The Challenges of Institution Building in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Reconstruction:
Issues in and Approaches for Nigeria
By
Ejeviome Eloho Otobo*
Presented at THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT
16th – 17th November, 2015, ABUJA F.C.T.
……………………………..
Abstract
Institution building is one of the most important and complex challenges in post conflict
peacebuilding and reconstruction. Institution building consists of such elements as rehabilitating
existing organisations; creating a new organisational structure; developing the capacity or
expertise to undertake the tasks of organisational structure; establishing the rules or embedding
a value system in the organisation; and developing the processes and systems for the effective
functioning of organisations. The importance of institution building is reflected in the fact that
it is the “ultimate peace dividend”, in as much as institutions are the vehicles for delivery of a
range of tangible services to the people, for laying the foundation for peace, and for promoting
recovery, reconstruction, growth and development. The complexity of the institution building
stems in part from the fact that it takes place in peacebuilding as well as nation building and
state building contexts. And in part, because institution building efforts are strewn with many
challenges. Drawing on chapter 7 ( “The Centrality and Challenges of Institution building in
Peacebuilding”) of the book titled Consolidating Piece in Africa: The Role of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Commission, this paper, highlights the five major challenges in institution
building in peacebuilding context from a global perspective. The paper notes that typically,
countries emerging from conflict are involved in creating three types of institutions
simultaneously: institutions that undertake humanitarian relief; institutions that manage the
reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts; and institutions that are needed to sustain the normal
functioning of the state, economy and society. This paper highlights Nigeria’s efforts in building
the three categories of institutions in its current national context. It explains that the Nigerian
context is marked by transition from multiple conflicts, thus displaying the features of an
economy simultaneously in war, an economy in transition, and an economy in usual
development mode. These features have profound policy and institution building implications
for the design and implementation of measures for post conflict peacebuilding and
reconstruction.
*The author was Director and Deputy Head of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office at UN
Headquarters, New York and is currently a Non-Resident Senior Expert in Peacebuilding and Global
Economic Policy at the Global Governance Institute, Brussels, Belgium.
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Introduction
Institution building is a complex and painstaking process. In the best of circumstances, institution
building is a challenging task. In the context of countries emerging from conflict, institution building is
particularly arduous; in so far as a conflict not only causes death but also inflicts significant damage on
the economic and social infrastructures, destroys institutions, and unravels social trust. Institutions may
be conceived as “rules, enforcement mechanisms and organisations…distinct from policies, which are
goals and desired outcomes; institutions are rules, including behavioural norms, by which agents
interact–and organisations that implement rules and codes of conduct to achieve desired outcomes.” 1
The notion of institutions as “the rules of the game” was first articulated in the context of economic
development.2
Institution building in post conflict context invariably conjures up the image of rehabilitation of
institutions. This idea is directly linked to the so-called 3Rs Framework, which conceives and perceives
post conflict peacebuilding efforts as consisting of institutional Rehabilitation, political and social
Reconciliation, and economic Reconstruction. However, institution building efforts in post conflict
peacebuilding contexts can extend beyond mere rehabilitation of “old” or pre-conflict institutions, in so
far as post conflict planning can draw on or be inspired by the “build back better” notion -- the idea that
the end of conflict offers a unique opportunity to redesign a new institutional architecture for the state,
economy and society. Thus, institution building consists of such elements as rehabilitating an existing
organisation; creating a new organisational structure; developing the capacity or expertise to undertake
the tasks of organisational structure; establishing the rules or embedding the values system in the
organisation; and developing the processes and systems for the effective functioning of the
organisations.
There are political and economic arguments for institution building in post conflict peacebuilding
and reconstruction. The most popular political argument, which inspires and infuses UN peacebuilding
work, is that effective governmental institutions, or in some cases informal institutions, are required to
mediate and manage political tensions or crises from spiraling out of control and from avoiding relapse
into conflict. Closely linked this argument is the idea that a peaceful state is the building block of a stable
regional and international political order, with well-functioning and effective state institutions at the
core of national peace and stability. The economic argument runs thus: institutions in various sectors of
the economy are the vehicles for delivery of a range of tangible services to the people, for laying the
foundation for peace, and for promoting reconstruction, recovery, growth and development. Viewed
from this perspective, institution building is the ultimate peace dividend in as much as it helps to
facilitate political and economic transactions, in particular laying the foundations for peace and for
development.
