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Appeasement Disadvantage – Negative
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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Cuba
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Cuba Shell – Appeasement 1NC
Cuban engagement is limited --- no major foreign policy changes coming
Associated Press, 6/21/2013 (Cuba, US Try Talking, But Face Many Obstacles, p.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=194107378)
To be sure, there
is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them. The State Department
has kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havana's commitment to
fighting human trafficking. The Obama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruled for
more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part, Cuba continues to denounce Washington's 51-year-old economic embargo.
And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing
communications equipment to the island illegally. His case has scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officials say
privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States, something Washington
has said it won't consider. Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped
organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with
upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missed opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its
history. "I think that a lot more would have to happen for this to amount to momentum leading to any kind of
major diplomatic breakthrough," he said. "Obama should be bolder and more audacious ."
Engagement with Cuba sends a signal of appeasement.
Rubin, 10/18/2011 (Jennifer, Obama’s Cuba appeasement, Washington Post, p.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cubaappeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html)
The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to
relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for
Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same . Throughout his tenure, President Obama has
failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and
promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take
their shots at the U nited S tates. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its
engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression . Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit
down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions.
Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally
to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and , from their
perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to
tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind .
Appeasement causes global aggression and multiple scenarios for conflict.
Chapin and Hanson, 12/7/2009 (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow
at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p. http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disasterobama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/)
BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can
anything good result from President Obama’s
marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can
understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on
public perceptions , however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw
the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to
see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be
1979 redux , when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most
damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten
ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to
apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern
Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth.
There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the
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pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and
now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.
Iranian proliferation causes nuclear war.
Henry Sokolsky, executive director – nonproliferation policy education center, 10/1/2003, Policy Review, p. lexis
If nothing is done to shore up U.S. and allied security relations with the Gulf Coordination Council states and with Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt,
Iran's acquisition of even a nuclear weapons breakout capability could prompt one or more of these states to try to
acquire a nuclear weapons option of their own. Similarly, if the U.S. fails to hold Pyongyang accountable for its violation of the NPT
or lets Pyongyang hold on to one or more nuclear weapons while appearing to reward its violation with a new deal--one that heeds North Korea's
demand for a nonaggression pact and continued construction of the two light water reactors--South Korea and Japan (and later, perhaps, Taiwan)
will have powerful cause to question Washington's security commitment to them and their own pledges to stay non-nuclear. In such a world,
Washington's worries would not be limited to gauging the military capabilities of a growing number of hostile, nuclear, or near-nuclear-armed
nations. In addition, it would have to gauge the reliability of a growing number of nuclear or near-nuclear friends. Washington might still be able
to assemble coalitions, but with more nations like France, with nuclear options of their own, it would be much, much more iffy. The amount
of international intrigue such a world would generate would also easily exceed what our diplomats and leaders could
manage or track. Rather than worry about using force for fear of producing another Vietnam, Washington and its very closest allies are more
likely to grow weary of working closely with others and view military options through the rosy lens of their relatively quick victories in Desert
Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Just Cause. This would be a world disturbingly similar to that of 1914 but with one
big difference: It would
be spring-loaded to go nuclear .
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Cuba – Engagement Link
Engagement with Cuba signals accommodation and rewards misbehavior.
Poblete, 12/1/2008 (Jason – Poblete Tamargo LLP, The Obama Administration and U.S.-Cuba Policy, DC
Dispatches, p. http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/12/01/the-obama-administration-and-us-cuba-policy/)
There was no silver lining for the Democratic Left in South Florida or for their long-time obsession of normalizing relations with Communist
Cuba. From a purely partisan standpoint, I hope that Obama or his officials go meet in private with envoys for the Cuban regime (as recently
proposed by Raul Castro). Such a meeting would be up there with the Bay of Pigs under Kennedy or Elian Gonzalez’s
kidnapping during Easter by the federal government under Bill Clinton. Americans do not like to reward dictators and
tyrants . It would help Republicans for generations with voters of Cuban and non-Cuban ancestry. Yet such a meeting between the
Obama Administration and regime officials would be a serious mistake . The Castro brothers, and many of their key advisors, have
nothing of value to offer the U.S. They should be convicted in U.S. federal courts, or tried by the Cuban people, for human rights abuses and
other crimes. Cuba remains a state sponsor of terrorism because the Castros support the Iranians, the FARC in Colombia,
among other persons and acts. The Cubans are suspected of operating a biological weapons program. The Obama
Administration can try and sweep all of this under the rug, but South Florida leaders will be there to remind people of the truth. The political onus
is on the future leaders of Cuba to constructively engage the U.S. based on the conditions establised under U.S. laws. The best assistance we can
offer the Cuban opposition, as well as the future leaders of Cuba, is to enforce U.S. laws to the fullest extent reasonably possible. This means
keeping the limits on travel and on family remittances. It also means calling on our allies in the Hemisphere and elsewhere to cooperate with our
policy on Cuba or face limits on foreign assistance and cooperation in areas important to them. The U.S. needs to tell the future leaders of a free
Cuba that we are not interested in cleansing the crimes of the Castro brothers or their key advisors through talks or other political legitimization
efforts. Quite the opposite. We should either indict these people or advise the Cuban people how they can indict them in a free Cuba. The Cuban
people need an orderly way to deal with these issues. There are many pent up frustrations that need to be addressed in a future Cuba and the
courts may be the only orderly way to do so. Talking to future possible defendants is not the way to go. Rather than entertaining taking,
the Obama Administration should announce in the first few months in office that it does not intend to reverse Bush
Administration in any way. They should call on allies to support our efforts in Cuba. They should call on the regime to release political
prisoners. They should indict Fidel and Raul Castro for crimes against Americans, including the Brothers to the Rescue incident that claimed the
lives of several American citizens and one U.S. national. They should round up more of Cuba’s spies in the U.S. Be bold. Keep up the
pressure from Day One. These and other action items should have been undertaken during the past eight years . Some
were, some were not. Regardless, the Bush Administration leaves a foundation from which to build a solid front from which
to deconstruct Cuban tyranny in a peaceful manner. Any accommodation with Fidel or Raul Castro, their key advisors, will surely
do the opposite . It may not happen in the short-term, but such talks will lay the seed for future conflict on the island .
Engagement is a form of accommodation that sets a bad precedent
Poblete, 12/1/2008 (Jason – Poblete Tamargo LLP, The Obama Administration and U.S.-Cuba Policy, DC
Dispatches, p. http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/12/01/the-obama-administration-and-us-cuba-policy/)
There was no silver lining for the Democratic Left in South Florida or for their long-time obsession of normalizing relations with Communist
Cuba. From a purely partisan standpoint, I hope that Obama or his officials go meet in private with envoys for the Cuban regime (as recently
proposed by Raul Castro). Such a meeting would be up there with the Bay of Pigs under Kennedy or Elian Gonzalez’s
kidnapping during Easter by the federal government under Bill Clinton. Americans do not like to reward dictators and
tyrants . It would help Republicans for generations with voters of Cuban and non-Cuban ancestry. Yet such a meeting between the
Obama Administration and regime officials would be a serious mistake . The Castro brothers, and many of their key advisors, have
nothing of value to offer the U.S. They should be convicted in U.S. federal courts, or tried by the Cuban people, for human rights abuses and
other crimes. Cuba remains a state sponsor of terrorism because the Castros support the Iranians, the FARC in Colombia,
among other persons and acts. The Cubans are suspected of operating a biological weapons program. The Obama
Administration can try and sweep all of this under the rug, but South Florida leaders will be there to remind people of the truth. The political onus
is on the future leaders of Cuba to constructively engage the U.S. based on the conditions establised under U.S. laws. The best assistance we can
offer the Cuban opposition, as well as the future leaders of Cuba, is to enforce U.S. laws to the fullest extent reasonably possible. This means
keeping the limits on travel and on family remittances. It also means calling on our allies in the Hemisphere and elsewhere to cooperate with our
policy on Cuba or face limits on foreign assistance and cooperation in areas important to them. The U.S. needs to tell the future leaders of a free
Cuba that we are not interested in cleansing the crimes of the Castro brothers or their key advisors through talks or other political legitimization
efforts. Quite the opposite. We should either indict these people or advise the Cuban people how they can indict them in a free Cuba. The Cuban
people need an orderly way to deal with these issues. There are many pent up frustrations that need to be addressed in a future Cuba and the
courts may be the only orderly way to do so. Talking to future possible defendants is not the way to go. Rather than entertaining taking,
the Obama Administration should announce in the first few months in office that it does not intend to reverse Bush
Administration in any way. They should call on allies to support our efforts in Cuba. They should call on the regime to release political
prisoners. They should indict Fidel and Raul Castro for crimes against Americans, including the Brothers to the Rescue incident that claimed the
lives of several American citizens and one U.S. national. They should round up more of Cuba’s spies in the U.S. Be bold. Keep up the
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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pressure from Day One. These and other action items should have been undertaken during the past eight years. Some
Bush Administration leaves a foundation from which to build a solid front from which
to deconstruct Cuban tyranny in a peaceful manner. Any accommodation with Fidel or Raul Castro, their key advisors, will surely
do the opposite . It may not happen in the short-term, but such talks will lay the seed for future conflict on the island .
were, some were not. Regardless, the
Appeasement with Cuba fails: makes US look weak to Iran and North Korea; strong perceptions key to peace
Sal 09(Sal, writer, Axis of Right, on Israel, politics, tyranny, and the war on terror. 2/12/09Axis of Right: Axis of Right is a conservative blog to
discuss Politics, Religion, Culture, etc. http://axisofright.com/2009/02/12/appeasement-update-syria-and-cuba/)
The new era of Capitulation and Appeasement is in full force. The Obama administration plans to lift all sanctions against Syria
as part of it’s unraveling of the War on Terror. Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism. They aided Al Quaida in Iraq against our armed forces, are
building a nuclear reactor, and have aided Hezbollah in Lebanon in attacks against Israel. Yet now, in this new day of Capitulation and
Appeasement, we are making friends with the Syrians by lifting the only (weak) leverage that we have without any preconditions. This
olive branch to Syria is not in the best interests of the United States. In other news, a bill going through the Congress would lift all
travel restrictions between the U.S. and Cuba, prevent a President from making any similar restrictions, all without any
concessions from Cuba. Capitulating to and Appeasing terrorists, dictators, and thugs only makes us as a nation look
weak. The leaders of Cuba and Syria, as well as Iran and North Korea, do not value peace as we do. When two nations have
completely different objectives (peace at any cost vs. domination and power), it is impossible to come to any meaningful peace
settlement. Peace through strength is the only valid foreign policy doctrine in a world populated by terrorists, dictators
and thugs. The Obama administration does not understand this, and is in for a rude awakening.
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Cuba – Embargo Link
Lifting the embargo will not result in change only appeasement.
Brookes, 4/16/2009 (Peter – senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at the Heritage
Foundation, Let’s Take it Slow on Overtures to Cuba, Heritage Foundation, p.
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/lets-take-it-slow-on-overtures-to-cuba)
If you're hoping for major changes in Cuba following the White House's announcement Monday of the easing of some restrictions on
interactions with the island -- think again . Sure, for humanitarian purposes, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more
regularly than once every couple of years - even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit the United States. And, allowing remittances to American
relatives in Cuba can ease some suffering due to the regime's failed policies - even though at least 20 percent of the money sent to Cuba will be
siphoned off by the government. But in the end, it's still the brothers Castro, Fidel and his successor Raul, who will decide whether there is an
opening to the United States -- or not. And in usual Cuban-regime style, in response to the White House announcement, Fidel Castro stood
defiant, barely recognizing the change in long-standing U.S. policy. Instead, and predictably, Fidel called for an end to el bloqueo (the
blockade) on Cuba - without any offer of change from the regime holding 11 million people in its iron grip. So much for
Obama's magic spell on the world's bad actors. The concern among many is that liberal criticism and a lack of a positive Cuban
response will lead the White House to make even more concessions in an effort to create an opening . Of course, the
big empanada is the 1962 U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, which is unquestionably the thing Havana most wants ended. Lifting the
embargo on Cuba won't normalize relations, but instead will legitimize - and concede defeat to - Fidel's 50-year struggle against the
Yanquis. It'll also pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers, allowing Havana to repress more at home and hop-up its anti-American
agenda abroad. The last thing we need to do is line the pockets of the communist regime, which they'll use to control the Cuban people. Cuban
human-rights are grim enough. The totalitarian state manhandles all aspects of the Cuban people's lives - not to mention the more than 200
political prisoners, languishing in rat-infested dungeons. Freedom of speech, press, assembly or association? Forget it. Cuban security services
closely monitor domestic and international journalists, restrict both Internet access and foreign news -- and censor domestic media. We also
don't need a re-invigorated Cuba becoming a major menace to U.S. interests in this hemisphere. There'd be no joy in
seeing Cuba team up with Venezuela in advancing their leftist, anti-American agenda down South. Indeed, the embargo has kept Cuba in its box
since the loss of Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused since then? Contrast that with the
1980s. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead it labors in the yoke of a
Castro-imposed dystopia. The U.S. embargo remains a matter of principle - and a leveraged response to Cuba's
repression of its people. Knuckling under to evil without reciprocity is a moral hazard, only begetting more of the
same .
Easing embargo undermines U.S. credibility – reinforces Cuba’s tyrannical regime
Walser 11 (Ray, a veteran Foreign Service officer, is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation,
1/18/2011, The Foundry, “Obama’s Ill-Timed, Confusing Concessions Leave Cuba Unimpressed,” http://blog.heritage.org/2011/01/18/obamasill-timed-confusing-concessions-leave-cuba-unimpressed/)
On January 14, the White House unveiled further liberalization of its Cuba policy. New changes alter rules to allow easier American
citizen visits, permit non-family remittances (up to $500 per quarter), and broaden the number of U.S. airports able to
send charter flights to Cuba. The measures, the White House trumpeted, “will increase people-to-people contact; support civil society in
Cuba; enhance the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people; and help promote their independence from Cuban
authorities.Ӧ Liberals proponents of enhanced Cuba ties have applauded the measure. The decision, however, is ill-timed and confusing
and fails to impress the hard-line Castro regime.¶ It is ill-timed because it comes just as a Cuban Communist Party congress prepares
to ratify an economic game plan that throws more than a million Cubans into the “private sector” while preserving the fundamentals of a
command or planned economy. Cuba’s un-free economic model, Jose Azel of the University of Miami notes, reflects “the desire for control by
the military and the Communist Party of every aspect of Cuban life” and an economic program that is antithetical to the individual liberty and
empowerment necessary to bring about an economic renaissance. Non-family remittances will provide a modest lifeline that
supports the objectives of the regime: a voiceless, powerless private sector that will not rock the Communist boat.
The decision is confusing because it undercuts recent attempts to pressure the Cuban regime to release U.S. citizen
Alan Gross. Speaking in Santiago, Chile on January 13, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Arturo Valenzuela said, “the
United States finds it very difficult to advance on matters of common interest” with Cuba while President Raul Castro’s government continues to
hold Gross, a U.S. government contractor. Gross was arrested in December 2009 and has spent a year in Cuban prison without charges. Havana
claims that Gross is a spy but has made no attempt to prove the case. Before Valenzuela could return home, the White House
announced the latest unilateral easing of travel restrictions, a blow to those ready to keep the Gross case at the center
of the current debate on U.S.–Cuban relations.¶ Ileana Ros-Leithen (R–FL), chair of the House Foreign Affairs committee, correctly
summarized the Obama Administration’s errors:¶ Loosening these regulations will not help foster a pro-democracy
environment in Cuba. … They certainly will not help the Cuban people free themselves from the tyranny that engulfs
them. … [They] undermine U.S. foreign policy and security objectives and will bring economic benefits to the Cuban
regime.¶ The Castro regime continued to take the Obama Administration to task for its failure to lift full travel
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restrictions and charged it with seeking “domination” and “destabilization” of Cuba. The Cuban Foreign Ministry went into
rage mode when a visiting U.S. delegation present for immigration talks met with Cuban dissidents. It charged the U.S. with advancing a “policy
of subversion and intervention” and supporting “internal counterrevolution.” So much for an improved climate in relations! ¶ After two
years, the valiant promises of candidate Obama regarding Cuba with his call for libertad [liberty] and a “road to freedom for all
Cubans” that begins “with justice for Cuba’s political prisoners, the rights of free speech, a free press and freedom of assembly” leading to
“elections that are free and fair” are largely overshadowed by more unilateral concessions to the Castro regime.
Further US unilateral concessions to Cuba exacerbate human rights violations; the embargo provides the best
means for movement towards democracy
Cuban Exile Quarter 12(No Author; 12/23/12. Cuban Exile Quarter: blog purposed for the discussion of US/Cuban diplomatic politics.
