 26.
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18 USCS § 1001
Fact that government did not rely upon false statement of defendant, but instead obtained evidence as to defendant's
criminal record from the police department, does not exclude defendant's violation from operation of 18 USCS § 1001.
Blake v United States (1963, CA8 Mo) 323 F2d 245.
Whether or not the government was deceived, or suffered monetary loss because of the acts charged in the indictment,
is immaterial. United States v Jones (1972, CA8 Ark) 464 F2d 1118, cert den (1973) 409 US 1111, 34 L Ed 2d 692, 93 S
Ct 920.
Defendant, who gave false answer during course of investigation by Drug Enforcement Agency, was properly convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001 even though investigators knew answer was not true when given since answer was
calculated to induce agency reliance; court will look to intrinsic capabilities of false statement itself, rather than possibility
of actual attainment of its end as measured by collateral circumstances. United States v Goldfine (1976, CA9 Wash) 538
F2d 815.
Materiality is essential element of violation of 18 USCS § 1001, although proof of actual reliance is not required;
however, government bears burden of proving that statement is capable of influencing agency action. United States v
Talkington (1978, CA9 Cal) 589 F2d 415.
Test for determining materiality of false statement within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001 is whether falsehood is calculated to induce reliance by United States agency; government has burden of proving that false statement had intrinsic
capacity to influence agency decisions. United States v Valdez (1979, CA9 Cal) 594 F2d 725.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, government need not prove that false statements or misrepresentations were actually relied upon or that government suffered financial loss. United States v Hicks (1980, CA8 SD) 619
F2d 752 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
Statement may be material even though Government does not actually rely on it. United States v McIntosh (1981,
CA5 Miss) 655 F2d 80, reh den (1981, CA5 Miss) 660 F2d 497 and cert den (1982) 455 US 948, 71 L Ed 2d 662, 102 S Ct
1450.
Proof of agency's actual reliance on statement is not necessary to sustain conviction under 18 USCS § 1001. United
States v Cowden (1982, CA8 Minn) 677 F2d 417.
It is not certain under 18 USCS § 1001 that statement must be a material one and it is accepted § 1001 lore that reliance upon statement by Government need not be shown, but while statute is thus formidable in its scope and severity it
must in each instance of its application derive substance of its prohibition from circumstances in which statement is used.
United States v Gomez-Londono (1976, ED NY) 422 F Supp 519, revd on other grounds (1977, CA2 NY) 553 F2d 805 and
affd without op (1978, CA2 NY) 580 F2d 1046.
Even if materiality were required element of violation of 18 USCS § 1001, defendant's statement was material in that
his response carried potential of inducing agency reliance and of perverting legitimate function of agency. United States
v Pereira (1978, ED NY) 463 F Supp 481.
2.Particular Cases 85. Assistance and grant programs
Defendant conceals material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where he induces certain veterans to lend him use of
their name so he can buy property at price available only to veterans. Ehrlich v United States (1956, CA5 Ga) 238 F2d
481.
Manager of cattle-feeding operation committed material falsehood in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by altering existing lease between cattle-feeding operation and trucking firm so it appeared that lessee cattle-feeding operation was
taking all risks involved in order to obtain preferred payment rate under Hay Transportation Assistance Program. United
States v Voorhees (1979, CA8 SD) 593 F2d 346, 49 ALR Fed 614, cert den (1979) 441 US 936, 60 L Ed 2d 665, 99 S Ct
2061.
Submission of false timesheets to Housing Authority of Dallas is material despite fact that Authority received grant
from United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to fund project which employed defendants before
submission of false sheets; performance of program is hindered when funds are spent for work that is not done and
quarterly reports required by Department of Housing and Urban Development show that federal agency has ultimate
authority to see that funds are properly spent. United States v Baker (1980, CA5 Tex) 626 F2d 512 (criticized in United
States v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953).
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18 USCS § 1001
False statements by employees regarding their employment status, made at order of employer so that he could obtain
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act funds from non-profit organization for on-the-job training were material
under 18 USCS § 1001 since they were capable of influencing federal agency responsible for proper disbursement of
federal funds. United States v Brantley (1986, CA7 Ill) 786 F2d 1322, 20 Fed Rules Evid Serv 302, cert den (1986) 477
US 908, 91 L Ed 2d 572, 106 S Ct 3284 and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in United States v Pearson (1995, CD Ill)
897 F Supp 1147) and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
Falsified signatures of purported beneficiaries of HUD community grant monies were material misstatements under
18 USCS § 1001, even though their production was not required by HUD, since § 1001 prohibits false statements generally; signatures were material even though they had no actual effect on HUD, since they were "capable" of affecting or
influencing HUD's actions, and since statements were made in hope of influencing pending investigation. United States
v Corsino (1987, CA1 Puerto Rico) 812 F2d 26 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P
50163).
Selling of rice from commercial mills by rice growers association to Commodity Credit Corporation under rice price
support program does not constitute concealment of material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where fact that rice was
commercially milled does not affect its eligibility for purchase. United States v Rice Growers Asso. (1953, DC Cal) 110
F Supp 667.
86. Criminal record concealment
Corporation physicist concealed material fact in filling out personal questionnaire required for security clearance for
work corporation was engaged in with Atomic Energy Commission where he stated that he had never been arrested when
in fact he had been convicted of at least two felonies. Pitts v United States (1959, CA9 Cal) 263 F2d 353, cert den (1959)
360 US 935, 3 L Ed 2d 1547, 79 S Ct 1457, reh den (1959) 361 US 857, 4 L Ed 2d 97, 80 S Ct 47.
Defendant who plead guilty to charge of aggravated robbery falsified material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by
answering "no" to question on Post Office Department application for temporary employment as to whether he had ever
been arrested, charged, or held for a violation of any federal, state, county, or municipal law. Juan Alire v United States
(1962, CA10 Colo) 313 F2d 31, cert den (1963) 373 US 943, 10 L Ed 2d 699, 83 S Ct 1554.
Evidence was sufficient that contractor's false statement on HUD form, that he was not convicted felon, was material,
even though convicted felon may still be awarded contracts, since his misrepresentation deprived HUD of opportunity to
determine, based upon all relevant information, which bidder was best qualified to complete job. United States v Puente
(1993, CA5 Tex) 982 F2d 156, 38 CCF P 76533, cert den (1993) 508 US 962, 124 L Ed 2d 684, 113 S Ct 2934.
District court erred in dismissing two indictments under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) for making materially false statements
on applications for secure identification display area (SIDA) badges, as defendants' failure to disclose convictions for
misdemeanor firearms offenses was material. United States v Baer (2003, CA4 Va) 324 F3d 282, dismd (2003, ED Va)
274 F Supp 2d 778, affd (2004, CA4 Va) 92 Fed Appx 942.
87. Customs matters
Defendants' use of fictitious names in response to questions posed by Customs Officials on airline tickets, notarized
affidavits of residency, and other documents is falsification of material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where defendants were found to have concealed marijuana in their luggage. United States v Parten (1972, CA5 Tex) 462 F2d 430,
cert den (1972) 409 US 983, 34 L Ed 2d 248, 93 S Ct 325.
False statement made by defendant to border agent at border crossing that he had only two cameras when in fact there
were other dutiable items carried by him in suitcase, was material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, even though his
statement was oral, unsworn and unrelated to any monetary claim against United States, since declarant was claiming
privilege of entry, and his statement potentially impaired function of customs service. United States v Rose (1978, CA9
Wash) 570 F2d 1358 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494,
1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35) and (criticized in United States
v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5) and (criticized in United States v Huber (2002, DC ND) 2002 US
Dist LEXIS 306).
Response of "no" to customs inquiry of whether person was bringing over $ 5,000 into United States is material
within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Duncan (1982, CA9 Cal) 693 F2d 971, 12 Fed Rules Evid Serv 82,
cert den (1983) 461 US 961, 77 L Ed 2d 1321, 103 S Ct 2436.
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18 USCS § 1001
Defendant's 2 false denials to customs officials that he had anything to declare were material, despite fact that second,
identical, denial, was immediately corrected by true oral statement, since true statement was only made once he was
confronted with imminent inspection of his vehicle. United States v Salas-Camacho (1988, CA9 Cal) 859 F2d 788, 111
ALR Fed 779.
Car importer concealed material fact from customs, where he imported cars which required conversion work, but
obtained one-time personal use exemptions from EPA for them by listing others, who had no legal or financial interest in
vehicles as importers. United States v Gardner (1990, CA5 La) 894 F2d 708, 31 Envt Rep Cas 1036, reh den (1990,
CA5) 1990 US App LEXIS 3673.
88.--Export declarations
False statement included by defendant in shipper's export declaration as means of receiving Department of Commerce permission to export particular electron tube is material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001 where export license
would have been denied had accurate statement been made. United States v Sorkin (1960, CA2 NY) 275 F2d 330, cert
den (1960) 362 US 989, 4 L Ed 2d 1022, 80 S Ct 1077.
Undervaluation of items being exported was material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, where it was stratagem designed to facilitate scheme to get items out of country, despite fact that there was no pecuniary loss to Government, since
false document had natural tendency to influence official decision. United States v Gregg (1987, CA8 Mo) 829 F2d
1430, 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1170, cert den (1988) 486 US 1022, 100 L Ed 2d 226, 108 S Ct 1994.
Shipping export declarations were material to function of United States Customs Service in prosecution under 18
USCS § 1001, since Customs Service routinely utilizes information contained in them to carry out its functions of monitoring types, amounts, and destination of goods exported from United States. United States v Gafyczk (1988, CA11 Fla)
847 F2d 685.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain false-statement convictions under 18 USCS § 1001 regarding shipper export
declarations because there was evidence that defendant either signed declarations himself or had freight forwarder sign
them on his behalf, using false values provided by defendant, and misstatements were material in that they impaired
government's ability to identify shipments that might have been in violation of export regulations. United States v Ihsan
Elashyi (2008, CA5 Tex) 554 F3d 480.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Court of appeals reversed defendant's convictions for willfully failing to file report declaring that he
was carrying more than $ 10,000 when he attempted to enter Mexico, in violation of 31 USCS § 5316, smuggling more
than $ 10,000 into Mexico, in violation of 31 USCS § 5332, and knowingly and willfully making false statement to
government agent, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, because there was no evidence defendant knew he had to combine
amounts he and his wife were carrying at time he was asked to make binding declaration at border, that he attempted to
smuggle more than $ 10,000 into Mexico, or that his statement that he was carrying $ 7,000, although false, either influenced or was capable of influencing decisions customs agents made. United States v Beltran (2005, CA9 Ariz) 136 Fed
Appx 59.
89. Government contracts and contractors
Manufacturer of plexiglass cockpit canopies concealed material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by transferring
approval stamps from approved canopies to canopies that were not approved by prime contractor and United States Navy.
United States v Steiner Plastics Mfg. Co. (1956, CA2 NY) 231 F2d 149.
Executive director of redevelopment authority concealed material fact by falsely denying that he had private interest
in two contracts between authority and architectural firm of which he was undisclosed partner since such conflict of
interest violated federal agency regulations. United States v Kenny (1956, CA3 NJ) 236 F2d 128, cert den (1956) 352 US
894, 1 L Ed 2d 87, 77 S Ct 133.
Although concessionaire paid United States sum equal to 25 per cent of his gross receipts, as provided in contract,
statements rendered to United States understating his net profits were material. Brethauer v United States (1964, CA8
Mo) 333 F2d 302.
House builder falsified material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by signing form authorized by FHA stating that
he had paid in full for all materials and labor owed on construction of house when in fact he owed bills totaling ap-
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18 USCS § 1001
proximately $ 200 since FHA made unrestricted payment to house builder of balance due on contract on false assumption
that all bills had been paid. United States v Trull (1978, CA5 Miss) 581 F2d 551.
Defendant's certification that grain warehouse's inventories as reflected in its records were actually on hand as required by contract between elevator association of which defendant was general manager and Commodity Credit Corporation, constituted material falsification under 18 USCS § 1001 despite fact that company had sufficient stock of grain
on hand at various storage facilities. United States v Gilbertson (1978, CA8 Minn) 588 F2d 584.
It was material that housing contractor, who leased property to city housing authority which had annual contributions
contract with U.S. HUD, presented false documents concerning restoration expenses in deposition, since false documents
had capacity to influence amount of money which contractor received from U.S. HUD through housing authority, had
their falseness not been discovered. United States v Lawson (1987, CA11 Fla) 809 F2d 1514, reh den, en banc (1987,
CA11 Fla) 815 F2d 717.
90. Government employees
Fictitious receipts of expenses allegedly incurred by civilian employee of United States Air Force while transferring
to new duty station constitute falsification of material facts under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v East (1969, CA9
Mont) 416 F2d 351.
False statements which employees of county water district made in county plant's monthly report to state water
agency regarding drinking water turbidity levels were material to matter within jurisdiction of Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), since statements had capacity to affect Agency's administrative enforcement of drinking water regulations
and influenced course of investigation which could yet result in agency enforcement action. United States v White (2001,
CA6 Ky) 270 F3d 356, 53 Envt Rep Cas 1946, 32 ELR 20298.
False statement in letter written by United States Department of Agriculture employee under investigation by agency
of Department of Agriculture to effect that employee did not own any part of particular warehouse is material to proper
exercise of jurisdiction of Department and choice of personnel to administer and exercise such jurisdiction. United
States v Cowart (1954, DC Dist Col) 118 F Supp 903.
91. Housing matters
House builder falsified material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by signing form authorized by FHA stating that
he had paid in full for all materials and labor owed on construction of house when in fact he owed bills totaling approximately $ 200 since FHA made unrestricted payment to house builder of balance due on contract on false assumption
that all bills had been paid. United States v Trull (1978, CA5 Miss) 581 F2d 551.
Submission of false timesheets to Housing Authority of Dallas is material despite fact that Authority received grant
from United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to fund project which employed defendants before
submission of false sheets; performance of program is hindered when funds are spent for work that is not done and
quarterly reports required by Department of Housing and Urban Development show that federal agency has ultimate
authority to see that funds are properly spent. United States v Baker (1980, CA5 Tex) 626 F2d 512 (criticized in United
States v Blankenship (2004, CA11 Fla) 382 F3d 1110, 17 FLW Fed C 953).
It was material that housing contractor, who leased property to city housing authority which had annual contributions
contract with U.S. HUD, presented false documents concerning restoration expenses in deposition, since false documents
had capacity to influence amount of money which contractor received from U.S. HUD through housing authority, had
their falseness not been discovered. United States v Lawson (1987, CA11 Fla) 809 F2d 1514, reh den, en banc (1987,
CA11 Fla) 815 F2d 717.
Falsified signatures of purported beneficiaries of HUD community grant monies were material misstatements under
18 USCS § 1001, even though their production was not required by HUD, since § 1001 prohibits false statements generally; signatures were material even though they had no actual effect on HUD, since they were "capable" of affecting or
influencing HUD's actions, and since statements were made in hope of influencing pending investigation. United States
v Corsino (1987, CA1 Puerto Rico) 812 F2d 26 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P
50163).
In prosecution of developer under 18 USCS § 1001 for conspiracy to defraud Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) by submitting fictitious billings for work not performed, submission of documents used to cover up
fraud was material, despite lack of reliance thereon by HUD, since documents served to make payments appear legitimate
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18 USCS § 1001
and therefore had capability of influencing HUD. United States v Campbell (1988, CA8 Mo) 848 F2d 846, 25 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 742.
Defendants' convictions under 18 USCS §§ 1001, 2, and 371 were affirmed because under given instruction, jury was
required to find that false statement could have actually resulted in change in position by Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) and there was sufficient evidence that fraudulent gift letters regarding source of down
payment for home buyers were material to HUD because if source of downpayments were known Federal Housing Administration it would not have insured defaulted mortgages. United States v Peterson (2008, CA9 Cal) 538 F3d 1064.
Housing authority executive director is acquitted of one count of making false statement, even though he was
properly found guilty of numerous other counts relating to bribery scheme, where he signed annually required Public
Housing Management Assessment Program Certification stating that 100 percent of units inspected met housing quality
standards when in fact they did not, because it was not realistic to expect there would not be some problem with some unit
somewhere at any given time, director relied on staff and computer system that was malfunctioning at time, and ministerial signing of form did not constitute materially false statement as matter of law. United States v Evans (2001, MD Fla)
149 F Supp 2d 1331, 14 FLW Fed D 425.
92. Immigration, naturalization and citizenship
Defendant makes material false representation in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where as witness in naturalization
proceedings of his wife he conceals his true name and states falsely that he is United States citizen. Dear Wing Jung v
United States (1962, CA9 Cal) 312 F2d 73.
Concealment of fact that certain aliens had contracted to marry American citizens solely to obtain immigrant visas is
material under 18 USCS § 1001 since immigrant visas are available only to aliens whose marriages to Americans are bona
fide. United States v Bernard (1967, CA2 NY) 384 F2d 915.
Letters containing fictitious offers of employment were "material" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001 where aliens
submitted offer of employment from United States employer to consular authorities in order to receive immigrant visa
and, therefore, letters were capable of influencing consular authorities in their statutory duty of not granting immigrant
visas to anyone who is likely to become public charge. United States v Valdez (1979, CA9 Cal) 594 F2d 725.
Attorney's knowingly entering false priority dates on applications for permanent residency of clients was material
within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, notwithstanding that statements could not trick Immigration and Naturalization
Service into granting residency. United States v Lopez (1984, CA11 Fla) 728 F2d 1359, reh den (1984, CA11 Fla) 733
F2d 908 and cert den (1984) 469 US 828, 83 L Ed 2d 56, 105 S Ct 112 and (criticized in United States v Holland (1996,
ND Ga) 919 F Supp 431) and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
Criminal indictment may not be based on false statements made to immigration officials regarding current viability of
marriage of alien where current viability of marriage is immaterial to issue of whether marriage was pretextual at time of
inception, which is sole issue upon which alien's status depends. United States v Qaisi (1985, CA6 Ky) 779 F2d 346.
Defendant's false statement to border patrol that all occupants of motor vehicle were U. S. citizens was material, since
it had capacity to affect border patrol's decision to conduct inspection. United States v Rodriguez-Rodriguez (1988, CA9
Cal) 840 F2d 697.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, alien's concealment of actual purpose of marriage on immigration document in
order to obtain permanent residency was material fact which bore upon validity of marriage, since intention of parties to
marriage to limit their relationship is material under immigration law. United States v Zalman (1989, CA6 Ky) 870 F2d
1047, cert den (1989) 492 US 921, 106 L Ed 2d 594, 109 S Ct 3248.
Rational juror could have readily inferred that State Department, had it relied on defendant's statement that she had
not heard from State Department in connection with her 1991 passport application, could have decided question of defendant's eligibility for passport without benefit of earlier correspondence (specifically her biographical information,
which had resulted in State Department's determination that she had failed to establish eligibility); there was sufficient
evidence that defendant's false statement was "capable of influencing" State Department's decision on her eligibility for
passport in 2007, and thus sufficient evidence to support finding of materiality. United States v Jimenez (2010, CA5 Tex)
593 F3d 391.
Unpublished Opinions
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Unpublished: Defendant's contention that government's prosecution of him was frivolous on ground that government
knew that conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 for marriage fraud would be impossible because defendant did not present
full extent of alleged fraud cover-up during his adjustment interview lacked merit because whether defendant took affirmative action to conceal material fact was question of fact for jury, and fact that legality of defendant's conduct presented jury question did not render his prosecution frivolous; thus, district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant's request for attorney fees under 18 USCS § 3006A. United States v Hristov (2005, CA9 Nev) 121 Fed Appx 699.
93. Labor Department
Defendant falsified material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by falsely stating in non-Communist affidavit that he
was not member of Communist Party since filing of non-Communist affidavit is required by National Labor Relations Act
to limit National Labor Relations Board benefits. Sells v United States (1958, CA10 Colo) 262 F2d 815, 43 BNA LRRM
2476, 36 CCH LC P 65189, cert den (1959) 360 US 913, 3 L Ed 2d 1262, 79 S Ct 1298.
False statements made to state employment division were material to Department of Labor within meaning of 18
USCS § 1001, since statements had propensity to influence or affect federal public works and employment agencies which
use information on state program claimants in planning work projects. United States v Facchini (1987, CA9 Or) 832 F2d
1159.
False statements which defendant caused union to file with Department of Labor were material within meaning of 18
USCS § 1001, since they were capable of influencing agency action, even though misstated amounts were relatively small,
since magnitude of falsehood is irrelevant, as is existence of misdemeanor statute, 29 USCS § 439, covering same conduct. Hughes v United States (1990, CA6 Ohio) 899 F2d 1495, 133 BNA LRRM 3086, 115 CCH LC P 10189, 91-1 USTC
P 50022, 66 AFTR 2d 5716, reh den, en banc (1990, CA6) 1990 US App LEXIS 8935 and cert den (1990) 498 US 980, 112
L Ed 2d 520, 111 S Ct 508, reh den (1991) 498 US 1116, 112 L Ed 2d 1109, 111 S Ct 1027.
94. Loans
As matter of law, false representations on FHA mortgage application that applicant was manager of hotel and that he
owned 1974 Mercedes-Benz were capable of influencing, or having natural tendency to influence, agency's decision and
were therefore material under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Keefer (1986, CA6 Mich) 799 F2d 1115.
Statement of annual income appearing in application for housing loan with Farmers Home Administration was material, since it was capable of influencing officials empowered to approve or disprove loan, despite testimony that loan
officers do not rely on that statement when determining loan eligibility. United States v Hartness (1988, CA8 Ark) 845
F2d 158, cert den (1988) 488 US 925, 102 L Ed 2d 326, 109 S Ct 308.
Principal shareholder of corporation does not commit material falsehood by submitting allegedly false financial
statement to Reconstruction Finance Corporation where statement submitted does not misrepresent corporation's ability to
repay government loan. Freidus v United States (1955, App DC) 96 US App DC 133, 223 F2d 598.
Court is not required to hold pretrial hearing on materiality of allegedly false statement concerning use of $ 132,000
Small Business Administration loan under 18 USCS § 1001, because (1) government's evidence makes it unlikely defendant will prevail on issue and (2) in event defendant does prevail on issue, count at issue will be dismissed and jury
given limiting instruction. United States v Joyner (1987, ND Ill) 669 F Supp 226, affd (1989, CA7 Ill) 870 F2d 1304.
95.--Guarantees for loans
False statements regarding expenses associated with construction project are material where they had natural tendency to influence Small Business Administration to refrain from exercising its rights to reduce its exposure under its loan
guarantee, to refrain from exercising its general power to investigate whether defendant had violated Small Business
Administration Statute, and to influence Small Business Administration not to inspect project site. United States v Notarantonio (1985, CA1 RI) 758 F2d 777.
False statements given to Veterans Administration by defendant to obtain guaranteed loans are material and in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 since Veterans Administration is entitled to have true and exact information as to each qualification of applicant for guaranteed loans. United States v Jacobson (1964, ED Pa) 236 F Supp 577.
96. Tax matters
President of corporation violates 18 USCS § 1001 when he falsely states to IRS agents investigating company expenses that he was not aware of certain wells being drilled on his land. United States v McCue (1962, CA2 Conn) 301
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F2d 452, 9 AFTR 2d 1041, cert den (1962) 370 US 939, 8 L Ed 2d 808, 82 S Ct 1586, reh den (1963) 374 US 858, 10 L Ed
2d 1083, 83 S Ct 1860.
Banker and controller of numbers operation misrepresented material fact on his wagering tax return by entering
"none" as to number of persons accepting wagers on his behalf; such answer disguised his out-of-state source of income
and allowed those persons who accepted wagers on his behalf to evade payment of taxes for which they were liable.
United States v Zambito (1963, CA4 W Va) 315 F2d 266, cert den (1963) 373 US 924, 10 L Ed 2d 423, 83 S Ct 1524.
Defendant concealed material fact by representing to IRS agent that he had no bank account, business or personal,
when he maintained such accounts under false names. United States v Ratner (1972, CA9 Cal) 464 F2d 101, 72-2 USTC
P 9526, 30 AFTR 2d 5058.
Defendant who received bribes from racetrack owners made material false statement by telling IRS agents that
"Chicago company" listed in his tax return was financial institution when it was in fact harness racing company whose
stock he had received as bribe. United States v Isaacs (1974, CA7 Ill) 493 F2d 1124, cert den (1974) 417 US 976, 41 L
Ed 2d 1146, 94 S Ct 3183, 94 S Ct 3184, reh den (1974) 418 US 955, 41 L Ed 2d 1178, 94 S Ct 3234.
In indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and 26 USCS § 7206 by tendering fictitious documents to IRS investigator to preserve defendant's claimed tax deductions, fact that government had begun its own investigation did not
render statements made by defendant immaterial. United States v Schmoker (1977, CA9 Nev) 564 F2d 289, 78-1 USTC P
9109, 41 AFTR 2d 399.
Statement falsely stating that taxpayer had found deduction that he had not claimed and that he would like to submit
it which leads IRS employee to add it to worksheet as item opened by Service is clearly material false statement which
perverted agency's function, and fact that it did not actually influence Government is immaterial. United States v Fern
(1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.
False statements to IRS concerning ownership of real property and tax liability therefor support conviction under 18
USCS § 1001. United States v Morris (1984, CA8 SD) 741 F2d 188.
Bank customer was liable for conspiracy to violate 18 USCS § 1001 for concealment of material fact, where defendant structured transaction to conceal material fact that it involved more than $ 10,000 in order to cause bank to fail to
file Currency Transaction Report, despite fact that customer was under no duty to file Currency Transaction Report with
government, Currency Transaction Report since bank would have violated § 1001 had it intentionally structured transaction in this manner. United States v Nersesian (1987, CA2 NY) 824 F2d 1294, 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 487, cert den
(1987) 484 US 957, 98 L Ed 2d 380, 108 S Ct 355 and cert den (1987) 484 US 958, 98 L Ed 2d 382, 108 S Ct 357 and cert
den (1988) 484 US 1061, 98 L Ed 2d 983, 108 S Ct 1018.
False statements which former farm owner made on 1099 tax forms, claiming that he had paid non-employee compensation to bank officers at bank which had foreclosed upon his property were material, since they had natural tendency
to influence or were capable of influencing IRS action, and they influenced possibility that IRS investigation would ensue.
United States v Meuli (1993, CA10 Kan) 8 F3d 1481, cert den (1994) 511 US 1020, 128 L Ed 2d 76, 114 S Ct 1403.
Defendant's submission of IRS Form 1099-S with false identification number was material, even though defendant
may not have been required to provide it as a non-citizen, since purpose of form is to furnish information to IRS regarding
money received by seller of property to verify tax liability. United States v Hutchison (1993, CA9 Cal) 22 F3d 846, 93
CDOS 292, 93 Daily Journal DAR 611, 37 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1068 (criticized in United States v Nash (1997, CA9 Cal)
115 F3d 1431, 97 CDOS 4952, 97 Daily Journal DAR 8049).
Defendants' motion to dismiss indictment on ground that they were not provided fair notice that their conduct was
illegal, in violation of their rights to due process of law under Fifth Amendment, was denied where defendants' contention
that they were not given clear notice that their activities were material to 26 USCS § 501(c)(3) determination, and that they
were thus unaware that they had to disclose those activities to IRS was without merit because I.R.S. Form 1023 clearly
instructed applicant to provide detailed narrative description of all activities of organization, past, present and planned;
more fundamentally, whether defendants knew information was material was irrelevant because in determining whether
defendant knowingly and willfully made false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and 26 USCS § 7206(1), issue
was defendants' knowledge of falsity of statements, not their knowledge of statement's materiality to federal agency
involved. United States v Mubayyid (2007, DC Mass) 476 F Supp 2d 46, 99 AFTR 2d 1362.
97.--Affidavits
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Defendant falsified material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 when he signed affidavit stating that former IRS
agent did not indicate his willingness to disclose government's case for income tax evasion against particular taxpayer
where such false statement was calculated to induce action or reliance by IRS in its investigation. Brandow v United
States (1959, CA9 Cal) 268 F2d 559, 59-2 USTC P 9699, 4 AFTR 2d 5489.
Defendant makes material false statement in affidavit issued in course of IRS investigation of third party where he
denies association with person under investigation. Sica v United States (1963, CA9 Cal) 325 F2d 831, cert den (1964)
376 US 952, 11 L Ed 2d 972, 84 S Ct 970.
False affidavit submitted by defendant in court concerning IRS investigation of discrepancies between his income
reported and received, in which third party incorrectly stated that he had made cash gifts of unspecified amounts to defendant during period in question, was material for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001, requirement of materiality having been
construed to exist in second clause of this section; affidavit had natural and probable tendency to influence decision to be
made by tribunal, such tendency being judged by content of document itself, and not by any special knowledge possessed
or required by Service; while 18 USCS § 1001 does not apply to mere answers, including untruthful ones, to investigator's
questions, submission of affidavit did not fall within "exculpatory no" exception to this section as defendant offered
affidavit on his initiative, knew of criminal investigation, and nonetheless affirmatively and voluntarily misrepresented
material fact in order to convince Service not to prosecute. United States v Johnson (1976, CA5 Ga) 530 F2d 52, 76-1
USTC P 9398, 37 AFTR 2d 1242, cert den (1976) 429 US 833, 50 L Ed 2d 97, 97 S Ct 96.
98. Miscellaneous
Pharmacist and drug store owner violated 18 USCS § 1001 when he falsely recorded in prescription file that 450
missing morphine sulphate tablets had been dispensed to particular customer. Coil v United States (1965, CA8 Neb) 343
F2d 573, cert den (1965) 382 US 821, 15 L Ed 2d 67, 86 S Ct 48.
Escrow agent's closing statement regarding disposition of approximately $ 33,000 is material within meaning of 18
USCS § 1001. United States v Bailey (1984, CA7 Ill) 734 F2d 296, cert den (1984) 469 US 931, 83 L Ed 2d 263, 105 S Ct
327.
Airplane pilot's lies to Secret Service agents as to why he flew into prohibited airspace over President Reagan's ranch
were material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, since they were admittedly made in effort to prevent revocation of his
pilot's license and to avoid possibility of criminal prosecution, and clearly had propensity to influence agency decisions.
United States v Myers (1989, CA9 Cal) 878 F2d 1142 (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35).
Allegedly false statements made by police officers as to location of firearm they retrieved, whether from defendant's
person or from black bag, were material, since they tended to influence, impede or dissuade government's investigation
and prosecution of defendant, even though they may not have influenced ultimate charge against defendant of being felon
in possession. United States v Gribben (1993, CA2 NY) 984 F2d 47.
Fact that FBI already knew that state senator had received $ 6,000 in cash from lobbyist for horse racing industry did
not affect materiality of his statements to contrary, since FBI could not have concluded its investigation without interviewing him, and his responses foreclosed this critical line of questioning. United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54
F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P, reh, en banc, den (1995, CA6 Mich) 1995 US App LEXIS
19703 and cert den (1996) 516 US 1043, 133 L Ed 2d 657, 116 S Ct 701 and (criticized in United States v Robertson (2003,
CA8 ND) 324 F3d 1028).
Although government failed to sustain its burden of proving that interest and royalty payments were nonreimbursable
under Medicare, concealment of their true nature, as well as concealment of advertising costs under term "outreach,"
constituted material falsity for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Calhoon (1996, CA11 Ga) 97 F3d 518, 51
Soc Sec Rep Serv 740, 45 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1081, 10 FLW Fed C 493, cert den, motion gr (1997) 522 US 806, 139 L Ed
2d 11, 118 S Ct 44, reh den, motion gr (1997) 522 US 1037, 139 L Ed 2d 626, 118 S Ct 648.
Although district court plainly erred when it decided element of materiality as matter of law, error did not seriously
affect fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, where United States presented unrebutted evidence
that false 10-K report which overstated profit by $ 7,000,000 not only had tendency to influence SEC but did in fact
influence that agency to take remedial action against defendant. United States v Schleibaum (1997, CA10) 130 F3d 947.
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Defendant does not falsify material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where his misstatement concerning Communist-front organization is merely part of lengthy affidavit and without weight or influence in any decision to be made by
Subversive Activities Control Board. Weinstock v United States (1956, App DC) 97 US App DC 365, 231 F2d 699.
Falsifications on financial disclosure statements filed by congressman under Ethics in Government Act (Public Law
No. 95-521, 92 Stat 1824) meet materiality requirement for conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 where falsifications relate
to financial transactions which are within charge of committee to which forms are submitted and tend to conceal information that would prompt investigation or action. United States v Hansen (1985, App DC) 249 US App DC 22, 772 F2d
940, cert den (1986) 475 US 1045, 89 L Ed 2d 571, 106 S Ct 1262, post-conviction relief gr, remanded (1995, CA9 Idaho)
1995 US App LEXIS 27043, habeas corpus den, request den, request gr (1995, DC Dist Col) 906 F Supp 688 and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163) and (criticized in United States v Oakar (1997,
App DC) 324 US App DC 104, 111 F3d 146).
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: To be material statement need only have natural tendency to influence decision of decision-making
body to which it is addressed, it need not actually exert such influence. United States v Bossinger (2009, CA2 NY) 2009 US
App LEXIS 3815.
Unpublished: Defendant's statements to investigators (that she gave elected official three checks made out to election
campaign, when in fact she gave official five checks made out to "cash" and to his son) were material because difference
between making checks out to legitimate campaign and to "cash" and family member was highly relevant to question of
whether payments were bribes or campaign contributions. United States v Foxworth (2009, CA2 Conn) 2009 US App
LEXIS 12192.
Unpublished: Defendant's statements to investigators (that she did not have conversation with elected official about
official loaning defendant's ex-husband $ 500 from official's campaign funds, when in fact she had such conversation, and
defendant's statement that same $ 500 was to pay her and her ex-husband back for loan they made to official, when in fact
$ 500 was loan from official to defendant's ex-husband) were material, since they could reasonably be understood as
designed to convince investigators that $ 3000 defendant gave to official was loan rather than bribe, issue that was central
to bribery investigation. United States v Foxworth (2009, CA2 Conn) 2009 US App LEXIS 12192.
IV.PERSONS LIABLE 99. Generally
Predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001 made it offense for persons other than claimants to cause pecuniary or property loss
to government by willfully concealing material fact. Capone v United States (1931, CA7 Ill) 51 F2d 609, 2 USTC P 786,
10 AFTR 286, 76 ALR 1534, cert den (1931) 284 US 669, 76 L Ed 566, 52 S Ct 44.
18 USCS § 1001 should not be construed to extend to cases where false statements are made by person not under oath
and not under duty to speak, but should be limited in its application to persons under legal obligation to speak or give
information to representatives of agency or department of United States who have authority to finally dispose of matter
being investigated, and to cases where keeping of records or filing of documents are required or permitted by law. United
States v Levin (1953, DC Colo) 133 F Supp 88.
100. Aiders and abettors
Defendant was properly convicted where evidence showed that he had aided and abetted veteran entitled to purchase
surplus property for his own use, in presenting purchase applications on their face representing that property was to be
used for veteran in permissible enterprise, such representations, however, being false and fraudulent, and that defendant
had general plan to use veterans as means of acquiring war surplus property for his own business. McCoy v United States
(1948, CA9 Mont) 169 F2d 776, cert den (1948) 335 US 898, 93 L Ed 433, 69 S Ct 298.
Person who permitted another to make out and file false income tax return in order to obtain refund of fictitious
overpayment of income taxes could be convicted as aider and abettor under 18 USCS § 1001. Driver v United States
(1952, CA5 Fla) 199 F2d 860, 52-2 USTC P 9548, 42 AFTR 866.
United States could properly prosecute defendant under 18 USCS § 1001 for having aided and abetted in preparation
of false payroll records to United States navy, although government might have prosecuted him under another section.
United States v Greenberg (1959, CA2 NY) 268 F2d 120, 37 CCH LC P 65575.
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Attorney-client relationship is not radically altered, and attorney may be convicted of aiding and abetting the making
of false statements if he prepared visa petition for permanent residence in the United States for alien who has entered a
sham wedding with an American citizen in reckless disregard of whether the statement made was true or with a conscious
effort to avoid learning the truth (requirements that satisfy the preferred charge of acting "knowingly" and "willfully").
United States v Sarantos (1972, CA2 NY) 455 F2d 877.
Defendants, who hired 2 undercover government agents to convert counterfeit currency into 5 cashiers' checks at
bank, were aiders and abettors under 18 USCS § 1001 where bank did not file CTR's after agents identified themselves as
such, since had defendants personally conducted transactions on their own behalf, bank would certainly have had duty to
report transactions, and fact that agents did so on behalf of defendants and with defendants' money did not convert
transactions into transactions by government as part of its day-to-day operations. United States v Hernando Ospina
(1986, CA11 Fla) 798 F2d 1570, 21 Fed Rules Evid Serv 878.
Person with no duty to file Currency Transaction Reports can be prosecuted under both 31 USCS § 5322 and 18 USCS
§ 1001 on account of aiding and abetting financial institution's failure to file CTR's. United States v Cure (1986, CA11
Fla) 804 F2d 625.
Even if none of facts, taken alone, would have been sufficient proof to uphold defendant's convictions for willingly
making false statements to federal agency under 18 USCS § 1001 and of immigration fraud under 18 USCS § 1546(a)
(although § 1546 convictions were reversed on other grounds), combination of his position as sole lawyer in law firm in
which criminal activities took place, spouse of wrongdoer, active participant in at least forgery of one asylum application,
and contact with government officials regarding questions about fraudulent ETA-750 forms, provided evidentiary basis
sufficient to support jury's verdict that defendant was liable as aider and abettor under 18 USCS § 2. United States v
Phillips (2008, CA10 Kan) 543 F3d 1197.
101. Corporations
In prosecution of corporation for conspiracy to defraud by furnishing jet airplane canopies which were fraudulently
stamped as approved by government inspectors, it is not necessary that government prove that president or other officers
of corporation took active part in the conspiracy but it is sufficient to show that corporate agents acting in area entrusted to
them had joined in the conspiracy; jury may find corporation guilty but not president as individual since corporate guilt
may be premised upon acts of its agents other than the president, even of close-owned corporation. United States v
Steiner Plastics Mfg. Co. (1956, CA2 NY) 231 F2d 149.
