Turnout as Consent: How Fair Governance Encourages Voter Participation
Matthew R. Miles
Brigham Young University, Idaho
Department of History, Geography and Political Science
525 S. Center Street
Rexburg, Idaho 83460-2160
email: milema@byui.edu
Phone: (208) 496-4238
Fax: (208) 496-5238
Keywords: procedural fairness, voter turnout, comparative political behavior, corruption
Abtract
The dominant view assumes that people vote to influence election outcomes. As such, most assume that campaign
contact, election competiveness and the probability of one’s voting influencing the outcome of an election are the
primary forces motivating voter participation. However, some people may view elections as a referendum on
system performance and may participate in elections regardless of the electoral outcome. Voting is one means for
the public to express their consent to be governed. If so, we should expect higher voter participation in systems
that generate public approbation. This article uses a national survey experiment, a cross-national panel of 35
advanced democracies and aggregate voter turnout data to demonstrate that people in systems that control
corruption, govern effectively and have fair judicial processes are more likely to vote. This is because systems
that treat people fairly in their day-to-day operations make people feel valued by their political system.
Particularly when the probability of changing the composition of government with a single vote is small, voting is
a tacit endorsement of the existing regime.
Introduction
Voting behavior has captured the attention of scholars for more than half a century.1 Yet, despite
several decades of serious thought, scholars are still trying to understand that which motivates citizens to
participate in the electoral process by casting a vote. While some frame voting as an irrational behavior
(Downs 1957, Riker and Ordeshook 1968, Blais 2000), others argue that voting is the logical result of
particular social (Verba and Nie 1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993,
Verba, et al. 1993), institutional (McAllister 1986, Powell Jr 1986, Blais 2006), demographic (Verba, et
al. 1995, Gallego 2007, Leighley and Nagler 2014), or biological (Fowler, et al. 2008, Fowler and
Dawes 2008) mechanisms. Regardless of the specific mechanism thought to influence electoral
participation, nearly every study of voter turnout assumes that the individual vote calculus is motivated
in part by the election, the campaign, or the candidates. That is, most assume that people participate in
elections because they have some interest in the outcome of the elections.
Yet, some people participate in elections regardless of the outcome. Whether their social
network encourages them to vote, voting has become habitual, or they simply feel some civic duty to
vote; many people participate in elections irrespective of electoral outcomes (Riker and Ordeshook
1968, Blais 2000). People who are dissatisfied with their government may choose to abstain from
electoral participation because they feel that participating in elections lends legitimacy to a regime with
which they are displeased. Conversely, some may vote because it is an implicit endorsement of their
government. Put simply, some people participate in elections when they are satisfied and refuse to
participate when they are displeased with government performance. Particularly when the probability of
1
Data, replication files, and the online methodological appendix are available at https://osf.io/uxsyz/
changing the composition of government through a single vote is small, participating in an election is a
tacit endorsement of the existing regime.
More than a half century has passed since Schattschneider (1960) argued that in its ideal form a
democratic system aspires to involve every citizen in the electoral process, and is not content to
represent the simple majority of the population that participates. Though we have learned much about
the institutional arrangements and individual motivations that influence voter participation, many
advanced democracies involve the same proportion of voters that they have for decades. Much of the
voter turnout literature approaches the topic from the perspective of political campaigns. Recently the
literature has focused on techniques to mobilize voters in particular elections. As a result, the literature
tends to conflate voter mobilization with voter turnout. The two are conceptually distinct. Political
campaigns are motivated to mobilize some groups while discouraging participation from others. As
such, we should expect campaigns to utilize particular tactics that both mobilize and de-mobilize, like
negative advertising.
Conflating these concepts might explain the view that US voters are more likely to participate in
elections when they are upset with the current regime. Political parties and election campaigns motivate
electoral participation through divisive, combative politics. Ideally, democratic systems seek broad voter
participation from every segment of society. These governments are not content with simply winning
elections at any cost, but try to use elections as a vehicle for the public to express its will. In the decades
since Schattschneider, the literature has yielded productive insights, but has not really discovered how
democratic systems can motivate greater proportions of the population to participate voluntarily in the
electoral process. Perhaps this is because we have focused too much on how electoral institutions
influence voter participation and have neglected the influence of non-electoral institutions (i.e. judicial
systems, bureaucracies) on individual motivations to participate in the electoral process.
One of the most consistent findings to emerge from social psychology is the influence that
perceptions of institutional fairness have on individual political behavior (Thibaut and Walker 1975,
Lind and Tyler 1988, Doherty and Wolak 2011). Thus, the fairness of day-to-day government
operations inform people about the value that the system of government places on individuals within the
system. The interactions people have with the arbitrating institutions of government (courts, civil
service, and bureaucracy) deal with issues that are highly salient to those involved and occur relatively
frequently (Rohrschneider 2005). When people receive unfair treatment in their interactions with these
institutions either because of corruption or their lack of political clout, the message they receive is that
ordinary citizens do not count in their political systems. As such, we should expect lower electoral
participation in elections in such systems. Even if the government promised a free and fair electoral
process, those who think that their government is not committed to true equality would likely abstain,
rather than endorse such a system of government.
