Running head: HURRICANE KATRINA
1
Hurricane Katrina: Disaster management and public health
Dr. Hollie Pavlica
Health Policy and Management
MPH 525
Katelyn Strasser
February 2014
2
HURRICANE KATRINA
Table of Contents
Chapter
Page
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….3
2. Effects of the Hurricane………………………………………………………………..3
3. Warnings……………………………………………………………………………….4
4. Public Health Preparedness…………………………………………………………….5
5. Government Response…………………………………………………………………5
Local and State Governments……………………………………………………..5
Federal Government………………………………………………………………6
6. Reasons for Delay……………………………………………………………………..7
7. Lessons Learned……………………………………………………………………….9
8. Triumphs……………………………………………………………………………...10
9. Summary……………………………………………………………………………...11
10. Recommendations…………………………………………………………………...12
References………………………………………………………………………………..13
3
HURRICANE KATRINA
Hurricane Katrina: Disaster management and public health
Chapter 1
Introduction
Hurricane Katrina of August 2005 is one of the most devastating disasters to
occur in recent years, as well as in the history of the United States. Events like natural
disasters, release of chemical agents, disease epidemics, or man-made environmental
disasters all call for public health preparedness. Public health preparedness deals with
preparing for and gathering resources in the event that one of these types of disasters
would occur. Disaster management involves government at the local, state, and federal
levels. This paper will outline the events surrounding hurricane Katrina and the response
from all levels of government. It will also analyze lessons learned from the disaster and
triumphs in the midst of this crisis. The paper will end with recommendations about how
local and state governments can play a larger role in emergency preparedness
(Teitelbaum & Wilensky, 2013)
Chapter 2
Effects of the Hurricane
Hurricane Katrina’s disastrous hurricane conditions and subsequent flooding
caused a record setting amount of destruction in parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama, with New Orleans being the most populous city affected (Kelman, 2007). The
hurricane resulted in huge economic and financial loss. Of even greater importance was
the damage of property, displacement of people, and untimely deaths of many. In fact,
Hurricane Katrina was one of the five deadliest hurricanes to ever hit the United States
(Fritz et al., 2008). Approximately 1,330 people died in this event, with about 80 percent
4
HURRICANE KATRINA
of these fatalities coming from the New Orleans Metropolitan area (The White House,
n.d.).
Chapter 3
Warnings
Although Hurricane Katrina shocked many people, numerous warnings and
concerns by experts had been given far in advance of the storm. New Orleans’ nickname
“City in the Bowl” describes how the city is situated below the level of surrounding sea,
river, and lake water (Kelman, 2007). This left the city especially vulnerable to flooding
(Parker, Stern, Paglia & Brown, 2009). Experts also agree that infrastructure problems
and the building of many low-lying homes added to flooding possibilities. The Corps of
Engineers tried to warn city officials that soil erosion and subsidence had caused parts of
the levee system to sink at least three feet (Shughart, 2011). The structures that were
supposed to protect the city for two to three hundred years could not withstand the effects
of upper-category hurricanes (Parker et al., 2009).
Multiple people commented on the impending danger. For example, PBS and
American Radio Works both made documentaries based on the risk of a hurricane hitting
New Orleans. Joe Allbaugh, who was the first FEMA director of the Bush
administration, said in 2002 that, “there are a half-dozen or so contingencies around the
nation that cause me great concern, and one of them is [in New Orleans]” (Parker et al.,
2009). In 2001, FEMA listed the event of an upper-category hurricane as “one of the
three most likely catastrophes facing the nation. FEMA even initiated a hands-on
preparedness event when it carried out the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise with local
and state emergency managers. Although this exercise prepared its participants for a
5
HURRICANE KATRINA
larger death toll than Katrina, its scenario did not include the breaching of levees around
New Orleans (Parker et al., 2009)
Chapter 4
Public Health Preparedness
Public health preparedness involves the work of every level of government. The
local and state governments are responsible for creating policies, building infrastructure,
and working with its citizens to disseminate health security information. States have
police powers, which means that they have the power to regulate health and safety.
