WAR MAKING AND THE BUILDING OF STATE CAPACITY:
EXPANDING THE BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP
Karen Rasler, Indiana University and William R. Thompson, Indiana University
War makes states and states make war is a catchy aphorism that for all of its appeal
remains contested. Scholars who have studied European history and/or the trajectories of
major powers have found strong evidence in support of the relationship. Scholars who study
less developed regions tend to argue that the relationship does not work in their selected patch
of the world. Still others argue that the relationship is more complicated. Its operation is
contingent on the presence or absence of additional, critical variables. It depends, according to
different authors, on what types of war are waged, how the wars are fought and financed, what
types of regimes are at war, where the wars are fought, or even who wins and loses.
Oddly enough, the proposition that war tends to expand state capacity (revenue
extraction) in an upward ratcheting way has never been tested all that comprehensively. Part
of the problem has been missing data on revenues and systematic ways to control for inflation.
By default, much of the information that we have is based on major powers because they are
prominent and because their fiscal records are more accessible. However, more data are now
available. Hence, it is possible to examine the empirical relationship between war and
revenues more broadly.
In a new effort to address the contested nature of war making-state making processes,
we advance a more generalized argument and expand the number of cases and geographical
scope for investigation beyond earlier analyses. In the end, we put forward a theoretical and
empirical resolution of some of the analytical debates on this topic. We maintain that it is
not war per se that makes the state. Rather, it is intensive warfare that leads to extensive
mobilization and, consequently, more state expansion. Other factors play some role as well,
but it is the extent of warfare, not its mere occurrence, that is most critical for state
expansion.
We believe that claims for the lack of applicability of the war making-state making
relationship – although fairly well established in European history – to various parts of the
non-European world should consider the types of wars fought in these parts, and not so
much the utility of the “bellicist” theory alone. In other words, we are modifying the
traditional aphorism to “intensive war makes states, and states make war at varying
intensity.”
1
The War-State Building Relationship
The basic contention in the war making-state making model is that states are
inherently organizations that make war and collect tribute in order to make more war
(Pollack, 2009: 291):
The state is a political organization that claims a monopoly on violence
within a given territory. To the extent that a particular state actually
possesses such a monopoly (or something close to it), it is ideally situated
to perform two vital functions: make war and collect tribute from those
living under its jurisdiction. A good deal of the tribute collected is
typically dedicated to the military apparatus of the state, which in turn, is
used to forcibly extract revenue from society and sometimes, other
nations. This is the basis of the powerful combination of fiscal and
military powers behind the state. In essence, all states are fiscal-military
organizations – some more efficient and successful than others.
The survivors of the intensely escalatory warfare in Europe (and some of its leading
former colonies) between the sixteenth and mid-twentieth centuries developed into relatively
strong states. To survive the warfare, more and more revenue needed to be extracted from
wherever they could be found. Meanwhile, more demanding wars required an expanded
bureaucracy to collect and manage state revenues. They also entailed larger armed forces and
more expensive weaponry technology. In turn, stronger states could then fight more total
wars, which lead to an increasing threshold of future resources that states would need to
participate in the warfare system. It is in this sense that war made the state and states made
war.1
Yet there are at least four possible problems with the war-state building relationship.
One is that it is too simple. A number of variables could intervene between the war stimulus
and the state building outcome.2 A second possible problem is that the relationship is
1
The literature on what is sometimes called the “bellicist” approach to state making is growing. Some of the first
wave of contemporary arguments include Marwick (1968, 1974); Hintze (1975), Ardant (1975); Braun (1975); Finer
(1975); Tilly (1975, 1985, 1990); Stein (1978); Cohen (1984);Cohen, Brown, and Organski (1984); Mann (1986,
1993); Rasler (1986); Higgs (1987); Brewer (1988); Parker (1988); Rasler and Thompson (1988); and Bensel (1990).
A second wave includes Cioffi-Revilla (2000); Clapham (2000); Katznelson and Sheffer (2002); Callahan (2003);
Thies (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007); Mayhew (2005); Stubbs (2005); Pollack (2009); Helling (2010); Keir and Krebs
(2010);and Saldin (2011).