Typically, countries emerging from conflict are involved in creating three types of institutions
simultaneously: institutions that undertake humanitarian relief; institutions that manage the
reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts; and institutions that are needed to sustain the normal
functioning of the state, economy and society. This paper highlights Nigeria’s efforts in building the
three categories of institutions in its current national context. It explains that the Nigerian context is
2|Page
marked by transition from multiple conflicts, thus displaying the features of an economy simultaneously
in war, an economy in transition, and an economy in usual development mode. The paper examines the
five main challenges to institution building in peacebuilding; examines the policy and institutional
implications of the current national context; and provides some concluding thoughts.
Challenges of Institution Building in Countries Emerging from Conflict
In fragile countries or countries emerging from conflict, virtually every activity aimed at laying the
foundation of, or creating the conditions for, durable peace ineluctably entails some of institution
building. In general, countries emerging from conflict encounter five major challenges in undertaking the
task of institution building. These include the challenge of timing the commencement of an institutionbuilding effort; the challenge of setting priorities for institution building; the challenge of linking post
conflict institution building to nationbuilding and state building; the challenge of promoting partnership
in support of institution building; and the challenge of financing institution building. Taken together,
these challenges imply that the scale and scope of efforts required for institution building is huge and
entails long-term commitment. While, the nature of these challenges are discussed in this section,
their application to Nigeria’s conflict-affec5ted areas are discussed in the section on policy and
institutional implications.
The challenge of timing the commencement of an institution-building effort: There is no
perfect timing to initiate an institution building effort at the end of conflict, although the common
refrain is that institution building efforts, as an integral part of peacebuilding, can start when the guns
fall silent. Even so, there is the view that peacebuilding efforts can proceed alongside war efforts. The
problem with this approach is that unless such peacebuilding efforts are carefully calibrated to address
some specific needs, on which there is a broad agreement on their importance, such efforts could be
wasted. Hence, prudence would suggest that the period after peace agreements provides a good
window of opportunity to launch institution building effort. Starting the institution- building efforts with
the institutions reflected in peace agreements –whether defined as organisational structures or new
“rules of the game” – represents a sensible way to commence the efforts at institution building in a
postconflict context. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that all civil conflicts are brought to an end by
peace agreements, mediated or not mediated. Whether a conflict is brought to an end power by peace
agreement (negotiated settlement), or victory over armed antagonists (military defeat), or foreign
intervention ( post invasion), a newly installed government has a strong desire to acquire legitimacy,
enhance its authority and strengthen its capacity; all of which helps the regime deliver on the core
functions of the state.
The challenge of setting priorities for institution building: It is one thing to agree on the
importance of institution building in the context of peacebuilding; it is quite another to decide on the
priorities for institution building. Institution building occurs in a variety of national contexts. If national
context determines priorities for institution building in peacebuilding and if the initial conditions in
countries emerging from conflict differ, why is it that security and justice rank high on most of the lists
of priorities for peacebuilding? The answer is that the safety and security of the individual is a pre3|Page
condition for all other tasks that follow. Granted that (re) building the institutions of the security sector
should rank high for all the reasons adduced, what area in institution building should come next? Again,
there is not much agreement. But I have argued that the process of sequencing priorities should take
into account the minimum functions that a state should perform and suggested that in “the order of
importance, these [are] (1) protection of life and property (security); (2) delivery of basic services
(education, health, water, and sanitation); and (3) macro-economic management (the ability to mobilise
resources from direct and indirect taxes).”3 These priorities have been validated in the New Deal for
Engagement with Fragile States which prioritises five Peacebuilding and State building (PSGs), namely
inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services.4
The challenge of linking post conflict institution building to nationbuilding and state
building: Institution building takes place in various national contexts: the normal, fragile, and post
conflict contexts. Institution building is also a key element in peacebuilding, nationbuilding, and
statebuilding. In many important respects, the difference between a normal functioning state and a
fragile or postconflict state is that whilst the former has resilient institutions, the latter is generally
marked by weaknesses in the design of its institutions, contestation of the underlying value systems and
significant deficiencies in the operations of its institutional processes and systems. These dysfunctions
are usually harbingers of descent into violence or relapse into conflict. Institution building is the
common thread that runs through peacebuilding, nation building, and state building. To see why that is
case, it is important to examine the definitions of the latter two concepts. Nation building is defined as
“actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a common sense of nationhood purpose; to
overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; to counter alternate sources of identity and
loyalty; and to mobilise a population behind a parallel state building project.”5 State-building, on the
other hand, is an “endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state
driven by state-society relations.”6 Institution building efforts to support statebuilding process need
focus on those areas that enable the state to perform the core functions of security, justice, macroeconomic management and delivery of basic social services. At the same time institution building efforts
that foster national reconciliation, draws constitutions that promotes equity, and generate a shared
sense of national identity, and fair and free electoral process can contribute to nation building.