States also have to create their own emergency preparedness plans and carry out
emergency preparedness training. Preparedness training can be unique for all states,
depending on the unique needs for that state, but they must meet some national
preparedness goals. The federal government works in collaboration with local and state
governments, but also is responsible for domestic health preparedness. It is crucial that
the federal government works with other countries “to ensure an effective worldwide
system for preparedness, information sharing, and collaboration in preventing, detecting,
reporting, and responding to public health threats.” Also, multiple federal agencies such
as Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, and the
Environmental Protection Agency offer services (Teitelbaum & Wilensky, 2013).
Chapter 5
Government Response
Local and State Governments
Many have argued that the response to Hurricane Katrina was not as speedy as it
should have been, and that there were breakdowns of the emergency response system at
HURRICANE KATRINA
6
every level. All of the area’s public officials were warned of the impending storm, but
many were accused of being slow to act. On August 26, Louisiana’s governor issued a
state of emergency, which triggered her state’s disaster plan. She then left the decisions
about mandatory evacuation to be made by Mayor Ray Nagin. Nagin also received a
telephone call from the director of the National Hurricane Center to inform him of the
significance of this storm. Still, Nagin did not order a mandatory evacuation until the
storm was within 24 hours of hitting the coast. Many people were not able to evacuate in
this short of time span. Then the governor and his officials decided to seek shelter at a
Hyatt Regency hotel rather than at the city’s Mobile Command Center or Louisiana’s
emergency operations facility in Baton Rouge, where other state and local officials
waited out the storm. This caused the Mayor to be cut off from the rest of the officials
for two days, leaving him and others stranded with no form of communication. Disrupted
communication has also been blamed for Governor Blanco’s inability to give a list of
requests to the White House until September 1, four days after the hurricane first hit
(Shughart, 2011).
Federal Government
Although people were upset with the response of the local and state governments,
most of the blame was placed on the federal government, especially the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA works with state and local
governments to plan for disasters, and to train local responders how to act in the event of
an emergency (Parker et al., 2009). When disasters do strike, FEMA offers its assistance
to individuals, families, and businesses. Through this agency, the federal government
7
HURRICANE KATRINA
also offers disaster assistance through loans by the Small Business Administration (Plitt
& Maldonado, 2012).
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s assistance came much later than
anticipated. President Bush declared an emergency in Louisiana on Saturday, August 27.
This declaration should have been the beginning of FEMA working with state and local
officials to plan for the upcoming storm. One FEMA official noted that the agency did
not send enough food, water, and medical supplies before the storm hit. Once federal
agencies did recognize the importance of a national response, sixteen thousand federal
employees were sent to the Gulf Coast (Shughart, 2011)). Another 63,000 military
personnel were deployed to the area. This was the largest number of military personnel
sent to any disaster in the history of the United States (Miller, 2012). Congress also set
aside $88 billion for relief, recovery, and rebuilding in the area. Another $5.8 billion was
underwritten in disaster loans by the Small Business Administration (Shughart, 2011).
Chapter 6
Reasons for Delay
Reasons for the federal government’s slow response to the disaster are
multifaceted as well as complicated. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, FEMA
was reorganized with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This led the agency
to lose some of its autonomy and authority to mainly immerse its undertakings in
emergency preparedness. Instead, the DHS led FEMA to focus more of its mission and
budget on planning for future terrorist attacks. This forced many of FEMA’s most
experienced members to leave (Shughart, 2011). Relationships with local and state
emergency response programs also weakened as the Office of Domestic Preparedness
HURRICANE KATRINA
8
took on the control of preparation grants. The partnerships that were so essential to
FEMA’s success in times of disaster were now strained (Parker et al., 2009).