2
Various arguments for multivariate interpretations include Tilly (1990), Barnett (1992), Downing (1992); Porter
(1994), Ertman (1997), Gongora (1997), Lopez-Alves (2000), Taylor and Botea (2008), Nexon (2009), Ferejohn and
McCall (2010); and Schwarz (2012).
2
outdated.3 It may have worked in European history but, for various reasons, it no longer
accurately describes the impact of intensive conflict episodes today – in large part, perhaps,
because the wars are not as sufficiently intense as they once were. But, a third possibility is
that some types of wars build states while others do not.4 Or, the fourth possibility is that
the relationship is entirely spurious. Wars only seem to build state capacity sometimes but
the processes that seem most overt only mask more subtle interactions.5
In many respects, these four problems may actually represent one more complicated
and encompassing problem: war per se simply does not have a generic, generalizable effect.
Sometimes wars build states into stronger organizations than had existed before the war.
Other times, they destroy the states. In between these two extremes are perhaps many
cases in which war participation seems to have little effect. In other words, wars come and
go but the states that fight them remain virtually untouched before and after the combat.
If the war making-state making relationship is too simple, then we need to move beyond
this bivariate relationship. This is especially the case if different types of war occur in diverse
parts of the world, leading to differential war-state building effects in various regions.
Alternatively, since war making activity has shifted gradually away from Europe, perhaps, the
problem is that non-European wars fail to have some ingredient(s) that once characterized
European warfare. If so, we need to capture what distinguishes these regions and/or wars
theoretically – which is still yet another argument for transforming the bivariate war makingstate making relationship into a multivariate one.
We argue that the main feature that distinguishes contemporary third world warfare
from the older European variety is its mobilization intensity. Wars in Europe once were largely
ignored by most of the population. Unless armies happened to march through agrarian fields,
much of the population might have little direct contact with soldiers. But, indirect pressures on
the population gradually increased as desperate states sought revenues to pay for expanding
and more expensive combat. As the combat grew in scope, it became more difficult for the
local populace to evade the fighting. By the twentieth century, few city dwellers were safe
from aerial bombardment. As wars became increasingly total, few members of a population at
war could escape some contact with dead and injured relatives, women working in factories, or
sundry sacrifices on the home front that insured food, chemicals, and gasoline were committed
3
Tilly (1975, 1985) initially thought that his war making-state making argument would no longer work in a third
world environment that was more restricted in its warfare than had been the case earlier in Europe. See, as well,
Holsti (1986); Herbst (1990, 2000); Ayoob (1995), Lustick (1997); Krause (1998); Heydermann (2000); al Khafaji
(2000); Perthes (2000); Bates (2001); Sorenson (2001); Reno (2003a, 2003b); Leander (2004); and Fazal (2007).
4
Arguments for focusing on the type of wars fought include Rasler and Thompson (1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1989,
1999); Jaggers (1992); Centeno (2002, 2003), and Levy and Thompson (2011).
5
See Spruyt (1994); Glete (2002, 2010); Gunn, Grummitt and Cools (2007, 2008); Gunn (2010); Parrott (2010);
Burkhardt (2010); and Teschke (2010).
3
to the war effort. Total warfare, therefore, was distinguished by the high degree of
involvement of the entire society at war.
In marked contrast, most contemporary interstate warfare is much more limited in
effect and degree of involvement.6 States often make little effort to expand revenue
collection for wars which are over relatively quickly. The short time frames make widespread
conscription or even civilian shortages unlikely. The battle fronts are reasonably far way in most
cases. Much of the population may be aware that war is ongoing but its degree of involvement
is considerably less than total.
Thus, it was not European warfare per se or warfare of the 1494-1945 era that was
different. Rather, it was the intensity and the growing intensifying impact of escalating warfare
over a long period of time that made surviving political organizations stronger than they had
been at the outset of this warring states period. Most European political organizations did not
survive the destruction. If there were as many as 1000 actors in 1000 CE, only 500 still existed
in 1500 CE. By 1945, the number had dwindled to about 30. But, many of the states that
remained were much stronger political organizations than the states that had failed to
experience a half-millennium of upward spiraling warfare.7 Our main hypothesis, therefore, is
H1: States that engage only in limited warfare are less likely to experience
positive state making impacts than states that engage in less limited or
total warfare.