The remaining sections of this article develop the argument and present empirical evidence that
the day-to-day operations of government influence voter turnout. The first set of analyses utilizes a
national survey experiment to test the validity of the theoretical concept on the individual level. The
second set of analyses uses the third wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to test
the validity of the claim in a cross-section of 35 democracies. A final analysis replicates these results
with aggregate voter turnout data from these same countries. This article makes two contributions to the
literature. First, it demonstrates that fair governance has a direct influence on whether people vote. That
is, controlling for the institutional arrangements theorists argue motivate voter turnout, systems with fair
arbitrating institutions (courts, civil service, and bureaucracy) have higher levels of voter turnout than
systems without. Second, this article demonstrates the mechanism through which fair governance leads
to higher levels of voter turnout. Fair governance influences public perceptions of system fairness and
this in turn, motivates them to participate in elections.
Why People Vote
A vast literature explores the institutional arrangements that influence voter turnout. At the
aggregate level, compulsory voting (McAllister 1986, Franklin 1999, Norris 2004, Blais 2006, Blais
2007), electoral competition (Dalton, et al. 2011, Karp and Banducci 2011, Leighley and Nagler 2014),
and having proportional representation (Jackman 1987, Blais and Aarts 2006, Blais 2007) have strong
influences on voter turnout. People are more likely to vote in economically advanced democracies
(Powell 1982, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Fornos, et al. 2004, Blais 2007) and in more decisive,
competitive elections (Blais 1998, Blais 2000, Dalton, et al. 2011).
While aggregate studies inform us about institutional arrangements that can influence broad
levels of turnout, voting is ultimately an individual act, subject to a variety of individual-level influences
and motivations. For instance, some argue that voting is habitual. Those who develop the habit of voting
when they are young, tend to vote when they are older (Plutzer 2002). In addition, political campaigns
mobilize voters. People are more likely to vote when contacted by friends, family or members of a
political party who encourage them to vote (Lazarsfeld, et al. 1948, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980,
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba, et al. 1995, Dalton, et al. 2011). Finally, people are more likely to
vote when political parties offer policy distinct policy alternatives that are relevant to the voter (Leighley
and Nagler 2014). However, viewing voter mobilization from the perspective of political campaigns
may mask important individual motivations that promote electoral participation. Virtually every
political campaign attempts to win the election. Yet, it is unlikely that every voter expects that the vote
they cast will be decisive (Downs 1957, Aldrich 1993). People participate in elections for a variety of
reasons other than hoping to determine the outcome of the election (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, Plutzer
2002).
The integrity of the electoral process influences the probability of voting. Simpser (2012) argues
that rigging elections alters individual electoral participation. People who expect fraudulent elections
are less likely to vote (McCann and Domınguez 1998) and those who receive a bribe may become
disgusted with the system and choose to abstain from voting, contrary to their original intentions
(Simpser 2012). Birch (2010) sees electoral system fairness as an integral part of the rational choice
voting model. In this view, the probability of one’s vote being decisive is influenced by the perception
of that vote being counted properly. Perceptions that an election will not be fairly administered
diminishes the probability of voting by decreasing the “probability of a vote being decisive” calculus.
However this view of voting is substantially different from the central argument of this article, which is
that the procedural integrity of arbitrating institutions informs the public about the capacity of the entire
system to account for their interest. When arbitrating institutions are procedurally fair, contact with
these institutions heightens public evaluations of the government and motivates people to participate in
elections as an endorsement of the system.
Procedurally Fair Arbitrating Institutions
People tend to place higher value on political processes than outcomes (Thibaut and Walker
1975, Lind and Tyler 1988). Perceptions of procedural fairness have a strong influence on individual
support for political leaders (Tyler, et al. 1985), institutions (Tyler 1987, Tyler, et al. 1989, Tyler and
Huo 2002, Tyler 2006, Sondak and Tyler 2007, Gibson 2009, Doherty and Wolak 2011) and public
policy (Rasinski and Tyler 1988, Miles 2014). A prominent example of this is how perceptions of the
fairness of judicial processes influence support for court decisions (Thibaut and Walker 1975, Tyler
1987, Lind and Tyler 1988, Tyler and Huo 2002). Since the true guilt of a defendant is largely
unknowable, people use the fairness of the judicial process as a heuristic which determines their support
for the decision of the court (Tyler 1984, 1987).
This is why people support criminal justice decisions,
even when the decision is not in their favor (Thibaut and Walker 1975, Tyler 1984). Thus, the fairness
of procedures provides people important information about government priorities. The outcome is less
important than the information that government processes provide people about their relative value to
government officials. When one group of people is systematically disadvantaged by government
processes, they feel less valued by their government and become less supportive of the system (Hurwitz
and Peffley 2005, Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).
Democratic systems of government inform the public about their commitment to individual
equality through their judicial systems. Dahl (1989, p.188) argues that democratic systems may use the
judicial system to represent minorities that are otherwise ignored by the electoral system. By providing
an alternative avenue for people to express grievances and obtain redress from their government, a fair
judicial system articulates to the public that individual liberties are not selectively protected and
demonstrates commitment to preserving equal intrinsic worth in conflict resolution. The courts are the
primary vehicle for ensuring that a system provides the rule of law. A system that fails to treat
individuals equally under the law may send the message that some people are more valued by the system
of government than others, because individual liberties are protected selectively. In such a system, the
public may decide to abstain from electoral participation because they do not want to endorse this kind
of inequality.