A lack of experience in this manner caused confusion and delay in the
Department of Homeland Security when the hurricane finally did arrive. White House
and Defense Department officials also questioned whether to federalize National Guard
units in the storm area. Supposedly, President George W. Bush asked Louisiana’s
Democratic governor Kathleen Blanco to give control of local law enforcement and
military to the federal government. After a day of contemplation, she refused because
she thought that this would allow the president to claim credit for relief efforts that were
starting to show improvement. Blanco may have been inclined to have this attitude
toward the President because of a notion that historically, he had been quicker to offer
assistance in electoral battleground states. One example was the speedy aid that arrived
to Florida after Hurricane Charley. This was a notably different response than the four
days it took to visit after Hurricane Katrina (Shughart, 2011).
Although blame could be placed on many different people during the Hurricane
Katrina disaster, some common trends seem to plague all disaster relief preparedness
programs. Policies and political agendas at both the state and national level are crowded
with many pressing issues. The topics that are the most immediate and those with certain
consequences tend to receive the most attention. For example, during the time frame of
Hurricane Katrina, the government was focused on domestic tax cuts and the War on
Terror. Other threats such as counterterrorism, immigration border security, and threats
of avian influenza also plagued the DHS at the time. Agendas concerned with emergency
preparedness are pushed aside because they are not immediate threats. When these
9
HURRICANE KATRINA
possibilities do become realities, appropriate policies are not in place (Parker et al.,
2009).
Chapter 7
Lessons Learned
All levels of government, especially the federal government, learned lessons from
this disaster that will hopefully prevent this large-scale crisis from occurring again. One
lesson is that the Executive Branch agencies need to be better equipped to manage
disasters and communicate with the appropriate groups. The federal government should
also work on implementing the National Preparedness Goals (NPGs) (The White House,
n.d.) A National Response Plan had been made before Hurricane Katrina, but it gave a
sense of false hope because the plan was untested at the time (Parker et al., 2009).
Another lesson was that the DHS should review current laws and policies about
communication during an emergency. As noted earlier, many key players in the
emergency response lost communication, further delaying aid to the area. During the
storm, three million people lost telephone services, and many of the 911 emergency call
centers were unable to function. Nearly half of all radio and television stations lost
access to their audience. The federal government plans on working with the Office of
Science and Technology Policy to develop a National Communications Strategy that
would support communication during disasters (The White House, n.d).
A third lesson learned was that certain aspects of public health and medical aid
need to be more readily offered during these critical periods. Unfortunately, Hurricane
Katrina hit two states (Louisiana and Mississippi) that had public health infrastructures
ranking 49th and 50th in the United States. The flooding caused many people to lose
10
HURRICANE KATRINA
access to their homes, and medications and medical devices that people with chronic
conditions rely on to survive. Numerous hospitals and clinics were too damaged to
operate. People also lacked access to clean water, and sanitation was an issue. To lessen
problems like these in the future, the federal government would like to partner the
Department of Health and Human Services with the Department of Homeland Security to
strengthen the federal government’s competency in delivering public health and medical
aid in an emergency (The White House, n.d.).
Chapter 8
Triumphs
Even with all the flaws in the emergency response system at the time of Hurricane
Katrina, there were some noteworthy parts to the process. One aspect that really helped
the relief effort was the massive amount of volunteer and non-profit organizations that
offered their services during this time. The USA Freedom Corps and Governor’s State
Service Commissions both helped bring volunteers from non-profit organizations into the
aid process. The Citizen Corps also brought more than 14,000 volunteers into the
recovery efforts. Faith-based organizations such as Southern Baptist Relief, Operation
Blessing, and the Salvation Army came to provide aid in the form of food, supplies, and
shelter. These were just a few of the groups that volunteered their time and resources to
help those affected by the hurricane (The White House, n.d.).
