US-EU Relations Core – LWY/HTR
AFF
US/EU Rels Impacts
Afghani Stability Module
Europe is questioning US commitment to the alliance- reinvigorating relations are key
to ensure stability in Afghanistan
Coffey ’14 (By Luke Coffey —Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center
for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation., March 2014,
This trip will provide an opportunity for the President to demonstrate America’s commitment to transatlantic relations. The President
needs to get the transatlantic community united over the Ukraine, committed to NATO , supporting genuine free
and focused on Afghanistan . Time to Unite over Ukraine Ever since Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, the
U.S. and its European allies have not been on the same sheet of music regarding how best to deal with Russia.
There is a big gap between U.S. and EU sanctions. The U.S. targeted people who at one time or another have been
close to Vladimir Putin. In stark contrast, the EU’s larger list of 13 Russians targeted by sanctions (plus eight
Crimeans) hits much lower-ranked figures. This demonstrates that the EU cannot move beyond a “lowest common
denominator” approach to foreign policy making. There have also been inconsistent messages coming from inside
Europe on how to deal with Russia. For example, on one hand, NATO’s Secretary General describes Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as the biggest threat to European security since the Cold War. Yet the French continue to sell
Moscow warships, and the Spanish allow the Russian navy to use their territories in North Africa. Transatlantic Trade
trade,
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) In February 2013, President Obama called for a free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU during his
annual State of the Union address. With a number of foreign policy decisions by the Obama Administration leaving Europeans questioning
America’s commitment to transatlantic relations, politicians and commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have seized on this announcement
as the answer to the transatlantic relationship’s woes. Failure of the trade deal to deliver the expected political and economic results could
further damage transatlantic relations. The promotion of economic freedom is a vital part of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. A TTIP that
genuinely reduced trade barriers would contribute significantly to this aim. But even though negotiations are still at an early stage, there are
reasons to be concerned that TTIP will not promote free trade but instead will build a transatlantic managed market. This would reduce or even
eliminate U.S. gains from TTIP and would not promote economic freedom. The U.S. should continue negotiating but be cautious and assess any
agreement on its merits. Supporters of economic freedom and limited government should be prepared to support a TTIP that empowers
consumers and opens market opportunities for entrepreneurs, but they should not start cheering for TTIP before they confirm that the
agreement is not a Trojan horse for increased regulation and the importation of the EU’s managed market into the U.S. Such an agreement
would be a bad deal for everyone, especially the U.S. The Upcoming NATO Summit The NATO summit taking place in September in Wales will
be particularly important and should be high on the President’s agenda during his visit. This will be the last summit before NATO ends its
combat operations in Afghanistan and the first summit since Russia invaded Crimea. Many of the important issues that will be discussed at the
summit will require the U.S. to prepare the groundwork now. As NATO redefines its mission in a post–Afghan War world,
it
will need U.S. leadership . The alliance should make collective defense the underpinning of everything it does. In
addition, the U.S. should use the next NATO summit to advance an agenda that keeps NATO focused on the future of Afghanistan, ensures that
NATO enlargement is firmly on the agenda, and readies the alliance for the challenges of the 21st century. NATO should focus on
preventing nuclear proliferation, defending against cyber attacks, ensuring energy security, combatting terrorism,
and establishing a comprehensive missile defense system. It should also get back to training for its Article 5 mission. Remember
Afghanistan? One of the most crucial
periods of the Afghan campaign will commence in 2015, when Afghans take
the lead for their security. The President should also use his visit to drum up financial and military support for
Afghanistan after 2015. After NATO-led combat operations end this year, two important issues regarding
Afghanistan remain to be resolved: the number of troops in Afghanistan and the funding for the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF). A major part of the transition strategy in Afghanistan has been training the ANSF to a level
where it can meet Afghanistan’s internal security challenges without tens of thousands of NATO troops on the
ground. Maintaining the ANSF after 2015 will cost the international community approximately $4.1 billion per year. According to a
report by the Government Accountability Office, the international community is still short $1.8 billion for the years 2015–2017 for
ANSF funding. NATO should demonstrate that it will stay engaged in Afghanistan after 2014. Do Not Waste This Opportunity President
Obama’s visit to Europe could not come at a more important time. With Ukraine, the future of NATO,
stability in Afghanistan , and free trade high on the agenda, President Obama should use his trip as an
opportunity to show America’s commitment to transatlantic relations . The President should: Show leadership on
dealing with Russia. The President should rally America’s European allies around a common approach when dealing
with Russia. This will require American leadership. Having a divided transatlantic alliance does no good for
Europe’s security and stability . Promote transatlantic free trade. An agreement that reduces trade barriers and empowers
individuals over government bureaucrats would be beneficial. Talks that make the U.S. more like another member of the EU would not. Keep
NATO focused on territorial defense. NATO’s original mission of territorial defense has not been as important since the Cold War. In light of
Russia’s recent bellicose behavior, the U.S. should lead the alliance toward refocusing on policies that keep the North Atlantic region safe and
secure. Keep Europe focused on Afghanistan. Too much blood and treasure has been spent the past 13 years in
Afghanistan for the West to turn its back now. The U.S. needs to drum up financial support for the ANSF and seek
concrete troop pledges for the mentoring mission in Afghanistan after 2015. This is no time for NATO to turn its back on the
situation there. Strengthen the Alliance Regrettably, the Obama Administration has attached little importance to the
transatlantic alliance, and Europe has barely figured in the Administration’s foreign policy . Consequently,
Europeans are left questioning America’s commitment to transatlantic relations. A strong transatlantic
alliance should be at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. The President should reinvigorate partnerships with
America’s key friends and allies in Europe.
Afghanistan instability causes global nuclear wars
Carafano ’10 (Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe By JAMES
JAY CARAFANO Saturday, Jan. 2, 2010 James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national
security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies.
There’s little chance Kabul will become Saigon 1968. If the war in Afghanistan starts going south for allied forces, President Obama will probably
quit rather than risk getting bogged down. President Lyndon B. Johnson considered Vietnam more a distraction than a national mission, yet he
ramped up the troop commitment all the same. In 1968, the North Vietnamese launched a major offensive during the Tet holiday. They lost
that battle. Badly! But the fact that they were able to mount such a large-scale offensive gave many Americans—including Walter Cronkite—the
impression that the war wasn’t winnable. As “the U.S. is bogged down” became the common view, Johnson’s presidency fell to ashes. Not
much chance Obama will go that route. If
the violence skyrockets next year and it looks as though the president’s ambitious
objectives can’t be met, Afghanistan could look a lot more like Vietnam in 1973. U.S. forces withdrew. Our abandoned ally was
soon overrun. South Vietnam became a gulag; Cambodia sprouted the killing fields; life in Laos was just plain lousy. By 1979, the SinoVietnamese war erupted. We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing
South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in
decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nucleararms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came
into fashion. Osama
bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in
Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional
terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two
countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into
overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous
neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more
dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing
one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances
snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China
and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional
challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending
because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only
a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.
Asia Module
US EU relations key to solve coming Asian conflicts
Timmerman ’14 -- Dr. Martina Timmermann, DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow
(Setting the Stage for a U.S.-German Partnership Befitting the Twenty-First Century Author: Martina
Timmermann Published: August 6, 2014 Topics: German Foreign and Security Policy, Reconciliation in
Europe and Asia Dr. Martina Timmermann was a DAAD/AICGS Research Fellow from July to August
2014. While at AICGS, Dr. Timmermann explored the potential and options for EU/German involvement
as a mediator in East Asia In 1998, Dr. Timmermann received her doctorate degree from Ruhr-University
Bochum for a study in comparative politics, titled The Power of Collective Thought Patterns: Values,
Change and Political Culture in Japan and the United States of America (Leske & Budrich 2000, in
German). Her PhD research, which she conducted at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo from 1993-1994
and at Harvard University’s U.S.-Japan Program and Reischauer Institute in summer 1995, was kindly
funded by the Japanese-European Special Exchange Program (SEP), the so-called Takeshita-Initiative.
Critical challenges facing the German-American relationship—in Ukraine and Russia, Iraq, Syria, Israel and Palestine, Afghanistan, and
several countries in Africa—urgently need solutions. Overcoming them would be easier and mutually beneficial if
Germany, the European Union, and the U.S. walked more closely side by side. Such closer cooperation would be
beneficial not only to conflicts in and around Europe, but also to a set of conflicts in East Asia that have the
potential to exert a major global impact: the conflict between China, Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam, the Philippines, and
Malaysia over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the conflict between China and Japan on the Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea. The United States has been prodded by its allies in Asia-Pacific to serve as a
mediator. Several American observers (like Jonathan Pollack[1] or Daniel Sneider[2]) have also argued
for U.S. high-level shuttle diplomacy. Giving this a second thought, however, it is obvious that the United
States as a direct stakeholder in the region, with its hands tied by its bilateral security treaties with both
Japan and the Republic of Korea, could not really fill the role of an independent broker on this matter.
China, moreover, has already made clear that it will not accept any American role as a mediator in these
conflicts. The U.S. would therefore benefit from involving a trusted and reliable partner, such as the EU, whose
reputation for credibility and integrity in peaceful multilateral conflict resolution is well known. Still, although European
economic interests would also be affected by conflicts in Asia, and especially when militaries are involved, these conflicts have not advanced to
a center stage debate between the U.S. and Europe. Instead, there seems to be a shared perception that conflicts occurring beyond Europe’s
doorstep do not require European attention or, from an American perspective, do not require European involvement. This, however, would be
a waste of precious political opportunity. Particularly in East Asia, all stakeholders would benefit from stronger U.S.-
European cooperation resulting in a more constructive complementing of their experiences and soft and hard
policy instruments.
Asian wars escalate- cause great power wars
Rudd ‘13 (“East Asia is a tinderbox on water” BY KEVIN RUDD | JANUARY 30, 2013 Kevin Rudd is the
former prime minister and foreign minister of Australia. He studied a Bachelor of Arts in Asian Studies at
the Australian National University, majoring in Chinese language and Chinese history. He worked for the
Department of Foreign Affairs from 1981 to 1988, when he became Chief of Staff to Queensland Premier
Wayne Goss. After the Goss Government lost office in 1996, Rudd was hired as a Senior China
Consultant by the accounting firm KPMG Australia. Rudd was first elected to the House of
Representatives for Griffith at the 1998 federal election, joining the Shadow Cabinet in 2001 as Shadow
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/30/a_maritime_balkans_of_the_21st_century_east_asi
a?page=0,1
These are no ordinary times in East Asia. With tensions rising from conflicting territorial claims in the
East China and South China seas, the region increasingly resembles a 21st-century maritime redux of the
Balkans a century ago -- a tinderbox on water. Nationalist sentiment is surging across the region,
reducing the domestic political space for less confrontational approaches. Relations between China and
Japan have now fallen to their lowest ebb since diplomatic normalization in 1972, significantly reducing
bilateral trade and investment volumes and causing regional governments to monitor developments
with growing alarm. Relations between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines,
have also deteriorated significantly, while key regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) have become increasingly polarized. In security terms, the region is more brittle
than at any time since the fall of Saigon in 1975. In Beijing, current problems with Tokyo, Hanoi, and Manila are top of mind.
They dominate both the official media and the social media, and the latter have become particularly vitriolic. They also dominate discussions
between Chinese officials and foreign visitors. The relationship with Japan in particular is front and center in virtually every official conversation
as Chinese interlocutors probe what they identify as a profound change in both the tenor of Japanese domestic politics and the centrality of
China within the Japanese debate. Beijing does
not desire armed conflict with Japan over territorial disputes, but
nonetheless makes clear that it has its own red lines that cannot be crossed for its own domestic
reasons, and that it is prepared for any contingency. Like the Balkans a century ago, riven by overlapping
alliances, loyalties, and hatreds, the strategic environment in East Asia is complex. At least six states or
political entities are engaged in territorial disputes with China, three of which are close strategic partners of
the United States. And there are multiple agencies involved from individual states: In China, for example,
the International Crisis Group has calculated that eight different agencies are engaged in the South
China Sea alone. Furthermore, these territorial claims -- and the minerals, energy, and marine resources at stake -- are vast. And
while the United States remains mostly neutral, the intersection between the narrower interests of claimant states
and the broader strategic competition between the United States and China is significant and not
automatically containable. Complicating matters, East Asia increasingly finds itself being pulled in radically
different directions. On the one hand, the forces of globalization are bringing its peoples, economies, and countries closer together than
at any other time in history, as reflected in intraregional trade, which is now approaching 60 percent of total East Asian trade. On the other
hand, the forces of primitive, almost atavistic nationalisms are at the same time threatening to pull the region apart. As a result, the
idea of
armed conflict, which seems contrary to every element of rational self-interest for any nation-state enjoying
the benefits of such unprecedented regional economic dynamism, has now become a terrifying, almost
normal part of the regional conversation, driven by recent territorial disputes, but animated by deeprooted cultural and historical resentments. Contemporary East Asia is a tale of these two very different
worlds. The most worrying fault lines run between China and Japan, and between China and Vietnam. In September 2012, the Japanese
government purchased from a private owner three islands in the Senkakus, a small chain of islands claimed by both countries (the Chinese call
the islands the Diaoyu). This caused China to conclude that Japan, which had exercised de facto administrative control over the islands for most
of the last century, was now moving toward a more de jure exercise of sovereignty. In response, Beijing launched a series of what it called
"combination punches": economic retaliation, the dispatch of Chinese maritime patrol vessels to the disputed areas, joint combat drills among
the branches of its military, and widespread, occasionally violent public protests against Japanese diplomatic and commercial targets across
China. As a result, Japanese exports to China contracted rapidly in the fourth quarter of 2012, and because Japan had already become China's
largest trading partner, sliding exports alone are likely to be a significant contributive factor in what is projected to be a large contraction in
overall Japanese economic growth in the same period. In mid-December, Japan claimed that Chinese aircraft intruded over Japanese airspace
above the disputed islands for the first time since 1958. After a subsequent incident, Japan dispatched eight F-15 fighter planes to the islands.
While both sides have avoided deploying naval assets, there is a growing concern of creeping militarization as military capabilities are
transferred to coast guard-type vessels. While the "static" in Japanese military circles regarding China-related contingency planning has become
increasingly audible, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took office in mid-December, has sought to moderate his public language on China,
apparently to send a diplomatic message that he wishes to restore stability to the relationship. This was reinforced by a conciliatory letter sent
from Abe to Xi Jinping, China's new leader, on Jan. 25 during a visit to Beijing by the leader of New Komeito, the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party's coalition partner. This has been publicly and privately welcomed in Beijing, as reflected in Xi's public remarks the following day. Beijing's
position is that while it wants Japan to formally recognize the existence of a territorial dispute in order to fortify China's political and legal
position on the future of the islands, it also wishes to see the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute managed in a manner that does not threaten regional
security, which would undermine the stability necessary to complete its core task of economic reform and growth. There may therefore be
some softening in the China-Japan relationship for the immediate period ahead. But diplomatic and strategic realities appear to remain largely
unchanged. The intensity of Abe and Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida's unprecedented mid-January diplomatic offensive involving
visits to seven East Asian states demonstrates that the temperature between Beijing and Tokyo remains high -- just as the late January
statement from Tokyo on the establishment of a special Japanese Coast Guard force of 12 enhanced vessels and 600 servicemen specifically
dedicated to the Senkaku theater underlines the nature of the challenges lying ahead. The problem is that neither
side can afford
domestically to be seen as retreating from current positions. China believes that Japan has altered the status quo; Japan
believes it has no need to budge because there is no sovereignty issue in the first place. All of this means that both sides remain
captive to events on the high seas and in the air -- events that could quickly spiral out of control.
Asia conflict goes nuclear
Dibb ‘1 (emeritus professor of strategic and defence studies at The Australian National University (Paul,
Winter. “Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, Issue 1. Ebsco.)
The areas of
maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of
the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than
anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War
ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the
world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense
(about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top
four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia's
security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military
conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an
optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial,
ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the
region has no history of successful multilateral security
cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.
Asia Pivot Module
Strong relations shore-up European commitments to Middle East stability – key to
effective Asia pivot
Larivé 12 (Maxime Henri André Larivé, Ph.D., is a Research Associate at the EU Center of Excellence at
the University of Miami, “Obama 2: Future Implications for EU,” Miami - Florida European Union Center
of Excellence - US Relations, November, Vol. 12, No. 8, http://aei.pitt.edu/43440/1/Larive_EUUSunderObama.pdf, CMR)
The ‘pivot’ to Asia The ‘pivot,’ symbolizing the strategic shift to Asia, is real. It has been the cornerstone of the first
mandate of the Obama’s foreign policy. His first trip in November 2012 as newly reelected president took place in Asia. The three
countries visited, Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia, were a direct message sent to Europe and China. First to Europe, the growing interest and
shift to Asia implies that Europeans will have to increase their contributions to regional and international security. Second to China, because of
the three countries visited, they all encircle China Southern part. Building alliances with China’s neighbors may certainly be a cornerstone of the
US containment policy of China. However, as un derlined by Christopher Hill, “another
aspect of the pivot involves moving
away from the Middle East.” 30 This means that a stable M iddle E ast and N orth A frica is a core component for a
successful US shift to Asia. Considering the current financial climax, the US would certainly be unable to
play a leading role onto two theaters simultaneously. This also means that the Europeans will have to
increase their contributions in stabilizing the Middle East. Justin Vaïsse of the Brookings argued that the US pivot to Asia
goes through a step up of Europeans in the Middle East. 31 Furthermore, in Dyer’s article published in the Financial Times, Tom Donilon, the
White House national security adviser, said: “The US is a Pacific power whose interests are inextricably linked with Asia’s economic security and
political order. America’s success in the 21 st century is tied to the success of Asia.” 32 In the case of the EU, Asia is seen as a strong economic
and political partner. For instance, Chinese direct investments have increa sed these last decades in Europe and even triple in 2011. 33 The
degree of trade and investment between China and the EU will certainly continue to increase in the coming decades. But the EU will have to
adjust its perceptions towards Asia as well. Herman va n Rompuy recently declared that “Europe is clearly not a Pacific power and will not
become one.” 34 Despite some geographical truth, the
EU will need to change its position and its strategic
understanding of the region. Ultimately, the Asian ‘pivot’ of Was ington can only succeed with the
contribution of Europe. For the US to shift its grand strategy to Asia, the EU will have to step up its
contributions to international security in the Middle East and Wider Europe. The Obama doctrine does fit with the ‘pivo t’ as it allows the
US to intervene on the cheap thanks to the contribution of the Europeans where it matters as proven in Libya in 2011. At the difference with
Afghanistan costing $300 million a day, the cost for the intervention in Libya was only $3milli on a day. 35
Asia pivot prevents nuclear war
Colby 11 – Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to
the Secretary of Defense’s Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional
Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, “Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire,” The Diplomat,
online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes
But the pendulum shouldn’t be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasn’t been overseas commitments and
interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. The
US alliance and partnership structure, what the late William Odom called the United States’
‘liberal empire’ that includes a substantial military presence and a willingness to use it in the defence of US and allied
interests, remains a vital component of US security and global stability and prosperity . This system of voluntary and
US leadership , particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable bloc defending the
liberal international order. But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where
consensual cooperation under
the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the global economy. A nuclear North Korea’s violent behaviour
threatens South Korea and Japan, as well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyang’s development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,
moreover, brings into sight the day when North
Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack , a prospect
that will further imperil stability in the region. More broadly, the rise of China – and especially its rapid and opaque military build-up – combined with
its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troubling to the United States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly
relevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijing’s anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets. While Beijing remains
a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities will give China the growing power to deny the United States the ability to operate
effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to undermine
the US-guaranteed security substructure that has defined
littoral East Asia since World War II. Even if China says today it won’t exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring?
Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engage Beijing
as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. In
short, the
United States must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply
maintaining the military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments to improve US
capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US
security umbrella. This won’t be cheap, for these requirements can’t be met simply by incremental additions to the existing posture, but will have to include
advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech capabilities. Yet such efforts are vital, for East
Asia represents the
economic future, and its strategic developments will determine which country or countries set the
international rules that shape that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in the Middle East and, to
been driven by far more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the
national interest, encompassing the proposition that failing or illiberally governed peripheral states can
contribute to an instability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true, the
effort is rightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the benefits gained . Moreover, the United States can scale (and has
a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe have
scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing
terrorism. The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather
that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led
structure, leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be counted on to look
out for US interests. We
need to focus on making the right interventions , not forswearing them completely. In practice, this
means a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious security challenges there, and less emphasis on the
Middle East .
This isn’t to say that the United States should be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there
should be more tightly connected to concrete objectives such as protecting the free flow of oil from the region, preventing
terrorist
attacks against the United States and its allies, and forestalling or, if necessary, containing nuclear proliferation as opposed to the more
idealistic aspirations to transform the region’s societies. These more concrete objectives can be better met by the more judicious and
economical use of our military power. More broadly, however, it means a shift in US emphasis away from the
greater
Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific region, which dwarfs the former in economic and military
potential and in the dynamism of its societies. The Asia-Pacific region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global
stage, is where the future of the international security and economic system will be set , and it is there that
Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. In light of US budgetary pressures,
including the hundreds of billions in ‘security’ related money to be cut as part of the debt ceiling deal, it’s doubly important that US security
dollars be allocated to the most pressing tasks – shoring up the US position in the most important region of the
world, the
Asia-Pacific. It will also require restraint in expenditure on those challenges and regions that
don’t touch so directly on the future of US security and prosperity.
Bioterror Module
Relations key to solve bioterror
Hamilton et al. 9 -- Richard von Weizsäcker Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic
Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
(Daniel Hamilton is the Richard von Weizsäcker Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic
Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University;
and Executive Director of the American Consortium on EU Studies Charles Barry, Hans Binnendijk,
Stephen J. Flanagan, Ph.D., is Senior Vice President and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Julianne Smith is director of the CSIS Europe Program and the
Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnershi, James J. Townsend Jr. is a Vice President of the Atlantic
Council of the United States and is Director of the Council’s Program on International Security, “Alliance
Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century,” http://transatlantic.saisjhu.edu/bin/i/y/nato_report_final.pdf)
Biosecurity is perhaps the most dramatic example of the changing challenges we face. Bioterrorism is a first-order strategic threat to
the transatlantic community, and yet neither our health nor our security systems are prepared for intentional attacks of infectious
disease. Homeland security approaches that focus on guards, gates and guns have little relevance to this type of challenge. A bioterrorist
attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a nuclear attack, but requires a
different set of national and international responses. Unless we forge new health security alliances and take other measures, an
attack of mass lethality is not a matter of whether, but when. A great challenge of our century is to prevent the
deliberate use of disease as a weapon from killing millions, destabilizing economies and disrupting societies. The
grand security opportunity of our century is to eliminate massively lethal epidemics of infectious disease by
ensuring that biodefense – humankind’s ageless struggle to prevent and defeat disease – is far more potent than attempts to create
and deploy bio agents of mass lethality.10 This example underscores the need for the United States, Canada and European
partners to advance a multidimensional strategy of societal resilience that goes beyond “homeland” security and relies not just on
traditional tools but also on new forms of diplomatic, intelligence, counterterrorism, financial, economic and law enforcement cooperation;
customs, air and seaport security; equivalent standards for data protection and information exchange; biodefense and critical infrastructure
protection. It needs to begin with the transatlantic community, not only because
European societies are so
inextricably intertwined, but because no two continents are as deeply connected as the two sides of the North
Atlantic. Our ultimate goal should be a resilient Euro-Atlantic area of freedom, security and justice that balances mobility and
civil liberties with societal security.11 Such efforts, in turn, can serve as the core of more effective global measures.
Europeans and Americans share a keen interest in building the societal resilience of other nations, since strong homeland
security efforts in one country may mean little if neighboring systems are weak. In fact, 20th century concepts of “forward defense” should be
supplemented by the broader notion of “forward resilience.” Elements of this initiative will need to be conducted bilaterally ,
and much of it through invigorated channels between North America and the EU, but other mechanisms and organizations, including NATO, can
offer support in specific areas, as we outline later.
Terrorists use of bioweapons causes extinction
Kellman ‘8 -- director of the International Weapons Control Center
[Barry Kellman is the director of the International Weapons Control Center, “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat”, The Futurist, May-June 2008,
http://www.wfs.org/March-April09/MJ2008_Kellman.pdf]
A looming danger confronts the world—the threat of bioviolence. It is a danger that will only grow in the future, yet we are increasingly failing
to confront it. With every passing day, committing a biocatastrophe becomes a bit easier, and this condition will perpetuate for as long as
science progresses. Biological warfare is as old as conflict, of course, but in terms of the objectives of traditional warfare— gaining territory or
resources, comzpelling the surrender of an opposing army—biological weapons weren’t very effective. If the objective is to inflict mass death
and panic on a mixed population, however, emerging bioweapons offer remarkable potential. We would be irresponsible to presume that
radical jihadists like al Qaeda have ignored said potential. What’s New in Bioviolence? Bioviolence refers to the many ways to inflict disease as
well as the many people who might choose to do so, whether heads of states, criminals, or fanatics. Fortunately, doing bioviolence is technically
far more difficult than using conventional explosives. Natural pathogens like anthrax are difficult to weaponize. Smallpox remains unavailable
(presumably); plague is readily treatable; Ebola k i l l s t o o q u i c k l y t o i g n i t e a p a ndemic. But emerging scientific disciplines—notably
genomics, nanotechnology, and other microsciences— could alter these pathogens for use as weapons. These scientific disciplines offer
profound benefits for humanity, yet there is an ominous security challenge in minimizing the danger of their hostile application. For exampl e ,
highly dangerous agents can be made resistant to vaccines or antibiotics. In Australia, scientists introduced a gene
into mousepox (a cousin of smallpox) to reduce pest populations—it worked so well that it wiped out 100% of affected mice, even those that
had immunity against the disease. Various bacterial agents, such as plague or tularemia (rabbit fever), could be altered to increase their
lethality or to evade antibiotic treatment. Diseases once
thought to be eradicated can now be resynthesized,
enabling them to spread in reg ions where there is no natural immunity . The polio virus has been synthesized from
scratch; its creators called it an “animate chemical.” Soon, it may be resynthesized into a form that is contagious even among vaccinated popu l
a t i o n s . Recreation of long eradicated livestock diseases could ravage herds severely lacking in genetic diversity, damage food supplies , and
cause devastating economic losses. Perhaps the greatest biothreat is the manipulation of the flu and other highly contagious viruses, such as
Ebola. Today, scientists can change parts of a virus’s genetic material so that it can perform specific functions. The genomic sequence of the
Spanish flu virus that killed upwards of 40 million people nearly a century ago has been widely published; any savvy scientist could reconstruct
it.
The avian flu is even more lethal , albeit not readily contagious via casual aerosol delivery. A malevolent bioscientist might
augment its contagiousness. The Ebola virus might be manipulat ed so that i t ki l l s more slowly, allowing it to be spread farther before its
debilitating effects altogether consume its carrier. A bit further off is genetic manipulation of the measles virus—one of the great killers in
human history—rendering useless the immunizations that most of us receive in early childhood. Soon
, laboratory resynthesis of
smallpox may be possible. Advanced drug delivery systems can be used to disseminate lethal agent s
to broad populations . Bioregulators — small organic compounds that modify body systems— could
enhance targeted delivery technologies. Some experts are concerned that new weapons could be aimed at the immune,
neurological, and neuroendocrine systems. Nanotechnology that lends itself to mechanisms for advanced disease detection and drug delivery—
such as gold nanotubes that can administer drugs directly into a tumor—could also deliver weaponized agents deep into the body, substantially
raising the weapon’s effectiveness. Altogether, techniques that were on the frontiers of science only a decade or two ago are rapidly mutating
as progress in the biological sciences enables new ways to produce lethal catastrophe. Today, they are on the horizon. Within a decade, they
will be pedestrian. According to the National Academies of Science, “The threat spectrum is broad and evolving—in some ways predictably, in
other ways unexpectedly. In the future, genetic engineering and other technologies may lead to the development of pathogenic organisms with
unique, unpredictable characteristics.” For as far into the future as we can possibly see, every passing day it becomes slightly easier to commit a
violent catastrophe than it was the day before. Indeed, the rapid pace of advancing science helps explain why policies to prevent such a
catastrophe are so complicated. Bioviolence Jihad? Some experts argue that terrorists and fanatics are not interested in bioviolence and that
the danger might therefore be overblown. Since there have been no catastrophic bioviolence attacks, these experts argue, terrorists lack the
intention to make bioweapons. Hopefully, they are correct. But an enormous amount of evidence suggests they are wrong. From the dawn of
biology’s ability to isolate pathogens, people have pursued hostile applications of biological agents. It is perilous to ignore this extensive history
by presuming that today’s villains are not fervent about weaponizing disease. Not a single state admits to having a bioweapons program, but
U.S. int e l l i g e n c e o f f i c i a l s a s s e r t t h a t a s many as 10 states might have active programs, including North Korea, Iran, and Syria.
Moreover, many terrorist organizations have expressed interest in acquiring biological weapons. Whatever weight the taboo against inflicting
disease might have for nation-states, it is obviously irrelevant to terrorists, criminals, and lunatics. Deterrence by threat of retaliation is
essentially meaningless for groups with suicidal inclinations who are likely to intermingle with innocent civilians. Al
-Qaeda and aff i l iat ed I
s lami c fundamentalist organizations have overtly proclaimed their intention to develop and use bioweapons.
The 11th volume of al-Qaeda’s Encyclopedia of Jihad is devoted to chemical and biological weapons. Indeed, alQaeda has acknowledged that
“biological weapons are considered the least complicated and easiest to manufacture of all weapons of mass destruction.” Al-Qaeda
is
widely reported to have acquired legal pathogens via publicly available scientific sources. Before 9/11, alQaeda operatives reportedly purchased anthrax and plague from arms dealers in Kazakhstan, and the group has repeatedly
urged followers to recruit microbiology and biotechnology experts. Follow ing th e Ta l iban ’ s fa l l , f iv e a l Qaeda
biologi cal weapons labs in Afghanistan tested positive for anthrax. Documents calculating aerial dispersal
methods of anthrax via balloon were discovered in Kabul, along with anthrax spore concentrate at a nearby vaccine laboratory.
According to a lengthy fatwa commissioned by Osama bin Laden, jihadists are entitled to use weapons of mass destruction against the infidels,
even if it means killing innocent women, children, and Muslims. No matter that these weapons cannot be specifically targeted. “[N]othing is a
greater duty, after faith itself, than repelling an enemy attacker who sows corruption to religion and the world.” According to the fatwa, “No
conditions limit this: one repels the enemy however one can.” The sentiment might be reprehen sible, but it is certainly not irrational. Even the
most passionate terrorists must realize that conventional attacks are not bringing the West to its knees. The 9/11 strikes, the bombing of the
Madrid and London subways, and numerous smaller attacks have all put civilization on edge, but history marches inexorably forward. A few
thousand people can be killed, yet Western armies still traverse the world, and Western economies still determine winners and losers. From
this perspective, the stakes must be raised. Bioviolence is perhaps the most dire, easiest means to execute existential danger. What Might
Bioviolence Accomplish? Envision a series of attacks against capitals of developing states that have close diplomatic linkages with the United
States. The attacks would carry a well-publicized yet simple warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or suppo r t i t
s po l i c i e s , thou sand s o f y o u r p e o p l e wi l l g e t s i c k . ” How many a t ta ck s in how many c i t i e s would it take before international
diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, comes to a crashing halt? In comparison to use of conventional or chemical weapons, the
potential death toll of a bioattack could be huge . Al though the numbe r of victims would depend on where an attack takes place, the type of
pathogen, and the sophistication of the weapons maker, there is widespread consensus among experts that a heightened attack would inflict
casualties exceedable only by nuclear weapons. In comparison to nuclear weapons, bioweapons
are far easier and cheaper to
make and transport, and they can be made in facilities that are far more difficult to detect. The truly
unique characteristic of c e r t a i n bioweapons t h a t d i s t i nguishes them from every other type of weapon is
contagion. No other type of weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter how
occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place. If you aren’t there, you are angry and upset but not
physically injured by the attack. An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread, potentially imperiling
target populations far from where the agents are released. A b i o - o ff e n d e r c o u l d i n f e c t h i s minions with a
severe,
disease and send them across borders before symptoms are obvious. Carriers will then spread it to other unsuspecting victims who would
themselves become extended bioweapons, carrying the disease indiscriminately. There are challenges in executing such an attack, but fanatical
terrorist organizations seem to have an endless supply of willing suicide attackers. All this leads to the most important characteristic of
bioviolence: It raises incomparable levels of panic. Contagious bioviolence means that planes fly empty or perhaps don’t fly at all. People cancel
vacation and travel plans and refuse to interact with each other for fear of unseen affliction. Public entertainment events are canceled; even
going to a movie becomes too dangerous. Ultimately, bioviolence is about hiding our children as everyone becomes vulnerable to our most
fundamental terror: the fear of disease. For
people who seek to rattle the pillars of modern civilization and
perhaps cause it to collapse, effective use of disease would set in motion political, economic, and
health consequences so severe as to call into question the ability of existing governments to maintain
their citizens’ security. In an attack’s wake, no one would know when it is over, and no government could credibly tell an anxious
population where and when it is safe to resume normal life. While it is difficult to specify when this danger will strike, there should be no doubt
that we are vulnerable to a rupture. Just as planes flying into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, instantly became a historical marker
dividing strategic perspectives before from after, the day that disease is effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change
everything.
If you want to stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to go . The notion that
no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is simply untenable. What Can We Do? How can we confront these growing dangers? First, we
must appreciate the global nature of the problem. Perpetrators from anywhere can get p a t h o g e n s f ro m v i r t u a l l y e v e r ywhe re .
Biore s earch labs that onc e were concentrated in about two dozen developed states are proliferating, expanding the risk that lethal agents
could be diverted and misused. The knowledge needed to weaponize pathogens is available on the Internet. An attack can be prep a r e d t h ro
u g h e a s y n e tw o r k s o f transnational communication. Once a bioweapon is prepared, terrorists or other perpetrators from anywhere can
slide across national boundaries and release disease anonymously. Once released, a contagious agent would spread without regard for
boundaries, race, religion, or nationality. Public health responses would have to be internationally coordinated. New modes of international l
egal coope rat ion would immediately be needed to investigate the crime. Thus, bioviolence dangers shrink the planet into an interdependent
neighborhood. It makes no sense for any particular country to try to insulate its homeland from these dangers. No missile defense system will p
ro t e c t u s f rom b i o v i o l e n c e . Improved border security will not keep disease at bay. National efforts to enhan c e m ed i ca l p repa redn
e s s hav e virtues, but these defenses can be readily circumvented. To prevent bioviolence requires policies that focus on humanity as a species
and that are implemented everywhere with centralized governance. Antibioviolence policies must be global. Ye t , advanc ing ant i -bioviol enc e
policies is what the international community does worst. Bioviolence dangers are unnecessarily high because national and international
antibioviolence strategies are gap-ridden, often incoherent, and not globally observed. As a result, we are all virtually naked in the face of
unacceptable dangers. No ot her t hreat pre s ent s such a s tark cont ras t between severity of harm and a failure of leadership to reduce risks.