Of course, there are many types of state making impacts. In this examination, we focus
exclusively on revenue extraction which is customarily regarded as the primary avenue to
expand state capacity. Peacock and Wiseman (1961) established, at least for the United
Kingdom, that warfare tends to exhibit a ratchet-like effect on state revenues and spending.
Both fiscal activities increase during wartime and then may decrease in the post-war era but
the decrease does not return the extraction level to the pre-war level. Therefore, warfare
provides an opportunity to overcome the normal resistance to paying more taxes and decisionmakers are usually keen to exploit this window of opportunity. If they are involved in a life and
death struggle, they have little choice but to mobilize more resources for the fight. In contrast,
they face more domestic resistance and fewer options in struggles that are perceived to be less
salient. Thus, we expect that step-like expansions of revenue collection should be associated
with more intensive warfare.
6
Insurgencies could work differently if they are long run and widespread but in this paper we are interested only
in interstate warfare. On limited versus total war impacts, see Rasler and Thompson (1983,1985a, 1985b, 1988),
Centano (2002), and Levy and Thompson (2011).
7
Half millenniums of escalatory warfare are fairly unique in history (Levy and Thompson, 2011). Perhaps the most
comparable period was the “Warring States” era in China in the second half of the first millennium BCE that led to
the development of the Han Dynasty empire.
4
There are other factors that might also conceivably influence this effect. Although we
have some doubts as to whether these factors should have significant impacts for all of the
dimensions of war effects, we include them in our empirical analysis. One such factor is the
level of economic development. We expect that pre-war economic levels will act as constraints
on post-war economic growth (Van Raemdonck and Diehl, 1989; Jaggers, 1992). For instance,
less developed states are more likely to remain less developed after engaging in war. More
developed states may be poorer after war, at least temporarily, but the level of economic
complexity is unlikely to be diminished for long.8
War outcomes and regime types are other possible factors. War winners are more likely
to experience positive impacts (or avoid negative impacts) than are losers. War losers may
have to pay reparations and sustain losses of territory and population. Their governments may
also suffer in terms of popularity, legitimacy, and survival (Stein and Russett, 1980; Bueno de
Mesquita and Siverson, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, and Siverson, 2003). Therefore, it
should be more difficult to sustain wartime levels of resource extraction after losing.
As for regime type, Lake (1992) argues that democracies are more capable of extracting
increased resources from their populations. If they should lose a war, democracies, in
comparison to autocracies, are also more adaptable and unlikely to experience institutional
collapse (Jaggers 1992). Moreover, since democracies would have more legitimacy than
autocracies, they would be able to overcome negative post-war environments more
successfully. On the other hand, democracies are likely to be more sensitive to voter
dissatisfaction and therefore more likely to reduce wartime extraction levels quickly in a postwar era. But, this propensity may be offset by popular demands for more governmental
services, especially in welfare – a trend since at least the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Certainly, one of the reasons why older European states have come to have high revenue
extraction levels has been their commitment to welfare spending.
Still another factor to consider is the interaction between regime type and war victory.
There has been considerable and ongoing debate as to whether and why democracies tend to
win the wars in which they participate (Lake, 1992; Jaggers, 1992; Reiter and Stam, 2002, 2003;
Desch, 2002, 2008; Choi, 2004; Rasler and Thompson, 2005; Downes, 2009; Keir and Krebs,
2010).
In sum, although we are less concerned with economic growth than the impacts on
state capacity, we are not sure the extent to which economic development levels should
constrain expanding state capacity, but we acknowledge that it could. Revenue extraction is
8
On this issue, see Organski and Kugler (1980), Rasler and Thompson (1985a), and Kang, Kugler, and Kugler
(forthcoming).