The challenge of promoting partnership in support of institution building: The importance
of promoting partnership in support of institution building is widely acknowledged. The partners and
stakeholders in institution building are many and diverse. These include the national government of the
country emerging from conflict; the citizens and civil society organisations in the country; regional
organisations; international nongovernmental organisations; the United Nations; bilateral and
multilateral development agencies. The existence of such large numbers of interested and active actors
in institution building underline the need for strengthened partnership both between the government
and other national stakeholders, on one hand, and among the other stakeholders, usually referred to
as international partners, on the other hand. The term partnership can be broad: It entails issues of
coordination among various key actors in peacebuilding; promoting a cooperative relationship among
local stakeholders; and international financial support for peacebuilding. The last of these three issues is
discussed below. There are several advantages in effective coordination among key stakeholders in
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countries emerging from conflict: It reduces the strain on the limited administrative capacity of the
nascent post-conflict governments; it imposes order and coherence on the work of the diverse
international partners working in the country; it avoids fragmentation of programming and financial
efforts among international actors; and it potentially contributes to better peacebuilding outcomes.
The challenge of financing institution building: Institution building is as much an economic
endeavour as it is a political undertaking. This is because every institution building effort requires
significant financial commitment alongside political support. Lack of adequate domestic financial
resources is but one of the major challenges that countries emerging from conflict confront in their
institution-building efforts. Countries emerging from conflict can be classified into three categories on
the basis of their initial fiscal conditions and extent of external support when conflict ends. The first
category of countries includes those that draw on their own financial resources to meet their post
conflict peacebuilding needs. This was the case with a number of oil producing countries that have
emerged from conflict in the past four decades (Nigeria in 1970; Kuwait in 1991; and Angola in 2002).
The second category of countries includes those where many donors are ready and willing to help.
These are the post conflict countries referred to as “donor darlings”. The third category is the post
conflict countries referred to as “donor-orphans”, which often receive very limited external financial
support.7 This divergence in initial financial situations not only has an influence on the ability of
postconflict countries to fund their peacebuilding efforts, in general, and institution building efforts, in
particular; but also to decide on the scope and sequencing of those efforts. While the countries in
category one, which fund their post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts may have greater
flexibility in asserting national ownership and leadership over their institution building efforts, most
postconflict countries face some of the broader challenges in prioritisation and pace as well as scope
and sequencing of institution building process. These may include deciding on priority between
institution building and other aspects of postconflict peacebuilding; prioritisation within each sector;
and deciding on how much and from what source resources should be allocated to institution building.
Features of Nigeria’s Current Context: Making Transition from Multiple Conflicts
The most striking feature of Nigeria today is that it is wracked by violence in some parts and recovering
from conflict in others. A conflict has been raging in the North East region for over five years, involving
the armed forces and the Boko Haram terrorist group. The conflicted-affected areas in the Northeast
have suffered all atrocities associated with war: death, displacement, destruction, and abductions of
many people, including the Chibok girls. Meanwhile, the Niger Delta -- the main source of Nigeria’s oil
wealth -- has a huge unfinished peacebuilding agenda and teeters between peace and possible renewed
violence. Outside these two regions, insecurities reflected in tensions between pastoralists and farmers,
armed robbery and kidnappings are rife. Another important feature of the current national context -which has affected national understanding and response to the two major conflicts -- is that because the
two major conflict-affected areas are located in the extreme corners of the country; the rest of the
country feels a sense of normalcy. There is no collective national sense that the country is at war in
Northeast and that the peace in Niger Delta remains fragile.