Defendant's contention that, since he signed monthly report which contained false statement in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency only in his capacity as corporate officer, violation of 18 USCS § 1001 should have been charged
against corporation rather than defendant personally, was without merit, where record shows that defendant took active
part in operating business and knew about and participated in fraud on government; defendant, as knowing corporate
officer, could have been personally responsible for acts of corporation as aider and abettor. United States v Lanier (1978,
CA8 Mo) 578 F2d 1246, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 317, cert den (1978) 439 US 856, 58 L Ed 2d 163, 99 S Ct 169.
Corporation may be convicted of making and using false documents in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency on
basis of action taken by agent of corporation acting within scope of employment which action is taken at least in part to
benefit corporation; there is no requirement that any officer or director knowingly and willfully participate in or authorize
unauthorized practice. United States v Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (1985, CA4 Va) 770 F2d 399.
102. Miscellaneous
Predecessor to 18 USCS § 1001 made it offense for persons other than claimants to cause pecuniary or property loss
to government by willfully concealing material fact, and thus extended to taxpayers. Capone v United States (1931, CA7
Ill) 51 F2d 609, 2 USTC P 786, 10 AFTR 286, 76 ALR 1534, cert den (1931) 284 US 669, 76 L Ed 566, 52 S Ct 44.
18 USCS § 1001 includes reports of Internal Revenue agents who "knowingly and willfully" falsify them and is
consistent with 26 USCS § 7214(a)(7), concerning agents who make "fraudulent" entry, as opposed to making innocent
false statement. United States v Eisenmann (1968, CA2 NY) 396 F2d 565.
Defendant has violated 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 18 USCS § 2, where he purposefully structured banking transactions of
over $ 10,000 so as to avoid bank's filing of Currency Transaction Reports (CTR's), despite fact that he had no duty to
disclose and therefore could not ordinarily be guilty of concealment of material fact, since by operation of 18 USCS § 2,
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defendant is liable as principle for willfully causing innocent bank to fail to file CTR. United States v Richeson (1987,
CA4 Md) 825 F2d 17.
Defendant could not be guilty of violating 18 USCS § 1001 by concealing material facts on CTR, where he revealed
only holder of account, since he had no duty to reveal real source of funds for whom transaction was completed. United
States v Bucey (1989, CA7 Ill) 876 F2d 1297, reh den (1989, CA7) 1989 US App LEXIS 11009 and cert den (1989) 493 US
1004, 107 L Ed 2d 560, 110 S Ct 565 and (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v Gollott
(1991, CA5 Tex) 939 F2d 255).
Convictions of mine operator and its managers for making false statements to government inspectors about safety
conditions under Mine Safety and Health Act were affirmed, except convictions for making false statements where
managers had no duty to disclose violations which might become, but were not yet, hazardous conditions. United States v
Gibson (2005, CA6 Ky) 409 F3d 325, 2005 FED App 230P.
Notary public was punishable under predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001 for falsely certifying, in claim for soldier's additional homestead that witness appeared before him. United States v Lair (1902, DC Ark) 118 F 98.
Presence of seller at meeting where purchaser signed false certificate, stating that price paid for property was not in
excess of appraised value of property, did not make him guilty of filing false claim, if evidence failed to show he knew
about requirement. United States v Mignon (1952, DC Pa) 103 F Supp 20.
Failure of county sheriff to furnish United States Army with information in his files concerning army enlistee's arrest
and adjudication as youthful offender did not violate 18 USCS § 1001. Doe v County of Westchester (1974, 2d Dept) 45
App Div 2d 308, 358 NYS2d 471.
V.PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT
A.In General 103. Jurisdiction and venue
Mere fact that criminal conviction might rest on false statement made while engaging in business regulated by
agency, did not of itself place action within jurisdiction of former Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals; case or
controversy itself must have arisen under statute or regulations and resolution of issue must have turned on proper interpretation of agency. United States v Uni Oil, Inc. (1981, CA5 Tex) 646 F2d 946, cert den (1982) 455 US 908, 71 L Ed
2d 446, 102 S Ct 1254.
Venue for prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 is proper in district in which false documents are prepared rather than
in district in which documents are filed. United States v Mendel (1984, CA2 NY) 746 F2d 155, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv
771, cert den (1985) 469 US 1213, 84 L Ed 2d 331, 105 S Ct 1184.
Language of 18 USCS § 1001 applies to false statements made on customs forms without regard to place where offense occurred, so district court in Washington had jurisdiction over United States citizen who made false statement on
customs form while at international airport in Vancouver, Canada. United States v Walczak (1986, CA9 Wash) 783 F2d
852.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, venue for HUD applicant for mortgage insurance was proper in state through
which false statements were made, where applicant made statements in Washington, D. C., knowing they would go to
bank in Virginia and then on to HUD in Washington, since applicant could not have sent documents directly to HUD.
United States v Barsanti (1991, CA4 Va) 943 F2d 428, 34 Fed Rules Evid Serv 256, cert den (1992) 503 US 936, 117 L Ed
2d 618, 112 S Ct 1474.
In prosecution for making false statements to federal officers, even though defendant made false statements in
Kentucky and never left Kentucky, fact that statements affected proceedings in Indiana made venue for his prosecution
proper in Indiana. United States v Ringer (2002, CA7 Ind) 300 F3d 788, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2002, CA7) 2002 US
App LEXIS 22206 and cert den (2003) 538 US 981, 155 L Ed 2d 672, 123 S Ct 1785.
Where defendant's making false statements to government convictions under 18 USCS § 1001 concerned documents
filed in New Jersey and forwarded by agency to New York (NY) for processing, force that was propelled immediately
contemplated NY and venue had been proper in Southern District of NY. United States v Ramirez (2005, CA2 NY) 420 F3d
134.
Where possible venue defect as to charge under 18 USCS § 1001 of making materially false statement to federal agent
was apparent on face of indictment, defendant waived challenge to venue on appeal by failing to object before close of
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government's case; possible venue defect as to second § 1001 charge was not apparent on face of indictment, and issue
was again waived because defendant's Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal did not specifically raise issue of venue.
United States v Knox (2008, CA7 Ill) 540 F3d 708.
Under 18 USCS § 3237, alleged violations of § 1001 may be prosecuted in either district in which false statement was
prepared and mailed, or in district in which offense was completed, that is, where federal agency receives and acts upon
statement. United States v Culoso (1978, SD NY) 461 F Supp 128, affd without op (1979, CA2 NY) 607 F2d 999.
General venue statute, 18 USCS § 3237(a) is applicable to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001; therefore when offenses may be said to have commenced with mailing of documents venue is proper in district in which such mailing
occurred. United States v La Bar (1981, MD Pa) 506 F Supp 1267, affd without op (1982, CA3 Pa) 688 F2d 826, cert
den (1982) 459 US 945, 74 L Ed 2d 202, 103 S Ct 260, reh den (1982) 459 US 1093, 74 L Ed 2d 941, 103 S Ct 583.
Venue for prosecution for violating 18 USCS § 1001 by preparing and filing false visa application is proper in New
York, even though application was filed in Vermont, where application was completed in New York, because violations
of § 1001 are continuing offenses for which venue is proper in any district in which offense began, continued, or was
completed, and INS clearly had interest in visa applicant before application was actually filed on her behalf. United States
v Kouzmine (1996, SD NY) 921 F Supp 1131.
Fact that defendant allegedly made false statement to FBI agents in Northern District of Texas that may have had
effect on investigation in Southern District of New York did not create venue for prosecution in Southern District of New
York, since 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) did not require that there be proof of false statement's effect. United States v Bin Laden
(2001, SD NY) 146 F Supp 2d 373.
Indictment alleging that defendant made false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements under 18 USCS §§ 1001, 2(b) was
not subject to dismissal for improper venue pursuant to 18 USCS § 3237(a) because defendant's alleged conduct in
causing false statements to be made occurred, at least in large part, in Los Angeles, and, thus, it did not matter that report
was ultimately filed in D.C., as required by Federal Elections Campaign Act; criminal conduct charged occurred in
Central District of California; therefore, venue was appropriate there as matter of law. United States v Rosen (2005, CD
Cal) 365 F Supp 2d 1126.
104. Single or separate offenses and multiple violations
18 USCS § 1001 aims at the making or using of each false writing or document and intends wrong connected with
each to be separate offense. United States v Bettenhausen (1974, CA10 Kan) 499 F2d 1223, 74-2 USTC P 9544, 34
AFTR 2d 5415.
Only one violation of 18 USCS § 1001 occurred where statements were submitted, all of which were necessary to
influence bank's action in loan application proceeding. United States v Canas (1979, CA1 Puerto Rico) 595 F2d 73
(criticized in United States v Schlei (1997, CA11 Fla) 122 F3d 944, 48 Fed Rules Evid Serv 143, 11 FLW Fed C 541).
Although false statement made by defendant in each annual claim was identical, submission of each statement was
separate violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Huber (1979, CA2 NY) 603 F2d 387, cert den (1980) 445 US 927,
63 L Ed 2d 759, 100 S Ct 1312 and (criticized in Lockheed Martin Corp. v Boeing Co. (2005, MD Fla) 2005 US Dist
LEXIS 3948).
Multiple violations of 18 USCS § 1001 occurred where defendant food stamp vendor submitted monthly reports
supposedly reflecting amount of deposits made each month in Federal Reserve Bank, each report involved different
amount of money, covered different time, was submitted in separate documents and contained separate signatures by
defendant. United States v Lanier (1979, CA8 Mo) 604 F2d 1157.
Where false statements are made in distinct and separate documents requiring different proof as to each statement,
filing of each false document constitutes crime under 18 USCS § 1001 and each filing may be alleged in separate count of
indictment; where defendant falsely represented her name on 2 different documents, each misrepresentation constituted
separate offense, because proof of each count was contained in separate document, making evidence required on one
count unnecessary to prove other count, even though 2 documents were presented in same transaction and contained same
falsity. United States v Guzman (1986, CA5 Tex) 781 F2d 428, cert den (1986) 475 US 1143, 90 L Ed 2d 343, 106 S Ct
1798.
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Where identical false statements, in either oral or written form, are made in response to identical questions, declarant
may be convicted only once. United States v Olsowy (1987, CA9 Cal) 819 F2d 930, 23 Fed Rules Evid Serv 272, reported at, amd (1987, CA9 Cal) 836 F2d 439, cert den (1988) 485 US 991, 99 L Ed 2d 509, 108 S Ct 1299.
Two convictions were proper under 18 USCS § 1001, where importer made, identical false statements to 2 separate
officials denying that he had anything to declare, since each official had distinct duties and functions which were impaired
at border. United States v Salas-Camacho (1988, CA9 Cal) 859 F2d 788, 111 ALR Fed 779.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: When defendant was convicted of two counts of making false statements to federal officials, based on
statements made at two different times on same day, statements were not multiplicitous because (1) defendant did not give
identical false statements on two different occasions, and (2) one of officials testified how defendant's lying further impaired officials' investigation by requiring officials to independently verify anything defendant told agents. United States
v Amirnazmi (2009, ED Pa) 2009 US Dist LEXIS 74833.
105. Estoppel and res judicata
Acquittal of several defendants charged jointly with offense under 18 USCS § 1001 was not res judicata as to indictment of one of defendants for same or similar offense. United States v Kenny (1956, CA3 NJ) 236 F2d 128, cert den
(1956) 352 US 894, 1 L Ed 2d 87, 77 S Ct 133.
Fact that government representative is aware of false statements and claims submitted to government does not estop
government from alleging falsity of statements and claims where government representative is also involved in crime.
United States v Martin (1985, CA8 Minn) 772 F2d 1442.
District Court did not err in refusing to dismiss portion of indictment charging violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1623 on
grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, where defendants had previously been acquitted of willfully and
knowingly misapplying moneys entrusted to bank with intent to injure and defraud bank in violation of 18 USCS § 656,
and willfully and knowingly making false material statement to bank for purposes of influencing actions of that bank in
violation of 18 USCS § 1014, and conspiracy to commit those offenses under 18 USCS § 371, even though conspiracy
charge in present indictment was dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, since substantive offenses charged under each
indictment involved completely different statutory violations requiring proof of different facts, and involved completely
different transactions. United States v Levy (1986, CA5 La) 803 F2d 1390.
Although defendants' prior guilty plea to 9 counts of criminal indictment under 18 USCS §§ 371 and 1001 collaterally
estops them from relitigating issues essential to convictions, plea on particular count, does not conclusively establish
substantive counts incorporated and particular counts' explanation of effectuation of defendants' conspiracy.
Alsco-Harvard Fraud Litigation (1981, DC Dist Col) 523 F Supp 790.
106. Statute of limitations
Where defendant knew and assented to the objectives of the conspiratorial scheme by making false statements to
Immigration and Naturalization Service to obtain permanent residence status for alien who had entered into sham marriage with citizen, and the record is devoid of evidence that defendant disassociated himself from the scheme, the trial
court properly regarded defendant as a participant throughout the life of the conspiracy notwithstanding his assertion that
he was not aware that an additional affidavit would have to be submitted beyond the visa petition, which was filed more
than five years, the applicable limitations period, before filing of indictment, and defendant could be convicted on the
basis of false statements made by the alien to the Immigration and Naturalization Service within five years of the filing of
the indictment. United States v Sarantos (1972, CA2 NY) 455 F2d 877.
Offense under 18 USCS § 1001, of causing submission of false statements to government based on clinical investigators' submission to manufacturer and sponsor of research relating to drugs of reports containing false information
resulting in manufacturer submitting false report to Food and Drug Administration was complete when manufacturer
mailed report, and action commenced 5 years and 5 days thereafter was barred by 5-year statute of limitations; there is no
requirement that government actually receive or rely on statement before offense is completed. United States v Smith
(1984, CA9 Cal) 740 F2d 734.
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Defendant's oral false statement was made within statute of limitations period, even though he had made identical
false statement earlier in writing, since he was not charged with first statement. United States v Roshko (1992, CA2 NY)
969 F2d 1.
Statute of limitations did not begin to run on scheme to conceal under 18 USCS § 1001 until each overt act constituting scheme had occurred, since case could not be brought and proven until that time. United States v Heacock (1994,
CA5 Miss) 31 F3d 249.
Indictment of mortgage broker for making false statements within jurisdiction of Department of Housing and Urban
Development was not barred by five-year statute of limitations of 18 USCS § 3282, since five years did not start running
until crime was complete, which occurred when HUD received final loan application, thereby obtaining jurisdiction over
matter. United States v Lutz (1998, CA6 Ohio) 154 F3d 581, 1998 FED App 263P.
Making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001 was not considered continuing offense for statute of limitations
purposes because nothing in explicit language of § 1001 compelled conclusion that offense committed thereunder was to
be considered continuing one, nor did nature of crime involved indicate that Congress intended that it be continuing
offense since none of criminalized acts clearly contemplated prolonged course of conduct; therefore, district court's
conclusion that five year statute of limitations had expired on superseding indictment, which charged defendant with
violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was not plain error. United States v Dunne (2003, CA10 Utah) 324 F3d 1158.
Mailed document did not contain additional false statements, and waiver page, which was not included in faxed
transmission sent day prior, did not explicitly incorporate false statement in earlier pages; therefore, filing indictment one
day outside of five-year statute of limitations for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was not permissible. United States v
Grenier (2008, CA6 Ohio) 513 F3d 632, 2008 FED App 37P.
18 USCS § 1001 reveals congressional intent to penalize, among other acts, pattern of conduct and not necessarily to
penalize only independent acts which manifest pattern; thus Congressman, who in 1949 falsely certified that certain
woman was eligible for salary as his clerk, could not claim, when he was indicted for receiving her checks in 1953, the
three-year statute of limitations under 18 USCS § 3282 since overt acts continued into 1953. Bramblett v United States
(1956, App DC) 97 US App DC 330, 231 F2d 489, cert den (1956) 350 US 1015, 100 L Ed 874, 76 S Ct 658.
Although loan application which contained initial false statements was submitted more than 5 years before filing of
indictment, where conspiracy count alleges some overt act in furtherance of objectives of conspiracy which occurred after
filing of indictment statute of limitation did not bar prosecution; statute of limitations begins to run, in criminal conspiracy
charges, from date of last over act. United States v Culoso (1978, SD NY) 461 F Supp 128, affd without op (1979, CA2
NY) 607 F2d 999.
Defendant's indictment returned on April 15, 2005, alleged that she applied for home loan on April 14, 1998, February 22, 1999, and April 5, 1999, and that she applied for Department of Agriculture payment subsidies on April 5, 1999;
according to indictment, in making each application, defendant concealed fact that her boyfriend at time resided with her
and earned substantial wages. Government admitted that case could have been brought and proved when defendant made
each individual application for benefits and thus each alleged application was completed offense, not merely act in prolonged crime; therefore, pursuant to five-year statute of limitations in 18 USCS § 3282, portion of indictment containing
allegations concerning conduct that occurred before April 14, 2000, was untimely. United States v Gremillion-Stovall
(2005, MD La) 397 F Supp 2d 798.
Crime of concealment described in 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) is not continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes; that crime is "committed," within meaning of 18 USCS § 3282(a), when defendant commits affirmative act of
concealment in furtherance of scheme, and each new affirmative act of concealment is new criminal act, triggering new
limitations period. United States v Mubayyid (2008, DC Mass) 2008-2 USTC P 50504, 102 AFTR 2d 5348.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant allegedly engaged in scheme to conceal presence of asbestos at oil refinery, five-year
statute of limitations did not bar indictment because alleged scheme continued into five years preceding filing of indictment. United States v Shaw (2005, CA10 Kan) 150 Fed Appx 863, 61 Envt Rep Cas 1363.
107. Comments of prosecutor
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18 USCS § 1001
Prosecutor's comments referring to "smuggling" of whiskey into foreign country was no so egregious as to require
new trial for willfully submitting false statement to government agency by falsely designating liquor onboard ship, especially since court gave curative instruction. United States v Lichenstein (1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980)
447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.
Defendant's conviction of 36 violations of 18 USCS § 1001 conclusively established his civil liability to government
under former 31 USCS §§ 231-235; imposition of civil sanctions on defendant convicted of criminal violation of § 1001
did not place defendant in double jeopardy and did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Berdick v United States
(1979) 222 Ct Cl 94, 612 F2d 533.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's judgment and conviction for violating 18 USCS § 1001, which arose from his illicit use of
constable's badge to gain access to secured area of Pittsburgh International Airport reserved for ticketed passengers only,
was affirmed because evidence against defendant, including his own admissions, was more than sufficient to support jury
verdict; since there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction, appellate court rejected his argument that he was
unduly prejudiced by closing arguments of his co-defendant's counsel. United States v Kobold (2004, CA3 Pa) 118 Fed
Appx 638, cert den (2005) 544 US 978, 125 S Ct 1868, 161 L Ed 2d 729.
Unpublished: Defendant's convictions for violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) were affirmed because he was properly
convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2); district judge instructed jury on all elements of § 1001(a)(2) violation, and
fact that government erroneously referred to license or pilot's license at trial had no effect on outcome of trial because
government never indicated pilot's license and medical certificate were same document, and testimony provided that
airman medical certificate was not pilot's license; therefore, any error prosecutor made did not warrant new trial. United
States v Milo (2008, CA11 Fla) 2008 US App LEXIS 5054.
108. Verdict
Jury verdict acquitting defendant of charge of submission of false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 is not
inconsistent with verdict finding defendant guilty of charge of willful under reporting of taxable income in violation of 26
USCS § 7206. United States v Claiborne (1985, CA9 Nev) 765 F2d 784, 85-2 USTC P 9821, 18 Fed Rules Evid Serv
1131, 56 AFTR 2d 6264, cert den (1986) 475 US 1120, 90 L Ed 2d 182, 106 S Ct 1636.
Conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 can rest on evidence that defendant knowingly and willfully caused false statement to be made to government agency, and defendant need not have prepared statement himself. United States v Alemany Rivera (1985, CA1 Puerto Rico) 781 F2d 229, cert den (1986) 475 US 1086, 89 L Ed 2d 725, 106 S Ct 1469.
Inconsistent jury verdicts acquitting defendant of submitting backdated report to EPA, in violation of 18 USCS §
1001, while convicting him of mail fraud based upon receipt of payment in connection with same EPA case, did not
require reversal, since jury could have decided that he was not aware of backdating earlier but knew by time he received
payment. United States v Gaind (1994, CA2 NY) 31 F3d 73 (criticized in State v Singh (2002) 259 Conn 693, 793 A2d
226).
Political asylum applicant is entitled to new trial on charge of making material misstatements in asylum application
under 18 USCS § 1001, where jury rendered general verdict and only 1 of 2 misstatements was material, because it is
impossible to determine whether verdict rested in whole or part on immaterial misstatements. United States v
Naserkhaki (1989, ED Va) 722 F Supp 242.
By excepting words "knowingly and willfully" from its findings as to specification based upon violation of 18 USCS
§ 1001, which denounces crime of making false statement or representation of material fact when done knowingly and
willfully, court-martial found accused not guilty of essential elements of offense charged. United States v Wright (1963)
34 CMR 518.
109. Appeal and review
Convictions of submitting, and conspiring to submit, false documents overturned due to prejudicial denial of defendant's motion for severance, the bases for said motion being that testimony of co-defendant vital for the defense was
withheld because of co-defendant's decision not to take the stand, where the nature of his anticipated testimony was made
known to the presiding judge, as was his offer to testify upon severance. United States v Shuford (1971, CA4 SC) 454
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18 USCS § 1001
F2d 772 (criticized in People v Lawley (2002) 27 Cal 4th 102, 115 Cal Rptr 2d 614, 38 P3d 461, 2002 CDOS 658, 2002
Daily Journal DAR 849).
Since no objection was made to trial court's failure to instruct jury as to meaning of term "jurisdiction" in 18 USCS §
1001, appellant was foreclosed from raising issue for first time on appeal. United States v Kraude (1972, CA9 Cal) 467
F2d 37, cert den (1972) 409 US 1076, 34 L Ed 2d 664, 93 S Ct 684.
Whether criminal defendant who gives false name to magistrate can be indicted and prosecuted under 18 USCS §
1001 is question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. United States v Plascencia-Orozco (1985, CA9 Cal) 768
F2d 1074.
Failure to take count away from jury on basis of "exculpatory no" doctrine, which resulted in finding of guilt and
sentence, was not reversible error, where there existed only small window of opportunity for application of "exculpatory
no" exception, and this was only issue preserved on appeal. Moser v United States (1994, CA7 Wis) 18 F3d 469 (criticized in United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5).
Totality of circumstances required vacating private developer's convictions on two counts of violating 18 USCS §
1001 by submitting false information to FmHA, where prosecutor's depiction of him had decidedly pejorative connotation, prosecutor encouraged jury to consider irrelevant and inadmissible evidence, and jury could have had reasonable
doubt as to his intent to deceive FmHA. United States v Rooney (1994, CA2 NY) 37 F3d 847.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's appeal of his 18 USCS § 666 bribery conviction was denied, but he was entitled to be resentenced due to district court's plain Booker error as (1) government presented sufficient evidence to support conviction;
(2) defendant's U.S. Const. amend. VI Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by admission of third party's
out-of-court statements, and admission of such statements did not violate federal evidentiary rules, because statements
were not admitted for their truth; and (3) court presumed prejudice arising out of district court's Booker error because
record did not indicate whether or not defendant would have received lesser sentence under advisory federal guidelines
scheme. United States v Guishard (2006, CA3 VI) 2006 US App LEXIS 643.
Unpublished: Defendant's motion for new trial as to Count Two was based upon his sister's affidavit that she was
present at his birth in Nogales, Arizona; district court reasonably found that defendant was not diligent in seeking such
evidence from his family members during year after he was indicted and before his trial began; furthermore, district court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that new evidence was unlikely to result in judgment of acquittal, in light of Government's evidence that defendant was born in Mexico. United States v Salazar (2009, CA4 SC) 2009 US App LEXIS
14835.
Unpublished: Defendant's motion for new trial as to Count Four was based upon sworn statement by human resource
specialist who prepared defendant's application for early retirement based upon January 30, 1954, date of birth that was
listed in his personnel records, in which she indicated that she was aware in April 2004 of discrepancies concerning
defendant's date of birth, contrary to her testimony at trial; district court found that evidence was not newly discovered
because it was provided to defendant, in substance, before trial and he attempted to impeach specialist's testimony with it
when she testified; furthermore, evidence was merely impeaching and was not sufficient to establish affirmative defense
of entrapment by estoppel because it established at most only that specialist, not other government employees who proposed defendant's early retirement, was aware of discrepancies between defendant's reported dates of birth. United States
v Salazar (2009, CA4 SC) 2009 US App LEXIS 14835.
Unpublished: Jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence; defendant did not contest that he claimed to have
been born in Nogales, Arizona, on questionnaire he submitted for purpose of maintaining his security clearance and
evidence that defendant's statement on questionnaire was knowingly false was persuasive; defendant challenged reliability of government's evidence and credibility of its witnesses at trial, but did not present any affirmative evidence that he
was born in Arizona, rather than Mexico; assuming that jury credited testimony of government's witnesses, and viewing
evidence in light most favorable to government, evidence was sufficient for reasonable jury to find defendant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. United States v Salazar (2009, CA4 SC) 2009 US App LEXIS 14835.
110. Search and seizure
18 USCS § 844(h)(2)--which prohibited carrying explosive "during" commission of any felony which might be
prosecuted in court of U.S.--did not include requirement that explosive had to be carried "in relation to" underlying fel-
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18 USCS § 1001
ony; thus, where respondent gave false information on customs form while attempting to enter U.S. (in violation of 18
USCS § 1001), and search of his car revealed explosives that he intended to detonate in this country, because his carrying
of explosives was contemporaneous with his 18 USCS § 1001 violation, he carried them "during" that violation. United
States v Ressam (2008, US) 128 S Ct 1858, 170 L Ed 2d 640, 21 FLW Fed S 248.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 government must return property seized since search warrant issued
in investigation of home-study school for possible fraudulent practices in connection with federal insured student loan
program did not satisfy particularity requirement where it was framed to allow seizure of almost all papers and was limited
only by qualification that seized item be evidence of violations of cited statutes which penalized very wide range of frauds
and conspiracies; at minimum, precise nature of fraud or conspiracy offense for which warrant was authorized should
have been stated in affidavit; even though warrant may have satisfied particularity requirements as regards student rosters,
student files, file jackets, and contents as well as lessening grading cards, it covered documents antedating school's participation in program, and affidavit did not indicate any connection between earlier document and alleged criminal behavior; warrant authorizing seizure of HEW documents and forms was too general since Office of Education operates
many programs in addition to student loan program and affidavit did not establish probable cause for seizure of
non-federal student loan documents and forms. In re Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc. (1979, CA1 RI) 610 F2d 1.
District court properly denied defendant's pretrial suppression motion, which challenged warrant-based search of his
home, which search resulted in defendant pleading guilty to sexual exploitation of minor, possession and receipt of materials involving sexual exploitation of minor, and making false statement offenses under 18 USCS § 2251(a), (e),
2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), (b)(1), (b)(2), 1001(a)(2) since (1) issuing judge's finding, that information provided to Federal
Bureau of Investigation by Spanish law enforcement computer crimes unit and its technique of tracking images using
"hash values" were reliable, was not clearly erroneous; (2) defendant did not contend that information provided by
computer crimes unit was stale, and warrant affidavit contained information that allowed issuing judge to make staleness
determination; (3) warrant was not invalid per se merely because it did not specify search strategy; (4) warrant met U.S.
Const. amend. IV particularity requirements as it described and identified items to be seized from his home computer; and
(5) defendant was not in custody and voluntarily made incriminating statements during search. United States v Cartier
(2008, CA8 ND) 543 F3d 442.
Airline traveler convicted under 18 USCS § 1001 for lying to Customs agent is not entitled to new trial on grounds
that Customs agent selected him for questioning solely because traveler was black, where agent approached traveler who
was waiting to board airplane and after questioning and pat down search located undeclared money in secret pouch,
because traveler's behavior fit profile of typical currency violators and agent's pat down search was based upon reasonable
suspicion and not on racial prejudice. United States v Obiuwevbi (1991, ND Ill) 788 F Supp 351, affd (1992, CA7 Ill)
962 F2d 1236, 35 Fed Rules Evid Serv 773.
111. Miscellaneous
Defendants' convictions for environmental violations were reversed due to trial judge's ex parte meeting with jury
foreperson; judge's comments may have impressed on jury obligation to return verdict, and judge's instruction on definition of overt act created risk that foreperson would provide innocent misstatements of law to jury. United States v Peters
(2003, CA5 Tex) 349 F3d 842, 57 Envt Rep Cas 1353, 62 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1261.
Case was remanded to determine whether defendant could establish fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea to
18 USCS § 1001 pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 because there was no indication that district court had applied proper
standard, i.e., that defendant need only show proper advice could have at least plausibly motivated him not to have pled
guilty. United States v McTiernan (2008, CA9 Cal) 546 F3d 1160.
In ruling on vessel owner's motion to dismiss prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 for separate offense that occurred
when cruise ship, following its alleged improper discharge of oil outside territorial waters of U.S., falsely represented to
Coast Guard that no such discharge had occurred, District Court would not consider implications of its decision on international balance of powers, as representing nonjusticiable political issue properly reserved to executive branch. United
States v Royal Caribbean Cruises (1998, SD Fla) 11 F Supp 2d 1358, 1998 AMC 1817.
Where defendant allegedly made unauthorized disclosures of classified information about ambassador's wife's affiliation with Central Intelligence Agency to journalists and allegedly made false statements to federal agents and grand
jury, defendant's motion to compel discovery was granted as to, inter alia, documentation of discussions defendant had
with government officials or reports regarding ambassador or wife, but motion was denied as to documents concerning
ambassador and wife. United States v Libby (2006, DC Dist Col) 432 F Supp 2d 81.
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In case in which defendant moved for new trial or for acquittal, arguing that addition of Count Five, which alleged
violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) in superceding indictment was vindictive prosecution following reversal of several of
his convictions and remand by appellate court, government successfully rebutted presumption of vindictiveness created
by defendant because government changed its trial strategy, and government had justified its change of trial strategy, that
was, adding Count Five to superseding indictment, by setting forth neutral, rational reasons related to evidentiary and
other procedural problems that became apparent only after first trial and decision of court of appeals. United States v
Safavian (2009, DC Dist Col) 644 F Supp 2d 1.
In case in which defendant moved for new trial or for acquittal, arguing that addition of Count Three, which alleged
violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) in superceding indictment was vindictive prosecution following reversal of several of
his convictions and remand by appellate court, government successfully rebutted presumption of vindictiveness created
by defendant; government argued that one witness's testimony and at least some of evidence was not available to government prior to first trial because process under Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between United States and United
Kingdom had not been completed. United States v Safavian (2009, DC Dist Col) 644 F Supp 2d 1.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: District court did not clearly err in denying defendant's Batson motion where Government's proffered
explanation was that it struck African-American juror based on its belief that he may have been biased as result of his
brother's pending criminal charge and no empaneled juror had pending criminal charge or family member with pending
criminal charge. United States v Norris (2005, CA4 SC) 140 Fed Appx 443.
Unpublished: Defendant was properly convicted of using telephone to convey false information concerning bomb, in
violation of 18 USCS § 844(e), and of making false statements to law enforcement officer in violation of 18 USCS §
1001(a)(2) because (1) government's reference in its rebuttal summation to testimony of defendant's acquaintance, who
said he was with defendant at airport where she made 911 call but did not see her with anyone else there, was not new
theory of case and was not ultimately prejudicial, and (2) district court did not err in denying defendant's request to give
surrebuttal summation or curative instruction. United States v Faisal (2008, CA2) 2008 US App LEXIS 12396.
Unpublished: In case in which defendant appealed his convictions for violating 18 USCS §§ 876(c) and 1001 by
arguing that district court judge was required to recuse himself under 28 USCS § 455(a), he argued unsuccessfully that
proper procedure for waiver was not followed in case because there was not full disclosure on record of basis of disqualification; he expressly waived his right to file motion to have district court judge removed and, therefore, could not
base his appeal on § 455(a); he agreed to consolidate charges against him and proceed with sentencing in front of district
court judge, who considered whether he needed to recuse himself and determined that such action was unnecessary;
furthermore, district court judge repeatedly explained to defendant that he had, and was waiving, right to seek recusal
because of potential conflict based on threatening letter defendant mailed to district court judge's chambers. United States
v Disch (2009, CA11 Ga) 2009 US App LEXIS 17470.
Unpublished: In case in which defendant appealed his convictions for violating 18 USCS §§ 876(c) and 1001, he
argued unsuccessfully that district court judge was required to recuse himself under 28 USCS § 455(b) because judge was
victim in proceeding and, therefore, (1) qualified as party to proceeding and (2) had financial interest in case because he
was entitled to mandatory restitution under 18 USCS § 3663(A); defendant had sent threatening communications to
judge's chambers, however, he had pled guilty to making false statements to FBI agent, and he was not charged with
making threat to judge; circumstances made it apparent that his threats were motivated by desire to cause recusal. United
States v Disch (2009, CA11 Ga) 2009 US App LEXIS 17470.
B.Indictment or Information
1.In General 112. Duplicity and multiplicity
In 18 USCS § 1001, enumeration of different kinds of conduct reflect different modes of achieving same result and
not separate and distinct offenses, thus, indictment which alleged different kinds of conduct in single count based on
single document was not duplicitous; submission of false documents to Government is not essential element of violation
of 18 USCS § 1001, thus, in § 1001 prosecution in which indictment contained 28 counts each count based on a separate
document defendant's contention that regardless of how many false documents may have been prepared there are only as
many offenses as there are submissions, and therefore two or more counts based on one submission would be multiplicitous, was rejected. United States v UCO Oil Co. (1976, CA9 Cal) 546 F2d 833, cert den (1977) 430 US 966, 52 L Ed 2d
357, 97 S Ct 1646.
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18 USCS § 1001
Counts of indictment charging violations of 18 USCS § 1001 are not duplicitous since each count involved only one
Medicare or Medicaid claim form, although some forms were alleged to contain 2 or more false items submitted for
payment; government had charged only one crime in each count and, though there may be more than one piece of evidence to support each count, counts are not duplicitous. United States v Adler (1980, CA8 Mo) 623 F2d 1287.
In prosecution for conspiracy, making false statements to United States Department of Labor, theft and embezzlement, and filing false income tax returns, indictment counts charging defendant with submitting certain misleading invoices and counts charging defendant with submitting closeout reports that were summations of such misleading invoices
are not subject to attack based upon duplicity because each false document made or submitted can be charged as separate
offense of making false statements to United States Department of Labor. United States v Bennett (1983, CA9 Cal) 702
F2d 833.
Indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 was not multiplicitous, where customs broker's three statements made to government agents concerning refund checks she expected to receive were distinct and not repeated iterations of initial assertion, since different proof would be required to prove falsity of first two statements, made at same time, and third
statement was new representation. United States v Segall (1987, CA9 Cal) 833 F2d 144, 24 Fed Rules Evid Serv 348.
Separate counts under 18 USCS §§ 666 and 1001 based on same criminal behavior were not multiplicitous, since §
666 requires proof of several facts not required to establish violation of § 1001. United States v Frazier (1995, CA10 Utah)
53 F3d 1105, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 96 (criticized in United States v Ferrera (1997, CA7 Ill) 107 F3d 537) and (criticized
in United States v Maher (1998, CA4 Va) 1998 US App LEXIS 27771) and (criticized in United States v Kinney (2000,
CA2 NY) 211 F3d 13).
Indictment charging violations of 18 USCS §§ 1163, 1001, and 666 was not impermissibly multiplicitous, even
though evidence overlapped, since each charge required proof of at least one element that others did not. United States v
Wilkinson (1997, CA8 ND) 124 F3d 971, 47 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1057, reh, en banc, den (1997, CA8) 1997 US App
LEXIS 27817 and cert den (1998) 522 US 1133, 140 L Ed 2d 146, 118 S Ct 1089.
Two counts of 18 USCS § 1001(a) were multiplicitous where same FBI agent asked prisoner twice whether he had
threatened federal judge and prison made identical denials both times; it could not be said that prisoner's second denial
further impaired operations of government. United States v Stewart (2005, CA9 Ariz) 420 F3d 1007.
Claims that indictment alleging scheme to conceal improprieties in real estate transactions was multiplicitous would
be "better sorted out post-trial" to permit development of factual issues as to what statements were made, what acts of
concealment were committed, and whether later acts or statements further impaired operations of government. United
States v Hubbell (1999, App DC) 336 US App DC 144, 177 F3d 11.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was not duplicitous because it charged defendants with making false
statement and making and using false statement or document knowing same to contain false statement or entry. United
States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F Supp 1120.
Defendants' Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B) motion to dismiss count nine as multiplicitous of counts seven and eight
was denied where (1) counts seven through nine of second superceding indictment alleged violations of 18 USCS §§ 2 and
1001; (2) count seven alleged that defendants, as principals and as aiders and abettors, caused witness to provide material
and untruthful information; (3) count eight alleged that defendants, as principals and as aiders and abettors, caused second
witness to provide material and untruthful information; and (4) count nine alleged that defendants, as principals and as
aiders and abettors, did knowingly and willfully, make materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent, statement or representation, in matter within jurisdiction of executive, legislative, or judicial, branch of Government of U.S.; defendants' act of
actively conveying untruthful information to assigned Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) was separate act made at distinct
time from their role in allegedly facilitating provision of false information by two witnesses; their repetition of witnesses'
false statements, which separately formed basis for counts seven and eight, to assigned AUSA, knowing that such
statements were false, could support separate charge under count nine. United States v Brown (2007, DC Dist Col) 503 F
Supp 2d 217.
113. Joinder and severance
If indictment charging that in matter within jurisdiction of Department of Air Force defendant had filed certificate in
which he had falsely denied that he had been member of Communist Party and that in same document defendant had
falsely denied that he had been affiliated or associated with Communist Party charged 2 offenses, they were properly
joined under USCS Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8(a). Ogden v United States (1962, CA9 Cal) 303 F2d 724.