5
certainly more difficult in agrarian and less affluent economies than it is in economies built
around industry, trade and urbanization. Since past research tells us that war outcomes,
regime types, and their interaction, could also have a significant influence on state capacity, we
need to investigate their roles as well. Losing autocracies do have some propensity to
experience political instability in a postwar era which we expect could influence the likelihood
of sustaining expanded state power. If democracies are better at winning, extracting revenues,
and responding to demands for increased governmental services, we might anticipate that they
will be more likely to maintain expanded state size in the aftermath of warfare. It may also be
that resistance to increased taxes is greater in democracies (in comparison to autocracies) and
that democratic decision-makers therefore have a greater incentive to exploit the window of
opportunity associated with periods of intensive warfare.
Research Design
Measurement Issues
These questions of war intensity impacts have already been examined. While there are
a number of small N, empirical quantitative studies and case studies, Rasler and Thompson
(1985b) demonstrated that among major powers, global wars, because they were more intense
and mobilized more people and resources, were far more likely to lead to the expansion of
state revenues and spending than were non-global wars.9 Nonetheless, Jaggers (1992) argued
quite correctly that we needed to go beyond a dichotomous measure of war type and an overly
restricted major power group in order to generalize the argument. He introduced several
measures of war mobilization that were found to have a significant and positive impact on state
capacity (e.g., revenues per capita) – a finding that included other non-major powers.
However, Jaggers’ sample (which included both civil and interstate wars) was restricted to 20
European and American participants in 20 interstate wars that were fought between 1815 and
1954.10 As a consequence, 61 percent of the cases involved major powers and exactly half of
the participation cases were linked to World Wars I and II. Although Jaggers’ study reflects an
9
Rasler and Thompson (1988) examine empirically older cases of major power state building as well.
Jaggers included 20 civil wars as part of his war N, but we see this as a separate question that requires an
independent analysis. For instance, Jaggers assumes that civil wars are least likely to lead to extensive mobilization
but that could vary considerably within the civil war pool. If we throw civil wars into the same sample as world
wars, any variance within the civil war population is likely to be marginalized.
10
6
effort to obtain a more comprehensive and representative sample than one exclusively
oriented toward major powers, we believe that we can broaden his sample even more.11
However, our efforts to broaden the sample are hampered by real limitations on the
availability of state revenue data and the necessity of calculating the proportion of state
revenues to GDP in order to control for inflationary effects.12 Still, Sarkees and Wayman’s
(2010) revised Correlates of War list of interstate wars counts 95 wars and 338 participants
between 1816 and 2007. Most of these war participants are not major powers. So, there is
potential to expand the spatial and temporal scope of the interstate wars and war participants
significantly. Despite constraints of data availability, our empirical investigation below roughly
doubles the number of cases and war participants relative to Jagger’s analysis. More precisely,
we look at 40 wars between 1870 and 2007 which involve 39 participants (without geographic
restrictions) – 85% of which are non-major powers. The WW I and WW II cases present less
than 20% of our sample. Obviously, we are still missing a fair amount of data, but the sample is
at least becoming more representative.
Methodology
We estimate two OLS regression models in order to determine the extent to which
involvement in interstate warfare influences increases in state capacity. We hypothesize that
interstate war involvement, particularly those that are fought with the greatest intensity, will
have a positive effect on increasing state capacity, and we expect this relationship to hold for
small and developing states as well as those that are larger and advanced. In addition to
estimating the influence of interstate wars, we introduce three additional variables that are
expected to influence state capacity in post-war settings: regime type, war outcome and
economic development. Since democracies are thought to be more responsive to demands for
post-war reconstruction and to enjoy more legitimacy than are autocracies, we expect that
these regimes will recover more quickly from war. Also, past research indicates democracies
are likely to win wars that they enter because either their leaders are confident that they can
win, or they have greater wealth that can be mobilized in comparison to autocracies, their
citizens are more willing to cooperate with wartime extraction, or because they produce more
11
The Jaggers study also has multiple dependent variables (military spending, economic growth, institutional
coherence in addition to capacity) and this makes it more difficult to differentiate which findings are associated
with which questions.