Most important, existing institutional arrangements are inadequate. In sharp contrast to most other global security challenges, there is no
responsible international authority that defines relevant prohibitions and responsibilities, implements policies over time, or evaluates whether
obligations are being fulfilled. With regard to global bioviolence prevent i o n p o l i c i e s , t h e r e ’ s n o b o d y i n charge. No one is
responsible; no one is accountable. The absence of authority is profoundly dangerous. Bioviolence prevention and preparedness requires a
sizable orchestra, made up of various instruments, to play complicated music in harmony. Today, there is not a bad “conductor”, there is no
conductor at all. The result is cacophony. Simply stated, bioviolence is the dark s ide of global izat ion, ye t int e rna tional alarms of bioviolence
ring nowhere! We need a comprehensive national and international strategy for bioviol enc e prevent ion . [Se e box: “Five S t r a t e g i e s f o r
P r e v e n t i n g B i oviolence,” page 30.] Policies should be pursued within an integrated approach that enables each policy to gain strength
from all the others. Such policies are potentially available and effective, but they demand progressive changes in our global order. The Security
Mission Global bioviolence prevention and preparedness policies are imperative, but also imperative is recognition that the world faces natural
disease horrors. Where mass public health challenges are daily phenomena, the risks of terrorists using pathogens must be weighed against
more tangible natural threats. Simply stated, it is illegitimate to insist that every nation adopt policies for preventing human-inflicted disease
without acknowledging the silent genocide of natural disease that is responsible for millions of deaths. But neither is it legitimate to view
bioviolence dangers as distractions from efforts to combat natural disease and therefore to put off beneficial measures until those afflictions
are defeated. To do so frustrates forward movement on cost-effective initiatives that could help build an international security architecture for
advancing science and health. Thus, bioviolence prevention must be a facet of a broad international commitment to: 1. Prevent the spread of
disease ( e .g. , through publ i c -heal th measures). 2. Enhance protection against and cures for disease (e.g., through vaccination and drug
therapies). 3. Supervise the conduct of biological science. 4. Criminalize unauthorized or improper use of pathogens. From this foundation
should flow a policy commitment to the growth of bioscience as a global public good. Policies to encourage its worldwide spread deserve
vigorous support. This governance mission should, therefore, be conceived as a global covenant . As bios c i enc e goe s forward as a
fundamental pillar of human progress, all nations must undertake common responsibilities to prevent bioviolence even as the burdens
associated with those responsibilities are differentiated according to wealth and capability. From everyone according to their abilities—to all for
the benefit of all. The United Nations’ Importance The United Nations represents the b e s t venu e fo r a new gove rnanc e platform that can
accommodate the need for an integrated global strategy agains t bioviol enc e . Only the United Nations has the necessary in ternational
legitimacy, and only the Uni t ed Nat ions can int egrat e the many sectors—health, law enforcement, science, military, emergency
preparedness—that must devote expertise and resources. A primary consideration here is to minimize any bureaucratic reshuffling. There is
certainly no need to modify or replicate existing capabilities. Many relevant governance tasks are already addressed by one or more
international organizations. For example, the World Health Organization should continue to be responsible for addressing the health
implications of a pandemic, whether natural or malevolent. Interpol should continue to be responsible for a d d re s s i n g b i o v i o l e n c e ’ s l
aw e nforcement implications. Indeed, the UN’s role should be only to coordinate the performance of these tasks. Broadly viewed, the United
Nations should be able to undertake three functions: First, a specific UN agency should stimulate bioscience development by incorporating
security concerns into the fabric of scientific undertakings and by assisting countries in using bioscience in ways that are consistent with policies
for preventing bioviolence. Because science, development, and security can and must be mutually reinforcing, this agency’s primary
responsibilities would be to promote and distribute knowledge and build capacity to fulfill obligations, especially in developing nations. Second,
a UN office should coordinate activities among the relevant international/regional organizations, professional networks, and expert bodies. For
example, three major international organizations focus on health (World Health Organization, Animal Health Organization, and the Food and
Agriculture Organization); Interpol and Europol both focus on law enforcement; a large array of organizations focus on conveyance of
dangerous items (e.g., International Maritime Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization). This UN office should be a steering
mechanism to engage each of these orga nizations’ specialized expertise and to identify synergies. Third, a Security Council Committee should
be authorized to investigate bioviolence preparations as well as respond and coordinate assistance to a bioviolence attack. Situations that call
for investigation or response arise rarely, but they carry disproportionate significance for international peace and security. The Security Council
Committee should not advance programmatic agendas, but it should be able to wield expertise and political muscle in volatile situations. Its
primary mission would be to enable the international community to sustain global order in the face of a bioviolence challenge. Ever since
someone harnessed a new technology to create a weapon with more devastating effects, there has been a link—a double helix—between the
progress of science and the pursuit of security. This is inevitable. These dangers of bioviolence do not a rg u e f o r re l i n q u i s h i n g s c i e n t i
f i c progress, but they disprove notions tha t n ew cha l l eng e s can b e e ff e ct ive ly addre s s ed wi th ye s t e rday’ s policies. At bottom is a
condition unique to this historical era: Scientific progress is intertwined with escalating malevolence threatening human security.
Progressing capabilities improve our l ive s and ye t , inext r i cably, enabl e truly harmful weapons against humanity.
Here are the challenges to international peace and security at the beginning of the third millennium. Failing to do the right thing in
response to these challenges could have dire consequences for all humanity.
Institutions Module
US-EU relations key to global institutions- the impact is World War 3
O'Sullivan ‘4
(John, National Interest editor , Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Distinguished Fellow in
International Relations "Europe and the Establishment," The National Interest, 7-31-2004,
nationalinterest.org/article/europe-and-the-establishment-2608]
The report's starting point -- that U.S.-European relations
are extremely important --
is undeniable. A
united Western
alliance would shape world institutions in line with values and practices rooted in liberty and democracy and coax rising
powers such as India and China into going along with this international status quo for the foreseeable future. Indeed, this
is already happening as China accepts liberal economic rules at home in order to enter institutions such as the G7 and the World Trade
Organization. By contrast, a
disunited West would tempt such powers to play off Europe and America against
each other and foster a global jockeying for power not unlike the maneuvering between a half-dozen great
powers that led to 1914.
Iran Module
US EU relations are key to solve Iran talks
Pollard ’14 -- Robert Pollard is a State Department visiting fellow with the Europe Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
(By Robert A. Pollard MAR 14, 2014 Robert Pollard is a State Department visiting fellow with the Europe
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.)
If the recent crisis in Ukraine has brought home one clear message, it is this: policy unity between the
United States and the European Union is absolutely essential. NATO will remain the first place where the
United States will turn due to our treaty obligations and our status as a member. Yet the European
Union is an increasingly important player in the transatlantic policy discourse, and Washington has been
slow to fully recognize it. Therefore, it is very timely and fitting that, for the first time in his presidency,
Barack Obama will visit Brussels on March 26 for the U.S.-EU summit. That said, while the EU leadership is eagerly
awaiting the meeting, the history of U.S.-EU summits has been long on aspirations and short on achievements. So what can we reasonably
expect from this, the first transatlantic summit in over two years? The Unfinished Agenda First, let’s look at the score card from the last
summit in Washington. Measured against the official declaration issued at the end of the meeting, the track record is not bad. One major
achievement was the decision to set up a High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, which ultimately resulted in the launch of
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It is easy to forget, but at the time, it was not a foregone conclusion
that the two sides would go ahead with such a comprehensive free trade agreement, a goal that had eluded decisionmakers for literally
decades. One downside: the inauguration of TTIP meant that the preexisting Transatlantic Economic Council was virtually disbanded, meaning
that ongoing efforts to cut back costly regulatory barriers to trade and investment were largely put on hold for the duration of the trade talks.
Another bright spot was Iran. After the Washington summit, the United States and European Union
spearheaded extraordinary international cooperation on sanctions, including a nearly total oil embargo
that helped force Tehran to the negotiating table. No one is ready to declare victory, but transatlantic
cooperation in this instance showed that economic sanctions can work if the United States and its
European allies pull together.
Iran prolif causes nuclear war
Montgomery ‘11 -- research fellow at the CSBA
(Eric Edelman, distinguished fellow at the center for strategic and budgetary assessments, Andrew
Krepinevich, President of the CSBA, evan montgomery, research fellow at the CSBA “Why Obama Should
Take Out Iran's Nuclear Program,”)
Even so, the U.S. government might persist with its existing approach if it believes that the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran are
manageable through a combination of containment and deterrence. In fact, the Obama administration has downplayed the findings of the new
IAEA report, suggesting that a change in U.S. policy is unlikely. Yet this view underestimates the challenges that the United States would
once Iran acquired nuclear weapons. For example, the Obama administration should not discount
the possibility of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear conflict. From the very start, the nuclear balance between
these two antagonists would be unstable. Because of the significant disparity in the sizes of their
respective arsenals (Iran would have a handful of warheads compared to Israel's estimated 100-200), both sides would have huge
confront
incentives to strike first in the event of a crisis. Israel would likely believe that it had only a short period during which it could launch a nuclear
attack that would wipe out most, if not all, of Iran's weapons and much of its nuclear infrastructure without Tehran being able to retaliate. For
its part, Iran might decide to use its arsenal before Israel could destroy it with a preemptive attack. The
absence of early warning
systems on both sides and the extremely short flight time for ballistic missiles heading from one country
to the other would only heighten the danger. Decision-makers would be under tremendous pressure to
act quickly. Beyond regional nuclear war, Tehran's acquisition of these weapons could be a catalyst for additional proliferation throughout
the Middle East and beyond. Few observers have failed to note that the United States has treated nuclear-armed rogues, such as North Korea,
very differently from non-nuclear ones, such as Iraq and Libya. If Iran became a nuclear power and the United States reacted with a policy of
containment, nuclear weapons would only be more appealing as the ultimate deterrent to outside intervention. Meanwhile, Iran's rivals for
regional dominance, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, might seek their own nuclear devices to counterbalance Tehran. The road to
acquiring nuclear weapons is generally a long and difficult one, but these nations might have shortcuts. Riyadh, for example, could exploit its
close ties to Islamabad -- which has a history of illicit proliferation and a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal -- to become a nuclear power almost
overnight.
ISIS Module
US EU relations are key to solve ISIS
Lang et al. ’14 (Brian Katulis and Hardin Lang are Senior Fellows with the National Security and
International Policy team at the Center for American Progress. Vikram Singh is the Vice President for
National Security and International Policy. Defeating ISIS: An Integrated Strategy to Advance Middle East
Stability Syria SOURCE: AP Members of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, are seen in Raqqa,
Syria. By Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang, and Vikram Singh | September 10, 2014
A transatlantic and allied response to ISIS The September 2014 NATO summit took several steps to
energize the transatlantic community to confront ISIS. Nine countries pledged to join U.S. efforts to
counter ISIS, but no specific commitments were made. And as evidenced over the past few years in
Afghanistan and Libya, follow through on commitments is essential. Further, the United States and its
Western partners need to proactively manage the dangers posed by European and American citizens
now fighting alongside ISIS. The United States should work with its transatlantic partners and traditional
allies to: Enable reliable and capable partners in the region to take the fight directly to ISIS. The United States is
providing the greatest support to forces fighting ISIS. NATO and other U.S. allies should together develop a strategy to help the region counter
ISIS with technical support and military assistance. This should include specific commitments to provide support to the Iraqi government,
Kurdish forces, and third-way opposition alternatives to the Assad regime and ISIS in Syria. Enhance law enforcement and
intelligence fusion efforts to identify and counter ISIS and other terrorist fighters holding Western passports. This should
build on existing U.S.-European efforts in coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization, or INTERPOL. More than
12,000 foreign fighters are estimated to have flocked to Iraq and Syria. According to intelligence agencies and outside experts, one-quarter of
these fighters come from Western countries. With an estimated 3,000 individuals, including perhaps 500 each from Britain
and France, the dangers of extremists coming home to continue the fight with acts of terrorism cannot be ignored.
Western countries should partner with allies in the Middle East and local communities on counter-radicalization efforts.
ISIS triggers World War 3
Corre ’14 (Addam Corre 6-17-14, Inquisitr writer, “World War 3: Forget Ukraine, Iraq Is The Most Likely
Flash Point”, Inquisitr, 06/17/2014, http://www.inquisitr.com/1303680/world-war-3-forget-ukraineiraq-is-the-most-likely-flash-point/
Over the past few months speculation has been rife that the events in Ukraine could trigger the next World War. Numerous articles have
proclaimed that to be the most likely scenario. But is it? The actions of the Islamic militant group calling itself ” The Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria” – or
ISIS – has created a new situation on the ground which has a far great er potential for setting off a
world conflict than Ukraine could ever have. Despite all the world posturing and tut-tutting about the Crimea, it is, after all, simply
a piece of land whose ownership is disputed. Viewed objectively, given the demographic structure of the area, the Russians have at least an
arguable case to justify its annexation. Whether the fears of the local Russian speaking population were real or imagined, it’s now a faitaccompli, and no one is going to do anything to change the situation any time soon. Even that the expansion of Russian interests in other parts
of Ukraine have similar elements of justification, which might keep the diplomats busy for a few months, but are unlikely to include any
significant military dimension. But the situation in the Middle East
is completely different. It is far more volatile and
dangerous because it is not really a question of land. What the world is witnessing, not for the first time – and certainly not for the
last – is a clash of ideologies within Islam. Some may feel that while they are busy butchering and beheading each other at least they are not a
threat to the rest of the world. That is mistaken and shortsighted thinking. With every passing year, the theories of Samuel P. Huntington that
people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world, gain even more credence.
Huntington’s concept, which he aptly termed “The Clash of Civilizations” was first proposed in 1992. Since then, the world has witnessed with
growing horror the expansion of ever increasingly radical Islamic groups in almost every corner of the globe. Islamic militant groups are active in
Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria, Kenya, Lebanon, The Palestinian territories, and Gaza, just to list a few. Although Russia nominally
crushed the Islamists of Chechnya, remnants of them still manage the odd bombing atrocity in Russia. Islamic activity in China also appears to
have been suppressed, but facts from there are almost impossible to verify. But Islamic extremism and terrorism is not confined to countries
with mainly Muslim populations. From the attack on the Twin Towers in New York to the London bus bombings to the Madrid train bombings,
Islam carried its war to the rest of the world. And the world cleaned up the sites, mourned – and moved on. Some might argue that the U.S.,
and one or two other countries, tried to do something about those atrocities by invading Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein, fighting the Taliban in
Afghanistan and (eventually) killing their leader, Osama bin-Laden. History will judge whether those tactics succeeded or not; currently, the
legacy is not looking too good. Why could the
actions of ISIS trigger a third world war ? It all depends on which group, or
groups, the major powers ally themselves with and support diplomatically, financially, or militarily. We are today witnessing the
truth of the adage that adversity makes strange bedfellows. Even a week ago, who could have envisaged a scenario in which the U.S. and Iran
could share a mutual interest, and possibly support each other in actions against ISIS? Apart from the fact that Russia, and sometimes
China, have an almost knee-jerk reaction against any direction the U.S. might take in the international arena, Israel
is the wild card in the pack. If it senses that – for whatever reason – the U.S. and Iran will find themselves allies, it
will understand that the U.S. will be constrained in taking further action against Iran regarding its efforts to
manufacture a nuclear bomb . Facing such a situation, The Israeli government may feel that he window of
opportunity to take military action against Iran is rapidly closing . Although, until now, the prevailing belief has been that Israel
could not act alone – and succeed – it could be, and probably is the fact, that Israel will be left with no alternative. Diplomatic
efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear program have palpably failed . The danger of such a course of action is that it would almost
certainly result in the Islamist factions stopping their mutual bloodletting in order to confront their joint enemy,
Israel. From that point, it does not require too much imagination to project what will be the effect of world and
regional governments aligning themselves with one side
or the other. World War 3 starting in the Middle East
as an indirect result of the actions of ISIS is not such a fanciful prediction !
Laundry List Module
Security cooperation with Europe solves nuclear war and multiple transnational
threats
Yannis Stivachtis 10, Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster
University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European
and American Studies, 2010, pg. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlanticstudies/78.html
There is no doubt that
US-European relations are in a period of transition , and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the
number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same
terrorism, the nuclearization of North Korea and especially Iran, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the
transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of China, the political and economic transformation
and integration of the Caucasian and Central Asian states, the integration and stabilization of the Balkan countries, the promotion of
peace and stability in the Middle East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations
require further cooperation among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and
Europe is more imperative than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of
crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than
global, but the implications of success or failure will be global. The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it
time, international
since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were
fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe
parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense. Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common
European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European
if European leaders conclude that Europe must become
counterweight to the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a
common ground than an elective partnership requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for
leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A
vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary
political commitment. There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is
disagreements. There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First,
terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly
perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from reading newspapers and magazines. But while
elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight
sharp differences over global leadership, defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance.
There are other
important, shared interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the
international community is a priority both for the U.S. and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime in Ukraine. It is
necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a united front to meet these challenges because first, there is a risk that dangerous
materials related to WMD will fall into the wrong hands; and second, the spread of conflict along those countries’ periphery could
destabilize neighboring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in
the Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic
transformation and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE. This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and
prevent those countries of becoming havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically.
Dealing with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other political issues in the Middle East are also of a great
concern for both sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-European cooperation will be more effective in
dealing with the rising power of China through engagement but also containment. The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question
of adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if
transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue.
The future course of relations will be determined above all by U.S.
policy towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Wise policy can help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the
a policy that takes Europe for granted and
routinely ignores or even belittles Europe an concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued
alliance outweigh its benefits.
Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and opportunities of the evolving world together. But
Middle East Module
Relations are key to Middle East stability
Hamilton ‘3 -- Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations @ Johns Hopkins University
[Daniel, 6/11/2003 (Congressional Testimony) p. lexis]
If our efforts in these areas are ultimately to be successful, however, they must be part of more comprehensive transatlantic
strategies aimed at the modernization and transformation of the Greater Middle East itself. A circle--with its center in
Tehran-- that has a diameter roughly matching the length of the continental United States covers a region that encompasses 75 percent of the
world's population, 60 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources. The Greater Middle East is the region of the world
where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, fragile and failed regimes, and deadly combinations of
technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast, relatively contiguous energy field upon which Western
prosperity depends. Transformation of this region is the strategic challenge of our time and a key to winning the
campaign against terrorism. Choices made there could determine the shape of the 21st century--whether weapons of
mass destruction will be unleashed upon mass populations; whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia will
become reliable sources of energy; whether the Arab world will meet the challenges of modernization and globalization; whether Russia's
borderlands will become stable and secure democracies; whether Israel and its neighbors can live together in
peace; and whether the great religions of the world can work together. This is a long term effort. We cannot hope to transform this turbulent
region into an area of democratic stability and prosperity soon. But we can act more successfully together to defend common interests, to
dampen the negative trends that are gaining momentum, and to work with those in the region who seek to carve out areas of civil society
where the state does not intrude. Such an effort is far more likely to succeed if America and Europe were to pool our
energies and resources and pursue it together.
Middle East instability causes extinction
Russell ‘9 -- Senior Lecturer of National Security Affairs @ the Naval Postgraduate School
(2009,“Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East”
IFRI, Proliferation Papers)
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can
introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into
relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent
relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that
its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to preemptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a
communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in
the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of
miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under
which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from
being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the
probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would
likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international
community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an
unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
Multilat Module
US-EU relations are key to global multilateralism
Wright ‘12 (Brookings Managing Global Order fellow (Thomas, Ph.D. from Georgetown University,
former executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a lecturer at the Harris
School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and senior researcher for the Princeton Project on
National Security, "What if Europe Fails?" The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2012, 35:3, 23-41,
csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerWright.pdf)
Western Europe has been an integral part of the U.S.-led international order since its foundation in the years
after World War II. NATO’s greatest role was undoubtedly in waging a successful cold war against the Soviet Union while consolidating
democracy in Western Europe, but it
continues to play a central part in international politics. In recent years, NATO has
and diplomatically, Europe and the United
States form a powerful constituency for openness, democracy, and human rights on the world stage, even
if they occasionally disagree about how to pursue these goals. If Europe fails, the transatlantic pillar of the international
order would begin to crumble. In the relatively benign scenario of bare survival, Europe would turn inward as it became
spearheaded interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and North Africa. Politically
preoccupied politically, economically, and diplomatically with tackling its own existential crisis. Under such conditions, it is hard to see how
Europeans would be willing to play a truly global role in world affairs. Even if they did, military budgets would continue to drop under the
constraints of austerity, and the capabilities gap with the United States would widen. Europe’s soft power, which optimists have long pointed to
as the European Union’s real contribution to world politics, would be decimated as European-style integration became a warning to be avoided,
not a model to be emulated. If failure takes the form of a disorderly collapse, the outcome would be immeasurably worse. As Europe reels from
the shock of historic proportions, the United States would have to cope with a rapidly worsening geopolitical climate, particularly in the Middle
East, North Africa, and China, but also in a number of fragile states around the world. The demand for international leadership and
crisis management would skyrocket at precisely the time when a pillar of the West is in a state of collapse. The United States would be
compelled to go it alone while Americans would undoubtedly be angered and frustrated at what they would accurately perceive as a European
crisis that could have been avoided had better decisions been taken earlier on. Taking a step back from the fate of the Western alliance,
Europe’s failure, in either scenario, would be bad news for multilateralism. At the outset, the financial crisis seemed to be
a boon for global governance. The crisis demonstrated the need for reform of the global economy, the involvement of emerging powers, and
the absolute necessity of international cooperation and coordination. Even better, a ready-made solution was available in the form of the G-20,
which enjoyed initial success and appeared to usher in a new era for international financial institutions. Three years later, however, the G-20
has failed to make its presence felt on the Eurocrisis; although the United States and the emerging powers largely agree, they have been unable
to convince Germany to change course. Meanwhile, the major powers in the west have become sharply divided on fundamental questions,
including the relative merits of austerity versus stimulus, as well as the nature and scope of financial markets reform. No leader has been able
to articulate a future for the global economy and free markets that truly resonates. Few have even tried. No one is running for the exits. It is
clear that economic isolationism and unilateralism will not work. But, it is also apparent that institutions are changing for the worse. Large
countries are much more assertive within institutions. They actively undermine constraints upon their freedom of action and clash directly with
other states with different interests. If there are asymmetries of power, the larger state will not hesitate to use whatever leverage it has to
compel the smaller state to acquiesce to its wishes, as has been the case in Europe.
Multilateralism solves multiple extinction scenarios
Dyer ‘4 (Gwynne Dyer, former senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 12/30/2004, The End of War, The
Toronto Star, p. lexis
The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over
half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the
stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some
countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in
the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the U nited S tates in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it
will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be
able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war , but the
potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is
something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system
that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that
emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If
they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses.
NATO Module
Europe is questioning US commitment to the alliance- reinvigorating relations are key
to NATO success
Coffey ’14 (By Luke Coffey —Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center
for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation., March 2014,
This trip will provide an opportunity for the President to demonstrate America’s commitment to transatlantic relations. The President
needs to get the transatlantic community united over the Ukraine, committed to NATO , supporting genuine free
trade,
and focused on Afghanistan . Time to Unite over Ukraine Ever since Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, the
U.S. and its European allies have not been on the same sheet of music regarding how best to deal with Russia.
There is a big gap between U.S. and EU sanctions. The U.S. targeted people who at one time or another have been
close to Vladimir Putin. In stark contrast, the EU’s larger list of 13 Russians targeted by sanctions (plus eight
Crimeans) hits much lower-ranked figures. This demonstrates that the EU cannot move beyond a “lowest common
denominator” approach to foreign policy making. There have also been inconsistent messages coming from inside
Europe on how to deal with Russia. For example, on one hand, NATO’s Secretary General describes Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as the biggest threat to European security since the Cold War. Yet the French continue to sell
Moscow warships, and the Spanish allow the Russian navy to use their territories in North Africa. Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) In February 2013, President Obama called for a free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU during his
annual State of the Union address. With a number of foreign policy decisions by the Obama Administration leaving Europeans questioning
America’s commitment to transatlantic relations, politicians and commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have seized on this announcement
as the answer to the transatlantic relationship’s woes. Failure of the trade deal to deliver the expected political and economic results could
further damage transatlantic relations. The promotion of economic freedom is a vital part of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. A TTIP that
genuinely reduced trade barriers would contribute significantly to this aim. But even though negotiations are still at an early stage, there are
reasons to be concerned that TTIP will not promote free trade but instead will build a transatlantic managed market. This would reduce or even
eliminate U.S. gains from TTIP and would not promote economic freedom. The U.S. should continue negotiating but be cautious and assess any
agreement on its merits. Supporters of economic freedom and limited government should be prepared to support a TTIP that empowers
consumers and opens market opportunities for entrepreneurs, but they should not start cheering for TTIP before they confirm that the
agreement is not a Trojan horse for increased regulation and the importation of the EU’s managed market into the U.S. Such an agreement
would be a bad deal for everyone, especially the U.S. The Upcoming NATO Summit The NATO summit taking place in September in Wales will
be particularly important and should be high on the President’s agenda during his visit. This will be the last summit before NATO ends its
combat operations in Afghanistan and the first summit since Russia invaded Crimea. Many of the important issues that will be discussed at the
summit will require the U.S. to prepare the groundwork now. As NATO redefines its mission in a post–Afghan War world,
it
will need U.S. leadership . The alliance should make collective defense the underpinning of everything it does. In
addition, the U.S. should use the next NATO summit to advance an agenda that keeps NATO focused on the future of Afghanistan, ensures that
NATO enlargement is firmly on the agenda, and readies the alliance for the challenges of the 21st century. NATO should
focus on
preventing nuclear proliferation, defending against cyber attacks, ensuring energy security, combatting terrorism,
and establishing a comprehensive missile defense system. It should also get back to training for its Article 5 mission. Remember
Afghanistan? One of the most crucial
periods of the Afghan campaign will commence in 2015, when Afghans take
the lead for their security. The President should also use his visit to drum up financial and military support for
Afghanistan after 2015. After NATO-led combat operations end this year, two important issues regarding
Afghanistan remain to be resolved: the number of troops in Afghanistan and the funding for the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF). A major part of the transition strategy in Afghanistan has been training the ANSF to a level
where it can meet Afghanistan’s internal security challenges without tens of thousands of NATO troops on the
ground. Maintaining the ANSF after 2015 will cost the international community approximately $4.1 billion per year. According to a
report by the Government Accountability Office, the international community is still short $1.8 billion for the years 2015–2017 for
ANSF funding. NATO should demonstrate that it will stay engaged in Afghanistan after 2014. Do Not Waste This Opportunity President
Obama’s visit to Europe could not come at a more important time. With Ukraine, the future of NATO,
stability in Afghanistan , and free trade high on the agenda, President Obama should use his trip as an
opportunity to show America’s commitment to transatlantic relations . The President should: Show leadership on
dealing with Russia. The President should rally America’s European allies around a common approach when dealing
with Russia. This will require American leadership. Having a divided transatlantic alliance does no good for
Europe’s security and stability . Promote transatlantic free trade. An agreement that reduces trade barriers and empowers
individuals over government bureaucrats would be beneficial. Talks that make the U.S. more like another member of the EU would not. Keep
NATO focused on territorial defense. NATO’s original mission of territorial defense has not been as important since the Cold War. In light of
Russia’s recent bellicose behavior, the U.S. should lead the alliance toward refocusing on policies that keep the North Atlantic region safe and
secure. Keep Europe focused on Afghanistan. Too much blood and treasure has been spent the past 13 years in
Afghanistan for the West to turn its back now. The U.S. needs to drum up financial support for the ANSF and seek
concrete troop pledges for the mentoring mission in Afghanistan after 2015. This is no time for NATO to turn its back on the
situation there. Strengthen the Alliance Regrettably, the Obama Administration has attached little importance to the
transatlantic alliance, and Europe has barely figured in the Administration’s foreign policy . Consequently,
Europeans are left questioning America’s commitment to transatlantic relations. A strong transatlantic
alliance should be at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. The President should reinvigorate partnerships with
America’s key friends and allies in Europe.
Strong NATO solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war- US-EU ties are key
Brzezinski ‘9 [ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, 2009, U.S. National Security Adviser from 1977 to 1981. His most recent book is Second Chance:
Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, September 2009 - October 2009, (Foreign Affairs, SECTION: Pg. 2 Vol. 88 No. 5,
HEADLINE: An Agenda for NATO Subtitle: Toward a Global Security Web, p. Lexis)]
ADJUSTING TO A TRANSFORMED WORLD And yet, it is fair to ask: Is
NATO living up to its extraordinary potential? NATO
today is without a doubt the most powerful military and political alliance in the world. Its 28 members come
from the globe's two most productive, technologically advanced, socially modern, economically prosperous, and politically democratic regions.
Its member states' 900 million people account for only 13 percent of the world's population but 45 percent of global GDP. NATO's potential is
not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States,
and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. NATO's
real power derives from the fact that it combines the
United States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic
weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, that combination makes NATO globally
significant . It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between
the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are
historically unprecedented risks to global security . Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a
territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial
power. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire
history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction -not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for
coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. The three great political
contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially
unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from
Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the
British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto
passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the
Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed
as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in
Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more
recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the
most acute example of
this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more
than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply
embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick
recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic
gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. And of the currently leading
global powers -- the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India -- at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their
orientation. Whether
they are "rising peacefully" (a self-confident China), truculently (an imperially
nostalgic Russia) or boastfully (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious
vulnerabilities), they all desire a change in the global pecking order. The future conduct of and
relationship among these three still relatively cautious revisionist powers will further intensify the
strategic uncertainty . Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the emerging regional rebels, with
some of them defiantly reaching for
nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international community
by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons -- and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its
unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has
proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider
consensual arrangements with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nucleararmed Pakistan , an extremist anti-Western religious movement is threatening the country's political stability.
These changes together reflect the waning of the post-World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power.
Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the currently threatening state of affairs. The
combination of Washington's arrogant unilateralism in Iraq and its demagogic Islamophobic sloganeering weakened the unity of NATO and
focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally
Only NATO can resolve global nuclear conflicts
Duffield ’94 (John Duffield, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, 1994 [Political Science
Quarterly 109:5, p. 766-7]
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring
relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external
threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the
alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating
from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the
relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's
capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions.
NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central
and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively
promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance
has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has heped stabilize Western Europe, whose states
had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of
common security policies, NATO
has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region
virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a
significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American
economic interests in Europe— as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct
foreign investment by American companies — remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the
United States could easily be
drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more
devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.11
NoKo Module
US EU relations are key to solve North Korea and Iran conflict and nuclearization
Stivachtis ’10 -- Professor of Poli Sci & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster
University
Yannis Stivachtis 10, Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster
University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European
and American Studies, 2010, pg. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlanticstudies/78.html
There is no doubt that US-European
relations are in a period of transition , and that the stresses and strains of globalization
are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War
have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international terrorism, the nuclearization of
North
Korea and especially Iran, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of Russia into a stable and
cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of China, the political and economic transformation and integration of
the Caucasian and Central Asian states, the integration and stabilization of the Balkan countries, the promotion of peace
and stability in
the Middle East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation
among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more
imperative than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new
relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but
the implications of success or failure will be global. The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it
since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945
relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite
trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and
biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense. Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common
European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been
added to the list of US-European disagreements. There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, if European leaders
conclude that Europe must become counterweight to the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for
a common ground than an elective partnership requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it
difficult even for leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations. If both sides would actively work to
heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make
the necessary political commitment. There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more
shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by
publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from reading
newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military force,
biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences over global leadership,
defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance. There are other important, shared
interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the international community is a priority both for the U.S.
and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime in Ukraine. It
is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a
united front to meet these challenges because first, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to WMD will fall into
the wrong hands; and second, the spread of conflict along those countries’ periphery could destabilize
neighboring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in the Caucasus and
Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities
such as the OSCE. This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those countries of becoming havens for international
terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically. Dealing
with Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other political issues in the
Middle East are also of a great
concern for both sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-European cooperation will be more effective in
dealing with the rising power of China through engagement but also containment. The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer
simply a question of adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe
implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue. The future course of
relations will be determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Wise policy can help forge a
new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and
opportunities of the evolving world together. But a
European concerns, may
policy that takes Europe for granted and routinely ignores or even belittles
force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits.
Unchecked North Korea nuclearization causes nuclear war and extinction
Hayes & Hamel-Green ’10 -- Victoria University AND **Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute
(Peter and Michael, “-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and
Northeast Asia”, 1/5)
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related
political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst,
there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading
to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range
missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to
the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented
proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited
nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws
attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2
(by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads
equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in
global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness
will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease
substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will
cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from
hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s
protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind
radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The
direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity,
could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear
weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or
break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security
relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or
warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear
proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community
Russia Module
Europe is questioning US commitment to the alliance- reinvigorating relations are key
to solve Russian aggression
Coffey ’14 (By Luke Coffey —Luke Coffey is Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center
for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation., March 2014,
This trip will provide an opportunity for the President to demonstrate America’s commitment to transatlantic relations. The President
needs to get the transatlantic community united over the Ukraine, committed to NATO , supporting genuine free
trade,
and focused on Afghanistan . Time to Unite over Ukraine Ever since Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, the
U.S. and its European allies have not been on the same sheet of music regarding how best to deal with Russia.
There is a big gap between U.S. and EU sanctions. The U.S. targeted people who at one time or another have been
close to Vladimir Putin. In stark contrast, the EU’s larger list of 13 Russians targeted by sanctions (plus eight
Crimeans) hits much lower-ranked figures. This demonstrates that the EU cannot move beyond a “lowest common
denominator” approach to foreign policy making. There have also been inconsistent messages coming from inside
Europe on how to deal with Russia. For example, on one hand, NATO’s Secretary General describes Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as the biggest threat to European security since the Cold War. Yet the French continue to sell
Moscow warships, and the Spanish allow the Russian navy to use their territories in North Africa. Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) In February 2013, President Obama called for a free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU during his
annual State of the Union address. With a number of foreign policy decisions by the Obama Administration leaving Europeans questioning
America’s commitment to transatlantic relations, politicians and commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have seized on this announcement
as the answer to the transatlantic relationship’s woes. Failure of the trade deal to deliver the expected political and economic results could
further damage transatlantic relations. The promotion of economic freedom is a vital part of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. A TTIP that
genuinely reduced trade barriers would contribute significantly to this aim. But even though negotiations are still at an early stage, there are
reasons to be concerned that TTIP will not promote free trade but instead will build a transatlantic managed market. This would reduce or even
eliminate U.S. gains from TTIP and would not promote economic freedom. The U.S. should continue negotiating but be cautious and assess any
agreement on its merits. Supporters of economic freedom and limited government should be prepared to support a TTIP that empowers
consumers and opens market opportunities for entrepreneurs, but they should not start cheering for TTIP before they confirm that the
agreement is not a Trojan horse for increased regulation and the importation of the EU’s managed market into the U.S. Such an agreement
would be a bad deal for everyone, especially the U.S. The Upcoming NATO Summit The NATO summit taking place in September in Wales will
be particularly important and should be high on the President’s agenda during his visit. This will be the last summit before NATO ends its
combat operations in Afghanistan and the first summit since Russia invaded Crimea. Many of the important issues that will be discussed at the
summit will require the U.S. to prepare the groundwork now. As NATO redefines its mission in a post–Afghan War world,
it
will need U.S. leadership . The alliance should make collective defense the underpinning of everything it does. In
addition, the U.S. should use the next NATO summit to advance an agenda that keeps NATO focused on the future of Afghanistan, ensures that
NATO enlargement is firmly on the agenda, and readies the alliance for the challenges of the 21st century. NATO should focus on
preventing nuclear proliferation, defending against cyber attacks, ensuring energy security, combatting terrorism,
and establishing a comprehensive missile defense system. It should also get back to training for its Article 5 mission. Remember
Afghanistan? One of the most crucial
periods of the Afghan campaign will commence in 2015, when Afghans take
the lead for their security. The President should also use his visit to drum up financial and military support for
Afghanistan after 2015. After NATO-led combat operations end this year, two important issues regarding
Afghanistan remain to be resolved: the number of troops in Afghanistan and the funding for the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF). A major part of the transition strategy in Afghanistan has been training the ANSF to a level
where it can meet Afghanistan’s internal security challenges without tens of thousands of NATO troops on the
ground. Maintaining the ANSF after 2015 will cost the international community approximately $4.1 billion per year. According to a
report by the Government Accountability Office, the international community is still short $1.8 billion for the years 2015–2017 for
ANSF funding. NATO should demonstrate that it will stay engaged in Afghanistan after 2014. Do Not Waste This Opportunity President
Obama’s visit to Europe could not come at a more important time. With Ukraine, the future of NATO,
stability in Afghanistan , and free trade high on the agenda, President Obama should use his trip as an
opportunity to show America’s commitment to transatlantic relations . The President should: Show leadership on
dealing with Russia. The President should rally America’s European allies around a common approach when dealing
with Russia. This will require American leadership. Having a divided transatlantic alliance does no good for
Europe’s security and stability . Promote transatlantic free trade. An agreement that reduces trade barriers and empowers
individuals over government bureaucrats would be beneficial. Talks that make the U.S. more like another member of the EU would not. Keep
NATO focused on territorial defense. NATO’s original mission of territorial defense has not been as important since the Cold War. In light of
Russia’s recent bellicose behavior, the U.S. should lead the alliance toward refocusing on policies that keep the North Atlantic region safe and
secure. Keep Europe focused on Afghanistan. Too much blood and treasure has been spent the past 13 years in
Afghanistan for the West to turn its back now. The U.S. needs to drum up financial support for the ANSF and seek
concrete troop pledges for the mentoring mission in Afghanistan after 2015. This is no time for NATO to turn its back on the
situation there. Strengthen the Alliance Regrettably, the Obama Administration has attached little importance to the
transatlantic alliance, and Europe has barely figured in the Administration’s foreign policy. Consequently,
Europeans are left questioning America’s commitment to transatlantic relations. A strong transatlantic
alliance should be at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. The President should reinvigorate partnerships with
America’s key friends and allies in Europe.