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Joinder in same indictment of 13 counts charging defendant with uttering of false documents and making of false
statements to influence action of FHA was proper under USCS Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8(a), offenses being of
same or similar character and growing out of common plan of operation. Roth v United States (1964, CA10 Colo) 339
F2d 863.
Joinder in same indictment of 4 counts charging defendant with submission of false mortgage applications to FHA to
secure mortgage insurance and to 2 federally insured savings and loan associations to secure mortgage loans was proper
under USCS Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8(a). United States v Berlin (1973, CA2 NY) 472 F2d 1002, cert den
(1973) 412 US 949, 37 L Ed 2d 1001, 93 S Ct 3007.
Joinder of fraud charges with mail and wire fraud scheme is warranted where fraud charges are integral part and are
all part of common scheme. United States v Medows (1982, SD NY) 540 F Supp 490.
Balancing of competing considerations of F.R. Crim. P. 8 and 14 favors joinder of conspiracy and mail fraud charge
and charge of 18 USCS § 1001 false statements since (1) conspiracy and mail fraud offenses arise out of same overall
transaction or insurance "give-up" scheme as offense of making false statements, (2) offenses require common elements
of proof, and (3) FBI agent's testimony relating to false statements will not impair defendant's presumption of innocence
any more than will agent's testimony relating to conspiracy and mail fraud charges. United States v Gilpin (1988, ND Ill)
678 F Supp 1361.
Defendant's claim that codefendants did not tell him true status of corporation's ownership interest in other company
did not show mutually antagonistic defenses requiring severance of charge under 18 USCS § 1001, given allegations in
indictment that, although other defendants did not tell defendant of status of ownership interest, he knew of it from contract documents. United States v Dunne (2001, DC Utah) 134 F Supp 2d 1231, subsequent app (2003, CA10 Utah) 324
F3d 1158.
114. Bill of particulars
Specific allegations in indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 were in nature of bill of particulars, which government
would have been required to furnish had it not voluntarily done so in indictment itself. Stevens v United States (1953,
CA6 Tenn) 206 F2d 64.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, grant or denial of bill of particulars is well within discretion of court. Sachs v
United States (1961, CA5 Ga) 293 F2d 623, cert den (1961) 368 US 939, 7 L Ed 2d 338, 82 S Ct 381.
Indictment charging defendant with violation of 18 USCS § 1001 which stated location of false statements and theory
under which government would argue them to be false, was not deficient in failing to inform defendant of nature of
charges so as to prepare a proper defense, especially where defense received extensive bill of particulars detailing underlying fraudulent acts. United States v Smith (1975, CA5 Fla) 523 F2d 771, cert den (1976) 429 US 817, 50 L Ed 2d 76,
97 S Ct 59, reh den (1976) 429 US 987, 50 L Ed 2d 599, 97 S Ct 509.
Motion for bill of particulars is warranted where count charges defendants with concealing material facts and causing
to be made certain false statements concerning transactions in currency although Government has not alleged what
statements it contends are false, nor has it alleged material facts which it contends defendants concealed. United States v
Konefal (1983, ND NY) 566 F Supp 698 (criticized in United States v Reguer (1995, ED NY) 901 F Supp 515) and (criticized in United States v Lopez (1997, ND NY) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 5631) and (criticized in United States v Rio (1997, ND
NY) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 15888) and (criticized in United States v Brunson (1998, ND NY) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 3867).
115. Dismissal of indictment or counts
Dismissal of indictment of gambler who made false statements on returns and registration application filed under §
4412 of Title 26 was not required by privilege against self-incrimination, as validity of government's demand for information is not element of 18 USCS § 1001 which prohibits making of false statements to any federal agency, and gambler
was not indicted for crime about which he had been forced to make incriminating statements. United States v Knox
(1969) 396 US 77, 24 L Ed 2d 275, 90 S Ct 363, 70-1 USTC P 15925, 27 AFTR 2d 1902.
Defendant's conviction, for making false statement by placing note and white powder at security desk suggesting that
powder was Anthrax and that Capitol police training exercise was being conducted, which defendant argued was done as
joke while he was Capitol police officer, was vacated and indictment was dismissed because false statement was not made
as part of investigation or review by entities specified in statute and because evidence did not show that such element
could have been proven. United States v Pickett (2004, App DC) 359 US App DC 205, 353 F3d 62.
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Dismissal of indictment is denied in prosecution for making false statements to federal agents, where motion was
based on "exculpatory no" exception, but where accused attached FBI reports to motion, because challenge was not to
sufficiency of indictment, but to sufficiency of evidence and was not properly determined at stage of proceedings involving challenge to indictments. United States v Antonucci (1987, ND Ill) 663 F Supp 243.
Indictment counts alleging violations of 18 USCS §§ 2 and 1001 must be dismissed, where independent counsel is
prosecuting holding corporation for conspiring to make and concealing illegal campaign contributions, because defendants had no duty to disclose uncharged criminal conduct under concealment prong of § 1001, and indictment does not
adequately allege use of affirmatively false writing under false statement prong. United States v Crop Growers Corp.
(1997, DC Dist Col) 954 F Supp 335, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99548.
Director's motion to dismiss false statement count brought against him under 18 USCS § 1001, on basis that underlying questions and context in which they were asked rendered them fundamentally ambiguous, was denied because
questions were capable of being reasonably understood and, thus, were not fundamentally ambiguous, and context in
which questions were asked did not make them fundamentally ambiguous. United States v Caputo (2003, ND Ill) 288 F
Supp 2d 912.
In case arising from U.S. Army contract for procurement of non-standard ammunition for use in Soviet-era weaponry
in which defendants moved to dismiss superseding indictment, which alleged violations of 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1031 and
1343, defendants unsuccessfully argued fraud charges in superseding indictment were invalid because charges were based
on breach of contract, which could not be used as basis of fraud charges; superseding indictment alleged that defendants
knowingly and with intent to defraud, did devise and intend to devise scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money
from United States and its agency, Department of Army, by means of material false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, knowing that pretenses, representations and promises were false and fraudulent when made. United
States v AEY, Inc. (2009, SD Fla) 603 F Supp 2d 1363, 21 FLW Fed D 567.
In case arising from U.S. Army contract for procurement of non-standard ammunition for use in Soviet-era weaponry
in which defendants moved to dismiss superseding indictment, which alleged violation of 18 USCS § 1001 defendants
unsuccessfully argued superseding indictment failed to adequately allege false statement charges; language on Certificates of Conformance, asking for Manufacturer (point of origin), was not invalid; defendants had falsely stated point of
origin, and contract explicitly incorporated Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Rule 252.225-7007,
which prohibited procurement of munitions from Communist Chinese military companies; thus, it seemed perfectly
reasonable that Certificate of Conformance, which existed to ensure that shipment conformed with contract, would ask
defendants to certify Manufacturer (point of origin) of ammunition, and defendants falsely stated point of origin. United
States v AEY, Inc. (2009, SD Fla) 603 F Supp 2d 1363, 21 FLW Fed D 567.
In case arising from U.S. Army contract for procurement of non-standard ammunition for use in Soviet-era weaponry
in which defendants moved to dismiss superseding indictment, which alleged conspiracy to violate 18 USCS §§ 1001,
1031, and 1343, all in violation of 18 USCS § 371, and substantive false statement, major fraud, and substantive wire fraud
violations, defendants unsuccessfully asserted that munitions supplied to U.S. Army did not violate Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement Rule 252.225-7007, applicable regulation in case, and therefore they did not conceal
or misrepresent anything to Department of Defense; it was alleged in superseding indictment that defendants repackaged
ammunition manufactured in People's Republic of China, and Rule 252.225-7007 implemented § 1211 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3461 (2006), and prohibited acquisition of
supplies or services covered by United States Munitions List, 22 CFR pt. 121, through contract or subcontract at any tier,
from any Communist Chinese military company. United States v AEY, Inc. (2009, SD Fla) 603 F Supp 2d 1363, 21 FLW
Fed D 567.
In case arising from U.S. Army contract for procurement of non-standard ammunition for use in Soviet-era weaponry
in which defendants moved to dismiss superseding indictment, which alleged conspiracy to violate 18 USCS §§ 1001,
1031, and 1343, all in violation of 18 USCS § 371, and substantive false statement, major fraud, and substantive wire fraud
violations, defendants unsuccessfully asserted that enforcing Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Rule
252.225-7007 violated Ex Post Facto Clause of U.S. Constitution; Administrative Procedure Act exempted government
procurement contracts from its notice and comment requirements, and rule 252.225-7007, was properly promulgated
under requirements of Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, 41 USCS §§ 401 et seq., and its implementing regulations, Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 CFR § 1.101 et seq. United States v AEY, Inc. (2009, SD Fla) 603 F Supp 2d
1363, 21 FLW Fed D 567.
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In case arising from U.S. Army contract for procurement of non-standard ammunition for use in Soviet-era weaponry
in which defendants moved to dismiss superseding indictment, which alleged conspiracy to violate 18 USCS §§ 1001,
1031, and 1343, all in violation of 18 USCS § 371, and substantive false statement, major fraud, and substantive wire fraud
violations, defendants unsuccessfully asserted that enforcing Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Rule
252.225-7007 was unconstitutionally vague; language of 48 CFR § 252.225-7007 provided notice of prohibited conduct
to person of common intelligence, and it did not conflict with § 1211 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3461 (2006). United States v AEY, Inc. (2009, SD Fla) 603 F Supp 2d 1363, 21
FLW Fed D 567.
Defendant was entitled to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 dismissal of indictment in part because some of alleged statements
constituting false statements charges under 18 USCS § 1001 were based on impermissibly ambiguous questions, which
were posed to defendant, and thus, did not constitute violations of this provision. United States v Kerik (2009, SD NY) 615
F Supp 2d 256.
116. Miscellaneous
Although word "facilitate" does not appear in text of either 18 USCS § 1001 or § 1002, use in indictment of that verb
in conjunction with, and not as alternate to, other verbs directly quoted from statute was mere harmless surplusage.
United States v Rodriguez (1977, CA2 NY) 556 F2d 638, cert den (1978) 434 US 1062, 55 L Ed 2d 762, 98 S Ct 1233.
Withdrawal by prosecution of count of violation of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.) filed in
connection with 40 counts of falsifying records did not amount to unlawful amendment of indictment, since nothing was
added thereto and counts were independent. United States v Diaz (1982, CA11 Fla) 690 F2d 1352.
Indictment charging making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was sufficient, notwithstanding that
indictment did not specifically allege that defendant falsified material fact or that false statements were material. United
States v Banks (2001, CA6 Tenn) 27 Fed Appx 354, 88 AFTR 2d 6182.
Two and one-half year delay between when defendant committed crime of making false entry on firearms permit, in
violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), and when he was indicted did not violate defendant's U.S. Const. amend. V due
process rights because there was no evidence that delay was intentionally created by government for purpose of gaining
tactical advantage. United States v Ingram (2006, CA11 Fla) 446 F3d 1332, 19 FLW Fed C 477.
U.S. Supreme Court has determined that criminal limitations statutes must be liberally interpreted in favor of repose
and that doctrine of continuing offenses is to be applied only in limited circumstances. District Court finds that language
of 18 USCS § 1001 does not explicitly compel that conduct alleged in indictment be construed as continuing offense, nor
does nature of alleged conduct compel such outcome - merely calling conduct scheme is not sufficient. United States v
Gremillion-Stovall (2005, MD La) 397 F Supp 2d 798.
In denying federal employee's motion to dismiss count of indictment for making false statement when seeking ethics
advice, court rejected as of no significance defendant's argument that regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.107, did not itself warn
of potential criminal liability; otherwise every regulation creating legitimate government function would have needed to
reference 18 USCS § 1001 in order to provide basis for prosecution under that statute, and in any event, regulation itself
contemplated potential for criminal prosecution arising out of information provided to ethics officer. United States v
Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 429 F Supp 2d 156.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where alien was ordered removed from United States on basis of his conviction for credit card theft in
violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-128c, alien's waiver of his right to seek nunc pro tunc reduction of his one-year prison
sentence so that underlying conviction would not qualify as aggravated felony conviction within meaning of 8 USCS §
1101(a)(43)(G) was voluntary because: (1) alien's attorney had informed court that it was not in alien's best interest to
seek nunc pro tunc reduction; (2) indictment charging attorney with violations of 18 USCS §§ 2, 1001, and 1546 presented
waivable conflict; (3) alien understood significance of indictment and potential conflict; and (4) alien consented to attorney's continued representation. Wilks v Gonzales (2007, CA2) 2007 US App LEXIS 4703.
Unpublished: Federal district court did not impermissibly broaden count against defendant that alleged false, fraudulent, and fictitious material statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by instructing jury that it could find defendant
guilty if it found that she made material false statement or concealed or covered up material fact by trick, scheme, or
device; district court's instruction on specific charge pertaining to defendant was taken largely from indictment and did not
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amend it; moreover, district court made clear in its instructions that defendant was accused of specific false statements,
which jury could then judge if she made. United States v Dwyer (2007, CA1 Mass) 2007 US App LEXIS 20259.
Unpublished: Defendant's convictions for violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) were affirmed because he waived his
ability to claim indictment was defective since he did not raise issue in pre-trial motion and he could not show indictment
failed to invoke court's jurisdiction or to state offense; he also failed to show good cause for relief from waiver because he
had all information necessary to challenge indictment before trial began but failed to do so. United States v Milo (2008,
CA11 Fla) 2008 US App LEXIS 5054.
2.Sufficiency and Particular Allegations 117. Language of statute
Indictment was sufficient although it did not use words in matter within jurisdiction of department or agency of
United States, but stated facts which showed that concealing and covering up occurred in such matter. Chevillard v
United States (1946, CA9 Cal) 155 F2d 929.
Indictment which uses statutory language charging concealment by "trick, scheme, or device" is sufficient to inform
defendants of charges against them and states offense under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v London (1977, CA5 Ga)
550 F2d 206.
Where each count of indictment specified what was false about cited document or documents submitted to state
department, inasmuch as each count alleged that false statement was submitted in matter within jurisdiction of specified
federal agency, that is, state department, it was unnecessary for indictment further to allege that false statements were
"material and capable of influencing" state department; and even though word "facilitate" does not appear in text of §§
1001 or 1002, use in indictment of that verb in conjunction with, and not as alternate to, other verbs directly quoted from
statute was mere harmless surplusage. United States v Rodriguez (1977, CA2 NY) 556 F2d 638, cert den (1978) 434 US
1062, 55 L Ed 2d 762, 98 S Ct 1233.
Indictment written in language of predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001 was not necessarily sufficient; where statute defines crime in broad and general language which merely describes general nature of offense charged, indictment should
describe with greater particularity offense charged. United States v Devine's Milk Laboratories, Inc. (1960, DC Mass)
179 F Supp 799.
118. Substantive offenses
Indictment charging defendant with falsifying his dispensation record of morphine dispensed by him between named
dates was insufficient for not setting out showing as to time and place and person of each separate dispensation, since all
government was required to do was to prove dispensation record false. Mitchell v United States (1944, CA10 Okla) 143
F2d 953.
Indictment for willful and false concealment of wage and hour records during course of investigation by wage and
hour division of United States department of wages must allege that defendants were engaged in interstate commerce
within coverage of Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USCS §§ 201 et seq.). United States v Moore (1950, CA5 Fla) 185 F2d
92, 19 CCH LC P 66031.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by making false statement in connection with bringing foreign currency
through United States Customs was not defective for failure to expressly mention regulation defining monetary instruments to include Canadian currency or citation of wrong customs forms used. United States v Fitzgibbon (1978, CA10
Colo) 576 F2d 279, cert den (1978) 439 US 910, 58 L Ed 2d 256, 99 S Ct 279.
Indictment against defendant, official of labor union, for making false affidavit that he was not member of Communist Party, and not affiliated with Communist Party, was not uncertain and vague on ground that indictment failed to
allege that defendant was member of or affiliated with Communist Party. United States v Valenti (1952, DC NJ) 106 F
Supp 121, 30 BNA LRRM 2709, 22 CCH LC P 67174, revd on other grounds (1953, CA3 NJ) 207 F2d 242, 32 BNA LRRM
2655, 24 CCH LC P 67827.
119. Falsity of statement
In prosecution for submission of allegedly false Medicare claims in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, indictment which
identified each of documents relied on, dates and patients involved, period covered, and which specified types of falsifications charged adequately laid out grand jury's charges and general factual circumstances underlying them so as not to
violate guarantee of Fifth Amendment, despite use of general terms and alleged failure to state particulars in connection
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with misstatements. United States v Radetsky (1976, CA10 Colo) 535 F2d 556, cert den (1976) 429 US 820, 50 L Ed 2d
81, 97 S Ct 68 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994).
Indictment is sufficient to allege violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where it specifically states that appellant caused to be
used false time sheet containing false statement of hours worked. United States v Mouton (1981, CA5 Tex) 657 F2d 736.
Indictment failed to allege false statement, where contractor's certification that he had made payments to subcontractors and suppliers from previous payments he had received under contract was not inconsistent with his having yet to
pay subcontractors in full. United States v Gatewood (1999, CA6 Tenn) 173 F3d 983, 1999 FED App 126P, reh den (1999,
CA6 Tenn) 1999 US App LEXIS 10900.
For purposes of prosecution for making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, evidence was sufficient to
allow jury to find that defendant's statements to investigators were false rather than literally true but misleading, with
respect to his knowledge of shadow hiring system; as result, district court did not err by rejecting jury instruction with
respect to defendant's answering of question in way that was literally true but unresponsive. United States v Sorich (2008,
CA7 Ill) 523 F3d 702.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, allegation in indictment is sufficient where it alleges that particular
defendant caused to be made false written statement as to material facts in matter within jurisdiction of agency of United
States even though it does not specify federal agency involved but refers simply to federal funds. United States v Brown
(1981, WD Wis) 521 F Supp 511.
Labor leader is entitled to have stricken from indictment several specifications of allegedly false statements, even if
certain hypothetical situations presented in government questioning can be shown to have occurred and to have produced
different response from leader, because when subject describes what he "would have done" rather than what he actually
did he is not bound by reality but rather is free to describe course of action which would have been appropriate under
circumstances. United States v Carey (2001, SD NY) 152 F Supp 2d 415.
Rational juror could have found that defendant made false statement to FBI based on agent's testimony that defendant
admitted to accidentally calling fax machine and defendant's contradictory statement at trial that he never admitted to
calling fax machine. United States v Reich (2006, ED NY) 420 F Supp 2d 75.
In denying federal employee's motion to dismiss counts of indictment for making false statements, court found it
impossible, with number of facts and incidents that took place over time period alleged, to reduce question of falsity to
single statement with single answer, as employee urged court to do, and indictment did not do so. Thus, court declined to
dismiss indictment for failure to allege falsity necessary to prove charge. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col)
429 F Supp 2d 156.
Even though specification alleges uttering of writing falsely made, no offense is set out under 18 USCS § 1001 or
under Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military Justice where specification fails to allege falsity of contents. United
States v Hutchins (1955) 5 USCMA 422, 18 CMR 46; United States v Sher (1956, US) 21 CMR 371.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant was entitled to reversal of her conviction for making false statement to federal officer under
18 USCS § 1001 because indictment completely failed to identify what alleged false statement was. United States v
Cuevas (2008, CA9 Cal) 2008 US App LEXIS 15337.
120. Intent, knowledge and willfulness
Indictment charging defendant, an osteopath, with violation of 18 USCS § 1001 for submitting false Medicare claims,
was fatally defective since it did not specifically allege that defendant committed the offense "willfully"; allegations in the
indictment of "fraudulent statement," "as he then knew he had not performed such services," and "knowingly," were not
allegations of similar import to allegation of "willfulness" and they import no more than that defendant acted "with
knowledge," a separate and distinct element of a § 1001 offense. United States v Mekjian (1975, CA5 Fla) 505 F2d 1320.
Indictment which alleges in Count 1 that 31 USCS § 1121 violation was in furtherance of violation of both 18 USCS
§§ 371 and 1001 is valid where indictment clearly alleges intentional concealment of information that should have been
reported to Customs Service. United States v Hajecate (1982, CA5 Tex) 683 F2d 894, 83-1 USTC P 9192, 51 AFTR 2d
1282, cert den (1983) 461 US 927, 77 L Ed 2d 298, 103 S Ct 2086.
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In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS §§ 371 and 1001 agents' intent to benefit corporation is not essential element
of crime which must be specifically alleged. United States v Cincotta (1982, CA1 Mass) 689 F2d 238, 11 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 423, cert den (1982) 459 US 991, 74 L Ed 2d 387, 103 S Ct 347.
In reviewing convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Violent Crimes in Aid of
Racketeering Act, appellate court, in rejecting Government's Pinkerton theory of liability, determined that rational juror
could not have concluded that two of defendants could have reasonably foreseen when they entered into their
false-statement conspiracy in 1994 that co-conspirator, as natural or necessary consequence of their agreement, would
make false statement to FBI agent in course of federal grand jury investigation that was convened six years later. United
States v Bruno (2004, CA2 NY) 383 F3d 65.
Indictment was sufficient if it alleged presentation of affidavit with signature known to be false and forged. United
States v Adler (1892, DC Iowa) 49 F 733.
Indictment charging defendant violated 18 USCS § 1001 when he stated to assistant United States Attorney that
certain person had stolen checks from him and that by means of forgery such person had cashed same and that at time he
made this statement defendant knew statement was untrue and that this was false statement of material fact in matter
within jurisdiction of department of United States, was good. United States v Van Valkenburg (1958, DC Alaska) 17
Alaska 450, 157 F Supp 599.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 which alleged that defendant "did knowingly and willfully transport
monetary instruments" from United States onto airplane bound for Brazil "without filing a report" sufficiently alleged
willful failure to file report. United States v Pereira (1978, ED NY) 463 F Supp 481.
Indictment properly alleged violation in prosecution of bookmakers' scheme to launder money where larger sum was
divided into smaller transactions of less than $ 10,000 each to avoid triggering federal currency transaction reporting
requirements under 31 USCS § 5313 because intentional concealment of true size of transaction resulted in concealment
of material facts required to be reported to government. United States v Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (1986, ED Pa) 650
F Supp 490, motion den sub nom United States v Cantley (1987, ED Pa) 1987 US Dist LEXIS 6247.
Indictment charging secretary of Puerto Rican municipality with violation of 18 USCS § 1001 is approved, where
attempt to minimize her role in transmitting information as "ministerial" is undermined by fact that she was secretary of
municipality during time when federal emergency funds were received and that she was personally responsible for preparing minutes attesting to bidding process which she knew had not taken place, because facts as alleged support charge
that she willfully presented documents to special investigator to validate disbursement of funds previously made, knowing
that these documents contained false information pertaining to nonexistent bids. United States v Reyes Mercado (1994,
DC Puerto Rico) 871 F Supp 103.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) because his
false statement to officer, staff member of Bureau of Prisons, contained his acknowledgement that he was informed that it
was violation of federal law to provide false information to federal agents, and defendant indicated that he acted purposefully in making statement. United States v Thomas (2006, CA5 Tex) 2006 US App LEXIS 739.
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for conspiracy to defraud U.S. and making false
statements under 18 USCS §§ 371, 2, and 1001 because evidence showed that defendant knew that his conduct was illegal
and he embarked on fraudulent scheme to use government grant for personal use and submitted fraudulent invoices for
work not performed. United States v Blockett (2009, CA5 Miss) 2009 US App LEXIS 9928.
121. Jurisdiction of federal entity
Indictment which stated that defendant submitted false statements to Securities and Exchange Commission and that
defendant operated business which sold commodity options to public and caused his business to buy and sell commodity
futures by use of various commodity brokerage firms sufficiently alleged nexus between subject matter of SEC investigation which led to defendant's submission of false documents and agency's regulatory authority to satisfy jurisdiction
requirement of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Di Fonzo (1979, CA7 Ill) 603 F2d 1260, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P
96957, cert den (1980) 444 US 1018, 62 L Ed 2d 648, 100 S Ct 672.
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Indictment alleging that defendant kept certain records for inspection of the Office of Price Administration, agency of
United States, showed that such records were made in matter within jurisdiction of department or agency of United States.
United States v Ganz (1942, DC Mass) 48 F Supp 323.
Motion to quash indictment based on 18 USCS § 1001 charging defendant with making false statements to, and receiving funds from, a state nonprofit corporation which was incorporated for purposes of designing, developing and
implementing programs to alleviate severe economic hardships of Mexican Americans and their hardcore unemployed,
was denied, since defendant's violation, set forth in indictment, was matter within "jurisdiction" of an agency of the United
States as required by the statute because nonprofit corporation was a subcontractor to national organization which was a
contractor to the Department of Labor which regulated use of government funds distributed through the national organization to nonprofit corporation. United States v Munoz (1974, ED Mich) 392 F Supp 183, affd without op (1975, CA6
Mich) 529 F2d 526.
Allegation concerning the making of false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 is insufficient unless it contains
essential element of averment that false statement was made in matter within jurisdiction of agency or department of
United States. United States v Davis (1968) 39 CMR 632.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: District court properly dismissed indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 against defendant who was
charged with making materially false statements in connection with allegedly false time card entries submitted to her
employer, prime contractor of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE); Government failed to establish element of "agency
jurisdiction" because DOE did not have power to act with regard to defendant's allegedly false time card entries; rather,
evidence demonstrated that defendant's alleged falsification of her time cards was peripheral to DOE's obligations and not
directly related to any DOE-authorized function. United States v Holstrom (2007, CA9 Wash) 2007 US App LEXIS 12329.
122. Materiality
Indictment, charging that accused "unlawfully, knowingly and willfully made false, fictitious and fraudulent statement" in matter within jurisdiction of treasury department, was not legally insufficient for failure to allege that false
statement related to material fact. United States v Silver (1956, CA2 NY) 235 F2d 375, cert den (1956) 352 US 880, 1 L
Ed 2d 80, 77 S Ct 102.
Although materiality is essential element of offense defined in 18 USCS § 1001, indictment charging that manager of
electric cooperative made false statements to rural electrification administration, but not charging that statements were
material, was not insufficient where its fact allegations showed that they were material. Gonzales v United States (1960,
CA10 NM) 286 F2d 118, cert den (1961) 365 US 878, 6 L Ed 2d 190, 81 S Ct 1028 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by
United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994).
Inasmuch as each count in indictment alleged that false statement was submitted in matter within jurisdiction of
specified federal agency, it was unnecessary for indictment further to allege that false statements were "material and
capable of influencing" that agency. United States v Rodriguez (1977, CA2 NY) 556 F2d 638, cert den (1978) 434 US
1062, 55 L Ed 2d 762, 98 S Ct 1233.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 need not allege in what way alleged false statements were material, since
it need state only essential facts constituting offense charged and materiality of false statements were self-apparent.
United States v Kirby (1978, CA7 Ind) 587 F2d 876.
Government demonstrated sufficient basis of materiality in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where it
alleged that defendants failed to disclose kickback transaction in prospectus and in proxy statements. United States v
Fields (1978, CA2 NY) 592 F2d 638, cert den (1979) 442 US 917, 61 L Ed 2d 284, 99 S Ct 2838.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 need not use word materiality where it alleges sufficient facts to establish
that element. United States v Adler (1980, CA8 Mo) 623 F2d 1287.
It is incumbent upon Government to prove that defendant had duty to disclose material facts at time he was alleged to
have concealed them. United States v Irwin (1981, CA10) 654 F2d 671, cert den (1982) 455 US 1016, 72 L Ed 2d 133,
102 S Ct 1709 and (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994) and (ovrld on
other grounds as stated in United States v Allemand (1994, CA10 Wyo) 34 F3d 923).
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Indictment raised inference of materiality, where it alleged that defendant had ownership interest in business, since
his false statement to contrary could significantly have affected IRS's efforts to monitor and verify his tax liability, given
fact that most people are taxable entities and ownership interests in property invariably affect taxes. United States v
Ladum (1998, CA9 Or) 141 F3d 1328, 98 CDOS 2851, 98 Daily Journal DAR 3937, 98-1 USTC P 50345, 81 AFTR 2d
1576, cert den (1998) 525 US 898, 142 L Ed 2d 185, 119 S Ct 225 and cert den (1998) 525 US 1021, 142 L Ed 2d 457, 119
S Ct 549.
Indictment in exact language of statute was sufficient, although it failed to allege that false facts were material or to
state to whom false writing was submitted. United States v Varano (1953, DC Pa) 113 F Supp 867.
Allegations that, during investigation as to whether defendant held financial interest in warehouse and was rendering
or about to render services for it, he falsely denied any ownership, but then owned capital stock of corporation and later
received proceeds of sale of such stock, showed false statements were material to proper exercise of jurisdiction of department and the choice of personnel to administer and exercise such jurisdiction. United States v Cowart (1954, DC
Dist Col) 118 F Supp 903.
Materiality of alleged false statement need not be pleaded where offense charged is violation of the second or third
clauses of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Lange (1955, DC NY) 128 F Supp 797.
Indictment, charging defendant with causing to be made and causing to be used false writings or documents in circumstances constituting such acts crimes, was sufficient although it did not aver that falsity of writings was in relation to
material fact or facts, since that portion of 18 USCS § 1001 under which indictment lay contains no requirement that
falsity or misrepresentation be of material fact. United States v Okin (1955, DC NJ) 154 F Supp 553.
It is not necessary that indictment allege in haec verba that false statement was material; it is sufficient if materiality
can be inferred from facts. United States v Allen (1961, SD Cal) 193 F Supp 954.
Information charging false negative answer by applicant for temporary employment with post office department as to
arrests for violation of federal and state laws, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was good, as against contention that information failed to set forth facts showing that false statement was material. United States v Blake (1962, WD Mo) 206 F
Supp 706, affd (1963, CA8 Mo) 323 F2d 245.
Indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 is sufficient if facts alleged show materiality of allegedly false statement. United
States v Olin Corp. (1979, WD NY) 465 F Supp 1120.
Indictment properly alleged violation in prosecution of bookmakers' scheme to launder money where larger sum was
divided into smaller transactions of less than $ 10,000 each to avoid triggering federal currency transaction reporting
requirements under 31 USCS § 5313 because intentional concealment of true size of transaction resulted in concealment
of material facts required to be reported to government. United States v Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. (1986, ED Pa) 650
F Supp 490, motion den sub nom United States v Cantley (1987, ED Pa) 1987 US Dist LEXIS 6247.
In denying federal employee's motion to dismiss counts of indictment for making false statements, court rejected
employee's argument that his misrepresentation or concealment, if any, were not shown by indictment to have had natural
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, decision of decision making body because bases for argument were
documents and evidence outside of indictment which employee asked court to accept at face value (with his particular
interpretation of them) without waiting to hear testimony of witnesses at trial and consider evidence presented. Furthermore, issue of whether or not decision was material was one for jury. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col)
429 F Supp 2d 156.
Allegations that defendant's alleged false statements under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) were not material did not require
dismissal of his indictment because materiality of false statements was question for jury to resolve at trial and did not
concern adequacy of indictment. United States v Adams (2007, WD Va) 472 F Supp 2d 811.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied because government presented
sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for making false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; government sufficiently proved that false statements that defendant gave to federal investigator were "material" because
defendant was local conservation enforcement officer, investigator had initially relied upon defendant's good faith as
fellow enforcement official, investigator was misled by defendant, and investigator switched focus of interview once he
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realized that defendant had not been entirely truthful with him. United States v Guishard (2006, CA3 VI) 2006 US App
LEXIS 643.
123. Trick, scheme or device
Indictment was not insufficient because it failed to allege trick, scheme, or device by which the material fact was to be
concealed, since it was knowing falsity of statement which is material part of statutory crime, not vehicle of its preparation. United States v Uram (1945, CA2 NY) 148 F2d 187.
Indictment which uses statutory language charging concealment by "trick, scheme, or device" is sufficient to inform
defendants of charges against them and states offense under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v London (1977, CA5 Ga)
550 F2d 206.
Real estate developer's use of false loan closing statement to document and justify $ 2,225,000 loan amount, his
causing true closing statement to carry camouflaged disbursement hiding his conversion of $ 612,000 overage to his own
use and his admission that he had willfully concealed true purchase price in order to get loan larger than purchase price
were sufficient to allow jury to conclude that he had concealed and covered up true purchase price by trick, scheme and
device. United States v Swaim (1985, CA5 Miss) 757 F2d 1530, cert den (1985) 474 US 825, 88 L Ed 2d 66, 106 S Ct 81
and (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
Indictment adequately alleged that bank customers violated 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 2 by aiding and abetting structuring of financial transactions of purchases of money orders totaling over $ 10,000 so as to avoid bank's duty to file
CTR's, where they conspired with bank officers, who were aware of transactions to degree sufficient to impose duty upon
bank, although defendants themselves had no duty to disclose, even though indictment failed to define particularly
"scheme and device." United States v Farm & Home Sav. Ass'n (1991, CA8 Mo) 932 F2d 1256, cert den (1991) 502 US
860, 116 L Ed 2d 141, 112 S Ct 179.
Indictment charging that ". . . defendant did conceal and cover up by trick, scheme and device. . . a material fact in the
following manner, to-wit;. . . the defendant furnished and delivered rolls of paper of a stated specification. . . under a
contract,. . . that called for furnishing and delivering rolls of paper of a different specification. . . , and the defendant well
knew that the said paper furnished and delivered did not comply with the required specification and the defendant willfully and knowingly committed the said fraud. . . ." was insufficient in that it failed to set forth essential facts showing
concealment or covering up or any trick, scheme, or device. United States v Harris (1962, MD Ga) 217 F Supp 86.
Indictment charging that the object of conspiracy was to knowingly and willfully cause the falsification and concealment by any trick, scheme and device a material fact and cause the making of a false writing and document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and entry in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was impermissibly vague and insufficient to state an offense where the overt acts alleged in the conspiracy count of the indictment
totally failed to indicate in any way the nature of the false information, or the agency to which the false information was to
be submitted. United States v Borland (1970, DC Del) 309 F Supp 280, 73 BNA LRRM 2399, 62 CCH LC P 10688.
Indictment charging defendants with concealing material facts in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 sufficiently describes
concealment scheme where count specifies dates, times, and locations of events while relying on statutory language
unsupported by additional facts. United States v Bank of New England, N.A. (1986, DC Mass) 640 F Supp 36.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's fraud convictions were proper because even though spendthrift trust appeared properly
created under Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 112.035, it was rendered self-settled sham for purpose of concealing assets from
FDIC and his activities in relation to trust constituted mail fraud, false statements, and concealment of assets under 18
USCS §§ 1341, 1001(a), and 1032. United States v McBirney (2008, CA5 Tex) 2008 US App LEXIS 752.
124. Use, presentation or filing of statement or document
It was not necessary to allege that defendants wrote and presented receipt, or that such receipt was to be used as
predicate for false bill or claim against United States. Chevillard v United States (1946, CA9 Cal) 155 F2d 929.
Evidence at trial demonstrated that defendant signed certain union forms for both 2003 and 2004, defendant told
Department of Labor investigators that she did, in fact, review forms, and defendant also admitted that consequences of
false statements on forms would meant that payments to her would go undetected; thus, there was more than sufficient
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evidence for reasonable jury to find defendant guilty of false statement offenses with which she was charged. United
States v Love (2008, CA8 Mo) 516 F3d 683.
Indictment was sufficient if it alleged presentation of affidavit with signature known to be false and forged. United
States v Adler (1892, DC Iowa) 49 F 733.
It was not necessary to allege in indictment for making false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and representations
in affidavit of non-Communist union officer that affidavit was filed. United States v Lohman (1953, DC Ohio) 127 F
Supp 432, 27 CCH LC P 69129.
Indictment for making false deposition did not need to allege use or attempted use of deposition or that claim had
been filed or was pending when deposition was made. United States v Rhodes (1887, CCD Mo) 30 F 431.
125. Miscellaneous
Allegation of loss or damage to government was not necessary in indictment under predecessor of 18 USCS § 1001.
United States v Goldsmith (1940, CA2 NY) 108 F2d 917, cert den (1940) 309 US 678, 84 L Ed 1022, 60 S Ct 715, reh den
(1940) 310 US 657, 84 L Ed 1420, 60 S Ct 1073 and reh den (1941) 313 US 599, 85 L Ed 1551, 61 S Ct 956.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 which alleged that in-office services listed on claim forms submitted for
payment under Medicare and Medicaid programs by defendant physician were not actually rendered was sufficient.
United States v Adler (1980, CA8 Mo) 623 F2d 1287.
Defendant's indictment sufficiently stated falsity and materiality elements under 18 USCS § 1001 to provide defendant with adequate notice of offense charged to overcome plain error review. United States v Hoover (2006, CA5 La)
467 F3d 496.
Indictment charging that defendants for purpose of inducing veterans administrator to insure dwelling made false
statement warranting that dwelling had been constructed "in substantial conformity with plans and specifications therefor'
was not invalid on ground of vagueness as to warranty. United States v Wender (1958, DC NY) 158 F Supp 496.
In denying federal employee's motion to dismiss counts of indictment for making false statements, court rejected
employee's argument that indictment failed to allege affirmative act to conceal material fact, that is lobbyist's business
dealings with GSA, because government, both in indictment and in its opposition, identified additional acts of concealment, other than one statement relied on by employee, such as employee's use of his home rather than work email. Taking
indictment on its face - and not holding it up against evidence that had not yet been admitted (and much of which consisted
of hearsay and required interpretation) - court concluded that indictment sufficiently alleged affirmative acts. United
States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 429 F Supp 2d 156.
There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of making false statements or acts of concealment under 18 USCS
§ 1001(a)(1) because jury was adequately instructed and had sufficient evidence to find that defendant had requisite intent
to commit each of false statement offenses and to find element of materiality; further, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
had jurisdiction to investigate whether defendant's participation in trip with lobbyists violated standards of ethical conduct
because Committee was investigating lobbyists' dealings with Indian tribes. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col)
451 F Supp 2d 232.
False statement counts under 18 USCS § 1001(a) were not dismissed under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) because "truth
paragraphs" satisfied stark contrast rule, defendant failed to show that statements were "fundamentally ambiguous," and
any issues related to interpreting precisely what defendant meant when uttering statements were properly left to jury to
decide at trial. United States v Hassoun (2007, SD Fla) 477 F Supp 2d 1210, 20 FLW Fed D 647, motions ruled upon
(2007, SD Fla) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 25086.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Evidence adduced at trial showed that former sheriffs department officer cooperated with investigators
and agreed to wear wire to record conversations with other members of department and Government recorded conversation between officer and defendant, during which officer told defendant he was looking for known drug dealer in order to
sell him half-kilogram of cocaine; FBI agents interviewed defendant as part of their investigation and during that recorded
interview, defendant twice told agents he had no idea why officer was looking for drug dealer; in light of recordings,
which were played for jury, sufficient evidence existed to support guilty verdict as to violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2).