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The widespread lack of sense of a nation-in-conflict is matched by a lack of national appreciation of
the impact of those conflicts on the economy. Nigeria is a country that displays the features of an
economy simultaneously at war, in transition, and in normal development mode. The analytical
framework for analyzing and understanding the current Nigerian context is provided by Graciana del
Castillo who posited that:
“Countries coming out of war or other chaos confront a multi-pronged transition. Crime and
violence must surrender to public security (security transition), lawlessness and political exclusion
must give way to the rule of law, participatory government and respect for human rights(
political transition); class, ethnic or religious confrontation must give in to national reconciliation
(social transition); and war-ravaged economies must reconstruct and become functioning
economies that enable ordinary people earn a decent and honest living(economic transition).
The fact the economic transition (also referred to as ‘economics of peace’ or ‘economic
reconstruction’) takes place amid multi-pronged transition makes it fundamentally different
from development as usual or ‘economics of development’…Economics of peace is an
intermediate and distinct phase between ‘economic of war ---in which underground economy of
illicit and other rent-seeking activities thrive ---and economics of development.”8.
This analytical framework is illustrated in the diagram below. But it bears emphasis that some
overlap exists among the various phases. As a result, the features of a particular phase will persist
alongside the next phase until sustained progress has made been in peace consolidation, when the
vestiges of the earlier phase will disappear.
PHASES OF RE-ACTIVATION OF ECONOMY IN WAR-AFFECTED COUNTRIES
ECONOMICS OF WAR
(or UNDERGROUND WAR ECONOMY)
ECONOMICS OF PEACE
(or ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION)
(or ECONOMIC TRANSITION)
ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT
(or LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT)
(or DEVELOPMENT AS USUAL)
Source: del Castillo, Graciana (2014) The Economics of Peace: Is the UN System Up to the
Challenge? In S. Brown and T.G. Weiss(eds), Post-2015 UN Development : Making Change
Happen (London: Routledge), page 146.
.……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
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From a peacebuilding perspective, three major issues loom large in the current national context
and the related challenges would have to be addressed as an integral part of the national response to
the multiple transitions and to lay the foundation for durable peace and sustained development. First
is to understand and address the ‘root causes’ of the various conflicts. Few will disagree with the
proposition that the conflicts in the Niger Delta and the Northeast erupted for different reasons. In the
Niger Delta, which has been marked by spasmodic agitations and violence dating back to almost 50
years, three main factors have served as triggers to conflict: sense of injustice regarding the fact the
region is not getting a fair share of the revenue derived from oil – this is the so-called ‘resource control’
issue; pervasive environmental degradation; and development neglect, reflected in poor physical and
social infrastructure.
By contrast, the conflict in the Northeast is attributed mainly to desire by a terrorist group to
impose its version of religion on others – this is the root cause of the conflict. In the words of Alhaji
Yayale Ahmed “their [Boko Haram] demand is such that is not economically based or a social
emancipation [need]. Their demand is, crudely put a religious demand, which even the constituency of
Boko Haram actors, Islam, is not comfortable with.”9 Failing to achieve that goal, that terrorist group
has engaged in violent extremist measures including attacking security and other public institutions,
markets and mosques and in the process causing much death, displacement and damage. Thus,
contrary to the views of some analysts and leaders within and outside the country, who have attributed
the atrocities of Boko Haram to poor governance; the inconvenient truth is that poor governance has
served as an accelerator rather than the trigger of Boko Haram violent extremism.10
Second is to recognise that, while the conflicts in the Niger Delta and in the Northeast have
attracted much national attention and elicited varying degrees of international response, there are lowintensity conflicts in other parts of the country, especially in the Middle Belt region, where tensions
between the pastoralists and farmers have periodically erupted into violence. Meanwhile, not only
have tensions between the itinerant pastoralists and farmers flared up in other parts of the country but
also kidnappings have become rampant. Each of these forms of insecurities has an associated
underground economy marked by ransom payment and theft.