US EU cooperation on Russia is key to avoid miscalculation and full-scale war
Stacey ‘14 – Jeffrey Stacey, Dr. Jeffrey Stacey is currently Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center for
Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University. He joined CTR after serving in the Obama Administration as a State Department official
specializing in NATO and EU relations at the Bureau for Conflict Stabilization Operations. At State he
founded and managed the International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI), which has over
20 government and international organization partners. Dr. Stacey has just joined forces to blog at the
Duck of Minerva foreign policy blog. He is the author of "Integrating Europe" by Oxford University Press
and is currently working on a follow-up book about how the West should deal with the rise of China. He
has been a guest blogger at The Washington Note and Democracy Arsenal, a professor of U.S. foreign
policy at Tulane University and Fordham University, a consultant at the Open Society Institute and the
U.S. Institute of Peace, and a visiting scholar at George Washington, Georgetown, and the University of
California. He received his PhD from Columbia University. , 3-23-14)
The U.S. and Russia are not engaged in a new Cold War, but Russia is clearly playing the geopolitical menace du jour. The U.S. and Europe
are going to need to up their game to keep Vladimir Putin’s hands off the rest of Ukraine. Beyond this crisis the West
needs a new defense posture, as the world just entered a new era of international relations. Just weeks ago numerous observers dubbed the
opening of the Winter Olympics in Sochi “Putin’s Triumph,” when it was anything but that. Russia may have barely edged the U.S. in total
medals, but the price for Putin’s orderly Olympics was serious repression, severe environmental damage, and seismic corruption. Then came
Ukraine. His reputation already tarnished, Putin seemingly wasted little time in setting off the biggest East-West crisis in decades. But
contrary to conventional wisdom, his abject territorial grab of Crimea has less to do with any grand plan on his
part—and more to do with western miscalculation and the momentum of reactive decision-making by a
country led by officials with a stark inferiority complex. The catalyst for the current crisis came in two parts. First, Europe badly
miscalculated by offering Ukraine membership in the European Union (EU) and making ensuing moves that forced Putin’s hand by making him
choose to keep Ukraine in Russia’s sphere of influence or not. Second, Putin did not decide to embark on his current course until the day after
former President Yanukovich fled, specifically when the Ukrainian Parliament stripped him of his powers and scheduled new president
elections. But the seeds of this crisis were sewn long before. Putin and his coterie have long been adding up sleights from the West: NATO
expansion to Russia’s border, in particular the Kosovo War and the bombing of Serbia without UN Security Council approval, the same for the
Iraq War, U.S. involvement in the Ukraine and Georgia revolutions, an intention to install radar stations in Poland and the Czech Republic, and
NATO’s coming close to offering both Georgia and Ukraine membership. Russia is not “back” so much as acting out again in its own region of
the world. Its 2008 invasion of Georgia, notably, came after the end of the Kosovo War when NATO and Russian troops raced to be the first to
occupy a former Yugoslav Army base on the outskirts of Pristina. Russian Foreign Secretary Lavrov at the time flatly stated that the West was
forcing Russian to go to war somewhere. After making good on that threat in Georgia, Russia kept troops in two breakaway regions of the
country that are now considered in international limbo. So after a period of virtual strategic irrelevance, Russia has achieved a Pyrrhic victory.
Putin has gained Crimea, but he has cost Russia a great deal in both economic and reputational terms, made a
mockery of future claims of any imperative for the West to gain approval of the UN Security Council for crisis
interventions, and above all lost the rest of Ukraine. Or not? Will Putin seek further Ukrainian territory in the
Russian-speaking east? Already Russian troops have seized a petroleum plant across the border in Ukraine proper
and Russia placed thousands of troops just over Ukraine’s eastern border for the purposes of “exercises .”
Moreover, Putin is displaying enormously risky behavior, for direct altercations could easily spiral into a
prolonged battle that with reinforcements could rapidly lead to full-scale war . It is better to deter him from
even trying . To do this the U.S. and Europe need to do more than place a small number of jet fighters in Eastern Europe and kick Russia
out of the G8. Putin views the West as feckless and is likely emboldened by the lack of a robust Western response thus far. Much more costly
economic sanctions are necessary, plus stepped up aerial patrols, forward placement of additional ground capabilities, and staging a NATO
ground exercise in Poland, in order to establish credible conventional deterrence. Now that there are indications that part of Moldova–on the
other side of Ukraine–may also be in Russia’s sights, this has become an urgent task. At present, in conventional deterrence terms,
the U.S. and Europe are not credible in the eyes of Putin . The fact that he views the West as feckless and unlikely to intervene
indicates that deterrence is low. Western inaction in this case is more likely to lead to a massive Russian action, thus moderate action intended
to augment deterrence is necessary to prevent this. The Western preference is to keep the rest of Ukraine intact but not to go to war to ensure
this, thus it needs to focus on reestablishing deterrence but it has little time in which to do so. Directly arming Ukraine would likely backfire, but
ground movements in exercise form in either Poland or Romania would constitute an appropriately measured but more forceful response. The
Bush Administration’s error in not sanctioning Russia’s Georgia invasion is even more glaring in retrospect. Now by openly accusing President
Obama of appeasement, the American political right has only reinforced Putin’s perception. Yet in the process it made an unintentional but
crucial strategic point: other countries also need to be deterred from territorial takeovers, especially China. The aborted Syrian intervention
already harmed Western deterrence, and a meager response to the annexation of Crimea could easily lead to a Chinese occupation of the
islands it claims from Japan. The Russia-Ukraine case may not be identical to the China-Japan case, but wouldbe border changers are buoyed by
Putin’s getting away with Crimea fairly cost free. Japan is more powerful than Ukraine, but until very recently has been averse to using force
and has little experience doing so. Thus, if China does not view the U.S. as credible in conventional deterrence terms, it may be emboldened to
occupy the disputed islands despite the US-Japan defense treaty. The lack of action in the Syria and Ukraine cases has degraded this deterrence;
it now needs to be reestablished. The fallacy of those advocating a buildup in Asia and drawdown in Europe is now clear. The U.S.
commitment to its alliances in both the Asian and European spheres must be sufficient to achieve its simultaneous security
interests. But with economic austerity and a decreased defense budget, the U.S. cannot build back up in Europe AND
pivot fully to Asia. As a consequence the U.S. needs to rely on partners to a greater extent than in the past. In
addition to NATO, the most capable and like-minded bilateral partners are France, the UK, and Germany. Despite reduced defense budgets,
they have made their military forces more capable and shown an increased willingness to act even when the U.S. is reluctant to lead. This new
“lead nation” model calls for rotating which country spearheads a particular crisis intervention, with the others playing support roles by
providing smaller scale but vital assistance. On-the-fly uses of this yet to be fully developed model were on display in the interventions in Libya
and Mali, as well as the near intervention in Syria. It is time to put this model fully in place, including in the Pacific theater by partnering with
Australia and an increasingly activist Japan under Prime Minister Abe. Meanwhile, this crisis is NATO’s to handle. If the Post-war era after World
War II gave way to the Post-Cold War era, that in turn gave way to the Post 9-11 era which has been with us for just over a decade. The new
era–call it for now the Era of Incessant Conflict–may not be welcome, but with the Middle East in pieces and the forceful posturing of Russia
and China we are going to have to get used to it and make the necessary adjustments. It no doubt is too early to deem this a completely new
era of world politics, but there nonetheless is something distinctive about this emerging period of international lawlessness. In the past several
years, since the advent of the Arab Awakening or perhaps back to the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, there has been a clear shift–not a sizable power
shift, but certainly a notable shift in the ability of the West to influence the behavior of states who are not like-minded. This rise of regional
powers, an increased penchant for meddling across borders, and large-scale instability in the Mideast and elsewhere together herald a new
period in which western powers rapidly need to recalibrate their capabilities and how they will wield the less effective tools of foreign policy in
their hands. Wielding them in concert will increase their utility and effectiveness. But western leaders cannot afford to be led by their
increasingly isolationist publics; it is time for them to educate their people about this emerging era, and get on with leading.
Russia nuclear war causes extinction
Bostrom ‘2 (Nick Bostrom 2, PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, www.nickbostrom.com)
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An
all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that
might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best
acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate
our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear
arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk
that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between
India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart
humankind’s potential permanently.
Russia + Terror Module
US-EU relations solve russian expansionism and terrorism
Saryusz-Wolski 6/4
(Jacek, Polish Diplomat and Politician, The new transatlantic alliance for the 21st century, June 4th,
2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/243802-the-new-transatlantic-alliance-forthe-21st-century)
It is a direct response to the challenges we face today. The US is our key strategic partner with whom we share our values. We share a vision of
a world where democracy, freedom of expression and rule of law flourish, for the benefit of all. We might sometimes differ on specific policy
issues – but our common cultural heritage and commitment to universal values is unquestionable. The
EU and the US share more than
values. We have a common interest in guaranteeing the stability of Eastern Europe, where we must counter
the imperialist policy and the 'might is right' attitude of Russia. We have a common interest in
countering extremism and terrorism in the Middle East. We also have a common interest in preventing
humanitarian atrocities from happening anywhere in the world, because we all face their consequences. Our shared
goals, burden and efforts in our neighbourhood require a transatlantic unity.
Terror + Prolif Module
Cooperation with Europe solves nuclear terror and prolif
Stivachtis 10 – Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University [Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations
from Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research
Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, pg. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/globalissues/transatlantic-studies/78.html]
There is no doubt that US-European
relations are in a period of transition, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are
increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly
to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international terrorism, the nuclearization
of North Korea and especially Iran, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member of the
international community, the growing power of China, the political and economic transformation and integration of the Caucasian and
Central Asian states, the integration and stabilization of the Balkan countries, the promotion of peace and stability in the Middle
East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation among
countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more imperative
than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship
between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications
of success or failure will be global. The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say
that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with
disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S.
and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense. Questions such as, the future role of NATO
and its relationship to the common European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists
are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements. There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, if European leaders
conclude that Europe must become counterweight to the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground
than an elective partnership requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for leaders who want to forge
a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A
vibrant
transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary political
commitment. There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most
dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North
Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues
than one would expect from reading newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military
force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences over global leadership, defense spending,
and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance. There
are other important, shared interests as well.
The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the international community is a priority both for the
U.S. and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime in Ukraine. It is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form
a united front to meet these challenges because first, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to WMD will fall
into the wrong hands; and second, the spread of conflict along those countries’ periphery could destabilize
neighboring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in the
Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation
and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE. This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those
countries of becoming havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically.
Dealing with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other political issues in the Middle East are also of a great concern for both sides
although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-European cooperation will be more effective in dealing with the rising power of China through
engagement but also containment. The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question of adapting transatlantic institutions to new
realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation
and partnership is to continue. The future course of relations will be determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Wise policy can
help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and
opportunities of the evolving world together. But a
policy that takes Europe for granted and routinely ignores or even
belittles European concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance
outweigh its benefits.
Nuclear terrorism is highly likely
Plame ’14 (Nuclear terrorism: Most immediate and extreme threat to global security 143686 2 By
Valerie Plame - 09/26/14 07:00 AM EDT A former career covert CIA operations officer, Plame worked to
protect U.S. national security and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. She is now
a New York Times best-selling author and a leader of the international Global Zero movement for the
elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Yet this mounting violence and instability pales in comparison to what could be wrought by nucleararmed terrorists. We know that the Islamic State group has the means and motive to attain weapons
of mass destruction. They have an appetite for shocking demonstrations and indiscriminate killing,
and have already seized low-grade nuclear material from a facility in Mosul. They are acquiring the ability to
build radioactive dirty bombs that could cause major health and economic damage. With reports of
escalating funding and recruitment of citizens from every continent, and ties to radicals in nuclear
weapons-states such as Pakistan, it is increasingly conceivable that weapons-grade materials – or
even a ready-made nuclear device – could fall into their hands. If that happens, they would not hesitate
to use them – possibly at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. There are more than 16,000 nuclear weapons in the
world and enough highly-enriched uranium and plutonium to make hundreds of thousands more. We can do our best to prevent isolated
incidents in which terrorists buy, build or steal them – but those efforts are stop-gap at best, and we won’t know if we missed something until
it’s too late.
Nuclear terrorism is all but inevitable unless we work quickly and urgently to secure all
nuclear materials and eradicate all nuclear weapons. To eliminate the risk we have to drain the swamp.
Terrorism causes full scale nuclear wars
Hellman ‘8 (Martin E. Hellman* * Martin E. Hellman is a member of the National Academy of
Engineering and Professor Emeritus at Stanford University. His current project applies risk analysis to
nuclear deterrence
Nuclear proliferation and the specter of nuclear terrorism are creating additional possibilities for
triggering a nuclear war. If an American (or Russian) city were devastated by an act of nuclear terrorism, the
public outcry for immediate, decisive action would be even stronger than Kennedy had to deal with
when the Cuban missiles first became known to the American public. While the action would likely not
be directed against Russia, it might be threatening to Russia (e.g., on its borders) or one of its allies and
precipitate a crisis that resulted in a full-scale nuclear war. Terrorists with an apocalyptic mindset might
even attempt to catalyze a full-scale nuclear war by disguising their act to look like an attack by the U.S. or
Russia.
Prolif causes extinction- it will be fast and dangerous
Kroenig ’12 (Matthew Kroenig: The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future? NPEC
asked Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant
professor of government Matthew Kroenig to review the bidding. His take and bottom line is that such
nuclear optimism always was strained, that it remains far less popular out of academe than in and with
cause. May 26, 2012 AUTHOR: Matthew Kroenig: Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown
University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations The History of Proliferation
Optimism (PDF) 173.80 KB The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future? Prepared for
the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center)
The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in
possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a
catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in human
extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties,
billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare
once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many
analysts point to
sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it
would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again. After all, analysts in the 1990s
argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to
be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late
Naughts.[53] This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new
nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this
context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if
Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large
arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating
counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but ,
when it first crosses the nuclear
threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are
at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might
believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a
preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive
might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action.
Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or loose
‘em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire
nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise
attack.[54] If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first
than to go second. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a
devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational
deterrence theory assumes
nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a suicidal
nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the
future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains
leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We
cannot
rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, one leader will choose to launch
a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality,
however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of
international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This
leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have
devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.[55] This strategy might be especially
attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States
was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. As Russia’s
conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed,
Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to deescalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals
openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above leaders can make
a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[56] They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk
of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.[57] When we think about
future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that existed during the Cold War, meaning that
there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.
Nuclear terrorism. The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.[58] It used to be said that “terrorists want a lot of people watching,
not a lot of people dead,” but the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed expert perceptions of the terrorist threat.[59] September 11th demonstrated
that Al Qaeda and other modern terrorist groups are interested in imposing massive casualties and there are few better ways of killing large numbers of civilians
than detonating a nuclear weapon in a major metropolitan area. And, while September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have
been much worse had Osama Bin Laden been able to acquire nuclear weapons. Osama Bin Laden declared it a “religious duty” for Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear
weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.[60] Unlike states, which can be deterred,
there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them. Indeed, in recent years, many U.S. politicians and security analysts have
agreed that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security.[61] Wanting nuclear weapons and actually possessing them, however, are two
different things and many analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.[62]
Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear
weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to
terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group with nuclear weapons increases. Some fear,
for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hezbollah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no
state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft,
allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that
representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al Qaeda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.[63] Finally, a nuclear-armed state
could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nuclear weapons problem. U.S. officials are currently very concerned about what would
happen with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a
history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washing has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a
nightmare if Iran had nuclear weapons and a break down in authority forced us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional instability: The spread of
nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other
states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the
conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed,
international relations theories about the “stability-instability paradox” maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.[64]
Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses
have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and
that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.[65] Similarly, research on internal decisionmaking in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to
initiate militarized disputes against India.[66] Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears a major military retaliation from the United States or Israel,
but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more
aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle
East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in
a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Nuclear
proliferation can also lead to regional instability due to preventive strikes
against nuclear programs. States often conduct preventive military strikes to prevent adversaries from
acquiring nuclear weapons . Historically, the United States attacked German nuclear facilities during World War II, Israel bombed a nuclear reactor
in Iraq in 1981, Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr reactors in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and Iran returned the favor against an Iraqi nuclear plant, a U.S.-led
international coalition destroyed Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure in the first Gulf War in 1991, and Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007. These strikes have
not led to extensive conflagrations in the past, but we might not be so lucky in the future. At the time of writing in 2012, the United States and Israel were polishing
military plans to attack Iran’s nuclear program and some experts maintain that such a strike could very well lead to a wider war in the Middle East. Constrained
freedom of action. The spread of nuclear weapons also disadvantages American’s national security by constraining U.S. freedom of action. As the most powerful
country on the planet, with the ability to project power to every corner of the globe, the United States has the ability to threaten or protect every other state in the
international system. This is a significant source of strategic leverage and maintaining freedom of action is an important objective of U.S. national security
policy.[67] As nuclear weapons spread, however, America’s military freedom of action is constrained. The United States can use or credibly threaten to use force
against nonnuclear states. The threat of military action against nuclear-armed states is much less credible, however, because nuclear-armed states can deter U.S.
military action with the threat of nuclear retaliation. In January of 2012, for example, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow Persian Gulf waterway
through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil flows, and the United States issued a counter-threat, declaring that Washington would use force to reopen the Strait. If
Iran had had nuclear weapons, however, Washington’s threats would have been much less credible. Would a U.S. President really be willing to risk nuclear war with
Iran in order to reopen the Strait? Maybe. But, maybe not. While the United States might not be deterred in every contingency against a nuclear-armed state, it is
clear that, at a minimum, the spread of nuclear weapons greatly complicates U.S. decisions to use force. Undermines alliances: The spread of nuclear weapons also
complicates U.S. alliance relationships. Washington uses the promise of military protection as a way to cement its alliance structures. U.S. allies depend on
America’s protection, giving Washington influence over allied states’ foreign policies. Historically, the United States has offered, and threatened to retract, the
security guarantee carrot to prevent allied states from acting contrary to its interests. As nuclear weapons spread, however, alliances held together by promises of
military protection are undermined in two ways. First, U.S. allies may doubt the credibility of Washington’s commitments to provide a military defense against
nuclear-armed states, leading them to weaken ties with their patron. As Charles de Gaulle famously asked about the U.S. commitment to defend France from the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, would Washington be willing to trade New York for Paris? Similarly, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, U.S. partners in the Middle
East, such as Israel and Gulf States, will question Washington’s resolve to defend them from Iran. After all, if the United States proves unwilling to use force to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, would it really be willing to fight a war against a nuclear-armed Iran? Qatar, for example, already appears to be
hedging its bets, loosening ties to Washington and warming to Tehran. Second, nuclear proliferation could encourage client states to acquire nuclear weapons
themselves, giving them greater security independence and making them less dependable allies. According to many scholars, the acquisition of the force de frappe
was instrumental in permitting the French Fifth Republic under President Charles de Gualle to pursue a foreign policy path independent from Washington at
NATO.[68] Similarly, it is possible that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states will acquire independent nuclear capabilities to counter Iran’s nuclear arsenal,
greatly destabilizing an already unstable region and threatening Washington’s ability to influence regional dynamics. Further proliferation. Nuclear
proliferation poses an additional threat to international peace and security because it causes further
proliferation. As former Secretary of State George Schultz once said, “ proliferation begets proliferation .”[69] When one
country acquires nuclear weapons, its regional adversaries, feeling threatened by its neighbor’s new
nuclear capabilities, are more likely to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response. Indeed, the history of
nuclear proliferation can be read as a chain reaction of proliferation. The United States acquired nuclear weapons in response to Nazi Germany’s crash nuclear
program. The Soviet Union and China acquired nuclear weapons to counter the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The United Kingdom and France went nuclear to protect
themselves from the Soviet Union. India’s bomb was meant to counter China and it, in turn, spurred Pakistan to join the nuclear club. Today, we worry that, if Iran
acquires nuclear weapons, other Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, might desire nuclear capabilities, triggering an arms race in
a strategically important and volatile region.
Trade Module
US-EU relations are key to trade
Mix, 12 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, February 28, 2012, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues”, Congressional
Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf)
Economic Relations 7 The
United States and the European Union have the largest trade and investment relationship
in the world. In 2010, the value of the two-way transatlantic flow of goods, services, and income receipts
from investment totaled more than $1.5 trillion. U.S. and European companies are also the biggest investors in each other’s
markets—total stock of two-way direct investment came to about $3.4 trillion at the end of 2010. Transatlantic economic activity
provides an estimated 15 million jobs in the United States and Europe. 8 With the United States and the EU together
comprising approximately 40% of global gross domestic product (GDP), the transatlantic economic relationship is also
the world’s most influential in terms of shaping standards and regulations. U.S.-EU cooperation has
been the key force driving efforts to liberalize world trade.
Global trade deescalates every conflict
Sapiro ‘14 (Miriam, Visiting Fellow in the Global Economy and Development program, former Deputy
US Trade Representative, Why Trade Matters, September 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/why%20trade%20matters/trade%2
0global%20views_final.pdf)
This policy brief explores the economic rationale and strategic imperative of an ambitious domestic and
global trade agenda from the perspective of the United States. International trade is often viewed through the relatively narrow prism of trade-offs that might be made among
domestic sectors or between trading partners, but it is im- portant to consider also the impact that increased trade has on
global growth, development and security. With that context in mind, this paper assesses the implications of the Asia-Pacific and
European trade negotiations underway, including for countries that are not participating but aspire to
join. It outlines some of the challenges that stand in the way of completion and ways in which they can be addressed. It examines whether the focus on "mega-regional" trade agreements
comes at the expense of broader liberalization or acts as a catalyst to develop higher standards than might otherwise be possible. It concludes with policy recommendations for action by
governments, legislators and stakeholders to address concerns that have been raised and create greater domestic support. It is fair to ask whether we should be concerned about the future of
In the
Middle East, significant areas of Iraq have been overrun by a toxic offshoot of Al-Qaeda, civil war in Syria
rages with no end in sight, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in tatters. Nuclear negotiations with Iran
have run into trouble, while Libya and Egypt face continuing instability and domestic challenges. In Asia, historic rivalries and disputes over
territory have heightened tensions across the region, most acutely by China's aggressive moves in the
South China Sea towards Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. Nuclear-armed North Korea remains isolated, reckless and
unpredictable. In Africa, countries are struggling with rising terrorism, violence and corruption. In Europe, Russia continues to foment instability
and destruction in eastern Ukraine. And within the European Union, lagging economic recovery and the surge in support for extremist parties have left people
international trade policy when dire develop- ments are threatening the security interests of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe.
fearful of increasing violence against immigrants and minority groups and skeptical of further integration. It is tempting to focus solely on these pressing problems and defer less urgent
A key
motivation in building greater domestic and international consensus for advanc- ing trade liberalization
now is precisely the role that greater economic integration can play in opening up new avenues of
opportunity for promoting development and increasing economic prosperity. Such initiatives can help stabilize key
issues—such as forging new dis- ciplines for international trade to another day, especially when such issues pose challenges of their own. But that would be a mistake.
regions and strengthen the security of the United States and its partners. The last century provides a
powerful example of how expanding trade relations can help reduce global tensions and raise living standards.
Following World War II, building stronger economic cooperation was a centerpiece of allied efforts to
erase battle scars and embrace former enemies. In defeat, the economies of Germany, Italy and Japan faced ruin and people were on the verge of
starvation. The United States led efforts to rebuild Europe and to repair Japan's economy. A key element of the Marshall Plan, which established the foundation for unprecedented growth and
the level of European integration that exists today, was to revive trade by reducing tariffs.1 Russia, and the eastern part of Europe that it controlled, refused to participate or receive such
assistance. De- cades later, as the Cold War ended, the United States and Western Europe sought to make up for lost time by providing significant technical and financial assistance to help
integrate central and eastern European countries with the rest of Europe and the global economy. "There have been subsequent calls for a "Marshall Plan" for other parts of the world,'
impor- tant lessons have been
learned about the valuable role economic development can play in defusing tensions, and how opening markets can
hasten growth. There is again a growing recognition that economic security and national security are two sides of the same coin.
although the confluence of dedicated resources, coordinated support and existing capacity has been difficult to replicate. Nonetheless,
General Carter Ham, who stepped down is head of U.S. Africa Command last year, observed the close connection between increasing prosperity and bolstering stability. During his time in
security and stability in many ways depends a lot more on economic growth and opportunity than it does on military strength."1 Where people have opportunities for themselves and their children, he found, the result was better governance,
Africa he had seen that "
increased respect for human rights and lower levels of conflict. During his confirmation hearing last year, Secretary John Kerry stressed the link between economic and national security in the
context of the competitiveness of the United States but the point also has broader application. Our nation cannot be strong abroad, he argued, if it is not strong at home, including by putting
more than ever foreign policy is economic policy," particularly in light
of increasing competition for global resources and markets. Every day, he said, "that goes by where America
is uncertain about engaging in that arena, or unwilling to put our best foot forward and win, unwilling to dem- onstrate our resolve to lead, is a day in
which we weaken our nation itself."4 Strengthening America's economic security by cementing its economic
alliances is not simply an option, but an imperative. A strong nation needs a strong economy that can generate growth, spur innovation and create jobs. This is
true, of course, not only for the United States but also for its key partners and the rest of the global
trading system. Much as the United States led the way in forging strong military alliances after World
War II to discourage a resurgence of militant nationalism in Europe or Asia, now is the time to place equal
emphasis on shoring up our collective economic security. A failure to act now could undermine
international security and place stability in key regions in further jeopardy .
its own fiscal house in order. He asserted—rightly so—that "
Warming Module
US-EU relations key to solve warming
Larivé 12 (Maxime Henri André Larivé, Ph.D., is a Research Associate at the EU Center of Excellence at
the University of Miami, “Obama 2: Future Implications for EU,” Miami - Florida European Union Center
of Excellence - US Relations, November, Vol. 12, No. 8, http://aei.pitt.edu/43440/1/Larive_EUUSunderObama.pdf, CMR)
As demonstrated during the 15 th session of the Confer ence of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in 2009, or COP15, followed by the COP16 in 2010, and COP17 in 2011, the EU and US were not in sync. The lack
of unity has had a considerable role on the failure of all three UN meetings on Climate Change. The most
obvious was the COP15 taking place in Copenhagen, where for the first time the ‘Rest’ – BRICS countries led by China – did balance the
influence and power of a divided West, which affected the outcomes of the convent ion. Since
then, the Europeans have been
increasing their diplomatic reach in order to develop strategic partnerships and push for a global set of
rules on carbon emissions. 40 Quite interestingly, in the mind of Americans, climate change is still closely li nked to energy
independence. The latest energy revolution taking place in the US, shale gas, has completely changed the dynamics. The US is on its way to
become the largest producer of gas by 2020 well beyond Russia. 41 The narrative in the US has been that shale gas not only will permit to lower
carbon emissions, but is also environmental friendly. Such assumption has been a strong point of debate within the specialized literature. 42
For instance, Europeans, at the exception of Poland, have stopped the produc tion of shale gas due to the environmental risks associated with
the extraction process, so - called fracking, which is a mix of sand, water and undisclosed chemicals underground in order to release the
unconventional gas stacked in the rocks. In order to ad dress the problem of gas emissions, which have been identified as the major cause of
global warming, two solutions are currently on the table: carbon tax or Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). 43 The carbon tax has been advanced as
the best option to regulate gas emissions. Even Shell’s chief executive, Peter Voser, was calling governments to introduce a carbon tax, or a
minimum price for CO2, because “the ETS was failing to deliver sufficient incentives to kickstart expensive technologies such as carbon capture
a nd storage.” 44 Furthermore, the current financial crisis has hurt the credibility of a solid and reliable trading system considering the flaws of
market - based mechanisms. Thus, a tax on carbon would be a more accurate way to calculate the actual emissions. In the case of the EU, it has
been argued that a carbon tax would have the greatest impact on the “green growth” of the EU, rather than the ETS, which has been the
flagship of the EU climate policy instrument. 45 Despite a lack of unity in the US, the politi cs tend to favor a trading scheme rather than a tax.
Even though both actors may disagree on the future of shale gas and on the creation of carbon tax, it
is undeniable that under the
second mandate of President Obama, the
EU and the US must work closely together in order to push for new sets
of global regulations in order to address climate change. The discussion over carbon tax or ETS will be
crucial in the coming four years. Europeans are keen on pushing new norms, but only with the support of
the US can they be transferred and adopted by other countries and global institutions.
Warming is the largest risk of extinction
Deibel 07 – professor of IR at National War College (Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy, “Conclusion: American Foreign
Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2”)
there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent
action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life
depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere
possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on
climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic
warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find
evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates
Finally,
almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents,
wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier
than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the
hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “
Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths
and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea
temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating ,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking
up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present
Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a
century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for
significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories
quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs
of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the
Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea
level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another
catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter
weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States
alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway
they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels.
greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere
that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global
temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s
continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the
earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to
burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous
when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a
theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is
the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the
long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United
States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.
Extra
Iran
US-EU relations key to diplomatic paths that check Iranian nuclear aggression
Larivé 12 (Maxime Henri André Larivé, Ph.D., is a Research Associate at the EU Center of Excellence at
the University of Miami, “Obama 2: Future Implications for EU,” Miami - Florida European Union Center
of Excellence - US Relations, November, Vol. 12, No. 8, http://aei.pitt.edu/43440/1/Larive_EUUSunderObama.pdf, CMR)
Dealing with a Nuclear Iran Iran may be one of the few issues where the EU can take the lead and play an
active role along the sides of the US. The EU could play a central role in the coming year of 2013. 2013 has been identified as the
year of diplomacy in order to find a solution with Iran. The threat of war has been looming between the US and
Iran since the first decade of the 21 st century. The Iraq invasion of 2003 was certainly a strategic mistake by the Bush administration as Iraq,
the onl y balancer of Iran in the region, has been removed and wiped out. However, a part of the solution consists in identifying what kind of
nuclear power can Iran become. There
is little doubt – unless a war is launched against Tehran in 2013 – that Iran will become a
nuclear power. The question for the members of the Euro - Atlantic community is what kind of nuclear Iran can they
live with? Changing the perceptions and visions will be an important starting point in establishing the bases for the new rounds of neg
otiation with Tehran. The EU had been involved under the High Representative (HR) Javier Solana in the negotiation with Iran in 2003, under
what was known the EU3+1 – France, Germany, United Kingdom + HR – . Despite months of negotiations, diplomacy failed and led to a rising
degree of frustration in the US. 36 For instance, Mr. Obama, at the time candidate for the Presidency, voiced some frustrations when declaring
“We cannot unconditionally rule out an approach that could prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclea r weapon. We have tried limited, piecemeal
talks while we
outsource the sustained work to our European allies. It is time for the United States to lead.” 37 Since the
failure of the diplomatic attempt of EU3+1, the EU and the US have implemented some of the hardest sanctions on Iran. 38 It appears with little
doubt that Iran will become a nuclear state in the next years. This will neither be a failure of the Obama administration nor of the EU. As per the
father of the theory of balance of power, Kenneth Waltz a rgued in Foreign Affairs that a nuclear Iran “would probably be the best possible
result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.” 39 Such statement is in fact embedded in the assumption that a nuclear Iran
would deter Israel. It is a ty pical case of deterrence based on the examples of the US - Soviet Union and India - Pakistan. President Obama
could certainly launched a new round of diplomatic negotiations between the EU, US and Iran. Reaching out to
Russia and China would certainly be an i mportant stepping - stone for the credibility of the 2013 diplomatic negotiations.
Laundry List
Effective relations solve a host global problems – terrorism, prolif, instability
Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb
3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)
Common values, overlapping interests, and shared goals are the foundation of what is often described as the
transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe. Many observers stress that in terms of security and
prosperity the United States and Europe have grown increasingly interdependent. Both sides of the Atlantic face
a common set of challenges, including a broad range of economic concerns as well as terrorism , nuclear prolif eration,
and armed conflict or other forms of instability in many parts of the world . Both sides are proponents
of democracy, open societies, human rights, and free markets. Supporters of close U.S.-European cooperation argue that
neither the United States nor Europe can adequately address the wide array of global concerns alone, and
that the track record shows the two sides can accomplish much more when they work together. The United
States and Europe also share a huge and mutually beneficial trade and investment relationship. This report summarizes key areas of shared
interest and cooperation and highlights some of the main challenges in the transatlantic relationship.
Climate, terrorism, economy, heg
Larivé 12 (Maxime Henri André Larivé, Ph.D., is a Research Associate at the EU Center of Excellence at
the University of Miami, “Obama 2: Future Implications for EU,” Miami - Florida European Union Center
of Excellence - US Relations, November, Vol. 12, No. 8, http://aei.pitt.edu/43440/1/Larive_EUUSunderObama.pdf, CMR)
Several issues are clearly threatening the two sides of the Atlantic: climate change; the future of the Arab world;
international terrorism; and Asia. 53 If there is one major threat to the influence and power of the West – US and EU – it ought to be the
economy. As underlined in his influential book in 1987, Paul Kennedy 54 demonstrated that weak economic foundation is one
of the main variables leading to the decline of a great power . 55 The foreign policies of the US and EU will have to take
into considerations domestic politics. The excellent ECFR report asked the following question: “How should Europe respond to Obama’s
reelection?” 56 The answer is that Obama’s pragmatic and universalistic approach to foreign policy is unlikely to change. The ‘pivot’ to Asia is
real, and the Obama doctrine is at the heart of the US strategy in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 57 Central Asia, and Africa. The
retrenchment implemented by the US combine d with the unstable and uncertain transitions of Europe’s neighbors – Russia, Middle East and
Africa – call for a higher degree of integration of the CSDP. 58 European leaders need to understand that saving the EU from its visceral crises –
Eurocrisis and nationalism – is only a starting point, and that the EU ought to play an increasing role in stabilizing its wider neighborhood. The
transatlantic community is more important than ever in order to maintain the status of both the US
and the EU in this shifting world order.
Terrorism, prolif, cyber-security, climate change
Rasmussen 14 (NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the conference ''Strengthening
the Transatlantic Bond’’, June 10, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_110916.htm, CMR)
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine demonstrates that freedom is not a given. Russia has ripped up the rule book.
And in doing so, it has undermined the international order that has been the foundation of our peace and
prosperity. By standing together , North America and Europe have been the inspiration and the driving force of
that order. To uphold it now, we must continue to stand together. This means we must reinforce our economic ties. And
here the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is key. We must make energy diversification a strategic transatlantic priority and
reduce Europe’s dependency on Russian oil and gas. We must increase defence investment in Europe. And we must strengthen our security
cooperation in NATO. But the challenge now posed by Russia is not the only challenge we face. There
are a wide range of other,
global security risks and threats. Like terrorism and extremism. Prolif eration and piracy. Cyber and energy security .
And the security implications of
climate change . Transatlantic resolve and unity will be critical in meeting all these
complex challenges. And NATO is the unique political and military instrument that allows us to muster that transatlantic resolve, and
translate it into unified action.