Corruption has a negative influence on voter turnout. While some argue that corruption might
increase voter turnout when the public responds to the vote-buying mechanisms corruption is intended to
produce (Johnston 1983), substantial evidence documents the erosive influence corruption has on voter
turnout. Kostadinova (2009) argues that corruption diminishes voter participation in elections because it
erodes popular belief that citizens can influence political outcomes—a necessary component of civic
engagement. Corruption diminishes public trust in the institutions of government (Chang and Chu
2006), influences attitudes about how well the bureaucracy functions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003),
and reduces perceptions of system legitimacy (Seligson 2002), all of which might dampen voter
participation (Mishler and Rose 2005, Kostadinova 2009, Stockemer 2013).
However, corruption may have a different influence on voter participation. Beyond the erosive
effects discussed in the previous section, corruption sends the public a message about how much the
system of government values one individual relative to another. Particularly, when people are forced to
pay bribes to obtain public services that should be provided to everyone equally; corruption cheapens
the value of codified rights because these rights are protected based on one’s ability to purchase them
through a corrupt system (Warren 2004). A system that selectively protects individual liberties through
corrupt practices sends the message that the government places a premium on one’s ability to pay. Thus,
voter apathy comes not from a perception that people cannot change the system (Kostadinova 2009) but
because people think that the government does not care about them (Doppelt and Shearer 1999).
Finally, systems in which the implementation of law is influenced by external political pressure
may send the message that politically relevant individuals matter more than others. People expect civil
servants to be free to implement policies without undue political pressure (Anderson and Tverdova
2003). A system may be completely democratic in its selection of representatives and throughout the
policy-making process, but if the government fails to deliver the desired goods through fair policy
implementation, people may be less likely to endorse the system with a participatory vote.
The current literature places too much emphasis on election processes and outcomes and too
little on how procedurally fair governance influences the vote/abstain calculus. While the dominant
view leads us to assume that people vote when they think that their vote is decisive (Downs 1957,
Aldrich 1993) or influences the composition of government (Lijphart 1999), it is also likely that people
vote when the government sends the message that it values its citizenry (Doppelt and Shearer 1999).
Voting is only costly if one is concerned with the outcome of an election. Yet, political behavior and
institutional support derived through perceptions of procedural fairness are not outcome dependent.
Electoral participation is a means for public feedback about government performance that extends
beyond the policy platforms of political parties. Viewed from this perspective, voting is one means for
the public to express their consent to be governed, regardless of the electoral outcome. If so, the cost of
participating in elections is really dependent only on the relative cost of casting a vote compared to the
importance of endorsing one’s own system of government. Information costs are negligible, because the
government provides a steady stream of information about the relative value they place on their
constituents through their daily interactions via the arbitrating institutions of government. When
governments treat people fairly through equality in governance, the public receives the message that the
government cares about all its citizens. This, in turn motivates greater public participation in elections
as an endorsement of the existing regime.
The preceding discussion leads to two hypotheses examined in the next section. First, the
fairness of arbitrating institutions will have an indirect influence on voter participation. The degree to
which the courts, civil service and bureaucracy in a system treat people equally in their day-to-day
operations will influence individual perceptions of system fairness. Those who perceive the system to
be fair will be more likely to participate in elections, and those who think that it is unfair will be less
likely to vote (H1).
Second, the procedural fairness of the arbitrating institutions of government (courts, civil service,
and bureaucracy) will have a direct influence on voter turnout in the system. All things being equal,
people in systems with procedurally fair arbitrating institutions should be more likely to vote (H2).
Methods and Results
These hypotheses are tested via two survey instruments and replicated with aggregate voter
turnout data. Ultimately we want to know how the psychological mechanisms operate on the individual
level and then measure the strength of the relationship in a variety of institutional contexts. The first
experiment is embedded in a national survey of US adults to maximize both the internal and externally
validity of the concept. The second set of analyses utilizes the third wave of the Comparative Study of
Electoral Systems (CSES) which contains nationally representative surveys from 35 advanced
democracies.
Demonstrating a statistical association between the procedural fairness of the arbitrating
institutions in a system of government and the probability of voting in that system would provide
suggestive evidence of the theoretical model. To strengthen the quality of the evidence and deal with
endogeneity concerns, I utilize an experimental approach which manipulates the features of the macrolevel variable to show how changes in the procedural fairness of the arbitrating institutions cause people
to alter their intentions to vote. Ostensibly, the survey experiment could be conducted in any advanced
democracy because the psychological mechanisms are not context dependent; this survey is conducted
in the United States. While the United States is a poor approximation for the ideal in some regards, it is
ideal in others. On the one hand, the US system has comparatively low voter turnout, relatively frequent
local, state and national elections, and a strong separation of powers which could introduce contextdependent bias into the results. Respondents in the United States may view elections differently than
those in other countries.