12
Jagger’s capacity measure, revenues per capita, curiously reflects the absence of any attempt to control for
inflation which is generally a problem with serial revenue data but especially so in postwar settings.
7
competent soldiers than autocracies (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 2002; Bueno de Mesquita
et.al. 2003. While past research also raises questions about these causal justifications, most
scholars acknowledge some relationship between regime type and war outcome.
In addition to democracy, we expect that that those states that emerge as winners in
the post-war environment will see a positive increase in state capacity in comparison to those
that lose. Losers are expected to recover more slowly due to greater internal destruction that
would make it harder for state leaders to mobilize internal revenues for rebuilding. Also, losers
are likely to suffer additional burdens associated with war reparations and disrupted trade
relationships – both of which would slow the process of mobilizing revenues. Meanwhile,
energy consumption is introduced as a control for the level of economic development since
earlier research indicates that poor states are likely to be affected most adversely by war
involvement (Van Raemdonck and Diehl 1989).
The first OLS model estimates the influences of democracy, war outcome, the type of
interstate war and energy consumption. In the second model, an interaction term between
democracy and winner is estimated along with the direct additive influences of the remaining
variables.
(a) Y1(State Capacity) = β0
β1 (Democracy)t
+
β2 (Winner)t
(b) Y1(State Capacity) = β0 + β1 (Democracy)t
β4 (War Type)t + β5 (Energy)t + ε0.
+
β2 (Winner)t
+
+
+
β3 (War Type)t + β4(Energy)t
β3 (Democracy x Winner)t
+
ε0
+
Variable Measures
State capacity is measured as the difference between the 5 year pre-war mean and the
5 year post-war mean of a state’s revenues/GDP. The difference between the 5 year pre-war
mean and the 10 year post- war mean of state’s revenues/GDP will also be estimated. The
revenues and GDP data are obtained from Banks Cross-Polity Time Series dataset (Banks, 2011)
and are supplemented by data from the Economy Watch Statistics and Indicator Data Base.13
Democracy is a binary variable. States that have a Polity II value of 7 or greater (after
subtracting the autocratic score from the democratic score) are coded 1 (democracies) and the
remaining states are coded 0 in the year preceding the war. This data can be found in the Polity
IV dataset at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
13
See Economy Watch Economic Statistics and Indicators Database at http://www.economywatch.com/economic
-statistics/.
8
War winner is also a binary variable. Those states that are winners are coded 1 while all
other outcomes are coded 0. This variable is based on the Correlates of War Interstate War
dataset (v.4).14
War type is an ordinal variable based on Jaggers (1992) measure of the type of impact
that a war is likely to have. While Jaggers established that the values of 1 and 2 applied to civil
wars with or without external intervention, he reserved the values of 3 through 6 for interstate
wars. In this study, interstate wars with two party conflicts were coded 3; wars with multiparty
conflicts were coded 4; global wars with non-major power participants in World Wars I and II
were coded 5; and lastly, hegemonic wars with major-power participants in World Wars I and II
were coded 6. The presumption is that hegemonic and global wars are likely to impact state
power more dramatically given their scale, scope and duration and the higher levels of resource
mobilization required to fight them (Jaggers, 1992: 43).
Energy is an interval variable and reflects the level of primary energy consumption in
the year before the war started. The data are based on the Correlates of War National
Capabilities (v.4) dataset (Singer, 1987) found at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/nmc4.htm.
Spatial-Temporal Domain
Each country’s involvement in a war represents a single case. The list of the pooled
cases is provided in Appendix A-1. Data constraints played a significant role in determining the
sample size. Our sample includes only those cases in which revenues as a proportion of GDP
could be obtained for each war participant. Although revenues by themselves were available
for a wider number of war participants, the lack of data availability for gross national product
severely constrained our sample size. Since we believe that the presence of war and post-war
inflation is likely to overestimate the changes in state revenues in the post-war aftermath, we
included only those cases in which we had values for both revenues and GDP in the time period
under consideration. Therefore, we have 102 pooled cases for our first dependent variable: the
difference between the five year pre-war mean and the five year post-war mean in
revenues/GDP. We have 106 pooled cases for our second dependent variable: the difference
between the five year pre-war mean and the ten year post-war mean in revenues/GDP.15
The distribution of the independent variables within each of the pooled samples for our
dependent variables is provided in table 1. The table below shows that neither democracies,
14
14 states were democracies in the year preceding their war involvements, 26 were war winners and 14 were
both democracies and winners. The war data are elaborated in Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and found at
http://www.correlates of war.org/COW2%20Data/WarData-NEW/WarList.NEW.