United States v Adams (2009, CA4 Va) 2009 US App LEXIS 14035.
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C.Defenses 126. Authority
Appellant's assertion, that he was authorized, or reasonably believed that he was authorized, to sign his wife's name
on documents he submitted, constitutes affirmative defense which tends to negate government's charge that he "knowingly" submitted false documents. United States v West (1981, CA2 Vt) 666 F2d 16, 7 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1506.
127.--Federal entity
Once it appeared that department had colorable authority to do what it was doing, accused could not justify his
falsehood by collateral attack upon authority. United States v Barra (1945, CA2 NY) 149 F2d 489.
State department employee who was charged with making false and fraudulent statements and representations as to
membership and activities in Communist Party could not justify his falsehood by a collateral attack upon authority of
federal bureau of investigation, civil service commission and state department to investigate his activities in such subversive organization. United States v Marzani (1947, DC Dist Col) 71 F Supp 615, affd (1948, App DC) 83 US App DC
78, 168 F2d 133, affd (1948) 335 US 895, 93 L Ed 431, 69 S Ct 299.
Indictment charging owner of plywood mill with violation of 18 USCS § 1001, arising out of submission of production and consumption reports which falsely understated its use of resin, is stricken, where resin reporting requirements
were not in emissions permit or state implementation plan and where there is no federal authority to regulate resin, because resin consumption reports are not within jurisdiction of EPA and cannot form basis for criminal liability under §
1001. United States v Louisiana Pac. Corp. (1996, DC Colo) 925 F Supp 1484, 43 Envt Rep Cas 1025, 27 ELR 20405, app
dismd (1997, CA10 Colo) 106 F3d 345, 27 ELR 20715 (criticized in United States v Oakar (1997, App DC) 324 US App
DC 104, 111 F3d 146) and (criticized in United States v Serafini (1999, CA3 Pa) 167 F3d 812).
128. Double jeopardy
Union president may not be convicted under Landrum-Griffin Act for willfully making false entry in union records
and of violating 18 USCS § 1001 based on his activities in connection with only one record book. United States v Sullivan (1980, CA8 Mo) 618 F2d 1290, 89 CCH LC P 12105, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1230.
District Court did not err in refusing to dismiss portion of indictment charging violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1623 on
grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel, where defendants had previously been acquitted of willfully and
knowingly misapplying moneys entrusted to bank with intent to injure and defraud bank in violation of 18 USCS § 656,
and willfully and knowingly making false material statement to bank for purposes of influencing actions of that bank in
violation of 18 USCS § 1014, and conspiracy to commit those offenses under 18 USCS § 371, even though conspiracy
charge in present indictment was dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, since substantive offenses charged under each
indictment involved completely different statutory violations requiring proof of different facts, and involved completely
different transactions. United States v Levy (1986, CA5 La) 803 F2d 1390.
Punishment under both 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 1014 for same acts of making false statements to federally insured
financial institution did not violate double jeopardy, since Congress intended to allow cumulative sentences under 2
offenses, where 2 statutes are directed at different ends, and where, although § 1014 requires additional element of intent
to influence financial institution, not merely any government agency, § 1001 does not appear to be lesser included offense
of § 1014. United States v York (1989, CA5 Tex) 888 F2d 1050, 29 Fed Rules Evid Serv 142, reh den (1989, CA5) 1989
US App LEXIS 19532.
Double jeopardy did not bar retrial on all 6 statements made to FBI agents in furtherance of grand jury investigation,
and alleged to be false on Count 1 under 18 USCS § 1001, where jury found defendant guilty of first statement by special
verdict and made no finding as to others, since there was no implicit acquittal; Count 2 of indictment, alleging that justice
was obstructed by means of one or more false statement enumerated in Count 1, was sufficient, even without itemizing
particular statements, since it adequately protected defendant's right to be tried on charges presented to Grand Jury; double
jeopardy would not be violated by his retrial on Count 2, since each count stated separate offense, and defendant had
moved to dismiss on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence. United States v Wood (1992, CA10 NM) 958
F2d 963, reh den, amd (1992, CA10) 1992 US App LEXIS 4656.
Double Jeopardy Clause prevented multiple convictions for violations of l8 USCS §§ 542, l00l for making false
statements and misrepresentations to Customs officials, since every element needed to prove violation of § l00l is element
of § 542, and there is no clear indication of congressional intent to provide for cumulative punishments under both statutes. United States v Avelino (1992, CA2 NY) 967 F2d 815.
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18 USCS § 1001
Defendant may properly be punished both under 18 USCS § 287 for making false claim against United States and
under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statement in matter within jurisdiction of United States Probation Office, even
though he committed only one act of lying about his ownership of Porsche during interview to determine whether he
qualified for court-appointed counsel, since each statute requires proof of fact which other does not. United States v
Allen (1993, CA4 NC) 13 F3d 105, 6 Fourth Cir & Dist Col Bankr Ct Rep 110.
Double jeopardy did not bar prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 for materially false representations made to Customs,
where same statements had been determined in pretrial hearing to be immaterial under 18 USCS § 1623, since jeopardy
never attached to first indictment, and question of materiality varies in context of each charge. United States v Bailey
(1994, CA8 Mo) 34 F3d 683.
Double jeopardy clause did not bar government from prosecuting defendant for stealing money from federal agency
under 18 USCS § 641 and making materially false statement to federal agency under 18 USCS § 1001(a) based on same
acts of submitting false time cards for same pay period, since 18 § 1001(a), which required proof of materially false
statement which 18 USCS § 641 did not, could not be lesser included offense of § 641, which required proof of theft of
more than $ 100, which § 1001(a) did not. United States v Turner (1997, CA8 Mo) 130 F3d 815, cert den (1998) 524 US
909, 141 L Ed 2d 147, 118 S Ct 2071, subsequent app (1999, CA8 Mo) 189 F3d 712, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1048, reh, en
banc, den (1999, CA8) 1999 US App LEXIS 23014.
Assessment of civil penalties of $ 400,000 against tobacco marketer for exceeding federal marketing quotas subsequent to his acquittal on criminal charges did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause, since criminal prosecution required
proof of intent which civil statute, 7 USCS § 1314(a) did not, while civil statute required proof of failure to remit penalty
which 18 USCS §§ 1341, 1001, and 371 did not, and Congress intended penalty to be civil in nature. Cole v United States
Dep't of Agric. (1998, CA11 Ga) 133 F3d 803, 11 FLW Fed C 987.
After defendant was acquitted on charges of supplying services to Taliban, subsequent prosecution under 18 USCS §§
1001(a), 1503, and 1623 based on defendant's conduct in falsely denying that he had participated in jihadist camp and that
he knew about people he had communicated with about training for jihad was not barred by collateral estoppel component
of Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment because issues of ultimate fact in two prosecutions were distinct. United
States v Benkahla (2008, CA4 Va) 530 F3d 300.
Defendant's motion to dismiss charge of larceny of four postal money orders on ground that information filed in
Federal District Court against accused involved same money orders, was rejected, where federal information set forth that
accused representing to post office certain money order and falsely representing that he was lawful payee, violated 18
USCS § 1001, and where Federal Court convicted accused, but suspended imposition of any sentence, upon being advised
of court-martial sentence; even if, instead of Federal Court, court-martial had tried § 1001 charge, there would not have
been unreasonable multiplicity of charges, since criminal conduct involved was so basically different, and since accused
was sentenced by only one court, he could not complain of multiple punishment. United States v Schwender (1958) 25
CMR 753.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Conviction under 18 USCS § 101 did not violate double jeopardy protections where, although counts
charged defendant with making same false statement to same recipient, false statements were made on two separate dates.
United States v Lacefield (2005, CA6 Tenn) 146 Fed Appx 15.
Unpublished: Indictment charging defendant with conspiracy to commit document fraud under 18 USCS §§ 371,
1001 and 1546(a) and 42 USCS § 408(a)(6) and (7)(A) was not subject to dismissal under Double Jeopardy Clause of
Fifth Amendment based on post-conviction dismissal in another court of charges of conspiring to provide material support
to terrorists and to engage in document fraud; defendant was not acquitted in prior case and did not show that jury made
factual findings that would have been fatal to instant case; also, prior charges and instant charges were not "same" for
double jeopardy purposes because alleged conspiracies were separate and distinct. United States v Elmardoudi (2007, ND
Iowa) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 48487.
129. Entrapment
Defendant's conviction for making false statements to United States agencies in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was
affirmed notwithstanding defendant's argument that he was entrapped. United States v Cooper (1974, CA9 Cal) 501 F2d
1089.
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18 USCS § 1001
Defendant in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 presented insufficient evidence of entrapment where there
was no evidence on record that defendant's participation in conspiracy was induced by government agents, but rather he
was induced to conspire with law breaker unassociated with government. United States v Freedson (1979, CA9 Cal) 608
F2d 739, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 627.
130. "Exculpatory no" defense
"Exculpatory denial" defense was not available in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 since employee of
Small Business Administration had been advised of his constitutional rights several times and was also told of penalties
for perjury, and circumstances surrounding employee's statement implicating coworker indicated that statement was
deliberate falsehood which succeeded for short time in shifting focus of Secret Service investigation to innocent
coworker. United States v Shanks (1979, CA2 NY) 608 F2d 73, cert den (1980) 444 US 1048, 62 L Ed 2d 736, 100 S Ct
740.
Predicate of "exculpatory no" defense is simply that negative response cannot serve as proof of knowledge and
willfulness required to convict defendant under 18 USCS § 1001; such defense cannot prevail where inquiries which
defendant responded to were purely administrative in nature, such as customs declaration forms. United States v Fitzgibbon (1980, CA10 Colo) 619 F2d 874 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46 MJ 31, 1997 CAAF
LEXIS 5).
"Exculpatory" doctrine was not applicable as defense to falsification of affidavit to obtain court-appointed counsel in
violation of 18 USCS § 1001, since defendant's holding of safe deposit box containing unreported cash suggested active
concealment of his ownership. United States v Blackmon (1988, CA2 NY) 839 F2d 900, 24 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1123.
Individual who made false denial of his drug use in order to secure employment with government would not be entitled to "exculpatory no" defense, were it adopted, since he himself precipitated investigation by seeking employment
with government, and policy underlying "exculpatory no" doctrine of limiting government's ability to coerce individuals
suspected of self-incrimination during course of governmental investigations would not be advanced through protecting
persons from prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 who make false statements in connection with their quest for government employment. United States v Barr (1992, CA3 Pa) 963 F2d 641, reh den (1992, CA3) 1992 US App LEXIS 14558
and cert den (1992) 506 US 1033, 121 L Ed 2d 684, 113 S Ct 811.
"Exculpatory no" doctrine is no defense to charge of making false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, since
there is no support for it in either statutory language or legislative history. United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d
35, affd sub nom Brogan v United States (1998) 522 US 398, 139 L Ed 2d 830, 118 S Ct 805, 98 CDOS 643, 1998 Colo J
C A R 495, 11 FLW Fed S 322 and cert den (1998) 522 US 1107, 140 L Ed 2d 101, 118 S Ct 1033 and (criticized in United
States v Whab (2004, CA2 NY) 355 F3d 155).
When federal agents asked defendant about his involvement in gun sale, he lied by saying that he didn't know what
they were talking about and that there was no gun; defendant was charged under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) with making false
statement to federal agents; while defendant claimed that he was simply asserting his Fifth Amendment right to end
conversation, Seventh Circuit held that "exculpatory no" doctrine provided no valid defense to liability under 18 USCS §
1001; therefore, district court properly refused to provide instruction on defense. United States v Brandt (2008, CA7 Ind)
546 F3d 912.
Dismissal of indictment is denied in prosecution for making false statements to federal agents, where accused raised
"exculpatory no" defense and where government stipulated to determination of defense on factual merits, because affirmative defense to false statement indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 must be raised at trial and not by motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b), because Rule 12(b) motions cannot be turned into criminal counterparts
of motions for summary judgment and stipulation by parties cannot amend rules to create new motion. United States v
Antonucci (1987, ND Ill) 663 F Supp 245.
"Exculpatory no" defense serves as exception to § 1001 and prevents government from punishing individual for
giving false negative answer in response to government inquiry if truthful affirmative answer would have incriminated
individual or if individual reasonably believed that truthful affirmative answer would have been incriminating. United
States v Harrison (1985, ACMR) 20 MJ 710.
131. Immunity
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Where individual had received use and derivative use immunity regarding grand jury testimony, such testimony
could not be basis of prosecution for making false statements to law enforcement officials under 18 USCS § 1001. In re
Weir (1974, SD Cal) 377 F Supp 919, affd (1974, CA9 Cal) 495 F2d 879, cert den (1974) 419 US 1038, 42 L Ed 2d 315,
95 S Ct 525.
There was no agreement between parties, nor did government make promise, that defendant would receive transactional immunity for falsehoods told in return for truthful statements. United States v Rosario (2002, ED NY) 237 F Supp
2d 242.
132. Invalidity or unconstitutionality of statutory requirement
The constitutionality of former § 159(h) of Title 29 which required affidavits concerning Communist party affiliation
of union officers was not involved in postconviction proceeding by union officer convicted of making false statements in
such an affidavit under 18 USCS § 1001, as the claimed invalidity of the statutory requirement would be no defense to
knowingly making a false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States.
Bryson v United States (1969) 396 US 64, 24 L Ed 2d 264, 90 S Ct 355, 72 BNA LRRM 2833, 61 CCH LC P 10510.
Unconstitutionality of operation or proceeding in relation to which alleged deception had been practiced was not
defense to prosecution for such deception, as long as department or agency of United States had colorable authority to do
what it was doing. United States v Meyer (1944, CA2 NY) 140 F2d 652.
Defendant's due process rights were not violated by his indictment for conspiracy to make false statements or to
misapply and convert tribal property, 18 USCS §§ 666, 1001, where he was put on fair notice that his conduct was criminal
under statutes at time of his actions, since recent holding that selling excess federal property was prohibited by Act did not
affect crime for which he was indicted. United States v Oseby (1998, CA8 SD) 148 F3d 1016, 49 Fed Rules Evid Serv
1135.
Defendants' motion to dismiss indictment on ground that prosecution violated their rights of free speech and free
exercise of religion as protected by First Amendment was denied where (1) defendants were not prosecuted for engaging
in those activities, they were prosecuted for concealing those activities; (2) defendants' claim of undue burden on free
exercise of religion under Religious Freedom Restoration Act was without merit because there was no reason why
providing complete and truthful description of organization's planned activities whether or not those activities were religiously motivated, inhibited or substantially burdened exercise of religious freedom; (3) IRS clearly had statutory and
regulatory authority to inquire about entity's proposed activities, and thus, defendants could have been prosecuted under
18 USCS § 1001 and 26 USCS § 7206 for providing false responses regarding those activities; (4) unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not preclude IRS from denying entity 26 USCS § 501(c)(3) status based on nature of its activities
because IRS could have reasonably concluded that entity's efforts to support and promote armed conflict were not charitable or religious in nature and could have denied tax-exempt status on that basis; and (5) because information regarding
entity's activities had natural tendency to influence IRS's investigation of entity's 26 USCS § 501(c)(3) eligiblity, it was
material. United States v Mubayyid (2007, DC Mass) 476 F Supp 2d 46, 99 AFTR 2d 1362.
133. Reliance
Fact that defendant may have relied on United States Customs' past inactivity in failing to object to abuse of "reasonable quantities" limitation on vessel supplies was no defense in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by falsely
designating as "vessel supplies" large quantity of whiskey on United States Customs form. United States v Lichenstein
(1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.
134.--Expert advice
Defendant signing forms in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 cannot assert defense of reliance on expert advice unless he
establishes good faith reliance on expert coupled with full disclosure to expert. United States v Smith (1975, CA5 Fla)
523 F2d 771, cert den (1976) 429 US 817, 50 L Ed 2d 76, 97 S Ct 59, reh den (1976) 429 US 987, 50 L Ed 2d 599, 97 S Ct
509.
Reliance defense, urged most frequently in tax evasion cases, is designed to refute government's proof that defendant
intended to commit offense; essential elements of defense are (a) full disclosure of all pertinent facts to experts, and (b)
good faith reliance on expert's advice. United States v Miller (1981, CA4 SC) 658 F2d 235.
Defense of good faith reliance on expert advice is designed to refute government's proof that defendant intended to
commit offense; defendant must show that (1) he fully disclosed all relevant facts to expert and (2) that he relied in good
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faith on expert's advice. United States v Johnson (1984, CA11 Fla) 730 F2d 683, 15 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1115, cert den
(1984) 469 US 857, 83 L Ed 2d 119, 105 S Ct 186 and cert den (1984) 469 US 867, 83 L Ed 2d 142, 105 S Ct 211.
135. Miscellaneous
Defendant, employed by employer seeking access to classified material from atomic energy commission, who
knowingly made false statements on such commission's security questionnaire, cannot escape conviction for violation of
18 USCS § 1001 by claiming that he had not defrauded United States of financial or proprietary interest, or that his employer and not defendant had submitted questionnaire, or that defendant did not have training required for him to have any
access to classified atomic information. Pitts v United States (1959, CA9 Cal) 263 F2d 353, cert den (1959) 360 US 935,
3 L Ed 2d 1547, 79 S Ct 1457, reh den (1959) 361 US 857, 4 L Ed 2d 97, 80 S Ct 47.
To make fear of one's life sufficient to excuse perjury, fear must be more than general apprehension of danger, particularly if one has chance to escape or to seek protection of government. United States v Housand (1977, CA2 Conn)
550 F2d 818, cert den (1977) 431 US 970, 53 L Ed 2d 1066, 97 S Ct 2931.
Intent element of 18 USCS § 1001 precludes conviction for honest misinterpretation of government forms; not only
was government's certification form which defendant signed not so vague on its face as to violate due process, but also
jury was properly not impressed by defendant's argument that she had made understandable mistake in interpreting it.
United States v Weatherspoon (1978, CA7 Ill) 581 F2d 595 (criticized in Truck Ins. Exch. v Kafka (1995, ND Ill) RICO
Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8873).
Fact that false statement by accountant to IRS auditor regarding charitable contribution by accountant's client was
discovered and did not influence outcome of audit is not defense in prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 since false
statement has capacity to impair IRS auditing function. United States v Fern (1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1
USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, defendant's defense that he did not participate in scheme while
codefendant's main defense was that government could not prove federal offense, are not mutually antagonistic defenses
since both could have been accepted by jury. United States v Petullo (1983, CA7 Ill) 709 F2d 1178.
Farmer's filing of 1099s with IRS, falsely reporting over $ 20 million income to recipients, including judge, lawyers,
bankers, and others involved in foreclosure of his property, cannot be considered purely protest speech, since 18 USCS §
1001 is not content-based, and freedom of speech does not protect speech which violates or incites violation of "tax law",
even where he argued duty to file 1099 under 26 USCS § 6041, since jury found that he filed falsely. United States v
Citrowske (1991, CA8 Minn) 951 F2d 899, 92-1 USTC P 50014, 71A AFTR 2d 4230.
In joint trial where both farmer and his nephew-farming partner were charged as principals and as aiders and abettors
of one another in offenses relating to conversion of pledged crops, 18 USCS §§ 2, 658, 1001, 1956, and 1957, acquittal of
nephew was no defense to conviction of farmer. United States v McClatchy (2001, CA5 Miss) 249 F3d 348, reh den (2001,
CA5 Miss) 2001 US App LEXIS 13266 and cert den (2001) 534 US 896, 151 L Ed 2d 155, 122 S Ct 217.
Evidence was sufficient to prove that foreign politician made false statements on Customs forms regarding how much
money or currency he had in his possession, where his second false statement could not amend his first, since there is no
recantation defense under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Sebaggala (2001, CA1 Mass) 256 F3d 59, 57 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 484.
Defendant charged with filing false claims for income tax refunds in violation of 18 USCS § 287 and making false
statements to government agency in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 is entitled to have insanity defense determined in accordance with law applicable at term of offense. United States v Lakey (1985, SD Tex) 610 F Supp 210.
Former chief of staff of Agriculture Secretary fails to plead prima facie case of selective prosecution, even if no
person has ever before been indicted for failing to disclose receipt of $ 22,000 or less on public financial disclosure report,
where he has not shown that no individual has ever been indicted under 18 USCS § 1001 for alleged falsehoods in sworn
declaration, because there is inadequate proof that (1) he has been singled out as compared to persons similarly situated, or
(2) Office of Independent Counsel was actuated by impermissible motives. United States v Blackley (1997, DC Dist Col)
986 F Supp 616.
Unpublished Opinions
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Unpublished: Counsel was not ineffective in violation of Sixth Amendment during defendants' trial for making
material false statements regarding planting dates in their applications for crop disaster assistance, violation of 18 USCS §
1001, because (1) defendants made no showing of deficient performance of counsel as they had not adequately demonstrated viability of two-prong defense they claimed counsel erred in not presenting; (2) even if defenses were viable,
counsel's decision not to employ them was entitled to deference as reasonable trial strategy as counsel's tactics might have
been best available, and record amply reflected that defendants consented to their use; (3) defendants made no showing of
prejudice because they had not shown that there was any reasonable probability that proceedings would have been different (in their favor) had counsel made arguments and defenses defendants raised in their habeas petition, but rather, if
proposed defenses had been pursued, there was reasonable probability that defendants would have been convicted of crop
insurance fraud as well as disaster program fraud. United States v Wheeler (2007, CA5 Miss) 2007 US App LEXIS 22095.
D.Evidence
1.In General 136. Variance between indictment and proof
While extent by which proof may vary from indictment before prejudice arises is much narrower in false statement
case under 18 USCS § 1001 than in many other prosecutions, there is no fatal variance between indictment based on such
statute and proof merely because statement shown by evidence is not in haec verba with statement in indictment. United
States v Lambert (1974, CA5 Fla) 501 F2d 943 (ovrld in part on other grounds by United States v Rodriguez-Rios (1994,
CA5 Tex) 14 F3d 1040).
No fatal variance between indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and proof offered at trial existed where defendant was informed of particular false statement in question; fact that indictment charged defendant with "making" of
false statement "by means of a letter" but that proof showed the "using" of false documents was of no significance.
United States v Guthartz (1978, CA5 Fla) 573 F2d 225, reh den (1978, CA5 Fla) 576 F2d 931 and cert den (1978) 439 US
864, 58 L Ed 2d 173, 99 S Ct 187.
Variance between proof adduced at trial and allegations of indictment were insignificant and did not require reversal
where only variance consisted of substitution of numerals "15" in indictment for letter "S" shown at trial, since mere
variance in proof that does not affect substantial rights of accused will not warrant setting aside conviction. United States
v Ford (1986, CA5 Tex) 797 F2d 1329, cert den (1987) 479 US 1070, 93 L Ed 2d 1011, 107 S Ct 964 and reinstated, in part
(1987, CA5 Tex) 824 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 484 US 1034, 98 L Ed 2d 776, 108 S Ct 741.
Defendant, teacher, was improperly convicted under 18 USCS § 1001 of making false statement to Federal Bureau of
Investigation agent who questioned him about participating in scheme to defraud public school district by falsely inflating
overtime hours because government failed to prove that defendant lied during time frame alleged in indictment, which
was ambiguously phrased; thus, indictment materially varied from proof adduced at trial, and new trial was required.
United States v Baker (2008, ED La) 544 F Supp 2d 522.
137. Self-incrimination
Fifth Amendment gives taxpayer no privilege to file false tax return when faced with choice of prosecution for failure
to file return or for incriminating statements in truthful return; resulting pressure is not testimonial compulsion, and
prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 may occur. United States v Knox (1969) 396 US 77, 24 L Ed 2d 275, 90 S Ct 363,
70-1 USTC P 15925, 27 AFTR 2d 1902.
District court properly suppressed statements that were made during interview with INS agent in defendant's trial for
perjury, 18 USCS § 1621, and for making false statement, 18 USCS § 1001; questioning of alien from China while he was
in custody in Guam on administrative deportation warrant constituted "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda because
facts showed that defendant was subject to especially heightened risk of prosecution for illegal entry under 8 USCS §
1325; therefore, agent was required to give Miranda warning before interview. United States v Chen (2006, CA9 Guam)
439 F3d 1037.
Where individual had received use and derivative use immunity regarding grand jury testimony, such testimony
could not be basis of prosecution for making false statements to law enforcement officials under 18 USCS § 1001. In re
Weir (1974, SD Cal) 377 F Supp 919, affd (1974, CA9 Cal) 495 F2d 879, cert den (1974) 419 US 1038, 42 L Ed 2d 315,
95 S Ct 525.
138. Perjury rule
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In prosecution of one for unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly concealing by trick material fact for purpose of defrauding home owners loan corporation by deleting part of abstract showing judgment against property on which loan was
sought, fact that judgment debtor believed judgment to be excessive was not admissible in evidence. Christensen v
United States (1937, CA7 Wis) 90 F2d 152.
In 18 USCS § 1001 prosecution, perjury rule, requiring corroborated testimony, was not invoked. Todorow v United
States (1949, CA9 Cal) 173 F2d 439, cert den (1949) 337 US 925, 93 L Ed 1733, 69 S Ct 1169.
Perjury corroboration rule is not applicable to the prosecution under this section for violation of statute relating to
filing of non-Communist affidavit by union official. Fisher v United States (1956, CA9 Wash) 231 F2d 99, 37 BNA
LRRM 2599, 29 CCH LC P 69765.
Two-witness rule in perjury cases is not applicable to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Killian
(1957, CA7 Ill) 246 F2d 77, 32 CCH LC P 70750, 39 CCH LC P 66146; Fisher v United States (1958, CA9 Wash) 254
F2d 302, 42 BNA LRRM 2020, 34 CCH LC P 71454, cert den (1958) 358 US 895, 3 L Ed 2d 122, 79 S Ct 157, reh den
(1959) 358 US 938, 3 L Ed 2d 310, 79 S Ct 322; United States v Marchisio (1965, CA2 NY) 344 F2d 653.
Application of perjury rule to prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by false noncommunist affidavit would
merely thwart attainment of end that Congress sought to accomplish by enactment of § 9(h) of Taft-Hartley Act, where
defendant was active member of party until few days before filing affidavit, when he made extrajudicial admissions to FBI
agents, in form of written statements, that he maintained contact with Communist Party throughout time he was officer of
union; in case at bar evidence of two witnesses plus defendant's own admissions is substantial ground for finding of
falsity. Sells v United States (1958, CA10 Colo) 262 F2d 815, 43 BNA LRRM 2476, 36 CCH LC P 65189, cert den (1959)
360 US 913, 3 L Ed 2d 1262, 79 S Ct 1298.
Making of false statement which is covered by 18 USCS § 1001 can be proved by testimony of person to whom
statement is made even though such testimony is uncorroborated by other witnesses and even though such testimony is
contrary to that of defendant. Neely v United States (1962, CA9 Ariz) 300 F2d 67, 9 AFTR 2d 1046, 93 ALR2d 718, cert
den (1962) 369 US 864, 8 L Ed 2d 84, 82 S Ct 1030.
In prosecution for conspiracy and for making false statement in contravention of 18 USCS § 1001 to the Office of
Educational Opportunity to obtain fraudulently monies which were the subject of poverty program grant, it was unnecessary for the government to present testimony from trainees named in forged check endorsements and receipts and in the
false time and attendance sheets, as long as the government presents sufficient, relevant circumstantial evidence to prove
concert of action in the commission of unlawful acts from which a common design could be inferred. United States v
Cogwell (1973, CA7 Ill) 486 F2d 823, cert den (1974) 416 US 959, 40 L Ed 2d 310, 94 S Ct 1975.
There is no need to apply the common law rules of evidence applicable peculiarly to perjury trials. United States v
Stephens (1970, WD Okla) 315 F Supp 1008.
139. Inferences
Courtroom identification is not necessary where evidence is sufficient to permit inference that defendant on trial is
person who made statements in question. United States v Fern (1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51
AFTR 2d 819.
Evidence that attorney for owner of sailing vessel filed with United States Customs Service a Petition for Remission
or Mitigation of Forfeiture so that owner could recover vessel seized as having been used in importation of marijuana, that
owner's affidavit and false charter agreement purporting to show that boat had been chartered by owner to third party
during period of offense was attached to petition, that third party's signature to charter had been forged after forger had
practiced writing signatures several times on stationery bearing letterhead of owner's charter company, and that owner
subsequently had this piece of stationery in his possession, was sufficient to support jury's inference that owner knowingly
and willfully presented false statement and document to Customs in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Benz
(1984, CA11 Fla) 740 F2d 903, reh den, en banc (1985, CA11 Fla) 756 F2d 885 and cert den (1985) 474 US 817, 88 L Ed
2d 51, 106 S Ct 62.
Defendant's conviction was reversed, where government adduced no evidence from which jury could have drawn
permissible inference that defendant intended to defraud Small Business Administration at time loan documents were
signed; any wrongdoing defendant may have committed occurred subsequent to signing of loan documents and could not
support conviction. United States v McCarrick (2002, CA11 Fla) 294 F3d 1286, 15 FLW Fed C 678.
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140. Miscellaneous
In prosecution of union officer for filing, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, affidavit with National Labor Relations
Board falsely denying that he was member of Communist Party, membership can be proved by evidence of lawful acts
and statements as well as by evidence of unlawful acts and statements. Killian v United States (1961) 368 US 231, 7 L Ed
2d 256, 82 S Ct 302, 49 BNA LRRM 2189, 43 CCH LC P 17306, reh den (1962) 368 US 979, 7 L Ed 2d 441, 82 S Ct 476,
44 CCH LC P 17389.
Trial judge's characterization of government witness as unreliable, followed by statement later in trial that court
would rely on that witness' testimony, denied defendants fair trial where first statement caused defense to refrain from
pursuing additional evidence to impeach witness and rebut his testimony, and from putting one defendant on witness
stand. United States v Mendel (1984, CA2 NY) 746 F2d 155, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 771, cert den (1985) 469 US 1213,
84 L Ed 2d 331, 105 S Ct 1184.
Defendant's request for mistrial during his trial on charge of violating 18 USCS § 1001 was properly denied because,
while Government's misstatements of evidence during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct, they did
not prejudice defendant; remarks were brief and not deliberate, and strong and thorough curative instruction was given;
moreover, case was not close and there was no likelihood that remarks could have affected outcome; record was clear that
there was enough independent evidence that defendant submitted false SF-86 Form and that he did so intentionally.
United States v Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, absence of proof regarding words constituting false statement required that
guilty verdict be set aside. United States v Clifford (1976, ED NY) 426 F Supp 696.
Postal service must comply with grand jury subpoena by supplying personal information which is apparently sought
for computer matching program to identify any postal employee who might be receiving federally-funded welfare benefits
and who might be shown by further investigation to have obtained such benefits by making false or fraudulent statements
in violation of 18 USCS § 1001. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to United States Postal Service (1981, ED Tenn) 535
F Supp 31.
2.Burden of Proof 141. Falsity
Where indictment did not restrict itself to allegation that defendants did knowingly make false statement, but proceeded to state in detail what constituted alleged falsity, government was required to prove falsity as specifically alleged.
Stevens v United States (1953, CA6 Tenn) 206 F2d 64.
It is incumbent upon government in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 to introduce proof sufficient to
establish falsity of statements as well as defendant's knowing and willful submission of such statements. United States v
Anderson (1978, CA8 Ark) 579 F2d 455, cert den (1978) 439 US 980, 58 L Ed 2d 651, 99 S Ct 567.
142. Intent, knowledge and willfulness
In order to constitute commission of crime created by 18 USCS § 1001 where it is charged that written instrument was
used, the proofs relating to instrument need only establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused knowingly and willfully
made or used any false writing or document knowing same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
fact that indictment characterizes writing as "contract" or "affidavit" does not require proof that it is such. Robles v
United States (1960, CA9 Ariz) 279 F2d 401, cert den (1961) 365 US 836, 5 L Ed 2d 745, 81 S Ct 750, reh den (1961) 365
US 890, 6 L Ed 2d 201, 81 S Ct 1032.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, by making false statement in connection with bringing foreign
currency through United States Customs, government must prove that defendant knowingly made false statement.
United States v Fitzgibbon (1978, CA10 Colo) 576 F2d 279, cert den (1978) 439 US 910, 58 L Ed 2d 256, 99 S Ct 279.
It is incumbent upon government in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 to introduce proof sufficient to
establish falsity of statements as well as defendant's knowing and willful submission of such statements. United States v
Anderson (1978, CA8 Ark) 579 F2d 455, cert den (1978) 439 US 980, 58 L Ed 2d 651, 99 S Ct 567.
In prosecution for making false affidavit in support of false claim against United States, it was necessary to prove
making, by defendant, of false statements in affidavit in question and knowledge of their falsity, and with intent to aid
collection of such false claim. United States v Long (1936, DC Mass) 14 F Supp 29.
143. Materiality
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18 USCS § 1001
In order to gain conviction under 18 USCS § 1001, government must prove that false statement was "material" as that
term has been defined in case law. Paritem Singh Poonian v United States (1961, CA9 Cal) 294 F2d 74, 61-2 USTC P
9647, 8 AFTR 2d 5400.
Rule that materiality must be proved beyond reasonable doubt for conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 does not apply
retroactively on collateral review. United States v Mandanici (2000, CA2 Conn) 205 F3d 519, cert den (2000) 531 US
879, 148 L Ed 2d 132, 121 S Ct 190 and cert den (2002) 536 US 961, 153 L Ed 2d 840, 122 S Ct 2666.
144. Miscellaneous
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, charging submission of false signature, prosecution is not required to prove
lack of authorization as part of its prima facie case. United States v West (1981, CA2 Vt) 666 F2d 16, 7 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 1506.
District court was merely of view that defendant's "no's" were not perjurious, not that simple denial of guilt without
more was not perjurious as matter of law; district court found that government did not prove by preponderance of evidence
that defendant was lying. United States v Aguilar-Portillo (2003, CA8 Iowa) 334 F3d 744.
In prosecution for making false affidavit in support of false claim against United States, it was necessary to prove
making, by defendant, of false statements in affidavit in question and knowledge of their falsity, and with intent to aid
collection of such false claim. United States v Long (1936, DC Mass) 14 F Supp 29.
In prosecution of defendant for making false statement that he was not Communist in order to continue employment
under Federal Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1941, defendant's contention that definitions of term "Communist"
were so many and so wide that term was indefinite did not bar prosecution, but proof of meaning of term was burden that
must be assumed by government in proving its case. United States v Schneider (1942, DC Wis) 45 F Supp 848.
In prosecution for conspiracy to defraud United States by willfully concealing material facts and by making false or
fraudulent statement and for substantive offense, wrongful purpose on part of defendants was essential element which
prosecution must have proved in each offense charged. United States v Buckley (1943, DC Dist Col) 49 F Supp 993.
Burden in establishing defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution is heavy one and once defendant satisfies
this burden of proof, burden shifts to government, which must justify its actions in singling out particular person or
persons for prosecution. United States v Carron (1982, WD NY) 541 F Supp 347.
3.Admissibility or Exclusion of Evidence 145. Confessions and admissions
Defendant's confession concerning preparation of false letters to be presented to agencies of United States was admissible in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Williams (1980, CA5 La) 616 F2d 759, 5 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 1328, cert den (1980) 449 US 857, 66 L Ed 2d 72, 101 S Ct 156.
Statements made by defendant during interview with probation officer were admissible in prosecution for making
false statements, where interview, which was conducted before defendant appeared before magistrate and pled guilty, was
not custodial interrogation. United States v Gonzalez-Mares (1985, CA9 Cal) 752 F2d 1485, cert den (1985) 473 US
913, 87 L Ed 2d 663, 105 S Ct 3540.
Defendant was entitled to new suppression hearing following his conviction for conspiracy to make false statement in
passport application, 18 USCS § 371, making false statement in passport application, 18 USCS § 1542, and making false
statement within jurisdiction of U.S., 18 USCS § 1001; U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Seibert required district court to
consider whether law enforcement agents deliberately used two-step interrogation procedure to circumvent Miranda, and
if so, whether midstream Miranda warning effectively apprised defendant of his U.S. Const. amend. V rights. United
States v Williams (2006, CA9 Cal) 435 F3d 1148.
146. Materiality
Testimony of government witnesses concerning HUD policy against making loans to persons who have not paid for
fees and charges incident to purchase of property out of their own funds was admissible, not as statement of law regarding
HUD and VA loans, but as relevant to materiality of false statements. United States v Kingston (1992, CA10 Okla) 971
F2d 481, 36 Fed Rules Evid Serv 545.
Testimony of customs agent that answers given by travelers on currency transaction and reporting forms permit
government to track people who enter or leave United States with more than $ 10,000 was admissible to establish mate-
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18 USCS § 1001
riality, as required by 18 USCS § 1001, of defendant's false answer to currency statement on customs declaration form.
United States v Wales (1992, CA9 Hawaii) 977 F2d 1323, 92 CDOS 8620, 92 Daily Journal DAR 14271, 36 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 1408.
147. Prior or other acts
At sentencing hearing in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 evidence concerning post-indictment obstruction of justice is admissible because sentencing judge is entitled to know that defendant has attempted to distort very
proceeding at which sentence is determined. United States v Pineda (1982, CA2 NY) 692 F2d 284.