“Embargoing Human Rights for Trade? The Sanctions Paradox.” http://cubanexilequarter.blogspot.com/2012/12/embargoing-human-rights-fortrade.html)
The Obama Administration has
continued to extend a hand to the Cuban regime and has little to show for it, except
increased repression, the deaths of high profile activists, and an American citizen rotting in a Cuban prison . There is
no reason to suppose that further unilateral concessions will produce a different outcome. Sanctions are the last
nonviolent way of seeking to change an unjust system by refusing to cooperate with tyranny. When discussing the Cuban
embargo in the mass media these two aspects are rarely, if ever, touched upon. Academics and the lobbyists for big business, such as USA
Engage, often claim that sanctions never work; rather, it is economic engagement that leads towards greater respect for
human rights. However, recent history in China, Burma, and Vietnam indicate otherwise. This disconnect from
reality stems from two factors: self-interest and a reading of power dynamics that ignores people power in favor of
focusing on regime elites. In a New York Times article entitled "Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo," Carlos
Saladrigas claims that “maintaining this embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hard-liners . . . what we
should be doing is helping the reformers.” Essentially, Mr. Saladrigas argues that lifting sanctions would weaken and dissuade hardliners while at
the same time benefiting reformers. Over the past four years the Obama Administration has loosened economic sanctions on
Cuba. If Mr. Saladrigas is correct, we should observe former outsiders in the regime tackling and winning policy discussions, but that has not
been the case. On the human rights front[,] the situation has actually deteriorated. One of the policy objectives of the Castro
regime both internally and internationally is to portray itself as David against Goliath. Despite having normal trade relations, Hugo Chavez has
undertaken the same kind of campaign in Venezuela. Often times the U.S. State Department has fallen short of explaining the sanctions policy
fully or for that matter defending it in a vigorous manner at international forums. This has allowed the Cuban government a free hand in a
sustained campaign to portray itself as a victim blaming all of its economic woes on the American blockade on Cuba. Nevertheless as John
Adams once observed, “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot
alter the state of facts and evidence.” The facts at present demonstrate that the arguments of the regime and its apologists do not hold up under
scrutiny. First, one of the problems with the sanctions debate is that words are used interchangeably which are not synonymous while others that
should be are not. For example the Cuban government and many of its apologists use the terms blockade and embargo as if they were the same
thing. At the same time the terms embargo and sanctions are viewed as somehow different. A blockade is specifically a military term that
according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary is “for the isolation by a warring nation of an enemy area (as a harbor) by troops or warships to
prevent passage of persons or supplies.” In the case of Cuba there was only one time when a blockade was put in place and that was by President
John F. Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis beginning on October 22 and it was ended less than a month later on November 20, 1962.
What is known as the Cuban Embargo began On January 3, 1961 when President Dwight D. Eisenhower suspended trade with Cuba, a few days
after his administration broke diplomatic relations with the country. The embargo on Cuba since its inception has meant restrictions on trade and
travel to the island by U.S. citizens and in practice has been a partial embargo. Over the decades these sanctions have been loosened and
tightened depending on the circumstances at the time. An actual embargo would mean that there is a complete ban on or prohibition of trade by
the United States with Cuba. This is not the case. What you have in Cuba is a partial embargo which is exactly the same in definition as economic
sanctions. Between January 2000 and September 2012 according to the United States Census Bureau there has been $4,291,200,000.00 in U.S.
trade in goods with Cuba. The ban on U.S. imports from Cuba remains but U.S. exports to Cuba have been going on since 1992 with the amounts
dramatically increasing since 2002 reaching its peak in exports to Cuba under the Bush Administration in 2008. Despite loosening restrictions
further under the Obama Administration trade with Cuba has dropped to 363.3 million dollars in 2011 and figures for 2012 show a slight
improvement with total sales to the island at $337.5 million as of September. This is not a total embargo but a partial one in which the United
States is one of Cuba’s top trading partners. At the same time Cuban exiles, many committed to maintaining economic sanctions against the
dictatorship, are also a main source of remittances to their families on the island totaling hundreds of millions of dollars per year. The aim of the
embargo initially, during the Cold War, was to penalize the Castro regime for seizing U.S. properties and limit its ability to fund armed guerrillas
and terrorist groups in the region aimed at toppling friendly governments. With the exception of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979 this policy
was a success in the Americas. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union changes were made to sanctions policies that sought in the 1992
Torricelli Bill and 1996 Helms Burton Bill to make clear that sanctions would remain in effect until all political prisoners were freed, the
government tolerated a political opposition and free elections were held. Funds were also set aside by Congress to assist through development
assistance independent civil society. In addition Congress in the 1980s established Radio/TV Marti to break the information monopoly of the
dictatorship. Also in the late 1980s the United States led an effort at the U.N. Human Rights Commission to expose the
systematic human rights abuses on the island and hold the Cuban dictatorship to greater scrutiny . The result of what
amounted to a tightening of sanctions and redirecting them from Cold War considerations to a pro-democracy effort combined with
diplomacy was to provide protection to Cuban dissidents on the island, along with the means to reach the populace via radio while also setting up
licensing to permit the sending of humanitarian and technical assistance to dissidents by civil society groups in the United States. This led to
the growth of the pro-democracy movement on the island and greater support for it internationally.
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Easing the embargo creates a bad precedent globally
King, 10/19/2011 (U.S. Cubans blast Obama deal with Havana, Caribbean Life, p.
http://www.caribbeanlifenews.com/stories/2011/10/2011_10_17_nk_concessions.html)
“Shame on the administration for engaging with the tyrants in Havana,” said South Florida Republican Congresswoman Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen. “This would set a dangerous precedent and encourage other dictators to take Americans as
prisoners ,” she added. Florida Republic Sen. Marco Rubio said Gross is “a man who was wrongfully jailed in the first place”, adding:
“Rather than easing sanctions in response to hostage taking, the U.S. should put more punitive measures on the Castro
regime.”
Easing restrictions only strengthens the government – Iran proves
Bustillo 5/9 (Mitchell, author for International Policy Digest, 5/9/2013, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo,”
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/)
When thinking of U.S.-Cuba relations, the trade embargo, or el bloqueo, is first and foremost on people’s minds. In
2009, President Barack
Obama eased the travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to Cuba, and again in 2011 , allowing students
and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba, as recently demonstrated by American pop culture figures, Beyoncé and her husband Jay-Z.
Despite a history of hostile transgressions, the U.S. is inconsistent with its implementation of the embargo, which
sends mixed signals to Havana and displays our weak foreign policy regarding Cuba. ¶ Undoubtedly, Cuba is capitalizing on
this weakness by using the embargo as a scapegoat for all of its woes without any immediate fear of reinstated restrictions. Because the goal is to
promote Cuban democracy and freedom through non-violent and non-invasive means while refraining from providing any support to the current
oppressive Cuban government, the current legislation regarding the embargo and travel ban against Cuba needs to be modernized and
strengthened. The need for an embargo has never been more important or potentially effective, even considering the
current human rights and economic arguments against the embargo.¶ Washington’s goal in its dealings with Havana is clear:
facilitate the introduction and growth of democracy while increasing personal freedoms. There are many who argue that the best way to spread
democracy is by lifting the embargo and travel restrictions. U.S. Rep. Michael Honda argues that an influx of politically enlightened U.S.
travelers to Cuba would put Havana in a difficult place, leading to their own people calling for change. However, this is erroneous. Due to the
fractured and weakened state of the embargo, over 400,000 U.S. travelers visited Cuba in 2011, making the United States the second-largest
source of foreign visitors after Canada, according to NPR’s Nick Miroff. Obviously, this influx of what has been theorized to be
liberty-professing tourists has not resulted in an influx of such democratic ideals into this overwhelmingly federally
controlled country.¶ One example is the case of Alan Gross, an American citizen working for USAID. He was
arrested in Cuba in 2009 under the allegations of Acts against the Independence and Territorial Integrity of the State while distributing
computers and technological equipment to Jewish communities in Cuba. He is currently serving the fourth of his fifteen-year
conviction, is in poor health, and receiving little to no aid from the U.S., according to the Gross Family website. In light of this,
it is hard to believe that the U.S. would be able to protect a large number of tourists in a hostile nation, especially when they plan to ‘profess’
political freedom. This view is further promoted by the Ladies in White, a Cuban dissident group that supports the embargo. They fear ending it
would only serve to strengthen the current dictatorial regime because the real blockade, they claim, is within Cuba. Allowing American travelers
to visit Cuba does not help propel the cause of Cuban democracy; it hampers it. ¶ Still there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to
this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution.
From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an
estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is perhaps the single
largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.” ¶ These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban
families, not support the Cuban government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban
citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can
increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands. “After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the
remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,” states Alvaro Vargas Llosa,
Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. ¶ However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a
nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or
even improve their fate. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will
increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United
States or the embargo.¶ No doubt, it has been a fruitless 50 years since the embargo was enacted. Little has changed as far as democracy and
human rights are concerned. To maintain control, Cuba has “managed to offset much of the effects over the years in large part because the
Soviets subsidized the island for three decades, because the regime welcomed Canadian, Mexican and European capital after the collapse of the
Berlin Wall, and because Venezuela is its new patron,” according to Llosa. However, Venezuela is now undergoing a political transition of its
own with the recent death of Hugo Chávez, its president for the past 14 years, and the controversial election of Nicolás Maduro.¶ Despite being
Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro only won by a narrow margin and will likely be forced to cut spending on social programs and foreign
assistance in an effort to stabilize Venezuela’s dire economic problems. Therefore, now is the ideal time to take action. Without Venezuela’s
support, the Cuban government will assuredly face an economic crisis. Strengthening the embargo to limit U.S.
dollars flowing into Cuba would place further pressure on the Cuban government and has the potential to trigger an
economic collapse. A change in the Cuban political climate is within reach. ¶ According to U.S. Senator Robert Menendez,
“Tourism to Cuba is a natural resource, akin to providing refined petroleum products to Iran. It’s reported that 2.5
million tourists visit Cuba – 1.5 million from North America…1 million Canadians…More than 170,000 from England…More than
400,000 from Spain, Italy, Germany, and France combined – All bringing in $1.9 billion in revenue to the Castro regime.” This behavior
undermines the embargo, which is why the U.S. should urge other nations to adopt similar policies toward Cuba. A strong and unyielding
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“Those who
lament our dependence on foreign oil because it enriches regimes in terrorist states like Iran, should not have a
double standard when it comes to enriching a brutal dictatorship like Cuba right here in our own backyard.” ¶ If the
embargo, supported by the U.S. and its allies, is necessary to incite political change. Furthermore, Sen. Menendez argues,
policy of the U.S. is to challenge these behaviors, then it must also stand up to Cuba. It would be a disservice to squander the progress of the past
50 years when opportunity is looming.
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Ext – Embargo = Leverage
The embargo provides leverage and should not be removed unconditionally
Perez, Spring 2010 (David – J.D. 2010 Yale Law School, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Harvard Latino Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis)
After conducting some initial discussions, both countries can then move on to the embargo. No one argues that the embargo is an effective
foreign policy, because it has clearly failed to bring about real reform on the island; the only argument for maintaining the embargo is that it can
be used as a bargaining chip for more dialogue - not that in its current state it can lead to a better situation. Put differently, the embargo is
only valuable to the extent that its removal can be part of a quid pro quo strategy - not that its maintenance will lead to
fundamental reform on the island. n82 This reveals a bifurcated myopia that affects both sides of the debate. On the one hand those who support
the embargo as a negotiating chip often gloss over the fact that its continuation will not lead to regime change. On the other hand, those who
focus on the embargo's inability to topple the regime and instead support
lifting the embargo unconditionally, generally give too
little weight to the embargo's value during diplomatic negotiations. The Helms-Burton legislation lays out the rather onerous
conditions that must be met on Cuba's end before the U.S. can begin restoring diplomatic relations. n83 The significance of Helms-Burton's
restraints cannot be overstated: while a particular president's rhetoric or a particular resolution's wording might chill diplomatic relations between
two countries, Helms-Burton's arduous provisions freeze relations. The onus to thaw that freeze is properly placed upon Washington, rather than
Havana. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States to change its own laws before any rapprochement with Cuba can begin. Invariably the
debate surrounding America's embargo revolves around its solvency: has it worked? The question should instead be reworded to ask: will current
U.S. policy work from here on out to achieve certain definable interests? The United States sold the island over $ 700 million in goods in 2008,
accounting for 40% of the island's agricultural imports. n84 That number seems to indicate that Cuba's trading relationship with the U.S. is not of
[*217] trivial importance to the island's leadership. However, the strength of this relationship may steadily diminish relative to other trading
partners in the next few years. For example, over the next five to seven years Cuba will have an increased energy productivity stemming from its
coastal drilling operations that will bring it closer to Spain, Canada, Norway, Brazil, and India. n85 With these relatively stable flows of capital,
Cuba will increasingly become insulated from U.S. economic pressure. The moment to decisively influence Cuba's government through
economic pressure may have never existed, but if it did, it has surely passed. The notion that the U.S. can intricately craft Cuba's governmental
and domestic policies by applying a combination of economic and political pressure must be rejected either as categorically false, or as an
anachronism of the early 1990s. During her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said "that it is not time to lift the
embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important source of leverage for further change on the island." n86
Secretary Clinton is correct: the embargo definitely provides a valuable bargaining chip during negotiations, and
should not be lifted unconditionally . But given this evidence, the Obama Administration should be suspect of claims that the embargo
gives the U.S. decisive leverage over Cuba.
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Cuba – Travel Ban Link
Lifting the travel ban signals weakness and legitimizes Cuba
Suchlicki, 2/26/2013 (Jime – Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director of the Institute for
Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and
the Embargo?, Focus on Cuba, Issue 185, p. http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue185.htm)
Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent
changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be
significant implications : • Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening
state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother. • American tourists will have limited
contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient
security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the
island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. •
While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited.
Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. • Tourist dollars would
be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the
Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. • The
assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at
best naïve. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. • Over the past
decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If
anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. •
As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper
economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst.
Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were
halted or rescinded by Castro. • Lifting the travel ban without major concessions from Cuba would send the wrong
message “to the enemies of the U nited S tates”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation;
allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the U nited S tates; espouse terrorism and antiU.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the U nited S tates will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with
tourism, investments and economic aid . • Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized
democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President
Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries.
The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. U.S. policy has not been uniformly
applied throughout the world, yet it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. While no one is advocating military intervention,
normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the
continent .
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Cuba – AT: Mail Services Non-Uniques
Mail services does not change Cuban policy or the U.S. signal
Agence France Presse, 6/17/2013 (US, Cuba seek to restore mail services, p. Lexis-Nexis)
"Representatives from the Department of State and the United States Postal Service will meet with representatives from the
government of Cuba for a technical discussion on re-establishing direct transportation of mail," spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. "The
it's not meant to
be a signal or anything or indicate a change in policy ." She stressed that the talks were technical and did not indicate
any change in the US policy towards Cuba . Washington and Havana do not have official diplomatic relations, but each country has
reason we're doing this is because it's, of course, good for the Cuban people. This is something we feel is good for us, but
an interests section in the other.
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Cuba – AT: Plan is Hardline
The nature of fiat means the plan is appeasement. The U.S. cannot backtrack if Cuba cheats.
Perez, Spring 2010 (David – J.D. 2010 Yale Law School, America’s Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy
Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Harvard Latino Law Review, p. Lexis-Nexis)
Policymakers in America often emphasize that any change on America's end must be met with irreversible change on Cuba's end, based on the
idea that the United States might be offering irreversible carrots for nothing. The underlying premise of that notion is simply wrong: there is no
reason to believe that once the U nited S tates changes parts of its Cuba policy, it cannot reverse those changes in
response to negative behavior in Havana. Concessions the United States makes on many of these issues can be
reversed: targeted sanctions can be reapplied after they have been removed; [*218] travel bans can be reinstituted after they
have been lifted; diplomatic relations can be re-severed after they have been re-established. If the U nited S tates normalizes relations
with the Cuban government, only to witness the Cuban government imprison or execute hundreds of dissidents,
there is no reason why our government could not respond strongly, and even consider reverting back to hostile
relations . Establishing relations between Washington and Havana is not an end in itself, nor is it a right that has been taken away from
Havana. Instead, normalized relations should properly be seen as a privilege that Cuba has to earn before it is once again offered by the United
States. But even if it is offered to Cuba, by no means are any overtures on Washington's end irreversible .
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Cuba – AT: Concessions
Cuba won’t make any real concessions.
