FE431: PUBLIC FINANCE Fall 2012 Professor Schmitt Homework 2 – due 18 September 1. (30 points) The supply of flu shots is described by the following equation: QS = 4P, where QS is quantity supplied per day and P is the price per shot. The demand is described by QD = 500 – P, where QD is shot demanded per day. Because of the external benefits to society associated with flu shots, there is a marginal external benefit of $25 are associated with each flu shot. a) (10 points) Assuming that flu shots are sold in a competitive market, show this situation graphically. Be sure to properly label your graph and indicate if this market is efficient or inefficient. If it is inefficient, clearly show the deadweight loss. P 525 MSC = MPC + 0(MEC) 500 A DWL Pproducer =105B PC=100 Pconsumer C D = 80 E MSB = MPB + MEB F MPB QC = 400 Qefficient = 420 b) (5 points) Assuming that flu shots are sold in a perfectly competitive market, what is the market price per day? How many flu shots will be produced per day at that price? QS = QD = 500 – 1P = 4P 500 = 5 P or P = 500/5 = $100 per day Plug P into either QS or QD 500 – 5*100 = 4*100 = 400 = QC c) (5 points) What is the efficient annual output of flu shots? How can this level of output be achieved? Taking the positive externality into account – MSB = MPB + MEB but in order to calculate this, you cannot merely add to the MEB, you need to rearrange your QD equation QD = 500 – P now becomes P = 500 – QD Adding the MEB to this yields, P = 500 – QD + 25 which can be rearranged to give you QD = 525 – P Re-equate this to MSC 525 – P = 4P 525 = 5P Or P = 525/5 = $105 a day (although this is not the “real price” this price would give the efficient quantity, but note that consumers would not get to the efficient output if prices were $105). This yields an efficient output of Qefficient = 420 QS = 4*P = 4*105, or QD = 525 – P = 525 – 105 = 420 Again, consumers wouldn’t purchase 420 units at $105 (need to look at MPB), at $105, they’d only buy MPB = QD = 500 – 105 = 395, so the government may need to subsidize – they’d set subsidy = MEB = $25. It is reasonable to assume that Coase Theorem would not hold as the bargainers would have difficulty identifying themselves, there are a large number of bargainers, information may not be known, and zero transactions costs probably isn’t a good assumption. d) (10 points) What was the inefficiency associated with the inefficient level of output? (Recall that the area of a triangle is ½ b*h.) Shade it on your graph. The area above ACD – to calculate, we need to figure out what the price at A is: To do that, you need to see what is the price at the MSB = 525 – P = 400, or P = 125. Now, just use the ½ bh: ½ b*h = ½ (420 – 400)*(125-100) = ½ * 20 * 25 = 250, Therefore the total DWL is 250 the area ACD in the graph. 2. (10 points) Warrenia has two regions. In Oliviland, the marginal benefit associated with pollution cleanup is MB = 300 – 10Q, while in Linneland, the marginal benefit associated with pollution cleanup is MB = 200 – 4Q. Suppose that the marginal cost of cleanup is constant at $12 per unit. What is the optimal level of pollution cleanup in each of the two regions? The optimal level of cleanup will occur when the marginal benefit just equals the marginal cost. In Oliviland, the marginal benefit is 300 – 10Q; marginal cost is 12. Therefore, the equation to solve for Oliviland is 300 – 10Q = 12, or 288 = 10Q. The optimal level in Oliviland is 4 equal to 28.8. For Linneland, the marginal benefit is 200 – 4Q. Setting the benefit equal to 12 yields 200 – 4Q = 12, or 188 = 4Q. The optimal level in Linneland is equal to 47. 3. (10 points) In which way could smoking exert a positive externality on others? The reduction in expected lifetimes can deliver a positive externality. If smokers tend to die soon after their retirement, they will collect less in Social Security payments, leaving more money for nonsmokers. In addition, if smokers pay into group retirement plans that do not differentiate smoking behavior, then their reduced time of withdrawal from the plans will subsidize the longer-lived nonsmokers. 4. (10 points) Caffeine is a highly addictive drug found in coffee, tea, and some sodas. Unlike cigarettes, however, there have been very few calls to tax it, to regulate its consumption, or limit its use in public places. Why the difference? Can you think of any economic arguments for regulating (or taxing) it’s use? Unlike cigarettes, caffeine does not cause any obvious externalities (e.g., secondhand smoke). If we believe Becker and Murphy’s rational addiction model, then addictiveness does not provide a motivation for regulating a good—only externalities do. On the other hand, if people have self-control problems, then “internalities” could potentially provide a motivation for taxing or otherwise regulating caffeine. This is particularly true for children, who tend to be short-sighted and may not fully appreciate the long-term consequences of caffeine addiction. This might be a reason to regulate sales of sodas containing caffeine in schools, for example. 5. (40 points) Use the following graph for the production of good X: P MSC MC DWL 30= MD 120 60 100 Quantity a) (10 points) Using the graph above, assume that the production of good X generates pollution. Assume that the environmental damage is $30 per unit of good X and that the socially optimal output of X is 60. Add these numbers to the graph above. b) (20 points) Assume there is no policy to correct for the environmental damage: For the 100th unit of good X; what is the MB to consumer? The marginal private cost? The marginal social cost? The marginal net loss to society? The net loss to society (deadweight loss) – shade this area on the given graph? MB to consumer = $120 MPC = $120 MSC = $150 MD (marginal net loss) = $30 Net loss = $600 [(1/2)($30)(40)=$600] c) (10 points) What tax would achieve the social optimum? And what (and in which direction) are the curves in the given graph changed with a tax? What happens to market price and quantity? T = MD = $30 S shifts up, Price of X increases, quantity of X decreases.