Defendant charged with conspiracy to defraud government through false Medicare claims is not prejudiced by government's proof at trial of acts not charged in indictment where defendant is not convicted of offenses other than actually
charged. United States v Gold (1984, CA11 Fla) 743 F2d 800, 17 Fed Rules Evid Serv 669, cert den (1985) 469 US 1217,
84 L Ed 2d 341, 105 S Ct 1196.
In action brought by Securities and Exchange Commission, district court did not have discretion under Rule 690(a)(2)
to exclude from evidence defendants' convictions for lying to Securities and Exchange Commission in violation of 18
USCS § 1001. SEC v Sargent (2000, CA1 Mass) 229 F3d 68, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 91244, 55 Fed Rules Evid Serv
1103, subsequent app (2003, CA1 Mass) 329 F3d 34.
Where defendants were charged with conspiracy, securities fraud, and false statements in connection with
front-running scheme whereby day traders were granted access to brokers' squawk boxes in exchange for execution of
wash trades, evidence showing that broker defendant sold squawk box access to traders not named in indictment was
admissible as direct evidence of guilt as to charge of making false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; evidence
tended to show that broker defendant lied when he told federal agents that he never intentionally used telephone lines to
allow traders to listen to his firm's squawk boxes; evidence was also admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) as evidence of
intent and of absence of mistake as to other charges against broker defendant. United States v Mahaffy (2007, ED NY) 477
F Supp 2d 560.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant was properly found guilty of wire fraud, violation of 18 USCS § 1343, and making false
statements regarding government contracts for military parts, violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), because his concealment of
quality deficiency reports was misrepresentation for 18 USCS § 1343 purposes, and fact that U.S. Air Force failed to
investigate was not material to his guilt; moreover, other acts evidence was not improperly admitted pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b), particularly where appropriate limiting instruction was given; there was no error in admitting testimony
demonstrating that defendant had working knowledge of certification process for aircraft parts, need to produce complying parts, and that there were ways to deceive government by using nonconforming material. United States v Se Keun
Oh (2006, CA6 Ohio) 2006 US App LEXIS 25873.
Unpublished: Defendant was properly found guilty of wire fraud, violation of 18 USCS § 1343, and making false
statements regarding government contracts for military parts, violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), because his concealment of
quality deficiency reports was misrepresentation for 18 USCS § 1343 purposes, and fact that U.S. Air Force failed to
investigate was not material to his guilt. Moreover, other acts evidence was not improperly admitted pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b), particularly where appropriate limiting instruction was given; there was no error in admitting testimony
demonstrating that defendant had working knowledge of certification process for aircraft parts, need to produce complying parts, and that there were ways to deceive government by using nonconforming material. United States v Se Keun
Oh (2006, CA6 Ohio) 2006 US App LEXIS 25873.
148. Relevant evidence
In prosecution for making and using false affidavit, knowing it to contain fraudulent and fictitious statements in
matter within jurisdiction of United States civil service commission, questions asked defendant when he was seeking
certification for federal position as to whether he had ever been arrested or summoned into court as defendant and to
furnish record of every employment both public and private which he had had since he first began to work were not
irrelevant, since they bore on his social conduct and on his qualifications. United States v De Lorenzo (1945, CA2 NY)
151 F2d 122.
In prosecution for knowingly submitting false statement to agency of United States, trial judge properly admitted
evidence that agency had paid for house and car for personal use as well as credit card bills for defendant since evidence
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was relevant because defendants' measure of defense was lack of motive to defraud; evidence established that individual
defendant benefited personally from over-billings and therefore had motive. United States v Jones (1979, CA5 Tex) 587
F2d 802, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 172.
Testimony of government witnesses concerning HUD policy against making loans to persons who have not paid for
fees and charges incident to purchase of property out of their own funds was admissible, not as statement of law regarding
HUD and VA loans, but as relevant to materiality of false statements. United States v Kingston (1992, CA10 Okla) 971
F2d 481, 36 Fed Rules Evid Serv 545.
149. State of mind
Since state of mind is difficult to prove precisely, evidence of surrounding circumstances may be admitted to prove
intent; evidence was properly admitted as to defendant's attempt to induce individual to do that which defendant later
succeeded in inducing second individual to do. McCoy v United States (1948, CA9 Mont) 169 F2d 776, cert den (1948)
335 US 898, 93 L Ed 433, 69 S Ct 298.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, stipulation of settlement, executed less than 2 months after events
which give rise to indictment, is admissible as non-hearsay evidence to show appellant's state of mind, i.e., that he believed that he had authority to sign name on document. United States v West (1981, CA2 Vt) 666 F2d 16, 7 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 1506.
150.--Intent, knowledge and willfulness
In prosecution for making false statement in baggage declaration evidence that defendant was using trunk with false
compartment was admissible as showing general intent of defendant to deceive government. United States v Zavala
(1944, CA2 NY) 139 F2d 830.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statements of assets during internal revenue service investigation, when defendant claimed that false statements were not intentionally made, affidavit, made by defendant seeking
draft deferment and reciting absence of assets to care for wife and expected child, was admissible, even if it might have
tendency to impute draft-dodging on defendant's part, in proof of intent. United States v Brott (1959, CA2 NY) 264 F2d
433, 59-1 USTC P 9276, 3 AFTR 2d 805, cert den (1959) 359 US 985, 3 L Ed 2d 933, 79 S Ct 941.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 where appellant argued court erred in allowing admission of tax returns for
period prior to period referred to in indictment, fraudulent tax returns were admissible to show motive and criminal intent.
United States v Egenberg (1971, CA2 NY) 441 F2d 441, 71-1 USTC P 9303, 27 AFTR 2d 1046, cert den (1971) 404 US
994, 30 L Ed 2d 546, 92 S Ct 530.
Evidence was demonstrated that defendant had several opportunities to inform government that he was no longer
eligible for welfare payments was relevant to issue of his knowledge in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001;
evidence showing amount that defendant was overpaid after his misstatements and omissions to government was relevant
to issue of intent. United States v O'Brien (1979, CA9 Wash) 601 F2d 1067, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1015.
Proof that defendant has specific intent to deceive by making false or fraudulent statement is prerequisite to conviction under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Dothard (1982, CA11 Ala) 666 F2d 498, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1159.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: During defendant's trial for violations of 8 USCS § 1325(c) and 18 USCS §§ 371 and 1001, woman he
had married for purposes of evading immigration laws was properly permitted to testify pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 701 that
defendant did not intend to live with her as man and wife; although defendant argued that woman's limited contact with
him demonstrated her testimony was not rationally based on her perceptions of him, facts to which she testified conversely
provided solid foundation for woman's opinion that defendant did not intend to live with her as man and wife, which was
fact in issue. United States v Moniruzzaman (2006, CA10 Kan) 2006 US App LEXIS 29962.
151.--Motive
In prosecution for making false statements to Immigration and Naturalization Service in violation of 18 USCS § 1001,
evidence bearing on motive for allegedly false statement that certain papers had been lost was properly admitted. United
States v Mestchersky (1969, CA2 NY) 411 F2d 610.
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In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 where appellant argued court erred in allowing admission of tax returns for
period prior to period referred to in indictment, fraudulent tax returns were admissible to show motive and criminal intent.
United States v Egenberg (1971, CA2 NY) 441 F2d 441, 71-1 USTC P 9303, 27 AFTR 2d 1046, cert den (1971) 404 US
994, 30 L Ed 2d 546, 92 S Ct 530.
In prosecution for knowingly submitting false statement to agency of United States, trial judge properly admitted
evidence that agency had paid for house and car for personal use as well as credit card bills for defendant since evidence
was relevant because defendants' measure of defense was lack of motive to defraud; evidence established that individual
defendant benefited personally from over-billings and therefore had motive. United States v Jones (1979, CA5 Tex) 587
F2d 802, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 172.
Copies of disability checks which defendant had failed to report on form required to maintain her eligibility for
AFDC benefits were admissible as direct evidence of her crime, relevant to her motive for failure to report disability
benefits, since checks were admitted for proper purpose, and probative value outweighed potential for prejudice. United
States v Murphy (1991, CA7 Ill) 935 F2d 899, 33 Fed Rules Evid Serv 423.
152. Miscellaneous
In prosecution of union officer for violating 18 USCS § 1001 by filing with National Labor Relations Board affidavit
falsely denying that he was affiliated with Communist Party, ultimate fact of affiliation, though subjective, may be proved
by evidence of objective facts and circumstances having rational tendency to show ultimate fact of affiliation. Killian v
United States (1961) 368 US 231, 7 L Ed 2d 256, 82 S Ct 302, 49 BNA LRRM 2189, 43 CCH LC P 17306, reh den (1962)
368 US 979, 7 L Ed 2d 441, 82 S Ct 476, 44 CCH LC P 17389.
Record of notary of contents of affidavit which it was alleged defendant caused another to execute was admissible,
where such record was kept by notary in regular course of his business, since it was best evidence of contents of affidavit,
defendant having according to his own testimony destroyed original document. Sanchez v United States (1943, CA1
Puerto Rico) 134 F2d 279, cert den (1943) 319 US 768, 87 L Ed 1717, 63 S Ct 1325.
Trial court committed reversible error in prosecution of defendant under 18 USCS § 1001 for violation of statute
relating to filing of non-Communist affidavit by labor union official in excluding: (1) production of records of federal
bureau of investigation to show considerable payments made by federal bureau of investigation to "informer" who was
principal witness against defendant, and (2) cross-examination evidence that "informer" who was presented as expert in
identification of Communists, that such informer had made mistaken cases of identity in past. Fisher v United States
(1956, CA9 Wash) 231 F2d 99, 37 BNA LRRM 2599, 29 CCH LC P 69765.
Parol evidence rule has no application to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 where government has proved by one of
purported parties to assignment that side agreement between appellant and purported assignee prevented document from
being assignment which it purported to be. United States v Satterfield (1969, CA5 Fla) 411 F2d 602, 69-2 USTC P 9638,
24 AFTR 2d 5087.
Trial court properly admitted series of computer printouts into evidence in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS §§
1001 and 1341 to prove that defendant, who operated beauty college approved for Veteran's Assistance benefits, had
enrolled over 6 times as many veterans as students as she was authorized to do, where proper foundation was laid for
introduction of printouts which were simply compilation of information taken from enrollment certification forms submitted by defendant and keypunched onto tape fed into computer. United States v Weatherspoon (1978, CA7 Ill) 581
F2d 595 (criticized in Truck Ins. Exch. v Kafka (1995, ND Ill) RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8873).
In prosecution for causing federally licensed grain inspector to falsify material fact, namely, inspection grade and
weight on certificates, defendants' offer of proof of test conducted on sample grains of corn was properly rejected.
United States v Kirby (1978, CA7 Ind) 587 F2d 876.
In prosecution for willfully and knowingly misrepresenting signatures on stipend rosters maintained by university as
part of government funded program, evidence of defendant's voluntary repayment of money following audit of university
was admissible. United States v Hooper (1979, CA7 Wis) 596 F2d 219, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1306.
Admission into evidence in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 of certain government forms which had been
filled out by government claims representative did not violate defendant's right to confrontation where claims representatives were subject to cross-examination and possibility that records were founded on faulty recollections was extremely
remote. United States v King (1980, CA7 Ill) 613 F2d 670, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 720, 56 ALR Fed 159 (criticized in
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United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized
in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35).
Defendant did not commit reversible error in permitting grand jury testimony of defendant's attorney to be read to
jury, where testimony revealed no significant additional evidence that jury would have considered in convicting defendant
of conspiracy to defraud United States or aiding and abetting violation of 18 USCS § 1001, in connection with contractor's
compliance with federal regulations concerning disadvantaged business enterprises. United States v Brothers Constr. Co.
(2000, CA4 W Va) 219 F3d 300, 54 Fed Rules Evid Serv 644, cert den (2000) 531 US 1037, 148 L Ed 2d 537, 121 S Ct
628.
In reviewing convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Violent Crimes in Aid of
Racketeering Act, appellate court vacated convictions for false-statement conspiracy because district court committed
plain error in admitting hearsay evidence--plea allocution and grand jury testimony--in violation of Confrontation Clause.
United States v Bruno (2004, CA2 NY) 383 F3d 65.
Defendant was properly convicted of making false statement to government agency pursuant to 18 USCS §
1001(a)(2) because introduction of content of phone conversations between he and prison inmate into evidence did not
violate Federal Wiretap Act, 18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq., pursuant to 18 USCS § 2515 given that inmate consented to his
calls being monitored pursuant to 18 USCS § 2511(c)(2); paperwork required to receive PIN to place calls required inmate's consent and placards placed near phones warned that calls were monitored, as did repeated messages; moreover,
even if inmate's consent was limited to monitoring for purpose of assuring prison safety and order, correctional investigator allowed monitoring because he believed that inmate was involved in ongoing crime, and federal district court gave
great deference to investigator's interpretation of prison policy; in addition, inmate as unaware of prison policy and,
instead, believed that all calls save those between he and his attorney were subject to monitoring. United States v Conley
(2008, CA1 Me) 531 F3d 56.
Defendant argued that he was entitled to new trial on Count One of superceding indictment, which alleged violation
of 18 USCS § 1505, and Count Three, which alleged violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) because evidence regarding cost
of charter flight was erroneously admitted, was crucial to both counts, and was extremely prejudicial; that argument failed
because: (1) there was some evidence provided to jury in form of ethics training materials and testimony to support
government's pro rata share theory; (2) in view of all of evidence that jury heard on cost and valuation from various
witnesses--inconsistent though it may have been--defendant could not succeed in his argument that jury necessarily relied
upon evidence concerning his pro rata share of $ 90,000 cost of charter flight in reaching its verdicts on Count One and
Count Three, nor did government ask jury to do so; and (3) there was sufficient evidence for jury to disregard any and all
evidence relating to value of airfare and still convict defendant on Count One and Count Three. United States v Safavian
(2009, DC Dist Col) 644 F Supp 2d 1.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: District court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that Government witness may have
been involved in bank robbery in order to challenge her credibility where defendant claimed, through conclusory and
unsupported allegations, that under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of witness's involvement in prior robbery would
somehow have negated her guilt. United States v Norris (2005, CA4 SC) 140 Fed Appx 443.
Unpublished: Although government improperly failed to disclose under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 that it intended to use
half-brother's birth certificate in case in chief, other overwhelming evidence was shown that defendant wrongfully used
half-brother's name for false passport and other identifications under 18 USCS §§ 1546, 1001, 911, and 1028A so that no
substantial prejudice was shown. United States v Zamor (2007, CA11 Fla) 2007 US App LEXIS 12787.
Unpublished: There was no error in finding that new trial was warranted on false statement count against utility under
18 USCS § 1001 because of admission of confusing and prejudicial evidence, as well as inconsistent results in jury's
deliberations. United States v San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (2009, CA9 Cal) 2009 US App LEXIS 5652.
Unpublished: In case in which defendant was convicted of violating 31 USCS § 5332 and 18 USCS § 1001, he unsuccessfully argued that district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection agents because he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda decision; reasonable person in defendant's position would not have felt that his freedom of action was
limited to degree associated with formal arrest; since he was not in custody at time he made statements, agents were not
required to inform him of his Miranda rights. United States v Akinmukomi (2010, CA4 Va) 2010 US App LEXIS 5260.
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4.Sufficiency of Evidence 153. Aiding and abetting
Conviction as aider and abettor of offense of presenting false invoices of goods purchased by United States or by
corporation in which United States is stockholder is warranted where, although there is no direct evidence tying defendant
to invoices, there was evidence that he was promoter of long and persistent scheme to defraud United States by circumventing governmental inspection as well as by making of false invoices, that makers of false invoices were defendant's
subordinates, that his family was the chief owner of business, that he was manager of it, that his chief subordinates were
his brothers-in-law, and that he had charge of office where invoices were made out. Nye & Nissen v United States (1949)
336 US 613, 93 L Ed 919, 69 S Ct 766.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS §§ 2 and 1001 by filing false customs export declaration, aiding and abetting
is proved if defendant voluntarily gave false information or participated in plan such that it was foreseeable that false
information would be used in statements made to government agencies in furtherance of plan. United States v Beck
(1980, CA7 Ill) 615 F2d 441.
Defendants, who hired 2 undercover government agents to convert counterfeit currency into 5 cashiers' checks at
bank, were aiders and abettors under 18 USCS § 1001 where bank did not file CTR's after agents identified themselves as
such, since had defendants personally conducted transactions on their own behalf, bank would certainly have had duty to
report transactions, and fact that agents did so on behalf of defendants and with defendants' money did not convert
transactions into transactions by government as part of its day-to-day operations. United States v Hernando Ospina
(1986, CA11 Fla) 798 F2d 1570, 21 Fed Rules Evid Serv 878.
Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting making of material false statement to
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officer in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001, 1002; evidence showed: (1) INS
had initiated criminal conspiracy prosecution against several individuals based, in part, upon alien's statements to INS
agent that she was forced to have sexual relations with one of individuals within day of her illegal entry into country; (2)
pursuant to INS procedure, claim of forced sex was "elevating circumstance" that made it much more likely that INS
would pursue investigation into circumstances surrounding alien's entry into country; (3) alien later recanted her rape
claim after it was disclosed that she had previously told private investigator that sex was consensual; (4) defendant was
present when alien gave her statements to investigator and to INS agent, and did not alert INS agent of contradictory
nature of alien's statements; and (5) alien testified that defendant had, in fact, actively encouraged her to lie to INS agent in
order to obtain remedy for her claims. United States v Mitchell (2004, CA8 Ark) 388 F3d 1139.
Elements of aiding and abetting are that defendant associated herself with unlawful venture, defendant participated in
it as something she wished to bring about, and defendant sought by her actions to make it succeed; defendant could be
prosecuted for aiding and abetting making of material false statement to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
officer in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, even though there was no direct communication between herself and illegal alien
who actually made false, material statements to INS agent, because evidence showed that defendant had fully and
knowingly participated with alien's translator in encouraging alien to lie to agent in order to spur INS into bringing
criminal conspiracy charges against individuals who had participated in bringing alien into country illegally. United
States v Mitchell (2004, CA8 Ark) 388 F3d 1139.
154. Circumstantial evidence
Affiliation imports less than membership in Communist Party, but more than sympathy, and requires adherence to or
furtherance of purposes or objectives of proscribed organization as distinguished from mere cooperation with it in lawful
activities; desire to belong and intent to adhere and further rather than merely sympathize are mental states; they can and
must be proved or disproved by circumstantial evidence; requirement of direct proof is requirement of impossible. Sells
v United States (1958, CA10 Colo) 262 F2d 815, 43 BNA LRRM 2476, 36 CCH LC P 65189, cert den (1959) 360 US 913,
3 L Ed 2d 1262, 79 S Ct 1298.
Intent to deceive under 18 USCS § 1001 may be proved by circumstantial evidence. United States v Markey (1982,
CA6 Mich) 693 F2d 594.
155. Concealment
Evidence was insufficient to prove that bank chairman concealed material fact in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, by
making large personal bank deposit without filing Currency Transaction Report, where he had knowledge of transaction
and failed to reveal it to bank, but took no affirmative step to conceal true facts. United States v Shannon (1988, CA8 Mo)
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836 F2d 1125, 24 Fed Rules Evid Serv 816, reh den (1988, CA8 Mo) 1988 US App LEXIS 18914 and cert den (1988) 486
US 1058, 100 L Ed 2d 930, 108 S Ct 2830.
Defendant could not prevail on argument that evidence was insufficient to support conviction for concealing material
fact from Small Business Administration (SBA), 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1), because (1) defendant's argument that he did not
conceal anything from SBA because he informed bank's loan officer of arrangement to finance initial capital investment
failed because loan officer was not SBA, (2) defendant admitted he realized that SBA was separate from bank, and (3)
defendant wrote check to bank so SBA would believe he made personal capital investment. United States v Moyer (2002,
CA8 Iowa) 313 F3d 1082.
As government failed to identify legal disclosure duty as was necessary for 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) concealment offense, defendant's convictions, which arose from his overseas golf trip with high profile lobbyist, could not stand. United
States v Safavian (2008, App DC) 528 F3d 957.
Defendant filed false statements directly with IRS concerning organization's activities as exempt entity under 26
USCS § 501(c), establishing sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) and 26 USCS §
7212(a). United States v Mubayyid (2008, DC Mass) 2008-2 USTC P 50504, 102 AFTR 2d 5348.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant allegedly engaged in scheme to conceal presence of asbestos at oil refinery, Government proved "duty to disclose" element of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) based upon legal duty to disclose created by forms
defendant submitted to Environmental Protection Agency; forms placed legal duty on one completing and submitting
them to disclose presence of asbestos and, if present, method of abatement. United States v Shaw (2005, CA10 Kan) 150
Fed Appx 863, 61 Envt Rep Cas 1363.
156. Conspiracy
Moonshiner, not shown to have been aware of grocer's arrangement whereby sugar sold for illegal making of whiskey
was reported as having been sold to other than purchasers thereof, cannot be found guilty of conspiracy to violate 18
USCS § 1001. Call v United States (1959, CA4 NC) 265 F2d 167, cert den (1959) 361 US 815, 4 L Ed 2d 62, 80 S Ct 54.
Sufficient evidence existed from which jury reasonably could conclude that defendants conspired to defraud United
States and lending institutions, by making false statements, of monies through Federally Insured Student Loan Program
and performed acts to further that end, where evidence established that defendants founded, were shareholders or held
offices in company owning trade schools in which students, some of whom never completed courses, were encouraged to
take part in student loan program and were requested to sign applications for loan insurance and blank promissory notes
payable to company, and one of defendants, cognizant of these liabilities, nevertheless, negotiated notes secured by
government guarantees and used proceeds for personal benefit. United States v Willis (1978, CA5 Tex) 583 F2d 203.
Evidence was sufficient to support jury verdicts that defendants engaged in conspiracy to defraud United States by
misrepresenting to state department of highways that contractor had performed work on highway construction project
when, in fact, subcontractor had performed all work, in violation of federal regulations regarding disadvantaged business
enterprises. United States v Brothers Constr. Co. (2000, CA4 W Va) 219 F3d 300, 54 Fed Rules Evid Serv 644, cert den
(2000) 531 US 1037, 148 L Ed 2d 537, 121 S Ct 628.
Evidence was sufficient from which jury could infer that marina employee conspired with his mother, marina owner,
and others to defraud United States Army Corps of Engineers (COE) in violation of 18 USCS §§ 371 and 1001 by submitting false "rental numbers" under lease agreement with COE, even though there was no direct evidence of his participation in accounting functions, and bulk of evidence showed that mother ran marina, whereas he, "heir apparent" to
business, having job description indicating he held position of responsibility, was one who called meeting with COE and
had control over bank account into which unreported boat sales proceeds were placed. United States v Loe (2001, CA5
Tex) 262 F3d 427, 88 AFTR 2d 5521, reh den (2001, CA5 Tex) 2001 US App LEXIS 22380 and cert den (2002) 534 US
1134, 151 L Ed 2d 979, 122 S Ct 1078.
157. Corroborative evidence
Evidence to corroborate admission of defendant that he had made claim for disaster relief loan when in fact he had
had no damages would be required in view of fact that witness had failed to mention defendant's statement in 6 prior
interviews with government agent although he was told that government was investigating false statements by defendant;
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evidence was insufficient to corroborate admission where record showed that one of landlord's agents testified that one of
adjoining buildings suffered "big dent in it" due to flooding, maintenance man testified as to extensive structural damages
done to one of landlord's buildings, computerized printout of disaster loans showed that 25 flood-related disaster loans
were granted within 2 1/2 blocks of defendant's apartment, Director of East Saint Louis Housing Authority testified that
when he went to defendant's apartment about 10 days later he saw high water mark on wall and smelled odor, members of
tenant advisory board of Housing Authority testified that defendant donated boxes of wet, mildewed clothing to them,
owner of construction company testified that he saw large amount of water accumulate behind apartment complex, cartographer testified that defendant had resided in depression contour, service hydrologist with National Weather Service
testified that high water condition in area was due to heavy and repeated rainfall and defendant testified that there was gap
along bottom of doorway which allowed water to enter his apartment. United States v Fearn (1978, CA7 Ill) 589 F2d
1316, 3 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1329.
What is actually said by defendant becomes critically important part of any prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 and
while verbatim transcript or written statement is not required under § 1001, where transcript of some answers has been
taken with no apparent constraint on interrogators to cut short their inquiry, where 2 of 3 allegedly false answers are not
included in such transcript, and where one of 3 statements is found only in solitary prosecution witnesses' testimony
without any contemporary corroboration, and such oral evidence is too fragile to support guilty verdict. United States v
Poutre (1980, CA1 Mass) 646 F2d 685, 52 AFTR 2d 5203.
No corroboration is necessary to sustain conviction for making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001. United States
v Fern (1983, CA11 Fla) 696 F2d 1269, 83-1 USTC P 9151, 51 AFTR 2d 819.
Alien's convictions pursuant to 18 USCS §§ 2, 287, 371, 1001, were not "aggravated felonies" sufficient to support his
deportation under 8 USCS §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), because none of crimes required finding of monetary
loss as element of offense, and neither superseding information nor judgment of conviction unequivocally established that
jury had found that losses arising from alien's crimes exceeded $ 10,000; although crimes met first part of definition of
generic description for "aggravated felony" under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), they would not constitute deportable offenses
unless they resulted in actual losses in excess of $ 10,000. Li v Ashcroft (2004, CA9) 389 F3d 892.
158. Falsity
In prosecution for concealment of Nazi party membership upon application for certificate of identification as alien
enemy, required by presidential proclamation, proof that defendant belonged to a group of "anwaerters," meaning indiscriminately "applicants" or probationary members, sustained conviction, as against contention that defendant was only
applicant for membership and not actually affiliated. United States v Dawe (1945, CA2 NY) 149 F2d 491; United States
v Koeniger (1945, CA2 NY) 149 F2d 492, cert den (1945) 326 US 725, 90 L Ed 430, 66 S Ct 30.
Conviction of making and submitting false documents to Tax Court could be based on defendant's testimony as to
origin of information transferred to books and his subsequent admission that notations from which entry into books was
made were not in existence at time of such entry, since in false document charge government need not, as required on
perjury charge, prove falsity of testimony by at least two witnesses or by one witness and corroborating evidence. Stein
v United States (1966, CA5 Tex) 363 F2d 587, 66-2 USTC P 9518, 18 AFTR 2d 5725, cert den (1966) 385 US 934, 17 L Ed
2d 214, 87 S Ct 294.
Evidence was insufficient to support conviction in prosecution of physician for making false, fictitious and fraudulent
statements in Medicaid and Medicare claims where witnesses who were patients were unable to testify that procedures for
which billings were made were not performed. United States v Herberman (1978, CA5 Tex) 583 F2d 222.
As matter of law, government failed to prove that forms submitted falsely represented that titanium was manufactured according to government specifications, even though government official testified that he would not have signed
them had he not been presented with document certifying titanium as ballistically tested, since, although titanium did not
conform, document did not lie, and it was through official's failure to perform adequate review that nonconforming material was certified. United States v Cannon (1995, CA11 Ga) 41 F3d 1462, 8 FLW Fed C 951, cert den (1995) 516 US
823, 133 L Ed 2d 44, 116 S Ct 86.
Evidence was insufficient to prove that applicant for citizenship made false statement on his INS Form N-445 application, where his response to question whether he had made change in marital status after he filed his original naturalization petition was literally true, since his separation from wife pre-dated petition and there had been no change between filing of petition and filing of INS Form N-445. United States v Moses (1996, CA5 Tex) 94 F3d 182.
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Evidence was sufficient to support lender's conviction for making false entries in reports within jurisdiction of
Government National Mortgage Association, in that, even though reports accurately reflected that payments had been
made, they failed to show that lender was making payments from its own funds to mask number of delinquencies. United
States v Logan (2001, CA6 Tenn) 250 F3d 350, 56 Fed Rules Evid Serv 84, 2001 FED App 158P, cert den (2001) 534 US
895, 151 L Ed 2d 154, 122 S Ct 216 and cert den (2001) 534 US 997, 151 L Ed 2d 384, 122 S Ct 468 and (criticized in
United States v Bailey (2003, CA10 Kan) 327 F3d 1131, 61 Fed Rules Evid Serv 853).
In action in which defendant appealed from judgment of district court denying defendant's motion to vacate and set
aside jury verdict, which found defendant guilty of making material false statement concerning matter within jurisdiction
of U.S. Government, 18 USCS § 1001(a), and converting property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agency, 18 USCS
§ 658, with respect to § 1001 count, there was sufficient evidence that defendant knew to be false his representation that
there had been no "material changes" to his financial condition where (1) in support of his renewed loan application,
defendant submitted documentation listing his crop year 2000 soybeans as asset; (2) defendant also granted Farm Service
Agency (FSA) security interest in soybeans and promised FSA that it would receive some of proceeds of sale of soybeans
in partial repayment of loan; (3) nevertheless, despite having sold over $ 11,000 of crop year 2000 soybeans day before or
morning of loan closing, defendant told FSA employees that his financial condition had not materially changed since July;
and (4) having sold $ 11,000 of that collateral, defendant at minimum placed $ 11,000 outside of agreements pledging his
soybeans as collateral. United States v Rice (2006, CA8 Iowa) 449 F3d 887.
Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001;
evidence showed that defendant and several other individuals engaged in insider trading based on large corporation's
purchase of small company and that individuals agreed to conceal from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) fact
that they had been provided with inside information; sufficient evidence supported jury's disbelief of defendant's testimony that he was telling truth when he testified before SEC that he did not trade on inside information. United States v
Hughes (2007, CA6 Ohio) 505 F3d 578, 2007 FED App 432P.
There was sufficient evidence that air-monitoring reports provided by defendants were false; government introduced
evidence demonstrating that one defendant could not have analyzed samples without having physical access to filter
cassettes from air-monitoring devices but that he was in continental United States from January 9, 2001, through January
26, 2001--that is, during period in which he ostensibly analyzed air samples described in reports--and that no packages
were sent to him after January 11, 2001. United States v Starnes (2009, CA3 VI) 583 F3d 196.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2)
because each count was based on submission of false Form 990 directly to IRS. United States v Mubayyid (2008, DC
Mass) 2008-2 USTC P 50504, 102 AFTR 2d 5348.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for making false statement to FBI in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2)
when defendant denied having traveled to Afghanistan. United States v Mubayyid (2008, DC Mass) 2008-2 USTC P
50504, 102 AFTR 2d 5348.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Reasonable juror could have found beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had intentionally provided
false answers to three questions on his asylum application, and had perpetuated those answers in his asylum interview;
therefore, evidence was sufficient support jury's verdict on all counts that charged defendant with violating 18 USCS §§
1001 and 1546. United States v Jamal (2007, CA6 Tenn) 2007 FED App 634N.
159. Intent, knowledge and willfulness
Trial court may rationally base its conclusion that appellant acted knowingly and willfully on appellant's oral "no"
response by his continued reluctance to let inspector know that answer should have been affirmative response. United
States v Carrier (1981, CA9 Idaho) 654 F2d 559.
There was ample evidence for rational trier of fact to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was lying
when she said that she found out about marriage between grandfather and his adopted granddaughter only in 2004; testimony of grandfather, granddaughter, and federal investigator all suggested that defendant knew about marriage from
moment of nuptials, and that evidence was never controverted. United States v Dedman (2008, CA6 Ky) 527 F3d 577,
2008 FED App 203P.
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Defendant arranged meeting between convicted felon interested in selling his AK-47 rifle and buyer, took money and
handed gun to buyer; when questioned by federal agents defendant repeated lied about his involvement in gun sale and
was charged under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) with making false statement to federal agents; district court did not err by
denying his motion for acquittal; evidence was sufficient to show that defendant acted willfully and with intent to deceive
agents. United States v Brandt (2008, CA7 Ind) 546 F3d 912.
Evidence was sufficient to satisfy mens rea requirement of 18 USCS § 1001(a) when it dispelled any doubt that defendant was sufficiently informed of intricacies of air-monitoring procedures to recognize that his codefendant could not
analyze any air samples from site without physical access to filter cassettes and that he knew that his codefendant did not
have such access during relevant period of time, and thus, would permit rational juror to reasonably infer that representations to contrary contained in air-monitoring reports were necessarily false; evidence also supported reasonable inference that defendant was aware that transmitting falsified air-monitoring reports was unlawful. United States v Starnes
(2009, CA3 VI) 583 F3d 196.
To establish act was done knowingly and willfully within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, evidence must show party
acted voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason, and with specific
intent to do something that law forbids. Holmes v General Dynamics Corp. (1993, 4th Dist) 17 Cal App 4th 1418, 22 Cal
Rptr 2d 172, 93 CDOS 6236, 93 Daily Journal DAR 10701, 8 BNA IER Cas 1249.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: There was sufficient evidence that defendant made several knowingly and intentionally false and fictitious statements to FBI agents, including special agent's testimony that defendant falsely stated to agent during interviews that he had no knowledge about victim's whereabouts, he had no involvement in victim's disappearance, he did not
have relationship with victim, he only knew victim because his children had been communicating with her, he had not
given victim any gifts, he needed to leave interview because he had to unlock vehicle for someone in his capacity as town's
only locksmith, and even after explaining that victim was safe, he stated she was in one of two towns in Kentucky before
finally admitting that he knew she was in hotel in another town. United States v Wise (2008, CA6 Ky) 278 Fed Appx 552,
2008 FED App 273N.
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for making false statements on matter within jurisdiction of federal government in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; record showed that defendant, as lessor, overstated by
approximately 10,000 square feet size of certain property that was leased to federally-funded non-profit organization;
evidence showed that misstatement on lease was willful because square footage of property had been discussed with
defendant and because defendant was knowledgeable regarding real property transactions; this evidence, in conjunction
with defendant's broad practice of dishonest reporting and false rent charges, permitted rational trier of fact to find that
defendant was aware of real square footage of property and misstated it deliberately. United States v Madison (2007, CA6
Tenn) 2007 FED App 279N.
Unpublished: Defendant's conviction for wire fraud in violation of 18 USCS § 1343, and making false and fraudulent
statements on United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-1 settlement statement forms in
violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed because defendant knew he was receiving more money than needed to purchase
properties and stated importance of disclosures on HUD-1 form that was required under Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), 12 USCS §§ 2601 et seq., had "natural tendency to influence" even if HUD did not directly
rely upon them. United States v Wilkins (2009, CA6 Tenn) 2009 FED App 72N.
Unpublished: Defendant's conviction for submitting materially false loan application to U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development was affirmed because evidence submitted in form of fraudulent documents that had been submitted with loan application was sufficient to support conviction as jury could have rationally concluded that, because
defendant solicited false information that was ultimately included in her loan application, loan application either contained false information when defendant signed it or else defendant knew false information would be inserted sometime
later. United States v Powell (2006, CA10) 2006 US App LEXIS 1835.
Unpublished: Defendant, who was convicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and aiding and abetting making
of false statements in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1341, 1001, and 2 in connection with statements to Small Business Administration (SBA) concerning defaulted loans, was properly denied judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29;
rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant acted with necessary intent to defraud SBA by underreporting
assets, regardless of any legal advice defendant may have received. United States v Groff (2006, CA3 Pa) 2006 US App
LEXIS 9489.
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18 USCS § 1001
Unpublished: In case in which defendant was convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001, he unsuccessfully argued
unsuccessfully that there was insufficient evidence to support conviction; there was sufficient evidence to show that
defendant made false statement willingly. United States v Akinmukomi (2010, CA4 Va) 2010 US App LEXIS 5260.
160.--Currency transaction reports
Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendants had knowledge of Reporting Act (31 USCS § 53130) and that they
had intent to violate it where there was direct evidence of such knowledge and where jury could infer from evidence that
only purpose accomplished by scheme was for defendants to disassociate themselves from cash, and launder it out of
United States while avoiding any required CTR's. United States v Hernando Ospina (1986, CA11 Fla) 798 F2d 1570, 21
Fed Rules Evid Serv 878.
Attorney acted willfully under 18 USCS § 2(b) with knowledge of currency transaction reporting (CTR) requirement
and with intent to cause bank to fail to file currency transaction report, where (1) attorney at time of transaction had
requisite knowledge under 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 2 of CTR requirements, and (2) there is reasonable inference that attorney directed people in her office and acted herself to take large amounts of cash and break it into amounts of less than
$ 10,000 and engaged in transactions at different banks and in names of different payees in order to hide that money
originated from single source and identity of source. United States v Perlmutter (1987, SD NY) 656 F Supp 782, affd
without op (1987, CA2 NY) 835 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 485 US 935, 99 L Ed 2d 271, 108 S Ct 1110.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant, upon boarding flight to Europe with his wife, falsely stated to Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) agents that his wife was carrying $ 6,500 and he had only $ 356, government established that
defendant knowingly and willfully lied to DHS agents, required element to support conviction for violating 18 USCS §
1001, because there was ample evidence that defendant, non-native English speaker, but U.S. citizen educated in U.S.,
knowingly and willfully lied. United States v Odunze (2008, CA6 Tenn) 2008 FED App 278N.
161.--Customs matters
In prosecution for causing false and fraudulent statements to be made in application for export license, letters and
other papers taken from person of defendant, which indicated that he knew that ultimate destination of oil storage tanks he
was exporting was not purported one, were not instrumentalities for commission of crime but were mere evidences of
criminal intent of defendant. Takahashi v United States (1944, CA9 Wash) 143 F2d 118.
Defendant's concealment of diamond and emerald ring and fact that 7 unset diamonds and diamond ring were found
on person of his traveling companion showed awareness that customs officials would be interested in gems and allowed
jury reasonably to infer that defendant had notice Customs would consider passage of valuable gems into United States
"material"; customs declaration form which clearly stated "all your baggage, including hand bags and hand-carried parcels, may be examined" was sufficient to establish that defendant, international traveler, had notice that his possession of
gems was material to Customs, even though gems were acquired in United States. United States v Masters (1979, CA9
Cal) 612 F2d 1117, cert den (1980) 449 US 847, 66 L Ed 2d 57, 101 S Ct 134.
Evidence was sufficient to establish specific intent of defendants to defraud United States where evidence established
that defendants submitted statement to United States Customs falsely designating 1,150 cases of bonded scotch whiskey
as "vessel supplies"; inference that 25-man crew on 14-day voyage could not ingest great amount of scotch was sufficient
for jury on issue. United States v Lichenstein (1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d
856, 100 S Ct 2991.
Evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant's knowledge that she carried in excess of $ 5,000 while making statement
on customs declaration that she did not, where money found in defendant's purse consisted of 2 large bundles of $ 100
bills, not concealed in wrapping material, bound only by rubber bands, with each bundle of currency being approximately
1 1/2 inches thick. United States v Silva (1983, CA2 NY) 715 F2d 43.
Defendant's forgery of name on false charter form submitted to United States Customs is fully sufficient to convict
defendant of submitting false documents in attempt to regain sailboat seized by customs as part of marijuana smuggling
scheme, regardless of defendant's defense that he had signed false name to form to appease his secretary, who had asked
him to sign false charter. United States v Cross (1984, CA11 Ga) 742 F2d 1279.
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18 USCS § 1001
Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had specific intent required to prove violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by
clandestinely importing and exporting cigarettes, where jury could infer from facts such as--that defendants had been in
export business for number of years--that they knew that false shipping export declarations would be created and submitted to United States Customs Service. United States v Gafyczk (1988, CA11 Fla) 847 F2d 685.
Evidence of importer's intent to misclassify plywood as "softwood" rather than "hardwood" with Customs so as to
avoid paying duties was sufficient, even though in exporting countries such woods were considered "soft," where, after
obtaining knowledge about correct classification, he directed suppliers to use term "softwood" on invoices to avoid import
duties. United States v Godinez (1991, CA11 Fla) 922 F2d 752, 13 BNA Intl Trade Rep 1142.
Sufficient evidence for conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 exists where Dominican Republic businessman could
reasonably have been found to have had knowledge of falsity of statements to U.S. Customs Service regarding sum of
money he was carrying into Puerto Rico, given his business sophistication and previous transporting of large sums of
money into Puerto Rico. United States v Urena Guzman (1986, DC Puerto Rico) 637 F Supp 48.
162.--Tax matters
Where several of defendant's acquaintances testified that defendant had approached them with request that they claim
he had large loans outstanding during years being scrutinized by Internal Revenue Service audit, evidence was sufficient
to sustain conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 for knowingly and willfully presenting United States agency with
materially false statements. United States v Lake (1979, CA5 Ga) 592 F2d 260.
Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant meant to submit false statements and documents to Internal
Revenue Service as part of money-laundering scheme where FBI agents who has posed as crime figures testified that
defendant had described scheme to them in which he and co-conspirator would receive tainted money from organized
crime members, commingle it with trust accounts he claimed to manage, invest commingled funds in commodities
transactions and return half illegal moneys to organized crime figure's nominees through sham salaries and commissions
which would appear to come from legitimate trading and commodities, negotiations among parties continued over
5-month period and culminated in meeting at which government agents handed defendant suitcase containing large sum
of money to be "laundered". United States v Freedson (1979, CA9 Cal) 608 F2d 739, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 627.
Evidence was sufficient that defendant acted willfully by making false statements on his son's college financial aid
application and on his tax returns, where he admitted he understood his tax returns were not truthful and that he had
substantial unreported income, and had asked tax preparer not to turn over accurate records to IRS, since sheer magnitude
of concealed income and assets evidenced deliberate and intentional fraud. United States v Hoover (1999, CA7 Ind) 175
F3d 564, 83 AFTR 2d 2214, subsequent app (2001, CA7 Ind) 240 F3d 593, 87 AFTR 2d 871 and post-conviction relief den
(2001, CA7 Ind) 6 Fed Appx 414, 87 AFTR 2d 1918.
Evidence was sufficient from which jury could infer that defendant's attorney violated 18 USCS § 1001(a)(3), where,
on offer to compromise he submitted to IRS, he failed to list defendant's possible ownership interest in newly-purchased
home as potential community property and made false statement that defendant and his wife could only afford to rent.
United States v Wright (2000, CA5 Tex) 211 F3d 233, 2000-1 USTC P 50438, 85 AFTR 2d 1791, reh den (2000, CA5 Tex)
2000 US App LEXIS 14955 and cert den (2000) 531 US 916, 148 L Ed 2d 199, 121 S Ct 274 and cert den (2000) 531 US
916, 148 L Ed 2d 199, 121 S Ct 274.
163.--Miscellaneous
Where defendant caused false representations in accountant's financial statement and actively participated in falsification of corporate records, jurors could reasonably decide that misrepresentations in accountant's financial statement
were intended and necessary result of defendant's deliberate action of falsifying sales records. United States v Markee
(1970, CA9 Or) 425 F2d 1043, cert den (1970) 400 US 847, 27 L Ed 2d 84, 91 S Ct 93.
Where owner of employment agency was convicted for filing false information with Department of Labor and Immigration and Naturalization Service concerning qualifications of aliens for positions as hospital orderlies, conviction was
reversed because government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the owner had actual knowledge of the aliens'
lack of qualifications for the orderly positions. United States v Glantzman (1971, CA3 NJ) 447 F2d 199.
Defendant's conviction of willfully and knowingly making a false statement to an agency of the United States in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed, since evidence was sufficient to permit the District Court to conclude beyond
reasonable doubt that defendant knew market value of property he offered to secure bonds for release of certain persons
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18 USCS § 1001
incarcerated while awaiting trial was less than $ 85,000 and that he willfully and knowingly represented to the contrary to
the court in the bail transaction. United States v Burkley (1975, CA4 Va) 511 F2d 47.
Defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 for willfully making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction
of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was affirmed, since evidence as to each of three
financial transactions sufficed for jury to find that defendant had knowledge that his personal expenses and those not of
the hospital were included within the general hospital accounts as transcribed to Medicare forms signed by him as president of the hospital. United States v Smith (1975, CA5 Fla) 523 F2d 771, cert den (1976) 429 US 817, 50 L Ed 2d 76, 97
S Ct 59, reh den (1976) 429 US 987, 50 L Ed 2d 599, 97 S Ct 509.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, sales invoices received by defendant were not considered outstanding bills, so
that defendant's affidavit as to bills paid could not be considered intentionally false for not including invoices. United
States v Lange (1976, CA5 La) 528 F2d 1280.
Sufficient evidence existed to find intent in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 for defrauding cooperative
of profits from sale of fertilizer through use of 2 corporations where there was evidence of contract between cooperative
and government which allowed cooperative to store grain pledged to producers for price support loans, contract called for
warehouse's records to be on hand, federal examiners were assured by defendant that grains in storage at elevator belonged to cooperative and were not store grain belonging to others, when in fact elevator did not have on hand sufficient
grain to cover all of its agreements with farmers. United States v Gilbertson (1978, CA8 Minn) 588 F2d 584.
There was sufficient evidence from which jury in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 could infer that filing
of false statements by operator of hospital supply house was done "willfully"; there was plenty of evidence that from
outset defendant was familiar with government hospital funding programs and such funding was essential to prosperity of
defendant's ongoing fraudulent business activities. United States v Huber (1979, CA2 NY) 603 F2d 387, cert den (1980)
445 US 927, 63 L Ed 2d 759, 100 S Ct 1312 and (criticized in Lockheed Martin Corp. v Boeing Co. (2005, MD Fla) 2005
US Dist LEXIS 3948).
In prosecution for aiding and abetting in false identification and marketing of flue-cured tobacco in violation of 18
USCS § 1001, to prove that defendant knew third parties and intended to enter illegal agreement with such, government
had to produce evidence that defendant knew both location of third party's farm on account of which marketing card was
issued and that defendant knew farm on which they grew tobacco they offered for sale; jury could find that defendant had
knowledge of third party's criminal intent only if there was evidence that defendant knew that their tobacco was grown in
different county from that from which farm was located and card was issued. United States v Winstead (1983, CA4 NC)
708 F2d 925.
There was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to deceive HUD, where defendant falsified signatures on list of
purported beneficiaries of HUD community grant money, since jury could infer intent, at least 2 people listed had not
received aid, and since desire to forestall insistence by HUD for repayment would have been motivating factor for deception. United States v Corsino (1987, CA1 Puerto Rico) 812 F2d 26 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5
Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).
It was at least jury issue whether contractor, minority contractor, or bank had specific intent required to violate 18
USCS § 1001 by minority contractor's assignment of proceeds from contracts to contractor in establishing mentor relationship, since parties were pursuing valid objective, no harm to government was intended and none occurred, and no
regulation or policy was violated, whether or not assignments violated assignment statutes, 31 USCS § 3727 and 41 USCS
§ 15. Arthur Pew Constr. Co. v Lipscomb (1992, CA11 Ga) 965 F2d 1559, 23 FR Serv 3d 445, 6 FLW Fed C 802.
Evidence was sufficient that president of company with contract to provide plastic bags for GSA willfully caused
false certification statements to be filed with government concerning compliance with contract, where, although he personally refused to sign such statements, he instructed employees to produce bags that could not meet contract specifications and to pack them by weight, resulting in shortages, even after he knew that false certificates were being signed and
supplied to GSA. United States v Fairchild (1993, CA9 Cal) 990 F2d 1139, 93 CDOS 2602, 93 Daily Journal DAR
4441, 38 CCF P 76513, cert den (1993) 510 US 898, 126 L Ed 2d 217, 114 S Ct 266.
Evidence was sufficient to support sheriff's conviction for false statements under 18 USCS § 1001, where, as part of
his ownership and operation of for-profit food service for inmates at local jail, he ordered county sheriffs to use county
vehicles to purchase federal surplus food supplies with county checks, since reasonable jury could have found that he
knowingly deceived federal surplus food program. United States v Hawkey (1998, CA8 SD) 148 F3d 920, 82 AFTR 2d
5058.
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Evidence was sufficient to convict firearms dealer of causing to be made and used false statements on Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms forms and false Acquisition and Disposition Book entries under 18 USCS §§ 2, 1001, where he
created sales receipts from which book entries would be made in names of undercover officers with knowledge they were
not actual buyers. United States v Inglese (2002, CA7 Ill) 282 F3d 528.
Evidence linked defendant, immigration lawyer, to forgery of I-589 asylum application where client testified that she
had neither signed form nor given authority to anyone to sign for her, and former law firm employee testified that applicant-signature on form was in defendant's handwriting; such evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction
for making false statement to federal agency under 18 USCS § 1001 and of immigration fraud under 18 USCS § 1546(a)
(although court reversed § 1546 convictions on other grounds). United States v Phillips (2008, CA10 Kan) 543 F3d 1197.
Lawyer's convictions were affimred for knowingly and willfully making false statements in violation of 18 USCS §
1001 when she affirmed that she intended to, and would, abide by "Special Administrative Measures" (SAMs) imposed on
her client who was serving life sentence in maximum security prison for terrorism-related crimes to restrict his ability to
communicate with persons outside of prison so as to prevent him from continuing to lead terrorist organizations; in light
of her repeated and flagrant violation of SAMs, reasonable factfinder could conclude that lawyer's representations that she
intended to and would abide by SAMs were knowingly false when made. United States v Stewart (2009, CA2 NY) 590 F3d
93.
Acquittal was denied where knowingly false promise made by attorney for terrorist inmate to abide by special administrative measures (SAMs), which severely restricted inmate's communications with third persons, constituted false
statement within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, and jury was properly instructed that in order to find violation of statute,
Government was required to prove that statements were untrue when made and that defendant acted knowingly and
willfully in failing to abide by SAMs. United States v Sattar (2005, SD NY) 395 F Supp 2d 79.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where jury convicted defendant of making false statements in matter within jurisdiction of Veterans
Administration (VA), defendant's employer, when he denied owning or having owned off-duty weapon after being asked
directly by investigator for VA, evidence showing that defendant made same false statement twice when asked directly
and that he knew that what he was saying was false supported jury's determination that defendant acted willfully. United
States v Carrasquillo (2007, CA2 NY) 2007 US App LEXIS 15471.
Unpublished: In case in which defendants were convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), they argued unsuccessfully that evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; evidence that they knowingly made false statements
was sufficient to support their convictions; while evidence showing defendant's knowledge of their lack of ownership was
partially circumstantial and inferential, knowledge could be shown by such evidence. United States v Miller (2008, CA5
Tex) 2008 US App LEXIS 25317.
Unpublished: Jury heard extensive testimony that defendant was part of identity theft conspiracy both before and at
time of his citizenship application process, and testimony showed that if defendant had acknowledged his wrongdoings,
he would not have been granted citizenship; thus, rational jury could have concluded that defendant violated 18 USCS §§
1001 and 1425. United States v Popa (2010, CA9 Nev) 2010 US App LEXIS 464.
164. Materiality
Argument of defendant in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 that his false statement to federal examiners
was not material in that victim cooperative had sufficient stock of grain on hand at various storage facilities to satisfy
maximum number of bushels which at any time could be converted into warehouse receipts had every farmer demanded
warehouse receipt was without merit since parties stipulated that amount of corn on storage agreements with cooperative
exceeded amount on hand and primary concern of federal examiners was to make sure that elevator in fact had sufficient
grain on hand to cover what was storage obligation to someone else and had to rely on accuracy of records produced by
defendants. United States v Gilbertson (1978, CA8 Minn) 588 F2d 584.
Evidence was insufficient to support contention that statements were material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001
where there was no evidence that statements were capable of affecting exercise of governmental functions in that there
was no requirement that directors of exempt co-operatives be farmers nor was there evidence to prove that lying about
names of directors would affect functions of Interstate Commerce Commission when ICC Form BOp 102 was filed.
United States v Talkington (1978, CA9 Cal) 589 F2d 415.
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Falsification of test report needed for approval of chemical codings in nuclear power plant is falsification of material
official statement supporting conviction. United States v Green (1984, CA9 Cal) 745 F2d 1205, cert den (1985) 474 US
925, 88 L Ed 2d 266, 106 S Ct 259 and (criticized in United States v Falkowitz (2002, SD NY) 214 F Supp 2d 365).
There was sufficient evidence for jury to find that false statements in eligibility questionnaires were material, where
defendant indicated on questionnaire that he was not recovered sufficiently to resume duty and that he was not employed,
since statements affected or influenced exercise of governmental functions, or had natural tendency to influence or were
capable of influencing agency decision. United States v De Rosa (1986, CA9 Cal) 783 F2d 1401, cert den (1986) 477 US
908, 91 L Ed 2d 571, 106 S Ct 3282.
Evidence was sufficient to prove materiality of false monthly water monitoring reports which water treatment plant
supervisor caused to be filed with EPA, even though plant technician's personal diary reflected true levels of pollutants to
be below falsely recorded levels, where diary covered only 2-month period, and expert testimony to contrary covered
18-month period, since statements could have influenced EPA enforcement decision. United States v Brittain (1991,
CA10 Okla) 931 F2d 1413, 32 Envt Rep Cas 2084, 21 ELR 21092.
Contractor's responsive statements as to quantity of windows which formed integral part of indictment under 18
USCS § 1001, alleging that he submitted false and inflated price list, were not material allegations, since number of
windows provided in price could not have influenced government in accepting his bid, where government had specified
quantity. United States v Johnson (1991, CA8 ND) 937 F2d 392, 37 CCF P 76193.
Evidence was sufficient that defendant's false written answer to Department of Labor (DOL) that he was not employed, when he was in fact self-employed, was material to DOL, since it was capable of influencing that agency to
continue his full benefits. United States v Harrod (1992, CA10 Okla) 981 F2d 1171, cert den (1993) 508 US 913, 124 L
Ed 2d 259, 113 S Ct 2350.
Testimony of expert witnesses that reduction of bottom-line profits for year as result of fraudulent restatement of
financial statements was sufficient to prove that restatement was capable of influencing, and did in fact influence, Securities Exchange Commission to take remedial action against defendant. United States v Wiles (1997, CA10 Colo) 106 F3d
1516.
Evidence sufficiently supported defendant's conviction for lying to federal officer, as defendant's false statements
made to federal officer regarding incident in which defendant pointed gun at another person, were material to government
inquiry since false statements had natural tendency to influence course of investigation. United States v Robertson (2003,
CA8 ND) 324 F3d 1028, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2003, CA8) 2003 US App LEXIS 9439.
Conviction for making false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed because defendant's false
statement concerning entering country two months prior to filing asylum application had natural tendency to produce
conclusion that, because defendant had entered within year, defendant was qualified to seek asylum, and false statements
were material because they could have affected investigation of illegal alien smuggling; government did not have burden
to establish that defendant entered United States more than year before application date, and thus, to show that government would have denied application had it known actual date. United States v Chen (2003, CA9) 324 F3d 1103, 2003
CDOS 2973, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 3834.
Government presented sufficient evidence to support jury's finding that false statements that defendant made to
federal investigators were "material" for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001: to be material, defendant's false statements did not
have to actually influence investigators, it was sufficient if statements were of type that would be capable of influencing
reasonable investigator; defendant admitted that he had falsely told investigators that he had not sold any firearms and that
two firearms had remained in his physical custody at police station at all times; and defendant's false statements were type
that, under different circumstances, might convince investigators to drop or refocus their investigation, which was what
defendant admitted he was attempting to do when he made statements. United States v McBane (2005, CA3 Pa) 433 F3d
344.
In case in which defendant repeatedly made false statements while testifying before grand jury and while talking to
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)special agent about important issue of when defendant first knew about property
owner's illegal fill activity in violation of Clean Water Act (CWA), evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for
violating 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1623, and 1001; by falsely claiming to have not known about owner's illegal fill activity until
after he was contacted by employee from United States Army Corps of Engineers, defendant disrupted and interfered with
investigation into owner's violations of CWA; specifically defendant's false statements denied both EPA agent and grand
jury access to witness, i.e., defendant, who had detailed, firsthand knowledge of owner's pre-March 2002 activities, in-
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18 USCS § 1001
cluding owner's preparations, plans, and rationale for his filling project. United States v Johnson (2007, CA11 Fla) 485
F3d 1264, 20 FLW Fed C 599.
Sufficient evidence supported conviction of defendant, former official of Bonneville Power Administration (BPA),
for making false claims and statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, which arose from her promotion of use of software
from company for which her husband worked as salesman and from her participation in decision-making process to
implement further use of software at BPA; evidence showed that defendant made false statement as to her husband's
employment dates in BPA recusal memorandum, and statement was material to BPA's analysis regarding scope and
length of conflict of interest. United States v Selby (2009, CA9 Or) 557 F3d 968.
Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was granted because evidence was insufficient to convict him of
making false statements where (1) government failed to offer evidence from which reasonable jury could find beyond
reasonable doubt that defendant made false statements about his date and place of last entry into United States; and (2) no
reasonable jury could find that government proved that defendant's alleged false statements on AR-11 Alien's Change of
Address Card change of address form was material to any decision; there was no evidence identifying any "decision" for
which form was used. United States v Khellil (2009, ND Ill) 678 F Supp 2d 713.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant, upon boarding flight to Europe with his wife, falsely stated to Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) agents that his wife was carrying $ 6,500 and he had only $ 356, when in fact he was carrying
additional $ 7,900, false statements were material, required element to support conviction for violating 18 USCS § 1001,
because they were capable of influencing DHS agents' investigation. United States v Odunze (2008, CA6 Tenn) 2008
FED App 278N.
Unpublished: Where jury convicted defendant of making false statements in matter within jurisdiction of Veterans
Administration (VA), defendant's employer, when he denied owning or having owned off-duty weapon after being asked
directly by investigator for VA, there was sufficient evidence showing that defendant's false statement was material to
investigator's inquiry because false statement went to heart of whether defendant had means of engaging in unprofessional
conduct. United States v Carrasquillo (2007, CA2 NY) 2007 US App LEXIS 15471.
Unpublished: Defendant's conviction for making materially false statement, violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was affirmed because her statement to FBI Agent that she did not know man to whom she purportedly mailed classified documents when she, in fact, had long-standing acquaintance with him, was material as government's attempts to locate
documents would have taken different course had government been aware of relationship. United States v Cummings
(2007, CA9 Wash) 2007 US App LEXIS 19593.
Unpublished: In case in which defendants were convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), they argued unsuccessfully that evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. Contrary to their assertion, their claims of ownership
of real estate were material since those claims were capable of influencing decision of Small Business Administration to
make loan. United States v Miller (2008, CA5 Tex) 2008 US App LEXIS 25317.
165.--Customs matters
Defendant's concealment of diamond and emerald ring, 7 unset diamonds and diamond ring on person of his traveling
companion showed awareness that customs officials would be interested in gems and allowed jury reasonably to infer that
defendant had notice Customs would consider passage of valuable gems into United States "material"; customs declaration form which clearly stated "all your baggage, including hand bags and hand-carried parcels, may be examined" was
sufficient to establish that defendant, international traveler, had notice that his possession of gems was material to Customs, even though gems were acquired in United States. United States v Masters (1979, CA9 Cal) 612 F2d 1117, cert
den (1980) 449 US 847, 66 L Ed 2d 57, 101 S Ct 134.
Affirmative, unsolicited statements offered by defendants to Customs officers to effect that they had not been in
Mexico but had flown from New Mexico are material since if believed such statements would have enabled defendants
and any contraband they might have been carrying to enter country without rigorous examination thus potentially impairing function of Customs Service and violating 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Moore (1980, CA9 Cal) 638 F2d
1171, cert den (1981) 449 US 1113, 66 L Ed 2d 842, 101 S Ct 924.
Jury could have reasonably decided that understatement of value on shipper's export declaration form based on values
he supplied to freight forwarders was material misrepresentation under 18 USCS § 1001, where government presented
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evidence that values submitted in such forms are used by customs officials in determining which outbound cargo to inspect and for statistical purposes which affect trade negotiations with other countries. United States v Chmielewski (2000,
CA8 Minn) 218 F3d 840, 55 Fed Rules Evid Serv 702, 86 AFTR 2d 5252, post-conviction relief den, motion den (2001,
DC Minn) 2001 US Dist LEXIS 19562.
166.--Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Defendant's conviction under indictment charging him with knowingly and willfully making false statement to
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was reversed where, although there was
evidence that defendant had failed to list in FDIC questionnaire form, loan to which he was accommodated, the only
evidence of materiality of his statement was the general statement by bank examiner that the FDIC relied upon the
questionnaire, without stating what for or for what purpose. United States v Beer (1975, CA5 Fla) 518 F2d 168.
Evidence of materiality was insufficient, where lie on HUD forms about amount of "broker's" commission earned for
sale of condominiums by bank directors engaged in self-dealing was not material to work of FDIC, since there was no
testimony that amount of commission was relevant to case or had potential to influence agency's conduct, although lie
about existence of commission might have been material. United States v Kwiat (1987, CA7 Ill) 817 F2d 440, cert den
(1987) 484 US 924, 98 L Ed 2d 245, 108 S Ct 284.
Evidence that defendant provided bank with false name and social security number was insufficient to convict under
18 USCS § 1001, where there was no evidence that false statements had natural tendency to influence or were capable of
influencing FDIC. United States v Ismail (1996, CA4 Va) 97 F3d 50, 96-2 USTC P 50510, 79 AFTR 2d 901.
167.--Payments or disbursements
Government proof of mere statement of claim for payment for drug, not extending to any additional statements capable of inducing payment, did not establish materiality of statements for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v
Radetsky (1976, CA10 Colo) 535 F2d 556, cert den (1976) 429 US 820, 50 L Ed 2d 81, 97 S Ct 68 and (ovrld in part on
other grounds by United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994).
Evidence was sufficient to establish that false statements made by defendant superintendent of Indian agency in
documents submitted to BIA were "material" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001 since BIA made disbursements based on
documents. United States v Hicks (1980, CA8 SD) 619 F2d 752 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss)
96-1 USTC P 50163).
False statements on time cards and time sheets are material where information on them initiated other records which,
in turn, had ultimate effect of paying trainees for performing unauthorized work while preventing State Agency and
Department of Labor from accurately monitoring federal funds. United States v Brown (1982, CA7 Wis) 688 F2d 1112,
11 Fed Rules Evid Serv 708.
False representations made in letters to Department of Housing and Urban Development seeking authorization for
release of mortgage escrow monies were material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, even though they did not induce
disbursement of any monies, since false representations were clearly capable of resulting in fraudulent procurement of
government funds and HUD plainly could have relied on them to its detriment. United States v Alemany Rivera (1985,
CA1 Puerto Rico) 781 F2d 229, cert den (1986) 475 US 1086, 89 L Ed 2d 725, 106 S Ct 1469.
168. Miscellaneous
It may be that under certain circumstances, prosecution of false statements may be sustained despite lack of proof as
to exact words used, but where sole charge relating to statement is alleged false statement violation, words become crucial, and where there was no basis other than pure speculation upon which reasonable juror could determine what question
was asked and what response was given, finding that false statement was made is unreasonable. United States v Clifford
(1976, ED NY) 426 F Supp 696.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: In case in which defendants were convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), they argued unsuccessfully that evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; they asserted that their claims of ownership of piece
of real estate were not statements under § 1001(a)(2) because they were expressions of legal opinions or conclusions;
however, since their claims of ownership were factual assertions that could be proven true or false, they were statements.
United States v Miller (2008, CA5 Tex) 2008 US App LEXIS 25317.
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169.--Cases where evidence found sufficient
Evidence that defendant, in application for certificate of identification required of all alien enemies by presidential
proclamation, answered "none" to question as to clubs and societies of which he had been member in preceding five years,
whereas it was proved that he was member of local branch of Nazi party, was sufficient to sustain conviction. United
States v Heine (1945, CA2 NY) 149 F2d 485, cert den (1945) 325 US 885, 89 L Ed 2000, 65 S Ct 1578; United States v
Barra (1945, CA2 NY) 149 F2d 489; United States v Schefold (1945, CA2 NY) 149 F2d 492, cert den (1945) 326 US 725,
90 L Ed 430, 66 S Ct 30.
Government proved defendant pharmacist purchased 600 morphine tablets, had only 150 on hand, and had legally
sold only 120; this was sufficient to show crime had been committed. Coil v United States (1965, CA8 Neb) 343 F2d
573, cert den (1965) 382 US 821, 15 L Ed 2d 67, 86 S Ct 48.
Defendant's conviction under indictment based on 18 USCS § 1001 charging him with aiding and abetting a woman
in filing a petition to classify status of alien relative for issuance of immigrant status, concealing from the INS the fact that
the woman had gone through a marriage ceremony with an alien solely for the purpose of obtaining status for the alien as
a permanent resident with the understanding that she and alien would not live together as man and wife, was affirmed,
where although defendant was not present when woman filled in petition form, and there is no direct proof that he was
aware of specific information called for, nevertheless it was easily foreseeable that she would affirmatively inform INS of
marriage and conceal its limited nature, and such representation and concealment were essential to success of plan.
United States v Lozano (1975, CA7 Ill) 511 F2d 1, cert den (1975) 423 US 850, 46 L Ed 2d 74, 96 S Ct 94.
Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by making false
statement on form requesting payment from Farmers Home Administration for building of house where government
official testified that he thoroughly explained forms to defendant, that he supervised defendant's signing of form which
stated that all subcontractors' bills had been paid, that he knew of no other bills that had not been paid and that he would
not have authorized issuance of check if he had known about them. United States v Trull (1978, CA5 Miss) 581 F2d 551.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by willfully and knowingly
misrepresenting signatures on stipend rosters maintained by university as part of government funded program although he
knew such signatures were false and fraudulent; each of 9 students testified that their name had been forged on rosters and
that they had not received stipend payments for those dates, testimony of expert witness unquestionably proved that
defendant had forged signatures of those students and, in addition, defendant admitted doing so. United States v Hooper
(1979, CA7 Wis) 596 F2d 219, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1306.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 where evidence proved that defendant operated business which sold commodity options to public utilizing services of several brokerage houses, that
Securities and Exchange Commission began to investigate defendant and his investment company, defendant submitted
documents to agency as part of investigation which contained altered figures and figures made company appear more
solvent than it actually was. United States v Di Fonzo (1979, CA7 Ill) 603 F2d 1260, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 96957, cert
den (1980) 444 US 1018, 62 L Ed 2d 648, 100 S Ct 672.
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of violation of 18 USCS § 1001, despite her contention that she was
mere bystander at sale of counterfeit immigration documents to undercover agent, since she was present at each of sales,
placed fake phone call in presence of undercover agent supposedly to obtain additional documents for other member of
agent's family, and when she was arrested, possessed marked money which agent had given codefendant husband in initial
purchase of fake documents. United States v Cervantes (1979, CA10 Colo) 609 F2d 974, cert den (1980) 444 US 1023,
62 L Ed 2d 656, 100 S Ct 684.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS §§ 371, 665(a) and 1001, evidence was sufficient to support defendant's
conviction where it was proved that defendant was job developer for state department of employment security, codefendant was co-owner of home decorators company in state, 3 individuals were employed at codefendant's business and
were placed on CETA rolls, defendant falsified documents relating to employment of persons and conspired with codefendants to effect such falsification and then to cover it up. United States v Pappas (1979, CA1 Mass) 611 F2d 399, 5
Fed Rules Evid Serv 1329.
Evidence that defendant charged with violation of 18 USCS § 1001, knowing that government claims representatives
were seeking information to determine defendant's eligibility for benefits, gave false response to question whether he was
receiving other benefits or any other income was sufficient to support conviction. United States v King (1980, CA7 Ill)
613 F2d 670, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 720, 56 ALR Fed 159 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d
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18 USCS § 1001
1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d
35).
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where testimony established that defendant union president and his wife who was union office manager filed union's financial reports showing as strike
expenses moneys which had actually gone for personal use and benefit of defendants. United States v Sullivan (1980,
CA8 Mo) 618 F2d 1290, 89 CCH LC P 12105, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1230.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant physician's conviction
where documentary testimonial evidence indicated that Medicaid and Medicare claim forms had been submitted which
billed certain Friday office visits by patients although he did not have office hours or normally see patients on Fridays.
United States v Adler (1980, CA8 Mo) 623 F2d 1287.
In prosecution for misrepresentation in connection with county supervisor's alleged personal use of county resources
received in part from federal government as antirecession funds, government is not required to show specific weeks in
which federal funds were used or prove actual concealment, but evidence is sufficient to support conviction of misrepresentation where record shows that county employees, who worked on defendant's personal farm, were paid by county
using federal funds during general periods charged. United States v Robinson (1983, CA5 Miss) 700 F2d 205, 12 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 1295, cert den (1984) 465 US 1008, 79 L Ed 2d 235, 104 S Ct 1003.
Evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 that appellant made or caused to be made statements and invoices for billings of services of engineer and engineer in training which were false where although engineer
testified that he worked only few of 150 reported hours on project, whereas appellant billed for 307 hours of service and
appellant instructed him to alter his time sheets to be in accordance with invoices. United States v Jackson (1983, CA8
Mo) 714 F2d 809, 13 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1915.
Government's conclusive establishment of chain of custody of blood samples taken from cattle sufficiently proved
source of samples and sufficiently proved that laboratories received samples that were supposed to be sent to them.
United States v Mendel (1984, CA2 NY) 746 F2d 155, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 771, cert den (1985) 469 US 1213, 84 L Ed
2d 331, 105 S Ct 1184.
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 where it proved that defendant did not merely
give government check knowing there were not funds sufficient to cover amount in account, but also joined other defendants in scheme pursuant to which bank accounts were opened in names of companies that existed only for purpose of
issuing checks, vehicles were purchased with checks drawn on these company accounts, and defendants not only knew
that accounts had insufficient funds but had intent not to honor checks. United States v Ford (1986, CA5 Tex) 797 F2d
1329, cert den (1987) 479 US 1070, 93 L Ed 2d 1011, 107 S Ct 964 and reinstated, in part (1987, CA5 Tex) 824 F2d 1430,
cert den (1988) 484 US 1034, 98 L Ed 2d 776, 108 S Ct 741.
Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant made misrepresentations to his employer to effect that he was
working full time when in fact he was attending Harvard, where he turned in time sheets implying that he was working full
time when he was in class attendance and leased apartment in which he lived as student, calling it "office," although
business only required him to be in Boston on few occasions. United States v Burns (1997, CA2 Vt) 104 F3d 529.
Evidence that farmer made false statements to crop insurance agent so he could recover insurance money to which he
was not entitled was sufficient to convict under 18 USCS § 1001. United States v McClatchy (2001, CA5 Miss) 249 F3d
348, reh den (2001, CA5 Miss) 2001 US App LEXIS 13266 and cert den (2001) 534 US 896, 151 L Ed 2d 155, 122 S Ct
217.
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 in connection with loans he obtained from Small Business Administration (SBA), where he failed to disclose that he, not his wife,
was actual thirty percent owner and manager of business, that he had previously been convicted of crime, and that he
intended to borrow more than he needed from SBA and utilize surplus to pay off partnership's outstanding obligation and
use personally. United States v Kosth (2001, CA7 Ill) 257 F3d 712, 57 Fed Rules Evid Serv 423, mod, reh, en banc, den
(2001, CA7 Ill) 2001 US App LEXIS 28331.
Where defendant was indicted for offenses related to fraudulent investment scheme and indictment alleged that defendant told FBI agent that another person had absconded with all money invested by victims, evidence was sufficient to
support finding that defendant made false material statement to agent; agent testified at trial that defendant told agent that
defendant had to pursue person through foreign courts to get remedy, that defendant used money for personal expenses,
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18 USCS § 1001
that defendant credited victims with other monies under defendant's control, and that other monies were in account in
Switzerland, although defendant later admitted that there was no such account. United States v Liner (2006, CA8 Minn)
435 F3d 920.
Defendants' convictions for making false statements about consulting agreements to FBI under 18 USCS § 1001 were
supported by sufficient evidence, including handwriting exemplars, consulting agreements signed by and authorizing
payment to defendants, committee member and elected secretary for tribal district, returned checks tracking payments,
minutes showing that district's planning commission refused to authorize agreements, and FBI agent's testimony that
defendants denied having seen agreement and claimed not to recall being paid pursuant to one. United States v Brave
Thunder (2006, CA8 ND) 445 F3d 1062.
In action in which defendant appealed from judgment of district court convicting him of participating in price-fixing
conspiracy, 15 USCS § 1, and making false statements to federal law enforcement agent who was investigating that
conspiracy, 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1), judgment was affirmed where (1) record did not support defendant's contention that he
attempted to correct his false statements; and (2) because defendant's statements concealed his actual role in conspiracy,
they could have hindered FBI's investigation. United States v Beaver (2008, CA7 Ind) 515 F3d 730, 2008-1 CCH Trade
Cases P 76037.
Defendants' convictions for false statements, under 18 USCS § 1001, were supported even to extent that only one of
two alleged false statements had been proved because, as matter of law, one false statement was enough for conviction on
violation of 18 USCS § 1001; jury could be relied on to accept supported possibility and discard unsupported one. United
States v Caputo (2008, CA7 Ill) 517 F3d 935, decision reached on appeal by (2008, CA7 Ill) 2008 US App LEXIS 7970.
Fax headers on copies of falsified reports showed that defendant faxed blank air-monitoring report forms to his
codefendant in Florida day after agency sent noncompliance notice to defendant's attention and that codefendant faxed
completed reports back to defendant approximately seventeen minutes later; witness testified that falsified air-monitoring
reports were delivered to agency later that same day; rational juror could infer from this evidence that defendant transmitted, or arranged for transmission of, falsified records to agency. United States v Starnes (2009, CA3 VI) 583 F3d 196.
Evidence establishing that defendant, felon, purchased handguns from codefendant, federally licensed gun dealer,
and on each occasion false information was listed in federal forms required to be completed incident to sale, and it was
agreed that prior to dates of alleged transactions handguns in question had been shipped in interstate commerce, and that
defendant had been convicted of burglary, crime punishable by imprisonment for exceeding 1 year, defendant in making
first purchase used his girlfriend's driver's license as identification, and in making second purchase used name and address
of his cousin, was sufficient to support conviction of defendant for violation of 18 USCS § 371, 922(h)(1), and 1001.
United States v Panetta (1977, ED Pa) 436 F Supp 114, 2 Fed Rules Evid Serv 337, affd without op (1978, CA3 Pa) 568
F2d 771.
Defendant convicted of deprivation of civil rights under color of law causing bodily injury under 18 USCS § 242,
concealment of material fact under 18 USCS § 1001(a), and witness tampering under 18 USCS § 1512(b)(1) was not
entitled to posttrial acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 where numerous eyewitnesses testified to use of force against
bound detainee in sally port of superior court by defendant, U.S. marshal, and there was sufficient evidence, including
testimony, documents, and tape recordings, to support false statements and witness tampering counts. United States v
Cook (2007, DC Dist Col) 526 F Supp 2d 10.
Defendant's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on his conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was denied
because reasonable jury could find that number of defendant's statements were false when they were flatly contradicted by
other witnesses, including FBI special agent. United States v Kozeny (2009, SD NY) 664 F Supp 2d 369.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied where evidence presented by government was more than sufficient to support his convictions on wire fraud, bank fraud, and false statement charges arising
out of check-kiting scheme; evidence showed that (1) defendant was financial consultant for his co-defendant's investment accounts; (2) he opened up bank account to hide his co-defendant's financial activities; (3) he improperly authorized
payment of checks to and from co-defendant's accounts; and (4) he gave false and misleading information to bank representatives in response to their inquiries concerning his co-defendant's accounts. United States v Gordon (2004, CA9
Cal) 117 Fed Appx 501.
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18 USCS § 1001
Unpublished: Where evidence at trial showed that: (1) defendant had repeatedly informed several contractors for
whom he had performed construction services that he was nonresident alien, thus prompting many of them not to file
required Form 1099 with Internal Revenue Service; (2) defendant had been born in Minnesota; (3) defendant had lived in
Nebraska during years at issue; and (4) defendant had no citizenship other than U.S.; thus, there was sufficient evidence to
support defendant's convictions for violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(3). United States v McNeally (2005, CA8 Neb) 132 Fed
Appx 63, 2005-1 USTC 50429, 95 AFTR 2d 1400.
Unpublished: Where defendant, deputy sheriff, called friend whose property was going to be searched and also told
chief deputy that he knew whereabouts of friend, but defendant told Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents that he
had no contact with friend and did not know friend's location, sufficient evidence supported his conviction for giving false
statement to FBI. United States v Waddell (2005, CA6 Tenn) 135 Fed Appx 808.