Suchlicki, 3/4/2013 (Jaime, Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro, The Atlantic, p.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-aftercastro/273680/)
Similarly, any
serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one
of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and
factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and
elsewhere. Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran
and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U nited S tates. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin
America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and
that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible
concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and
directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in
speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington
and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the antihijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba. Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies. The
issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a
willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and
economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.
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Venezuela
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Venezuela Shell – Appeasement 1NC
Engagement with Venezuela sets a precedent for appeasement and signals weakness.
O’Leary 2008 (Brad – former President of the American Association of Political Consultants, The Audacity of
Deceit: Barack Obama’s War on American Values, p. 136-137)
Even when he's not ostensibly being dishonest about defending America, Obama signals the terms of his overall foreign policy, and all
the signs indicate that he would set a dangerous precedent with a policy that amounts to nothing more than appeasing
America's sworn enemies. During a CNN/YouTubc.com Democratic debate in July 2007, Obama and rival Senator Hillary Clinton—both of
whom have heavily criticized the Bush administration's approach to foreign policy—were asked if they, as president, would be willing to meet
with leaders of such rogue states as Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea. Obama readily said that not only would he do so, he would do so in
his first year of office. Claiming ”it is a disgrace we have not spoken to them,” Obama added, ”The notion that somehow not talking to countries
is punishment to them—which has been the guiding diplomatic principle of this administration—is ridiculous.”25 Apparently unbeknownst to
Obama, it is not ”ridiculous” to deny our enemies the upper hand at all times , especially in negotiations. To do so is not a
American diplomacy is not based on kindergarten rules. It would be a “disgrace” however, to allow
a lesser power to dictate terms to the most powerful country on the planet. In diplomatic speak, Obama’s approach is
called ”appeasement .” And as history has demonstrated, it doesn't work. In fact, it has been U.S. policy for decades—
through Republican and Democratic administrations—not to appease rogue nations—nations that (a) sponsor terrorism (think
Venezuela and Iran); or (b) attempt to hold U.S. foreign policy and that of its allies hostage (think Iran and North Korea, via their nuclear
“punishment,” and
weapons programs). Negotiations, when they have taken place, have usually been through third—party intermediaries or in conjunction with
other nations, though in the case of Cuba (the Clinton administration) and North Korea (the Bush administration), the U.S. did occasionally hold
certain high-level direct talks, depending on the importance of the issue. The reason is simple: as a superpower, the U.S. cannot
afford to look weak before the world by appearing to kowtow to a lesser enemy or adversary. To do so would
encourage smaller, less powerful nations to do the same and , worse, stronger enemies would feel empowered to take
a more hostile approach to the U.S., thinking they can get away with such affronts. This isn't rocket science; it's
Diplomacy 101 .
Appeasement causes global aggression and multiple scenarios for conflict.
Chapin and Hanson, 12/7/2009 (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow
at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p. http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disasterobama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/)
BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can
anything good result from President Obama’s
marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can
understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on
public perceptions , however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw
the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to
see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be
1979 redux , when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most
damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten
ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to
apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern
Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth.
There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the
pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up . I think we got off the back of the tiger and
now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.
Iranian proliferation causes nuclear war.
Henry Sokolsky, executive director – nonproliferation policy education center, 10/1/2003, Policy Review, p. lexis
If nothing is done to shore up U.S. and allied security relations with the Gulf Coordination Council states and with Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt,
Iran's acquisition of even a nuclear weapons breakout capability could prompt one or more of these states to try to
acquire a nuclear weapons option of their own. Similarly, if the U.S. fails to hold Pyongyang accountable for its violation of the NPT
or lets Pyongyang hold on to one or more nuclear weapons while appearing to reward its violation with a new deal--one that heeds North Korea's
demand for a nonaggression pact and continued construction of the two light water reactors--South Korea and Japan (and later, perhaps, Taiwan)
will have powerful cause to question Washington's security commitment to them and their own pledges to stay non-nuclear. In such a world,
Washington's worries would not be limited to gauging the military capabilities of a growing number of hostile, nuclear, or near-nuclear-armed
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nations. In addition, it would have to gauge the reliability of a growing number of nuclear or near-nuclear friends. Washington might still be able
to assemble coalitions, but with more nations like France, with nuclear options of their own, it would be much, much more iffy. The amount
of international intrigue such a world would generate would also easily exceed what our diplomats and leaders could
manage or track. Rather than worry about using force for fear of producing another Vietnam, Washington and its very closest allies are more
likely to grow weary of working closely with others and view military options through the rosy lens of their relatively quick victories in Desert
Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Just Cause. This would be a world disturbingly similar to that of 1914 but with one
big difference: It would
be spring-loaded to go nuclear .
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Venezuela – Engagement
Engagement with Venezuela is appeasement, threatening nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and
narcotrafficking
Harper 10(Liz, journalist, America’s Quarterly. 10/21/10. America’s Quarterly: The Policy Journal for Our Hemisphere is a magazine
dedicated to policy analysis and debate of economics, finance, social development, and politics in the Western Hemisphere.
http://americasquarterly.org/taxonomy/term/2741)
The long-running debate over how to deal with the irrational and impulsive strongman, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez,
has reached feverish pitch this winter. The latest casualty in this war of words has become U.S. Ambassador Larry Palmer, the Obama
administration's nomination as ambassador to Venezuela. Worse yet, Chávez ultimately got what he wanted out of this latest battle: his choice of
who will not be our next Ambassador in Venezuela. On Monday, Venezuela formally told the U.S. to not bother sending Larry Palmer as the next
ambassador since he would be asked to return the moment he landed in Caracas.¶ How did this all go down?¶ Like Cuba, any U.S. move
regarding Venezuela involves egos, politics and fortunately, some policy. Naturally, when Palmer went before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee over the summer, the career diplomat—characterized by some at the U.S. Department of State as "not a
Washington man"—he already faced an uphill slog.¶ Our domestic debate over Venezuela generally falls into two camps:
engagement and confrontation. There are, of course, shades of gray and nuances between the two sides—though such voices are so often
overpowered by the more extreme views.¶ On one side, you have those espousing "strategic engagement," keeping in line with the Obama
administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an
irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want
a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest. You raise concerns discretely and express
disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be “subversive," because you seek to assert positive influence
by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer
was the right guy to carry out this mission.¶ But, the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, seems more like
"appeasement," say people clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death by a thousand
cuts. This past week, Hugo Chávez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby further eroding the country's
once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chávez threaten[ing]s more than human rights and democratic norms; the
U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and narcotrafficking . Yet, as
Chávez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral?
Despite the will to change, current politics indicate the aff plan will engage with Venezuela under a
framework of appeasement
Bootroyd 12(Rachel, writer, Venezuela Analysis. 9/23/12. Venezuela Analysis: Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website produced by
individuals who are dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about the current political situation in Venezuela.¶ The site's aim is to provide
on-going news about developments in Venezuela, as well as to contextualize this news with in-depth analysis and background information. The
site is targeted towards academics, journalists, intellectuals, policy makers from different countries, and the general public.
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7283)
Republican nominee for Vice-President of the U.S., Paul Ryan, has vowed that [it] aRomney administration would get “tough on Castro,
tough on Chavez” and to end what he described as a “policy of appeasement” applied by the Obama administration
towards both Cuba and Venezuela.¶ Ryan made the comments from the Versailles Restaurant in Miami, Florida last Saturday, where he
was accompanied by staunch members of the anti-Castro lobby, including Republican Representative, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Ros-Lehtinen is a
member of the Cuban-American Lobby and the Congressional Cuban Democracy Caucus; organisations which claim to be aimed at speeding up
Cuba’s “transition to democracy”.¶ "In a Mitt Romney administration, (Castro). All it has done is reward more despotism... We will help those
pro-democracy groups. We will be tough on Castro, tough on Chavez. And it's because we know that's the right policy for our country,” said
Ryan.¶ The nominee had reportedly travelled to Florida in a bid to win over the majority Latino vote two months ahead of the US we will not
keep practising this policy of appeasement, we will be tough on this brutal dictator elections. Florida is currently thought to
be a “swing state” and could prove a determining vote for the overall election results. Results of a recent voter intention poll in the state carried
out by NBC news show that Obama currently has a 5% lead over Romney, with a voting intention of 49% to 44%.¶ ‘I learned from these friends,
from Mario (Diaz-Balart), from Lincoln (Diaz-Balart), from Ileana (Ros-Lehtinen), just how brutal the Castro regime is, just how this president's
policy of appeasement is not working. They've given me a great education, lots of us in Congress, about how we need to clamp down on the
Castro regime,” said Ryan. According to Ros-Lehtinen, Ryan is now a “loyal friend” to those who campaign on Cuba-related political issues.¶
Ryan's statements have caused some Democrats to accuse him of hypocrisy after he appears to have dramatically changed his stance on Cuba-US
relations. Prior to 2007, the Republican had called for “free trade” between all nations, which included voting to lift the trade embargo on Cuba.¶
"To paraphrase President Clinton, it takes real brass to vote three times against economic sanctions on the Cuban regime and then come to Little
Havana and ask Cuban-Americans for their vote," said Giancarlo Sopo, a Cuban-American supporter who told the US' Sun Sentinel that he would
vote for Obama.¶ "It's one thing to have a genuine disagreement with someone on a policy. It's something else to change your position from one
day to the next just to pander in order to win votes,” added Sopo.¶ Recently leaked footage of a meeting between Romney and party donors also
showed the presidential hopeful lambasting Obama for believing that “his magnetism and his charm, and his persuasiveness is so compelling that
he can sit down with people like Putin and Chávez and Ahmadinejad, and that they'll find that we're such wonderful people that they'll go on with
us, and they'll stop doing bad things”.¶ The leaked recording also shows Romney referring to Iranian President Ahmadinejad as a “crazed fanatic”
and Iranian mullahs as “crazy people”. He also commented that, in his view, the Palestinian people have “no interest whatsoever in establishing
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peace”.¶ With the presidential elections now drawing near, the Republican party is beginning to increasingly outline its prospective domestic and
foreign policy, which Romney has said would be principally based on an attempt to implement a neo-liberal “Reagan economic zone” in Latin
America and other regions, such as the Middle East.¶ The Republican presidential candidate has been outspoken in his criticism of the
“anti-American” views purported by the governments of Venezuela, Cuba and Iran and has described them as one of
the biggest threats to the United States today.¶ Earlier in July, Romney brand[ing]ed the Venezuelan government as a
“threat to national security” and accused the country's president, Hugo Chavez, of “spreading dictatorships and tyranny
throughout Latin America”. The Republican National Committee also circulated a video of Obama shaking hands with Chavez at the OAS
“Summit of the Americas” in Trinidad and Tobago 2009 at the same time.¶ Romney has often claimed that the leader of Venezuela's
Bolivarian revolution has links to “terrorist” organisations such as Hezbollah and has access to weapons that could
“harm the US”. He has never presented any evidence in support of these accusations.
Engagement with Venezuela is a form of appeasement – this prompts the country’s solicitation of cyber
attacks and Iranian nuclear war
Independent, real-time
study of more than 50 leading strategies by the American Association of Individual Investors. http://news.investors.com/ibdeditorials/010912-597200-venezuela-under-chavez-grows-even-more-lawless.htm)
Investors Business Daily 12 (No author; Investors.com. 1/9/12. Investors.com: Investors Business Daily:
The Americas: With U.S. attention focused elsewhere,
Venezuela's dictator is at it again — breaking contracts, pushing drugs,
plotting cyberattacks and cavorting with Iran's tyrant. This is what appeasement brings.¶ Well before President Obama
gave President Hugo Chavez a handshake at a 2009 summit, wiser heads at the State Department warned him against a "reset." Obama
ignored them.¶ The rube-like naivete has now come to bite Obama as the craziness in Caracas spirals wildly in just the last few days. The
Rumsfeld Maxim that "weakness is provocative" seems to be operative here, setting the stage for the astonishing string of lawless
acts that now demand hard sanctions. Among them:¶ • Breaking international contracts. Chavez announced Monday he'll ignore an
arbitration ruling from the World Bank that ordered Venezuela to pay ExxonMobil $1 billion for Chavez's expropriation of its
investments. Exxon had asked for $12 billion, got $1 billion, but Chavez says he'll only pay $250 million.¶ • Naming a drug kingpin as
head of military. Chavez appointed Henry Rangel Silva — identified by the U.S. Treasury as a "kingpin" — as his defense minister. That
act not only flouts global efforts to stop organized crime, but effectively turns Venezuela into a narcostate and its army into a drug
cartel.¶ • Plotting war against the U.S. A Venezuelan diplomat was kicked out of the U.S. last weekend for soliciting
cyberattacks on U.S. military, intelligence and nuclear targets. Her acts were clumsy, but her malevolence extended straight to
Chavez's palace, where she said she had ties. It calls for a hard response.¶ • Aiding America's enemies. Chavez defied international
sanctions by bringing Iran's tyrant, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to our hemisphere in a bid to gain credibility as a rogue state. The
Iranian madman got a red-carpet welcome at Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas on Monday, undercutting the U.S.
efforts to sanction Iran, which threatens the world with nuclear war. ¶ With our military gutted and the long fuse to
Iran burning shorter, the last thing we need is a rogue state across the Gulf of Mexico conducting acts of war .¶
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Venezuela – AT: Post-Chavez Changed Everything
Chavez’s death has had no affect on Venezuelan/Iranian relations
Press TV 13(No author; PressTV.com. 3/9/13. PressTV.com: first Iranian international news network, broadcasting
in English on a round-the-clock basis. http://presstv.com/detail/2013/03/09/292703/iran-venezuela-ties-remainunchanged/)
Iran’s Vice President for International Affairs Ali Saeedlou says the death of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez will not
undermine relations between Tehran and Caracas.¶ Saeedlou on Saturday rejected some Western media reports that the death of
the former Venezuelan president may adversely affect Tehran-Caracas relations, calling them media speculation. ¶ The official noted that
the people of Latin America have been long dominated by the imperialism and have fought for decolonization with
Chavez organizing these struggles and making them more objective. ¶ “It is wrong to say that our relations with
Venezuela have been based on a personal relationship. The Islamic Republic of Iran maintains deep-seated relations with all
nations, particularly in Latin America...,” Saeedlou added.¶ Chavez died on March 5 at the age of 58 after a two-year battle with cancer. ¶
He became involved in revolutionary movements within the armed forces in 1977. ¶ Chavez toured the country, electrified Venezuelans
with his speeches, and won his first presidential election in 1998. He also won presidential elections in 2000, 2006, and 2012. ¶ Chavez
started the Bolivarian Revolution to establish popular democracy and economic independence and to equitably distribute wealth in Latin
America. ¶ He was one of the key players in the progressive movement that has swept across Latin America over the past few years. ¶
Iran and Venezuela have forged strong economic and political relations in the recent years. ¶ Leaders of some Latin
American countries have in recent years built up diplomatic and trade ties with Iran, while their relations with the
United States have been greatly reduced amid popular demands for an end to dependence on Washington. ¶
Chavez’s death will have no affect on Venezuela – he has left a legacy that has been institutionalized that his
successors will uphold
Ball 13(Helena, A Venezuelan journalist living in the United States with a graduate degree from the London School of Economics. 3/13/13.