NoKo
North Korea breaks international agreements, nonproliferation efforts are not
working and their nuclear weapons program continues to expand
Byrne 15
Brendan Byrne primarily lectures in descriptive and comparative statistics and simultaneously earned an Msc in Banking and
International Finance from the University of Wales-Bangor, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Set Dangerous Precedent For
Iran”, ValueWalk, July 8, 2015
North
Korea has been able to successfully develop and test nuclear weapons despite an
agreement with the United States , and some commentators think that there is little reason to believe that Iran will not be able to achieve the same feat.
As James S. Robbins writes for US News, any potential deal with Iran looks set to be far less robust than the one which ultimately failed to
prevent North Korea getting its hands on nuclear weapons . Failure of Agreed Framework should act as a warning At
As negotiations continue with Iran related to its nuclear weapons program, a look back into recent history provides a worrying example of the failure of nonproliferation.
the beginning of the 1990s, North Korea's development of nuclear weapons became an increasing important issue. In 1994 an agreement was reached between Washington and Pyongyang which
would supposedly see North Korea freeze and dismantle its nuclear program, submit its spent uranium fuel to international observers and grant access to the International Atomic Energy Agency
so that it could verify compliance through a series of "special inspections." In return for compliance, North Korea would be given two light water reactors, which could not be used for military
purposes, a supply of fuel oil and the possibility of normalized relations. Under the terms of the "Agreed Framework," the IAEA was present at the Yongbyon nuclear site to ensure compliance.
North Korea breaks
international agreements As it turned out, Pyongyang had implemented a secret centrifuge
program where it may have been producing weapons-grade plutonium. At the same
time, it continued work on a ballistic missile program despite the fact that ongoing
work was having a negative effect on diplomatic relations. It took until 2002 for the
truth to emerge. North Korea admitted that it had been working on a uranium
enrichment program in order to make nuclear weapons, violating the Agreed
Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other accords. The IAEA then called in the U.N. Security Council,
and the Six Party talks followed. Despite apparent early success in dissuading North Korea from
following the path to nuclear weapons, Pyongyang announced a successful nuclear
test in 2006. Failures in North Korea set a dangerous precedent for a potential deal with Iran. The Agreed Framework was certainly stronger on paper than the P5+1 agreement
However wrangling over technical terms made it difficult for the agency to know if North Korea's program had actually been frozen.
which is currently being proposed with Iran. Proposed deal with Iran set to be less stringent Under the Agreed Framework, verification was stringent, the existing nuclear stockpile would have
been removed, and the program would have been halted completely. By contrast, the P5+1 negotiations have not taken into account similar objectives. As a result, any final deal looks set to be
weaker than
the Agreed Framework which ultimately failed in North Korea . Worryingly, Iran also has a
stronger economy and better infrastructure than North Korea has ever had. According to reports, talks are ongoing over a $50 billion no-strings-attached signing bonus, which Tehran will be free
to spend on whatever it likes. Iran not only has its own technical experts, but can also draw on the knowledge which North Korea has gained from its own research. A recent investigation by the
Iranian opposition confirmed long-held suspicions that the two countries have been collaborating on nuclear and weapons programs for years. Neither have economic sanctions prevented Iran
from amassing wealth. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif used an interview with Charlie Rose to reveal that despite sanctions, Iran possesses sufficient nuclear material to build 8
nuclear weapons. Iran may possess nuclear weapons despite possible deal The P5+1 talks with Iran are proposing a similar deal as the Agreed Framework with North Korea. Pyongyang has none
of the capabilities, economic or scientific, that Tehran currently possesses, and their deal was stricter in its rules on the existing nuclear program, and yet the Kim regime now has a nuclear
weapon. There is a concern that the P5+1 talks will not prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons, whether a deal is reached or not. Although the international community is now aware of the
formerly secret nuclear facility at Fordow, the heavily fortified site would be perfect for continued work on nuclear weapons should Iran be willing to openly flout an agreement like North Korea
did. The proposed sale of S300 missile systems from Russia to Iran would add a formidable layer of defense capabilities to the subterranean site, raising the stakes of any future intervention to
prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons. Hope remains that a deal can be struck with Iran, but recent history proves that sometimes such agreements are not worth the paper they are written on.
If Tehran proves itself to be as willing as Pyongyang to become an international pariah at the expense of nuclear weapons, the P5+1 talks could be in vain.
A2: Energy Alt Cause
A2: Energy
Energy differences don’t affect security cooperation—empirics, it spurs tech
cooperation and economic benefits
Berzina 14 (Kristine, transatlantic fellow for energy & society at GMF, where she is responsible for
shaping energy programming in Europe and contributing to GMF's work in the United States, “Bridging
Energy Gaps for Greater Transatlantic Cooperation”, July 2014, MC)
Although gaps between North American and European energy policies remain, they are not a stress test
for transatlantic security cooperation . The gaps in approaches provide opportunities for complementarity
and a formal cooperation. Acting as a harmonious bloc will be important as both regions address their waning
importance over the coming decades. Already, China and India dominate conversations about growing energy demand
and non-OECD countries consume the majority of the worlds oil supplies.3 The United States and Europe will need to band together on
research and trade to stay at the forefront of energy innovation. Europe and the United States have
a common goal of
improving the security of their energy supplies! but the two regions have approached this goal differently. The United States has
been blessed with geology and technological innovation that has allowed U.S. companies to develop new tight oil and shale gas resources. In
Europe, geology* and political priorities have not led to a shale boom. Instead, European energy transformations have focused large!)' on
increasing renewable energy* saturation to meet energy self-sufficiency* and climate change goals. The United States and Europe started out
as both energy producing and energy importing countries. As recently as ten year: ago, the United States planned to increase natural gas
imports, and many companies built liquefied natural gas import terminals along the U.S. eastern seaboard. But the shale gas boom changed this
trajectory. Since 2009, the United States has been the world's top natural gas producer, putting more than six times more natural gas on the
market than Saudi Arabia. In the European Union, the United Kingdom (UK.) had been the major natural gas producer. But production has
steadily decreased over the last decade. In 2013, the U.K. produced just 35 percent of the volume of natural gas that it produced ten years
earlier* Households and industry in the United Stales have benefited from the fossil fuel boom and low prices for natural gas. In 2013, the
price of natural gas in the United States had fallen to one-third the price of European gas. Not only has this kept
household heating bills low, cheap natural gas has rejuvenated energy intensive manufacturing in the United States.
Chemicals manufacturers, including Germany's BASF, arc opening new plants in the United States to take
advantage of the more competitive environment. Meanwhile in Europe, many countries arc undergoing energy
transformations of their own. Germany introduced its Energicwende (energy transition) in 2011. pledging to phase out nuclear
power by 2022 and aiming to reach 80 percent renewable energy by 2050. The policy has been so popular that by 2013. Germany was home to
over 10 percent of the world's renewable energy capacity (not including hydroclcctricity)." This success has come at a high price to households
and to energy-intensive industry. Households finance the energy* transition through surcharges on their electricity bills, and the boom in
rcncwablcs has made Germany's average household electricity bills the highest in Europe, industry, which is largely exempt from paying the
renewable energy surcharges, argues that their exemptions from surcharges arc not enough to keep German industry competitive. Between
low fuel prices in the United States and low labor costs in Asia, Germany has been put at a disadvantage. One option that analysts suggest will
reduce Germany's costs — developing shale gas resources of their own* — has encountered strong domestic resistance. In
spite of how
different the trajectories appear, both the North American shale gas boom and Germany's Energicwende
aim to reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports and to improve economic competitiveness in the long run.
Both regions wish to share their experiences and technical innovations around the world. The United States is
moving quickly to achieve these goals. Not only is the United States meeting its own demand for cheap energy and cushioning itself against
disruptions and political conflicts in supplier states, it is preparing to share its reserves with buyers overseas. By the end of 2015. the first
shipments of liquefied natural gas from Sabine Pass, Louisiana, will be sent to buyers including Korea's Kogas, the U.K's BG Group, Spain's Gas
Natural Pcnosa, France's Total, and India's GAIL. Countries across the world arc looking for a direct line to cheaper U.S. natural gas and arc
seeking to replicate the U.S. success story by developing shale gas of their own. Germany is playing a longer-term game. The immediate effects
of the energy transformation have been increased costs and higher coal consumption. Yet the strategic goals of the transition could eventually
overcome these hurdles. By becoming more energy self-sufficient, phasing out expensive fossil fuel imports, and paying off new rcncwablcs
capacity quickly through feed in tariffs, Germany could become an example for how to create a competitive, resilient, low-carbon economy.
Much as the United Stales seeks to spread its shale story. Germany is also sharing its experiences with European neighbors and emerging
economics alike. A recent study found that whereas European energy specialists focused on ihe Encrgicwcndcs cost challenges, experts in Brazil.
China, and South Africa were favorably disposed to ihe luicrgicwcndc and its long-term strategic goals. North American and
European energy policies are growing closer in both domestic and foreign policy aspects. The climate
change versus fossil fuel argument once represented a gulf between the transatlantic partners, but today the
disagreements represent a small fissure between the two sides. European policymakers arc becoming more
open to pursuing new fossil fuel exploration. The U.K. is exploring its own shale gas and tight oil reserves, and
the European Union has developed recommendations for unconventional oil and gas exploration that
simplify the development of new resources. Rather than mandating strict impact assessments, the standards improve
transparency and predictability for operators and communities.* Similarly, the EUs decision to case the language
of its Fuel Quality Directive appears to be an olive branch to Canada and the United States. The directive, which
aimed to label oil sands and other unconventional fuck as "dirty" from an emissions perspective, has been a source of conflict
between the transatlantic partners since 2009. Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obama is showing leadership on
climate change issues by pressing for more serious emissions regulations for coal power plants. Thus far, US. success in
lowering emissions has been due to markets not policy. Cheap natural gas pushed out coal in electricity generation, causing a drop in U.S.
carbon emissions. But in
June, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency proposed a Clean Power Plan to regulate the
emissions of existing power plants.* In their energy* policies, the United States and Europe arc working more
closely than they have before. The situation in Ukraine has prompted cooperation not only on economic sanctions, but
also on energy policies. In May, the G7 initiated a new subgroup. The Rome G7 Energy- Initiative for Energy- Security, to
work toward common energy security objectives, including diversifying supplies. This not only opens the
door for more direct energy trade between North America and Europe, but also stimulates greater knowledge sharing
across the Atlantic. The United States and Europe can learn from each other's experiences in developing new fossil fuel and renewable energy
resources.
A2: Impact Turns
A2: China/EU Rels
EU and Asia Relations are Strong now—No need for US-EU cooperation
EU, 6-29-2015 ("European Commission," European Commission - Press
release, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5279_en.htm)
The EU and China have agreed a joint summit declaration and held a joint press conference. High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Federica
Mogherini also participated, alongside Vice President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness Jyrki
Katainen, Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström andCommissioner for Research, Science and Innovation
Carlos Moedas. President Juncker and Vice-President Katainen also spoke at the EU-China Business Summit
and Urbanisation Forum in the margins of the Summit.During the Summit, the leaders of both sides
reconfirmed their commitment to reinforcing cooperation on the protection and enforcement of Intellectual
Property (IP) Rights. The EU-China IP Dialogue Mechanism was further reinforced with the signature of a
Memorandum of Understanding by Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström and the Chinese Minister of
Commerce, Gao Hucheng. Its main objective is the improvement of the IP environment as one of the key
conditions to promote creativity, innovation and investment, and the deepening of mutual understanding and
public awareness of IP issues in the EU and China. It includes mutual commitment to developing joint initiatives
to support the protection and enforcement of IP rights, including trade secrets, and the fight against online
counterfeiting and piracy. Trade between China and the EU is worth more than €1 billion every day. Today,
we form the second-largest economic cooperation in the world. Bilateral trade in goods reached € 467.2 billion
in 2014. China expressed interest in the EU's € 315 billion Investment Plan, which was welcomed by
Commission Vice-President Katainen who will continue discussions with China when he visits the country for
the High Level Economic Dialogue on 28 September.The EU and China also agreed to step up their
cooperation to fight climate change. In the EU-China Statement on Climate Changeboth sides commit to
embark on low-carbon development and cooperate on developing a cost-effective low-carbon economy. The
statement also highlights the importance of low-carbon investments and the need to increase ambition over
time under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. They agreed to intensify the
bilateral climate cooperation for example in the areas of domestic mitigation policies, carbon markets, lowcarbon cities, greenhouse gas emissions from the aviation and maritime industries, and hydrofluorocarbons
(HFC). The on-going cooperation on emissions trading will be expanded, in view of China's plans to establish a
nationwide emissions trading system by 2020.
EU and Asia cooperation on Asian Security and other issues is effective at
preventing conflict now
EU, no date ( EU-Asia Security Fact
Sheet, http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/docs/eu_in_asia_factsheet_en.pdf)
Since the establishment of the ARF in 1994 the EU has taken part and contributed to fostering constructive
dialogue on political and security issues of common interest in the Asia-Pacific region. The EU-ASEAN 2012
Banda Seri Begawan Plan of Action will deepen the relationship. → In 1996 the EU, together with its Asian
partners, set up the region-to-region dialogue ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) as a platform for enabling policy
dialogue on political, economic, social and cultural issues. The process is driven by bi-annual summits; the
2014 Summit will take place in Brussels. → The2001 Strategy ‘Europe and Asia’ identified six objectives for
EU-Asia cooperation including strengthened peace and security, increase in mutual trade and investment
flows, enhanced development cooperation, protection of human rights, spread of democracy and good
governance as well as actions raising mutual awareness. → In its 2003 Security Strategy the EU specified its
interest in the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on the challenges posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The
Strategy indicated that EU should develop strategic partnerships with several Asian countries. At this
stage, Asia is home to four of EU’s strategic partners, namely China, India, Japan and Republic of Korea. → In
2012 the EU updated its 2007 East Asia Policy Guidelines providing a broad and upto-date orientation for the
EU’s policy across the full range of EU activities. → Also in 2012 the EU acceded to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and expressed interest in participating in the East Asia Summit (EAS) as
well as in the enlarged meeting of ASEAN Defence Ministers.
NEG
A2: US-EU Rels
1NC – No Impact
No impact to US/European relations
Haas 11—president of the CFR Lecturer in public policy, Harvard. DPhill, Oxford (17 June 2011, Richard,
Why Europe No Longer Matters, http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/why-europe-no-longermatters/p25308)
Gates sounded a pessimistic note, warning of "the real possibility for a dim if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance." Yet, the outgoing Pentagon chief may not have been
The U.S.-European partnership that proved so central to managing and winning the Cold War will inevitably play a far
diminished role in the years to come. To some extent, we're already there: If NATO didn't exist today, would anyone feel compelled to create it? The
honest, if awkward, answer is no. In the coming decades, Europe's influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply
limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined. Certainly, one reason for NATO's increasing marginalization stems from
pessimistic enough.
the behavior of its European members. The problem is not the number of European troops (there are 2 million) nor what Europeans collectively spend on defense ($300 billion a year),
With NATO, the whole is far less than the sum of its parts.
Critical decisions are still made nationally; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just
that -- talk. There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and
intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. The alliance's effort in Libya -- the poorly conceived intervention, the
but rather how those troops are organized and how that money is spent.
widespread refusal or inability to participate in actual strike missions, the obvious difficulties in sustaining intense operations -- is a daily reminder of what the world's most powerful
With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political
willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military. (Britain and France, which each spend more
military organization cannot accomplish.
than 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense, are two of the exceptions here.) Even where a willingness to intervene with military force exists, such as in Afghanistan,
where upward of 35,000 European troops are deployed, there are severe constraints. Some governments, such as Germany, have historically limited their participation in combat
operations, while
the cultural acceptance of casualties is fading in many European nations. But it would be wrong, not to mention
fruitless, to blame the Europeans and their choices alone. There are larger historical forces contributing to the continent's increasing irrelevance to world affairs. Ironically, Europe's own
notable successes are an important reason that transatlantic ties will matter less in the future. The current euro zone financial crisis should not obscure the historic accomplishment that
was the building of an integrated Europe over the past half-century. The continent is largely whole and free and stable. Europe, the principal arena of much 20th-century geopolitical
competition, will be spared such a role in the new century -- and this is a good thing. The contrast with Asia could hardly be more dramatic. Asia is increasingly the center of gravity of the
world economy; the historic question is whether this dynamism can be managed peacefully. The major powers of Europe -- Germany, France and Great Britain -- have reconciled, and the
regional arrangements there are broad and deep. In Asia, however, China, Japan, India, Vietnam, the two Koreas, Indonesia and others eye one another warily. Regional pacts and
arrangements, especially in the political and security realms, are thin. Political and economic competition is unavoidable; military conflict cannot be ruled out. Europeans will play a
modest role, at best, in influencing these developments. If Asia, with its dynamism and power struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago, the Middle East is more
reminiscent of the Europe of several centuries before: a patchwork of top-heavy monarchies, internal turbulence, unresolved conflicts, and nationalities that cross and contest
Political and demographic changes within Europe,
as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still
consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls,
domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europe's security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less
boundaries. Europe's ability to influence the course of this region, too, will be sharply limited.
immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their
ties across the Atlantic were forged at a time when American political and economic power was largely
in the hands of Northeastern elites, many of whom traced their ancestry to Europe and who were most interested in developments there. Today's
United States -- featuring the rise of the South and the West, along with an increasing percentage of
Americans who trace their roots to Africa, Latin America or Asia -- could hardly be more different.
American and European preferences will increasingly diverge as a result. Finally, the very nature of international relations has
continent. Moreover, intimate
also undergone a transformation. Alliances, whether NATO during the Cold War or the U.S.-South Korean partnership now, do best in settings that are highly inflexible and predictable,
where foes and friends are easily identified, potential battlefields are obvious, and contingencies can be anticipated. Almost none of this is true in our current historical moment. Threats
are many and diffuse. Relationships seem situational, increasingly dependent on evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Countries can be friends, foes or both, depending on the day
of the week -- just look at the United States and Pakistan. Alliances tend to require shared assessments and explicit obligations; they are much more difficult to operate when worldviews
diverge and commitments are discretionary. But as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya all demonstrate, this is precisely the world we inhabit. For the United States, the
no amount of harping on what European governments are failing to do will push
them toward what some in Washington want them to do. They have changed. We have changed. The world has changed. Second, NATO
conclusions are simple. First,
as a whole will count for much less. Instead, the United States will need to maintain or build bilateral relations with those few countries in Europe willing and able to act in the world,
other allies are likely to become more relevant partners in the regions that
present the greatest potential challenges. In Asia, this might mean Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, especially if U.S.-China relations
including with military force. Third,
were to deteriorate; in the greater Middle East, it could again be India in addition to Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others.
US-European relations are irrelevant in solving global problems
Wright 8 [Thomas, executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 12/4, pg.
http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/548178]
Europe is no longer at the centre of gravity for many of the biggest difficulties facing the United States.
Pakistan is indispensable in the fight against Al Qaeda. The Middle East peace process can't move
without Israel and Saudi Arabia. Success or failure on climate change will turn on America's relations
with China and India. Today, the E uropean U nion often matters in international affairs in the way the U.S. mattered in the first half of the 20th century: a
wealthy power with tremendous potential that could choose to engage or, instead, hang back and
focus on the home front.
1NC – Inevitable
Relations will stay low, but cooperation is inevitable
Walt 11, IR – Harvard, [The coming erosion of the European Union Posted By Stephen M. Walt
Thursday, August 18, 2011 - 11:19 AM Share
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/18/the_coming_erosion_of_the_european_union]
we will see less cooperative and intimate
security partnership between Europe and America in the future. Why do I think so? One obvious reason is the lack of common
external enemy. Historically, that is the only reason why the United States was willing to commit troops to Europe, and it is therefore no surprise that America's military
Third, I argued that the glory days of transatlantic security cooperation also lie in the past, and
presence in Europe has declined steadily ever since the Soviet Union broke up. Simply put: there is no threat to Europe that the Europeans cannot cope with on their own, and thus
little role for Americans to play. In addition, the various imperial adventures that NATO has engaged in since 1992 haven't worked out that well. It was said in the 1990s that NATO
had to "go out of area or out of business," which is one reason it started planning for these operations, but most of the missions NATO has taken on since then have been something
of a bust. Intervention in the Balkans eventually ended the fighting there, but it took longer and cost more than anyone expected and it's not even clear that it really worked (i.e., if
NATO peacekeepers withdrew from Kosovo tomorrow, fighting might start up again quite soon). NATO was divided over the war in Iraq, and ISAF's disjointed effort in Afghanistan just
reminds us why Napoleon always said he liked to fight against coalitions. The war in Libya could produce another disappointing result, depending on how it plays out. Transatlantic
security cooperation might have received a new lease on life if all these adventures had gone swimmingly; unfortunately, that did not prove to be the case. But this raises the obvious
question: If the United States isn't needed to protect Europe and there's little positive that the alliance can accomplish anywhere else, then what's it for? Lastly, transatlantic security
cooperation will decline because the United States will be shifting its strategic focus to Asia. The central goal of US
grand strategy is to maintain hegemony in the Western hemisphere and to prevent other great powers from achieving hegemony in their regions. For the foreseeable future, the only
potential regional hegemon is China. There will probably be an intense security competition there, and the United States will therefore be deepening its security ties with a variety of
Asian partners. Europe has little role to play in this competition, however, and little or no incentive to get involved. Over time, Asia will get more and more attention from the U.S.
foreign policy establishment, and Europe will get less. This trend will be reinforced by demographic and generational changes on both sides of the Atlantic,
as the
percentage of Americans with strong ancestral connections to Europe declines and as the generation that waged the Cold War
leaves the stage. So in addition to shifting strategic interests, some of the social glue that held Europe and America together is likely to weaken as
well. It is important not to overstate this trend -- Europe and America won't become enemies, and I don't think intense security competition
is going to break out within Europe anytime soon. Europe and the United States will continue to trade and invest with each other, and we will
continue to collaborate on a number of security issues (counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, counterproliferation, etc.). But Europe won't be America's "go-to" partner in the decades ahead, at least not the way it once was. This will
be a rather different world than the one we've been accustomed to for the past 60 years, but that's not necessarily a bad thing. Moreover, because it reflects
powerful structural forces, there's probably little we can do to prevent it. Instead, the smart response -- for both Americans and
Europeans -- is to acknowledge these tendencies and adapt to them, instead of engaging in a futile effort to hold back the tides of history
1NC – Resilient
US-EU free trade agreement proves relations resiliency
The Hill 12/9/14
Breathing new life into the US-EU trade talks http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreignpolicy/226358-breathing-new-life-into-the-us-eu-trade-talks//sd
trade focus in Washington will center on
Partnership TTIP
between the US and E
While much of the
the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks taking place around the city, this week will be at least equally important for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
(
area
). The proposed agreement
uropean
U would create the world’s largest free trade
nion
—covering almost half of global GDP and two-thirds of foreign investment. Monday, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman met with his European counterpart Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström who is travelling to Washington for the first time in her new position
overseeing international commerce for the EU. Monday's meeting is a key part of the larger effort to give
have an opportunity to work together
the TTIP negotiations fresh start”
a“
after a challenging first year. As Ambassador Froman recently underlined, “we
for a fresh start to the negotiations. The United States is committed to moving forward with TTIP as soon as we can and as fast as we’re able.” But what does this “fresh start” actually
entail, and what role should today’s meeting play? To answer these questions, we need to take a look at the broader political picture on both sides of the Atlantic. On the European side, a new European Parliament has been elected along with a new European Commission. New
Commission President Juncker’s “Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change” outlines that completing an ambitious TTIP agreement is among Europe’s top economic and strategic priorities. Similarly, last month’s US mid-term elections have shifted the balance of power in
Trade policy provides fertile ground for bipartisan cooperation:
Congress
should work closely with the White House to move the trade agenda forward.
both houses of Congress firmly towards the Republicans who are eager to demonstrate their ability to govern.
according to the incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), trade is one of the few issues where congressional leaders see room for cooperation with President Obama. Given the number of jobs that TTIP (and TPP) could create,
Of course, there is still the question of whether Congress will grant the
President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—which would allow Congress up-or-down votes on both TPP and TTIP without amendments that could scupper both deals. However, considerable progress can be made even before the passage of TPA—and that is where Ambassador Froman
and Commissioner Malmström’s “fresh start” comes in. For Commissioner Malmström, there is a need for more clarity, debate, and realism to more effectively communicate to citizens what is actually being negotiated, and how TTIP would help them. Other important goals of the fresh
start include increasing civil society involvement in the negotiations and outlining ambitious and realistic goals for European access to the large US goods, services, and public procurement markets. After less than a month in office, Malmström has already started publishing previously
restricted TTIP documents and hosted numerous meetings with legislators and NGOs as part of a broad transparency initiative. This is an important effort as the public debate in Europe turns increasingly hostile towards globalization and international trade. Fostering an informed and
enlightened public debate on TTIP is of paramount importance on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the main myths about the agreement is that it will primarily help large corporations, leaving the small ones on the sidelines. According to a recent Atlantic Council study, however, the
exact opposite is the case: SMEs stand to gain exponentially from a transatlantic agreement that streamlines regulatory and customs processes. More than 99 percent of all businesses in both the United States and European Union are SMEs with less than 500 employees. These s mall
companies account for the vast majority of employment and have contributed almost two-thirds of all net new private sector job creation in the United States over the past twenty years, adding more than 14.3 million new jobs to the US economy. In her first official meeting before the
European Parliament’s Trade Committee, Commissioner Malmström confirmed that she wants “[a] TTIP that works for small and medium enterprises.” Ambassador Froman agrees, calling small businesses “the backbone of economic growth, job creation, and a stronger middle class in
communities across America.” During a time where the Internet and free movement of data are forceful drivers of economic growth, jobs, and welfare, SMEs have more opportunities than ever before to connect t o potential customers across the world. To unlock the full potential of TTIP
for businesses of all sizes, the US and EU need to work to establish a truly transatlantic digital marketplace with reliable, secure, and safe information flowing online as easily as goods and services do in planes or ships. As the world’s two largest economies, any transatlantic agreement on
TTIP
shows the deep commitment of both sides to give the negotiations new impetus.
cross-border data flows should shape a future global agreement. Coming back to our initial question—how can today’s meeting give
in November)
a fresh start? The second meeting of the lead negotiators from both sides of the Atlantic in less than a month’s time (they also met in Brussels
As the two sides prepare to reconvene in
February, political leadership from Froman and Malmström is needed to develop a common transatlantic public relations strategy that promotes clarity of TTIP’s purpose and its benefits while encouraging an open and informed public debate on the
of building a more-integrated transatlantic market.
true potential
2NC – Resilient
EU/US relations resilient
Joyner 11—editor of the Atlantic Council. PhD in pol sci (James, Death of Transatlantic Relationship
Wildly Exaggerated, 14 June 2011, www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/death-transatlantic-relationshipwildly-exaggerated)
The blistering farewell speech to NATO by U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates warning of a "dim, if not dismal" future for the Alliance drew the Western public's attention to a longstanding debate about the state of the
transatlantic relationship. With prominent commenters voicing concern about much more than just a two-tiered defensive alliance, questioning whether the U.S.-Europe relationship itself is past its prime, doubts that the
fears are overblown, and may be mistaking short-term
bumps in the relationship for proof of a long-term decline that isn't there. Gates' frustration with the fact that only five of the 28
Western alliance that has dominated the post-Cold War world are reaching a new high. But those
NATO allies are living up to their commitment to devote 2 percent of GDP to defense, which has hindered their ability to take on even the likes of Muammar Qaddafi's puny force without American assistance is certainly
the U.S.-Europe partnership may not be living up to its potential, it is not worthless, and that relationship
continues to be one of the strongest and most important in the world . Gates is an Atlanticist whose speech was, as he put it, "in the spirit of solidarity and friendship,
legitimate and worrying. Though
with the understanding that true friends occasionally must speak bluntly with one another for the sake of those greater interests and values that bind us together." He wants the Europeans, Germany in particular, to
Europeans don't see their security as being in jeopardy and political leaders are hard pressed to divert
scarce resources away from social spending -- especially in the current economic climate -- a dynamic that has weakened NATO
but, despite fears to the contrary, not the greater Transatlantic partnership. It would obviously have been a great relief to the
understand what a tragedy it would be if NATO were to go away. Most
U.S. if European governments had shouldered more of the burden in Afghanistan. This disparity, which has only increased as the war has dragged on and the European economies suffered, is driving both Gates' warning and
broader fears about the declining relationship. But it was our fight, not theirs; they were there, in most cases against the strong wishes of the people who elected them to office, because we asked. We'd have fought it
exactly the same way in their absence. In that light, every European and Canadian soldier was a bonus. Libya, however, is a different story. The Obama administration clearly had limited interest in entering that fight - Gates
himself warned against it -- and our involvement is due in part to coaxing by our French and British allies. The hope was to take the lead in the early days, providing "unique assets" at America's disposal, and then turn the
fight over to the Europeans. But, as Gates' predecessor noted not long after the ill-fated 2003 invasion of Iraq, you go to war with the army you have, not the one you wish you had. The diminished capabilities of European
militaries, spent by nearly a decade in Afghanistan, should be of no surprise. NATO entered into Libya with no real plan for an end game beyond hoping the rebels would somehow win or that Qaddafi would somehow fall.
That failure, to be fair, is a collective responsibility, not the fault of European militaries alone. But the concern goes deeper than different defensive priorities. Many Europeans worry that the United States takes the
relationship for granted, and that the Obama administration in particular puts a much higher priority on the Pacific and on the emerging BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies. New York Times
columist Roger Cohen recently wrote that this is as it should be: "In so far as the United States is interested in Europe it is interested in what can be done together in the rest of the world." In Der Spiegel, Roland Nelles and
Gregor Peter Schmitz lamented, "we live in a G-20 world instead of one led by a G-2." It's certainly true that, if it ever existed, the Unipolar Moment that Charles Krauthammer and others saw in the aftermath of the Soviet
collapse is over. But that multipolar dynamic actually makes transatlantic cooperation more, not less, important. A hegemon needs much less help than one of many great powers, even if it remains the biggest. Take the G20. Seven of the members are NATO Allies: the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and Turkey. Toss in the EU, and you have 40 percent of the delegation. If they can form a united front at G-20 summits, they are
much more powerful than if each stands alone. Add in four NATO Partner countries (Russia, Japan, Australia, and South Korea) and you're up to 60 percent of the delegation -- a comfortable majority for the U.S.-European
partnership and its circle of closest allies. Granted, it's unlikely that we'll achieve consensus among all 12 states on any one issue, let alone most issues. But constantly working together toward shared goals and values
expands a sense of commonality. And, like so many things, projects end. Indeed, that's generally the goal. The transatlantic military alliance that formed to defeat fascism remained intact after victory; indeed, it expanded to
NATO outlasted the demise of its raison d'être, the Soviet threat, and went on
to fight together --along with many of its former adversaries -- in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Libya. Is there seriously any doubt that other challenges will emerge in the future in which the
Americans and its European allies might benefit from working together?
include its former German and Italian adversaries.
Conflicts over surveillance won’t collapse relations – it’s all for show, strategic
interests prevail
Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb
3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)
Other analysts argue that the purported U.S.
surveillance operations remain a point of friction but that tensions
have proven manageable and do not pose a sustained threat to the overall transatlantic relationship .
Those holding this view contend that much of the outrage expressed by European leaders has been for domestic
public consumption. They also note that while senior European officials may not have been familiar with the
details of U.S. surveillance activities, many were well aware that their own security services conduct
various surveillance operations and often work closely with U.S. intelligence services to help prevent
terrorist attacks and other serious crimes in Europe. In addition, especially given the potential threat posed by
the Islamic State and returning foreign fighters, officials indicate that cooperation between U.S. and European
intelligence and security services has continued uninterrupted despite any loss of trust at the political
level. 35
Relations resilient – any conflict is self-correcting
Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb
3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)
Polls show that European perceptions of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama Administration remain relatively
favorable, and considerably more positive compared to the years of the George W. Bush Administration. 3 The
overall tone of transatlantic relations has been mostly constructive over the past six years, and many of
the broad global challenges faced by the United States and Europe have pushed the two sides toward
common or cooperative approaches. In attempting to deal jointly with the daunting list of challenges they
face, however, both sides have also encountered frustrations and reality checks that have reminded each side
to be realistic about what it can expect from the other.
Prefer consensus
Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb
3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)
some observers assert that the global influence of the
Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In addition, the Obama Administration’s announced intention of “re-balancing” U.S.
foreign policy toward Asia has caused some anxiety among Europeans. Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the United
States and Europe are likely to remain one another’s closest partner, and that U.S.-European cooperation
is likely to remain the foundation of international action on a wide range of critical issues.
As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment,
Cooperation is resilient- shared values, economic ties, and issue specific cooperation
McCormick ‘6 (The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations James M. McCormick 1 1 Iowa State University
ABSTRACT
AU: James M. McCormick TI: The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations SO: Politics & Policy VL: 34
NO: 2 PG: 426-450 YR: 2006
Even if the conceptual gap were to narrow only slightly over U.S. foreign policy generally and terrorism particularly,
powerful
international and domestic constraints remain, which may motivate both the United States and Europe to close
the action gap. In other words, certain existing constraints may actually serve as incentives to close the action gap between these two
global actors in the near term. Some of these constraints result from the common ties that already exist, but others are unique to the United
still bound together by a set of underlying common
values and beliefs that brought them together during the Cold War after World War II, albeit no longer with the Soviet
Union acting as a lone star guiding policy formulation. Those common values and beliefs are hardly empty notions to the vast
majority of Europeans and Americans, particularly not to the new European states that have escaped communist
rule since the fall of the Berlin Wall. How those values should be advanced will surely remain as a source of disagreement both within and
between Europe and America, but those values will undoubtedly continue to serve as incentives for all parties to
seek some policy accommodations. Second, Europe and America are fundamentally tied by the significant
economic links that serve as the "sticky power" (Mead 2004, 46-53; Mead 2005, 29-36) between them. Indeed, economic
States and Europe.First, of course, the United States and Europe are
ties remain very strong, despite recent political differences and lingering disputes over access to both participants'
markets (Drozdiak 2005). Third, the often unspoken levels of cooperation on terrorism—for example, in the areas of
law enforcement, intelligence matters, or the tracking of financial matters—remain in place, even in the
face of more visible political differences over Iraq and the wider war on terrorism. Moreover, the events of 3/11/04
in Madrid and 7/7/05 in London continue to provide very powerful incentives for this kind of transatlantic cooperation. In this sense, these
different kinds of "ties that bind"—and continue to bind—should not be forgotten as important sources
of momentum to seek common ground between America and Europe.
1NC – Alt Cause – Court Ruling
Alt cause – court case
Williams 6/24
(Lauren, tech reporter for ThinkProgress with an affinity for consumer privacy, cybersecurity, tech
culture and the intersection of civil liberties and tech policy, French Anger Over NSA Spying Further
Strains Europe-U.S. Relations, June 24th, 2015,
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/06/24/3673403/french-anger-nsa-spying-strains-europe-usrelations/)
Negative global perception of the NSA’s actions could also affect how the U.S. does business overseas.
European regulators have already begun investigating tech companies’ potential wrongdoing by
participating in NSA surveillance programs. The Court of Justice of the European Union is hearing a case
involving Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Yahoo, for potential privacy law violations. The decision could seriously
damage the U.S.-European relationship by deterring companies from doing business through stricter
regulations. Facebook’s European public policy director Richard Allan warned legislators in April that imposing stringent regulations on tech
companies would be bad for business stateside and abroad: National regulators in a number of countries, including Belgium and the
Netherlands, appear to be initiating multiple, overlapping investigations of Facebook, revisiting basic questions about how our services work.
1NC – Alt Cause – Energy
The plan is a drop in the bucket – energy is the litmus test to relations
Koryani, 11—Hungarian diplomat, former Undersecretary of State, foreign policy and energy expert.
He is also the Deputy Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center of the Atlantic Council of the United
State (David [Editor], Tranatlantic Energy Futures, 2011, http://transatlantic.saisjhu.edu/publications/books/Transatlantic_Energy_Futures/Transatlantic_Energy_Futures.pdf)
Critical factors of divergence cannot be discounted either, as they have an almost equally strong pull.