The federal government also commended the actions taken by various law
enforcement groups. Local fire and police departments, along with emergency response
units worked long past scheduled hours to assist those in need. Other cities and states
also offered their law enforcement members to help in recovery and rescue missions. For
11
HURRICANE KATRINA
example, the Fire Department of New York City and the New York City Police
Department sent hundreds of its members to the disaster area, along with various fire
trucks, police cruisers, schools buses, and transit buses (The White House, n.d.).
Another positive result of Hurricane Katrina was the development and
implementation of new policies. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform of
Act of 2006 promises changes to both FEMA and DHS that will improve emergency
preparedness in the future. After the disaster, a new administrator was appointed to
FEMA. This new administrator has emergency management experience, which is one of
the provisions in the previously mentioned reform act.
The act also mandates that the
head of FEMA “will have direct communication access to the Congress and to the
president in a time of emergency” (Miller, 2012). The act is seen as a shift back towards
preparedness instead of just recovery
Chapter 9
Summary
Hurricane Katrina proved to be one of the largest natural disasters that the United
States has ever had. It showed many inadequacies in both the emergency preparedness
plans and responses to the disaster at local, state, and national levels. The nation learned
important lessons about how to effectively plan for future disasters, and what parts of
communication and public health need to be improved in order to function more
seamlessly. Even with these challenges, the recovery efforts were unprecedented, with
various volunteers, donations from non-profit organizations, and the tireless work of law
enforcement. Subsequent policies hope to close the gaps in the emergency response
system so that the government can be more coordinated in future events.
12
HURRICANE KATRINA
Chapter 10
Recommendations
Although the federal government has taken much of the blame for the Hurricane
Katrina crisis, I think that greater local and state government involvement in emergency
preparedness could have helped immensely in this situation. As noted before, police
powers are assigned to the states. They carry the responsibility of protecting the health
and safety of their citizens. Obvious problems within Louisiana’s levee system were
noted before the hurricane, but no action as taken to fix them. Also, the states most
affected by the hurricane had some of the worst public health infrastructures in the
country.
I would recommend that local and state officials in this area, along with all states,
take action to write emergency preparedness and response policies. Unlike the federal
government, the state government is able to focus its policies to the specific needs of that
community. Each state should not only create its own emergency preparedness and
response plans, but also carry out drills to make sure that these plans can be implemented
successfully at the time of a disaster. Local and state public health agencies are
knowledgeable about emergency preparedness, and well suited to make plans for the
states. Public health agencies can also make sure that public health and medical aid will
be in place in the event of a crisis.
13
HURRICANE KATRINA
References
Fritz, H. M., Blount, C., Sokoloski, R., Singleton, J., Fuggle, A., McAdoo, B. G., & ...
Tate, B. (2008). Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge Reconnaissance. Journal Of
Geotechnical & Geoenvironmental Engineering, 134(5), 644-656.
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)1090-0241(2008)134:5(644)
Kelman, I. (2007). Hurricane Katrina disaster diplomacy. Disasters, 31(3), 288-309.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2007.01010.x
Miller, L. M. (2012). Controlling disasters: recognising latent goals after Hurricane
Katrina. Disasters, 36(1), 122-139. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2011.01244.x
Parker, C. F., Stern, E. K., Paglia, E., & Brown, C. (2009). Preventable Catastrophe? The
Hurricane Katrina Disaster Revisited. Journal Of Contingencies & Crisis
Management, 17(4), 206-220. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.2009.00588.x
Plitt, S., & Maldonado, D. (2012). When Constitutional Challenges to State Cancellation
Moratoriums Enacted After Catastrophic Hurricanes Fail: A Call for a New
Federal Insurance Program. BYU Journal Of Public Law, 27(1), 41-96.
Shughart, I. F. (2011). Disaster Relief as Bad Public Policy. Independent Review, 15(4),
519-539.
Teitelbaum, J.B. & Wilensky, S. E. (2013). Essentials of health policy and law. United
States of America: Jones and Bartlett Learning.
The White House: President George Bush. (n.d.). The federal response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons learned. Retrieved from http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/
HURRICANE KATRINA
14