The Stateless Man, Liberty Beyond Borders: website dedicated to the spread of information of those who pursue individual liberty beyond
arbitrary borders, oppressive governments, and myths of national obligations. http://thestatelessman.com/2013/03/06/chavez/)
I was twelve when Hugo Chavez Frias became president of Venezuela. Fourteen years later he has left power, betrayed by his own
body. He has left with the reputation for having been a legitimate, democratically elected president . As someone who grew
up experiencing the gradual destruction of a country and its institutions, I can tell you one thing—it was all a show.¶ The Frontline Club
in London recently released a video from its conference on Venezuela, during which Guardian correspondent Rory Carroll insightfully
called Hugo Chavez a “master illusionist.” Carroll was himself a witness to the president’s tactics, once inadvertently becoming a puppet
in the show after asking a question during an episode of Aló Presidente, a weekly national broadcast. Yet Carroll’s denial to refer to
Chavez as a despot reveals that he did not grasp the extent of the illusion. ¶ True, there were no death squads and no disappearances—
not, at least, in the way that Fidel and other dictators carried them out in the past. But there are still morgues filled to the brim with dead
bodies and an uncountable number of prisoners yet to be charged for a crime or to appear before the courts (although to allude to the
courts seems comical when they have become obsolete in the current structure of power).¶ Most people criticize Chavez for not
attempting to restrain the exponential rise of violence in the country, naively—or cleverly, perhaps for fear of retribution—failing to
identify it as a conscious strategy. A population that lives in fear is much easier to control.¶ As to whether Chavez expected the extent to
which the violence has reached, it is impossible to know; yet his lack of action during his term in power speaks loudly. Perhaps most
frustratingly, very few are willing to publicly admit that when talking of Chavez they are referring to a dictator that
governed a country under a totalitarian regime—not a democracy. Just as Al-Qaeda redefined modern warfare so did Chavez
modern dictatorship. What you see is never what you get. ¶ So, does it matter that Chavez died? Not really. For months he was
out of action, and his successors will continue to follow the clear instructions left behind, only somewhat hindered
by the chaotic state of the economy and their ambitions for power. Chavismo has been institutionalized, and the
country will find it hard to return to a true democracy. Chavez strategically decimated Venezuelan institutions to perpetuate an
opportunistic ideology in power, veiled by a message of altruism and class warfare. ¶ The Supreme Court conceded Chavez’s successors
additional time for the implementation of the preconceived plan when it allowed for his inauguration to be postponed. The vice president
and the president of the National Assembly were already flexing their campaign muscles and preparing the political atmosphere for the
impending election long before his death was officially announced. The process of elections will only be part of the farce. ¶ The news of
the president’s death will no doubt bring about an event similar in magnitude to that of the vigil and funeral of Evita Peron. Many will
portray him as a hero and a martyr for the Bolivarian Revolution and the press will be brimming with pictures of mourning
chavistas—all part of the master illusionist’s plan.¶ What is most surprising about the way many international news agencies covered
Chavez’s rule is that they were always keen to obtain official sources for their articles. These official sources were usually acquired
through the snippets of important information on Aló Presidente or through other government publications or declarations. In the name
of fair and ethical reporting, the official government side was always included. ¶ How did journalists not feel the tug of the strings from
the puppet master? Their information was coming from a manufactured reality. With the Soviet Union or Maoist China as examples of the
veracity of any information from such regimes in the past, are they truly approaching the government as a fair source for anything? Wake
up! It is all a pantomime, masterfully planned and carefully continued after its creator has passed away.¶ As is usually
the case in Latin America, the future of the country hinges on the whims of the military. The only important question now is, has Cuban
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infiltration reached the psyche of the top tiers of the Venezuelan military? Or will nationalism prevail over ideology? For the country’s
sake, not to mention the Latin American continent’s own, lets hope the latter prevails.
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Other Links
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Generic – Engagement
Engagement signals weakness through concession.
Borer 2004 (Douglas – Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Problems of Economic Statecraft:
Rethinking Engagement, p. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/12borer.pdf)
The policy of engagement refers to the use of non-coercive means, or positive incentives, by one state to alter the
elements of another state’s behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement as a form of
appeasement.21 However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that, while engagement can be
classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative difference exists between the two:
“Engagement is more than appeasement,” he says: It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power
into acceptance of the established order. In practice engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so
much by its goals but by its means: it relies on the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to
influence the target’s behavior. . . . The policy succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a
status quo power with a stake in the stability of the system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the
established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots. . . .
Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness that emboldens the aggressor to demand more.22
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Internal Link – One Instance Key
Appeasement sends a global signal --- other states watch for signs of weakness
Henriksen, 2/1/1999 (Thomas – senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with
Rogue States, Hoover Institution Monographs, p. http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side,
meaning that how the U nited S tates responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw
conclusions from weak responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, escaped unpunished for his
invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims from
Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the
cold war, and it may afford the only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be enough.
Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a wider war,
drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia.
U.S. foreign policy is global --- appeasement in one area spills over.
Henriksen, 2/1/1999 (Thomas – senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with
Rogue States, Hoover Institution Monographs, p. http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
Overseas engagement, whether military, diplomatic or economic, has indeed steadily become an integral part of America's external policy during
this century. Washington's leadership and power proved decisive from World War I to the Persian Gulf war. In each of these major conflicts, the
United States fought as member of an international coalition and its role has been pivotal. Despite domestic isolationist pulls, the U nited S tates,
more than ever, is the key international player. No other state or global body commands similar world standing .
The United Nations, on which so much optimistic expectation rested following World War II, is judged ineffectual in major crises. Even after the
conclusion of bipolarism, the United Nations Security Council suffers from nationalistic divisions. The anticipation of a veto from one of the
other four permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia) holds American initiatives hostage to a watered-down consensus. (Likewise,
America's veto power works to constrain the ambitions of China and Russia in the Security Council.) Hard realities, not mere altruism, mean that
America must act not like a policeman but like a sheriff in the old Western frontier towns, acting alone on occasion, relying on deputies or
long-standing allies, or looking for a posse among regional partners. Or, in some cases, it may look for another sheriff, or regional power, to
organize local forces.(3) It cannot allow desperadoes to run loose without encouraging other outlaws to test the limits
of law and order. History instructs us that the U.S. withdrawal from world problems, leaving Europeans and Asians to
their own devices in the 1930s, led to the rise of militarism and aggression. Aloofness from international politics
is simply not a viable option .
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Impacts
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Appeasement Impact 2NC – More Terminals
Perception of strength prevents multiple scenarios of conflict --- that’s Hanson.
Korean conflict results in extinction.
Africa News, 10-25-1999, p. lexis
Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge
smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military
tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at
war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North
Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the
people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the
politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has
vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early
this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the
intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US
mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself.
Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is
true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly
patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers
and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and longrange missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been
military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be
defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth . It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards
fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that
normalising relations with North Korea.
India/China escalates to nuclear war.
Kahn, 10/10/2009 (Jeremy, India’s china obsession, Newsweek, p. http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088)
The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a
1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war
between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just
the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and
China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian
democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
India/Pakistan conflict causes extinction.
The New Scientist, 10/3/2007 (Regional Nuclear War Could Trigger Mass Starvation, p.
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn12728-regional-nuclear-war-could-trigger-mass-starvation.html)
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan could cause one billion people to starve to death around the world, and hundreds
of millions more to die from disease and conflicts over food. That is the horrifying scenario being presented in London today by a US medical
expert, Ira Helfand. A conference at the Royal Society of Medicine will also hear new evidence of the severe damage that such a war could inflict
on the ozone layer. "A limited nuclear war taking place far away poses a threat that should concern everyone on the planet ,"
Helfand told New Scientist. This was not scare mongering, he adds: "It is appropriate, given the data, to be frightened." Helfand is an emergencyroom doctor in Northampton, Massachusetts, US, and a co-founder of the US anti-nuclear group, Physicians for Social Responsibility. In his
study he attempted to map out the global consequences of India and Pakistan exploding 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear warheads. Global hoarding
Earlier studies have suggested that such a conflict would throw five million tonnes of black soot into the atmosphere, triggering a reduction of
1.25°C in the average temperature at the earth's surface for several years. As a result, the annual growing season in the world's most important
grain-producing areas would shrink by between 10 and 20 days. Helfand points out that the world is ill-prepared to cope with such a disaster.
"Global grain stocks stand at 49 days, lower than at any point in the past five decades," he says. "These stocks would not provide any significant
reserve in the event of a sharp decline in production. We would see hoarding on a global scale." Countries which import more than half of their
grain, such as Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan, would be particularly vulnerable, Helfand argues. So, too, would 150 million people in north
Africa, which imports 45% of its food. Many of the 800 million around the world who are already officially malnourished would also suffer.
Large-scale impacts on food supplies from global cooling are credible because they have happened before, Helfand says. The eruption of the
Indonesian volcano Tambora in 1815 produced the "year without a summer" in 1816, causing one of the worst famines of the 19th century. Mass
starvation The global death toll from a nuclear war in Asia "could exceed one billion from starvation alone", Helfand concludes. Food shortages
could also trigger epidemics of cholera, typhus and other diseases, as well as armed conflicts, which together could kill "hundreds of millions".
Another study being unveiled at today's conference suggests that the smoke unleashed by 100, small, 15 kiloton nuclear warheads could
destroy 30-40% of the world's ozone layer. This would kill off some food crops, according to the study's author, Brian Toon, an
atmospheric scientist from the University of Colorado in Boulder, US. The smoke would warm the stratosphere by up to 50°C,
accelerating the natural reactions that attack ozone , he says. "No-one has ever thought about this before," he adds, "I think there
is a potential for mass starvation." Such dire predictions are not dismissed by nuclear experts, though they stress the large uncertainties involved.
The fallout from a nuclear war between India and Pakistan "would be far more devastating for other countries than generally appreciated," says
John Pike, director of the US think tank, globalsecurity.org. "Local events can have global consequences." Dan Plesch from the University of
London's School of Oriental and African Studies, agrees that everyone is at risk from a limited nuclear war. "We live in a state of
denial that our fate can be determined by decisions in Islamabad and New Delhi as much as in Washington and Moscow," he says.
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Appeasement Bad – Turns Economy
Rogues threaten international stability --- that collapses the global economy.
Henriksen, 2/1/1999 (Thomas – senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with
Rogue States, Hoover Institution Monographs, p. http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
The increased emphasis given to global economic issues after the end of the cold war gave birth to the fashionable
notion that economic preeminence is more important than politico-military considerations in international politics. That
nostrum ignores the fundamental fact that global markets depend on a secure international system. It is geopolitical
power, of which economic well-being is one factor, that undergirds the global system. Rogue adversaries threaten the global
equilibrium on which the U nited S tates and other nations base their commerce, access to resources and financial capital,
human interchange, and security. Rogue assaults on accepted international conduct disrupts peace and stability. Mussolini's
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 went a long way toward unraveling European peace, in large part because the League of Nations failed to rally
effective opposition. Saddam Hussein's military incursion into Kuwait likewise tossed the Persian Gulf states into turmoil and
shattered the dawn of the post-Soviet order. But unlike Italy's prewar aggression, Iraq's was met, defeated, and turned back by an
American-led coalition. This was the proper reaction to Baghdad's attack. Lawlessness feeds on itself if allowed to spread
unchecked.
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Appeasement Bad – Turns Hegemony
Embolden rogues collapse leadership --- they are the litmus test of U.S. strength
Henriksen, 2/1/1999 (Thomas – senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with
Rogue States, Hoover Institution Monographs, p. http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
A decade has passed since the toppling of the Berlin Wall spawned a world far different from the cold war order. This new epoch is a treacherous
morass characterized by neither peace nor war nor the certitudes of the preceding four decades. Rogue states are derailing our hoped-for
political harmony. In the previous era, two superpowers competed politically, economically, militarily, and ideologically across a worldwide
landscape. Massive military force, which both sides built up, formed the backdrop to relations between Washington and Moscow. But the sheer
destructive power possessed by each contender acted as a brake on risky policies or perilous actions. They restrained their dealings with each
other out of the logic of mutual deterrence and self-preservation. The new global order initially promised peaceful relationships based on market
economics, free trade, instantaneous telecommunications, and the liberal movement of financial capital across national borders. These factors
would, in turn, lead to the inexorable spread of prosperity and democracy. Politicians and pundits spoke confidently of a new international
environment where economic strength counted for more than armaments. Indeed, some commentators held armed forces as pass;aae. Military
spending could be drastically cut and the funds directed to ameliorating nations' manifest societal ills. Economic growth would automatically
induce less-developed nations to accommodate themselves to the prevailing global model. But what has become painfully clear during
the 1990s is that a handful of rogue states have rejected the global economic order and international standards for their
own belligerent practices. Rogue players are less politically encumbered since Soviet Russia (which sponsored anti-American
terrorism through surrogates) is no longer exercising a loose restraint over its clients. The United States has also disengaged from
credible actions abroad. Rogues confront a global renaissance of spreading democracy and peace with an atavistic challenge that
has yet to be met satisfactorily. Superweapons will expand their ambitions , give them deadly bargaining chips, and imperil
thousands of innocent lives. Their links to free-wheeling terrorist cells blur the line between state and nonstate actors,
complicating standard countermeasures to hold guilty governments accountable. Meaningful statecraft hinges on power as well as
wise policy. Now that the global financial crisis has crippled the belief that economic development alone would guarantee a democratic and
peaceful world, America's continued global primacy rests on how it handles renegade states. In the absence of U.S.
leadership, anarchy will grow, paving the way for still greater disorder and extremists on the world scene. This essay
explores some policies for dealing with those states that pose the greatest immediate threat. Terrorist rogues throw up deadly
challenges to the U nited S tates. But we can call on ample examples of past actions for guidance. Lessons can be gleaned from encounters
with Iraq, North Korea, Serbia, Iran, Libya, and Cuba over the past few decades. Although history does not set down hard-and-fast principles on
statecraft, it does offer analogies and perspective. Tough remedies short of war, in combination, can advance American interests.
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Appeasement Bad – Laundry LIst
The perception of weakness results in proliferation, terrorism and the collapse of alliances
Gaffney, 1/1/2000 (Frank – president of the Center for Security Policy, American power – for what, Commentary,
p. lexis)
Fundamentally, we agree that the main threat arises not from the U nited S tates' being too powerful but from its being perceived
abroad as weak and irresolute. That perception, alas, is generally the result of our acting that way at home--a phenomenon
all too much in evidence during the Clinton years. It is no coincidence that during this period we have witnessed serious
erosion in America's alliances, escalating proliferation, an ominous "strategic partnership" being forged between
the Russians and Chinese, and the growing power of rogue states and terrorist organizations. These are tectonic shifts in
the geopolitical plate structure with which we will have to contend for years to come.
Alliances prevent nuclear war
Ross, Winter 1998/1999 (Douglas – professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canada’s functional
isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. lexis)
Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been
willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all
worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a
proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus
the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years
the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by
enmeshing the capabilities of the U nited S tates and other leading powers in a co-operative security management
regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding
warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.
Proliferation causes nuclear war
Utgoff, Summer 2002 (Victor – deputy director for strategy, forces and resources division at the Institute for
Defense Analysis, Survival, p. OUP Journals)
Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons and that such shootouts will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless
nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all,
nations wearing nuclear "six-shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we
will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
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Appeasement Bad – China
Appeasement encourages Chinese aggression against Taiwan.
Henriksen, 2/1/1999 (Thomas – senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with
Rogue States, Hoover Institution Monographs, p. http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
Low points in American determination and leadership, such as the North Korean negotiations, did not go unnoticed.
U.S. reactions encouraged Iraq's recalcitrance in its dealings with U.N. arms inspectors, accounted for North Korea's later
face-off with Washington over demands to open its underground facilities to inspection (while demanding $500 million to discontinue
missile exports), and bolstered Serbia's reluctance, in the face of U.S.-led NATO efforts, to halt the bloodshed first in Bosnia and
then in Kosovo. A high-ranking Chinese military officer, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of China's general staff,
reportedly declared in 1995, in response to an American's unofficial warnings that Washington might react militarily to a
Beijing attack on Taiwan, "No, you won't. We've watched you in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and you don't have the
will."(15)
US/China war results in extinction
The Straits Times, 6/25/2000 (Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan, p. lexis)
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington
were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale
would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war.
Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking
China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.
If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may
try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe’s political landscape. The
balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and
Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US
war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the
Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from
military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on
future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have
led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20
nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese
military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its “non first use” principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General
Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for
Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He
said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.
Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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Ext – Chinese Aggression
Perception of weakness causes US/China war.
Christensen, Spring 2001 (Thomas – professor of politics at Princeton, Posing problems without catching up,
International Security, p. ebscohost)
On the active defense side, it appears that China is attempting to import and to build indigenously a fairly impressive layered air defense system
to counter cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. In addition to reported clandestine acquisition of Patriot technology, China has purchased and is
seeking to purchase from Russia an undisclosed number of SA-10 (S-300) and SA-15 (TOR-1) SAM systems. Some of this Russian technology
might be successfully integrated into China's own domestically produced SAM systems, such as the HQ-9. [66] China is also working to develop
antistealth and antisatellite capabilities. Even if the Chinese programs have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they
may still pose a future security challenge to Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war
of wills over an issue that they care about much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might still be emboldened
by the perceived capability --however limited--to increase costs to American and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets
in such a struggle. This problem is only exacerbated by any perceptions that Chinese elites might have about
America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer casualties. Implications and Prescriptions for U.S.
Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing war across the Taiwan Strait and between the United States and China is
much more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relative military power in the region might suggest. To deter
China from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in the region , the U nited S tates
must do more than demonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict; it must also demonstrate American
resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from defeat but also from significant harm.