Differing climate change perceptions and the lack of U.S. commitment and action is extremely dangerous,
as it alienates Europeans, both policymakers and the wider public alike. These differences, if not solved,
could drive a wedge for decades between the partners, undermine trust, create a value gap and hinder
cooperation not only in climate change and energy issues but in all other aspects as well. There is in
fact a chance that U.S. and European energy markets could largely decouple in coming years, due in part to differences
regarding the need to tackle climate change, and in part to diverging geopolitical and domestic trends. The U.S. has edged closer to
self sufficiency with respect to fossil fuels, with the extensive development of its vast unconventional gas resources and increasing reliance on
Canadian oil sands. This could lead to a more isolationist stance in U.S. policy . Meanwhile unconventional gas faces mixed reactions in
Europe; the EU, for example, plans to shun oil shales and tar sands in its impending Fuel Quality Directive. Friction in transatlantic perceptions on energy security
and divergences over preferred courses of action are real dangers that must be addressed head on. Towards a Transatlantic Energy Alliance The systemic
transformation of the world of energy, triggered by climate change and powered by new technologies, will likely cause the reorganization of our societies. The
benefits and pitfalls of transatlantic cooperation are beyond doubt. Renewing the transatlantic community’s leadership is essential to lead the world to a
sustainable, low carbon future. Transatlantic cooperation can contribute to provide secure and affordable energy to people in the EU and the U.S., foster economic
prosperity and create jobs.
Current cooperation on a wide range of subjects is encouraging but inadequate . What
we need is a new impetus, genuine political will, adequate resources and enhanced cooperation to advance a transatlantic green economy. Joint efforts in
addressing climate change, innovation
and investment into clean energy technologies, risk sharing and cost reduction, joint
RD&D and harmonized energy diplomacy must be the cornerstones of a Transatlantic Energy Alliance . A Transatlantic Energy
change and energy cooperation will be the litmus test of
converging or diverging European and American norms, values and interests in the 21st century. We have to bridge our
Alliance is desirable and feasible, but not self-evident. Climate
differences and we have to do that quickly in order to remain in the driving seat. To amend Robert Kagan’s famous line, Americans may be from Mars and
Europeans from Venus, but we shall all soon need to move to some other planet if we do not adjust course. Transatlantic Energy Futures endeavors to give you a
taste of the intricate and multifaceted energy challenges facing our communities. It aims to do so with a strong conviction in the enduring prominence and necessity
of the transatlantic partnership.
2NC – Alt Cause – Energy
Renewable energy is the cornerstone to the transatlantic alliance
Stori ’14 (January 27, 2014 | by Val Stori, OWAP Project Director Trade Missions Critical in Building an
Offshore Wind Industry
Perhaps one of the most cost-effective measures US developers can take to reduce project risk and
installation costs is partnership with experienced developers. Reducing risks and construction time can
have a significant impact on overall project costs. In Europe, growing professionalism in the industry—
mainly market entry by large construction companies and major utilities, has led to faster installation times
and improved methods. These major players have developed and improved techniques and equipment specific to offshore wind
development, which has led to speedier installations and thus, reduced costs. In fact, leading utility and major offshore wind developer DONG
Energy predicts that a cost reduction of 10-20% by 2017 is realistic; companies like these are focused on streamlining, improving efficiencies,
and incentivizing OEMs and suppliers to reduce costs.
Through partnerships , a US developer can gain valuable experience
and tap the wealth of knowledge that European developers have already amassed. To spur the development of
offshore wind in the US and to gain public acceptance through more acceptable power prices, the US must take
advantage not only of European know-how, but also of the European supply chain. State renewable energy agencies and
local economic development councils who already are heavily invested in offshore wind-related infrastructure and who are looking to position
engaging with key European developers and political
leaders through international trade missions . In 2013, two CESA members travelled to Germany and Denmark
themselves as leading US offshore wind players, are
along with a contingent from economic development councils and port authorities as part of international trade
missions. Both contingents returned to the US cognizant of the major challenges that lie ahead in building a domestic industry, yet aware of
the tremendous opportunities for growth. After touring some of the world’s largest wind farms, visiting offshore wind-dedicated ports, and
speaking with turbine OEMs, the US representatives returned home to champion for offshore wind. In the words of New Bedford Mayor Jon
Mitchell, who travelled to Europe with the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center, “it is hard to avoid the adage that seeing is believing.” But what
other than awe at the industry’s huge potential is to be gleaned from these international missions? Beyond the fact finding and
knowledge sharing lies an integral component of these trade missions—the opportunity to build
relationships and establish joint ventures . Dedicated matchmaking sessions and networking opportunities are critical to kickstarting efficient development off US shores. The opportunity to partner—whether a US contractor partners to operate in
Europe and brings the experience back or a US project partners with an experienced European contractor—
enables us to benefit from Europe’s learning curve. We do not have to reinvent the wheel every step of the way. In fact, to do so
would likely be cost prohibitive at this point in the game. The US currently does not have the volume or the guaranteed market to develop a
robust supply chain or to justify investment in domestic ventures that would support the nascent-at-best industry. Even in Germany, where
nearly 400MW of offshore wind were installed in 2013, factories sit idle when demand is low despite investment of an estimated $1.3 billion for
specialized ports and factories. Even though economic development and job creation are key goals for the states interested in building an
offshore wind industry, until a sufficient pipeline of projects is established along the US Atlantic coast, the first few projects will be supplied by
European manufacturers.
European developers and manufacturers are eager to work on this side of the
Atlantic. Recently, the Maryland Energy Administration was invited to attend the annual European Wind Energy Association’s conference at
the request of European turbine manufacturers who recognize that Maryland may be the first state to deploy a large-scale project in the US.
And in late December, Cape Wind contracted with Siemens to supply the project with Siemens’ 3.6MW turbines and an electrical services
platform. The platform, in fact, has been contracted out by Siemens to Cianbro Corp.—a Massachusetts-based company, that will construct the
offshore substation at its manufacturing facility in Brewer, Maine. While it may be too early for European developers to establish significant
facilities in the US at this stage, they are looking for project partners and prime locations to invest —especially if states set
offshore wind targets.
It could be a win-win situation . Local content is lacking and would be a substantial hurdle
causing major bottlenecks if US offshore developers chose to go “local only.” Overseas cooperation with local
industry will be key in getting the US offshore wind industry up and running, while providing a large opportunity
for the established European players to get involved in US developments.
1NC – Alt Cause – Trade
Expanding economic and trade ties are the only way to sustain the relationship
Brattberg ’13 (By Erik Brattberg. Published 8 November 2013. Erik Brattberg is Analyst at The Swedish
Institute of International Affairs, and currently Visiting Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States
and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns
Hopkins University in Washington DC.
If so, this could be the start of a recreated and re-invented transatlantic relationship. The development of a more
strategic EU-US relationship could also help allay fears regarding the US ‘abandonment’ of Europe .
While US strategic thinking is changing – and fast (the so-called ‘Asian pivot’ is only the beginning) – a more
strategic transatlantic relationship would still serve a critical function for Washington, and not just on the security
side of things. The drawdown of the military mission in Afghanistan means that the US will have less need for
Europe in coming years. Focusing more on global economic and trade issues could constitute a new
strategic imperative for closer EU-US ties.
Uniqueness
Rels High Now
US-EU united on foreign policy with M.E and Russian
Mason ‘15
(Jeff Mason covers the White House for Reuters. He was the lead correspondent for President Barack Obama's 2012
campaign and has been posted in Washington since 2008, when he covered the historic race between Obama, Hillary
Clinton and John McCain, traveling with all three candidates. Jeff has also been posted in Frankfurt, Germany, where he
covered the airline industry and Brussels, Belgium, where he covered climate change and the European Union. He has
appeared on MSNBC, CNN, BBC, and NPR. Jeff is a graduate of Northwestern University and a former Fulbright scholar,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/06/us-g7-summit-obama-idUSKBN0OM0OJ20150606
When President Barack Obama attends the Group of Seven summit in Germany on Sunday, he will join fellow leaders
who are growing accustomed to a new dynamic in the transatlantic relationship: less direction
from Washington, more demands on Europe. In responding to Russia's intervention in Ukraine, the crisis in
Libya and efforts to advance Middle East peace, European leaders have stepped up their role after a real or perceived sense
that the United States was drawing back. The shift has created both annoyance and satisfaction among European officials.
Some privately express frustration at what they view as reluctance by the Obama administration to get involved. They
contrast a "leading from behind" strategy in the Middle East and Europe with the more proactive U.S. stance in Asia,
where Obama is acting diplomatically and militarily to counter growing Chinese influence. France has publicly berated the
U.S. administration for not launching air strikes in 2013 against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It said that the decision
caused irreparable damage to the Syrian opposition on the ground and emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin on
the international scene. "At the heart of what’s going on is that the Americans themselves don’t want to be on the front line
in this region" a senior French official said. The phrase "leading from behind" grew out of the 2011 NATO intervention in
Libya when Washington let France and Britain do most of the heavy military lifting. DIVISION OF LABOR Other
diplomats and U.S. officials say France and Germany's leading role in talks between Moscow and
Kiev , which led to a shaky ceasefire deal in eastern Ukraine, was appropriate for a crisis that hits them closer
to home . "It's not a question of ceding responsibility, it's the natural division of labor between us," said David
O'Sullivan, the European Union's ambassador to the United States. Other areas, however, have been hurt by a lack of U.S.
leadership, foreign policy analysts said. Stephen Hadley, Republican President George W. Bush's national security adviser,
said it was very attractive to Russia not to have the United States at the table in the Ukraine ceasefire talks. He noted that
Europeans were eyeing a new approach to peace between Israelis and Palestinians by potentially backing a U.N. resolution
for a Palestinian state. "Overhanging this, of course, is this perception of American disengagement and stepping back from
leadership on a lot of problems in the world, which is a perception that our Arab friends and allies have in the Middle East
and, you know, I think is very much prevalent in Europe," he said. "STRONG ALIGNMENT" The White House rejects
that charge, which is voiced by many Republican critics. It points to U.S.-European unity on Iran's nuclear
program, global climate change negotiations, strikes against Islamic State militants, and sanctions
against Russia . "If you look at the president’s key foreign policy priorities, every single one of them, just about, is
supported by these key European partners," Obama's deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said. "I
think this is a moment of very strong alignment with Europe." That alignment has not translated into proAmerican sentiment in Germany, which is hosting the G7 summit. Germans remain angry at U.S. spying practices, an
issue German Chancellor Angela Merkel has raised repeatedly with Obama. In an effort to set a more positive tone,
Obama and Merkel will spend some public time together before the summit on Sunday, walking around a small village
and sampling local food. The United States has openly talked about the need for Europe to step up militarily and has
recently reiterated a long-standing message that its NATO partners must boost their military spending.
US-EU Relations strong for the future
Hughes ‘14
US, EU and tradehttp://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/238633-us-eu-and-trade
(Julia K. Hughs, President of International Development Systems, Inc., which has a proven international reputation as the
resource for companies, trade associations and countries when they need the latest information regarding trade statistics
and government regulation of textile and apparel products. Additionally, Ms. Hughes serves as Vice President,
International Trade and Government Relations for the United States Association of Textiles and Apparel (USA-ITA),
where she leads the development of new strategies to liberalize trade in textiles and apparel. Prior to joining IDS, Ms.
Hughes was Divisional Vice President of Government Relations for the Associated Merchandising Corporation (AMC),
the largest retail merchandising, marketing and consulting organization in the world.)
TPA, TPP, AGOA, and TESA are just a few of the trade policy acronyms we’ve heard on Capitol Hill lately, but this
week, the trade community is focusing on yet another acronym that could have an enormous benefit for both companies
and consumers: TTIP, or the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership. Trade negotiators from the United
States and European Union are currently meeting in New York City for the ninth round of TTIP negotiations
in hopes of strengthening the important partnership between the United States and Europe, which
already supports 13 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. While the U.S.-EU relationship is
already quite strong , many obstacles to trade remain in place. This is why our organizations—representing American
and European brands, retailers, and importers in a variety of industries, including the fashion industry—urge the
negotiation of an ambitious, high-standard agreement that recognizes the way companies do business in the 21 stcentury.
This means that the agreement should include the elimination of all tariffs as well as the reduction and harmonization of
product-related regulations. For companies, the benefits are clear. The United States and European Union have higher
tariffs and more restrictive practices on textile, leather, and fashion products than most consumer goods. By
eliminating tariffs and reducing technical barriers, companies would experience greater efficiencies
and reduced costs of doing business, allowing them to sell more products globally, expand their
operations, and create more high quality jobs , including design, compliance, retail, and marketing jobs in the
fashion industry. Such an agreement would also benefit the consumers those companies serve. Studies show an ambitious
agreement could create as many as 750,000 new jobs in the United States, while the expansion of transatlantic commerce
would add approximately €95 billion to the United States’ economy and approximately €119 billion to Europe’s economy
and each year. Families will reap the benefits, as the average American household could gain approximately $865 annually
while European households could gain approximately $720 annually. An ambitious agreement would also have a positive
impact on global trade. By instituting uniform, high-standard regulations on everything from product labeling and testing,
to sustainability and safety in the global value chain, the United States and Europe could set the global standard. TTIP
would serve as a model for future trade agreements when other nations see the widespread benefits of an ambitious
elimination of tariffs and reduction of trade barriers—as well as the cost savings and efficiencies that result when they
need to follow only one set of regulations for exporting to the United States and Europe. We strongly urge the negotiators
to take a fresh look at the proposals, and take a new, 21 st-century approach to trade policy. If they do, TTIP won’t just be
another acronym—but will be a landmark agreement that changes the future of business and trade for the better.
US-EU Communication never been higher
EU 2006
(http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/infopack_06_en.pdf)
Enhanced EU–US communication has been essential in developing a closer understanding of
respective policy positions and a better coordination of activities. The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration
introduced structured political dialogues to allow for EU–US discussion on a great variety of regional and horizontal
themes. The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) which followed in 1995 now governs the relationship. This ambitious
agenda of cooperation between the EU and the USA in a large number of areas requires intensive dialogue. The
yearly summits between the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council and the
President of the United States are the apex of an intensive dialogue. The summits are prepared by senior level
representatives from the EEAS, the European Commission, the Council Secretariat and the US State Department.
Implementation of summit decisions is taken forward via regular working level contacts. Under the EU’s Industrialised
Countries Instrument for 2007-2013, over € 20 million are earmarked for cooperation with the United States under three
focal areas: dialogues, people to people and cooperation. Following an Annual Work Programme, tenders or calls for
proposals for the various instruments (EU Centres of Excellence, people to people actions, dialogues and outreach
activities) are published on that same website and are opened to EU and US participants. Such activities should be eligible
for support as of 2014 under the new Partnership Instrument proposed by the European Commission under the MultiAnnual Financial framework for the period 2014- 2020. In recent years, the development of more informal and operational
ad hoc contacts have allowed for a more detailed understanding of our respective priorities and policies, provided early
warning of potential problems and improved the coordination of policy planning and assistance. The EU and the US
have continued to work together in the field of both civilian and military crisis management and
conflict preventio n. In March 2008, both sides concluded a work plan on crisis management and conflict prevention,
setting out the concrete steps to operationalise co-operation in a number of areas, with specific elements on conflict
prevention and early warning. In May 2011, the EU and the US formalised an agreement to allow US civilians to
participate in EU CSDP operations . Close cooperation continues in stabilization efforts, for example in
the Balkans , concerning the EULEX Kosovo rule of law mission.
French Anger Over NSA Spying Further Strains Europe-U.S. Relations,
Williams ’15 BY LAUREN C. WILLIAMS JUN 24, 2015 1:06PM,
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/06/24/3673403/french-anger-nsa-spying-strains-europe-us-relations/,
Lauren C. Williams is the tech reporter for ThinkProgress with an affinity for consumer privacy,
cybersecurity, tech culture and the intersection of civil liberties and tech policy. Before joining the
ThinkProgress team, she wrote about health care policy and regulation for B2B publications, and had a
brief stint at The Seattle Times. Lauren is a native Washingtonian and holds a master’s in journalism from
the University of Maryland and a bachelor’s of science in dietetics from the University of Delaware.
National Security Agency spied on the private communications of three French
presidents, angering the French government and adding strain to an already tenuous EuropeAmerican relationship.French news site Mediapart first published the documents Tuesday, which cover NSA activity from 2006 to 2012, and were part of the original WikiLeaks provided by former
NSA contractor Edward Snowden. That news quickly drew the ire of French President François Hollande, who called an
emergency meeting Wednesday with the U.S. ambassador and government attorneys. “France will
not tolerate actions that threaten its security and the protection of its interests,” Hollande said in a statement Wednesday.
“These are unacceptable facts that have already been the subject of clarification between the US and
France, notably at the end of 2013 when the first revelations were made and during a state visit by the president of the Republic to the United States in February 2014. Commitments were made by the US authorities.
They need to be recalled and strictly respected.”
New WikiLeaks documents show the U.S.
US-EU relations High Now—Key to counteracting terrorism
Archick ‘14
(“U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism”, Kristin Archick, Specialist in European
Affairs, December 1, 2014, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS22030)
U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law
enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions with individual EU member states. Despite some frictions , most U.S. policy makers and analysts
view the developing partnership with the EU in these areas as positive. Like its predecessor, the Obama Administration
has supported U.S. cooperation with the EU in the fields of counterterrorism, border controls, and
transport security. At the November 2009 U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, DC, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to work together to combat terrorism and enhance cooperation in the broader JHA
field. In June 2010, the United States and the EU adopted a “Declaration on Counterterrorism” aimed at deepening the already close U.S.-EU relationship and highlighting the commitment of both sides to combat terrorism within the
the United States will continue to
partner with the European Parliament and European Union to maintain and advance CT efforts that provide mutual security and protection to
citizens of all nations while also upholding individual rights.” The EU has also been a key U.S.
partner in the 30-member Global Counterterrorism Forum, founded in September 2011 as a multilateral body aimed at mobilizing resources and
rule of law. In June 2011, President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism asserted that in addition to working with European allies bilaterally, “
expertise to counter violent extremism, strengthen criminal justice and rule of law capacities, and enhance international counterterrorism cooperation.
US EU Relations Tense- Asia risks souring relations
Esther Brimmer, 2015, 6-22-15"Why rising Asia risks souring U.S.-EU relations,"
Europe’s World, http://europesworld.org/2015/06/22/why-rising-asia-risks-souringu-s-eu-relations/#.VZ7SuvlVgaB
Asia’s rise is going to need careful management by the U.S. and the EU, The U.S. and EU must manage
their reactions to the rise of Asia because this transition for it has the potential to deepen existing strains in the
transatlantic relationship. The need for America and Europe to manage cope with such external influences is hardly new. Transatlantic
relations have been buffeted over the years by trends ranging from Europe’s process of de-colonisation to America’s Vietnam War, and
from conflict in the Middle East to war in Afghanistan. Global changes affect North America and Europe differently, and
so can lead to misunderstandings because the long-term rise of Asia will change the world. Europeans and Americans need to build a more nuanced
understanding of their shared interests. There are different interpretations of the rise of Asia, but five aspects are particularly interesting. It can be seen as an economic phenomenon, a strategic
challenge, a global power shift, a recognition of the re-emergence of China and India, and an acknowledgement of the many “middle powers” in the region. All five interpretations are likely to
influence the views from North America and Europe. “The biggest transatlantic divergence over Asia’s rise is the strategic outlook now that many Asian countries are greatly increasing their
military spending” Asia contains a number of the largest economies in the world. China last year accounted for over 16% of global GNP, as measured by purchasing power parity. Japan for
5.4%, India 5.8% and the U.S. 16.3%. Although trade is important, investment flows show a more complex relationship. International capital is taking a renewed interest in stable, established
markets now the sparkle of emerging ones is being dimmed by slower growth. For European countries, Asia and especially China has become a source of investment income. The economic crisis
has ushered in an era of inadequate intra-European investment, creating a profound need for investment in Europe just at a time when China wanted to invest its huge surpluses internationally.
Chinese investors and others found bargains in Europe. The result is that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into the EU grew a whopping 338% between 2010-2012. UNCTAD reports that
Chinese investment in the United Kingdom doubled from $1.4bn, it was $2.8bn during that period, and the overall value of Chinese investment stock in the EU rose to $31.5bn from a mere
$1.3bn in 2006. Chinese investment in the U.S. reached $17bn in 2012, up from a similarly low level of $1.2bn in 2006. Yet, despite this dramatic increase in Chinese investment, the U.S. and
Europe are still by far each other’s most significant economic partners. In 2012, the U.S. accounted for about a quarter of the EU’s foreign investments, with China trailing far behind at 6.1%,
Hong Kong at 5.9% and India only 2.1%. As to U.S. foreign investment, Europe received $2.7 trillion in 2013, almost a fifth of which went to the UK alone. Asia as a whole was of far less
interest than Europe to American investors, getting $695bn in 2013, of which $61.5bn went to China. “The rise of Asia is creating opportunities, but is also opening new areas for politically
charged debate” The transatlantic partners know well that increased investment brings deeper social engagement. But cCorporate investors’ decisions canalso affect local labour conditions, and
now some of the most difficult negotiations over TTIP relate to investment disputes. The perception that other countries’ standards are not as high as your own creates a politically charged
climate for negotiations. Europe has agreed investment provisions with Canada, but is still debating them with the U.S. in the TTIP negotiations. Europeans worry that American companies will
use the investor state dispute mechanisms to circumvent the EU’s labour, health and safety standards. For their part, the Europeans want such mechanisms to be included in the pending EU-China
bilateral investment treaty precisely to protect them from local actions in the less transparent Chinese dispute resolution system. Different types of investors in China enjoy different degrees of
market access, with the state-owned enterprises there controlling an important segment of Chinese international investment., although tThey are less transparent than many commercial investors
yet wield political clout. Europe arguably needs this investment agreement more than China as it wants greater access to Chinese markets, while China already benefits from access to Europe’s
open economies. One possible source of transatlantic tension is that the U.S., and but only some EU countries, requires a security review of investments by foreign government entities. This
raises questions about whether NATO-member the EU countries will be able to develop acceptable investment rules with some Asian countries from a security perspective. The rise of Asia is
creating opportunities, but is also opening new areas for politically charged debate. The biggest transatlantic divergence over Asia’s rise is the strategic outlook now that many Asian countries are
greatly increasing their military spending. China last year spent $216.4bn, triple its 2006 defence budget of $71.4bn. While the U.S. accounts for over a third of global military spending, China’s
share has risen to 12.25%. Part of the heralded U.S. “rebalance” to Asia reflects Washington’s efforts to revitalise transpacific political and security relationships as Asia raises strategic and
political issues for America as well as economic ones. Europeans may speak of Asia as a neighbouring region, but for many Americans the U.S. is part of the Asia/Pacific region. Fifty million
Americans live in the five states that border the Pacific Ocean. The United States is not alone among the countries of the Asia/Pacific region to have been alarmed by China’s adventurism in the
East China and the South China Seas. Yet from a U.S perspective the rise of Asia in strategic terms means not only the challenge of a more assertive China but also the benefit of more capable
regional partners for Washington. America and Japan have been allies for over 60 years, and Australia and New Zealand have been bound by the ANZUS treaty for as long. The U.S. and India
have moved closer together over the past decade in a stronger security relationship, with their 2008 agreement and subsequent work to bring India closer to international nuclear weapons control
The re-emergence of Asia is
likely
to have a particular impact on Europe, whose leaders may feel they need to ingratiate themselves
with the emerging Asian powers to stay in the game. While the United States will be a large and powerful country for decades to come,
Europe may feel disadvantaged in its relations with Asia, and that could cause tensions with the U.S.
regimes having removed barriers to more widespread co-operation.
recalibrating global power balances. These changes are
US-EU will continue to work together
O’Sullivan ’15 (22 June 2015, “HENRY GRATTAN LECTURE: EU-US RELATIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD SPEECH BY DAVID O’SULLIVAN EU AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED
STATES”, http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/henry-grattan-lecture-eu-us-relations-in-a-changingworld-speech-by-david-osullivan-eu-ambassador-to-the-united-states/, David O'Sullivan is an Irish civil
servant who serves as the Ambassador of the European Union to the United States and the Head of the
Delegation of the European Union to the United States. Prior to arriving to the United States, he was the
chief operating officer of the European Union's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service
(EEAS). He has held a number of high level positions including Head of Cabinet to Romano Prodi and
Secretary-General of the European Commission)
the EU-US relationship much more effective. Without a program of
joint EU-US wide sanctions, we would not have brought Iran back to the table and we would
certainly have had a lot less leverage on Mr. Putin. So far, despite the drag of these sanctions on the European economy, we have managed to maintain unity, and as long as attempts to
divide us fail, the EU will continue to work hand-in- glove with the United States on these
complicated issues. Washington increasingly sees Europe as having an important role to
play also in our southern neighbourhood and Federica Mogherini has been tireless in her attempts to contribute to
Working increasingly with what I call ‘institutional Europe’ has rendered
Rels Low Now
U.S- E.U. relations are becoming increasingly strained as the U.S. continues with
international spying
Gramer, 14
(Robert Gramer, Gramer staffs the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, Collateral damage: US spy scandals endanger the world's
largest trade deal, 7/22/14, URL, LJG)
After two German officials were arrested on charges of spying for the United States, Germany ordered the CIA station chief in Berlin to leave
the country. This story ripped open painful wounds from the NSA-spying scandal that had barely begun to scab over, when leaked documents
revealed that the United States had spied on German citizens and tapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel's personal phone. According to
U.S. officials, this scandal is simply a crisis du jour spurred primarily by naivety and hypocrisy from an ally who spies right back on the United
States. But to German officials, it's the latest example of overreaching U.S. intelligence practices that irrevocably damage the U.S.-German
relationship and deeply undermine the sanctity of allies' trust — to the point where the German committee investigating the NSA has
considered switching to typewriters. In
this politically charged climate, German and EU leaders may find a new
political lightning rod for rising frustration toward the U.S. in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), an ambitious trade deal between the United States and the European Union slated to add $280 billion and 13 million
jobs to the transatlantic economy. Germany is the EU's economic center of gravity, making it the United States' most important bilateral
partner in the TTIP negotiations. German and EU politicians will have to sell TTIP to their people for it to pass. This will be much more difficult
with citizens furious at the country on the other side of the negotiating table. As one German official told The New York Times, the latest
scandal "overshadows everything we do," including TTIP negotiations (complicated by the fact that the next round of TTIP negotiations started
this week with the spy scandal still saturating headlines). Indeed, the chair of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Elmar
Brok, hinted in an interview after the Edward Snowden scandal first broke that TTIP could be leveraged against the United States: "the
European Union is in charge of all the trade negotiations, all the rules and regulations on data protection, on the new transatlantic marketplace
agreement. ... I think the Americans should see that it is in their interests to find a solution to this question." While few European officials have
explicitly stated that the spy scandal will slow TTIP talks, it will undoubtedly be the elephant in the negotiating room. How can the United States
American officials need to
acknowledge the full scale of damage to U.S.-German relations. Right now, American officials appear to
be more annoyed than concerned, neither comprehending how deeply the multiple spy scandals scarred
the German public nor how it could hinder TTIP negotiations. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said Germany
salvage TTIP's prospects before political pressures grind the trade negotiators' efforts to a halt? First,
should understand what allies' "intelligence relationships and activities entail" and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the U.S. House
Committee on Intelligence, accused Germany of throwing a "political temper tantrum." Intelligence, especially surveillance, is a deeply personal
and contentious subject for the German people, inextricably rooted in the country's painful and infamous past. That makes this scandal
disastrous for U.S.-German relations, but this fact falls on deaf ears in the White House. Second, the U.S. government must demonstrate that it
will exert additional oversight on overly broad intelligence collection practices. Even if the government didn't substantially alter U.S. intelligence
policy (something even Angela Merkel conceded is tough), it would demonstrate to allies that at least publicly elected bodies were sufficiently
"watching the watchmen." Lastly, the United States should include language in TTIP that explicitly signals a commitment to agreeable civil
liberty protection for both American and EU citizens, while still effectively protecting national security interests. European officials can brandish
this as a victory, and the United States can link TTIP's success with policies on curbing broad surveillance it should have implemented in the first
place. The
NSA spy scandal unleashed a political firestorm in Europe, and this most recent scandal further fanned the
American policymakers must realize that this will not simply blow over with the right mixture of time, a few
quotes about being "great friends," or a nice photo-op. This is a disastrous turning point for U.S.-German relations, and
potentially TTIP, but few Americans seem to notice. The United States has shown it's more than capable of eavesdropping
flames.
on allies, but now it's time to listen to them.
U.S. - E.U. relations are becoming increasingly strained as businesses in the E.U.
realize that U.S. privacy policies are mostly false.
Bernard, 14
(Doug Bernard, Bernard covers cyber issues for Voice of America News, “EU Data Retention Ruling May Roil US-European Relations”, 4/8/14,
http://www.voanews.com/content/eu-data-retention-ruling-may-roil-us-european-relations/1888781.html, LJG)
Before any data can leave an EU member nation, U.S. telecommunications firms must certify they follow privacy policies and programs similar
to the more stringent EU protections, creating a "safe harbor" for data privacy. However, Kelley said,
regulators on both sides of the
Atlantic have long known that many U.S. safe harbor certifications are actually false, creating a serious
potential problem for U.S. companies doing business in the EU. This week's court ruling, he said, will only make
commerce more difficult. "Even before Snowden, there were concerns about the EU Safe Harbor," Kelley said. "There's already
skepticism in Europe because of that, and then you throw in Snowden, it creates more distrust. Having
one more element of differentiation between the U.S. and EU is just not helpful."
Rise of Asia is likely to deepen problems with U.S. – E.U. relations
Brimmer, 6/22/15
(Esther Brimmer, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs (2009-2013) and Professor of International
Affairs at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, “Why rising Asia risks souring U.S.-EU relations”, 6/22/15,
http://europesworld.org/2015/06/22/why-rising-asia-risks-souring-u-s-eu-relations/#.VZ06wflVikp, LJG)
Asia’s rise is going to need careful management by the U.S. and the EU,
The U.S. and EU must manage their reactions to the
rise of Asia because this transition for it has the potential to deepen existing strains in the transatlantic
relationship. The need for America and Europe to manage cope with such external influences is hardly new. Transatlantic relations have
been buffeted over the years by trends ranging from Europe’s process of de-colonisation to America’s Vietnam War, and from conflict in the
Middle East to war in Afghanistan. Global
changes affect North America and Europe differently, and so can lead to
misunderstandings because the long-term rise of Asia will change the world. Europeans and Americans need to
build a more nuanced understanding of their shared interests. There are different interpretations of the rise of Asia, but five aspects are
particularly interesting. It can be seen as an economic phenomenon, a strategic challenge, a global power shift, a recognition of the reemergence of China and India, and an acknowledgement of the many “middle powers” in the region. All five interpretations are likely to
influence the views from North America and Europe.
EU US Relations Falling Apart- Obama Administration to Blame
Sputnik, 4-2-15, By, 7-9-2015, "What transatlantic renaissance? US-EU relations falling apart at the seams," SOTT.net,
http://www.sott.net/article/294681-What-transatlantic-renaissance-US-EU-relations-falling-apart-at-the-seams
While the US President urges his Western allies to rally support for Washington's stance on the most
burning international issues, he should not be surprised that consensus is hard to come by, notes David J.
Karl, pointing to the fact Barack Obama has repeatedly snubbed the continent's leaders. The "continuing
ructions" in the US relations with its Western allies caused by Obama's failure to develop strong ties with
European leaders have ultimately overshadowed Washington's plan of a "transatlantic renaissance," David
J. Karl, president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, an analysis and advisory firm, pointed out. "[In 2008]
speaking before a massive crowd assembled in Berlin's "Tiergarten", [President Obama] grandly vowed to
"remake the world once again," this time in a way that allies would "listen to each other, learn from each
other and, most of all, trust each other." That pledge is now so yesterday that Mrs. Merkel is reportedly
longing for the days of George W. Bush," the expert emphasized. Barack Obama has repeatedly snubbed
the European leaders, Mr. Karl pointed out. Instead of taking a chance to demonstrate to the world USNATO solidarity, Barack Obama "in fact deliberately" missed an opportunity to meet with the new
NATO Chief, Jens Stoltenberg, in Washington last week. Stoltenberg requested a meeting with the US
President "well in advance," the expert underscored. Obama's move could only be considered as an
obvious slight to Jens Stoltenberg: the US President is one of a few Western leaders who have yet to with
the NATO chief, who assumed the position almost six months ago. However, Obama has demonstrated
disinterest in the US' European allies many times before. For instance, in November 2009, Barack Obama
opted out of holding a meeting with European Union leaders at the White House sparking speculations
that British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, one of the most pro-
American French leaders, felt like they were being ignored. Remarkably, a year later the American
President once again missed a summit with the EU leaders. In September 2009, during a so-called "reset"
of relations with Moscow, Barack Obama changed his plans of deploying a missile defense system in
Poland and the Czech Republic, but did not bother to inform his eastern European counterparts about his
decision. David J. Karl cited a top Polish security official who said that Warsaw heard Obama had shifted
the plan though the media. Another European security official complained that US President Obama
"does not do consultation, and he doesn't do discussion with allies. He reports, and he describes his
analytical process," as quoted by the expert. Curiously, the members of the Obama administration also
demonstrated little if any respect to the US' continental allies. A senior German official close to
Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked that Susan Rice, the US National Security Adviser, in 2013, pressed
the German team to adopt the US approach to the Syrian crisis openly demonstrating that she was not
interested in the EU view, David J. Karl noted. The expert added that Rice even used the hardly
diplomatic term "mother**ker," causing outrage among German politicians. The leaked phone
conversation of Victoria Nuland, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who graphically
cursed the EU, once again demonstrated the Obama cabinet's attitude towards its European allies. While
Obama is urging the EU to rally common Western positions on such issues as the Ukrainian conflict,
Iran's nuclear program and the rise of China, he should not be surprised that consensus is hard to come by,
the expert underscored. Instead of repairing ties with Europe, Barack Obama has evidently mismanaged
relations with the continent, David J. Karl stated.