Unpublished: There was sufficient evidence to support convictions under 8 USCS § 1326(a), (b), 18 USCS §§ 911,
and 1001 where defendant, whose fingerprints matched those of Mexican citizen who had previously been deported,
purchased forged and counterfeit birth certificate that used another name. United States v Hernandez-Rodarte (2005, CA5
Tex) 141 Fed Appx 251.
Unpublished: Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal properly was denied and defendant properly was convicted of making false statement to FBI under 18 USCS § 1001 because defendant averred in his letter to FBI and
statements to FBI agents that explosions would take place in Athens, Georgia and that agents could find explosives in
Jackson County, Georgia, and statements necessarily concerned location of explosives in Athens because otherwise no
explosions could take place; defendant fabricated very existence of those explosives, so he knew that his statements
concerning bombings in Athens were false; thus, reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant lied about location
of explosives in Athens and that government had met its burden with respect to all five elements of § 1001 charge. United
States v Weathers (2006, CA11 Ga) 161 Fed Appx 854.
Unpublished: Defendant's conviction under False Claims Act, 18 USCS § 287, and False Statements Act, was affirmed because district court's denial of cross examination of budget analyst with regard to EEOC investigation of her was
proper because analyst had no discretion as to defendant's prosecution and evidence was sufficient for jury to determine
that defendant had requisite mental state. United States v Bracy (2007, CA6 Ohio) 2007 FED App 523N.
Unpublished: Defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence that she willfully made false statement was
without merit in view of testimony of government agents, defendant's I-9 Form, and additional I-9 Forms presented to jury
in light most favorable to prosecution; any rational trier of fact could have found that defendant knowingly, willfully, and
falsely represented in both her I-9 Form and in her oral statements to agents that her I-9 Form was completed on certain
date when she had back-dated form; moreover, back-dating form was material misrepresentation because it had tendency
to influence immigration officials in their investigation, and fact that defendant acted as both employer and employee did
not nullify her duty to truthfully represent her work status; thus evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction
for one count of one count of making or using false writing or document, violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(3), and one
count of willfully making materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement to Government, violation of 18 USCS §
1001(a)(2). United States v Magoti (2009, CA6 Mich) 2009 FED App 743N.
Unpublished: Defendant's conviction for willfully assisting filing of false tax return in violation of 26 USCS §
7206(2) and for making false statements to federal agency in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed because tax
returns were admitted not for truth of their contents but to establish existence of improperly claimed deduction, there was
no Confrontation Clause violation because defendant had opportunity to confront witness who testified against him and
jury instructions were proper. United States v Wong (2008, CA9 Nev) 2008-1 USTC P 50205, 101 AFTR 2d 951.
Unpublished: Defendant's convictions for violating 18 USCS §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1001(a)(2) were affirmed
where evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions, and district court did not err in its deliberate ignorance jury instruction; sentence was affirmed as district court did not improperly enhance defendant's sentence. United States v Tureaud (2006, CA11 Fla) 2006 US App LEXIS 3240.
Unpublished: Defendant's conviction for false statements and representations was affirmed where there was sufficient evidence to support finding that one party was sham purchaser of real property and that defendant, not other party,
was true owner; further, evidence also sufficiently showed that defendant bought three vehicles in name of company,
rather than in his own name, even though he was not authorized to sign title certificates in name of company; individuals
to whom defendant transferred vehicles also testified that they dealt only with defendant and not with company. United
States v Russo (2006, CA3 NJ) 2006 US App LEXIS 3731.
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Unpublished: Defendant's challenge to sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to commit
immigration fraud (stemming from conspiracy to arrange fraudulent marriages between Middle Eastern men and African-American women) failed because Government presented testimony of four of six co-conspirators involved in marriage-fraud conspiracy, each of whom testified as to first defendant's knowledge of conspiracy and his involvement
therein. United States v Serag (2006, CA4 Va) 2006 US App LEXIS 13357.
Unpublished: Evidence was sufficient for conviction of making false material statement to federal agent, in violation
of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), based on defendant's role in real estate scheme involving property-flipping through use of
straw-buyers in whose names loans were obtained, through providing false information to lenders, because evidence
showed that defendant assisted in perpetrating scheme by concealing "flip" nature of transactions from lenders, including
falsifying documentation regarding disbursement of loan proceeds, and by concealing fact that same straw-buyer was
purchasing multiple properties in rapid succession all as primary residences. United States v Lutz (2006, CA4 NC) 2006
US App LEXIS 30797.
Unpublished: Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for willfully making material false statement
to agent of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, because (1) according to testimony of
FBI agent, defendant made statements at issue in course of investigation by FBI and Immigration and Naturalization
Service into possible visa violations by one of defendant's employees, (2) defendant told agent that employee was contract
employee who received 1099 tax form at end of year and that appropriate withholdings were made from employee's pay,
(3) United States established at trial that this statement was false because employee did not receive 1099 tax form nor were
any withholdings made from employee's pay, (4) jury was entitled to conclude that defendant's statements that employee
and other contract employees were being properly reported to Internal Revenue Service were knowingly and willfully
false, and (5) these statements were material to FBI's legitimate law enforcement activities. United States v Abuhawwas
(2007, CA4 Va) 2007 US App LEXIS 2245.
Unpublished: In case in which defendant asserted that district court erred by admitting computer printouts to establish
his prior convictions that were not properly certified records of conviction when originals were destroyed, defendant's
51-month sentence for making false statement on food stamp program application, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was
affirmed since district court had sufficient, reliable evidence that he had misdemeanor convictions; while original records
had been destroyed, district court had: (1) copy of computer screen that displayed facts of case and had defendant's correct
Social Security number and date of birth, (2) waiver of arraignment signed by defendant, and (3) general letter and testimony stating reason why originals could not be provided. United States v Johnson (2007, CA11 Ala) 2007 US App
LEXIS 6444.
Unpublished: Where defendant argued that district court erred in finding that his offense involved more than minimal
planning, under USSG § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) (1994), defendant's 51-month sentence for making false statement on food stamp
program application, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was affirmed since, in light of defendant's repeated redemptions of
food stamps made possible by his false statement that he had no prior convictions, and in light of district court's finding
that his redemptions were pure fraud, district court did not err in rejecting his argument that his actions were merely
opportune. United States v Johnson (2007, CA11 Ala) 2007 US App LEXIS 6444.
Unpublished: Conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) for making false statement to agent of FBI that defendant did
not know victim was supported by sufficient evidence, including testimony of officer that defendant stated during interview with officer and FBI agent that defendant had never met victim and government's introduction of friend's testimony
and audiotape in which defendant told friend that he had been pushed or slapped by victim. United States v Maye (2007,
CA11 Fla) 2007 US App LEXIS 17265.
Unpublished: Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant knowingly made false statement to FBI because question of whether defendant "knew" certain individual was not fundamentally ambiguous, and jury saw several diary entries
documenting meetings between defendant and individual and defendant's concession that individual might have been his
dinner guest. United States v Aref (2008, CA2 NY) 2008 US App LEXIS 14032.
Unpublished: Where jury acquitted defendant on two counts of engaging in sexual acts with female inmate in violation of 18 USCS § 2243(b), defendant's convictions on other counts of engaging in sexual acts with female inmate in
violation of 18 USCS § 2243(b), engaging in sexual contact with female inmate in violation of 18 USCS § 2244(a)(4), and
making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 were supported by sufficient evidence because each conviction
was supported by testimony of witnesses other than victim and jury was free to believe some parts of victim's testimony
and not believe others. United States v DeFonte (2008, CA2 NY) 2008 US App LEXIS 14929.
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18 USCS § 1001
Unpublished: Given testimony provided by Government at trial detailing conflicting statements that defendant made
to investigators, jury was provided ample basis for finding defendant guilty of knowingly and willfully making materially
false statement in matter within jurisdiction of executive branch of Government of United States in violation of 18 USCS
§ 1001(a)(2). United States v Little (2009, CA10 Okla) 2009 US App LEXIS 1142.
170.--Cases where evidence not found sufficient
Evidence was insufficient to convict under 18 USCS §§ 2, 371, and 1001, where defendant, who ran money laundering operation and who paid cash to purchase cashier's checks from various banks, never personally purchased checks
totaling more than $ 10,000 from any banking location on any given day, but on 10 different days, he and his agents
purchased checks totaling in excess of $ 10,000 from same bank since 31 USCS § 5313 and its regulations do not impose
duty on participant in currency transaction with bank to inform bank of nature of transaction, therefore, there could be no
concealment in violation of § 1001, participant could not aid or abet under § 2 bank's failure to report currency transactions where there was no evidence that bank had knowledge of nature of transactions, and there could be no § 371 conspiracy to violate § 5313 where bank was not under duty to report currency transactions. United States v Reinis (1986,
CA9 Cal) 794 F2d 506, 86-2 USTC P 9559, 58 AFTR 2d 5443.
There was no evidence of knowing misrepresentation when defendant answered that he was not "self-employed"
during period for which he was claiming disability, where only work he performed was for corporation of which he was
president, since he was employee of that corporation; nor could he have been guilty of concealing self-employment, since
he was never asked if he was owner of any corporation. United States v Hixon (1993, CA6 Tenn) 987 F2d 1261.
Evidence was insufficient to support conviction of attorney's employee for making false statements to Immigration
and Naturalization Service on aliens' applications for asylum, where evidence tending to prove that defendant prepared
alien's false application consisted only of facts that alien was from Bangladesh, defendant was one of two employees who
handled Bangladeshi clients, and application contained language used in other applications prepared not only by defendant but also by other employees. United States v Walker (1999, CA2 NY) 191 F3d 326, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1502,
cert den (2000) 529 US 1080, 146 L Ed 2d 506, 120 S Ct 1702.
Insufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) for making false statement to
federal agent about number of microwave amplifiers exported to Chinese customer; context of statement, language barrier, and ambiguity of exchange between defendant and agent undermined district court's finding that defendant's statement was material and intentional. United States v Qing Chang Jiang (2007, CA9 Cal) 472 F3d 1162, amd (2007, CA9
Cal) 2007 US App LEXIS 1639.
A FBI agent testified at trial that issue of whether emergency assistance funds were used to buy personal vehicles for
tribe members was one of issues that court was originally briefed on as concern on how funds were being used in investigation, and that testimony alone would have allowed rational juror to find that defendant's false statement was material;
because there was ample evidence in record for rational juror to find defendant made material misstatement to FBI, defendant's sufficiency of evidence claim regarding her conviction for making material misstatement failed. United States v
Oldbear (2009, CA10 Okla) 568 F3d 814.
Under 18 USCS § 1001 Government must show that interrogation was fair in circumstances in which it was undertaken and in light of purpose of statute which authorizes inquiry and requires answer, thus in § 1001 prosecution in which
underlying statute was Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (former 31 USCS § 1101(b)) which is not
concerned with oral statements to investigators but rather with reports regarding international transportation of monetary
instruments, where evidence was that customs agents in interrogating prospective passenger on international flight as to
whether he was carrying more than $ 5,000 in currency simply elicited defensive reaction to exigency of unexpected
official questioning, violation of § 1001 was not shown even though defendant orally denied possession of more than $
5,000 which he, allegedly, in fact possessed. United States v Gomez-Londono (1976, ED NY) 422 F Supp 519, revd on
other grounds (1977, CA2 NY) 553 F2d 805 and affd without op (1978, CA2 NY) 580 F2d 1046.
Government failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that attorney caused material to be concealed from IRS
in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 2(b) and failed to file currency transaction reports in violation of 31 USCS § 5322(a),
where (1) there is reasonable doubt that attorney participated or directed splitting of $ 19,600 into two separate $ 9,800
deposits, and (2) handwriting expert could not identify handwriting on deposit slips as that of attorney. United States v
Perlmutter (1987, SD NY) 656 F Supp 782, affd without op (1987, CA2 NY) 835 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 485 US 935,
99 L Ed 2d 271, 108 S Ct 1110.
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Government failed to establish that attorney violated 18 USCS § 1001 in giving false statement to IRS regarding her
possession of check and bank statement, where (1) special agent did not take notes contemporaneously with interview
such that context of attorney's statement to agent was not fully recorded, and (2) there is reasonable doubt that attorney
believed representation to be false. United States v Perlmutter (1987, SD NY) 656 F Supp 782, affd without op (1987,
CA2 NY) 835 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 485 US 935, 99 L Ed 2d 271, 108 S Ct 1110.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant was entitled to reversal of his conviction for making false statements in matter within jurisdiction of federal agency in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), because district court violated defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights when it failed to submit issue of agency jurisdiction to jury; further, there was insufficient evidence
that agency of Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) was agency of Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for purposes of 42 USCS § 300g-2 because there was no evidence that agency of CNMI was authorized by EPA to
receive monthly reports at issue. United States v Babauta (2006, CA9) 2006 US App LEXIS 16984.
E.Questions of Law or Fact 171. Intent, knowledge and willfulness
Question of criminal intent was one of fact to be resolved by jury. Takahashi v United States (1944, CA9 Wash) 143
F2d 118; United States v De Lorenzo (1945, CA2 NY) 151 F2d 122.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, intent of defendant in making statement is question for jury. United States v
Allison (1977, CA7 Ind) 555 F2d 1385.
Defendant's intent was factual issue and specific intent may be inferred from all relevant circumstances, since direct
proof of intent is rarely available, and where evidence showing defendant's actual participation in diverting bank funds
demonstrated that defendant was familiar enough with bank records to know that false entries were being made and
fraudulent statements submitted, there was ample evidence to warrant submission of case to jury. United States v
Daileda (1964, MD Pa) 229 F Supp 148, affd (1965, CA3 Pa) 342 F2d 218, cert den (1965) 382 US 815, 15 L Ed 2d 63, 86
S Ct 35.
172. Materiality
In federal criminal case, trial judge's refusal to allow jury to determine materiality of alleged false statements made by
person accused of making false statements to government agency, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, infringes accused's
right to have jury determine his guilt of every element of crime charged. United States v Gaudin (1995) 515 US 506, 132
L Ed 2d 444, 115 S Ct 2310, 95 CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v
Copus (1997, CA10 Okla) 110 F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).
Materiality under 18 USCS § 1001 is question of fact which must be submitted to jury. United States v Gaudin (1994,
CA9 Mont) 28 F3d 943, 94 CDOS 4632, 94 Daily Journal DAR 8593, affd (1995) 515 US 506, 132 L Ed 2d 444, 115 S Ct
2310, 95 CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v Copus (1997, CA10
Okla) 110 F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).
Error in court's refusal to submit issue of materiality to jury was harmless, since jury necessarily considered facts
predicate to finding of materiality in reaching its verdict, where there was no evidence outside of defendant's own testimony of any other purpose for falsifying addresses of inmates on health care application other than to influence health
care provider's decision to process that application. United States v McGhee (1996, CA6 Tenn) 87 F3d 184, 1996 FED
App 183P, reh, en banc, gr, vacated (1996, CA6) 95 F3d 1335 and (criticized in United States v Wiles (1996, CA10 Colo)
102 F3d 1043, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99361, 46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 151) and (criticized in United States v Tandon
(1997, CA6 Ohio) 111 F3d 482, 97-1 USTC P 50373, 79 AFTR 2d 2292, 1997 FED App 136P) and subsequent app (1997,
CA6 Tenn) 119 F3d 422, 1997 FED App 211P.
Although issue of materiality of Medicare provider's concealments in ledgers to matter within jurisdiction of Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was not submitted to jury, error did not affect provider's substantial
rights, since there was no reasonable argument that statements at issue were not material. United States v Calhoon (1996,
CA11 Ga) 97 F3d 518, 51 Soc Sec Rep Serv 740, 45 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1081, 10 FLW Fed C 493, cert den, motion gr
(1997) 522 US 806, 139 L Ed 2d 11, 118 S Ct 44, reh den, motion gr (1997) 522 US 1037, 139 L Ed 2d 626, 118 S Ct 648.
Although district court erred in ruling as matter of law that immigrant violated 18 USCS § 1001 when he presented
fictitious health insurance application and forged lease renewal agreement to INS to support his claim that his marriage
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was not entered into to evade immigration laws, error did not require reversal, since documents in question were material
as circumstantial evidence of initial fraud, and evidence of materiality was overwhelming. United States v Dedhia (1998,
CA6 Ohio) 134 F3d 802, 1998 FED App 26P, cert den, motion gr (1998) 523 US 1145, 140 L Ed 2d 1105, 118 S Ct 1844.
Zirconium exporter was not prejudiced by court's failure to submit materiality issue to jury, where false statements
which he made to government about purpose for which he was exporting zirconium were clearly material, as their plain
meaning would influence Commerce Department in deciding whether or not to grant export licenses. United States v
Johnson (1998, CA11 Fla) 139 F3d 1359, 11 FLW C 1272, reh, en banc, den (1998, CA11 Fla) 149 F3d 1197 and cert den
(1999) 527 US 1021, 144 L Ed 2d 770, 119 S Ct 2365.
Court's failure to submit materiality to jury was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant habeas relief or to establish
miscarriage of justice, where he did not challenge materiality on direct appeal, and there was no basis for finding that his
withholding of information on Defense Department forms was not material. United States v Dale (1998, App DC) 140 F3d
1054, cert den (1999) 525 US 1067, 142 L Ed 2d 657, 119 S Ct 794.
173. Miscellaneous
Question of whether statement made by defendant is one within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001 is one which must be
decided by court. Tzantarmas v United States (1968, CA9 Or) 402 F2d 163, cert den (1969) 394 US 966, 22 L Ed 2d 569,
89 S Ct 1312.
No prejudice results from failure of trial judge to submit issues of law to jury. United States v Jones (1972, CA8 Ark)
464 F2d 1118, cert den (1973) 409 US 1111, 34 L Ed 2d 692, 93 S Ct 920.
Defendant's understanding and interpretation of questions to him by federal agency are questions for jury when
prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 results from such questioning. United States v Corr (1976, CA2 NY) 543 F2d 1042, 1
Fed Rules Evid Serv 376.
Whether criminal defendant who gives false name to magistrate can be indicted and prosecuted under 18 USCS §
1001 is question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. United States v Plascencia-Orozco (1985, CA9 Cal) 768
F2d 1074.
Trial court's failure to allow jury to decide whether defendant's false statements arose in connection with matter
"within jurisdiction of any department or agency" of United States did not prejudice his trial under plain error standard,
where jury was clearly informed that statements were made to Department of Labor. United States v Winstead (1996, App
DC) 316 US App DC 52, 74 F3d 1313.
Because under 18 USCS § 1001 it is offense for anyone to do any fraudulent act which is calculated to or does obstruct or impair governmental agencies and/or value of their operations, documents, and reports, question of whether
accused's conduct obstructs or impairs governmental function is matter for triers of fact, and in absence of instructions
submitting this issue to court-martial, it would be error to affirm accused's conviction as violation of 18 USCS § 1001.
United States v Addye (1957) 7 USCMA 643, 23 CMR 107; United States v Dazier (1958) 9 USCMA 443, 26 CMR 223.
F.Instructions to Jury 174. Generally
Court must instruct jury on all essential elements of offense charged under 18 USCS § 1001. Peterson v United
States (1965, CA5 Tex) 344 F2d 419, 65-1 USTC P 9348, 15 AFTR 2d 913.
175. Evidence
Instructing jury that government must prove that defendant intended to commit offense is quite different from explaining to jury how defendant can legitimately counter government's proof of this essential element of crime and is
therefore inappropriate instruction in trial for making fraudulent representation to agency of government. United States v
Miller (1981, CA4 SC) 658 F2d 235.
It was reversible error of court to instruct jury that proof of ownership of free airline ticket, for which defendant
submitted voucher against funds already advanced him by government, was irrelevant, since if defendant owned ticket,
his "statement" made by submitting voucher to government was not false. United States v Duncan (1987, CA4 Va) 816
F2d 153.
Erroneous jury instruction which allowed jury to find that defendants violated 18 USCS § 1001 by concealing material fact by "trick, scheme, or devise" merely by failing to file CTR's, without proof of any affirmative act of conceal-
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ment, was not harmless, where it was uncertain that jury must have found all elements of crime. United States v St.
Michael's Credit Union (1989, CA1 Mass) 880 F2d 579, 28 Fed Rules Evid Serv 840.
In prosecution of defendant for causing election campaign treasurers to submit false reports to Federal Election
Commission, in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1001, 2(b), jury instruction that defendant had legal duty to disclose name of
actual contributors to Federal Election Commission was clear error of law and required new trial, since it relieved government of proving its case under § 2(b) and was contrary to indictment. United States v Curran (1994, CA3 Pa) 20 F3d
560, reh den (1994, CA3) 1994 US App LEXIS 14937 and (criticized in United States v Khalife (1997, CA6 Mich) 106 F3d
1300, 79 AFTR 2d 1026, 1997 FED App 60P) and (criticized in United States v Gabriel (1997, CA2 NY) 125 F3d 89, 47
Fed Rules Evid Serv 1307) and (criticized in United States v Hsia (1999, App DC) 336 US App DC 91, 176 F3d 517).
176.--Character evidence
In prosecution for making false statements to United States, trial court's failure to instruct jury that testimony of
defendant's good character may alone create reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, and court's instruction that defendant's character witness did not testify about facts and circumstances of the case, was reversible error. Greer v United
States (1955, CA10 Utah) 227 F2d 546.
In prosecution of co-conspirators in scheme to defraud banks in violation of 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001, and 1343, it was
prejudicial error for court to refuse to give instruction as to character evidence, where case was complex, resting largely on
evidence of coconspirator's fraudulent activity, and jury found its decision-making process difficult, since evidence of
good character might have generated reasonable doubt. United States v Daily (1990, CA10 Kan) 921 F2d 994, reh den,
en banc (1991, CA10) 1991 US App LEXIS 3271 and cert den (1991) 502 US 952, 116 L Ed 2d 354, 112 S Ct 405 and
(criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163) and (ovrld on other grounds as stated in
United States v Wiles (1996, CA10 Colo) 102 F3d 1043, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99361, 46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 151) and
(ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in United States v Vaziri (1999, CA10 Wyo) 164 F3d 556, 1999 Colo J C A R
1397).
177. Intent, knowledge and willfulness
Instruction was insufficient where law officer failed to instruct court that "knowing and willful" falsification was
essential element of acts proscribed by 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Perdelwitz (1953, US) 14 CMR 423.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, failure of court to define "willfulness" or charge as to presumption of innocence was not error in absence of requests to do so. United States v Private Brands, Inc. (1957, CA2 NY) 250 F2d 554,
cert den (1958) 355 US 957, 2 L Ed 2d 532, 78 S Ct 542.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 involving fraudulent submission of claims under Medicare program, charge
that "the term knowingly and willfully as used in relation to making of a statement means the statement must have been
made voluntarily, deliberately, and intentionally, and with knowledge of its contents and falsity," was proper. United
States v Evans (1977, CA5 Fla) 559 F2d 244, reh den (1977, CA5 Fla) 562 F2d 1257 and reh den (1977, CA5 Fla) 565
F2d 1215 and cert den (1978) 434 US 1015, 54 L Ed 2d 759, 98 S Ct 731 and cert den (1978) 435 US 945, 55 L Ed 2d 542,
98 S Ct 1528.
Although instruction in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 which stated that jury could find defendant
guilty of statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless indifference as to their falsity may have
been improper, since there was considerable evidence of defendant's actual knowledge of falsity of statements and jury
would presumably have reached same verdict if conscious avoidance of truth had been added to charge, no prejudice
occurred. United States v Schaffer (1979, CA5 Fla) 600 F2d 1120.
Jury instruction that indictment alleges conspirators agreed to make false statements on loan guarantee application
and that defendant denied knowledge of these false statements is sufficient to inform jury that to find defendant guilty it
must find knowledge of false statements before loan was closed. United States v Hutcher (1980, CA2 NY) 622 F2d 1083,
5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1146, cert den (1980) 449 US 875, 66 L Ed 2d 96, 101 S Ct 218.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, it is not error for court to instruct jury that defendant had to knowingly and willfully make false statement to government officials before they could find him in violation of § 1001.
United States v Duncan (1982, CA9 Cal) 693 F2d 971, 12 Fed Rules Evid Serv 82, cert den (1983) 461 US 961, 77 L Ed 2d
1321, 103 S Ct 2436.
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In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, instruction is sufficient where it is given in effort to explain what
element of "knowingly" means in that element of knowingly requires jury to attempt to assess whether defendant subjectively knew that information he was providing was false. United States v Cox (1983, CA11 Ga) 696 F2d 1294, 12 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 539, cert den (1983) 464 US 827, 78 L Ed 2d 104, 104 S Ct 99.
No culpable mental state must be proved with respect to federal agency jurisdiction in order to establish violation of
18 USCS § 1001, and trial judge does not his discretion in refusing to give instruction on jurisdictional knowledge.
United States v Green (1984, CA9 Cal) 745 F2d 1205, cert den (1985) 474 US 925, 88 L Ed 2d 266, 106 S Ct 259 and
(criticized in United States v Falkowitz (2002, SD NY) 214 F Supp 2d 365).
There was no error in jury instruction stating that government need not prove company manager's knowledge that
falsely-dated bill of lading for shipment of hazardous waste was within jurisdiction of EPA, for purposes of 18 USCS §
1001, even though document was internal and not on preprinted government form--from which agency jurisdiction could
be inferred--since there is no mental state required for jurisdictional element. United States v Heuer (1993, CA9 Nev) 4
F3d 723, 93 CDOS 6519, 93 Daily Journal DAR 11177, 23 ELR 21357, cert den (1994) 510 US 1164, 127 L Ed 2d 540,
114 S Ct 1190.
Although evidence failed to establish requisite factual predicate for jury instruction on conscious avoidance, error
was harmless, where there was overwhelming evidence of business analyst for underwriting firm's actual knowledge of
fraudulent nature of loans, and jury was properly instructed on actual knowledge. United States v Ferrarini (2000, CA2)
219 F3d 145, subsequent app (2000, CA2 NY) 225 F3d 647, reported in full (2000, CA2 NY) 2000 US App LEXIS 18048
and cert den (2001) 532 US 1037, 149 L Ed 2d 1001, 121 S Ct 1997 and cert den (2001) 532 US 1037, 149 L Ed 2d 1001,
121 S Ct 1998 and post-conviction relief den (2002, SD NY) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 9463.
District court did not commit plain error when it failed to carve out exception, under 18 USCS § 1001, to principle that
ignorance of law is no excuse by failing to instruct jury that "willfully" under § 1001 required something more than that
defendant had been aware of generally unlawful nature of his conduct. United States v Whab (2004, CA2 NY) 355 F3d
155, cert den (2004) 541 US 1004, 158 L Ed 2d 519, 124 S Ct 2055.
Defendant's argument that "intent to deceive" instruction should have been given in connection with false statement
counts under 18 USCS § 1001 was without merit where U.S. Supreme Court has itself rejected claim that "intent to deceive" is required. United States v Gonsalves (2006, CA1 RI) 435 F3d 64.
District court did not plainly err in defining intent element of 18 USCS § 1001 in its jury instructions when it omitted
"knowingly" and "willfully' elements on verdict form; its instruction, which followed caselaw interpreting term willfulness as meaning nothing more in context than that defendant knew that his statement was false when he made it, was
proper, and § 1001 did not require intent to deceive; additionally, defendant did not object to verdict form and, as district
court properly instructed jury, it was not required to reiterate all elements of § 1001 violation in form. United States v
Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.
"False statements" conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 will not be disturbed, despite complaint that jury should have
been instructed that man could not be found guilty of § 1001 violation in absence of proof that he understood that
statements he made were false, because jury was indeed instructed that, in order to convict, it must find that man acted
knowingly--"with awareness and comprehension"--and willfully--"deliberately, voluntarily, and intentionally." United
States v Williams (1998, DC Dist Col) 29 F Supp 2d 1, vacated in part on other grounds, remanded sub nom United States
v Schaffer (2001, App DC) 345 US App DC 111, 240 F3d 35.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant was properly convicted of making false statements to Department of Housing and Urban
Development in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 because district court did not err in instructing jury on intent and agency
jurisdiction; Government was not required to prove specific intent to deceive or that defendant knew that her conduct was
unlawful; also, instructions adequately and fairly embodied law governing federal jurisdiction under § 1001. United States
v Jacobs (2006, CA9 Cal) 2006 US App LEXIS 30916.
178.--Good faith
Farmer was not entitled to "good faith" defense instruction in his prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 involving false
statements made to IRS concerning creditors who foreclosed on his farm, although his case arose from tax matter, since
exception involving good faith defense applies only to certain criminal tax statutes, and 18 USCS § 1001 concerns willful
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doing of prohibited act rather than willful failure to act. United States v Hildebrandt (1992, CA8 Minn) 961 F2d 116, 70
AFTR 2d 5270, cert den (1992) 506 US 878, 121 L Ed 2d 162, 113 S Ct 225.
District court's refusal to instruct jury that good faith error negated willfulness elements of 18 USCS §§ 371 and 1001
was not error, since § 1001 does not ordinarily invite use of good faith instruction, and court adequately instructed on
specific intent, even though defendants' "redemption" scheme concerned tax matter, since defendants were charged with
violating general prohibition against making false statements to government, not with criminal tax offense. United States
v Lorenzo (1993, CA9 Hawaii) 995 F2d 1448, 93 CDOS 3426, 93 Daily Journal DAR 5932, cert den (1993) 510 US 881,
126 L Ed 2d 180, 114 S Ct 225, reh den (1993) 510 US 1006, 126 L Ed 2d 487, 114 S Ct 589 and cert den (1993) 510 US
882, 126 L Ed 2d 182, 114 S Ct 227 and post-conviction relief den (2004, CA9 Hawaii) 92 Fed Appx 530.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant was convicted of fraud and of making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001
in connection with payment of personal expenses from corporate account, it was not error for trial court to refuse to give
jury instruction on good faith defense based on reliance of advice of counsel, because trial court issued specific intent
instruction and definitions given for "knowingly" and "willfully" required jury to acquit if, because of his good faith,
defendant lacked specific intent, and further, defendant was allowed to present defense through closing arguments and
had conceded at charging conference that no evidence had shown that defendant discussed matter with his lawyers. United
States v Frame (2007, CA5 Tex) 2007 US App LEXIS 12281.
179.--Willful blindness instruction
In prosecution of attorney/real estate developer for tax fraud and for making false statement to HUD in violation of 18
USCS § 1001, willful blindness instruction did not allow jury to substitute willful blindness for knowledge, since evidence
supported inference of knowledge, where defendant depended upon others to inform him of financial consequences of his
acts and never took basic investigatory steps, and where instructions clearly emphasized importance of finding specific
intent. United States v Bussey (1991, CA8 Mo) 942 F2d 1241, 91-2 USTC P 50402, 33 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1131, 68
AFTR 2d 5405, reh den (1991, CA8) 1991 US App LEXIS 22314 and cert den (1992) 504 US 908, 118 L Ed 2d 542, 112 S
Ct 1936, reh den (1992) 505 US 1238, 120 L Ed 2d 937, 113 S Ct 9.
Evidence was sufficient to warrant giving of willful blindness instruction, where illegal alien with limited English
argued he had merely stumbled upon agency providing him with bogus documents which he unwittingly purchased,
unaware that those documents falsely portrayed him as legal alien allowed to work, even though government failed to
show any discrete acts of purposeful avoidance, where sufficient warning signs existed to put reasonably prudent person
on notice. United States v Singh (2000, CA1 NH) 222 F3d 6.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: District court did not abuse its discretion by giving willful blindness instruction where government
presented evidence from which jury could have concluded or inferred that defendants were aware that their scheme, which
involved bogus mortgage loan notes that were sold to two federal mortgage associations, was illegal and that they knew,
or turned blind eye to fact, that mortgage notes submitted to associations contained false information. United States v
McLean (2005, CA4 NC) 131 Fed Appx 34.
180. Materiality
Instructions pointing out that statement must have been "material" and "made on a material matter," did not permit
finding of guilty if statement was false without requiring falsity to be material. United States v Johnson (1968, WD Mo)
284 F Supp 273, affd (1969, CA8 Mo) 410 F2d 38, cert den (1969) 396 US 822, 24 L Ed 2d 72, 90 S Ct 63.
Jury instruction as to materiality of false statement in prosecution for making false statement to government agency
under 18 USCS § 1001 was not subject to harmless error analysis, where trial court instructed jury that statement was
material in violation of constitutional requirement that materiality of false statement be determined by jury, because jury
did not render verdict of issue of materiality. United States v Jerke (1995, DC SD) 896 F Supp 962, affd sub nom United
States v Raether (1996, CA8 SD) 82 F3d 192 (criticized in United States v Hart (1996, CA6 Tenn) 1996 US App LEXIS
22475) and motions ruled upon (1996, DC SD) 940 F Supp 1485, affd (1997, CA8 SD) 1997 US App LEXIS 30165,
remanded on other grounds sub nom United States v Oseby (1998, CA8 SD) 148 F3d 1016, 49 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1135
and (criticized in United States v Wiles (1996, CA10 Colo) 102 F3d 1043, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99361, 46 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 151).
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Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Under 18 USCS § 1001, materiality inquiry focuses on whether false statement had natural tendency to
influence or was capable of influencing government agency or official; false statements need not be made directly to
government agency to establish jurisdiction under § 1001; instead, they need only relate to matter in which federal agency
has power to act. United States v McNeally (2005, CA8 Neb) 132 Fed Appx 63, 2005-1 USTC 50429, 95 AFTR 2d 1400.
181.--Failure to instruct on issue of materiality
Failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury that the materiality of the defendant's false representations was an essential element of the government's case was not reversible error if the materiality of the statements was established as a
matter of law. United States v East (1969, CA9 Mont) 416 F2d 351.
Issue of materiality should have been submitted to jury; however, in light of overwhelming evidence against defendants on essential elements, failure to do so was not reversible error. United States v Valdez (1979, CA9 Cal) 594 F2d
725.
Failure to instruct jury on issue of materiality required reversal, particularly where it was not clear court knew proper
definition of materiality and evidence of materiality was slim. United States v Baumgardner (1996, CA8 Iowa) 85 F3d
1305 (criticized in United States v Tandon (1997, CA6 Ohio) 111 F3d 482, 97-1 USTC P 50373, 79 AFTR 2d 2292, 1997
FED App 136P).
Failure to instruct on issue of materiality did not require reversal, even if it was obvious error that affected petitioner's
substantial rights, where it did not affect fairness, integrity, or public reputation of proceedings. United States v Upton
(1996, CA5 Tex) 91 F3d 677, 41 CCF P 76965 (criticized in United States v Wiles (1996, CA10 Colo) 102 F3d 1043, CCH
Fed Secur L Rep P 99361, 46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 151) and cert den (1997) 520 US 1228, 137 L Ed 2d 1027, 117 S Ct
1818.
Where court did not charge materiality as essential element of 18 USCS § 1001 and government failed to show that
defendant was not prejudiced by clear error, conviction must be vacated. United States v Ballistrea (1996, CA2 NY) 101
F3d 827, cert den (1997) 520 US 1150, 137 L Ed 2d 488, 117 S Ct 1327.
Failure to include materiality as element of offense under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) was harmless, where evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrated that defendant would have been convicted even if jury had been given issue of materiality,
since jury found that his misrepresentations were material on securities fraud counts, and underlying facts in securities
fraud counts were identical to underlying facts in § 1001 counts. Bilzerian v United States (1997, CA2 NY) 127 F3d 237,
cert den (1999) 527 US 1021, 144 L Ed 2d 770, 119 S Ct 2365.
Although jury instructions failed to address materiality requirement of false statements under 18 USCS § 1001, error
was harmless, where mail fraud counts on which jury was properly instructed on materiality were based on same false
statements, so that it was essentially inconceivable that jury could have found guilt on mail fraud counts without finding
materially false statements, where 18 USCS § 1001 charge directed jurors precisely to issue of false statements. United
States v Winstead (1996, App DC) 316 US App DC 52, 74 F3d 1313.
182.--Instruction on issue of materiality as matter of law
Instruction that statements charged in indictment under 18 USCS § 1001 were material as matter of law was plain
error, since it completely removed materiality, essential element of crime, from consideration of jury. United States v
Gaudin (1993, CA9 Mont) 997 F2d 1267, 93 CDOS 4617, 93 Daily Journal DAR 7858, affd, on reh, en banc, remanded
(1994, CA9 Mont) 28 F3d 943, 94 CDOS 4632, 94 Daily Journal DAR 8593, affd (1995) 515 US 506, 132 L Ed 2d 444,
115 S Ct 2310, 95 CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v Copus (1997,
CA10 Okla) 110 F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, court erred when it instructed jury that statements were material as matter of
law, since materiality is question of fact which must be submitted to jury. United States v Gaudin (1994, CA9 Mont) 28
F3d 943, 94 CDOS 4632, 94 Daily Journal DAR 8593, affd (1995) 515 US 506, 132 L Ed 2d 444, 115 S Ct 2310, 95
CDOS 4634, 95 Daily Journal DAR 7952, 9 FLW Fed S 187 (criticized in United States v Copus (1997, CA10 Okla) 110
F3d 1529) and (criticized in United States v Pappert (1997, CA10 Kan) 112 F3d 1073).
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It was fundamental plain error for district court to instruct on materiality as matter of law, where jury could have
concluded that materiality was not ultimately proven from fact that firearms dealer would have been allowed to continue
in his profession even had he responded truthfully to indictment question, (albeit under letter of operation rather than
renewed license), since power of jury is most important when defendant is charged with offending government itself.
United States v David (1996, CA4 Va) 83 F3d 638 (criticized in United States v Hart (1996, CA6 Tenn) 1996 US App
LEXIS 22475) and (criticized in United States v Wiles (1996, CA10 Colo) 102 F3d 1043, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 99361,
46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 151) and (criticized in United States v Tandon (1997, CA6 Ohio) 111 F3d 482, 97-1 USTC P
50373, 79 AFTR 2d 2292, 1997 FED App 136P) and (criticized in United States v Neder (1998, CA11 Fla) 136 F3d 1459,
98-1 USTC P 50302, 81 AFTR 2d 1367, 11 FLW Fed C 1139).
Where district court instructed jury that question of materiality of statement was issue for court, not jury, and further
charged jury that statement was material, conviction must be vacated and case remanded for further proceedings. United
States v Daughtry (1996, CA4) 91 F3d 675.