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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Appeasement Bad – Aggression
Weakened resolve invites global aggression
Silverberg, 5/31/2006 (Mark – Ariel Center for Policy Research, Only resolve is respected, p.
http://www.jfednepa.org/mark%20silverberg/onlyresolve.html)
In the Arab world, only resolve is respected. Outrage can be generated against America by portraying America to the Arab masses as a
bully. But to physically attack America (as happened on 9/11), or American interests abroad (as in the cases of the embassy bombings and the
USS Cole), requires that America also be depicted as weak and vulnerable. It is this perception of America, in the eyes of the Arab world, that
represents the greatest threat to Western civilization because Arab misperceptions about America have led to wars. Acts of terrorism are
encouraged by the belief that America is essentially weak, vulnerable, and capable of being brought to its knees by a high bodybag count before it has achieved its strategic objectives. It has been this perceived “softness” that has encouraged terrorists like al
Qaeda and rogue nations like Iraq, Iran and Syria to act against America and American interests abroad. In the
Middle Eastern mindset, it is fatal for any nation to be perceived as weak and vulnerable. And, in many ways, our actions and reactions have led to their perceptions.
The explosion of Islamic terror and the threats of mass destruction from an Iraqi tyrant armed with nuclear or biological weapons could have been prevented. For
example, in the 90’s, the decade of denial, hesitation and prevarication, U.S. foreign policy consisted of Bill Clinton desperately seeking a legacy, running America by
opinion polls, sending cruise missiles to blow up empty tents in the Afghan desert, signing agreements with dictators based on the belief that America would be "safe,"
and seeing attacks and provocations as nothing more than a series of separate and unrelated criminal acts rather than as a sustain organized military assault on
America. The assumption in those days, according to Claudia Rosett writing in the Wall Street Journal recently, was that “what we didn’t acknowledge, really
couldn’t hurt us. As long as we got dictators to sign on the dotted line, we’d be safe......protected by the paperwork that said so.” Decisions to use force were avoided
to prevent a confrontation with the Arab and Islamic world, and also in the naive hope that these threats would simply disappear. As a consequence, America focused
on the arrest and trial of “the criminals,” protecting buildings rather than tracking down the terrorists and neutralizing their funders, planners, organizers and
commanders. Worse, America relied on metal detectors, security guards, electronic surveillance and trials rather than ships, aircraft, soldiers and human intelligence.
America studied the acts of terror as distinct from the ideology of the terrorist. It failed to recognize that the cumulative effect of these acts against America and
our enemies perceived this as American vulnerability. The
policy of "self-deception" led to the monstrous growth of al Qaeda, the naive Oil-for-Food
shell-game with Iraq, the Oslo Accords, and the 1994 "Agreed Framework" with North Korea whereby America
American interests abroad were part of a sustained assault on this country. And
result was inevitable. This
proclaimed “peace on the Korean peninsula” in return for allowing North Korea (a soon-to-be-member of the Axis of Evil) food, oil and the
wiggle-room necessary to continue making (and marketing) missiles, chemical and biological weapons, and ultimately, its own nuclear weapon.
The North Korean fiasco was not the only attempt during the Clinton era at what Charles Krauthammer refers to as "paper diplomacy." The
bloodiest farce was the Oslo "peace" Accords between Israel and the Palestinians. President Clinton insisted that it be signed on the White House
lawn under his upraised arms. He then spent the next seven years brokering one new agreement after another while declaring the peace
"irreversible." He knew it was so because Yasser Arafat had promised - in writing - an end to violence and terrorism. Then Arafat decided to start
up the violence and terrorism in September 2000, bringing on the worst Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed in decades and leaving the Clinton "paperpushers" surprised. The absurd UN-run Oil-for-Food program with Iraq was another piece of paper based on the false assumption that Saddam
Hussein would respect the written rules crafted by the world’s most hapless bureaucracy - the UN. Needless to say, he didn’t respect the rules,
used Syria and Iran to bypass them, and now, he too is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. For too long, America has deluded itself into a
false sense of security based upon the written word of dictators, and this delusion has lead to the Arab perception of American weakness. Written
agreements didn't work well with Hitler or Mussolini and they still don't. Unfortunately, the Oil-for-Food program, the Oslo Accords and the
Korean Agreed Framework were not isolated incidents. The Arab states and al Qaeda took cognizance of the fact that the U.S., in the past, also
failed to respond aggressively to many terrorist attacks against its own citizens in Beirut, in Tanzania, in Kenya and in Somalia; stood by while
Americans were seized as hostages in Iran and Lebanon; let Saddam Hussein remain in power after the Gulf War (while letting the Shah fall in
Iran); and pressured Israel, its ally, to make dangerous strategic concessions while simultaneously courting Israel’s enemies and allowing its
prized Arab-Israeli peace process to be destroyed. This policy also led the Chinese to conclude that “the United States is a superpower in decline,
losing economic, political and military influence around the world,” according to the congressionally-mandated U.S.-China Security Review
Commission. The Commission also noted that “Chinese analysts believe that the United States cannot and will not sustain casualties in pursuit of
its vital interests.” That is, America is "soft." And China is far from alone in holding this opinion. America’s perceived decline into
weakness and its questionable “staying power” in pursuit of its strategic objectives has served as a call to arms to
the monsters of the world. Astute Middle Eastern observers have made much of the United States' post-Vietnam loathing for foreign
adventures, and America's enemies have listened. In the 1970s, when many Iranians worried that American power would destroy their revolution
if it went too far, Khomeini told them not to worry, saying America "won't do a damn thing." And as recently as 1998, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, Khomeini's successor, insisted there was no need to negotiate with the U nited S tates since Tehran had shown
that Washington was “too weak to be feared or heeded.”
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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Appeasement Bad – Terrorism
Terrorist rogue states pose a threat – U.S. force necessary to preserve global stability
Henriksen 99 (Thomas, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2/1/1999, Hoover Institution, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With
Rogue States,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side, meaning that how the
United
States responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak
responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt
emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in
pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold
war, and it may afford the only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be
enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a
wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia.¶ Political inaction creates vacuums, which can suck
in states to fill the void. Although the United States does not want to be the world's sheriff, living in a world without law and order is not an
auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the United States ought not intervene militarily in every conflict or humanitarian crisis.
Indeed, it should pick its interventions with great care. Offering Washington's good offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing;
dispatching armed forces to far-flung deserts, jungles, or mountains is quite another.¶ A global doctrine setting forth all-inclusive guidelines is
difficult to cast in stone. Containment, the doctrine articulated in response to Soviet global ambitions, offered a realistic guideline for
policymakers. A similar response to rogue states cannot be easily cloned for each contingency but may require the United States to corral allies or
partners into a unified policy, as circumstances dictate. But watching rogue behavior with complacency or relying on the United Nations courts
disaster in the age of weapons of mass destruction.¶ Most incidents of civil turmoil need not engage U.S. military forces.
Regrettable as the bloody civil war in Sri Lanka is, it demands no American intervention, for the ethnic conflict between the secessionist Tamil
minority and the Sinhalese majority is largely an internal affair. Political turmoil in Cambodia is largely a domestic problem. Even the civil war
in the Congo, which has drawn in small military forces from Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Zimbabwe, is a Central African affair. Aside from
international prodding, the simmering Congolese fighting is better left to Africans to resolve than to outsiders. In the case of the decades-long
slaughter in southern Sudan, the United States can serve a humanitarian cause by calling international attention to Khartoum's genocide of
Christian and animist peoples. These types of conflicts, however, do not endanger U.S. strategic interests, undermine
regional order, threaten global commercial relationships, or, realistically, call for direct humanitarian intervention.
No weapons of mass destruction menace surrounding peoples or allies. Thus, there is no compelling reason for U.S. military
deployment.¶ Terrorist rogue states, in contrast, must be confronted with robust measures, or the world will go down
the same path as it did in the 1930s, when Europe and the United States allowed Nazi Germany to propagate its ideology
across half a dozen states, to rearm for a war of conquest, and to intimidate the democracies into appeasement. Rogue states push the
world toward anarchy and away from stability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to President Carter, cited
preventing global anarchy as one of the two goals of "America's global engagement, namely, that of forging an enduring framework of global
geopolitical cooperation." The other key goal is "impeding the emergence of a power rival."4 ¶ Former Secretary of State George Shultz has
cogently linked force and diplomacy in practice and in word. He persuasively argued the principle while in office and later in his memoir that
force should be used not as a last resort but as an integral component of diplomacy. In defending the 1983 combat assault on the island of
Grenada to rescue American hostages and halt the spread of communism in the Caribbean, for example, he wrote in Turmoil and Triumph, his
personal account of his years in the Reagan administration:¶ The use of force, and the credible threat of the use of force, are
legitimate instruments of national policy and should be viewed as such. . . . The use of force obviously should not be taken
lightly, but better to use force when you should rather than when you must ; last means no other, and by that time the level of force
and the risk involved may have multiplied many times over.¶ 5¶ The Clinton administration, in contrast, severed the nexus between
power and diplomacy in dealing with rogue states, with a resulting decline in U.S. credibility. Its mishandling of crises in
Iraq, North Korea, and the Balkans furnishes ample negative lessons for diplomatic relations with rogue governments. Rather than build public
support for a respected overseas policy, the poll-driven Clinton White House pursued the lines of least resistance. It avoided shaping international
policy among a disinterested electorate, devoted episodic attention to rogue transgressions, and repeatedly vacillated on the use of military force
to achieve its diplomatic ends. Rogues played off American predilections for their own goals, leaving Washington
appearing incoherent, hesitant, and ineffectual.
Terrorism causes global nuclear war.
Speice, February 2006 (Patrick, William & Mary Law Review, p. 1437-38)
The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in
the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate
human and economic losses. Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the
perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a
full-scale nuclear conflict . In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will
reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. This proliferation will
increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts
will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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Ext – Appeasement Causes Terrorism
Rogue states grow ever more powerful without action – risks anarchy, terror, and weapons of mass
destruction
Henriksen 99 (Thomas, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2/1/1999, Hoover Institution, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With
Rogue States,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
A decade has passed since the toppling of the Berlin Wall spawned a world far different from the cold war order. This new epoch is a
treacherous morass characterized by neither peace nor war nor the certitudes of the preceding four decades. Rogue states are
derailing our hoped-for political harmony. In the previous era, two superpowers competed politically, economically, militarily,
and ideologically across a worldwide landscape. Massive military force, which both sides built up, formed the backdrop to relations between
Washington and Moscow. But the sheer destructive power possessed by each contender acted as a brake on risky policies
or perilous actions. They restrained their dealings with each other out of the logic of mutual deterrence and self-preservation.¶ The new global
order initially promised peaceful relationships based on market economics, free trade, instantaneous telecommunications, and the liberal
movement of financial capital across national borders. These factors would, in turn, lead to the inexorable spread of prosperity and democracy.
Politicians and pundits spoke confidently of a new international environment where economic strength counted for more than armaments. Indeed,
some commentators held armed forces as pass;aae. Military spending could be drastically cut and the funds directed to ameliorating nations'
manifest societal ills. Economic growth would automatically induce less-developed nations to accommodate themselves to the prevailing global
model.¶ But what has become painfully clear during the 1990s is that a handful of rogue states have rejected the global
economic order and international standards for their own belligerent practices. Rogue players are less politically
encumbered since Soviet Russia (which sponsored anti-American terrorism through surrogates) is no longer exercising a loose
restraint over its clients. The United States has also disengaged from credible actions abroad. Rogues confront a global
renaissance of spreading democracy and peace with an atavistic challenge that has yet to be met satisfactorily. Superweapons will expand
their ambitions, give them deadly bargaining chips, and imperil thousands of innocent lives. Their links to freewheeling terrorist cells blur the line between state and nonstate actors, complicating standard countermeasures to
hold guilty governments accountable.¶ Meaningful statecraft hinges on power as well as wise policy. Now that the global
financial crisis has crippled the belief that economic development alone would guarantee a democratic and peaceful world, America's continued
global primacy rests on how it handles renegade states. In the absence of U.S. leadership, anarchy will grow, paving the way
for still greater disorder and extremists on the world scene.
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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Appeasement Bad – Conflict
Diplomatic appeasement of rogue nations results in global WMD wars, including CBW use.
Haselkorn 1999 (Avigdor – strategic analyst and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, The
Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons and Deterrence, p. 225-226)
Diplomatic efforts to
draw extremist regimes into the "new world order" are not only exceedingly difficult but likely to encourage
attempts at political extortion. Yet, relying on deterrence as the cornerstone of national security is increasingly perceived as impractical.
Strategic deterrence, as has been exercised since World War II, is at a crisis point now that "undeterrable" regimes and possibly
terrorists are seen as ready to attack the population centers of their enemies with w eapons of m ass d estruction 197 Worse yet, active
For the future, the net result is that Western security will increasingly be at the mercy of these three interacting perils.
defenses cannot be relied upon to provide foolproof protection for a nation's cities against such threats. Even if such a system could be erected, it
could not cope with a ship-borne cruise missile carrying a BW warhead or guerrillas bent on wreaking maximum havoc. In essence, the political
utility of CB arms and SSMs has been boosted. Thus, regimes bent on redrawing regional maps and challenging the world order have
increasing incentive to acquire, or expand, such armories. Arms control may be on the verge of becoming a pathetic
slogan. Seven years after the Gulf War, international security and world peace are hanging in the balance again. The attempt
to secure the new world order through the forceful disarming of a dangerous dictator has failed. On the contrary, in the aftermath of the Gulf War
a sea change has been evident in the way that future wars and even domestic terrorism are perceived, both in the United States and elsewhere. In
large part this trend is the result of Saddam's ability to focus world attention on the one aspect that implicitly backs his claim that the Gulf War
was a tie — Iraq's CB weapons. Moreover, a number of highly militant states now see the ability to threaten the killing of
untold numbers of civilians as the crux of a strategy that they should adopt. Although civilian populations were regularly kept
hostage during the Cold War period, the possibility of replicating the U.S.- Soviet balance of terror (which kept the peace in Europe for 40 years)
in other areas seems a chancy proposition. In the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula, at least some of the protagonists
believe that their enemies are reckless, if not outright irrational. They will not hesitate to unleash poison weapons
indiscriminately whatever the punishment, or so they are perceived. Even if mass destruction weapons are not themselves employed, the fear
is that they will enable extremists to advance their aggressive designs. Unfortunately, the diplomatic formulas crafted so far to escape
this grim future have been akin to paying ransom to blackmailers. The efforts to fashion a "saner" world begun by a few farsighted leaders must be commended for drawing the correct lessons from the Gulf War and appreciating the gravest challenge to world peace on
the eve of the twenty-first century. But these diplomatic efforts will not bring peace. The answers offered so far may indeed
lead to a more chaotic, if not anarchic, international system.
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
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Appeasement Bad – Foreign Policy
Concessions fail, only shows of power can solve IR crises – empirically proven
Henriksen 99 (Thomas, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 2/1/1999, Hoover Institution, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With
Rogue States,” http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)
Rogue regimes, by their very nature, are less persuaded by appeals to the fine points of international law and customary
diplomatic practices than by armed force. Coercive diplomacy is initiated after, or in response to, a hostile action, whereas deterring a foe
dissuades him from undertaking an activity by threatening retaliation. But the principle is similar. Strong displays of force can contribute to
persuasion as well as deterrence. Tyrants traditionally treat conciliatory actions in response to egregious behavior with
contempt: Hitler interpreted Chamberlain's appeasement over Czechoslovakia at Munich as weakness, America's cruise
missile retaliation for an Iraqi attempt on former President Bush's life during his 1993 visit to Kuwait did not discourage Baghdad
from dispatching army units right up to the border of the oil-rich kingdom in 1994. To resist the Iraqi aggression, Washington had to
deploy American troops to Kuwait.¶ Showing the flag aggressively should not be perceived as an end in itself. Or the target may call the
showman's bluff. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Washington demonstrated enough political resolve and military
power that Moscow backed down and withdrew its missile batteries from Cuban soil. This standoff became a classic
case of a superpower using force to prevent a fundamental change in the balance of power in a vital region. ¶ The
exercise of power must not be undercut by ill-advised concessions. For instance, in May 1998 the Clinton administration
prompted NATO to display its air power close to Serbia's borders to persuade Milosevic to curb his forces in the province of
Kosovo. But the Clinton administration then offered to lift the recently imposed investment bans on Serbia, hoping to
facilitate U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke's peace negotiations with Belgrade. Subsequent American and NATO policy
failed to make up for the misstep, and the situation worsened as special Serb police and army units committed a wave of well-publicized
atrocities against Kosovo Albanians during the succeeding five months.¶ During the Soviet era, deterrence was a mainstay of U.S. policy toward
Moscow's nuclear threat. In the post-cold war period, deterrence may also dissuade rogue regimes from spreading
biological agents or launching nuclear-armed missiles. But if rogue players persist in deadly actions, then a preemptive strike or
counterassault may be in order. Iraq, as an illustration, ignored the U.N. Security Council ultimatum in November 1990 to withdraw from Kuwait
during the course of the American-led military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Conflict became the only effective option.