Third, a combination of lack of basic social services and weak ability of relevant institutions at
the federal, state and local government level to provide safety and security, has been important factor
in poor governmental response to the various conflicts and tensions. Indeed, these weaknesses are
indicators of state fragility. Further exacerbating the insecurities is the rather low employment
opportunities, especially for the youth in all parts of the country. The current national situation is
marked by transition from the multiple conflicts, with essentially three economies: parts of the country
are in ‘economics of war’, others by ‘economics of peace’ or ‘economics of reconstruction’ and the rest
in the ‘development as usual’.
7|Page
The Policy and Institution Building Implications
This section examines three sets of issues: how the five main challenges to institution building in
peacebuilding have been addressed in the conflict-affected areas in Nigeria; how the institution building
efforts in the two conflict-affected regions have responded to the root causes and risk factors of
conflicts in the two conflict-affected regions; and the how the two conflicts differ.
We begin by examining how the five main challenges to institution building in post-conflict
context have been addressed in the conflict-afflicted regions of Nigeria. Concerning the timing of the
start of the institution building efforts, the experience in the Niger Delta and in the Northeast shows
institution building efforts were or have been initiated, while conflict still raged on. In the case of the
Niger Delta, this was because the root causes of conflict were well known. In the case of the Northeast,
although its root cause is problematic, there is a general acknowledgement that the risk factors of
relapse or prolongation of conflict, if left addressed, could continue to pose a threat to the nation.
In so far as priorities for institution building efforts in peacebuilding are concerned, as explained
earlier, there is a growing consensus that five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals should be
prioritized: security, justice, inclusive politics, economic foundations, and revenue and services. Priority
setting for institution building has proved relatively easy for the Niger Delta. Various institutions viewed
as critical to restoring and sustaining peacebuilding in the region have been established; even it is
recognised that there is a huge unfinished peacebuilding agenda. Similarly, institutions have begun to be
developed in response to the peacebuilding needs of the Northeast.
The link between institution building efforts for priorities for peacebuilding, on one hand, and
nation building and state building, on the other is manifested in such areas as security, justice and
economic institutions which are as critical to peacebuilding as well as nation building and statebuilding.
Yet , the two conflicts that Nigeria is struggling to emerge from are of a different order, in so far they do
not conform to the typical civil war patterns. For example, although the two conflicts have proved
problematic for Nigeria’s armed forces, they have neither led to a significant degradation of the capacity
of the armed forces nor will they result in significant demobilisation for the armed forces. Security
sector reforms and justice reforms will need to be undertaken not because of the damages caused by
the two conflicts but because of an effort at continual modernisation and renewal of those two sectors.
Equally, while the conflicts have not done much damage to the functioning of the economic system,
they have nonetheless created a country with three economies.
As regards promoting partnerships and mobilising financing for institution building efforts, the
Federal government has placed well deserved emphasis on partnerships with the states, the private
sector, and individuals and developed financing arrangements that involve other stakeholders in
institutional arrangements for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta and in the Northeast.
The optimal public policy response for countries emerging from conflict would entail not only
developing the appropriate policies to deal with consequences of conflict, as well as the root causes of,
and risk factors for relapse into, conflict. It will also require setting the institutions to advance
peacebuilding and reconstruction. Countries emerging from conflict create three types of institutions
8|Page
simultaneously: those that undertake humanitarian relief to address the short-term needs of the
internally displaced persons or returnees; those that manage the reconstruction and peacebuilding
efforts; and those that are needed to sustain the normal functioning of the state, economy, and society.
In some cases, the category two institutions – those entrusted with the task of peacebuilding – are also
tasked with significant institution building role.
International humanitarian agencies play a prominent role in undertaking relief work in most
post-conflict settings, obviating the need for the national governments to devote many resources to
relief activities. Indeed, a variety of UN humanitarian agencies as well as the International Committee of
the Red Cross and the International Rescue Committee have provided assistance for internally displaced
persons in the Northeast. But Nigeria has established departments that provide general relief (for
example, National Emergency Management Agency) or special purpose institutions ( the Victims of
Terrorism Support Fund). It bears special emphasis that institution building efforts do not refer only to
rehabilitation or creation of organisational structures but also re-defining the “rules of the game” –
including such instruments as national constitutions.