Despite Stress over Surveillance- US EU Relations Still High
John Curran,, 6-16-2014, "EU AMBASSADOR NOTES EU-U.S. 'STRESS' OVER SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY," No Publication,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/docview/1541351319?pq-origsite=summon
Joao Vale de Almeida, the European Union ambassador to the U.S., this week called for a renewal of a
more trusting relationship between the EU and the U.S. following the past year's discord between the two
over disclosures of National Security Agency surveillance programs, which he said have constituted a
"stress test" of the relationship. Speaking at a cloud computing policy conference organized by Forum
Global, Mr. de Almeida said the EU and the U.S. need to "cultivate, nurture, protect, and promote" a
more trusted relationship. "In Europe, this is a serious issue," he said. "We should not underestimate the
importance of trust." "If trust does not exist...then the whole concept is not sustainable," he said, speaking
of agreements on cross-border data flows that are involved in cloud computing and other communications
services. Along those lines, he said the future may hold "severe weather alerts" over security and policy
differences. "Some clouds bring storms . . some storms can be linked to cybersecurity - this is the most
obvious problem," he said. On the policy front, he said NSA program revelations constitute a "political"
storm, with the "capacity to pollute policy making. He said, for example, that transatlantic trade talks now
underway between the EU and U.S. do not involve surveillance issues, but that those issues "are having
an impact on the negotiations. I don't think we should ignore this." Mr. de Almeida offered that it was
difficult to find the right balance between security and privacy, but that the EU and the U.S. nonetheless
have to attempt to "square the circle" on that issue. At the same event, Federal Trade Commissioner
Maureen Ohlhausen emphasized the importance of cross-border data flows to economic growth, and said
they constitute "the purest form of a broadband bonus - nobody loses, and everybody wins." She also
offered that the relationship between the U.S. and the EU has been improving in recent times following
the NSA surveillance program disclosures. "Despite some of the storms, it's getting stronger because it
needs to get stronger," she said. "It triggered a discussion, but I think we'll come out stronger." Cameron
Kerry, a former Department of Commerce general counsel and now a fellow at the Brookings Institution,
said that NSA surveillance "revelations have fueled the worst fears" that some Europeans have about U.S.
policy," and that some European institutions have tried to move forward on their own with data privacy
reforms as a result. "But at the end of the day, I don't think either side of the Atlantic can afford that," he
said. "Trade is too important, and the Internet is too important." He said the U.S. and the EU need to
affirm the continuing validity of their existing Safe Harbor framework for cross-border data flows, and
improve the "interoperability" of the exchange. "We need to dial back some of the regulatory friction so
we can focus on regulatory outcomes, not process." - John Curran, john.curran@wolterskluwer.com
US Spying on French Presidents Strain Relations
Khabar.Eu, 6-24-2015, "US must work to repair relations after spy claims, says French PM," Khabar.eu, http://www.khabar.eu/francesummons-us-ambassador-over-spying-claims-diplomatic-source/
PARIS: The United States must “do everything in its power” to repair relations after reports emerged that
it spied on French President Francois Hollande and two of his predecessors, Prime Minister Manuel Valls
said Wednesday. “The US should recognise not only the danger that such actions represent for our
freedom, but should also do everything in its power – and quickly – to repair the damage they have done
to relations… between the United States and France,” Valls told parliament. France earlier summoned the
US ambassador to complain about the “unacceptable” spying that was apparently revealed in leaked
documents. Hollande was due to discuss the documents released by WikiLeaks with US President Barack
Obama in the coming hours. France “will not tolerate any acts that threaten its security” the presidency
said, after a meeting between Hollande and his top intelligence officials and cabinet ministers. US
Ambassador Jane Hartley has also been summoned to meet French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius,
diplomatic sources told AFP. The United States wiretapped France's former presidents Jacques Chirac (L)
and Nicolas Sarkozy (C), as well as current leader Francois Hollande (R), French media report - AFP/File
The United States wiretapped France’s former presidents Jacques Chirac (L) and Nicolas Sarkozy (C), as
well as current leader Francois Hollande (R), French media report – AFP/File The documents – labelled
“Top Secret” and appearing to reveal spying on Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and Hollande from 2006
to 2012 – were published by WikiLeaks in partnership with French newspaper Liberation and the
Mediapart website. The leak coincides with a vote later on Wednesday in the French parliament on a
controversial new law granting the state sweeping powers to spy on its citizens. The White House said it
was not targeting Hollande’s communications and will not do so in the future, but it did not comment on
past activities. “We are not targeting and will not target the communications of President Hollande,” said
National Security Council spokesman Ned Price late Tuesday, calling the US partnership with France
“indispensable”. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (pictured) on Wednesday summoned the US
ambassador over leaked documents that suggest her government spied on President Francois Hollande
and two predecessors - AFP/File / Francois Guillot French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (pictured) on
Wednesday summoned the US ambassador over leaked documents that suggest her government spied on
President Francois Hollande and two predecessors – AFP/File / Francois Guillot Hollande’s office
recalled US promises in late 2013 not to spy on French leaders following accusations that the US National
Security Agency (NSA) had wiretapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel. “Commitments were made
by the US authorities,” the Elysee Palace said in a statement. “They must be remembered and strictly
respected.”
New Leaks show US Surveillance of German Officials- Further Strains Relations
Guardian, 7-1-2015, "WikiLeaks: US spied on Angela Merkel's ministers too, says German newspaper,"
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jul/02/wikileaks-us-spied-on-angela-merkels-ministers-too-says-german-newspaper
The United States did not just tap chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone but also eavesdropped on several of
her ministers, the German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung has reported, citing documents from WikiLeaks.
German-US relations were badly strained after fugitive US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden in
2013 revealed widespread US foreign surveillance, although a probe into the alleged tapping of Merkel’s
mobile phone was dropped in June over a lack of evidence. But according to the latest revelations the US
National Security Agency did not limit its snooping activities to Merkel and showed particular interest in
the activities of the ministries of finance, economy and agriculture, Sueddeutsche Zeitung reported. It said
WikiLeaks had shown it a list of 69 phone numbers belonging to ministers and senior officials that were
reportedly targeted. The list appears to date back to between 2010 and 2012. The current economy
minister and vice-chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel, was among those spied on by the NSA, the report said,
although it noted he had been in the opposition at the time. The list also features the number of former
finance minister Oskar Lafontaine, who left the job in 1999. But the number was “still active” according
to Sueddeutsche Zeitung, ringing through to the secretariat of the current finance minister, Wolfgang
Schaeuble. While Snowden alleged US spying on many European governments, his disclosures triggered
particular anger in Germany where bitterness lingers over mass state spying on citizens by the Stasi secret
police in former communist East Germany where Merkel grew up. Merkel herself phoned the US
president, Barack Obama, over the revelations and in public told Germany’s traditional post-war ally and
Nato partner that “spying between friends just isn’t on”. Washington appeared to confirm her phone had
previously been tapped when US officials said the cellphone was “no longer” a target.
NSA Foreign Surveillance Strains European-US Relations
Lauren C. Williams, 6-24-2015, "French Anger Over NSA Spying Further Strains Europe-U.S. Relations," ThinkProgress,
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/06/24/3673403/french-anger-nsa-spying-strains-europe-us-relations/
New WikiLeaks documents show the U.S. National Security Agency spied on the private
communications of three French presidents, angering the French government and adding strain to an
already tenuous Europe-American relationship. French news site Mediapart first published the documents
Tuesday, which cover NSA activity from 2006 to 2012, and were part of the original WikiLeaks provided
by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. That news quickly drew the ire of French President François
Hollande, who called an emergency meeting Wednesday with the U.S. ambassador and government
attorneys. “France will not tolerate actions that threaten its security and the protection of its interests,”
Hollande said in a statement Wednesday. “These are unacceptable facts that have already been the subject
of clarification between the US and France, notably at the end of 2013 when the first revelations were
made and during a state visit by the president of the Republic to the United States in February 2014.
Commitments were made by the US authorities. They need to be recalled and strictly respected.” The
White House has denied the spying allegations, saying via a statement Wednesday: We are not targeting
and will not target the communications of President Hollande. Indeed, as we have said previously, we do
not conduct any foreign intelligence surveillance activities unless there is a specific and validated national
security purpose. This applies to ordinary citizens and world leaders alike. We work closely with France
on all matters of international concern, and the French are indispensable partners. Spying on friendly and
enemy governments alike isn’t a new occurrence and is widely practiced, the U.S. is generally more
brazen about it. German lawmakers accused its own intelligence agencies earlier this year of violating
German regulations and gathering information in European targets for the NSA. The new Snowdenderived information comes as trust in U.S. government wanes domestically and overseas. Only a quarter
of Americans trust the government always or most of the time, according to a 2014 Pew Research survey.
When it comes to foreign relations, only 43 percent are at least fairly confident in how the U.S. handles
international matters, Gallup found. This week’s WikiLeaks also follows news that Germany folded its
investigation into the NSA’s spying practices after documents surfaced in 2013 indicating the agency
spied on Chanecellor Angela Merkel’s personal communications. But public disclosing of what should be
clandestine movements fuels international sentiment of American government’s disregard for civilian
privacy. “We find it hard to understand or imagine what motivates an ally to spy on allies who are often
on the same strategic positions in world affairs,” Stéphane Le Foll, a French government spokesman told
iTELE television. Negative global perception of the NSA’s actions could also affect how the U.S. does
business overseas. European regulators have already begun investigating tech companies’ potential
wrongdoing by participating in NSA surveillance programs. The Court of Justice of the European Union
is hearing a case involving Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Yahoo, for potential privacy law violations.
The decision could seriously damage the U.S.-European relationship by deterring companies from doing
business through stricter regulations. Facebook’s European public policy director Richard Allan warned
legislators in April that imposing stringent regulations on tech companies would be bad for business
stateside and abroad: National regulators in a number of countries, including Belgium and the
Netherlands, appear to be initiating multiple, overlapping investigations of Facebook, revisiting basic
questions about how our services work. In effect, this would mark a return to national regulation. If it is
allowed to stand, complying with EU law will no longer be enough; businesses will instead have to
comply with 28 independently shifting national variants. They would have to predict the enforcement
agenda in each country… Facebook’s costs would increase, and people in Europe would notice new
features arriving more slowly, or not at all. The biggest victims would be smaller European companies.
The next big thing might never see the light of day.
Impact Turns
1NC – China/EU Rels
US-EU relations trade off with China-EU relations
Small 7 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow with the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund - previously
worked as the director of the Foreign Policy Centre's Beijing office; as a visiting fellow at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, and was an ESU scholar in the office of Senator Edward M. Kennedy.
Graduated from Oxford. “China-Eu: A Common Future” edited by Stanley Crossick (Founding
Chairman, European Policy Centre, Brussels) & Etienne Reuter (European Commission, Belgium), World
Scientific Publishing Co., Chapter 6, p. 73-80)
For Europe and China alike, the most important bilateral relationship is with the United States. Although
often described as a ‘strategic triangle', neither the Chinese impact on the transatlantic relationship nor
Europe's role in the Sino-US relationship is remotely comparable to the significance of the United States
for the Sino-European relationship. Describing the United States as the elephant in the room does not
even begin to do it justice: the size and shape of the room are themselves shaped by the US factor.¶
To start with the Sino-Europcan relationship and then look at the US influence is to look in the wrong
place. It is the structure and dynamics of the other two relationships — the underlying tensions in the
Sino-US relationship and the underlying strength of transatlantic ties — that provide the critical
frame. The Primacy of the Transatlantic Relationship It is not much of an exaggeration to suggest that
major developments in EU-China relations over the past few years have been a subsidiary consequence
of the fraying and strengthening again of the transatlantic relationship. The 2003-2004 "honeymoon"
period in EU-China relations, during which the two sides launched the "strategic partnership" concept and
agreed, in principle, to lift the arms embargo, was substantially driven by a major transatlantic fallingout over Iraq. It was led, moreover, by two European political leaders — Jacques Chirac and Gerhard
Schroeder — who were simultaneously burning their bridges with the Bush administration. The end or
the honeymoon, in 2005. coincided with Schroeder's fading the scene, and the efforts of both Europe and
the United States, largely successful at an elite (if not a popular) level, to put transatlantic relations back
on track.
EU-China relations dampen global conflict and solve everything US-china rels do
better
Geiger 3 (“China and the European Union:¶ A Strategic Partnership for the Future”¶ Presentation made
by Henriette Geiger,¶ China Desk, DG External Relations, Unit H2 (China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan,
Mongolia), European Commission¶ 5 September 2003
http://www.ceibs.edu/ase/Documents/EuroChinaForum/henriette.htm#i3
The spectre of international terrorism, as well as growing concerns over the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, have brought new types of international security concerns to the top of the global
agenda. The sluggish world economy and concomitant negative trends in protectionism and regionalism
also loom as potential threats to global trade and development.¶ ¶ Faced with these common concerns, it is
in the clear and ever-greater interest of the EU and China to work together as strategic partners on the
international scene to safeguard and promote development, peace and stability.¶ ¶ Both EU and Chinese
interests converge on many issues, particularly in their appreciation of the key role of multilateral
organisations and systems in global governance. Through further reinforcement of their cooperation, the EU and China will be better able to promote these shared visions and interests, and to
shore up their joint security and other interests, both in the Asian region and elsewhere in the world.¶ ¶
Given China’s rapid emergence as a key global player, it must be recognised that Europe has a major
political and economic stake in supporting China’s successful transition process and full engagement in
the international community. At the same time China has a considerable interest in strengthening its ties
with a larger and stronger European Union.
1NC – Heg Collapse
US-EU relations constrain US leadership
John Van Oudenaren 2005, Chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, Summer [National Interest]
A partnership on terms likely to be acceptable to the EU would have significant economic disadvantages
for the United States and would complicate the ability of the United States to meet its global
commitments. The United States would remain the target of revisionist forces elsewhere in the world-whether Islamic radicalism or a rising China--but it would be forced to defer to a greater extent to
European views and interests with regard to these areas. While those who favor partnership argue that one of its main
advantages would be to provide the United States with added resources to deal with precisely these challenges, it is not clear that the
phasing-in of European contributions would keep pace with the decreased freedom of action that
partnership on European terms might entail.
Leadership prevents nuclear war and ensures great power peace
Barnett, Professor of Warfare Analysis and Research Dept U.S. Naval War College,
2011
(Thomas Barnett, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept – U.S. Naval War College, 3/7/11, “The
New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,”
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-andglobalization-at-crossroads)
Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole
full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the
responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us.
Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that
he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in
a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its
relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because
if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined
global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of systemadministering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As
the guardian of globalization , the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has
ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the
mass murder never would have ended . Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable
human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep
sliding down that path of perpetual war . Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by
ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order
known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an
explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling
of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent
reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember
that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its
cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters
and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain
the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world
looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th
century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a
world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than
100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations
suggest a 90
percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world
order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate.
But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S.
power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe
from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization
-- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated
globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the
Pacific Century now unfolding.
1NC – NATO Collapse
Ties with EU trades off with NATO
International Herald Tribune 2005 – 2-18
On the face of it, the issue is about how NATO and the European Union can discuss sensitive security issues when some EU
countries have not received security clearance from NATO to attend these meetings. In essence, however, diplomats say, it is about how the
two organizations are
vying with each other to set the agenda for the trans-Atlantic relationship. "There is
now a competition between both organizations where member countries try to play off their interests either against the
EU or NATO, " said a senior NATO official who, like most officials interviewed for this article, requested anonymity. "The relationship
between the
EU and NATO is in flux because both are jockeying for influence on the international stage," he
EU moves slowly along the road toward doing more defense and security, it is seen as threatening to NATO.
NATO knows it is no longer Washington's first port of call for its military missions. It is becoming a toolbox
for the U.S."
added. "As the
Collapse of NATO causes multiple escalatory nuclear wars
John Duffield 1994, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia,
[Political Science Quarterly 109:5, p. 766-7]
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important
factors that have helped to ensure the
alliance's enduring relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats sufficient to help
justify the preservation of the alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a
number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by
Russian military power, but also the relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the
pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the
alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in
containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it
works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc.
Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant
after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By
damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO
has
contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually
inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a
significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American
economic interests in Europe— as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable
direct foreign investment by American companies — remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United
States could
easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even
more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.11
2NC – NATO Collapse
Heightened US-EU cooperation will tradeoff with NATO and other regional alliances
John Van Oudenaren 2005, Chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, Summer [National Interest]
Two elements are important for a new U.S. strategy. First, a renewed attention to liberal multilateralism should make clear the direction that
U.S. policy should not take.
The United States should not pursue with the EU the kinds of charters, compacts,
partnerships and other bilateral arrangements currently being promoted in Atlanticist circles. However
well intentioned, this kind of U.S.-EU bilateralism moves away from a more plural and open
international order. Within Europe, it cannot help but promote the further centralization of policymaking in
and through Brussels that shifts power to the European Commission and member states such as France and Germany, even as
it helps to marginalize the contributions of more liberal outliers such as the UK, the Scandinavian countries and the new member states to the
east. In the wider world, it
increases the likelihood that U.S.-EU understandings will be imposed worldwide,
thereby marginalizing the influence of third countries that tend to be closer to U.S. positions. The result is a
double loss for international pluralism, both within Europe and at the global level. For the United States, such a loss might be worth paying if it
meant "pinning the EU down", both with regard to substantive principles (concerning regulation, global governance and so forth) and
procedural norms to ensure that these principles would be universalized in a cooperative rather than competitive manner. This is unlikely to
happen, however. Any
bilateral U.S.-EU understanding is certain to be ambiguous enough to preserve both
the EU's internal autonomy and external freedom of action, even as it diminishes the importance of
other mechanisms (such as NATO or the U.S.-Japanese relationship) that are valuable in their own right and that give the United
States levers of influence over the EU.
1NC – NMD
US-EU relations enable NMD
Malone and Thakur 1,(David, president of the International Peace Academy, Ramesh- vice Director of the United Nations University,
The Japan Times March 11,
Bush administration does not incline naturally toward multilateral diplomacy and a treaty-based
international security system. Nevertheless, it will not wish to alienate close allies on more than one or two issues at a
time and may soon find itself engaged in give-and-take with them. Its top priority appears to be the further
development and eventual deployment of a national missile defense system, a U.S. idea that has long unsettled not only
Russia and China, but also key European allies and Canada. It could well decide, among other measures, that ratification of the CTBT had
There can be little doubt that the
become useful to reassure allies and foes alike. Regardless of their views on NMD, U.S. allies and foes now need to consider their own
strategies. Indefinitely stamping their feet on an issue that may be nonnegotiable in essence but negotiable in specifics and at the margins,
would be self-defeating. NMD is not something the allies, Moscow or Beijing can stop. However, they
could well influence the
context within which NMD will be developed, its ultimate scope and its detailed aims. Their eventual consent can
also be exchanged against concessions from Washington on related or different issues.
NMD is a pretext for space militarization that results in global NBC war and
destruction.
Mitchell and Helwich 1, Gordon- Associate Professor of Communication, Kevin- Teaching Fellows in the Department of
Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html
Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer space would likely stir up massive political
opposition both home and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that 'the means by which
the placement of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second US space policy directive —
that of ballistic missile defense… This could preempt any political umbrage from most of the world's influential nations while
positioning the US as a guarantor of defense from a universally acclaimed threat'. 32 In this scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted under
the guise of missile defence, functions as a tripwire for unilateral US military domination of the heavens. A buildup of space weapons might
begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the
presence of
space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a
strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and antisatellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in
military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components.
As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in
space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic
missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can
also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's
atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into
strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death
Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon
platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers
with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale
sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space
weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless
performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different
ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that,
given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36
Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer
projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal
accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M.
Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can
do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the
same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing
offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One
imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique
potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack
would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An
accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive
military conflict ever seen.
1NC – Precautionary Principle
US-EU partnership forces adoption of the precautionary principle by the U.S.
John Van Oudenaren 2005, Chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, Summer [National Interest]
Furthermore, an
institutionalized partnership acceptable to Brussels and the member states probably would
have to be a kind of "partnership plus" in which the United States would cede a great deal more
influence than U.S. policymakers are likely to regard as reasonable. It would mean more than improved
consultation and a reining-in of what Europeans see as U.S. unilateralism. From the EU perspective, a satisfactory
partnership that would qualify as "equal" and "balanced" would be an acknowledgment of a new order
in which the EU would play an increased--and the United States a correspondingly decreased--role in setting the global "rules of
the game." The EU would expect to call the tune in multilateral settings, much the way it already does in forums such as
the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the trade area, such EU-pioneered concepts as the
precautionary principle, the cultural exception and the multifunctional role of agriculture would have to be
accommodated in some form.
The Precautionary Principle forces compliance with internationally binding
mechanisms that curtail nanotechnology development
Ronald Bailey 2004, Science Correspondent for Reason and former FERC analyst, 12-1
To address the social and economic effects of nanotechnology, the ETC Group is proposing a sweeping
international effort to regulate and control its development. "Extreme care should be taken that, unlike with biotech,
society does not lose control of this technology," warns Mooney. For the ETC Group, raising health and environmental concerns about
nanomaterials and nanobots is mainly a delaying tactic. "The biggest concern really is that with a technology as powerful as this one, society has
a role in deciding how it can and will be used," says Mooney. "This is going to have a profound effect on people's lives. Let people know that
their jobs are going to be taken away." In an April report on nanotechnology, the ETC
Group declares: "The international
community must begin work on a legally binding mechanism to govern atomtechnology, based on the
Precautionary Principle, one that will look beyond laboratory research to consider the wider heathh, socioeconomic and environmental
implications of nanoscale technologies... This protocol should be embedded in one or more of the relevant United Nations
agencies... Ultimately, ETC Group believes that the international regulations for atomtechnology should be incorporated under a new
International Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies (ICENT)." The framework for ICENT's evaluation of new
technologies would be the Precautionary Principle. As the ETC Group explains, "The Precautionary Principle says that
governments have a responsibility to take preventive action to avoid harm to human health or the environment, even before scientific certainty
of the harm has been established. Under the Precautionary Principle it is the proponent of a new technology, rather than the public, that bears
the burden of proof." Greenpeace's Douglas Parr also advocates using the Precautionary Principle to regulate the development of
The Precautionary Principle can be summarized as "never do anything for the first time." (See
"Precautionary Tale," April 1999.) The chief problem with the Precautionary Principle is that it encourages the natural conservatism of
our species. People far more easily imagine the harms new developments might bring than the benefits. But history clearly
nanotechnology.
demonstrates that the benefits of modern technology have far outweighed the harms. "Basically, people who support the strong Precautionary
Principle say, 'We don't care if we throw the baby out with the bathwater,'" says the Foresight Institute's Peterson. "They don't want any risks, so
they are willing to forgo the benefits."
This precautionary approach to nanotechnology causes extinction
Ronald Bailey 2004, Science Correspondent for Reason and former FERC analyst, 12-1
The ETC Group's ICENT proposal is starting to be taken seriously. Committees of both the European Parliament and the United Nations' Food
and Agriculture Organization have called for the adoption of an ICENT. "ICENT would have the power to conduct analyses of the economic
impacts, the effects on labor, on restructuring society," says Mooney. "ICENT
would examine all scientific, economic and
social issues of any new technology." Mooney argues that ICENT would improve our ability to forecast the effects of new
technologies. The track record for social, economic, and technological forecasting by experts is not very
encouraging. Consider the notorious 1972 Club of Rome study The Limits to Growth and President Carter's Global 2000 report, both of
which predicted that humanity would run out of a wide variety of natural resources by now. Or take Stanford University biologist Paul Ehrlich's
prediction that hundreds of millions of people would starve to death in massive famines in the 1970s. Such forecasts are not harmless. The
predictions in the 1970s that the world would soon run out of oil, for instance, resulted in the creation of the expensive and polluting Synfuels
program. Corporations aren't any better at forecasting than government agencies. In 1876 a Western Union internal memo
concluded, "This 'telephone' has too many shortcomings to be seriously considered as a means of communication. The device is inherently of no
value to us." In 1943 IBM CEO Thomas Watson famously predicted there would be a global demand for perhaps five computers. Over the short
term, nanotechnology will seem less odd than the telephone or the computer did. It will simply be incorporated into products that we already
know how to use: computers, cameras, clothing, cars. It will make them function better and more cheaply. By contrast, a full-fledged
nanotechnology, especially if molecular assemblers can be built, will disrupt all kinds of social and economic processes. Yet there is no reason to
believe that humanity will be unable to cope with what is coming. As for unintended consequences, someday something will go wrong with
nanotechnology, as it has with electricity, cars, and computers. But we
shouldn't deny ourselves the benefits of a new
technology just because we cannot foresee every consequence. We should proceed by trial and error and ameliorate
problems as they arise. That's how the dramatic progress humanity has seen during the last two centuries was accomplished. If an ICENT
had existed in the 19th century, we probably would still be riding horses, using candles for lighting, cooking on
wood stoves, and gulping whiskey for anesthesia. Mooney comes close to celebrating the emancipating possibilities offered
by the new technologies he fears. Yet he seems almost wistful for a time when he and many others believed ecological and economic collapse
was imminent. "We have lived so long by the assumptions of The Limits to Growth, it is hard to contemplate alternative possibilities" he writes.
"If
nanotech does work, we might console ourselves with the knowledge that we were not really wrong all this time, it is just that The
Limits to Growth have been postponed a few billion years... If nanotechnology is commercialized
successfully, Armageddon may have to be put on the back burner." Armageddon may indeed be
postponed indefinitely, but only if, with due caution, we leave human genius free to harvest the fruits of
technological progress.
1NC – Russian/EU Rels
U.S. – E.U. relations trades off with EU-Russian relations – Key to regional stability.
Recent events mean now is key.
Shapiro and Witney, 9 [TOWARDS A POST-AMERICAN EUROPE: A POWER AUDIT OF EU-US RELATIONS, Jeremy Shapiro and Nick
Witney, The European Council on Foreign Relations]
Relations with Russia are of intrinsic and self-evident importance to all the states of Europe and, for
sound historical reasons, the subject of a near obsession for some. A schism has long been evident between the “old
Europe” led by Germany, which is pursuing engagement (and gas), and the “new Europe” of ex-Communist member states which have an
altogether tougher attitude towards Russia. But, in fact, things are even more complex than that schism suggests. History, geography, and
culture have all played a part in generating a patchwork of views among the EU’s 27 member states. For example, there
is a discernible
bond of sympathy between Russia and its Orthodox co-religionists in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Greece. On the
other hand, a significant number of West European member states incline towards a “frosty pragmatism” in dealing with Russia, rather than any
enthusiastic pursuit of partnership. However, as the Bush presidency faded away in 2008, European attitudes
began noticeably to
converge. A number of factors contributed. First, as the dust settled on the Georgia crisis, the extent of Georgian
President Mikhail Sakashvili’s contribution to the debacle became clearer, while the effectiveness of French
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s intervention on behalf of the EU encouraged a degree of European self-confidence. Second, Russia had, like
everyone else, been humbled by the financial crisis – indeed, exceptional pride had gone before an unusually large fall. Third,
the gas crisis of early 2009 brought home to many Europeans that the problem is less energy
dependency on Russia per se than the murky issues involved in transiting Ukraine, and the lack of the right
networks and markets to distribute gas effectively within Europe. Against this background, it became easier for “old” and “new” Europe to find
common ground. With hindsight, German-French opposition to setting Ukraine and Georgia on the path to NATO membership at the Bucharest
summit of 2008 seemed smart. Member states began to agree that the right way to protect European interests in the Eastern neighbourhood
was through the EU (specifically, the new Eastern Partnership initiative), not NATO. Shortly before the 2009 NATO summit, the Polish foreign
minister even endorsed the idea of Russia one day joining the alliance – exemplifying both a new conciliation towards Russia and a reluctance to
use NATO as a weapon against it. Then, however, the Obama administration announced a “reset” of relations with Moscow. Although most
Europeans welcomed the US move, old
anxieties about “condominium” – in other words, the idea that Europe
could end up sandwiched between converging US and Russian interests – also re-emerged. In the wake of the June
2009 US-Russia summit in Moscow, these anxieties found striking expression in the open letter signed by 22 leading Central and Eastern
European figures that urged the US not to take the region for granted.37 The US was deeply irritated – its immediate reaction was, according to
one Washington insider, “a very, very angry push-back”. The Obama administration had, after all, done its utmost to reassure the new EU
member states that it was committed to their security and to ensure that Russia did not misinterpret “reset” as tacit permission to claim a new
sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. The episode illustrates that nothing so confuses and divides Europeans as an active US policy,
whether the president behind it is George W. Bush or Barack Obama. Our audit suggests that the key reason is that Eastern Europeans simply do
not trust their European partners and allies, even through NATO, to guarantee their security against Russia. They look only to the US for that
security. Neither EU solidarity nor NATO’s mutual security guarantees can compensate for the fear that they might be betrayed by the US.
Although the historic roots of this view are clear, it would seem to be anachronistic. After all, the US effectively had no Russia policy during the
last year of the Bush administration and did little when Russia invaded its neighbour. Meanwhile, with
the US effectively absent
during the interregnum between the old and new administrations, Europe worked through the Georgia
and gas crises with a quite untypical degree of cohesion and self-confidence. This analysis suggests that
Europeans might have more success if they worry a little less about what the US is up to and a little
more about defining and asserting their own common interests in relation to Russia. Having launched their new
Eastern Partnership initiative – albeit with German Chancellor Angela Merkel as the sole EU head of government in attendance – they now need
to devote the necessary attention and resources to making it a success. They need to make it harder for the Russians to play on their divisions
by presenting a more united front to Moscow, not just on issues such as energy but also on the wider economic relationship that is waiting to be
developed to mutual benefit. Europeans
should also debate Moscow’s ideas on a “new security architecture”
rather than just waiting to see what the US thinks about them. Europe’s interests in relation to Russia are not identical
with those of the US. Nor is it paranoid to believe that the Obama administration would like to see the Europeans taking rather more
responsibility for themselves and indeed for the post-Soviet states covered by the Eastern Partnership. As a global power, the
US cannot
afford to assign disproportionate time and attention to a region of the world that does not, or at least
should not, need it. The US wants the EU to be a more effective player on its own continent. From a European point of view, this would
not only be a more effective way of dealing with Russia, but also would prevent Washington and Moscow doing deals over querulous European
heads. From an American point of view, a Europe that acted in this way would be the sort of partner that it wants at the other end of an
effective transatlantic relationship.
And, Effective EU- Russian relations are key to stabilize Europe and prevent war.
Anderson 7, Russian-EU relations: Leaders, Present Conflicts, and Future Policies, Brussels Research Project, Andrea, Fall
This is a crucial time in EU-Russian relations because, not only is Putin up for reelection in a few months,
but his predecessor will most likely be someone he approves oil Will Putin try to use his influence with
the EU to promote economic stability in Russia? Or is socialism with a semi-dictatorship back on the
table? Even though anything is possible with elections just around the corner, the EU must decide now if close ties with
Russia will promote its agenda, as well as advance the EU’s and Russia’s reputation as global actors
(“Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation"). Even though anything is possible with presidential elections just around the corner, this paper
shows that because EU-Russian relations are still important. Thus, it
is in Russia’s best interests to stay tied politically and
economically to the EU. The EU needs to stay on good terms and in a relationship with Russia during this
Kosovo crisis so that Javier Solana,” who assists with the EU’s foreign policy matters, can influence
Russia to put pressure on Serbia to not act violently while the international community attempts to help
Serbia with Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The EU must decide if close ties with Russia will promote its
agenda, as well as advance its reputation as a global actor (“EU, Russia signal closer ties at Portugal summit”). This is more
likely because parting ways is not the best option for either of them right now. With yesterday’s signing of the Reform Treaty, the EU is rising on
the global scene. As becoming a global actor i: also Russia’s intention, the two are going in the same direction just with a few kinks in their
relationship. As far as human rights violations are concemed, the EU needs to start discussing these with Russia; human rights need to be back
on the table if Russia wishes to be taken seriously. Most countries have domestic problems, but the (in some cases, mass) displacement
of citizens by authorities and unrepresentative voting arrangements make Russia’s problems more than
just domestic conflicts that can be overlooked by the international community.
1NC – Unity
US-EU relations kill EU unity
Marquand 9 By Robert Marquand | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor from the
April 2, 2009 edition
Strasbourg, France - As Barack Obama leaves London and heads to a key NATO gathering here
Friday, he steps onto the European continent as new, fresh – an urban guy, a 21st century American,
someone Europeans understand and admire. Yet that may be part of the problem. President Obama,
the new US face and policy, represents
an inherent challenge to Europe: It is not just
that Obama drips soft power from every pore, is a listener, a Democrat, "sympathetique,"
and a hero for immigrant populations in Europe's suburbs that have yet to achieve
political power. More deeply, the popular young American president is stirring basic
questions here over how to coordinate and respond to a chief ally that is suddenly
sending all the signals Europe asked for . In London, in a last-minute compromise that
many called historic, the White House got far more stimulus to relight the global trade economy than
many thought possible. However, at NATO's 60th anniversary here in Strasbourg, he may not get
more troops for Afghanistan – though the new "Afpak" review indicates such troops are needed even
for the civil building that Europeans say will aid in "mission accomplished" there. But the "Obama in
Europe" storyline runs deeper than a difficult diplomatic checklist that includes Russia, Iran, North
Korea, and the global crisis, say political thinkers here. It has to do with a Europe that, for 40 years,
and in significant strides, has sought
to speak with one voice. For almost a decade,
Europe and America, tied by history, drifted apart in terms of stated values and
policy. But with an avowedly liberal internationalist at the US helm, Europe has
less to complain about. Ahead of his visit, in inconclusive meetings in Brussels, there was
uncertainty and bickering. What's causing stress in the European Union is not US
badgering and unilateralism, but the Obama dynamic of moving toward
agreement, consensus, and multilat eralism, say some economists and political scientists.
"President Bush was an extraordinary catalyst for Europe, a bogeyman. Even
people with diverging views on economic and foreign policy were united against the US policy," says
Karim Bitar, a Paris consultant and scholar at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations.
"But now the US can no longer be accused of all the world's ills. The truth is,
Europeans now think more about America than about Europe. There is no
European consensus on the most basic questions of our future, what we should be.
Under Bush, we could evade them. Not now." Europe's internal conflict over the
Russian war in Georgia last summer, and the crisis over interrupted oil and gas supplies to
Europe this winter, were indicators of division in what is still an economic union
struggling to achieve political solidarity. The question is whether Europe can find
its voice when there is basic agreement with Washington. "When the Europeans
agree with the US, they often disagree with each other," as a European diplomat puts it.
Unified Europe solves hotspots, growth and global war
STABILITY, GROWTH AND PROSPECT – A REVIEW OF CHINA-EU RELATIONS IN 2010
Ambassador SONG Zhe December
Mr SONG Zhe is the Ambassador of the People’s Republic
of China’s Mission to the European Union. Issue 6, December 2010 20 10 eu china observer
Europe is a major power in the international community. Europe plays
an important role in
upholding world peace, promoting common development, tackling global
challenges, and resolving regional and hotspot issues. Europe is a strong force
in building a fair and just international political and economic order. The EU’s
integration process is the most viable choice for European countries in order to
develop strength through unity. For decades, the European Union has demonstrated
admirable determination and resolve in overcoming all difficulties and hardships
and in establishing from scratch an otherwise highly integrated union today. We
firmly believe that the European integration process will continue to enjoy a
promising prospect in the future. Europe is the world’s most important economy.
As the world’s largest bloc of developed countries, the EU is a leading player in
terms of foreign trade, innovation, brand marketing, and economy of scale. We
have full Issue 6, 2010 4 confidence that the euro will emerge from the current crisis
and contribute to the stability and diversity of the international monetary
regime . Europe enjoy
s strong influence over international public opinion and agenda-setting. Europe is the birthplace of
Western civilization and modern philosophy and a supporter and practitioner of multilateralism,
global governance, and of peaceful resolutions to international disputes. We believe that thanks to
the many active minds present in Europe and thanks to the strength of its media,
Europe is in a position to contribute more forcefully to the prosperous development
of a more diverse world.
Impact Defense
A2: Afghanistan
1NC – Stable Now
Afghanistan stability now
PressTV, “US withdrawal brings stability to Afghanistan: Officials”, Feb 14, 2015,
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/02/14/397602/US-pullout-brings-peace-to-Afghanistan
The security situation across Afghanistan is gradually improving following the partial withdrawal of US-led
forces from the war-ravaged country, officials say, Press TV reports. Local residents and security officials in Afghanistan say order has
significantly improved in the volatile southern and eastern provinces, which were once the epicenters of
the Taliban militancy. US-led forces have closed most of their military facilities in the southern, eastern and central regions of the
violence-torn country. Thousands of Afghan troops have assumed full responsibility for the security of several
provinces. Maidan Wardak Police Chief Khalil Andarab has recently said attacks have decreased drastically in the past few
months. “Attacks and insecurities in Maidan Wardak Province, especially on Kabul-Kandahar highway, have
decreased by around 95 percent in the past 8 months,” he told Press TV.