Hostilities broke out weeks later as coalition forces counterattacked to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait.¶ The 1980s witnessed more-accomplished
uses of military power for diplomatic motives. In a dramatic exercise, Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion and temporary occupation of Grenada
in October 1983. During the two preceding years, Washington had looked with deepening concern at the hundreds of Cuban soldiers who were
working on Grenadan construction projects, especially the airport. It soon became apparent that the airport's expansion was intended for military
use, not tourism as was officially announced. Reagan's hand was forced when a radical Marxist Soviet-Cuban putsch endangered several hundred
American medical students studying on the small Caribbean island, alarming Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, and other tiny states of the region.
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) urged the United States to bring order to Grenada and restore democratic government.¶ A
series of reports from Grenada heightened the Reagan administration's fears for the safety of the medical students. Those anxieties deepened
when the Grenadan government imposed brutal martial law to suppress legitimate opposition and closed the airport to international landings.
After an urgent public appeal from the OECS for U.S. military intervention, the ensuing air and sea invasion encountered some stiff but isolated
resistance from the twenty-five hundred Cuban and Grenadan troops. But it soon rescued the students without their suffering any fatalities,
repatriated the Cuban contingent, and restored American credibility worldwide. The large-scale military deployment raised American standing
after the decline it had suffered with the loss of 241 U.S. Marines in a terrorist bombing in Beirut, followed by the precipitous American
departure from Lebanon. The rippling effect of Reagan's projection of power in the Caribbean also had an immediate and proximate reaction.
Suriname, located not far from Grenada, reversed its political course and expelled a large Cuban garrison in the wake of the U.S. assault.
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
Generics
Appeasement Disadvantage
38
Appeasement Bad – India/Pakistan/China
Obama pandering makes management of the Indo-Pak-China triangle impossible. That conflict escalates to
nucler war.
Coes, 9/30/2011 (Ben – former speechwriter in the George H.W> Bush administration, The Disease of a Weak
President, The Daily Caller, p. http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/)
weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to
pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately
results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike .¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who
The disease of a
are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats
from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the
fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t
bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have
implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects
Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation
of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons .¶ If you can only worry about preventing one
foreign policy disaster, worry about this one . Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have
fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear
weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many
times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold
of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali
Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and
Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the
years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little
notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller
writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a
radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater , America steps in and
removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as
Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing
to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there —
Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying
about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a
weak U.S. president . It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead.
Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
Generics
Affirmative Answers
Appeasement Disadvantage
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Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
Generics
Appeasement Disadvantage
40
N/U—Venezuela
The United States already engages with nations like Venezuela—media spin exaggerates the regime’s
misdeeds
Weisbrot 4/15 (Mark Weisbrot, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Interview with PBS’s Ray Suarez,
4/15/13, PBS Newshour, “Assessing U.S.-Venezuela Relations After Very Close Election Favors Maduro,”
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june13/venezuela2_04-15.html)
MARK WEISBROT, Center for Economic and Policy Research: Well, let me give you some context here I think for your listeners and viewers.¶
I think the only reason we're having a discussion about the legitimacy of the Venezuelan election or having all this news
and all the negative news really that you hear about Venezuela almost every day -- it's about 90 percent negative -- is -- there are
two reasons.¶ One is that this is probably the most important target for regime change from the United States
government. And, two, it has 500 billion barrels of oil approximately. And those two things are reeled. And I think that's why we're
having this.¶ Let's face it. In 2006, there was an election in Mexico where Calderon won by 0.6 percent , about a third of the
margin that Maduro had. And what did the U.S. government do? They congratulated him before there was any kind of
even announcement or official announcement that he won. And then they organized an international campaign to
legitimate his election.¶ And they supported them when they not only refused a recount, but refused to even divulge ...¶
Dartmouth Debate Institute 2013
Generics
Appeasement Disadvantage
41
Engagement=/=Appeasement
Analysts define engagement as distinct from appeasement – focus on cooperation and long-term reform
Rock 2k (Stephen, Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, “Appeasement in International Politics”)
Unlike “appeasement,” the term “engagement” pervades contemporary U.S. diplomatic discourse. The official national
security policy of the Clinton administration is “engagement and enlargement” of the zone of market-capitalist, liberal-democratic states.
Engagement is Washington’s current policy toward China and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam and other countries. It has
also been advocated by certain analysts as the best approach to dealing with Fidel Castro’s Cuba. What is engagement,
and what is the connection, if any, between engagement and appeasement?¶ The Clinton administration formally articulated its
vision of engagement in A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, published in 1996. Throughout much of this
document, the policy is defined in broad, grand-strategic terms. Engagement is essentially a synonym for involvement overseas, the opposite of
disengagement or isolation. Its components include maintaining strong defense capabilities, combating the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, fighting drug trafficking, participating in peacekeeping operations, and increasing American access to foreign markets. At the level of
grand strategy, engagement calls for active, multifaceted U.S. involvement abroad in order to ensure that America’s economic, ideological, and
security interests are protected and advanced. This is not, however, how most analysts and practitioners of contemporary U.S. foreign policy tend
to think of engagement.¶ Engagement, as typically conceived, is not a global national security strategy, but an approach
to dealing with a specific state (or states) exhibiting hostile or otherwise undesirable behavior. In this more common sense
of the term, “engagement” is often contrasted with “containment.” Rather than confronting one’s opponent through
economic sanctions or even military threats, engagement involves establishing or enhancing contacts, communication,
and exchanges, especially in the commercial realm. This notion of engagement is articulated in those portions of A National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement in which the document discusses China and certain other countries, and is the basis of America’s
current China policy. In fact, however, it predates the Clinton presidency. U.S. administrations from Nixon to Reagan pursued engagement with
respect to South Africa and the practice of apartheid. The Bush Administration did so in its approach to China before and after the shooting of
pro-democracy demonstrators in Tienanmen Square.¶ Various types of engagement—comprehensive, constructive, conditional,
coercive—have been employed or advocated, but they share the same basic objectives: (1) to integrate the adversary
into the international system, with its institutions, legal rules, and norms; (2) to maintain open channels for cooperation in areas
of mutual interest; and (3) to gain leverage in order to influence the adversary’s domestic and/or international behavior. Often, as
with China, for example, the hope is that engagement will lead to liberalization of the target state’s economy and, in turn, to liberalization and
democratization of its political system.¶ Critics of engagement—and there are many—consider it “a modern form of appeasement.” Their
insinuation that engagement is therefore doomed to fail can be disputed, but as a matter of definition they have a point. Appeasement and
engagement share a number of attributes. Both are nonconfrontational approaches to dealing with an adversary. Each
hopes eventually to produce a relaxation of tensions with the opponent and some modification of its internal and/or
external behavior. Each relies, in part, on the offering of inducements. Each sees some role for socialization or learning on the part
of the adversary, as well as the potential value of reassurance.¶ Appeasement and engagement are not identical. Appeasement can
be a strategy with short-run aims, while engagement almost necessarily implies a lengthy process and a distant time
horizon. More importantly, engagement is a broader, more wide-ranging approach to dealing with an opponent. It
places greater emphasis on cooperation on matters of mutual interest, enmeshing the adversary in a web of
commercial connections, rules, institutions, on the development of increased leverage and on shaping the long-term
evolution of the adversary’s economic and/or political system. Appeasement tends to be somewhat narrower in scope, relying
more heavily on inducements to remove the causes of conflict and reduce tensions.
Engagement is not appeasement – empirics prove accommodation solves conflict
Kupchan 10 (Charles, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
March/April 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, “Enemies Into Friends: How the United States Can Court Its Adversaries,”
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/files/internationalstudies/docs/kupchan03022011.pdf)
Some of the recalcitrant regimes Obama is seeking to engage will ¶ surely refuse to reciprocate. With such states,
Washington, after a¶ decent interval, should suspend the offer of accommodation in favor of¶ a strategy of isolation and containment. But other
regimes are likely¶ to take up the offer. Thus far, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and¶ Myanmar have all
demonstrated at least a modicum of interest in¶ engagement with the United States. Russia has worked with the¶ United States
on arms control, stepped up its effort to contain Iran’s¶ nuclear program, and expanded access to Russian territory and airspace¶ for military
supplies headed to Afghanistan. Enveloped in domestic¶ turmoil since its June 2009 election, Iran has taken an on-again, if¶ mostly off-again
approach to negotiations with the United States. It is¶ clearly tempted by the offer to compromise on the scope of its nuclear¶ program as a means
of avoiding—or at least delaying—a confrontation¶ with the West. North Korea has been similarly tentative in engaging with Washington over its
nuclear program. Meanwhile, Cuba has¶ been expanding its diplomatic dialogue with the United States, and last¶ fall Myanmar
welcomed a visit from a high-ranking U.S. diplomat¶ and allowed him to meet with the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. ¶ These glimmers of
progress notwithstanding, critics insist that¶ trying to make deals with extremists is appeasement by another name.¶ Drawing on
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s infamous¶ capitulation to Hitler at Munich in 1938, opponents of engagement ¶ claim that it will
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invite only intransigence and belligerence. As U.S.¶ President George W. Bush told the Knesset in 2008, negotiating with ¶ radicals is simply “the
false comfort of appeasement, which has been¶ repeatedly discredited by history.” Bush was certainly correct that¶ accommodation had no
place in dealing with a Nazi regime bent on¶ conquest and genocide, but Chamberlain’s fateful blunder should not ¶
tar all offers of accommodation as naive bouts of appeasement. ¶ On the contrary, the historical record reveals that the
initial accommodation of an adversary, far from being an invitation to aggression, ¶ is an essential start to
rapprochement. Such opening bids are usually¶ the product of necessity rather than altruism:¶ facing strategic overcommitment, a
state¶ seeks to reduce its burdens by befriending¶ an adversary. If the target country responds¶ in kind, an exchange of
concessions can follow, often setting the stage for the rivalry and ¶ mutual suspicion to abate. In the final stage¶ of
rapprochement, top decision-makers bring around bureaucracies,¶ legislative bodies, private interest groups, and ordinary citizens through ¶
lobbying and public outreach. Broader societal engagement is needed ¶ to ensure that rapprochement does not unravel when the leaders that ¶
brought it about leave.¶ To be sure, offers of accommodation may need to be balanced with ¶ threats of confrontation. Nonetheless, the historical
record confirms¶ that accommodation, not confrontation, is usually the essential¶ ingredient of successful rapprochement.The United States and
Great¶ Britain were antagonists for decades; after the Revolutionary War ¶ and the War of 1812, their geopolitical rivalry continued until the end ¶
of the nineteenth century. The turning point came during the¶ 1890s, when the United Kingdom’s imperial commitments began ¶ to outstrip its
resources. London made the opening move in 1896,¶ acceding to Washington’s blustery demand that it submit to arbitration ¶ a dispute over the
border between Venezuela and British Guiana—¶ an issue the United States deemed within its sphere of influence.The¶ United States responded
in kind to London’s gesture, agreeing to¶ bring to arbitration a disagreement over sealing rights in the Bering¶ Sea. Soon thereafter, the two
countries amicably settled disputes over¶ the construction of the Panama Canal and the border between Alaska ¶ and Canada. The United
Kingdom was the only European power to¶ support the United States in the 1898 Spanish-American War, and it¶ went on to welcome U.S.
expansion into the Pacific.¶ As diplomacy dampened the rivalry, elites on both sides of the¶ Atlantic sought to recast popular attitudes through
ambitious public¶ relations campaigns.Arthur Balfour,leader of the House of Commons, ¶ proclaimed in 1896 that “the idea of war with the United
States of¶ America carries with it something of the unnatural horror of a civil¶ war.” In a speech at Harvard in 1898, Richard Olney, U.S.
secretary of¶ state from 1895 to 1897, referred to the United Kingdom as the United ¶ States’ “best friend” and noted “the close community . . . in
the kind¶ and degree of the civilization enjoyed by both [countries].” With the¶ help of lobbying groups such as the Anglo-American Committee,¶
these changes in the public discourse ensured that by the early 1900s¶ the United Kingdom had succeeded in befriending the United States. ¶ In
1905, President Theodore Roosevelt informed London, “You need ¶ not ever be troubled by the nightmare of a possible contest between ¶ the two
great English-speaking peoples. I believe that is practically¶ impossible now, and that it will grow entirely so as the years go by.” ¶ how peace
breaks out¶ Other instances of rapprochement followed a similar trajectory—¶ as was the case with rapprochement between Norway and
Sweden.¶ As part of the territorial settlement at the end of the Napoleonic¶ Wars, Denmark ceded control over Norway to Sweden in 1814. The¶
Swedes promptly invaded Norway to put down a revolt against their¶ rule, and the resulting union between Norway and Sweden that¶ formed in
1815 led to decades of Norwegian estrangement from the¶ Swedish. Rivalry between the two parties began to abate in 1905, when ¶ Sweden,
confronted with resource constraints and pressure from¶ Europe’s great powers, accepted Norway’s unilateral secession from the¶ union. Norway
reciprocated by dismantling its border defenses, and ¶ the two countries proceeded to resolve their outstanding territorial¶ disputes. Their
cooperation during World War I consolidated rapprochement, setting the stage for the eventual consolidation of peace¶ throughout Scandinavia
after World War II.¶ Peace came to Southeast Asia in a comparable fashion.A militarized ¶ rivalry between Indonesia and
Malaysia began in 1963, when Jakarta¶ opposed the formation of Malaysia—a federation among Malaya,¶ Sabah, Sarawak, and
Singapore. In 1966, General Suharto took power ¶ in Indonesia and proceeded to back away from confrontation with ¶
Malaysia, primarily to redress the deteriorating economic conditions¶ brought on by Jakarta’s refusal to trade with Malaysia and by the
international sanctions imposed in response to Indonesian belligerence. ¶ The two countries then exchanged concessions on a
number of issues¶ and teamed up with their neighbors to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967,
which has helped preserve peace in Southeast¶ Asia ever since.¶ Rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil
followed a similar¶ pattern. After decades of rivalry that had begun in the colonial era,¶ mutual accommodation started to
clear the way for reconciliation in¶ the late 1970s. Argentina faced the prospect of a war with Chile and¶ needed to reduce its other
strategic commitments, and Brazil’s more¶ moderate leaders viewed rapprochement with Argentina as a way of ¶ undercutting the growing power
of hard-liners in Brazil’s security¶ and intelligence apparatus. Argentina made the opening move in ¶ 1979 by finally reaching an accord with
Brazil and Paraguay on the¶ construction of a hydroelectric dam across the Paraná River, which ¶ flows through the three countries. During the
1980s, Argentina and¶ Brazil exchanged concessions, cooperated on their nuclear programs, ¶ and deepened their
political, scientific, and cultural ties. In 1991, they¶ launched a regional trade pact—Mercosur—and soon thereafter¶ engaged in joint
military exercises, which brought Brazilian troops to¶ Argentine territory for the first time since the 1860s.¶ As these and many other
episodes of rapprochement make clear,¶ Obama is on firm ground in seeking to resolve long-standing rivalries¶
through engagement rather than confrontation. This strategy is all ¶ the more attractive at a time when the United
States is overstretched¶ by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and by economic distress at home. ¶ Obama’s outreach
certainly entails risks and comes with no guarantee ¶ of success. But U.S. President Richard Nixon had no guarantee of a¶
breakthrough when he went to Beijing in 1972, nor did Egyptian ¶ President Anwar al-Sadat when he went to Jerusalem in 1977. Even¶ George
W. Bush, who initially forswore dialogue with members of the¶ “axis of evil,” was by the end of his second term negotiating with
North¶ Korea, sending U.S. envoys to meet Iranian officials, and allowing¶ U.S. forces to cooperate with the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who had¶
spent the preceding years trying to kill Americans. When it is handled¶ correctly, engagement is not appeasement; it is sound
diplomacy.