However, the same is true of any country which might be used as a test case. Respondents in
any country might reflect the cultural bias of their particular system. Yet, because there is no reason to
assume a priori that cultural bias influences the relationship between perceptions of fairness and
electoral participation, the US is an ideal test case for the following reasons: First, respondents in the
United States are comfortable with participating in internet surveys. A vast literature of internet survey
protocols has been developed for the US context and is rigidly followed in this experiment. Second, the
separation of powers combined with a non-voting political culture makes the US context a “hard case”
for the hypothesis. Separation of powers makes it difficult for the public to assign the proper credit or
blame for government performance. A nonvoting political culture makes it less likely that respondents
will view elections as the ideal way to express displeasure with government performance. If the
experiment were to take place in a system where the civil service, bureaucracy or courts were more
closely aligned with elected officials (as they are in most advanced democracies) one could argue that
the findings simply reflect a public using elections to influence the composition of courts, bureaucracies
or the civil service. However, the United States lacks a logical connection between the arbitrating
institutions of government and the electoral process. As such, demonstrating the psychological
connection between fairly functioning arbitrating institutions and electoral participation in the United
States suggests that the findings are not conflating perceptions of fairness and something else related to
elections.
A nonprobability sample of 1,391 subjects was recruited by Clear Voice Research to participate
in a study about governance. Of these, 23% were Republicans and 35% were Democrats. The study
was fielded from June 11-June 18, 2012. The sample appears to resemble the US population in most
respects, including age, gender, income and political interest.2
Respondents were presented with
vignettes describing a hypothetical society. To minimize the influence of individual demographics on
the system evaluations, respondents were instructed to imagine themselves as an outside observer and to
2
Descriptive statistics are in the online methodological appendix.
evaluate the society as a whole without regard to their personal interests (Mitchell, et al. 1993, Mutz
2011).
[Table 1 Here]
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the vignette conditions.3 In each vignette, the
system has a strong economy, electoral freedoms, and women and minorities that do not complain about
how they are treated by their government. In the procedurally fair condition, the bureaucracy is efficient
and attempts to limit bribery, the courts are unbiased, and corrupt public officials are swiftly and
publicly brought to justice. In the partial treatment group (bureaucracy), respondents are informed that
“government services are inefficient and individuals frequently provide a small bribe to government
employees to expedite the process,” and that “government employees often complain that politicians put
pressure on them to implement policy in a way that will help the politician score political points.” These
two statements reflect the essence of the argument that corrupt systems and systems with inefficient
bureaucracies treat individuals differently based on their ability to use monetary or political currency to
purchase services.
The full treatment condition (bureaucracy plus courts) is designed to incorporate both the
theoretical argument of this article and the empirical measures found in the worldwide government
indicators that are used in the cross-national analysis. In the full treatment condition, respondents read a
vignette that is identical to the partial treatment vignette except for a change in the language regarding
the court system. Instead of reading that “the court system is free from racial or economic bias and even
the most minor cases receive adequate attention from the judicial process.”, respondents read that “The
court system in Green does a poor job of protecting private property, and often it seems that the wealthy
3
Group balance information is in the methodological appendix.
are able to purchase acquittals because their expensive attorneys have the contacts and skills necessary
to get evidence declared inadmissible.” Previous research demonstrates the importance of procedural
fairness in public evaluations of the court system (Lind and Tyler 1988, Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).
However, prior research focuses on court outcomes unrelated to private property. The measure of court
efficacy used here focuses on the degree to which courts protect private property and socioeconomic
equality under the law. This treatment condition is theoretically consistent with a system devoid of
fairly functioning arbitrating institutions and is empirically equivalent to the cross-national measure of
procedurally fair arbitrating institutions, used in the next section.
After reading the vignette, respondents indicated the degree to which they thought the electoral
system, government services, government officials and the justice system treated all people fairly and
equally. They were also asked if the courts can be trusted to give a fair trial in the system (all measured
on a 7-point scale with higher scores indicating increased support). These scores were then combined
into an index that measures individual evaluations of system fairness (Cronbach’s alpha=0.957). After
evaluating the fairness of the hypothetical society, respondents were asked to evaluate how
democratically the society was being governed (measured on a 10-point scale with 10 meaning
completely democratic), and finally respondents indicated how likely they would be to vote in Society
Green (0:never, 10:every election). Since I am dealing with a hypothetical system, I measure intended
frequency of voter participation rather than actual voting behavior.
[Figure 1 Here]
Figure 1 displays how the experiment influenced perceptions of system fairness in the
hypothetical society.
Those in the control condition reported significantly higher levels of perceived
system fairness than those in the partial or full treatment groups (F=322.2, df=2). This suggests that
corruption, unfair bureaucracies and an unfair justice system erode individual evaluations of system
fairness. We know that corruption, poorly functioning bureaucracies, and unfair judicial processes erode
public trust and government legitimacy (Anderson 2003, Tyler 1987, Seligson 2002), but the findings
here suggest that they also influence public perceptions of how fairly the system functions. Do
perceptions of system fairness influence the likelihood of a person voting? This is tested with a simple
OLS regression model that includes controls for the treatment group and perceptions of system fairness
as a predictor of intended voting frequency in Green. The findings are displayed in Table 2.
[Table 2 Here]
Table 2 models the direct effect of system fairness evaluations on hypothetical voting behavior.