15
The difference in N size is attributable to missing data that were more likely to be missing immediately after a
war (for the 5 year estimates) than later (for the 10 year estimates).
9
winners nor democracies and winners overly dominate the two pooled samples. Lastly, the
average difference between the pre and five year post-war means for revenues/GDP (our first
dependent variable) is .020 with a range between -.195 and .214 values for 102 pooled cases.
The average value for the difference between the pre and ten year post-war means (our second
dependent variable) is .023 with a range between -.187 and .218 values for 106 pooled cases.
/Table 1 about here/
Findings
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimated coefficients for the five and ten year post-war
changes in revenues/GDP. Together, the results are quite similar. When democracy, winner
and war type are treated as direct additive influences on five year post-war changes in state
capacity (see table 2, Model I) war type emerges as the only statistically significant variable.
Possible collinear influences are minimal: war type is weakly correlated with democracy at 0.15
and moderately correlated with a winning war outcome at 0.35. The control variable for
economic development (energy consumption) is statistically insignificant. However, in Model II
(table 2) when an interaction term that combines the influence of both democracy with war
outcome is added to the variables in the first model, it is associated with a significant positive
influence on increasing post-war state capacity. War type continues to have a positive
significant effect on post-war state capacity. Post-estimation simulations for these results are
displayed in the upper half of table 4 and indicate that while the interaction effect of
democracy and winning has a 153% increase in the five year change in post-war capacity, the
type of war is associated with an additional 18% increase at 171%.
/ Table 2 here /
The OLS results for the effects of the independent variables on the ten year post-war
changes in state capacity are provided in table 3. Like the five year post-war changes in state
capacity, the independent additive influences of democracy and war winners are statistically
insignificant, while war type has a strong positive influence (Model I, table 3). Again, collinearity
is ruled out as a possible influence on the results. In Model II (table 3), however, when the
interaction term between democracy and war winner is introduced with the earlier variables,
its estimate is associated with a very strong effect on ten year post-war changes in state
capacity as does war type as well. The post-estimation simulation results displayed in the
bottom half of table 4 show that both of these variables, in line with the five year results, have
a strong influence on increasing post-war state capacity in comparison to the baseline model
where the variables are held constant at their mean. More precisely, the interaction between
democracy and war winner has a 119% increase on the change in post-war state capacity, while
10
war type has a 143% increase. Like the results for the five-year change in state capacity, war
type has the stronger effect.
/ Table 3 here /
/ Table 4 here /
Conclusion
The straight forward argument that war making is a powerful contributor to expanding
state capability has been challenged by its apparent failure to apply widely to third world
combat since the end of World War II. While there are a variety of factors that can help explain
differential outcomes, our contention is that the basic war making-state making equation is
under-specified. It was not simply wars in Europe that led to state expansion and relatively
strong states. It was a long period of upwardly spiraling warfare that began around 1494 and
which climaxed in World War II. The survivors of this process had developed stronger states
than d the institutions in areas that were able to remain relatively aloof from the intensified
conflicts.
All wars do not have equal impact on state making. Some, more intensive, types of war
have had considerable impacts on expanding the capacities of the states that survived them.
To engage in increasingly total warfare that demands great mobilization efforts, it is not
surprising that a small number of states found ways to improve their abilities to extract
resources. The alternative was to accept defeat. But even in defeat, the states that had
participated directly in these world wars emerged with stronger states than they had possessed
before.