Even if they win that Afghan is unstable now --Solving Afghan Instability requires increasing ground forces --- they don’t do that
Faizi and Roufi 15 (Abdul Rashid Faizi graduated from the United Arab Emirates University, in the
UAE. Abdul is a researcher at the UAE University focusing on political economy, international economic,
economics of development, and foreign direct investment. Shahabuddin Roufi is a research assistant at
the College of Business and Economics, UAE University. His research interests include economics and
political economy focusing in Islamic countries. “Three Factors Contributing to Afghanistan’s Instability”
January 13 2015 accessed 7/9/15 http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/rural-population-afghanistan476/) DAH
Political scientists believe that higher population size and concentration raises the risk of civil conflict. It could also lead to higher probability of
revolutions to overthrow governing elites in non-democratic countries. This claim, supported by political scientists, does not refer to the
number of people that eventually join an insurgency, but only the number of people that start one. They constitute enough rebels to pose a
serious threat. In
Afghanistan the rural population is an important determinant of political stability. Now and
in the past, the political stability in Afghanistan has been threatened mainly by rural residents. Currently
almost all insurgent groups such as the Taliban are based in rural areas. From those safe heavens they recruit
insurgents and manage all of their destructive activities against the government. As a footnote in history, most resistance groups were based in
rural areas during Afghanistan’s fight against the Soviet Union. In 1996 when the Taliban conquered Kabul, almost all of their fighters were
recruited from rural communities. The
reasons are very obvious: rural areas are safe havens where insurgents
could easily and freely plan their destructive activities. Moreover, the threat of rural populations to
political stability of Afghanistan results from the interconnection of the following well-known facts:
Geography Insurgency is closely related to the geography of the country. The presence of rough terrain, poorly served by
roads and at a distance from the centers of state power, favors insurgents. This is fostered by the availability of cross-border
sanctuaries inhabited by people that can be easily manipulated by local insurgents. In this scenario it is not
uncommon that these local populations get trapped between their responsibilities as citizens of the country and their cultural loyalty to the
local insurgent groups. Moreover,
the government does not have a permanent control over these areas, which
nurtures a decent atmosphere for insurgent groups. Poverty People feel that their government has
abandoned them and failed to provide financial means to elevate their living standards. This problem is
enhanced by the fact that the country has a large percentage of young men who cannot find enough
employment opportunities. Their contribution to economic development and their participation in the political process is highly
underexploited. Afghan young men tend to participate in activities that are either economically unproductive, such as joining gangs and drug
cartels or politically destructive, such as organizing resistance groups under leadership of insurgents. Extremism It
is a well known fact
that religious extremism has become the core of much of Afghanistan’s violence. Extremists justify their
version of Islam to force people to accept their Islamic interpretation. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact
that almost all of the rural residents are uneducated. The presence of madrasas (Islamic schools) works in their favor. In these schools they
mainly spread their radical political thinking to the public. The products of madrasas are radical Muslims who play key roles in destabilizing
activities. Recently,
there has been a dramatic increase in insurgent attacks in the country. Security
handovers from NATO to Afghan forces, and the American pullout have motivated the Taliban to
increase their destructive activities. The threat might strongly resurface yet again. Based on these three reasons,
the rural population has a strong impact on the political stability of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it seems that the
government is not taking this problem very seriously. This threat is becoming very grave by the reduction and
withdrawal of American and NATO forces from the country. History might repeat itself again if the government fails to
tackle the challenges.
1NC – No Spillover
Afghanistan won’t spillover
Kazemi, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012
(S. Reza, “A Potential Afghan Spill-Over: How Real Are Central Asian Fears?”, http://aanafghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3152, ldg)
A spill-over of the Afghan conflict or aspects of it like the drug trade into Central Asia is realistic, but it
need not be as threatening and disastrous as the region’s governmental officials depict it. It also may differ for
particular Central Asian countries. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – of Afghanistan’s three direct Central Asian neighbours (with the third being Turkmenistan) – are likely
A spill-over of Islamist terrorism from Afghanistan seems unlikely, however, at least for
the time being. The leadership of the IMU, regarded as the most serious militant threat against the region, has
been largely dismantled. Although a 2011 AAN report identified some IMU presence in Afghanistan’s Balkh, Faryab and Kunduz provinces bordering
to continue to be most affected.
Central Asia, the bulk of the IMU fighters are based in Pakistan’s Waziristan, far away from any shared Afghanistan-Central Asia frontier. It is unclear, therefore, if
the movement can re-group to organise and carry out attacks in Central Asian territory, apart from causing localised instability and violence on Afghan soil.(9) And
even if so, terrorist and extremist threats facing Central Asia (and particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are more home-grown than what would originate from
Afghanistan, as, for example, Christian Bleuer argues (read, for example, here), although others like Ahmed Rashid have, both in the past and recently, talked about
larger regional networks of militants. If
there is any actual spill-over of the Afghan conflict into Central Asia, it is more
likely to continue to be drug trafficking. Afghanistan is by far the largest global producer of poppy and hashish and increasingly of derivates
produced from them. As the recent fighting in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) has shown, there are cross-border
networks functioning and corrupt government officials both in Afghanistan and Central Asia can hugely
benefit from their trafficking (for a UN report on drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia and onwards, see here). In a reverse way,
Uzbekistan has engaged to influence Afghanistan’s socio-political developments more seriously than any other Central Asian government. It has supported the
Uzbek commander-turned-politician Abdul Rashid Dostum and his party Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan (Afghanistan’s National Islamic Movement) (for
latest developments in the party, read a recent AAN paper). Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also have large numbers of co-ethnics inside Afghanistan, but Afghan Tajiks
and Uzbeks are very different from their ethnic kin in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, mainly because of Central Asia’s Sovietisation, despite speaking almost similar
languages (see, for example, here).(10) It also needs to be recalled that conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have had mutual spill-over effects. During the 1992-97
Tajik civil war, parts of the Tajik opposition fled to Afghanistan, were supported by Afghan mujahedin and used Afghanistan as a safe haven and base to carry out
attacks in Tajikistan. During the conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taleban, Tajikistan had provided, among other things, an airbase to the Northern
Alliance in Kulyab in southern Tajikistan for them to use to mobilise and organise the resistance against the Taleban’s advance towards northern Afghanistan (read,
for example, here). In addition, the civil war in Tajikistan drove tens of thousands of people out of Tajikistan to the northern Afghan provinces of Balkh, Kunduz and
Takhar (read here). Judging
by recent contemporary precedents, an American Central Asia researcher, who
requested not to be named, wrote to AAN that ‘the previous experience in the mid- to late 1990s of
having a civil war in northern Afghanistan and a Taleban government controlling much of the north was not particularly
traumatic’. Whatever the speculations about the Afghan conflict going northwards may be, Central
Asia plus Afghanistan is one of the world’s least integrated regions . To subsume the five former Central
Asian Soviet republics under one term – ‘the -stans’ – reflects an un-informed and superficial look at this
region. Considering the growing number of bilateral and intra-regional conflicts and competing attempts to achieve regional leadership, this perception is
everything but justified.
A2: Asian
1NC – No Asia War
No Asia war
Nick Bisley 14, Professor of IR @ La Trobe University (Australia) and Executive Director of La Trobe
Asia, “It’s not 1914 all over again: Asia is preparing to avoid war”, 3/10, http://theconversation.com/itsnot-1914-all-over-again-asia-is-preparing-to-avoid-war-22875
Asia is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle époque. Analogies are an understandable way of trying to make sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this
the historical parallel is deeply misleading. Asia is experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the US and China
reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key powers are at very high levels: Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But there are
very good reasons, notwithstanding these issues, why Asia is not about to tumble into a great power
case, however,
war. China is America’s second most important trading partner. Conversely, the US is by far the most
important country with which China trades. Trade and investment’s “golden straitjacket” is a basic reason to
be optimistic. Why should this be seen as being more effective than the high levels of interdependence between Britain and Germany before World War One? Because Beijing and
Washington are not content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace. They are acutely aware of how much they have at stake . Diplomatic
infrastructure for peace The two powers have established a wide range of institutional links to manage their
relations. These are designed to improve the level and quality of their communication, to lower the risks
of misunderstanding spiralling out of control and to manage the trajectory of their relationship. Every year,
around 1000 officials from all ministries led by the top political figures in each country meet under the auspices of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue has demonstrably
improved US-China relations across the policy spectrum, leading to collaboration in a wide range of areas. These range from disaster relief to humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of
Unlike the
near total absence of diplomatic engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to 1914, today’s
two would-be combatants have a deep level of interaction and practical co-operation. Just as the extensive array of
common interests has led Beijing and Washington to do a lot of bilateral work, Asian states have been
busy the past 15 years. These nations have created a broad range of multilateral institutions and
Afghan diplomats to marine conservation efforts, in which Chinese law enforcement officials are hosted on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime legal regimes.
mechanisms intended to improve trust , generate a sense of common cause and promote regional prosperity. Some organisations,
like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have a high profile with its annual leaders’ meeting involving, as it often does, the common embarrassment of heads of government dressing
there are more than 15
separate multilateral bodies that have a focus on regional security concerns. All these organisations are trying to build
what might be described as an infrastructure for peace in the region. While these mechanisms are not flawless, and
up in national garb. Others like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But
many have rightly been criticised for being long on dialogue and short on action, they
countries to clearly state their commitments and priorities.
have been crucial in managing specific crises and allowing
A2: Asia Pivot
1NC – Fails/False
Asia pivot fails
Auslin, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2012
(Michael, and columnist at wsj “America Doesn't Need a Pivot to Asia,” 8/27,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444506004577614941100974630.html?mod=googlen
ews_wsj)
It is time to bury the Obama administration's pivot to Asia. This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was
supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China's rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less
than it appears. It
won't solve Asia's problems
and may even add to the region's uncertainty by
over-promising and
under-delivering. Everything wrong with the pivot can be summed up by Four R's: rhetoric; reality; resourcing; and raising expectations
and then doubts. So far, the first and perhaps biggest problem with the idea of the pivot—or, as the Defense Department calls it, the
rebalancing—is that it remains largely rhetorical, vague and aspirational. True, there are some laudable moves,
such as basing U.S. Marines in northern Australia and agreeing to port new U.S. warships in Singapore. These,
however,
hardly add up to a breakthrough . The world still wonders what the purpose is: to contain China, to promote
democracy, to make the United States the de facto hegemon of Asia, or simply to reassure nervous nations about China's rise? The reality is
that not much will change in America's actions. The
pivot says nothing about taking on new commitments, for
example toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or to countries with whom America does not currently have formal
alliances. Just as importantly, Washington has made clear in recent months that it will not take sides in the territorial disputes that have roiled
the East and South China Seas, even when allies like Tokyo and Manila are involved. Further evidence for this reality comes from the resource
constraints imposed on this grand project. The Obama administration is trying to do it on the cheap. Pivot funding is in danger from
sequestration—forced budget cuts resulting from larger budget politicking in Washington—that, if allowed to proceed, will cut another $500
billion from a defense budget already reduced by $900 billion since 2009. The administration claims that America's military presence in Asia will
not be affected by these budget cuts. If that is so, then U.S. military posture in the rest of the world will be cut back. More likely, any buildup
will be difficult to sustain. The shifting of more planes and ships to the Pacific will soon slow down, as the size of the Air Force and Navy shrink,
and as other world problems such as Iran and Syria continue to dominate the attention of American policy makers. This, in turn, is raising
doubts about the pivot in Asia, so soon after the rhetoric from Washington had raised expectations. Countries such as Vietnam and the
Philippines led themselves to believe that the pivot would have concrete results, such as quickly increasing American presence in the region and
perhaps even American support in their maritime territorial disputes with China. Both accordingly reached out to Washington, holding new
military exercises or discussing greater security cooperation. Yet this enthusiasm makes it all the worse when those hopes turn out to be
dashed by Washington's failure to act. As one Philippines senator asked during his country's standoff this spring with China over the
Scarborough Shoal, what good is the alliance with the U.S. if America refuses to back up its partners in times of need? By appearing to make
unrealistic promises, the Obama administration has created new diplomatic headaches for itself in managing the fallout from its failure to deliver. What then is the point of the pivot? By not getting involved in maritime disputes, other than rhetorically,
Washington is actually taking the most realistic approach possible. No administration, Republican or Democratic, is going to risk a
crisis with China short of any overt attempt by Beijing to take over territory clearly controlled by other nations. Building up U.S.
forces in Asia, were it even possible, would not change that political calculation. The current American military posture can be diversified
to a few more countries, but essentially, Washington has had the right balance for the past several decades. While it would be a mistake to
shrink the U.S. air and naval presence in Asia, all Washington could do is slightly increase it, and that
will change nothing in the
region . Moreover, there are few realistic options for new partners in Asia, especially ones such as Japan and Australia that can provide
some level of regional security cooperation. That means America's current grouping of allies and partners is right-sized for the political and
security realities of the Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future.
Asia pivot is inflated- the status quo solves literally every impact
Innocent, foreign policy analyst at Cato, 2012
(Malou Innocent, “Talk of a U.S.-Asia 'Pivot' Is Overblown,”
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/13/talk-of-a-us-asia-pivot-is-overblown)
The greatest misperception surrounding Washington's "pivot" to Asia is that America's dominant presence is
not already felt there on a regular basis. It is. The United States plays a considerable role in the Far East, despite the
Obama administration's proclamations last autumn that it would "pivot" or "rebalance" there in the future. For one, the
United States maintains forward-deployed forces in South Korea, with 28,500 U.S. troops; Guam, with 4,500 U.S. troops;
and Japan, with 40,000 U.S. troops. Guam, of course, is part of America as a non-self-governing, unincorporated tervritory. South Korea and
Japan, however, after decades of proven internal stability and peaceful democratic transitions, are equipped to defend themselves. [See a
collection of political cartoons on defense spending.] Once upon a time, South Korea was incapable of surviving without America's support.
That began to change in the 1980s. Today, its economy ranks around 13th in the world, it has twice the North's population, and, if South
Korea's leaders chose to, could be spending on defense the equivalent of the North's entire annual GDP. As for Japan, despite its recent
economic woes, it had the fifth highest defense budget in the world in 2011, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Japan
surpassed Russia, India, and Brazil, and fell only behind the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Moreover, as scholars
Shinichi Ogawa and Michael Schiffer have pointed out, in criticism of its policy, Japan possesses a nuclear "breakout'' capacity, meaning its
civilian nuclear fuel cycle is so advanced "that, at the flip of the switch, [it] could be militarized." Save for a planned contingent of 2,500 U.S.
Marines in Australia, four littoral combat ships stationed in Singapore, and rotating troops and surveillance aircraft in the Philippines, it is
unclear whether U.S. troop deployments will grow more robust in Japan and South Korea. They should not. Such prosperous allies can live
without the generous welfare of American taxpayers. [Read the U.S. News Debate: Should Cuts Be Made to Domestic Social Programs to
Protect the Defense Budget?] Aside from these forward-deployed forces, the
Far East feels Washington's constant presence
with the United States Pacific Command. This regional unified military structure consists of about one-fifth of total
U.S. military strength. It includes six aircraft carrier strike groups, about two-thirds of U.S. Marine Corps
combat strength, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which goes on frequent patrols conducting joint, militarytraining exercises with America's allies and partners. Talking about partners, Uncle Sam has a lot of them in a region home
to over 50 percent of the world's population. The United States has been cultivating warmer relations with India, most
especially after accommodating New Delhi's nuclear expansion with a symbolic, 2008 agreement facilitating
civilian nuclear cooperation between them. Moreover, despite recent hand wringing over U.S.-Russia relations, Washington's so-called "reset"
has rebounded ties from their 2008 low, particularly with regard to Moscow's help supplying NATO's war effort in Afghanistan. [Read the U.S.
News Debate: Are Cuts to the Defense Budget Necessary?] Elsewhere, the
United States has forged better relations with
Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines, and has embraced existing multilateral
organizations and trade agreements, like the East Asia Summit, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In the end, Washington's obsessive fixation on the Middle East and North Africa should
warrant serious reconsideration. More of America's attention should be paid to the future of the Asia-Pacific, since maintaining peace in that
region will be the challenge of the 21st century. However, what foreign policy planners in Washington should be asking themselves is what the
United States should be willing to defend in this region, and at what cost? What implicit commitments should Washington make to prosperous,
populous countries eminently capable of defending themselves? Allies are intended to supplement a nation-state's power, not hinder or
jeopardize it. [See a collection of political cartoons on the Middle East.] Primarily, America's deepening involvement in Asia is meant to reassure
allies nervous over China's growing assertiveness and increased military spending. However, the United States can both value being a strong
military power and allow other countries in the Far East to assert a greater leadership role. These policies are neither zero-sum nor mutually
exclusive. For more than half a century, the United States has played a prominent military and economic role in the Asia-Pacific. The American
people should not be led to believe that their country was a never a force to be reckoned with there. Indeed, the
biggest tale
proponents of U.S. prominence in Asia ever sold was the intimation that we do not already have it.
A2: Bioweapons
1NC – I/L D
EU is not willing to upgrade security to help bioterrorism
Stokes, 15- Director of Global Economic Attitudes
5 key takeaways about the U.S.-German relationship http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/07/5key-takeaways-about-the-u-s-german-relationship/
Half (50%) of both Germans and Americans say their country should deal with its own problems and let
other countries deal with their own challenges. Roughly comparable proportions of Germans (43%) and
Americans (39%) believe their nation should help other countries deal with their difficulties. Younger
Germans and Americans in particular are more inward-looking than their older counterparts. More than
half of Americans (57%) and Germans (54%) ages 18 to 29 hold the view that their country should deal
with its own problems and let others deal with theirs. And only 36% of that age group in Germany and
31% in the U.S. believe that their country should assist other nations. This stands in sharp contrast with
the attitudes of their older countrymen: 46% of both Americans and Germans ages 65 and older say their
countries should do more to help others.
1NC – No Bioweapons
No risk of bioterror
Rebecca Keller 13, Analyst at Stratfor, 7 March 2013, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,”
Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)
The risk
of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being
studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the
best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three
out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are
part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those
wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with
national authorities. The
risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but
given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon
requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent
strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have
rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low.
Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious
pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack.
The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual
could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints
that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and
aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were
able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack
ineffective . Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a
contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the
infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like
small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.
A2: European War
1NC – Europe War
European war is impossible
Karaganov 11 et al – head of the Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Dean of the School of the World Economy and International Affairs at the National
Research University–Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE); Chairman of the Presidium, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP); Chairman of the Editorial Board, Russia in Global
Affairs journal. -- Report by the Russian Participants of the Working Group on the Future of the Russian—U.S. Relations, The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»: Building a New Agenda.
A View from Russia, http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/US-Russia%20relations_eng.pdf
This short list of challenges shows that the main threats to Russia and the U.S. in the world of today and tomorrow stem not from each other’s policies but from external global and
regional factors. Russia and the U.S. do not pose direct military threats to each other, either in the field of conventional forces in Europe, or in the strategic sphere.
A conventional
war » in Europe is physically impossible . The preservation by Russia and the U.S. of their ability
to physically destroy each other, while maintaining appropriate confidence-building measures and
strategic stability, has a stabilizing effect both on their own policies and the policies of other
nuclear and nonnuclear countries.
«big
No European war and no escalation
John J. Mearsheimer 10, PROF OF POLITICAL SCIENCE --- University of Chicago, “why is europe
peaceful today?,” ECPR KEYNOTE LECTURE, european political science: 9 2010, http://www.palgravejournals.com/eps/journal/v9/n3/pdf/eps201024a.pdf
Much has happened since then, including the dire economic crisis that we are now experiencing. It promises to have farreaching effects on European life. Nevertheless, I think that
the
most important development of the past two decades is the fact that Europe remains at peace. Of
course, there were a handful of small wars in the Balkans during the 1990s, but the major European powers did not
start them, did not exploit them for national gain, and with the help of the United States ultimately
managed to shut them down . Very importantly there has been no war between any of the major powers .
there has been little security competition among them. Given Europe’s tumultuous history, this is quite
remarkable. Remember that from 1900 to 1990 Europe was the site of two of the deadliest wars in recorded history followed by the Cold War. The broad sweep of European
Indeed,
history certainly looks very different from the past two decades.
A2: Institutions
1NC – Coop Fails
Cooperation internationally is terminally ineffective and small measures like the aff
can’t save it
Hellmann, 13 (Gunther Hellmann is a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the
German Marshall Fund, “The Decline of Multilateralism,” May 2, German Marshall Fund Blog,
http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/05/02/the-decline-of-multilateralism/)
It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue against retrenchment in Europe and North
America. Economic crises and domestic political stagnation absorb energy and consume financial resources.
Global military engagements in faraway places cost lives and treasure and often yield limited success. There is
growing disillusionment with democracy promotion. Coalitions of sovereign state defenders like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa) make life for the guardians of the liberal world order ever more challenging. The upshot is multilateral fatigue in both Europe and
North America. This is a perilous state of affairs because state-transcending global problems are proliferating. “Global Trends 2030,” a study published by the U.S. National
WASHINGTON—
Intelligence Council last December, predicts that “the current, largely Western dominance of global structures … will have been transformed by 2030 to be more in line with the changing
it remains unclear to what degree new or reformed
institutions “will have tackled growing global challenges.” One might be forgiven for taking this to be an overly optimistic projection. Based
on current trends, the outlook is much gloomier, due mainly to the political contagion effects of
hierarchy of new economic players.” Yet even if this were to happen, the report argues,
sovereigntism, the fixation on state sovereignty as an absolute value, and minilateralism. Moisés Naím, who
initially coined the term, defined minilateralism as getting together the “smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem.” The
problem is that the smallest possible number may quickly grow very large; Naím’s own book, The End of Power, provides ample evidence that this is so. Consider, for instance, the number and
political weight of countries needed to address the problems in the aftermath of a military escalation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The minimum number of countries required to
effectively regulate global warming does not look any more encouraging. In other words, sovereigntism and minilateralism are symptoms of the crisis of liberal world order — manifestations
of The Democratic Disconnect — and not a recipe for curing its ills. In the old days when multilateralism was not yet qualified politically with such adjectives as “assertive” (Madeleine Albright)
or “effective” (EU), it served as a descriptor for a fundamental transformation of interstate collaboration in the second half of the 20th century. In an influential article, John Ruggie, a Harvard
professor and former high-ranking UN official, showed that the actual practice of multilateralism by the liberal democracies of North America and Europe after World War II was based on a set
of generalized principles of conduct. These principles rendered segments of the post-war international order into more reliable cooperative settings, such as the United Nations, or islands of
peaceful change, such as the zone of European integration. A readiness to give up sovereignty or, at least to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity, were characteristic elements of
the “liberal world order.” This liberal order is under strain today because its creators and
guardians have themselves strayed from these principles. In the security field, “coalitions of the willing” have
undermined multilateralism not only in the UN context, but also in NATO. In economic and financial
matters, the politics of European sovereign debt crisis management illustrates both the dangers of
executive federalism and the limits of diffuse reciprocity among Europe’s nation states in the world’s
most integrated region. “Responsible stakeholders,” the former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once said, do more than merely “conduct diplomacy to promote
multilateralism and what came to be called
their national interests…They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.” What was meant as advice to China when Zoellick
gave that speech in 2005 can easily be redirected at the liberal democracies of North America and Europe today.
There are no easy ways out. Even if the
slide toward retrenchment can be stopped, the prospects do not seem bright for the kind of bold new
initiatives for global institutional reform that are required. It is debatable whether calls for
“democratic internationalism” or a new alignment among “like-minded democracies” can do the trick, but
Europe and North America need to realize that their stakes in the liberal order are much higher than those of relative newcomers. Indeed, overcoming crises at home hinges at least in part on
sustaining a conducive global environment. Readjusting the balance between minilateralism and multilateralism will help.
A2: Iran Prolif
1NC – I/L
US would prefer more EU involvement than there is in the squo
Adebahr, 6/8 (Cornelius, Adebahr is an associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. His research focuses on European foreign policy,
“Leave It to Europe: Why Iran Is Not (Solely) America’s Responsibility”,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/08/leave-it-to-europe-why-iran-is-not-solely-america-sresponsibility/i9l7)
Even before a nuclear deal with Iran has been signed, the debate in Washington has shifted to the regional
implications of a possible accord. But lessons learned from the success of the nuclear negotiations so far
help explain why the United States should not lead international efforts to bring about regional
cooperation with Iran. Instead, Washington should let its European allies take the initiative. After all, it
was the European Union—particularly France, Germany and Britain—that laid the diplomatic
groundwork since 2003. They brought China, Russia and the United States on board and, in close
transatlantic coordination, pursued a two-track approach of sanctions and diplomacy that led to the
current nuclear talks. Secondly, both sides have accepted the other’s domestic discourse. For Iran, the
narrative is about how the international community is ready to accept its demands to keep what Tehran
insists is a peaceful nuclear program, while dropping its sanctions and also helping to modernize this
program. In the United States, the narrative is that considerable concessions have been extracted from
Iran, which agreed to substantial program limitations, both of proportions and duration. The third success
factor of the talks lies in compartmentalization and de-politicization. By focusing on the nuclear issue—
and excluding everything from human rights to terrorism from the negotiations—the aim is to find
creative, but sustainable technical solutions that dodge the broader political questions. However, certainly
the first two ingredients are not yet there when it comes to regional cooperation. Washington’s major
accommodation would be to accept that Iran has a (legitimate) role to play in the region, while Iran would
have to overcome its refusal even to talk to Saudi Arabia—its regional rival—based on sectarian as much
as on geopolitical grounds. Both sides would have to be ready to ignore fundamentally different
viewpoints on regional order, not least because the power competition between them—with Israel and the
Arab Gulf states each playing their part—does not lend itself to the (comparatively easy) “no bomb”
compromise in the nuclear field. Moreover, simply getting the nuclear deal through will likely exhaust the
necessary willingness—both in Tehran and Washington—to accommodate the other side.
EU Unilateralism supported by the US
Adebahr, 6/8 (Cornelius, Adebahr is an associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. His research focuses on European foreign policy,
“Leave It to Europe: Why Iran Is Not (Solely) America’s Responsibility”,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/08/leave-it-to-europe-why-iran-is-not-solely-america-sresponsibility/i9l7)
This is where the EU comes in. Establishing a multilateral framework, the EU’s focus should be on
the third ingredient, i.e. to de-politicize and compartmentalize possible areas of cooperation.
Maritime security in the Gulf and the situation in Gaza are two such practical issues on which the
European Union could engage Iran. A regional maritime-security regime would broadly be based on the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (which neither Iran nor the United States have ratified)
that regulates nonmilitary fields of cooperation such as maritime safety, fisheries protection, marine-
environment protection and port security. Such an approach would also dovetail with the G7 declaration
last month to strengthen maritime governance in a cooperative, rules-based approach at the regional and
global level. Addressing the Gaza conflicts means involving Iran in the international efforts to implement
the unity government that the Palestinians agreed on, but so far failed to put in place. Even such narrow
and technical cooperation can be a difficult hurdle to jump, even before one could start thinking about
conflict resolution in Yemen or Syria. Given the Old Continent’s internal and external woes, it may seem
naïve to expect Brussels to provide a framework for regional cooperation with Iran. However, with clear
signals from Washington that it would support such a European lead in the aftermath of a nuclear
agreement, the EU and its member states should be happy to oblige. Previous European initiatives with
strong U.S. backing include the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which helped establish security cooperation
between the Cold War superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and the Madrid and Oslo
talks leading to the Israeli-Palestinian accords of the early 1990s. While these cases also show that
agreement cannot guarantee lasting success, the diplomatic opening that a deal can create in its wake is
what counts. Such momentum, however, needs to be given a direction. A single nuclear deal cannot bring
fundamental change to a region torn by religious strife, sectarian rivalry and weak governance. Add to
this the fact that the United States has now entered the pre-election season, and it becomes clear that it is
up to the European Union as the often-overlooked mediator of the nuclear talks to make a push for
regional cooperation after a possible deal. The United States, happy to direct its top-level diplomatic
resources to other burning crises, should welcome and support such an initiative of its European partners.
1NC – No Escalation
No prolif and long timeframe
Kahl ’12 (Colin H. Kahl 12, security studies prof at Georgetown, senior fellow at the Center for a New
American Security, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, “Not Time to Attack
Iran”, January 17, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attackiran?page=show
Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon
within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian
efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there
is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month
horizon,Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to
construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent
statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weaponsgrade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear deviceand
considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the
source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that
there is a "low probability" that the Iranians
would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because
there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom
sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weaponsgrade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA would thus detect such activity with
sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building
nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.
A2: ISIS
1NC – I/L D
ISIS distinct from terrorist organizations--- traditional EU-US coop is insufficient
Cronin 15 (AUDREY KURTH CRONIN is Distinguished Professor and Director of the International
Security Program at George Mason University and the author of How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism
Won't Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat” Foreign Affairs94.2 (Mar/Apr 2015): 87-98.)
After 9/11, many within the U.S. national security establishment worried that, following decades of
preparation for confronting conventional enemies, Washington was unready for the challenge posed by an
unconventional adversary such as al Qaeda. So over the next decade, the United States built an elaborate
bureaucratic structure to fight the jihadist organization, adapting its military and its intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to the tasks of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Now, however, a different
group, the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (isis), which also calls itself the Islamic State, has supplanted
al Qaeda as the jihadist threat of greatest concern. Isis' ideology, rhetoric, and long-term goals are similar
to al Qaeda's, and the two groups were once formally allied. So many observers assume that the current
challenge is simply to refocus Washington's now-formidable counterterrorism apparatus on a new target.
But isis is not al Qaeda. It is not an outgrowth or a part of the older radical Islamist organization, nor does
it represent the next phase in its evolution. Although al Qaeda remains dangerous-especially its affiliates
in North Africa and Yemen-isis is its successor. Isis represents the post-al Qaeda jihadist threat. In a
nationally televised speech last September explaining his plan to " degrade and ultimately destroy" isis,
U.S. President Barack Obama drew a straight line between the group and al Qaeda and claimed that isis is
" a terrorist organization, pure and simple." This was mistaken; isis hardly fits that description, and
indeed, although it uses terrorism as a tactic, it is not really a terrorist organization at all. Terrorist
networks, such as al Qaeda, generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not
hold territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. Isis, on the other hand, boasts some 30,000
fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls lines of
communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations.
If isis is purely and simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. And that is why the
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies that greatly diminished the threat from al Qaeda will
not work against isis. Washington has been slow to adapt its policies in Iraq and Syria to the true nature of
the threat from isis. In Syria, U.S. counterterrorism has mostly prioritized the bombing of al Qaeda
affiliates, which has given an edge to isis and has also provided the Assad regime with the opportunity to
crush U.S.-allied moderate Syrian rebels. In Iraq, Washington continues to rely on a form of
counterinsurgency, depending on the central government in Baghdad to regain its lost legitimacy, unite
the country, and build indigenous forces to defeat isis. These approaches were developed to meet a
different threat, and they have been overtaken by events. What's needed now is a strategy of " offensive
containment": a combination of limited military tactics and a broad diplomatic strategy to halt isis'
expansion, isolate the group, and degrade its capabilities.
1NC – Not a Threat
ISIS isn’t a threat—they can’t execute outside attacks or kill more than a dozen people
Benjamin 8/17 (Daniel, “Hawks exaggerate Islamic State threat to the United States,” Boston Globe,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/08/17/hawks-exaggerate-isis-threat-unitedstates/yICJ0bpzRhoK88GtauyHLO/story.html)
To judge by the doom-laden prophecies cascading in from Washington, the United States faces a
towering and imminent threat in the form of the militant group calling itself the Islamic State, or ISIS.
“They are coming here,” Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina intoned on Fox News Sunday. “I think of an American city in
flames because of the terrorists’ ability to operate in Syria and Iraq.” Senator Graham’s friend Senator John McCain is no less alarmist. Calling
for immediate air strikes in Iraq and Syria, he declared, “They are getting stronger all the time . . . And their goal . . . is destruction of the United
States of America.” Stoking the panic has been a very excitable press. On CNN last week, I was asked if Islamic State fighters represented an
“existential threat” to the United States. Set
aside that absurdity; no terrorist group threatens our existence.
(America has faced one existential threat in modern times — the Soviet nuclear arsenal — and that is it.) But is the Islamic State (IS) a
huge and menacing terrorist threat? Certainly not to the United States today. The danger to Iraq and its
neighbors is real. The Islamic State has shown itself to be a formidable insurgency. Its focus is on ripping apart Iraq and Syria, sowing sectarian
conflict, and creating in its midst a new jihadist state or caliphate. (That very word seems to incite fearmongers: “Every day that goes by, ISIS
builds up its caliphate, and it becomes a direct threat to the United States,” said New York Representative Peter King, conjuring an image of a
new Golden Horde with nuclear-tipped scimitars.) If the insurgency grows, and the threat to Jordan or Lebanon increases, we may have to act.
But, for now, it’s important to understand that even
if marauding operatives in Land Cruisers may be humiliating
Iraq’s hollowed-out military, that doesn’t mean they have genuine terrorist skills. Consider the details: The
Islamic State has never carried out a significant attack outside of its neighborhood. In 2005, when its
operatives were still part of Al Qaeda in Iraq, operatives carried out hotel bombings in Jordan and tried and failed to attack an American
warship in the Red Sea. More recently, four people were killed in an apparent lone-wolf attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels by a young
man trained in Syria. In other words, we’ve
seen no demonstrated ability to carry out the kind of complex
international strike that kills dozens or hundreds, let alone engulfs a US city in flames.
A2: Middle East War
1NC – I/L D
Alliance doesn’t solve foreign policy challenges
Techau 2011
(Jan, director of Carnegie Europe, the European centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 10/6/11, “The Dirty Secret of US European relations”
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/06/dirty-secret-of-u-s-european-relations/8l1h)
For the internal psychology of the transatlantic relationship, this is undoubtedly good news. The more interesting question, however, seems to be
whether all this new love translates into a
more meaningful partnership on shared foreign-policy challenges. Here the answer is less clear. While cooperation on issues such as the Middle East, Iran and
terrorism was and is constructive, one of the most crucial items on the Euro-American agenda remains untouched by the improved atmosphere: transatlantic
burden sharing in the field of security and defense. Here, Europeans have for the last sixty years been in a position of utter
dependence on the Washington’s willingness and ability to guarantee their security. And even though the global strategic framework has drastically changed since the beginning of this transatlantic bargain in the
1950s, Europeans still conduct their defense planning as if American generosity were the most naturally abundant and easily accessible political commodity. By doing so, they increase their reliance on U.S. guarantees, and they
become less and less interesting as an ally for their American counterparts. All attempts to wake Europeans up and make them rethink their priorities have died away without much impact. ¶ It would be easy to blame President
Obama for not using his popularity with allies intelligently enough to induce them to get their act together. But the European passivity on security and defense issues goes far beyond the reach of even the most popular American
president. By and large, Europeans are unaware of their utter dependency; they don’t feel particularly threatened, they hold a deep mistrust in all things military, and they have learned to look at the world without regard to
Their political leaders—to the
extent that they are aware of today’s realities—shy away from the enormous budgetary and political costs that a realistic security and defense
posture would create.The dirty little secret of transatlantic relations is that, under these circumstances, they will undoubtedly become a whole lot less boring very soon. Both America
and Europe are broke. Their ability to shape the world around them is getting weaker. The global center of gravity is shifting
strategic considerations. Despite Libya, their willingness for an active approach to the world around them and for intervention on behalf of values and interests is small.
towards the Pacific. Americans are ultimately better suited to master this process of relative decline. But it is in Washington’s fundamental interest to keep Europe safe and stable, to keep its best allies strong and to defend the
enormous economic investments it has placed in the old world. Obsessing about perceptions and sympathy ratings will soon look like frivolous luxury. The ball is in the European court. For Americans, a Europe with a grown-up
strategic culture will be more important than one that produces high approval ratings for the United States. For Europeans, investing in a relevant and workable transatlantic future will be more important than an American
president they find easy to like.
1NC – No Escalation
No escalation
Fettweis 7, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College,
(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)
Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the
religious divide exists. A
Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which
would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil
war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border;
once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of
which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able
to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own,
and a
nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly
likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem
counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted
governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its
monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained
independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's
autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads.
Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of
stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks
before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border
warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in
Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since.
Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the
region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's
neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into
penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to
intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role
that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired
solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides
the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable)
fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable,
functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address
that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.
A2: Multilat
1NC – I/L D
The EU itself is a terrible model for multilat
Van Schaik and Ter Haar 2013 (Louise van Schaik is Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael
Institute. She has extensively analysed the EU’s international activities in the fields of health (WHO),
climate change (UNFCCC) and food standards (Codex Alimentarius). She has also worked on related
research areas such as EU external affairs and the Lisbon Treaty, EU development cooperation and trade
policy, scarcity of natural resources, global public goods, and sustainable development, Barend (Bas) ter
Haar is Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. During his career at the Netherlands’
Ministry of Foreign Affairs he took part in many multilateral negotiations, inter alia on chemical weapons
and within the EU, NATO, OSCE, IAEA and UNESCO. At the ministry he served as Director of the
Policy Planning Staff. As Ambassador for International Security Affairs he represented the European
Union at the ASEAN Regional Forum, “Why the EU is not promoting effective Multilateralism”,
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Why%20the%20EU%20is%20not%20promoting%20effectiv
e%20multilateralism.pdf)
However, in the decade since 2003 the EU has become increasingly quiet about this objective.