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Cuba=/=Rogue State
No link – Cuba isn’t a rogue terrorist state, that’s U.S. media bias
Bolender 5/31 (Keith, research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 5/31/2013, The Guardian, “Cuba is hardly a ‘state sponsor of
terror,’” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/31/cuba-us-terror-sponsors-list)
While an attentive US audience watched President Obama outline his plan to wind down America's long war on terror last week, officials
in
Havana were shaking their heads in bewilderment and anger over how the issue of terrorism continues to be
cynically manipulated against the island nation. What raised their ire was the recent announcement that Cuba would
remain on the State Department's controversial list of states that sponsor terrorism. ¶ The long-awaited annual report on
international terrorism from the State Department was released Thursday, and confirmed what officials had already indicated – that Cuba is
staying on the list along with Iran, Sudan and Syria. State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell confirmed the administration "has no current
plans to remove Cuba". The decision came as a disappointment for those who were expecting new Secretary of State John Kerry, a long-time
critic of America's counter-productive policy against the Castro government, might recommend Cuba's removal. The fact he hasn't demonstrates
how difficult it is to change the dynamics of the antagonistic relationship between these two ideological adversaries. ¶ Cuba was originally
included on the list in 1982, replacing a then-friendly Iraq. The designation levies comprehensive economic punishments against Havana as part
of the overall strategy of regime change that includes a decades-long economic embargo, unrelenting propaganda, extra-territorial application of
American laws.¶ For it's part, Cuba calls its continued inclusion on the list "shameful" and pandering to a small
community of former Cuban citizens who now live in Florida. Cuba also asserts that the US has actually undertaken
actions on the island that have resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians. ¶ An official of the country's foreign relations
department, MINREX, who asked to remain anonymous, complained:¶ "It is ridiculous that the United States continues to include
Cuba on an arbitrary list of states that sponsor terrorism, while it is Cuba that has suffered so much from terrorism – originating
from the United States."¶ The so-called terrorism against Cuba began shortly after the triumph of the Revolution in 1959. In the early 1960s a
covert CIA program known as Operation Mongoose led to the killing of teachers, farmers, government officials and the destruction of agricultural
and non-military industrial targets. Other incidents involved attacks on villages, biological terrorism including the introduction of Dengue 2 that
resulted in the deaths of more than 100 children in 1981, and a 1997 bombing campaign against tourist facilities in Havana and Varadero that
killed Canadian-Italian tourist Fabio Di Celmo and injured dozens.¶ The most infamous act of terrorism occurred with the bombing of Cubana
Airlines in 1976, killing all 72 on board. One of the two recognized masterminds, former CIA agent Luis Posada Carriles, has a long history of
suspected terrorist activities against his former homeland; at one point bragging to the New York Times of his involvement in the hotel
bombings. Posada continues to live a quiet life in Miami, considered a hero among many of the first generation exiles whose anti-revolutionary
fervor has yet to diminish. The other architect of the Cubana Airlines bombing, Orlando Bosch, died peacefully in Miami a few years ago. As a
result of these terrorist activities, the Cuban government sent intelligence officers to Florida in the 1990s to infiltrate Cuban-American
organizations in an effort to thwart further acts. The agents, known as the Cuban Five, were uncovered by the FBI and are serving long prison
terms.¶ While Cuba's status as a state sponsor of terrorism remains unchanged, other countries that might be considered more deserving, such as
North Korea and Pakistan, aren't on the list. What makes it all the more galling for the Castro government are the arguments the United States has
advanced to justify Cuba's inclusion – the most egregious stemming from the charge Cuba was not sufficiently supportive of the US war on terror
or the invasion of Iraq, and was unwilling to help track or seize assets allegedly held by terrorists. A 2004 State Department report
asserted that "Cuba continued to actively oppose the US-led coalition prosecuting the global war on terrorism." In
reality, the Cuban side has consistently denounced all forms of terrorism, including the recent Boston Marathon
bombings that brought quick condolences from the island leadership. ¶ Other rationales over the past 30 years to keep Cuba on
the list have ranged from its support for left-wing rebels in Latin America, its relationship with the former Soviet Union, treatment of political
prisoners and allowing members from alleged terrorist organizations such as Columbia's FARC and Spain's separatist Basque movement ETA to
reside on the island. Even when those issues were resolved, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union more than 20 years ago, Cuba found its
unmerited designation had not changed.¶ One long standing reason, that Havana permits refugees from American justice to find safe haven on the
island, was re-invigorated with a ruling that was timed almost perfectly with the announcement that Cuba would not be taken off the terrorist list.
Assata Shakur, accused of killing a New Jersey state trooper 40 years ago, was suddenly labeled as a most wanted terrorist by the FBI, with a
$2m price tag on her head. Shakur, who fled to Cuba in 1979 and was given political asylum, has consistently maintained her innocence.
Categorizing Shakur as a terrorist could potentially endanger her life from those wanting to collect the bounty, and has led State Department
officials to utilize her changed status as justification to keep Cuba on the list. ¶ There is no legitimate reason to use the arbitrary
terrorism list as a political weapon against Cuba. To continue to do so simply exposes the State Department to
charges of hypocrisy and manipulation of a serious threat based solely on ideological differences. Most importantly, it
gives insult to all those who have been actual victims of terrorism.
No link – the “rogue state” designation is an obvious political tool, not a measure of threat
ENAN No Date (Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Relations, “Post–cold War Policy Isolating and punishing ‘rogue’ states,” http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/)
American foreign policymakers used the terms "rogue," "outlaw," and "backlash" states virtually interchangeably
after the Cold War. As early as July 1985, President Reagan had asserted that "we are not going to tolerate … attacks from outlaw states by
the strangest collection of misfits, loony tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich," but it fell to the Clinton administration
to elaborate this concept.¶ Writing in the March–April 1994 issue of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Lake cited "the reality of recalcitrant and
outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family [of democratic nations] but also assault its basic values." He applied this label
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to five regimes: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya and claimed that their behavior was frequently aggressive
and defiant; that ties among them were growing; that they were ruled by coercive cliques that suppressed human rights and
promoted radical ideologies; that they "exhibited a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world"; and that their
siege mentality had led them to attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. For
Lake, "as the sole super-power, the United States [had] a special responsibility … to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps
eventually transform" these miscreants into good global citizens.¶ The first Bush administration had agreed with Lake's analysis and in 1991
adopted a "twowar" strategy designed to enable U.S. forces to fight and win two regional wars simultaneously against "renegade" nations. The
second Bush administration emphasized the urgent need to develop a national missile defense to protect the United States from weapons launched
by rogue states. In short, the "outlaw" nation theme pervaded U.S. foreign policy throughout the post–Cold War era.¶ Critics seized on these
terms as inherently fuzzy, subjective, and difficult to translate into consistent policy. Although Lake had defined
rogues as nations that challenged the system of international norms and international order, disagreement existed
about the very nature of this system. For example, whereas the Organization for European Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and UN
Secretary-General Annan advocated international norms that would expose regimes that mistreated their populations to condemnation and even
armed intervention, others argued that such norms would trample on the traditional notion of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, the State
Department sometimes included Serbia on its outlaw list solely because President Milosevic had violated the rights of some of his nation's
citizens, and NATO undertook an air war against him in 1999 because of his repression of an internal ethnic group. ¶ In theory, at least, to be
classified as a rogue, a state had to commit four transgressions: pursue weapons of mass destruction, support
terrorism, severely abuse its own citizens, and stridently criticize the U nited States. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya all
behaved in this manner during at least some of the post–Cold War era. Yet the inclusion of Cuba, which certainly violated human
rights and castigated the United States, was put on the list solely because of the political influence of the American
Cuban community and specifically that of the Cuban American National Foundation. Moreover, in 1992 Congress approved
the Cuban Democracy Act, which mandated secondary sanctions against foreign companies who used property seized from Americans by the
Castro government in the 1960s. Attempts to implement this law outraged some of Washington's closest allies, and President Clinton, while
backing this legislation as a presidential candidate, tried hard to avoid enforcing it. On the other hand, states like Syria and Pakistan,
hardly paragons of rectitude, avoided being added to the list because the United States hoped that Damascus could
play a constructive role in the Arab-Israeli "peace process," and because Washington had long maintained close
relations with Islamabad—a vestige of the Cold War.
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Venezuela=/=Appeasement
Engaging with Venezuela isn’t appeasement—Maduro’s working to improve relations
Neuman 4/13 (William Neuman, New York Times Andes Region correspondent, 4/13/13, New York Times,
“Venezuela Gives Chávez Protégé Narrow Victory,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/world/americas/venezuelans-vote-for-successor-tochavez.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
Meanwhile, there
were also signs that the strident, Chávez-style anti-American message that Mr. Maduro used during the campaign
would now be set aside to improve Venezuela’s strained relations with the United States. ¶ Venezuela is a major oil
supplier to the United States with immense reserves, and under Mr. Chávez it has also been a major thorn in Washington’s side,
wielding its oil and its diplomatic muscle to oppose American policy everywhere from Cuba to Syria. Mr. Chávez, who succumbed to cancer on
March 5, built his political career on flaying the United States and its traditional allies in the Venezuelan establishment, and Mr. Maduro
followed his mentor’s script throughout the campaign with an acolyte’s zeal.¶ He accused former American diplomats of plotting to
kill him, suggested that the United States had caused Mr. Chávez’s illness, and had his foreign minister shut the door on informal talks with the
United States that began late last year. A senior State Department official in Washington said the harsh rhetoric had made the possibility of
improved relations more difficult.¶ But over the weekend, with his election victory looking likely, Mr. Maduro sent a private signal
to Washington that he was ready to turn the page. Bill Richardson, the former governor of New Mexico, who was in
Caracas as a representative of the Organization of American States, said in an interview that Mr. Maduro called him
aside after a meeting of election observers on Saturday and asked him to carry a message.¶ “He said, ‘We want to improve
the relationship with the U.S., regularize the relationship ,’ ” Mr. Richardson said.¶ The foreign minister, Elías Jaua,
met with Mr. Richardson on Sunday, and said Venezuela was ready to resume the talks that it had cut off, Mr. Richardson said.
Engaging with Venezuela isn’t appeasement—Maduro’s working to improve relations
Neuman 4/13 (William Neuman, New York Times Andes Region correspondent, 4/13/13, New York Times,
“Venezuela Gives Chávez Protégé Narrow Victory,”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/world/americas/venezuelans-vote-for-successor-tochavez.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
Meanwhile, there
were also signs that the strident, Chávez-style anti-American message that Mr. Maduro used during the campaign
would now be set aside to improve Venezuela’s strained relations with the United States. ¶ Venezuela is a major oil
supplier to the United States with immense reserves, and under Mr. Chávez it has also been a major thorn in Washington’s side,
wielding its oil and its diplomatic muscle to oppose American policy everywhere from Cuba to Syria. Mr. Chávez, who succumbed to cancer on
March 5, built his political career on flaying the United States and its traditional allies in the Venezuelan establishment, and Mr. Maduro
followed his mentor’s script throughout the campaign with an acolyte’s zeal.¶ He accused former American diplomats of plotting to
kill him, suggested that the United States had caused Mr. Chávez’s illness, and had his foreign minister shut the door on informal talks with the
United States that began late last year. A senior State Department official in Washington said the harsh rhetoric had made the possibility of
improved relations more difficult.¶ But over the weekend, with his election victory looking likely, Mr. Maduro sent a private signal
to Washington that he was ready to turn the page. Bill Richardson, the former governor of New Mexico, who was in
Caracas as a representative of the Organization of American States, said in an interview that Mr. Maduro called him
aside after a meeting of election observers on Saturday and asked him to carry a message.¶ “He said, ‘We want to improve
the relationship with the U.S., regularize the relationship ,’ ” Mr. Richardson said.¶ The foreign minister, Elías Jaua,
met with Mr. Richardson on Sunday, and said Venezuela was ready to resume the talks that it had cut off, Mr. Richardson said.
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Appeasement Fails – WWII Example Bad
Appeasement is not inherently bad – empirically solves conflicts, the WWII comparison is moot
Record 8 (Jeffrey, defense policy critic and teaches strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, Summer 2008, “Retiring Hitler
and ‘Appeasement’ from the National Security Debate,” http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/08summer/record.pdf)
Appeasement, which became a politically charged term only after ¶ World War II, actually means “to pacify, quiet, or
satisfy, especially by giving¶ in to the demands of,” according to Webster’s New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, which goes on to list
synonyms including “amends, settlement, reparation, conciliation, and compromise.”13 These terms are consistent with what ¶ most historians and
international relations theorists understand to be the phe¶ nomenon of appeasement: states seeking to adjust or settle their
differences by¶ measures short of war. Theorist Stephen Rock defines appeasement as simply¶ “the policy of reducing tensions
with one’s adversary by removing the causes ¶ of conflict and disagreement,”14 a definition echoed by political scientists¶
Gordon Craig and Alexander George: “the reduction of tension between [two ¶ states] by the methodical removal of the principal causes of
conflict and disagreement between them.”15 Thus Richard Nixon was guilty of “appeasing” ¶ Communist China in 1972 by embracing Beijing’s
one-China policy, and Ronald Reagan was guilty of “appeasing” the Soviet Union in 1987 by resolving ¶ tensions with Moscow over actual and
planned deployments of intermediaterange nuclear forces in Europe. ¶ Unfortunately, Anglo-French behavior toward Nazi
Germany gave¶ appeasement such a bad name that the term is no longer usable except as a political pejorative.
Before Munich, however, observes historian Paul Kennedy,¶ “the policy of settling international . . . quarrels by admitting and
satisfying¶ grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding ¶ the resort to an armed conflict
which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous” was generally viewed as “constructive, positive, and¶
honorable.”16 Five years after World War II, Winston Churchill, the great¶ anti-appeaser of Hitler, declared, “Appeasement in itself
may be good or bad¶ according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is¶ alike futile and fatal.”
He added, “Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only path to world peace. ”17¶
An oft-cited case of successful appeasement from a position of¶ strength is Great Britain’s resolution of disputes with the United States from¶
1896 to1903.18 By the 1890s the number and power of Britain’s enemies were ¶ growing. Britain had no great-power allies and faced rising
challenges from¶ Germany and Russia coupled with continuing tensions with France and the¶ United States. Tensions with industrially expanding
and increasingly bellicose Germany became especially acute when in 1898 Berlin gratuitously¶ moved to challenge British naval supremacy in
European waters. Accordingly, Britain decided to reduce the potential demands on its military power ¶ by resolving outstanding disputes with the
United States and France. With respect to the United States, it agreed to American demands that Britain explicitly accept the Monroe Doctrine;
submit British Guiana’s border dispute with¶ Venezuela to international arbitration; agree to US construction, operation, ¶ and fortification of an
interoceanic canal through Central America; and settle¶ an Alaskan-Canadian border dispute in America’s favor. None of these concessions
involved vital British security interests, which in fact were advanced ¶ by transforming the world’s greatest industrial power from a potential
enemy¶ into a friend (and later indispensable ally). Accepting US dominance within¶ the Western Hemisphere not only laid the foundation of
American entry on¶ Britain’s side in World War I; it also permitted a British naval evacuation of¶ the hemisphere for operations in European
waters.¶ Meaning of the Word¶ Use of the Munich analogy not only twists the meaning of appeasement; it also ignores the extraordinary nature of
the Nazi German threat.¶ Though the analogy’s power to persuade is undeniable, Nazi Germany remains without equal as
a state threat. Genuinely Hitlerian security threats to ¶ the United States have not been replicated since 1945. The scope
of Hitler’s¶ nihilism, recklessness, military power, and territorial-racial ambitions posed¶ a mortal threat to western civilization, and there was
nothing inevitable about¶ his ultimate defeat. No other authoritarian or totalitarian regime ever employed such a powerful
military instrument in such an aggressive manner on¶ behalf of such a monstrous agenda. Hitler was simultaneously
unappeasable¶ and undeterrable—a rare combination that made war the only means of bringing him down. He understood that he could
not achieve his international¶ ambitions without war, and no territorial or political concessions the democracies
might offer him would ever be enough.