States that did not have the “opportunity” to participate in highly intensive warfare
have tended to miss out on the most effective path to greater state strength. They fight more
limited types of warfare that do not last long and do not demand popular sacrifices and wideranging resource mobilization. As a consequence, these states tend to be of the variably
weaker variety. Whether their propensity for domestic warfare can serve as a substitute for
the state making benefits of global warfare remains to be seen. Newer states need not be
condemned to relatively less state capacity than the older states of Europe and North America
forever. Yet it remains unclear what new paths to state making and state expansion will
emerge – or if they will. If most internal warfare tends to be less intense, the expectation
should be that most insurgencies and civil wars should be unlikely to contribute significantly to
state making.
11
The argument and evidence herein thus suggests that the more appropriate specification for
the war making-state making relationship is that “intensified wars makes states and some
states make intensified war.” States that engage exclusively in limited warfare are much less
likely to experience state expansion or acquire state strength in the process.
This re-specification can also be extended to democratic winners which have had a
special affinity for state expansion. Presumably, this finding capitalizes on the outcomes
associated with twentieth century, major power warfare. Most of the winners of these
particularly intensified bouts of extended combat were democracies. Exactly why democracies
are linked to state capacity expansion, however, remains an open question. It may be
something associated with democratization. Or, it might be related to the historical
concentration of democracies in the European region. The possibility that it is a spurious
outcome linked to the interaction of democratic density and who won and lost twentieth
century wars in Europe cannot be rejected at this time.
Yet the control for economic development is consistently insignificant. This finding,
along with the others, suggests that the fundamental, war making-state making relationship is
not restricted in time and space, as is often argued. What is restricted is the intensity of
warfare. Most post-1945 warfare has been simply less intense than appears to be required for
maximal state making impact.
12
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Frequency
Table 1. Variation of Independent Variables in 5 and 10 Year Post-War Pooled Samples
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Five Year Post War
Change Cases (N=102)
Ten Year Post War
Change Cases (N=106)
Democracies
55
58
Winners
50
50
Democracies & Winners
31
32
20
Table 2. OLS Estimates of Five Year Post-war Change in Revenues/GDP
Model I
Variable
Constant
Democracy
Winner
War Type
Development
Adj.R-square
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-stat)
Akaike Criterion
Durbin-Watson
N=102
Coeff.
-.083 **
.019
-.005
.025 **
-.000
S.E.
.036
.015
.015
.009
.000
.068
.070
2.852 **
.028
-2.438
2.109
Model 2
Variable
Coeff.
-.066 *
-.009
-.035
.057 **
.024 **
-.000
Constant
Democracy
Winner
Democracy x Winner
War Type
Development
Adj. R-square
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
Akaike criterion
Durbin-Watson
N=101
S.E.
.036
.020
.021
.028
.009
.000
.098
.069
3.202 **
.010
-2.462
2.085
Note: Y Variable in both models is the difference
between the 5 year pre-war mean and the 5
year post-war mean in revenues/GDP.
21
Table 3. OLS Estimates of Ten Year Post-war Change in Revenues/GDP
Model I
Variable
Constant
Democracy
Winner
War Type
Development
Adj.R-square
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-stat)
Akaike Criterion
Durbin-Watson
N=106
Coeff.
-.089 **
.008
.001
.027 **
.000
S.E.
.033
.015
.014
.008
.000
.086
.069
3.489 **
.010
-2.454
2.227
Model 2
Variable
Coeff.
-.070 **
-.021
-.033
.062 **
.026 **
-.000
Constant
Democracy
Winner
Democracy x Winner
War Type
Development
Adj. R-square
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
Akaike criterion
Durbin-Watson
N=106
S.E.
.034
.019
.020
.027
.008
.000
.123
.068
3.962 **
.003
-2.487
2.174
Note: Y Variable in both models is the difference
between the 5 year pre-war mean and the 10
year post-war mean in revenues/GDP.