The public policy response to the conflict in Niger Delta provides a striking illustration of how
institution building efforts can be calibrated to address the root causes of conflict and risk factors of
relapse into conflict. But the experience of Niger Delta also shows how difficult it can be to reach
agreement on the appropriate policies and institutions to address the root causes of conflict, in
particular. As indicated earlier, there are three main root causes of conflict in the Niger Delta: lack of
satisfaction with the derivation formula; environmental degradation; and development neglect. The
main risk factor to conflict in that region is the threat of resumption of conflict by ex-militants.
To address the demand for increased derivation, various efforts have been made to raise the
share of oil revenue for the Niger Delta in the past 21 years at the 1994 Constitutional Conference, the
2005 National Constitutional Review Conference and the 2014 National Political Conference. The 1994
Constitutional conference agreed to raise the derivation by “no less than 13 percent of the revenue
accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources.”11 However, no agreement was
reached on raising the threshold of the derivation formula at the 2005 and 2014 conferences. To
address the environmental degradation issue in the Niger Delta, two special purpose environmental
bodies –The Hydrocarbon Pollution and Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills
Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA)12 have been created to tackle the environmental issues. To
address the broader issue of development neglect of the Niger Delta, the Niger Delta Development
Commission (NDDC), was established by an act of the National Assembly in 2000, as an intervention
agency to promote development. NDDC has developed a Niger Delta Regional Development Master
Plan to guide its efforts. A Ministry of Niger Delta was created in 2008 to provide policy guidance and
coordination for various initiatives in the Niger Delta. 1n 2009, the Presidential Amnesty Programme
established, essentially to serve as a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration body aimed at
addressing the risk factor of relapse into conflict posed by ex-militants. That programme focuses on the
re-orientation, re-integration and re-skilling programme for ex-combatants.
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THE EVOLVING NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR
MANAGING THE CONTINUM FROM RELIEF THROUGH
RECONSTRUCTION TO DEVELOPEMNT IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED
REGIONS OF NIGERIA.
REGION
*RELIEF
NORTH-EAST
** VICTIMS OF TERRORISM
SUPPORT FUND (Supports
Victims of Boko Haram
attacks in the North East
and other parts of the
country and provides direct
interventions for education
and health)
Source of Funding: private
sector
donations
and
Federal
Government
contributions.
NIGER DELTA
ECONOMICS
OF ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT
RECONSTRUCTION+
**PRESIDENTIAL
INITIATIVE FOR THE
NORTH-EAST
(A
Marshall plan for the
North East is being
developed, to be
presented
to
a
conference of stake
holders in December
2015)
Source of Funding:
Federal Government
budgetary allocations
PRESIDENTIAL
AMNESTY
PROGRAMME
(Re-orientation, Reintegration & Reskilling programme
for ex-combatants)
Source of funding:
Federal Government
budgetary allocations
NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION (NDDC)
Source of funding: (1) 15%
monthly allocations distributed
to oil producing states; (2) 3% of
oil
companies
operating
budgets; (3) 50% of Ecological
Fund for Niger Delta states; (4)
Foreign aid or private sector
donations.
* The National Emergency Management Agency also provides relief.
** The Presidential Committee on North East Initiatives coordinates the Victims of Terrorism
Support Fund, the Presidential Initiative on the North East and the Safe Schools Initiative.
+ The environmental repair programmes described in the paper in the Niger Delta will fall under this
category.
10 | P a g e
In the Northeast, a Presidential Initiative for the Northeast was created in 2014, which is
developing a Northeast ‘Marshall Plan’, estimated at N200 billion. That plan should have a laser-beamlike focus on three issues: de-radicalisation of the youth through training and employment creation;
supporting the re-integration of internally displaced persons; and undertaking the reconstruction of
damaged infrastructure and rehabilitation of vital institutions in conflicted-affected areas. Moreover,
the Presidential Committee on North East Initiatives has also been established to coordinate the Victim
Support Fund, the Presidential Initiative on the North East and the Safe Schools Initiative. (see Table on
The evolving institutional architecture for managing the continuum from relief through reconstruction
to development in Nigeria in the conflict-affected regions of Nigeria).