The first two independent variables compare the probability of voting by experimental condition,
relative to the baseline (control) condition. On average, those in the partial treatment group reported
significantly lower levels of intended voting frequency than those in the control, while those in the full
treatment group were statistically indistinguishable from the control group. This is mildly unexpected,
yet not wholly inconsistent with our theoretical model, since the experimental groups are designed to
manipulate perceptions of fairness and not to replicate any particular society. Consistent with the
theoretical model, the findings in Table 2 show that higher evaluations of system fairness are associated
with higher levels of voter turnout (t=8.65). In addition, the substantive influence of perceptions of
fairness on reported voting intentions is quite large. The perceptions of fairness scale is coded from 0 to
1, which makes the interpretation of the results in Table 2 straightforward. All things being equal, a
respondent at the maximum of the procedural fairness perceptions scale is predicted to placed
themselves at 9.32 on the ten-point probability of voting scale. Conversely, a respondent at the
minimum on the perception scale is predicted to place themselves at 5.64 on the ten-point probability of
voting scale. Those who think that the process is fair say that they are 65.24% more likely to vote than
those who do not. As public evaluations of system fairness increase, so does reported intentions to vote
in the hypothetical system (H1).
The experimental nature of these findings suggests a causal relationship between the degree to
which arbitrating institutions are procedurally fair and intended voting frequency. When systems of
government treat people fairly, it heightens public evaluations of system fairness which in turn
motivates people to participate in the electoral process. This empirical support for the theoretical model
suggests that for some, electoral participation depends on processes external to the election campaigns.
This implies that voting is not solely an opportunity to select new leaders, rather electoral participation
seems to involve an endorsement of the existing regime. When the arbitrating institutions of
government function fairly, people are more likely to participate in elections as an endorsement of the
system.
Cross-National Voting Patterns
One weakness of experimental research is that participants’ attitudes and reported behaviors may
be different than in the world that exists outside of the controlled environment. Experimental evidence
suggests that the degree to which the arbitrating institutions of government (courts, bureaucracy, and
civil service) govern fairly influences individuals’ reported likelihood of participating in elections in a
hypothetical system. However, if we were to move beyond the controlled experimental environment,
would we see the same pattern? To further scrutinize the hypotheses’ external validity, they are tested
using a cross-national dataset comprised of nationally representative surveys from 35 advanced
democracies. Wave 3 of the CSES asked respondents if they had voted in the most recent national
election. Though it is common for respondents to over-report voting behavior, previous analyses
utilizing this dataset have shown the responses to be similar to the actual turnout numbers in the CSES
countries (Dalton, et al. 2011). One advantage of this particular set of data is the inclusion of system
level variables that can be used to measure the influence of a particular institutional arrangement on
individual responses (McAllister 1986, Jackman 1987, Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Blais and
Massicotte 2002, Blais and Aarts 2006). Though aggregate data studies may have a slightly more
accurate measure of actual voter turnout levels, they cannot measure the relationship between a
particular set of institutions on individual attitudes (Hox 1998, 2002, Snijders and Bosker 2011). For this
reason, I analyze data contained in wave 3 of the CSES using a hierarchical logistic regression model
with system level variables as predictors of individual responses.
The measurement model that tests the hypotheses includes controls for the standard
demographics that are known to influence voter turnout: age, gender, education, marital status and
partisanship (Strate, et al. 1989, Leighley and Nagler 1992, Verba, et al. 1993, Schlozman, et al. 1995,
Stoker and Jennings 1995). In addition, the model controls for national-level institutional characteristics
known to influence voter-turnout. Many studies find higher levels of voter turnout in economically
advanced societies (Powell 1982, Norris 2002, Fornos, et al. 2004), however in older democracies this
amounts to a difference between poor and wealthy countries (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). For this
reason, I use the level of socioeconomic development in a system (HDI) as a control variable at the
country level. Those in more established democracies are more inclined to vote, as are those in
consensus model democracies (Grofman and Lijphart 1986, Lijphart 1999, Powell Jr 2000). These two
concepts are measured with variables that indicate the length and quality of democracy. In addition,
systems with greater party choice (Dalton, et al. 2011), compulsory voting, and electoral competition
have been shown to have higher levels of voter turnout, and the model controls for these. The nationallevel variable of primary interest is the degree to which the arbitrating institutions (courts, bureaucracy,
and civil service) govern fairly. All things being equal, systems with more fair arbitrating institutions
are expected to have higher levels of voter turnout (H2).
The fairness of arbitrating institutions is measured using data from the worldwide governance
index (WGI) compiled by the World Bank, which includes measures for the rule of law, the control of
corruption, and government effectiveness of the institutions in a country. The WGI compiles data from
31 expert and public opinion surveys funded by the public and private sector to create aggregate measures
for each country. As such, the WGI scores reflect the biases of those asked to evaluate the systems of
government. While some argue that perceptions of national conditions do not objectively measure the
institutional arrangements in society, the WGI measures have been validated and utilized in nearly a
thousand scholarly articles.4 Although it is possible that the results are simply reflecting some broad
correlation of perceptions in the aggregate with perceptions in a particular sample, the findings are
replicated using aggregate turnout data (not a survey) with the same results.