Appeasement theory wrong
Record 5 (Dr. Jeffrey Record, Rockefeller Younger Scholar on the Brookings Institution’s Defense Analysis Staff,
and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Hudson Institute, and the BDM International
Corporation. Author of books and over a dozen monographs, Doctorate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, August 2005, Strategic Studies Institute, “APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED:¶
INVESTIGATING THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE 1930s,”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB622.pdf)
No historical event has exerted more influence on post-World War ¶ II U.S. use-of-force decisions than the Anglo-French
appeasement of ¶ Nazi Germany that led to the outbreak of the Second World War. ¶ Presidents have repeatedly cited the great
lesson of the 1930s—namely, ¶ that force should be used early and decisively against rising security ¶ threats—to justify decisions for war and
military intervention; some ¶ presidents have compared enemy leaders to Hitler. The underlying ¶ assumption of the so-called Munich
analogy is that the democracies ¶ could and should have stopped Hitler (thereby avoiding World War ¶ II and the Holocaust) by
moving against him militarily before 1939. ¶ This assumption, however, is easy to make only in hindsight and ¶ ignores the
political, military, economic, and psychological contexts of ¶ Anglo-French security choices during the 1930s. Among
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the myriad ¶ factors constraining those choices were memories of the horrors ¶ of World War I, failure to grasp the nature of
the Nazi regime and ¶ Hitler’s strategic ambitions, France’s military inflexibility, Britain’s ¶ strategic overstretch, France’s
strategic dependence on Britain, guilt ¶ over the Versailles Treaty of 1919, dread of strategic bombing and ¶ misjudgment of the Nazi
air threat, American isolationism, and ¶ distrust of the Soviet Union and fear of Communism. ¶ Appeasement failed because
Hitler was unappeasable. He sought ¶ not to adjust the European balance of power in Germany’s favor, ¶ but rather to overthrow it. He
wanted a German-ruled Europe that ¶ would have eliminated France and Britain as European powers. But ¶ Hitler was also undeterrable;
he embraced war because he knew he ¶ could not get what he wanted without it. There was thus little that ¶ the democracies could do to deter
Hitler from war, though Hitler ¶ expected war later than 1939. There was going to be war as long as ¶ Hitler remained in power.¶
A reassessment of the history of appeasement in the 1930s ¶ yields the following conclusions: first, Hitler remains
unequaled ¶ as a state threat. No post-1945 threat to the United States bears ¶ genuine comparison to the Nazi dictatorship. Second, AngloFrench ¶ security choices in the 1930s were neither simple nor obvious; they were shaped and constrained by factors ignored or misunderstood ¶
by those who retrospectively have boiled them down to a simple ¶ choice between good and evil. Third, hindsight is not 20/20 vision; ¶ it
distorts. We view past events through the prism of what followed. ¶ Had Hitler dropped dead before 1939, there would have been no ¶ World
War II or Holocaust, and therefore no transformation of the ¶ very term “appeasement” into a pejorative. Finally, invocations of ¶ the
Munich analogy to justify the use of force are almost invariably ¶ misleading because security threats to the United States
genuinely ¶ Hitlerian in scope and nature have not been replicated since 1945.
No connection to WWII—modern aggressors have limited goals and hegemony checks
Record 5 (Dr. Jeffrey Record, Rockefeller Younger Scholar on the Brookings Institution’s Defense Analysis Staff,
and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Hudson Institute, and the BDM International
Corporation. Author of books and over a dozen monographs, Doctorate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, August 2005, Strategic Studies Institute, “APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED:¶
INVESTIGATING THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE 1930s,”
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB622.pdf)
The problem with the invocation of Munich is its suggestion ¶ that aggressor states are inherently insatiable and that
failure to act ¶ against them automatically endangers U.S. security. In fact, most ¶ aggressor states have limited territorial objectives,
and in some cases ¶ satisfaction of those objectives may be of little consequence to U.S. ¶ security. North Vietnam’s
objectives were confined to the former ¶ French Indochina, a place of little intrinsic strategic value to the United ¶ States. Yet the
administration of Lyndon Johnson painted Ho Chi ¶ Minh as the spear point of a concerted Sino-Soviet imperialism and ¶
claimed that a Communist victory in South Vietnam would topple ¶ dominoes all over Southeast Asia. Saddam Hussein was certainly ¶
Hitlerian in his brutality, recklessness, and appetite for aggression, ¶ but the military threat he posed was never a
match for the power ¶ the United States could—and did in 1990-91—mobilize against him; ¶ by 2003 the Iraqi threat had been
broken by 12 years of war and ¶ sanctions, though Saddam continued to run a monstrous tyranny ¶ and to defy UN demands that he account for
suspected prohibited ¶ weapons stocks. There was no counterpart in the Europe of the 1930s ¶ to the superpowerdom of the
United States in the Gulf over the past ¶ 2 decades. Stephen Rock observes that “Not every state that makes 7¶ demands has unlimited
ambitions.”19 Unfortunately, notes Robert ¶ Jervis, “Our memories of Hitler have tended to obscure the fact that ¶ most states
are unwilling to pay an exorbitant price for a chance at ¶ expansion.”20 To contend that Saddam Hussein was not Hitler is not ¶
necessarily to argue against the U.S. decision to invade Iraq; there ¶ was always a powerful moral and legal case for Saddam Hussein’s ¶
overthrow, and the future course of events in Iraq and the Middle ¶ East may well determine the final judgment on the wisdom of that ¶ decision.
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Appeasement Solves
Engagement works – diplomacy may be a long process, but it’s the only way to solve
Takeyh 9 (Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/7/2009, Council for Foreign Relations, “The
Essence of Diplomatic Engagement,” http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic-engagement/p20362)
As the Obama administration charts its foreign policy, there is increasing unease about its lack of achievements. The
Iraq war lingers, Afghanistan continues to be mired in its endless cycle of tribal disarray and Islamist resurgence, Guantanamo remains open.
Still, Obama has introduced important changes in both the style and substance of US diplomacy. An honest dialogue
with the international community has at times led the president to acknowledge our own culpabilities and
shortcomings. Even more dramatic has been Obama's willingness to reach out to America's adversaries and seek
negotiated solutions to some of the world's thorniest problems. ¶ It is Obama's declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of
critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently
exclaimed, "When France chides you for appeasement, you know you're scraping bottom." Acknowledgement of America's misjudgments is
derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues to test
its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns America's offers of a greater opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about
how George Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country. Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course
correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace. ¶ Such views
miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work
with every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to
seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their
essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation. ¶ Should these regimes
fail to grasp the opportunities before them, then Washington has a better chance of assembling a durable
international coalition to isolate and pressure them. One of the problems with a unilateralist Bush administration that prided itself on
disparaging diplomatic outreach was that it often made America the issue and gave many states an excuse for passivity. The Obama
administration's expansive diplomatic vision has deprived fence-sitters of such justifications. An administration that has reached out to North
Korea, communicated its sincere desire for better ties to Iran, and dispatched high-level emissaries to Syria cannot be accused of diplomatic
indifference.¶ The administration's approach has already yielded results in one of the most intractable global problems: Iran's nuclear imbroglio.
The Bush team's years of harsh rhetoric and threats of military retribution failed to adjust Iran's nuclear ambitions in any tangible manner. A
country that had no measurable nuclear infrastructure before Bush's inaugural made tremendous strides during his tenure. Unable to gain Iranian
capitulation or international cooperation, the Bush administration was left plaintively witnessing Iran's accelerating nuclear time clock. In a
dramatic twist of events, the Obama administration's offer of direct diplomacy has altered the landscape and yielded an
unprecedented international consensus that has put the recalcitrant theocracy on the defensive. Iran's mounting nuclear
infractions and its enveloping isolation caused it to recalibrate its position and open its latest nuclear facility to inspection and potentially ship out
its stock of low-enriched uranium for processing in Russia. Deprived of such fuel, Iran would not have the necessary resources to quickly
assemble a bomb. In a short amount of time, the administration has succeeded in putting important barriers to Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. ¶
The United States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its national power. The tumultuous
Bush years have demonstrated the limitations of military force. Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions
and acceptance of less than ideal outcomes. Moreover, as the United States charts its course, there is nothing wrong with
acknowledging past errors. Instead of clinging to its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the judgment of
other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.
Autocratic regimes do respond to engagement, Argentina and Brazil prove – and successful engagement
undermines autocrats
Kupchan 10 (Charles, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,
March/April 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, “Enemies Into Friends: How the United States Can Court Its Adversaries,”
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/files/internationalstudies/docs/kupchan03022011.pdf)
Building congressional support for Obama’s outreach to¶ adversaries will mean debunking three myths that often distort¶ public debate
about strategies of engagement. The first is the presumption that Washington compromises its values and power by
seeking¶ rapprochement with autocratic regimes. U.S. officials and opinionmakers on both sides of the aisle share a commitment to
democratization for both principled reasons¶ (democracies respect the rights of their¶ citizens) and pragmatic ones (democracies¶ are peaceful and
cooperative, whereas autocracies are presumably belligerent and ¶ unreliable partners). Accordingly, even if¶ the United States succeeded in
striking a¶ deal with the Iranian, the Russian, or the¶ Syrian government, critics would charge¶ that Washington’s behavior was
morally tainted (for rewarding¶ and strengthening autocrats) and naive (because such governments¶ cannot be trusted
to keep their commitments).¶ But Obama is fully justified in putting the democratization¶ agenda on the back burner and basing
U.S. diplomacy toward¶ other states on their external behavior, not their regime type. Even ¶ repressive regimes can
be reliably cooperative when it comes to¶ their conduct of foreign policy. Argentina and Brazil embarked on ¶ the path
of rapprochement when they were both ruled by military¶ juntas. Suharto oversaw a campaign of brutal repression at home¶ but
nonetheless ended Indonesia’s belligerent stance toward Malaysia¶ and helped found the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a ¶ pact to
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preserve regional peace.¶ Striking bargains with repressive regimes does require making moral¶ compromises. Doing so is justified,
however, by the concrete contributions to international stability that can result. Washington should ¶ speak out against
violations of human rights and support political¶ liberalization around the world. But when nuclear weapons, terrorism, ¶
and matters of war and peace are on the line, responsible statecraft¶ requires pragmatic compromise, not ideological
intransigence.¶ A second misconception, often affirmed by opponents of engagement, is that pursuing rapprochement with an adversary
means¶ abandoning hope that its government will change. On the contrary,¶ doing business with autocracies has the potential to bring about ¶
regime change through the backdoor by weakening hard-liners and¶ empowering reformers. Engagement with Iran, for example, could ¶
undermine a government that relies on confrontation with the United ¶ States to rally popular support and disarm the opposition. ¶ Belligerent
governments have frequently been the victims of¶ rapprochement. Sweden’s aristocracy and military lost power to ¶ the country’s liberals as
rapprochement with Norway advanced.¶ Military juntas governed Argentina and Brazil when their reconciliation began in
1979; by 1985, both countries were democracies. ¶ In none of these cases was rapprochement the only factor that helped¶ bring about
regime change, but the more benign strategic environment that accompanied reconciliation certainly strengthened ¶ the hand of reformers.¶
Should Obama’s outreach succeed in winning over adversaries, the ¶ anti-American pedigree of such leaders as
Ahmadinejad, Castro,¶ and Putin may well do more to compromise their credibility than to ¶ enhance their popularity. Over
the long run, working with recalcitrant ¶ autocrats may undermine them far more effectively than containment¶ and
confrontation.
Appeasement good in Cuba
Lopez-Levy 11 (Arturo, Lecturer¶ -Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver ¶ ,
Institute for the Study of Israel in the Middle East, 1/10/11, The Havana Note, “Appease Cuba? What Would
Winston Churchill Say?,” http://thehavananote.com/node/845)
Several former Castro’s government officials such as Cuba’s former Ambassador to the United Nations, Alcibiades Hidalgo and ex
diplomat Juan Antonio Blanco, who worked in the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, have explained how Cuban
leaders need enmity with the United States to derive their internal legitimacy and protect their authoritarian
privileges. According to these former officials, every time there was a chance of lifting the embargo, Fidel Castro did
something to keep it: Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977), and the shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996. ¶ Those views are an
exaggeration of Cuba’s policy towards the United States but I don’t dismiss their evidences. For some in the Cuban leadership, “antiimperialism”, manifested at its worst as “anti-Americanism”, is central to their identity. Cuban nationalists have a long list of historic
complaints and grievances against U.S. interventionism, from the exclusion of the Paris Treaty in 1898 and the Platt Amendment in 1902 to the
Helms-Burton Act in 1996.¶ Fidel Castro’s opposition to U.S. policies over the world is documented and consistent. The
Cuban “historicos”, the generation who fought in the revolution, don’t secretly aspire to be United States’ allies or to
relations between Cuba and the United States of the cordial kind Russia and Finland have. It is logical, they know only one way to
govern, the “under siege” one. A rapprochement with the United States would unleash unpredictable pressures for
reform and public deliberation, with more transparency and opportunities for those who think differently. Such a
situation would undoubtedly dilute their power.¶ But there is a growing pluralism not only in Cuban civil society but also within the Cuban elites.
The business of revolution for many of the sons and daughters of those who fought in Sierra Maestra or Bay of Pigs is not communist revolution
but business in a globalized economy. Communism is as much a bankrupt ideology in Havana as in Moscow or Beijing. Some months ago,
Esteban Morales, a leftist intellectual, denounced corruption, authoritarian lack of transparency, and inefficiencies as the most powerful threats
against the current system.¶ The rise of Raul Castro to power brought expansions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces-security complex over the
Cuban state. The FAR apparatus supposedly designed to defend the party control over the Cuban government is today master of the state and the
party. Most of the new military cadres come from a different experience than the revolution “historicos”. Their professional career is related not
to the fights of the 1960’s but to the Africa wars that ended in a compromise with the United States and South Africa, and the economic
management of the new sectors developed in the last two decades. Contrary to most of the “historicos”, these cadres or their immediate relatives
have contacts with friends and family in the Cuban American community. ¶ Therefore a policy of engagement can bring substantial
political gain by undercutting the blame-the-blockade narrative and exposing Cuban pluralist civil society and elites to
people to people contacts with the United States through academic, educational, cultural, sports and even simple tourism
exchanges.¶ Only in Miami could Ninoska Perez, a well-known hard-line radio show host, reject such engagement because “Adolf Hitler was
able to murder six million Jews, while apologists found excuses to justify his crimes. It is no different in Cuba” without raising concerns about
her mental health. No matter how repugnant certain of Castro’s policies might be towards political prisoners or Cubans
living abroad, any comparison with the power, aims and Human Rights violations of Hitler’s Germany or, for that matter, the
apartheid regime in South Africa and its colonial rule over Namibia, is simply nonsense. Unfortunately, Mrs. Perez’s analogies are not
marginal among the right wing exiles who defend the Helms-Burton Act, the legislation that guides current U.S. policy towards Cuba. ¶ Of
course, this is delusional. The Cuban communist political system and command economy might have prevented economic development of the
Cuban people and repressed its civil and political liberties but there is little evidence about genocidal or expansionist tendencies
in Raul Castro’s government. The U.S. inclusion of Cuba in the terrorist list of the State department is seen as the world
paradigm of political manipulation of a core theme of American foreign policy for domestic political reasons.¶ So, where does a
policy of engagement - or as critics would call it, “appeasement” - fit in? In fact, appeasement shouldn’t be a bad word for U.S.
policy towards Cuba since the island is a minor power with limited capacity to cause damage to U.S. national
interests.¶ As Winston Churchill, the main opponent of appeasing Hitler, wrote in 1950: “The world appeasement is not popular but
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appeasement has its place in all policy. Make sure you put it in the right place. Appease the weak. Defy the strong”. Cuban nationalism
and its sense of victimhood have never been a stronger conviction of the Cuban people. But the Cuban state’s power position versus
foreign powers is the weakest since 1959. Under the weight of the Special Period, the period of crisis that began in 1989 and amount to
forty percent of post revolutionary history, the Castros’ regime is economically exhausted. This is why Raul Castro is attempting a serious
reform.¶ Now is most likely the optimal time for the United States to address appeasable Cuban nationalism and
engage Cuban post-revolutionary society. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, the question should be whether Cuban power holders see
virtue in a permanent conflict with the United States, or there is space for accommodation of Cuba’s national interests in a U.S. led world order.
Only through engagement can Obama test whether Cuba’s new leaders are rooted in a Cold War opposition to the United States, or are just
defending their interests, values and privileges against U.S. impositions.
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Condition CPs Link
The conditions CP links
Rubin 11 (Jennifer Rubin, Right Turn staff writer, 10/18/11, Washington Post, “Obama’s Cuba appeasement,”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cubaappeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html)
the United States was considering a
potential prisoner swap with Cuba to free imprisoned American Alan Gross. The Daily Caller reported:¶ The spy swap was set
Last week, the newly confirmed undersecretary of state, Wendy Sherman, let it be known that
in motion by former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, who traveled to Cuba last month to seek Gross’s release. He told Cuban Foreign
Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the Obama administration would be willing to consider the release of a convicted Cuban
spy, Rene Gonzales along with other concessions.¶ Hernandez is serving two life sentences for sending information
to Havana which enabled Cuba to shoot down two Miami-based civilian aircraft with warplanes in 1996. All four
Americans on board were killed. The victims were members of the Brothers to the Rescue humanitarian organization¶ At the State Department
briefing the spokeswoman left just enough wiggle room in her denials to make clear that some sort of discussions were underway. ¶ The blowback
was swift. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) put out a statement that read: “It’s deplorable that the U.S. government offered several
unilateral concessions to the Castro regime in exchange for the release of a man who was wrongfully jailed in the
first place. Rather than easing sanctions in response to hostage taking, the U.S. should put more punitive measures on the Castro
regime. Until Secretary Clinton answers for this, the nomination of Roberta Jacobson to be the next assistant secretary of state for the western
hemisphere will be in question.”¶ The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to
news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene
Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate
the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana , which is designated by the
U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with
which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon
engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must
demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.Ӧ As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the
administration actions didn’t stop there. The Associated Press reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill
Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking
Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of
interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing
spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to
help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for
Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United
States.”