22
23
Table 4. Post-Estimation Simulation Results: Expected Values for Change in Five and
Ten Year Post-War Revenues/GDPe
Variable
Expected Y for
Max. Value of Xb
95% Confidence
Interval
Five Year Post
War Change
Democracy x Winner
War Type
.060
.063
.021, .101
.029, .099
Ten Year Post
War Change
Democracy x Winner
War Type
.067
.072
.027, .108
.039, .106
E(Y)= .017
E(Y)= .021
.004, .031
.008, .034
Baseline Modelc (Five Yr. Ch)
Baseline Modeld (Ten Yr. Ch)
Notes:
a) Simulations are based on Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 and are generated by CLARIFY: Software
for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.0 by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg
and King (2000). Post-estimation estimates are provided for only statistically significant
coefficients.
b) Expected Y values are derived from maximum values of war type while the interaction terms are
held at the product of the means of its X variables.
c) Baseline model is generated with war type held at its mean, while the interaction term is held at
the product of the means of its X variables for Model 1 in Table 3.
d) Baseline model is generated with war type held at its mean level, while the interaction term is
held at the product of the means of its X variables for Model 2 in Table 3.
e) The five and ten year post war change in revenues/GDP reflects the difference in the five year
pre-war mean and the five and ten year means in the post war period respectively.
24
Appendix A-1. List of Cases for the Dependent Variables
War
Participant
Brazil
UK
Germany
France
Italy
USA
Finland
Germany
USSR
Italy
USSR
Belgium
France
Finland
Norway
Canada
USA
South Africa
UK
Netherlands
Italy
Brazil
Australia
New Zealand
USSR
Germany
Finland
USSR
France
Belgium
Canada
Colombia
UK
Netherlands
France
Philippines
Post War 5 Yr.
Change Cases
(1= included case)
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
War Name
Lopez
World War I
World War I
World War I
World War I
World War I
Estonian Liberation
Latvian Liberation
Manchurian
Conquest of Ethiopia
Changkufeng
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
World War II
Russo-Finnish
Russo-Finnish
Franco-Thai
Korean
Korean
Korean
Korean
Korean
Korean
Korean
25
Post War 10 Yr.
Change Cases
(1=included case)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Australia
US
Taiwan
France
UK
Egypt
Israel
USSR
Taiwan(PRC)
France
Spain
India
Pakistan
Syria
Egypt
Jordan
Syria
Israel
Egypt
Israel
US
Philippines
Australia
India
US
US
Pakistan
India
Syria
Jordan
Egypt
Israel
South Africa
Ethiopia
Uganda
Tanzania
Iran
UK
Argentina
Syria
Israel
Kuwait
US
Korean
Korean
Off-shore Islands
Sinai War
Sinai War
Sinai War
Sinai War
Soviet Invasion of Hungary
Taiwan Straits
Ifni War
Ifni War
Assam
Second Kashmir
Six Day War
Six Day War
Six Day War
Six Day War
Six Day War
War of Attrition
War of Attrition
Vietnam War, Phase 2
Vietnam War, Phase 2
Vietnam War, Phase 2
Second Kashmir
Second Laotian, Phase 2
Communist Coalition
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War
War over Angola
Second Ogaden War,Ph 2
Ugandian-Tanzanian
Ugandian-Tanzanian
Iran-Iraq
Falkland Islands
Falkland Islands
War over Lebanon
War over Lebanon
Gulf War
Gulf War
26
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Canada
UK
Italy
Morocco
Egypt
Oman
France
Qatar
Syria
Croatia
Peru
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Italy
UK
Netherlands
France
Germany
US
India
Pakistan
Canada
France
UK
US
Australia
Australia
UK
US
N of Cases
Gulf War
Gulf War
Gulf War
Gulf War
Gulf War
Gulf War
Gulf War
Gulf War
Gulf War
Bosnian Independence
Cenepa Valley
Badme Border
Badme Border
War for Kosovo
War for Kosovo
War for Kosovo
War for Kosovo
War for Kosovo
War for Kosovo
Kargil War
Kargil War
Invasion of Afghanistan
Invasion of Afghanistan
Invasion of Afghanistan
Invasion of Afghanistan
Invasion of Afghanistan
Invasion of Iraq
Invasion of Iraq
Invasion of Iraq
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
N=102
27
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
N=106