The rule of law indictor measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police and the courts
and the likelihood of crime and violence. The control of corruption indicator captures perceptions of the
extent to which public power is used for private gains. This indicator includes both petty and grand forms
of corruption. The government effectiveness indicator measures perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure, the
quality of policy formation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
such policies (Kaufmann et al 2011). Consistent with (Rohrshneider 2005) these are combined into a
single, reliable measure (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96) which is used to estimate the direct effect of
procedurally fair governance on individual vote intentions.
4
Measured by the number of citations to the Kaufman article in google scholar
Since Wald tests are not always reliable tests of statistical significance in multilevel models
(Preacher, et al. 2006, Preacher, et al. 2007), the data analyses include a likelihood ratio test of model fit
as national-level variables are introduced. Each additional indicator increases the degrees of freedom by
one and the difference in likelihood ratio is chi-square distributed. Statistically significant changes in
the likelihood ratio test suggest that the new model is a superior fit to the previous model and that the
new national-level variable significantly improves the model (Hox 2002, Snijders and Bosker 2011).
Table 3 displays the estimates of the multilevel logistic regression model. Each column displays the
model as additional national-level variables are added.
[Table 3 Here]
The first column displays the estimates from the individual-level model, which includes a random
intercept for each country and compulsory voting as the only national-level predictor of voter turnout.
Consistent with previous research, the control variables are statistically significant and in the expected
direction. In addition, there is a significant, strong relationship between the strength of compulsory voting
enforcement and voter turnout. As we might expect, those who live in systems which strongly enforce
compulsory voting laws are significantly more likely to vote.
How do other national conditions influence voter turnout? The second model in Table 3
introduces the remaining national-level control variables into the model as predictors. Though the
decrease in log-likelihood suggests that this model fits the data better than the previous model, none of
the new national-level control variables achieve statistical significance. The individual-level controls
remain significant predictors of voter turnout and the direction of the coefficients are consistent with
those in the previous model and theoretical expectations. However, systems in which the arbitrating
institutions (courts, bureaucracy and civil service) govern fairly (control corruption, provide the rule of
law) are associated with higher levels of voter turnout (model 3). The chi-square test of the likelihood
ratio for the model in column 3 is significant at the p<0.05 level in a two-tail test as is the Wald test for
the coefficient, which indicates a direct, positive relationship between fairness in governance and voter
turnout. Compulsory voting is the only national-level predictor that has a stronger statistical association
with voter turnout than the fairness of arbitrating institutions.
Finally, I tested the hypothesis using aggregate voter turnout data, rather than reported data from
the CSES dataset. The last column in Table 3 uses aggregate voter turnout data from the 35 CSES
countries with the same national-level variables used in the previous analyses. Once again, the only
national-level variables that are significantly associated with higher levels of voter participation are
compulsory voting and the procedural fairness of arbitrating institutions. Additional analyses5 removed
the independent variable of interest from the model to look at how much procedurally fair arbitrating
institutions contribute to the explanatory power of the model. The model based on the dominant view of
voter turnout has an r-square of 0.49, compared to the model presented in Table 3 (r-square 0.64). This
pattern of findings suggests that people in systems that govern fairly are more likely to vote (H2).
Another approach is to look at how much procedural fairness influences voter turnout from the
individual (not system) perspective. How large is the group of voters that does not participate because
the system is unfair. One way to estimate this is to look at the model predicted change in voter turnout
in countries with multiple elections in the dataset and estimate the change in turnout that is explained
solely by procedurally fair arbitrating institutions from one election to the next. In the model using
aggregate data (Table 3, column 4) a one unit increase in procedurally fair arbitrating institutions
predicts a 5% increase in voter turnout. This means that a 0.2 change in the procedural fairness scale
accounts for a one percent change in voter turnout, all things being equal. According to the raw data,
5
Available in the methodological appendix
voter turnout in the 2006 presidential election in Mexico was 14 points higher than the 2009
parliamentary elections. Much of the change in voter turnout is explained by the difference between
presidential and parliamentary elections. Yet, in 2009 the arbitrating institutions in Mexico were 0.173
lower on the procedural fairness scale than in 2006. This change accounted for a 0.086 decrease in
overall voter turnout. In other words, had the arbitrating institutions in Mexico remained at their 2006
fairness levels, the model predicts an additional 666,260 voters in the 2009 parliamentary elections.
Brazil had two presidential races in the dataset. The actual difference in voter turnout in 2010
was 5 points lower than in 2006. Some of that is explained by the particulars of each election.
However, the arbitrating institutions in Brazil became 0.439 more fair in 2010 than they were in 2006.
As a result, more people participated in the 2010 elections than would have been expected otherwise.
The model predicts an additional two percent of voters participated in the 2010 elections because the
arbitrating institutions were more fair. Though fewer participated than in 2006, roughly 3 million voters
participated in the 2010 Brazilian presidential elections that would have stayed home otherwise.
[Figure 2 Here]
Figure 2 plots the probability of voting by the objective level of system fairness. The CSES
sample contains few countries with arbitrating institutions with fairness scores below zero. Yet, in those
countries, people are much less likely to vote than in countries with more fair arbitrating institutions.