Paradoxically (but logical in view of the explanation given below) the only field where the EU has been
partly successful is the field of classic security, a field where feelings of national sovereignty are usually
strongest. In other fields the support of the EU for effective multilateralism has, for the most part, been
fragmented and weak. The experts who represented EU countries in international talks on issues such as
the environment, health, food, water, education and transport, often seemed hardly aware of the existence
of a European strategy to strengthen an effective multilateral system. And the diplomats who were aware
of this strategy usually rather concentrated on the promotion of their national priorities. This, in
combination with the Eurocrisis and the threat of the UK to leave the EU reinforced the impression that
the EU is a power in decline, better known for its rhetoric than for its action. At the UN Climate Summit
in Copenhagen in 2009 the EU was rudely confronted with a new world order in which emerging
economies use their increased power to further their interests. Despite tenacious efforts to promote a new
international climate treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol and a detailed ‘leadership by example’ strategy,
the EU found itself sidelined, partly because of its inability to speak with a strong single voice. The case
also illustrates the EU’s lack of sensitivity to its negotiating environment. Promoting effective
multilateralism is not the same as simply expecting others to adopt European views and standards. An
ongoing study of the way the EU has operated in a large number of multilateral forums has led us to the
conclusion that the fiasco at Copenhagen is not an exceptional case, but is symptomatic.1 We were struck
by the lack of a European strategy in most forums. We found some instances where the EU supported a
multilateral approach, e.g. in the G20. However, in most cases the EU did not promote strategic goals, but
concentrated instead on administrative reforms. In larger debates the EU was sometimes conspicuously
absent due to its inability to come to a joint position, or because nobody felt responsible to cover the
topic. Furthermore, many of the representatives of the EU were unaware of the positions of EU member
states and EU institutions in other relevant forums. This made issue linkage difficult and could lead to
contradictory positions (e.g. on intellectual property rights).
1NC – Multilat Fails
Multilateral coop will always structurally fail regardless of their internal link
Barma et al., 13 (Naazneen, assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate
School; Ely Ratner, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Steven Weber, professor of
political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, March/April
2013, “The Mythical Liberal Order,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/themythical-liberal-order-8146)
the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most
important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation,
cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions
dissolve when the going gets tough —when member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in currency
manipulations), when the distribution of costs is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the
shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a sports team that perfects exquisite plays during
practice but fails to execute against an actual opponent, global-governance institutions have sputtered
precisely when their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most . WHY HAS this happened? The
hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or
“reengineering” the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the
real challenge. A decade-long effort to revive the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-aroundAssessed against its ability to solve global problems,
the-edges approach and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea and that its
The root cause of stalled global governance is simpler and more
straightforward. “Multipolarization” has come faster and more forcefully than expected. Relatively authoritarian and
postcolonial emerging powers have become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international
institutions are ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational.
consensus and, with that, multilateral institutions. It’s not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in effectiveness but
also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive. Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and
The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se.
There just wasn’t all that much liberal world order to break down in the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and
powerful. They are truly distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully
legitimacy.
different way .
A2: NATO
1NC – I/L D
EU doesn’t solve – NATO is redundant and other international organizations fill the
gap
Hartung 13 (Farina Hartung, Master Thesis International and European Relations, Linköping
University, “Case-study of NATO: Is NATO a redundant international organization or not?”,
http://www.liu.se/utbildning/pabyggnad/F7MME/student/courses/733a27masterthesis/filarkiv/spring2013/theses-june/1.464731/MasterThesisFinalVersionFarinaHartung.pdf)
Just as mentioned above, NATO has gone through a process of changes since it was first established. It can be said that the changes where
necessary or as a matter of fact that they were not - it always depends on the view one takes. The position of this paper has been stated before
that it is going to investigate the question if NATO is redundant and to show proof that it is. As history has shown, it can be argued that the
organization is
argued that
redundant and has survived much longer passed its due time. From this point of view, it can be
this is what hurts the organization ; they need to reform before they have a chance to
act. It is quite difficult to claim that NATO is not redundant, but as mentioned before, this Thesis will take a look at the opposite side of this
claim. Instead of trying to prove that NATO is needed, I will try to show that it
is not needed and has long surpassed
its duty . That has become clear over the past years. NATO has reformed itself in order to
ensure that it will stay relevant enough in order to play an impacting role in politics and international relations. Although
they have taken the initiative to stay relevant, they seem to have failed.
There have been different voices,
such as Theo Sommer and Kenneth Waltz, who claim and argue that NATO is as a matter of fact redundant. One could always ask what is
redundancy and how can it be measured. Redundancy is not self-evident, and it also cannot really be defined. Neither can redundancy be
measured. Redundancy is what one makes out of it and what others understand of redundancy is left open for discussion. But in regards to this
paper, redundancy is just the fact that NATO
is not really needed any longer. The task it is currently doing,
such as the peacekeeping, can be done by other international organizations, such as the U nited
N ations There is no longer the need for just one international organization to have its sole focus
and propose on collective security. Security is something that is desired by so many countries
and there is no need that NATO needs to be the one organization that will provide this to all the
countries in the world. And as mentioned before, NATO already goes outside its territorial borders in
order to provide security to the world (“NATO in the 21st Century). NATO is a redundant international
organization simply because it has lost its endeavor . It strives to do so much in order to provide
its member states with the necessary certainty that in case of a threat, there is a whole community that will act and
protect each member state. But how should NATO really do that in reality?
The member states have cut down their
size of military they have . In time of great danger, one country might not want to act because
there could be a conflict of interests. Currently, there is just not such a big threat as the Soviet
Union was that there needs to be a military alliance. In case that such a great threat rises to the surface again,
it is just simply as easy to create a new international military organization
which can then function
according to the actual needs, because it is always during the time of threat that new alliances are created. As mentioned above, the
purpose of NATO has vanished when the Cold War was over
main
and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Since the
Cold War and the threat that the Soviet Union posed so close to European borders dissolved in the beginning of the 1990s, NATO just has lost
its main function. According to Theo Sommer, NATO has ever since then been in a constant stage of “transformation”, never really knowing
what it should achieve and what its goal is (17). In addition to that, one could argue that NATO is facing more problems that seem to have come
along with the problem of the lacking threat. This Thesis argues that NATO
is neither necessary to fulfill a defensive
function or that of providing security for its members. NATO is an international organization that is in fact no longer
permissible. It has surpassed its life expectancy by many years. Moreover, it can be said that since it has surpassed its reason of existence, it will
step down from the position it holds in regards of an international security organization. It
is no longer the main focus of the
member states. NATO should also no longer be the main focus. Other organizations have emerged over the past decades that show that
they are able to do the necessary work without having to go through a process of transformation. For example regional international
organization, such as the European Union could take over this task, since most of the members are located on
the European continent to begin with. Furthermore, it can be claimed that NATO should be able to see that they are no longer fit for modern
times. Before NATO is able to act on any kind of problem or concern, it has to go through a process of transforming itself; otherwise, it might
not be able to act. This point of view may seem a bit exaggerated; however, it is suitable for NATO since it is pragmatic. NATO is not the same
since the end of the Cold War. It can be said that the main reason why the NATO was established was to be able to encounter the Soviet Union
in a time of crisis. According to Lindley-French, NATO today is a strategic and defensive focal point that can project both military and
partnership power worldwide (89). She continuous her argument by noting that the job the alliance has to done is the same as ever and has not
changed (Ibid). The job of the alliance has always been to safeguard the freedom and security of its member nations through political and
security needs, instituted by the values of “democracy, liberty, rule of law and the peaceful resolution to disputes” (Ibid). Yet another point he
claims is that NATO provides a strategic forum for consultation between North Americans and Europeans on security issues of common concern
and the facility for taking joint action to deal with them (Ibid). To repeat, NATO
has lost its power and maybe even its
standpoint in the modern day time politics. There are many different international organizations that
all could take over the work of NATO or even could continue it in a better manner than NATO is
currently doing. Claiming that NATO is not redundant just does not seem to follow the actual
fact of the position that NATO is currently in. They have missed indeed the point where it was time to either dissolve the
whole international organization or the time to reform which would have actually created positive outcomes. The latter point, however, seems
impossible now.
It just is impossible for NATO to change yet again . In the time of its existence, NATO has
undergone so many different changes and reforms, altogether a total of six. There is just no logical
reason why NATO is able to successfully undergo another process of changes and transformation. New
reforms always bring changes and if they actually will help NATO is left in the open. As Theo Sommer puts it, NATO
has served its
time simply because the world has changed (9). The threats are no longer the same and to some
extend may not even exist anymore. There are of course new threats, such as terrorism, piracy,
and cyber-attacks, now that have emerged and rose to the surface of international politics. However, those are not really
the same as they were when NATO was created. Hence, NATO is not suitable to tackle new issues
and problems . They can try to reform, but it will never be the same because NATO itself will have to adjust to the new
situation. But
this is not what this once great military alliance was intended to do.
1NC – Collapse Inev
NATO collapse inev—no purpose and shrinking force-structure
Granatstein 13 (Jack, has held the Canada Council's Killam senior fellowship twice, was editor of the
Canadian Historical Review, and was a founder of the Organization for the History of Canada. Fellow of
the Royal Society of Canada, awarded the Society’s J.B. Tyrrell Historical Gold Medal. He has been
awarded honorary doctorates by Memorial University of Newfoundland, the University of Calgary,
Ryerson Polytechnic University, the University of Western Ontario, McMaster University, and Niagara
University. Senior Fellow of Massey College. Officer of the Order of Canada Member of the Advisory
Committee of the Dominion Institute, an adjunct fellow of the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military
and Strategic Studies and Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. Board member
and the Chair of the Advisory Council of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. “J.L.
Granatstein: The end of NATO?” 3/13, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/03/04/j-lgranatstein-the-end-of-nato/)
Perhaps it might have been better if NATO had wound itself up at the end of the Cold War. The alliance instead sought
for a new role,
a new strategic purpose, and it found it outside the boundaries of the alliance. Provoked by ethnic slaughter in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, it conducted operations in the former Yugoslavia, involving air attacks against Serbia and the deployment of
troops in Kosovo. Then came 9/11 and a long war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, followed by an air campaign that
brought down the Gaddafi regime in Libya.¶ None of these operations were notable successes. In June 2011, then U.S.
secretary of defence, Robert Gates, stated in public what many had privately acknowledged: NATO, the linchpin of European
security and transatlantic relations, faced “the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal future … While every alliance
member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have
been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so
not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities
simply aren’t there.” This was an affirmation of the ineffectiveness of the alliance after six decades of
existence.¶ Matters have since worsened. NATO members have begun pulling combat troops out of
Afghanistan on their own timetables, and all the troops, except an undisclosed number of Americans, are scheduled
to depart by 2014. The global economic crisis has led members to cut back on defence spending. And
faced with the increasing power of China, the Obama administration indicated that it was rebalancing
its forces toward Asia.¶ The NATO alliance seemed completely unprepared for this new uncertainty. As
secretary Gates stated, “the U.S. share of NATO defence spending has now risen to more than 75% — at a time when politically painful budget
and benefit cuts are being considered at home.” The
U.S., in other words, won’t pay the bills much longer. We know
Canada won’t, and the Europeans don’t seem willing to do so, either. If this continues, NATO may not be
long for this world .
A2: NoKo Prolif
1NC – I/L D
Alliance doesn’t solve foreign policy challenges
Techau 2011
(Jan, director of Carnegie Europe, the European centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 10/6/11, “The Dirty Secret of US European relations”
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/06/dirty-secret-of-u-s-european-relations/8l1h)
For the internal psychology of the transatlantic relationship, this is undoubtedly good news. The more interesting question, however, seems to be
whether all this new love translates into a
more meaningful partnership on shared foreign-policy challenges. Here the answer is less clear. While cooperation on issues such as the Middle East, Iran and
terrorism was and is constructive, one of the most crucial items on the Euro-American agenda remains untouched by the improved atmosphere: transatlantic
burden sharing in the field of security and defense. Here, Europeans have for the last sixty years been in a position of utter
dependence on the Washington’s willingness and ability to guarantee their security. And even though the global strategic framework has drastically changed since the beginning of this transatlantic bargain in the
1950s, Europeans still conduct their defense planning as if American generosity were the most naturally abundant and easily accessible political commodity. By doing so, they increase their reliance on U.S. guarantees, and they
become less and less interesting as an ally for their American counterparts. All attempts to wake Europeans up and make them rethink their priorities have died away without much impact.¶ It would be easy to blame President
Obama for not using his popularity with allies intelligently enough to induce them to get their act together. But the European passivity on security and defense issues goes far beyond the reach of even the most popular American
president. By and large, Europeans are unaware of their utter dependency; they don’t feel particularly threatened, they hold a deep mistrust in all things military, and they have learned to look at the world without regard to
Their political leaders—to the
extent that they are aware of today’s realities—shy away from the enormous budgetary and political costs that a realistic security and defense
posture would create.The dirty little secret of transatlantic relations is that, under these circumstances, they will undoubtedly become a whole lot less boring very soon. Both America
and Europe are broke. Their ability to shape the world around them is getting weaker. The global center of gravity is shifting
strategic considerations. Despite Libya, their willingness for an active approach to the world around them and for intervention on behalf of values and interests is small.
towards the Pacific. Americans are ultimately better suited to master this process of relative decline. But it is in Washington’s fundamental interest to keep Europe safe and stable, to keep its best allies strong and to defend the
enormous economic investments it has placed in the old world. Obsessing about perceptions and sympathy ratings will soon look like frivolous luxury. The ball is in the European court. For Americans, a Europe with a grown-up
strategic culture will be more important than one that produces high approval ratings for the United States. For Europeans, investing in a relevant and workable transatlantic future will be more important than an American
president they find easy to like.
1NC – No NoKo Prolif
North Korea can’t prolif
Hymans ‘12
[Jacques E. C. Hymans, PhD from Harvard, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, his most
recent book is Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, “Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs
Often Fail on Their Own-and Why Iran's Might, Too,” Foreign Affairs91. 3 (May/Jun 2012): 44-53, Proquest]
The third lesson is that states that
poorly manage their nuclear programs can bungle even the supposedly easy steps
of the process. For instance, based on estimates of the size of North Korea's plutonium stockpile and the
ease of weapons fabrication, U.S. intelligence agencies thought that by the 1990s, North
Korea had built one or two nuclear weapons. But in 2006, North Korea's first nuclear test essentially fizzled,
presumed
making it clear that the "hermit kingdom" did not have any working weapons at all. Even its second
try, in 2009, did not work properly. Similarly, if Iran eventually does acquire a significant quantity
of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, this should not be equated with the possession of
a nuclear weapon.
Extra I/L D
The U.S. is known to be unfit to deal with North Korean policies. They have
disagreed with the EU on related policy in the past.
Wagner 01
Alex Wagner is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Strategic Affairs, Nonproliferation Reporter/Analyst at the Arms Control Association, and many other professional
occupations involving governmental law affairs. His extensive education includes a degree from the Department of War Studies
at King's College London, U. of London, a B.A. in political science at Brown University, and a law degree from the Georgetown
Law Center in which he had the role as the executive editor of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, “Bush Puts N. Korea
Negotiations On Hold, Stresses Verification”, ACA, April 1, 2001
Adopting a harder line toward North Korea than that of his predecessor, President George W. said March 7 that his administration would not immediately resume
missile negotiations with Pyongyang left unfinished by the Clinton administration. The announcement differed from previous statements by Secretary of State Colin
Powell, who had indicated that the administration planned to pursue what appears to have been a nearly complete deal by the Clinton administration to end North
Korea's missile development and exports. Bush, who made his remarks during a joint press conference with visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, expressed
"skepticism" about North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and said that he has concerns about the ability to verify any agreement with a closed society like North Korea.
Bush said he "look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any potential negotiation would require complete
Bush also said that the United States is "not
certain as to whether or not [the North Koreans] are keeping all terms of all
agreements." The statement sparked some confusion because the United States has
only one agreement with North Korea: the 1994 Agreed Framework, which ended
Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. In a briefing following the conference, a senior administration official explained that,
verification of the terms of a potential agreement." During the press conference
despite his phrasing, the president was referring to the potential verifiability of a future missile deal with North Korea. The official said that there are no indications
North Korea is violating the Agreed Framework. Bush's decision to put off negotiations contrasted with statements Powell had previously made on the
administration's approach to North Korea. On March 6, Powell told reporters that "we do plan to engage with North Korea and pick up where President Clinton and
his administration left off." Powell went on to say that "some promising elements were left on the table" and that the United States has "a lot to offer that regime if
emerging from the March 7 meeting between Bush
and Kim, Powell shifted gears, emphasizing that there is "no hurry" to engage
Pyongyang. He said that the administration is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and that it would, "in due course,
they will act in ways that we think are constructive." However,
decide at what pace and when we engage." Amending his remarks from March 6, Powell said that if "there was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about
to begin—that is not the case." According to a former senior U.S. official, North Korea had been prepared at the end of the Clinton administration to stop its missile
development and missile exports in exchange for international satellite launch services and nonmonetary compensation, respectively. Writing in The New York Times
March 7, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, Clinton's special adviser on North Korea, characterized such an agreement as "tantalizingly close." The former senior official
noted, however, that the problem of how to verify and monitor an agreement, in addition to the status of Pyongyang's current missile inventory, had remained
unresolved. Powell indicated this was one reason the Bush administration was reviewing its options before proceeding. "What was missing in what had been done was
how one would put in place any kind of monitoring or verification regime. And the North Koreans had not engaged on that in any serious way in the period of the
Clinton administration," he said in March 8 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Powell also said that the administration would consider issues
beyond missile negotiations in its policy review, including whether the conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula should be considered simultaneously
with missile talks—a course the Clinton administration had avoided. "There's a huge army poised on the demilitarized zone, pointing south, that is probably as great a
threat to South Korea and Seoul and regional stability as are weapons of mass destruction. Should that be included in a negotiation with the North Koreans?" Powell
asked. In what may have been a reaction to Bush's comments, on March 13 Pyongyang canceled cabinet-level discussions with Seoul hours before they were set to
North Korea threatened to "take thousand-fold revenge" on the United
States "and its black-hearted intention to torpedo the dialogue between North and
South [Korea]." The statement, issued by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, called Washington's new
policies "hostile" and noted that Pyongyang remains "fully prepared for both
dialogue and war." Congress Reacts Following Bush's demand for verification in dealings with North Korea, Republican leaders in the
begin. On March 15,
House and Senate urged the administration to reconsider the terms of the Agreed Framework, under which North Korea is to be provided with two lightwater reactors. On March 9, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms (R-NC), along with Senators Mike DeWine (R-OH) and Bob
Smith (R-NH), sent a letter to Bush calling for the administration to abandon the reactor project in favor of "several clean-burning, coal-fired power plants
to meet North Korea's civilian energy needs." The letter called into question Pyongyang's "track record" and said that "North Korea's regime hardly can be trusted
with [light-water reactor] technology, or with fissile material." In a March 13 speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Henry Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House
International Relations Committee, also championed replacing the light-water reactors with conventional power plants while stressing the need for comprehensive
verification in light of past actions by North Korea. Congressional Democrats urged Bush to continue to pursue a negotiated solution to U.S. concerns over
Pyongyang's nuclear and missile capabilities. In a March 6 letter to Bush before his meeting with Kim, the Democratic leadership of the House and Senate, as well as
the ranking members of the International Relations and Foreign Relations committees, encouraged the president to work with South Korea to address North Korea's
nuclear and missile programs and said that, if he does so, they "stand ready to support" him. EU to Send Delegation to Korean Peninsula Following President George
W. Bush's decision to put off missile negotiations with North Korea, the European Union (EU) announced it would send a high-level delegation to the Korean
Peninsula. Speaking at the EU summit in Stockholm, President of the European Council and Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson said March 24 that he, EU
Secretary-General Javier Solana, and EU External Affairs Commissioner Christopher Patten hope to visit Seoul and Pyongyang before the end of May. Persson said
he planned to broach "a broad agenda" with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, including discussions on missiles. Sweden currently holds the six-month rotating
presidency of the EU and has had diplomatic relations with Pyongyang for the past 26 years. According to a senior Swedish official,
the EU discussion is
intended to be "complementary" to both the North-South peace process and any further U.S.-North Korean security negotiations. The official stressed that it is
said that the dialogue on missile negotiations
"cannot and should not" be taken up without the United States. However, in a March 24
interview on Swedish television, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh reportedly
stated that the unanimous decision by the 15 EU leaders to send the delegation came
about because "it's becoming clear that the new U.S. administration wants to take a
more hard-line approach toward North Korea." Lindh went on to say that such a policy "means that Europe must step in
"important that the U.S.-North Korean discussions resume" and
to help reduce tension between the two Koreas, not least because the outside world is so worried about North Korean missiles." —A.W.a
U.S. and EU collaborative sanctions against North Korea don’t work
Bajpai 15
Prableen Bajpai is the Founder and Director at FinFix Advisors & Planners Pvt. Ltd., a financial planning and investment
advisory firm. Prableen contributes for The Tribune (India), IndiaNotes.com and has authored a section of the Equity Research
Module by the National Stock Exchange (NSE). She has also taught Investment Analysis and Macroeconomics to business
students at the Royal Thimphu College (RTC), Bhutan. She is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) from ICFAI, holds a masters
degree in Economics and is pursuing her CFP® certification, “US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea”, Febuary 18, 2015
The dynasty regime in North Korea continues to splurge and squander its resources towards nuclear armament and military expansion, while its people suffer from food deprivation and continue
to be fed by aid. The secretive totalitarian economy has increasingly isolated itself from the world except for a few allies. Its activities and actions have time and again violated international
agreements, thus inviting sanctions against it. However, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been repeatedly sanctioned by the United Nations (UN), the US, Japan,
Canada, Australia, and European Union, the regime has shown little inclination to comply with international agreements. (For more, see: How the North Korea Economy Works) Relations: The
European Union & The United States The European Union (EU) and most of its constituent countries have bilateral diplomatic relationships with North Korea and maintain embassies in
Pyongyang, and the EU indulges in annual talks with North Korea. The European Union’s stance regarding North Korea is based on a few key issues, including peace and stability in the region,
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, aid (and cooperation), and human rights. According to the European Commission External Action Service, “Since 1995, over €366 million in aid has been
provided in the form of food aid, medical, water and sanitation assistance and agricultural support. In 2011, the EU provided €10 million in emergency aid following a severe food crisis.” The
total trade between DPRK and the European Union was €144 million or about 2.09 percent of North Korea’s trade volume. Though there is no direct involvement by the EU in North Korea’s
economic reforms, Brussels is supportive of any initiatives toward reform. The European Union (through a few member countries) provides education and training in economic policy making
and business to North Korean officials. The United Sates does not have any diplomatic relations with DPRK, thus neither has an embassy in the other's country. The US operates through the
Swedish embassy in North Korea for any services for US citizens in DPRK. While economic interaction between the two countries is minimal, the US is concerned with issues like human rights
and food deprivation in North Korea. The only form of US economic assistance to North Korea is humanitarian during times of natural calamities or emergencies. Sanctions
The US
and EU comply by the UN Resolution 2094 (2013) and earlier resolutions regarding restrict ions (and bans) against North Korea on the following: Travel
and asset freezes on certain individuals involved in arms dealing and exports of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and other
weapons . Asset freezes of certain organizations involved in supporting activities towards arms and weapon dealings, as well as illegal trading activities. Items, Materials, Equipment,
Goods, and Technology (nuclear items, missile items, and chemical weapons list). Luxury goods (jewelry, pearls, gems, precious, and semi-precious stones and precious metal, as well as
transportation items like yachts, racing cars, and luxury automobiles). The first EU sanction was imposed in 2006 in reaction to North Korea’s first test of a nuclear device. Currently, the
European Union has autonomously banned provision of new DPRK bank notes and coins, any financial support which could be used for nuclear-related or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
program, and any new commitment towards DPRK in the form of concessional loans and financial assistance. There is a restriction on the issue and trade in certain bonds, use of EU airports, and
establishment of subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks. Moreover, there will be enhanced monitoring of banks in DPRK that work with EU financial institutions, as well as increased scrutiny
of DPRK diplomats. In addition to supporting the UN resolutions, the US has time and again imposed sanctions on North. The US, which has backed South Korea since the start of the Korean
War, first imposed an economic embargo on the North in 1950. Over the years, the US US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea By Prableen Bajpai, CFA (ICFAI) | February 18, 2015
7/9/2015 US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021815/us-and-eu-sanctions-against-north-korea.asp?view=print 2/2 © 2015, Investopedia,
LLC. has levied additional sanctions against North Korea, especially in the wake of its nuclear tests and provoking episodes against South Korea. Broadly, the US prohibits any foreign and
military aid, government-backed credits, agricultural credits or financing, US commercial bank financing, export licenses and imports into the US for certain goods and services, export-import
bank financing, any support for energy-related programs, cultural exchanges, and support in international institutions and banks. Under the Bush administration in 2008 (Executive Order 13466),
the US ended the Trading With the Enemy Act but continued with certain restrictions on North Korea and a few individuals. In 2010 (Executive Order 13551), the US blocked three North
Korean entities and one individual from property and interests in property that were under US jurisdiction. In 2011 (Executive Order 13570), direct and indirect import of goods, services and
technology was prohibited. The most recent sanctions (Executive Order 13687) were triggered by the cyber-attacking incident on Sony Pictures Entertainment and affect three North Korean
entities, including including a government intelligence agency and a North Korean arms dealer, as well as 10 individuals employed by those entities or by the North Korean government. They
have been barred from the US financial system; any assets under US jurisdiction have been blocked. (Related reading, see: How US & European Union Sanctions Impact Russia) Stance From
1988 to 2008, the US designated the DPRK government as state sponsor of terrorism. Though there are many sanctions in place against North Korea, the US has not levied any travel ban for US
citizens, nor is there a ban on trade of basic goods (the trade volume is negligible though). The sanctions imposed by the US on North Korea have resulted in minimal trade limited to medicines
and food. The US also prohibits any cultural exchange with DPRK. The limited engagement of Washington with Pyongyang on the diplomatic, political, and economic fronts gives it less
leverage over North Korea. On the other hand, the European Union’s focus on backing any economic reform in DPRK but wanting to put a stop to the proliferation of WMD has created a
quandary over what is the right balance of “pressure” and “support.” If the European Union exerts pressure without any economic engagement, the effectiveness could be minimal. While if there
is no constructive pressure while it offers some economic backing, the EU stance on DPRK becomes questionable and opposed to its own stated policies. Thus, the European Union’s sanctions
are aimed at blocking any direct or indirect help in North Korea’s nuclear armament program, while trying to maintain basic economic engagement in the form of trade, aid, and assistance that
might improve North Korea’s economic development, human rights, and its citizen’s standard of living. (Related reading, see: Socialist Economies: How China, Cuba And North Korea Work)
There many opinions about the effectiveness of the sanctions. It seems that
North Korea is able to get access to almost everything it requires whether it is for a
luxury project or nuclear program through a back channel via its allies from the
time of the Cold War. Another reason for the limited effectiveness of both EU and
US sanctions is the fact that North Korea does not depend greatly on the West; its
main trading partner and benefactor is China. Strings can be pulled when they are
attached.
Bottom Line
A2: Prolif
1NC – I/L D
EU defenses solve – Alliance isn’t key
Bandow 2013
(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, 4-22, "NATO's
Lack Of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should Retire",
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/04/22/natos-lack-of-any-serious-purpose-means-itshould-retire/)
Alliances should be based on international circumstance. Rasmussen recently argued that “The need for a strong military alliance between
Europe and North America has never been stronger.” That is nonsense. Neither
continent faces an existential military
threat. Neither faces a significant global competitor. Neither has a compelling interest to meddle in regional conflicts. While there is
much about which the U.S. and Europe should cooperate, there is no need for an American-dominated
transatlantic military alliance.
Thus, what is needed is U.S. burden-shedding rather than allied burden-sharing.
Europeans
could provide forces sufficient to defend themselves , patrol the Mediterranean, aid the Central Asia
states, and protect their interests in North Africa and the Middle East. If they chose not to do so, no worries for
America. But they shouldn’t expect Washington to step in. And U.S. officials then could stop their unproductive whining about Europe’s defense
choices.
1NC – No Prolif
No impact – takes too long and too many disincentives – reversal of the program is
more likely
Kahl et al., Georgetown Security Studies professor, 2013
(Colin, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf, ldg)
I I I . LESSONS FROM HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14
Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for
example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a
proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could
catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless,
predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades
have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than
nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have
found the road more difficult than imagined , both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants
to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam,
has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does
suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian
nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to
Analysts
predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or
downplaying the disincentives . Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so
rare because going down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that
outweigh the potential benefits. 19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership
Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons.
believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional
military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative
study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and
eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded.
Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945),
the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the
nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in
the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly
increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed
nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to
the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of
states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined .26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in
abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time,
1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and
suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a
vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In
the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these
efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only
Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible
military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain
murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have
found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in
the average time
required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970,
even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for prolif eration has expanded to more
progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans,
and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent
statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb,
although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an
leaders have to weigh
these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure
by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing
automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but
nuclear weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would
decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the
importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously
believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds
with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very
strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs
associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see
membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus
they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and
autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue”
states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few
renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in
such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to
dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must
be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear
weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration –
have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding
the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for
sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In
addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons
more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous
sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and
related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some
“latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway
whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons
program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage,
rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian
management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear
projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations
needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a
potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed
nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other
countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they
potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing
the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the U nited S tates (e.g.,
Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly
embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several
reduced prolif eration proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely
to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily
motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.
A2: Russian War
1NC – I/L D
Alliance fails to deter Russia – Europe alone solves
Bandow 2012
(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 8-12, "How NATO Expansion Makes America Less Safe",
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-nato-expansion-makes-america-less-safe)
With the end of the Cold War the justification for NATO disappeared. The Soviet Union split, the Warsaw Pact
dissolved, the global communist menace vanished. There no longer was any there there, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland. President Putin is
no friend of liberty, but he evidences no design — and possesses no capability — to recreate a global empire.
Under him Russia has reverted to a pre-World War I great power, focused on winning respect and protecting its
borders. A Russian invasion of Eastern Europe , let alone the core western members of NATO, is but a
paranoid fantasy. Anyway, the Europeans are able to defend themselves. Today the E uropean U nion has ten
times the GDP and three times the population of Russia . Despite their ongoing economic crises, EU members
together still spend far more than Moscow on the military . There is no prospect of Russia dominating
Eurasia. Unfortunately, expanding NATO over the last two decades has turned what once was a military alliance into an international social
club. Other than Poland, the post-1989 NATO entrants have been military midgets, security black holes requiring the U.S. to pay to rearm and
retrain militaries which remain too small to do anything useful in a real war. Yes, the new members contributed small contingents in America’s
other conflicts; President Saakashvili similarly sent Georgian troops to Afghanistan and Iraq to win American support. But the U.S. has paid
mightily for de minimis benefits. Still, alliance
advocates claim that NATO could at least protect countries at Europe’s
periphery. For instance, had Georgia been a member, they argue, Moscow would not have attacked. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Petras
Vaitiekunas contended that including Tbilisi would “clearly show to Russia how unhelpful it is to even try flexing its muscles.” Yet history is
full of examples of alliances which failed to deter powers from acting when they believed their vital
interests to be at stake. In World War I most of the continent plunged into bloody conflict despite
competing military leagues . In World War II Germany ignored British and French commitments to
Poland. Today Moscow might not believe that Americans and Europeans with little at stake would be so foolish as to confront a nuclear
armed power over interests it viewed as vital. Moreover, the Russians are not likely to be any more inclined toward “appeasement” than would
the U.S. in a comparable situation. Indeed, given
the West’s consistent policy of ignoring Russian interests, Moscow
to establish
friendly, democratic regimes along Russia’s borders, and turn them into military outposts as members of the historic
American-led, anti-Soviet alliance, is geopolitically aggressive . As America developed, Washington demonstrated little patience for
likely would insist even more strongly that concessions not be made and humiliations not be countenanced. Attempting
European “meddling” in Central and even South America, which it considered to be America’s backyard. Perhaps U.S. intentions were better,
though the Latin Americans might not agree. Nevertheless, European security guarantees for America’s neighbors would have made
Washington less rather than more tractable. Worse, NATO
expansion brings the political and territorial disputes of
new members with each other and Russia into the alliance. The organization then threatens to act as a
transmission belt of rather than firebreak to war. Countries reliant on their own resources are more
likely to compromise. In contrast, having a superpower in their corner makes them more likely to be
intransigent. Although most of the new NATO members, and especially the most recent additions like Albania and Croatia, are
money pits for American aid, at least these nations are geopolitically irrelevant. Moscow has no reason to pay them any mind.
1NC – No Russian War
No Russia war – no motive or capability
Betts, Columbia war and peace studies professor, 2013
(Richard, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence”, Foreign Affairs, March/April, ebsco, ldg)
These continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an adversarial relationship, but not
an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit deterrence does less to protect against a negligible threat from
Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In contrast to during the Cold War, it
is now hard to make the case that
Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse. First, the East-West balance of military capabilities, which at
the height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even, has not only shifted to NATO's advantage; it has
become utterly lopsided. Russia is now a lonely fraction of what the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old
eastern European allies; those allies are now arrayed on the other side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -military spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO enjoys
massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal. There is no plausible
way , however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for aggression, except as a backstop for a
conventional offensive -- for which NATO's capabilities are now far greater. Russia's intentions constitute
no more of a threat than its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there
is no plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve their interests. During the
twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic struggle between them over whose ideology would dominate the
world. Vladimir Putin's
Russia is authoritarian, but unlike the Soviet Union, it is not the vanguard of a globe-spanning
revolutionary ideal.
A2: Terrorism
1NC – I/L D
Terror coop is strong and resilient
Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,”
Feb 3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)
Overall, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism has been strong . U.S. and
European officials from the cabinet level down maintain regular dialogues on issues related to homeland security
and counterterrorism. In 2010, new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance entered into
force. The United States and the EU have also reached agreements on container security and sharing airline
passenger data as part of their efforts to strengthen aviation, transport, and border security. In addition, the
United States and the EU actively work together to track and counter the financing of terrorism, in forums
such as the Financial Action Task Force and through information sharing deals such as the U.S.-EU
“SWIFT agreement,” which allows U.S. authorities access to financial data held by a Belgium-based consortium of international banks as
part of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). While the EU has been increasing its relevance in this area,
bilateral intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperat ion between the United States and individual European countries also remains key to
disrupting terrorist plots and apprehending those involved.
1NC – No Terror
No risk of nuclear terrorism – too many obstacles
Mearsheimer, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago,
2014
(John J. “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged9639?page=show)
Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United
States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat . There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September
11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is
highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a
terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it
arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers
were toppled. What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence
would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to
supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that
weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but
the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might also try
to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there
are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and
delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group
acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the
terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat . And to the extent that we should
then
worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.
A2: Trade
1NC – I/L D
*Read generic take-outs to relations (resiliency, inevitable, alt causes, etc)
1NC – No Trade Wars
Trade is strong and resilient
Ikenson, 9 – associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute
[Daniel, “ A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” March
12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651]
Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy
rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global
economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research
Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the
average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent
over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that
7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between
1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from
what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of
their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an
adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have
room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD
countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value. 11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who
collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless,
governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various
pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama
publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the
legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In
early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus
bill.12 But even
more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce
existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide
consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in
January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items,
comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January
1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13v And Mexico is not alone. In February, the
Brazilian
government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of
machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision
in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on
February 27, a
new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and
members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world
might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain
interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited
policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as
they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive
than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.