There are three major differences between the conflict in the Niger Delta and the Northeast.
First, the atrocities perpetrated by Boko Haram have led to large numbers of internally displaced
persons and death. It is estimated that the activities of Boko Haram have led to over 5 million being
traumatized in the North east region, with an estimated 1.5 million displaced.13 Moreover, Boko Haram
has killed about 14,548 people between May 2011 and the end of October 2015.14, according to the
Council of Foreign Relations data which tracks the figures on death caused by Boko Haram. This comes
to an estimated 3,293 persons killed per year. By contrast, at the peak of the Niger Delta conflict from
January 2006- October 2009, a total of 144 were killed, consisting of 126 Nigerians and 18 expatriates;
and 589 persons were kidnapped, consisting of 166 Nigerians and 423 expatriates.15 This translates into
an average of 37 persons killed and 147 kidnapped every year in the Niger Delta during a period of four
years. The large numbers of displaced persons in the Northeast explains why relief has loomed very
large in the peacebuilding and reconstruction in that region.
The second major difference between the two conflict-affected regions is that while the three
root causes of the Niger Delta region are well known and was easier for the government to ascertain
what the militants were fighting for; in the Northeast, in the absence of clear and easily handled root
cause of conflict, the government is left to deal with the consequences of conflict, namely destruction of
infrastructures and damage to vital institutions, which is what the evolving Northeast Marshal Plan will
be seized with. Nonetheless, in order to avoid the risk factor of relapse into conflict in that region, it is
important to undertake efforts to make violent extremism less appealing to the youth in that region by
increasing vocational skills education and employment opportunities.
The third difference, which is a direct derivative of the first two, is that the while the people of
Niger Delta suffered little collateral damage from the activities of the Niger Delta militants; Boko Haram
has caused much death and displacement in the Northeast. Consequently, while the people of Niger
Delta view the militants as fighting a cause on their behalf; the people of the Northeast have suffered
immeasurably from the heinous activities of Boko Haram.
11 | P a g e
Conclusions
Nigeria is at a crossroads, politically and economically. On the economic front, the falling oil price has
had severe adverse repercussions on the economy. Foreign reserves are depleting. Domestic and
external debt is rising. Growth is projected to decelerate from 5.5 percent to 2.6 percent in 2015.
Moreover, the fall in oil export revenue is coinciding with a fall in non-oil export revenue, further
clouding the country’s fiscal and trade balance outlook. At the same time, inflation is on the rise. On
the political front, while the smooth transfer of power from a defeated incumbent to his opponent has
calmed the political situation; the security challenges, as described in various parts of this paper,
remain enormous. The national security and economic situation present a very challenging
environment for governance. It also presents an opportunity for deep national reflection on how to
move the country forward.
As Africa’s most populous country and largest economy, Nigeria has a unique place in Africa.
But it will neither achieve its full economic and political potential nor wield significant diplomatic
influence, if it is wracked by violent conflicts that are intractable or that Nigerian is seen as unable to
manage. No one looks up to fragile or failed nations. Intelligent and creative management of the
conflicts that afflict the country is key to overcoming the strand of fragility that haunts Nigeria. On the
hand, ensuring that a significant majority of the citizens reaps the dividends of revived growth will the
important for generating and sustaining a sense of economic inclusivity that has been lacking up till
now.
It is often said that what separates a fragile state from a resilient and well-functioning state are
the absence capable institutions in the former and the presence of accountable, inclusive and effective
institutions in the latter. Though the triggers of conflict in the Niger Delta and Northeast regions are
different, there is no question that state institutions have performed sub-optimally in anticipating and
managing the crises. In the case of the Niger Delta, the state has shown historically troubling default
recourse to use of military force in addressing essentially economic, environmental and social
grievances. In that sense, the failure was not just of state institutions but of leadership that has allowed
the problems to fester. In the Northeast region, Boko Haram did not emerge overnight. It gave all the
warning signs of what would come. Again, the relevant state institutions either failed to take the signs
seriously or were negligent. It may be said though that the lack of political consensus on how to
tackle Boko Haram could not have helped the state institutions to chart a proper course.