183. Miscellaneous
Instruction to jury in prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001 for filing with National Labor Relations Board affidavit
falsely denying membership in Communist Party, specifying objective circumstances that might be considered by jury in
determining membership, is not open to objection that these criteria allowed finding of membership on date other than
date when affidavit was executed, since instruction, considered as whole, emphasized to jury that issue for them to determine was whether accused was or was not member on latter date. Killian v United States (1961) 368 US 231, 7 L Ed
2d 256, 82 S Ct 302, 49 BNA LRRM 2189, 43 CCH LC P 17306, reh den (1962) 368 US 979, 7 L Ed 2d 441, 82 S Ct 476,
44 CCH LC P 17389.
Where first count charged defendant with falsity with respect to denial of "membership" in the Communist Party, and
second with falsity with respect to denial of "affiliation" with that party, and defendant was convicted and sentenced to
five years on each count, to run concurrently, trial court's denial of motion to require election of counts and refusal to give
instruction on point of duplicity was not prejudicial error. Fisher v United States (1958, CA9 Wash) 254 F2d 302, 42
BNA LRRM 2020, 34 CCH LC P 71454, cert den (1958) 358 US 895, 3 L Ed 2d 122, 79 S Ct 157, reh den (1959) 358 US
938, 3 L Ed 2d 310, 79 S Ct 322.
Where jury, hearing evidence on substantive charge of aiding and abetting in making of false documents, also heard
evidence on conspiracy charge in regard to which judgment of acquittal notwithstanding verdict was entered, there was no
prejudice to defendant involved where instructions on substantive count were clearly delineated. United States v Berling
(1963, CA7 Ind) 324 F2d 249, cert den (1964) 376 US 955, 11 L Ed 2d 973, 84 S Ct 974.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 court is not obliged to give instruction on ignorance of law where
court concludes that no evidence was presented to warrant such type of instruction inasmuch as defendant did not contend
that he was not required to state material on form which form specifically requested. United States v Cox (1983, CA11
Ga) 696 F2d 1294, 12 Fed Rules Evid Serv 539, cert den (1983) 464 US 827, 78 L Ed 2d 104, 104 S Ct 99.
Jury charge which tracked language of 18 USCS § 1001, permitting conviction for making false statements or use of
false documents, provided no ground for reversal where defendant was indicted for making false statements under § 1001,
since there is no distinction between oral and written statements under § 1001. United States v McCallum (1985, CA5
Tex) 788 F2d 1042, 19 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1716, cert den (1986) 476 US 1182, 91 L Ed 2d 544, 106 S Ct 2915, reh den
(1986) 478 US 1031, 92 L Ed 2d 767, 107 S Ct 11.
It was not plain error for court to instruct jury under 18 USCS § 2(a) rather than under § 2(b), even though change was
unexpected until charge itself was read, since defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced, where defendant was
convicted as aider and abettor for his participation in scheme to conceal financial transactions to avoid filing CTRs in
violation of 18 USCS § 1001. United States v Tannenbaum (1991, CA2 NY) 934 F2d 8.
Where gravamen of charge was that contractor's statement that his company had incurred costs to engineering firm
was false, jury instruction that failed to define "incurred costs" as contained in 48 CFR § 52.232-16 was in plain error,
where jury could have convicted defendant merely for making improper request for progress payments. United States v
Baird (1998, CA6 Tenn) 134 F3d 1276, 1998 FED App 34P, reh den (1998, CA6) 1998 US App LEXIS 7746.
Defendant's submission of bogus money orders to IRS did not implicate Petition Clause of First Amendment because
money orders were not genuine protest efforts and were vehicle of charged crimes of making false or fraudulent statement
to department or agency of U.S., in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede ad-
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ministration of tax laws, in violation of 26 USCS § 7212(a); thus, trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on
defendant's theory that fake money orders were genuine protest efforts. United States v Milton (2001, CA10 NM) 12 Fed
Appx 643, 2001 Colo J C A R 1762, 87 AFTR 2d 1465.
Because indictment charged defendant under 18 USCS § 1001 with making one false statement about double floor
planning and jury instructions allowed jury to convict defendant for making different false statement, defendant's indictment was constructively amended, resulting in violation of Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment. United
States v Hoover (2006, CA5 La) 467 F3d 496.
In concealment of fact charge under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1), government submitted proposed jury instruction that
narrowed prosecution to tax-related offense; although there was sufficient evidence to establish that two defendants
concealed information from non-IRS government agencies, inference that concealment could impair IRS functions was
unreasonable. United States v Mubayyid (2008, DC Mass) 2008-2 USTC P 50504, 102 AFTR 2d 5348.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant who was convicted of making false statement, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, was entitled
to new trial because defendant contended at trial that statements that he had made to government inspector regarding
whether he had allowed others to use squawk box were literally true and charge that was given to jury was erroneous
insofar as it indicated that intent to deceive, without more, was sufficient to support conviction. United States v Mahaffy
(2008, CA2 NY) 2008 US App LEXIS 17496.
G.Sentence and Punishment 184. Discretionary matters
Defense that union president was guilty of mere technical violation of 18 USCS § 1001 is without substance in that
Congress did not divide violations into degrees, and false affidavit as to nonaffiliation with Communist Party by union
president is ground for imposition of maximum sentence in discretion of trial court. Bryson v United States (1959, CA9)
265 F2d 9, 44 BNA LRRM 2061, 36 CCH LC P 65316, cert den (1959) 360 US 919, 3 L Ed 2d 1535, 79 S Ct 1437, 44 BNA
LRRM 2302.
Matter of penalties lays within discretion of Congress, and penalty for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 may exceed
penalty for perjury. United States v Adler (1967, CA2 NY) 380 F2d 917, cert den (1967) 389 US 1006, 19 L Ed 2d 602, 88
S Ct 561.
Notwithstanding fact that defendant confessed his wrongdoing, in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, court
does not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 2 consecutive 5-year prison terms, suspending one and placing
defendant on probation for 5 years upon completion of one term where defendant has 3 prior felony convictions and one
for larceny. United States v Jackson (1983, CA5 Tex) 696 F2d 320.
District court impermissibly granted downward departure of six offense levels under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(8)(B) after
defendant pled guilty to making materially false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 where defendant's conduct, i.e.,
making false entries in two oil record books on 30 separate occasions and routinely instructing subordinates to dump oily
water into sea, were made with purpose of deceiving Coast Guard and appeared to have been rather sophisticated. United
States v Kostakis (2004, CA2 NY) 364 F3d 45.
On defendant's convictions under 18 USCS §§ 287, 641, and 1001, "significant disruption" had to be found for upward departure under USSG § 5K2.7; thus, district court erred in concluding it had to examine only importance of governmental function under § 5K2.7. United States v Conroy (2009, CA5 Miss) 567 F3d 174.
For 18 USCS § 3553(a)(2) sentencing factor purposes, 18 USCS § 1001 offense is much more serious than typical §
1001 false statement to government offense when it is based upon defendant's failure to comply with Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations, which restrict number of hours that commercial drivers can drive daily and require
such drivers to accurately maintain logbooks reflecting their compliance with 10-hour daily driving restriction rule where
(1) DOT regulations address issues directly impacting public safety; (2) purpose behind those regulations is relevant when
considering nature of defendant's criminal conduct and seriousness of offense; and (3) evidence showing defendant's
repeated violation of DOT regulations bears on both seriousness of 18 USCS § 1001 falsification crime and implicates
notions of adequate deterrence and protection of public, all of which are factors to be considered under 18 USCS §
3553(a)(2). United States v Sandhu (2006, ED Pa) 462 F Supp 2d 663.
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Because defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 USCS § 1001 in connection with fatal accident that he caused,
district court would consider evidence pertaining to accident when determining whether or not to adopt upward departure
from advisory federal sentencing guidelines under USSG § 5K2.1 where (1) defendant's 18 USCS § 1001 offenses arose
out of his falsification of entries in his commercial truck drivers' daily logbook, in violation of Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations; (2) DOT regulations addressed driver fatigue, which was shown to be significant cause of traffic
accidents involving commercial drivers; (3) if defendant was violating DOT's 10-hour daily driving limit restriction at
time accident occurred, that fact would establish sufficient nexus between his § 1001 offenses and fatal accident to allow
upward departure under USSG § 5K2.1; and (4) although evidence that defendant had repeatedly violated DOT's 10-hour
daily driving limit restriction in days prior to accident was relevant to issue of whether he was suffering from accumulation of fatigue at time of fatal accident, court could not take judicial notice that defendant suffered from such fatigue,
merely because defendant had falsified his DOT logbook entries for days prior to accident. United States v Sandhu (2006,
ED Pa) 462 F Supp 2d 663.
Pursuant to 18 USCS § 3661 and USSG §§ 1B1.4, 6A1.3(a), district court could consider both evidence pertaining to
fatal accident that defendant, commercial truck driver, had caused and purpose behind Department of Transportation
(DOT) regulations when sentencing defendant for his 18 USCS § 1001 offenses where (1) defendant pleaded guilty to 42
counts arising out of his falsification of his commercial driver's daily logbook, which conduct violated DOT regulations;
(2) district court could consider any reliable, relevant evidence at sentencing; and (3) accident-related evidence and evidence showing safety purpose of DOT regulations were relevant to defendant's offenses because it bore on seriousness of
his conduct and danger that he presented in failing to comply with DOT regulations, particularly 10-hour daily driving
restriction imposed on commercial truck drivers. United States v Sandhu (2006, ED Pa) 462 F Supp 2d 663.
Although it was not required to provide advance notice to defendant under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h), district court stated
that its decision on defendant's motion to strike constituted notice that it was contemplating imposing sentence above
advisory federal sentencing guidelines range applicable to defendant's 18 USCS § 1001 offenses where (1) defendant's
convictions arose out fatal accident that he had caused while driving truck; (2) criminal conduct involved in § 1001 offenses was falsification of entries in defendant's commercial drivers' daily logbook; (3) defendant violated Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations in falsifying his logbook entries, and he did so in apparent attempt to hide fact that he
was violating DOT's 10-hour daily driving restriction rule; (4) DOT regulations were put in place to address commercial
driver fatigue, which studies showed contributed significantly to traffic accidents; and (5) fact that defendant's offenses
involved violations of DOT regulations made them much more serious than run-of-the-mill § 1001 false statement offenses, which justified imposition of upward sentencing variance under 18 USCS § 3553(a)(2). United States v Sandhu
(2006, ED Pa) 462 F Supp 2d 663.
District court could not accept Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that stipulated five-year probationary
sentence, $ 250,000 fine, and $ 12 million payment to U.S. Treasury in exchange for defendant's guilty plea to one count
of making false statement to Securities and Exchange Commission in violation of 18 USCS § 1001; probationary sentence
did not capture seriousness of defendant's alleged securities fraud conduct, and it had potential of creating huge disparities
between potential sentences of similarly situated defendants; further, proposed sentence did not inspire public respect for
United States' criminal justice system because it gave appearance that wealthy and popular defendants were given more
lenient and favorable plea deals. United States v Samueli (2008, CD Cal) 575 F Supp 2d 1154.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: District court did not abuse its discretion by enhancing defendant's offense level for her leadership role,
sophisticated means, and abusing position of trust under USSG §§ 3B1.1(a), 2F1.1(b)(5)(C), 3B1.3 following her conviction for making false statements to Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in violation of 18 USCS §
1001; defendant exercised leadership role over at least four other individuals to accomplish her scheme and record contained ample evidence that some of these individuals qualified as "participants" in defendant's criminal activity; when
viewed together, steps defendant undertook to accomplish and conceal her fraud comprised sophisticated scheme; further,
defendant abused position of trust with respect to buyers, sellers, lenders, and HUD. United States v Jacobs (2006, CA9
Cal) 2006 US App LEXIS 30916.
185. Debarment or disbarment
Government contractor can be debarred from future contracts for violation of 18 USCS § 1001; however, debarment
is not automatic, agency must take close look at circumstances surrounding offense, effect of suspension and payment of
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fine, length of time which has passed and person's character since offense and conviction. Bender (1976, AGBCA) 79-1
CCH BCA Dec 13801.
186.--Attorneys
Conviction of attorney under 18 USCS § 1001 constituted conviction of felony requiring his mandatory disbarment
under New York law. In re Cahn (1977, 2d Dept) 59 App Div 2d 179, 400 NYS2d 547, app den (1978) 44 NY2d 641, 405
NYS2d 1025, 376 NE2d 934, cert den (1979) 439 US 1069, 59 L Ed 2d 35, 99 S Ct 838 and app dismd (1978) 45 NY2d 775.
Conviction of conspiracy in advising alien clients to falsify information to be submitted to Immigration and Naturalization Service in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 warrants disbarment of New York attorney. In re Leifer (1978, 1st
Dept) 63 App Div 2d 174, 407 NYS2d 1.
187. Cumulative punishment
Cumulative punishment is properly imposed on defendant convicted of making false statement to federal agency (18
USCS § 1001) and of willfully failing to report that he was carrying more than $ 5,000 into United States (31 USCS §
5316), even though both convictions are based on same false answer to single question on Customs form asking whether
he was carrying more than $ 5,000 upon arrival into United States, since proof of one violation does not necessarily
include proof of other. United States v Woodward (1985) 469 US 105, 83 L Ed 2d 518, 105 S Ct 611.
Legislative history of 18 USCS § 1001 reveals no evidence of intent to pyramid punishment for offenses covered by
another statute as well as by § 1001; conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 542 and for violation of § 1001 were redundant
and conviction for violation of § 1001 would be vacated. United States v Rose (1978, CA9 Wash) 570 F2d 1358 (criticized in United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494, 1995 FED App 157P) and
(criticized in United States v Wiener (1996, CA2 NY) 96 F3d 35) and (criticized in United States v Solis (1997, CAAF) 46
MJ 31, 1997 CAAF LEXIS 5) and (criticized in United States v Huber (2002, DC ND) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 306).
Because defendant's conduct involved in each of his three 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1) false statements/concealments offenses was clearly directed at three investigatory entities, was sporadic or intermittent, and did not entail substantially
same harm, they were not grouped under USSG § 3D1.2. United States v Safavian (2006, DC Dist Col) 461 F Supp 2d 76.
188. Miscellaneous
Absent indication that sentencing judge relied on constitutionally impermissible factors or upon material inaccuracies, sentence of 3 months imprisonment and fine of $ 10,000 was proper upon conviction of offense under 18 USCS §
1001. United States v Glazer (1976, CA2 NY) 532 F2d 224, cert den (1976) 429 US 844, 50 L Ed 2d 115, 97 S Ct 123.
Defendant was improperly sentenced under perjury guideline rather than under fraud and deceit guideline for violating 18 USCS § 1001 by checking box for "no income" on financial affidavit required for court appointment of attorney,
since "affidavit" was not sworn to in sense of true affidavit and therefore defendant did not commit perjury. United
States v Duranseau (1994, CA6 Mich) 19 F3d 1117, 40 Fed Rules Evid Serv 679, 1994 FED App 100P (criticized in
United States v LeMaster (1995, CA6 Ky) 54 F3d 1224, 1995 FED App 157P, 42 Fed Rules Evid Serv 494).
Sentencing Guideline 2F1.1(b)(4)(A) was not limited to convictions for procurement fraud violations of 18 USCS §
1031, but rather, risk-of-serious-bodily-injury enhancement was appropriate for all fraud offenses, including 18 USCS §
1001. United States v McCord, Inc. (1998, CA8 Ark) 143 F3d 1095 (criticized in United States v Johansson (2001, CA9
Cal) 249 F3d 848, 2001 CDOS 3515, 2001 Daily Journal DAR 4345) and (criticized in United States v Lucien (2003, CA2
NY) 347 F3d 45).
Penalty for defendant, who was convicted of making false or fraudulent statement to department or agency of U.S., in
violation of 18 USCS § 1001 and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct or impede administration of tax laws in violation of 26
USCS § 7212(a), was improperly increased under former USSG § 2F1.1(b) where defendant was incapable of inflicting
intended loss on IRS. United States v Milton (2001, CA10 NM) 12 Fed Appx 643, 2001 Colo J C A R 1762, 87 AFTR 2d
1465.
Application of preponderance of evidence standard of proof in finding that truck driver's alleged conspiracy to violate
18 USCS § 1001 in matter within jurisdiction of Federal Highway Administration involved conscious or reckless risk of
serious bodily injury, resulting in enhancement of sentence under USSG § 2F1.1(b)(6)(A) and ineligibility for "split
sentence," did not violate due process. United States v Johansson (2001, CA9 Cal) 249 F3d 848, 2001 CDOS 3515, 2001
Daily Journal DAR 4345 (criticized in United States v Benton (2004, ED Wis) 323 F Supp 2d 903).
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18 USCS § 1001
Lawyer's offense of making false statements to FBI with regard to matter of tax representation, in violation of 18
USCS § 1001, was not "more aptly covered" by Obstruction of Justice guideline, USSG § 2J1.2, where facts did not
establish by preponderance of evidence that he knew of grand jury proceedings or that statements he was making to FBI,
fairly construed as exculpatory denials, would reach grand jury. United States v Scungio (2001, CA1 RI) 255 F3d 11.
District court erred under USSG § 2B1.1 in determining loss attributable to defendant following entry of his guilty
plea to making false statement in connection with Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster relief loan in violation of
18 USCS § 1001; district court's actual loss analysis was faulty because it ignored causation requirement inherent in rules
for determining loss; district court erroneously assigned portion of loss that SBA realized on foreclosure of property to
represent actual loss caused by defendant's false statement to SBA; defendant's acts could not reasonably have been
considered to have caused SBA's foreclosure loss. United States v Rothwell (2004, CA6 Tenn) 387 F3d 579, 2004 FED
App 375P.
District court erred under USSG § 2B1.1 in determining loss attributable to defendant following entry of his guilty
plea to making false statement in connection with Small Business Administration disaster relief loan in violation of 18
USCS § 1001; district court erred in assessing eight offense level points pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) because
defendant replaced money he improperly obtained before offense was detected. United States v Rothwell (2004, CA6
Tenn) 387 F3d 579, 2004 FED App 375P.
Defendant's 58-month sentence for making false statement under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) was not unreasonable where
district court properly found that Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory and that upward departure was necessary in
view of defendant's extensive criminal history and incorrigibility and sentence also complied with factors set forth in 18
USCS § 3553(a). United States v Shannon (2005, CA8 SD) 414 F3d 921.
Defendant, who was convicted of violating 18 USCS §§ 922(i), 1001, was entitled to have his case remanded pursuant
to Third Circuit's decision in Davis because district court violated Booker when it imposed sentencing enhancement based
upon its own factual findings; two-point enhancement for defendant's role in offense was not charged as part of indictment, and thus facts to support enhancement were not found by jury as required by Booker. United States v McBane
(2005, CA3 Pa) 433 F3d 344.
Appellant's sentence on guilty plea conviction for making false, fraudulent, and fictitious material statement and
representation within jurisdiction of U.S. Department of Homeland Security was vacated and case was remanded for
resentencing where neither of cited cross-references could have been properly utilized to sentence him pursuant to USSG
§ 2L2.1 and sentencing him under that section was not harmless error as it resulted in greater guideline range. United
States v Bah (2006, CA8 Iowa) 439 F3d 423.
Where defendant was convicted of bulk cash smuggling and making false and fictitious material statement and representation to Customs and Border Protection officer, violating 31 USCS §§ 5316, 5332 and 18 USCS § 1001, requiring
him to forfeit entire $ 24,000 that he attempted to bring into U.S. without reporting, was not plain error and, thus, there
was no violation of Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment; forfeiture amount was well within statutory maximum
fine and within potential fine range under Sentencing Guidelines, which were among relevant factors that could be considered in assessing gravity of offense. United States v Ely (2006, CA6 Tenn) 468 F3d 399, 2006 FED App 425P.
Where defendant was convicted of bulk cash smuggling and making false and fictitious material statement and representation to Customs and Border Protection officer, violating 31 USCS §§ 5316, 5332 and 18 USCS § 1001, his sentence
of five months' imprisonment and five months of home detention to be served as condition of supervised release was not
unreasonable because district court had thoroughly and appropriately considered all of appropriate factors under 18 USCS
§ 3553(a); moreover, it sentenced him at very bottom of advisory range, even allowing for half of sentence to be served in
home detention pursuant to USSG § 5C1.1(c); defendant, conceding that district court considered relevant factors, simply
asked federal court of appeals to balance factors differently, which was beyond scope of its appellate review. United
States v Ely (2006, CA6 Tenn) 468 F3d 399, 2006 FED App 425P.
Eighteen-month sentence for defendant's conviction for making false statements in violation of 18 USCS §
1001(a)(2) when he applied to work as baggage and passenger screener for Transportation Security Administration and
said that he had never left job under unfavorable circumstances or had clearance authorization suspended, when in fact
defendant had been discharged from U.S. Air Force because of his verbal support of Osama bin Laden and September 11,
2001 attacks and his access to classified information had been terminated at that time, was not substantively unreasonable;
sentence was grounded in seriousness of crime and need for deterrence, it did not accord unreasonable amount of weight
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18 USCS § 1001
to any pertinent factor, and it was not selected arbitrarily. United States v Ahmed (2006, CA6 Mich) 472 F3d 427, 2006
FED App 475P.
District court did not plainly err by imposing sex offender assessment and treatment as special condition of defendant's supervised release under 18 USCS § 3583(d) and 18 USCS § 3553(a) following his conviction for making false
statements to FBI, violation of 18 USCS § 1001, because (1) defendant would only have to undergo sex offender treatment
if court-ordered evaluation found such treatment necessary, (2) defendant's lies to FBI included claims that he buried
murdered child and was involved with child sex ring; (3) facts underlying defendant's conviction were not remote; and (4)
evidence suggesting that defendant fantasized about crimes against children was sufficient to warrant sex offender
treatment under plain error review; although imposition of sex offender treatment was somewhat unusual given nonsexual
nature of offense of conviction, facts underlying same showed that sentence would not result in miscarriage of justice.
United States v Ross (2007, CA7 Wis) 475 F3d 871.
In case in which defendant testified falsely before grand jury about his knowledge of illegal fill activity in violation of
Clean Water Act--testimony that was facilitated by his failure to produce all of his subpoenaed record--and, as result of
which, government was required to conduct further investigation into owner's conduct, defendant's 24-month sentence for
violating 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1623, and 1001 was affirmed because district court did not err in imposing three-level enhancement under USSG § 2J1.3(b)(2); additionally, since district court: (1) correctly calculated USSG range; (2) considered 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors; and (3) sentenced defendant within Guidelines range, sentence was reasonable.
United States v Johnson (2007, CA11 Fla) 485 F3d 1264, 20 FLW Fed C 599.
Federal district court did not improperly admit deposition when sentencing defendant for his conviction pursuant to
18 USCS § 1001; district court was not bound by ordinary rules of evidence, and there was no dispute about genuineness
of transcript. United States v Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.
Where defendant's sentence following his conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 included supervised release, remand for
resentencing was not required on ground that there was conflict between written judgment and oral sentencing judgment
regarding mental health counseling that was ordered as part of his supervised release; written judgment merely fleshed out
details of more general oral judgment; in addition, USSG § 5D1.3(d)(5) expressly allowed courts to impose mental health
counseling as supervised release condition, and district court ordered counseling because it believed that defendant was in
need of psychological or psychiatric treatment. United States v Riccio (2008, CA1 RI) 529 F3d 40.
Where defendant was convicted of making false material declarations to grand juries, in violation of 18 USCS § 1623,
obstructing justice by virtue of false declarations, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, and making false material statements, in
violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), defendant's sentence was properly enhanced pursuant to USSG § 3A1.4 for obstructing
investigation into federal crime of terrorism, as defined by 18 USCS § 2332b(g)(5), because defendant obstructed grand
jury investigation into violations of 18 USCS §§ 2339A and 2339B and violations involved jihadist camps training people
to fight governments of India, Russia, and United States; that enhancement depended on facts found by district court did
not violate Sixth Amendment because district court treated U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual as advisory. United States
v Benkahla (2008, CA4 Va) 530 F3d 300.
Where defendant embezzled funds while working as buyer at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by submitting false claims for payments from fictitious vendor, defendant occupied position of trust based on (1) defendant's $
100,000 procurement authority and lack of supervision, (2) defendant's ability to have new vendors activated in LANL
procurement system, and (3) defendant's discretion to waive normal LANL rules regarding timing and manner of vendor
payments. United States v Arreola (2008, CA10 NM) 548 F3d 1340.
In sentencing defendant under 18 USCS § 1001 for making false statements to federal authorities by using assumed
identity during counterfeiting case, district court erred in finding that defendant's filings with appellate courts were violations of § 1001; documents submitted to judge by party to judicial proceeding were excepted from § 1001; district court
properly included counterfeiting conviction as prior sentence under USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1), as counterfeiting was not relevant conduct under USSG § 1B1.3 for false statements offense. United States v Washington (2008, CA3 Pa) 549 F3d 905.
Because only two account holders suffered any pecuniary harm--which was prerequisite for being deemed "victim"
under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)--they were only "victims" of defendant's violations of 18 USCS § 1341 and 18 USCS §
1001(a)(3); accordingly, district court committed legal error when it held that all 34 account holders were victims under
USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) despite suffering no pecuniary harm United States v Kennedy (2009, CA3 Pa) 554 F3d 415.
Although defendant pled guilty to violating 18 USCS § 1001, because defendant admitted facts in his plea that established violation of 8 USCS § 1326, more serious offense on which his sentence was based, district court did not err in its
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calculation of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual recommended sentence. United States v Gutierrez-Sanchez (2009, CA9
Cal) 587 F3d 904.
As defendant's offense did not involve firearms or arson, he was convicted under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), which
proscribed false statements, and conduct set forth in his count of conviction did establish offense "specifically covered" by
another guideline, it was appropriate for district court to apply cross-reference provision to determine defendant's base
offense level. United States v Garcia (2009, CA5 Tex) 590 F3d 308.
In sentencing defendant under former USSG § 2F1.1 for violation of 18 USCS § 1001, district court properly inferred
that defendant intended loss greater than actual loss based on fact that defendant concealed over $ 1 million of assets with
intent to avoid maximum possible penalty for filing false statement with SEC. United States v Bolla (2003, App DC) 358
US App DC 173, 346 F3d 1148.
Where defendant pled guilty to making false statement and defendant's sentence was enhanced by factors that were
not stipulated or admitted by defendant or found by jury, court corrected sentence; because Blakely and Sixth Amendment
did not permit using additional facts beyond those contained in indictment and plea agreement to determine sentence,
court applied base level offense on basis of facts explicit or implicit in plea. United States v Toro (2004, DC Conn) 335 F
Supp 2d 268.
Cross reference provision of USSG § 2B1.1(c)(3) was applied to treat defendant's offense of making false statement
under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) as one under USSG § 2L1.1(a)(3) because conduct charged in indictment adequately set forth
offense of shielding alien from detection, with knowledge or reckless disregard, pursuant to 8 USCS § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).
United States v Rodriguez (2007, WD Tex) 493 F Supp 2d 833.
Although 18 USCS § 1001 imposes penalty which includes imprisonment for 5 years, court-martial punishment is
based upon violations of Uniform Code of Military Justice, and limits of punishment cannot exceed those prescribed by
Uniform Code of Military Justice and President of United States. United States v Varnadore (1958) 9 USCMA 471, 26
CMR 251; United States v Middleton, (1960) 12 USCMA 54, 30 CMR 54.
Offenses under 18 USCS § 1001 and Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military Justice are closely related offenses that
are apparently multiplicitous when same act is charged in both ways, and when violation of § 1001 is laid as crime or
offense not capital under Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, same may be punished only as violation of
Article 107 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, with maximum of 1 year's confinement. United States v De Angelo
(1965) 15 USCMA 423, 35 CMR 395.
Punishment for submission of false statements on matters within jurisdiction of departments and agencies of United
States, prescribed in 18 USCS § 1001 being fine of $ 10,000 or imprisonment of not more than five years, or both, brings
offense within definition of felony in 18 USCS § 1, which defines felony as any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for term exceeding one year. (1960) 40 Op Comp Gen 176.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant was convicted of engaging in scheme to falsify, conceal, or cover up presence of
asbestos at oil refinery, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a)(1), it was error to fail to impose two-level enhancement for
more than minimal planning under USSG § 2F1.1(b)(2) because defendant engaged in repeated acts over period of time.
United States v Shaw (2005, CA10 Kan) 150 Fed Appx 863, 61 Envt Rep Cas 1363.
Unpublished: Although advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was 12 to 18 months for defendant's violations of 18
USCS §§ 1341, 1343, 1001 and 31 USCS § 333, district court's sentence of 30 months was reasonable; district court
explicitly discussed 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors and found 18-month sentence inadequate to punish defendant's continued
course of fraudulent conduct; it was reasonable for district court to conclude that 18-month sentence would not provide
adequate deterrence for defendant's repeated fraudulent conduct and that longer sentence was necessary to protect public
from further crimes committed by defendant. United States v Zaky (2007, CA6 Ohio) 2007 FED App 349N.
Unpublished: Defendant's 60-month sentence for making false statements in matter within jurisdiction of executive
branch of United States was not disproportionate to defendant's 18 USCS § 1001 conviction because 18 USCS § 1001
contemplates sentence of five years and sentence imposed was quarter of length of applicable guidelines range; thus,
sentence did not violate Eighth Amendment. United States v Maflahi (2005, CA2) 2005 US App LEXIS 10496.
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18 USCS § 1001
Unpublished: Defendant failed to show that his within-guidelines 33 month sentence was unreasonable under 18
USCS § 3553 since (1) defendant, Social Security disability benefits recipient, was convicted of violating 18 USCS §§
1341, 1001(a)(2), and 42 USCS § 408(a)(4), in connection with his concealment of financial information from Social
Security Administration; (2) district court had considered mitigating factors cited by defendant, including his age, his
physical condition, his family ties and responsibilities, and his public service, but those factors were generally irrelevant
under federal sentencing guidelines, and defendant failed to show that he was more substantially affected by them than
other convicted individuals; and (3) record showed that district court had considered 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors and that it
had sufficiently articulated its reasons for imposing sentence, including seriousness of offenses, need for deterrence, and
concerns about recidivism. United States v Ilges (2006, CA7 Ill) 2006 US App LEXIS 29827.
Unpublished: Sentence that defendant received for violating 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001(a)(2), which consisted of
three-years' probation with six months' home detention, was reasonable where sentence was within applicable USSG
range, sentence did not exceed statutory maximum, and district court explicitly stated that it considered factors in 18
USCS § 3553(a), including mitigating evidence showing that defendant committed theft of government housing assistance funds to support his six children. United States v Boatwright (2007, CA11 Fla) 2007 US App LEXIS 6289.
Unpublished: In sentencing defendant on his conviction of failing to report transportation of monetary instruments in
excess of $ 10,000 under 31 USCS § 5316, acting with intent to evade currency reporting requirement under 31 USCS §
5332, and making false statement to U.S. Customs and Border Protection under 18 USCS § 1001, condition of supervised
release that prohibited defendant from using cell phone without prior approval of his probation officer was not closely
connected to nature of his crimes; there was nothing in record to suggest nexus between use of cell phone and defendant's
crimes, and cell phones were in such widespread use throughout world that restricting use of any cell phone was serious
restriction of liberty. United States v Zigetta (2007, CA9 Cal) 2007 US App LEXIS 21620.
Unpublished: In sentencing defendant on his conviction of failing to report transportation of monetary instruments in
excess of $ 10,000 under 31 USCS § 5316, acting with intent to evade currency reporting requirement under 31 USCS §
5332, and making false statement to U.S. Customs and Border Protection under 18 USCS § 1001, district court did not
commit plain error by imposing as condition of supervised release special condition that prohibited defendant from
working as investment counselor because condition was clearly related to crimes of conviction; defendant never disputed
fact that he was smuggling cash (including counterfeit American currency) for purposes of investing. United States v
Zigetta (2007, CA9 Cal) 2007 US App LEXIS 21620.
Unpublished: In sentencing defendant on his conviction of failing to report transportation of monetary instruments in
excess of $ 10,000 under 31 USCS § 5316, acting with intent to evade currency reporting requirement under 31 USCS §
5332, and making false statement to U.S. Customs and Border Protection under 18 USCS § 1001, district court did not
commit plain error by imposing as condition of supervised release condition that prohibited defendant from maintaining
storage facilities away from his principal residence; given nature of defendant's crimes, condition appeared reasonable.
United States v Zigetta (2007, CA9 Cal) 2007 US App LEXIS 21620.
Unpublished: Where plea agreement provided that defendant was aware that any sentence could be up to maximum
allowed by statute for offense, he could not have reasonably believed that he could only be sentenced according to two
counts he pleaded guilty to under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(3) and not according to five counts government agreed to dismiss.
United States v Delgado (2007, CA5 Tex) 2007 US App LEXIS 25397.
Unpublished: District court properly applied 12-point increase in offense level under former USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1)(M)
following defendant's guilty plea to violating 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 2, because unchallenged presentence report and
detailed supporting documentation proved $ 1.9 million loss amount by clear and convincing evidence; consideration of
dismissed counts and of losses outside statute of limitations was proper under 18 USCS § 3661 notwithstanding fact that
applicable burden of proof was clear and convincing evidence. United States v Calderon (2008, CA9 Cal) 2008 US App
LEXIS 2988.
Unpublished: Defendant's sentence following his convictions for crimes pursuant to 18 USCS §§ 922(g)(1),
1001(a)(2) and 21 USCS §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) was not improperly enhanced pursuant to USSG §§ 2D1.1, cmt., application
n. 12; 3B1.5(2)(B); and 4A1.2(m) as many witnesses corroborated drug amounts and estimates were conservative, he was
wearing body armor for its intended purpose when arrested for possession of drugs with intent to distribute, and warrant
was outstanding when he was arrested; that warrant was later withdrawn was irrelevant. United States v Chambers (2008,
CA10 Okla) 2008 US App LEXIS 4784.
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Unpublished: Defendant's 48-month sentence for falsifying his commercial truck driver logbook entries, violation of
18 USCS § 1001, was affirmed because district court was not required to identify aggravating circumstances to justify its
variance from advisory guidelines range of 8-14 months as it had denied upward departure under USSG § 5K2.1 for fatal
crash that occurred in case, and further, district court gave meaningful consideration to 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors and
reasonably applied them to case where (1) district court observed that falsification of logbooks in order to circumvent
United States Department of Transportation safety regulations was serious offense that carried risk far greater than those
for most document falsifications, as well as history and characteristics of defendant; (2) district court emphasized need for
sentence to reflect seriousness of offense and to provide adequate deterrence; and (3) district court explicitly stated that
upward variance reflected defendant's repeated violations over short period of time of 18 USCS § 1001 and 49 C.F.R. §
395.8, not accident. United States v Sandhu (2008, CA3) 2008 US App LEXIS 5391.
Unpublished: Defendant's embezzlement of his employer's funds was properly considered relevant conduct for
purpose of increasing his sentence under USSG § 1B1.3 for making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001
because district court was entitled to find that defendant made false statements to his halfway house concerning his
whereabouts to hide fact that he was gambling at casino, that he misappropriated his employer's funds to facilitate gambling, and that these acts constituted either same course of conduct or common scheme or plan of gambling. United States
v McConnell (2008, CA5 La) 2008 US App LEXIS 7795.
Unpublished: Defendant's embezzlement of his employer's funds, as well as false statements he made to his halfway
house in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, were offenses covered by USSG § 2B1.1; such offenses were among those required
to be grouped together under USSG § 3D1.2(d); thus, embezzlement was properly grouped with false statement offense
for purposes of increasing defendant's sentence under USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2). United States v McConnell (2008, CA5 La)
2008 US App LEXIS 7795.
Unpublished: Defendant's 60-month sentence for making false statements under 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2) was not
plainly erroneous under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 because issue of applying cross-reference contained in USSG § 2B1.1(c)(3)
and calculating guideline range under USSG § 2J1.2 for obstruction of justice was not clear under controlling precedent.
United States v Ochoa (2008, CA11 Fla) 2008 US App LEXIS 18657.
Unpublished: Where for year, in connection with his firearm, false statements, and fraud violations under 18 USCS §§
922(g)(1), (9), 924(a), 1001(a)(3), 1341, 1343, defendant two, convicted felon, carried gun while posing as police officer
after using fraudulent fingerprints to be hired, he could not escape culpability by arguing he was "required" to use gun in
connection with scheme to defraud, and USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement for use of firearm in connection with another
felony was warranted. United States v Arneth (2008, CA11 Ga) 2008 US App LEXIS 20005.
Unpublished: Although district court stated orally that defendant's 21-month sentence for violating supervised release, which was imposed upon her conviction for violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), exceeded advisory U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual range of four to 10 months because defendant appeared to be unable to complete supervised release
due to her drug problem and that defendant would need 18 months to complete prison drug treatment program, remand
was required because district court's reasons had to be in writing pursuant to 18 USCS § 3553(c). United States v Massengill (2009, CA11 Ala) 2009 US App LEXIS 5840.
Unpublished: Defendant's sentence upon revocation of supervised release was reasonable because district court
sentenced within applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual range after considering factors in 18 USCS §§ 3553(a)
and 3583(e); sentence was not unduly harsh given that she may have violated 18 USCS § 1001, federal offense. United
States v Wilkins (2010, CA11 Ga) 2010 US App LEXIS 2508.
Unpublished: Defendant's 108-month sentence for violating 18 USCS §§ 371, 1001, and 1957 in relation to scheme to
file fraudulent applications for immigration benefits was properly enhanced based on evidence she involved minor and
actively encouraged minor to violate 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 1546(a); sentence reflected seriousness of scheme, which
involved over 1,000 applications, covered many states, used church to launder money, and used minor to assist in scheme.
United States v Gerald (2010, CA11 Ga) 2010 US App LEXIS 2518.
Unpublished: In case in which defendant had been convicted of violating 31 USCS § 5332 and 18 USCS § 1001 and
he challenged district court's order that he forfeit entire amount involved in offense, district court's forfeiture order did not
violate Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment. United States v Akinmukomi (2010, CA4 Va) 2010 US App LEXIS
5260.