The median level of arbitrating institution fairness in this sample is 3.979 (Japan, 2007). The predicted
probability of a person voting in such a system is more than 0.85. A one standard deviation change in
arbitrating institution fairness (2.33) changes the probability of a person voting by plus or minus .13; a
change of more than 15%. If I explore the data by country, Australia (compulsory voting) clearly is an
exception to the model predicted trend, as are Uruguay, Thailand and Brazil. Yet, the model-based
predictions are consistent with the theoretical framework advanced in this article. The more fairly the
arbitrating institutions in a system function, the more likely people are to vote (H2).
It is noteworthy that the only system level variable to achieve statistical significance in the crossnational model is the variable hypothesized to be statistically significant in this article. This might cause
some to assume that the findings are spurious and inconsistent with the existing literature. However, the
findings reported in Table 3 are consistent with the current literature and other research that is based on
these data (Dalton et al. 2011). In addition, much of the literature that expects length of democracy,
socioeconomic development or quality of democracy to influence voter turnout is based on aggregatelevel measures and this relationship has yet to be established as a predictor of individual voting
behavior.
Ideally, the CSES dataset would include individual-level measures that precisely mirrored the
national survey experiment. Some individual-level predictors in the CSES data approximate perceptions
of system fairness, but are conceptually distinct. For instance, the CSES data contain retrospective
evaluations of system performance as well as two political efficacy items. Various models 6 utilizing
these individual-level predictors were fit and the results are consistent with the theoretical model
advanced in this article. However, retrospective evaluations of system performance and political
efficacy are conceptually distinct and including these measures in the analyses might be confusing.
After all, perceptions of fairness in governance (from the experiment) are not the same as perceptions of
how well a system has functioned over the last few years (CSES). While recognizing that the various
measures of individual evaluations are conceptually distinct, the pattern of findings presented suggests
that the theoretical mechanism advanced in this article influences the vote decision calculus. When the
6
Available in the methodological appendix
arbitrating institutions of government are procedurally fair, the public has higher regard for system
performance and this motivates greater voter participation as an endorsement of the system.
Conclusion
This article advances a new perspective on voting behavior. The cost of voting is not the
obstacle supposed by the dominant view. If a particular voter is not concerned with the outcome of an
election, the benefits one obtains from voting may be enough to outweigh the cost. While the cost of
information may be significant if one cares about picking the right leaders, they would be minimal to a
person who voting as an endorsement of the system. Finally, with early voting, online registration,
motor vehicle registration and the like; advanced democracies have made it much easier to vote. It
would seem that in modern democracies the act of voting is not as costly or irrational as the dominant
view implies.
This article presents substantial empirical evidence that non-electoral institutions strongly
influence electoral participation. First, in a national sample of US adults, perceptions of procedural
fairness is significantly associated with reported levels of voting behavior in a hypothetical system.
Those who perceived the hypothetical system to be fair were 65% more likely to vote than those who
did not. In addition, in a broad cross-section of 35 advanced democracies the fairness of the arbitrating
institutions has a direct influence on voter turnout. Directly, systems with fair governance have higher
levels of reported voting, which is consistent with the results of aggregate voter turnout analysis. All
things being equal, a one unit increase in procedurally fair governance predicts a more than 5% increase
in voter turnout in a system. This model of voter turnout accounts for variance unexplained by the
dominant view. Controlling for most of the institutional arrangements known to influence voter turnout
as well as the important demographic variables, this theoretical model is a significant improvement.
This pattern of findings has implications for the study of individual political behavior and
institutional future institutional analyses. For some, voting is tacit political system endorsement—an act
which signifies consent to be governed. When these people feel valued by their system of government,
they are more likely to vote. For these individuals, voting is not motivated by a desire to influence the
outcomes of elections, nor by a sense of civic duty; rather, voting expresses validation of the system.
Institutionally, voter participation does not exclusively depend on electoral systems. The
procedural fairness of the courts, civil service and bureaucracy have electoral consequences. Systems of
government that function fairly send the message that equality and freedom are more than slogans, but
are manifest in everyday government operations. This informs the public that each member of society is
valued equally, and can motivate greater public participation in elections. Systems of government that
aspire to Schattschneider’s (1960) ideal of full democratic participation should recognize the importance
of these non-electoral institutions on voter participation.
Future work should incorporate procedural fairness in their analyses of voter turnout.
Unfortunately, the analyses presented here focus exclusively on national elections. Participation in
national elections is likely motivated by different mechanisms than that which motivates participation in
local elections where an individual vote has a higher probability of making a difference. Future work
might also consider how the procedural fairness of local institutions influences participation in local
elections.
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Author Biography
Matthew R. Miles is a professor of political science at Brigham Young University, Idaho. His research
describing the relationship between the President and the public has appeared in The International
Journal of Press/Politics, Presidential Studies Quarterly, The Social Science Journal, The Journal of
Political Science, and some edited volumes.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Russell Dalton, Robert Rohrschneider, Mark Josyln, Sandra Schofield, Becky
Whitley, three anonymous referees and the editors of Political Research Quarterly for helpful comments
and suggestions.
Table 1: Vignettes for Experiments
Procedurally Fair
Green is a self-governing
society with free and fair
elections. The people of Green
come from a variety of racial
and ethnic backgrounds. Green
is consistently praised for its
record protecting individual
liberties and civil rights.