While lack of political consensus continue to hinder national resolve to address one of the root
causes of the Niger Delta, it must be hoped that both the Niger Delta and the Northeast would be given
needed political support and financial resources to implement their programmes of reconstruction.
Supporting the institutions dedicated to that task and strengthening the ones that foster reconciliation,
peace and development in the two regions are key to success. The national resolve to do should not fail
on this matter.
xxxx
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NOTES
1. World Bank, World Development Report – Building Institutions for Markets (New York:
Oxford University Press), 2002, page 6.
2. See Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1990
3. See my remarks in Governance Out of A Box: Priorities and Sequencing in Rebuilding Civil
Administration in Post-Conflict Countries –Report of the Workshop organised in New York
by the Crisis Management Initiative of Helsinki, Finland, on 17 September, 2007, page 13
4. The New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States adopted at the 4th High Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Republic of Korea in November 2011.
5. This definition is drawn from Charles T. Call and Elizabeth Coussens, “ Ending Wars and
Building Peace” Coping with Crisis Working Papers Series. New York: International Peace
Academy (now Institute) March 2007, 4 and quoted in Charles T. Call with Vanessa H.
Wyeth(eds)Building States to Build Peace (Boulder , Colorado: Lynne Rienner,) 2007, page 5.
6. OECD-DAC, State building in Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings, August 2008, page 1.
7. See Ejeviome Eloho Otobo (2015) Consolidating Peace in Africa: The Role of the United
Nations Peacebuilding Commission, (Princeton, : New Jersey, AMV Publishing Service), p.47
8. del Castillo, Graciana (2012) Aid, employment and Inclusive Growth in Conflict-Affected
Countries” United Nations University –World Institute for Development Economic Research
(UNU-WIDER) Working Paper No. 2012/47,page 2.
9. Alhaji Yayale Ahmed was the Secretary to the Government of the Federation under
Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan. His comments were published in the Sunday Interview
section of the Sunday Vanguard under the caption “Yayale: How Jonathan can make Nigeria
Work”, Sunday, 1 June, 2014 page 45.
10. For a very interesting analysis of the how various leaders and analysts have missed the point
about the reasons for the Boko Haram, see The Punch editorial titled “ Boko Haram: Ban Kimoon missed the point” 11 September 2015 page 24; for the theoretical explanations of
the rise of Boko Haram, see Jideofor Adibe’s (2014) “Explaining the Emergence of Boko
Haram” in AFRICA in Focus, Brookings Institutions, 6 May, 2014; for the view by Ahmed
Salkida, a journalist that embedded with Boko Haram, who opines that Boko Haram was
founded on ideology and poor governance was a catalyst for its actions, See Financial
Times story titled, “Rare glimpse into mysteries of Boko Haram" 23 May, 2012, p.6 ; and for
President Yar’Adua’s view on Boko Haram as evil force, see Olusegun Adeniyi (2011):
Power, Politics and Death: A Front-Row Account of Nigeria under the Late President Umaru
Musa Yar’Adua (Lagos: Prestige Books) page 109-110
11. See Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
12. The United Environment Programme Programme Report of 2011 Environmental Assessment
of Ogoniland recommended the establishment two special purpose vehicles dedicated to
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the clean-up Ogoniland: Environmental Restoration Authority would oversee the
implementation of the UNEP’s study recommendations as a transitional authority and the
creation of an Environmental Restoration Fund for Ogoniland with an initial capital injection
of US$1billion contributed by oil industry and government to cover the first five years of the
clean-up project.
13. See Story titled “5 million traumatized by insurgents says UNHCR (UN High Commissioner
for Refugees)” in The Vanguard 27 May 2015, page 55.
14. This figure is from
Council on Foreign Relations Tracker, see
http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29493 [ some other reports put the
figure of deaths from Boko Haram atrocities much higher, but such reports lack the
methodical tracking and compilation by the Council on Foreign Relations]
15. See Paul Francis, Deirdre Lapin and Paula Rossiasco (2011) Securing Development and Peace
in The Niger Delta: A Social and conflict analysis for Change [ Washington D.C.: Woodrow
Wilson Centre for Scholars] page 64-65.
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