Women earn equal pay relative
to their male counterparts and
the people of Green rarely
Corruption and Unfair
Bureaucracy
Green is a self-governing
society with free and fair
elections. The people of
Green come from a variety
of racial and ethnic
backgrounds. Green is
consistently praised for its
record protecting individual
liberties and civil rights.
Women earn equal pay
relative to their male
Corrupt with Unfair
Courts/Bureaucracy
Green is a self-governing
society with free and fair
elections. The people of Green
come from a variety of racial
and ethnic backgrounds.
Green is consistently praised
for its record protecting
individual liberties and civil
rights. Women earn equal pay
relative to their male
counterparts and the people of
complain about racial
inequality. Government
services are efficient and those
that attempt to bribe officials
are swiftly brought to justice.
Government officials in Green
display no tolerance for
corruption of any kind; in fact,
the news media are allowed
considerable access to
investigate corruption with
vigilance. Government officials
convicted of corruption lose
their position in society, go to
jail, and are required to return
gifts/money received. The court
system in Green is free from
racial or economic bias and
even the most minor cases
receive adequate attention from
the judicial process. Green has
one of the world’s strongest
economies with a consistently
low rate of unemployment.
counterparts and the people
of Green rarely complain
about racial inequality.
Government services are
inefficient and individuals
frequently provide a small
bribe to Government
employees to expedite the
process. Government
officials in Green
occasionally go to
considerable lengths to hide
their misdeeds from the
public news media.
Government employees often
complain that politicians put
pressure on them to
implement policy in a way
that will help them win an
election. The court system
in Green is free from racial
or economic bias and even
the most minor cases receive
adequate attention from the
judicial process. Green has
one of the world’s strongest
economies with a
consistently low rate of
unemployment.
Green rarely complain about
racial inequality. Government
services are inefficient and
individuals frequently provide
a small bribe to Government
employees to expedite the
process. Government officials
in Green occasionally go to
considerable lengths to hide
their misdeeds from the public
news media. Government
employees often complain that
politicians put pressure on
them to implement policy in a
way that will help them win an
election. The court system in
Green convicts racial
minorities and poor people at
a higher statistical rate, and
often it seems that the wealthy
are able to purchase
acquittals because their
expensive attorneys have the
contacts and skills necessary
to get evidence declared
inadmissible. Green has one
of the world’s strongest
economies with a consistently
low rate of unemployment.
Figure 1: Perceptions of Hypothetical System Fairness by Treatment Condition
Source: Author's Data.
Note: Solid black line indicates the median response in each group. Perceptions of system fairness is scaled 0-1
to reduce the size of the estimates in subsequent analyses. Procedurally fair group represents the control
condition.
Table 2: Reported Voter Turnout in a Hypothetical System
(1)
Intercept
0.565***
(0.037)
-0.045*
(0.016)
-0.034
(0.028)
0.368***
(0.043)
0.13
998
Partial Treatment
Full Treatment
Perceived System Fairness
R-square
Observations
Source: Author’s data
Note: Entries are regression coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares models estimated in R 2.15. The
variables are scaled 0-1 to reduce the size of the estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two tail test.
Table 3: Voter Turnout in 35 Advanced Democracies
Individual Level
Constant
Age
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.355**
(0.145)
0.001***
-0.592
(2.858)
0.001***
3.759
(3.203)
0.001***
51.805
(47.405)
Gender(Male Baseline)
Education
Marital Status
Partisanship
Country Level
Compulsory Voting
Quality of Democracy
Length of Democracy
Number of Parties
Electoral Fairness
Socioeconomic Development (HDI)
Electoral Competitiveness
Procedural Fairness of
Arbitrating Institutions
(0.000)
-0.058**
(0.024)
0.082***
(0.006)
0.569***
(0.024)
1.176***
(0.026)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.073*** -0.073***
(0.024)
(0.024)
0.083*** 0.083***
(0.007)
(0.007)
0.573*** 0.574***
(0.024)
(0.024)
1.200*** 1.199***
(0.026)
(0.026)
0.675***
(0.152)
0.741***
(0.176)
-0.096
(0.221)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.274
(0.769)
1.127
(2.772)
-0.053
(0.114)
0.702*** 10.546***
(0.163)
(1.707)
-0.059
1.774
(0.204)
(2.389)
-0.000
-0.088
(0.001)
(0.098)
0.000
0.140*
(0.008)
(0.069)
0.433
3.303
(0.710)
(3.136)
-5.567
-6.828
(3.787)
(57.666)
-0.006
-0.397
(0.106)
(0.972)
0.264** 5.072***
(0.109)
(1.455)
Likelihood Ratio chi-square
2392.8*** 5.48**
Individuals (n)
53,884
53,884
53,884
Countries (N)
35
35
35
35
R-squared
0.64
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Wave 3.
Note: Entries are estimates from a multilevel logistic regression model estimated using xtmelogit in
Stata 12. Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 two-tail test. Column 4 entries
are estimates from an OLS regression model using aggregated voter turnout data for the CSES 3
countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 2: Predicted Voter Turnout by Fairness of Arbitrating Institutions
Note: Simple Slopes estimated using the Effects package in R 2.15. Solid black line is the estimate, dotted lines
represent a 95% confidence interval.