How to avoid the epistemic error theory: An alternative to
epistemic instrumentalism
Abstract
According to metaethical error theorists, there is no place in a plausible
ontology for norms with inescapable and mind-independent authority.
Their claim is that if a normative domain postulates the existence of
such norms, then it is fundamentally mistaken. According to the
epistemic error theory, epistemic normativity is such a domain. One
popular way of avoiding the epistemic error theory is to adopt epistemic
instrumentalism. According to instrumentalists, epistemic norms only
have authority on agents who have the end of believing the true and not
believing the false. I argue that epistemic instrumentalism fails because
it cannot do justice to our concept of an epistemic norm. However, I
also claim that its failure does not mean that epistemic norms have
mind-independent and inescapable authority. As I argue, there is an
alternative account of epistemic normativity, epistemic constitutivism,
which promises to deliver the advantages of epistemic instrumentalism
without its problems. According to constitutivists, epistemic
normativity is ultimately grounded in the fact that belief has a
constitutive aim. Unlike instrumentalism, this view has all the resources
to do justice to our concept of an epistemic norm. Hence, I conclude
that it provides a more promising way of avoiding the epistemic error
theory.
1. Introduction: the threat of epistemic error theory
Most metaethical error theorists do not want to treat every species of
normative thought and discourse as fundamentally mistaken. 1 They only
target those involving norms that purport to have a particular kind of
authority or reason-giving force. According to Olson, for instance, we must
distinguish between ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ norms2:
[Transcendent norms] apply to agents categorically; their reason-giving force
transcends agents’ desires, ends, activities, or institutions. Immanent norms, by
contrast, are those whose reason-giving force depends on agents’ desires or ends,
their engagement in certain rule-governed activities, or their occupation of certain
roles; the reason-giving force of immanent norms does not transcend desires or ends,
or rule-governed activities or roles, which is why immanent norms imply only noncategorical reasons. […] while immanent norms determine correct behaviour
according to what is required to satisfy agents’ desires or promote their ends, or
according to rules or institutional standards, it does not follow that there are
categorical reasons to comply with these norms. For transcendent norms, it does
follow that there are categorical reasons to comply with them. (Olson 2011a, 80)
One notable exception is Streumer (2013). See also Bedke (2010) for the argument if the
moral error theory is true, then so is the error theory about all of normativity.
2 See Olson (2011a), (2011b). Although they use different terms, other error theorists make
roughly the same distinction; cf. Mackie (1977), Garner (1990), (1994), Joyce (2001), and
Phillips (2010). I use Olson’s terminology in what follows because he is one of the few who
explicitly defends the epistemic error theory.
1
1
Transcendent norms are those that have inescapable and mind-independent
reason-giving force while immanent norms only have mind-dependent and, in
some cases, escapable reason-giving force. While error theorists see no
problem with immanent norms, they claim that transcendent norms have no
place in a plausible naturalistic ontology.3 As Olson puts it:
Error theorists object to the existence of transcendent norms and categorical reasons.
It is metaphysically puzzling how there can be norms that imply categorical reasons
for agents to behave in certain ways irrespective of their desires, ends, roles, or
activities. Error theorists do not object to the existence of immanent norms and noncategorical reasons, however. There is nothing metaphysically queer about the fact
that there is (conclusive) non-categorical reason for chess players not to move the
rook diagonally, since this is just the fact that moving the rook diagonally is incorrect
according to the rules of chess. (Olson 2011a, 81)
If this is right, then any normative domain that would postulate the existence
of such norm would be systematically mistaken. It would entail, in other
words, that the norms of that domain do not exist.
Error theorists typically claim that transcendence is particular to moral
norms and therefore that morality is the only species of normativity that is
mistaken in that way. However, both friends and foes of the error theory have
recently disputed that claim and argued that at least one other normative
domain is characterised by transcendent norms: epistemic normativity. 4
According to them, our concept of an epistemic norm is also that of a
transcendent norm.
This paper examines that last claim. If it is correct, then the epistemic
error theory looms. In other words, if it is true that there can be no such thing
as a transcendent norm, and if epistemic norms are transcendent, then we
open the door for the following argument against the existence of epistemic
norms:
1. Normative epistemic claims (e.g., ‘S epistemically ought to believe that
P’, ‘S has an epistemic reason to believe that P’, ‘S is epistemically
reasonable in believing that P’) postulate the existence of (epistemic)
transcendent norms.
2. There are no transcendent norms.
3. There are no epistemic norms and none of our normative epistemic
claims are true (the epistemic error theory is true). 5
Cf. Mackie (1977), Garner (1990), (1994), Ruse (1995), Joyce (2001), and Olson (2011a),
(2011b), (2014).
4 On the realist side, Terence Cuneo (2007) uses this claim to mount a ‘partners in innocence’
strategy against the moral error theory (and moral anti-realism more generally). His
argument is roughly that since epistemic norms are transcendent just like moral ones, then
the moral error theory entails the epistemic error theory and vice-versa. But since the
epistemic error theory is false, it follows that the moral error theory is false as well. On the
error theoretic side, Jonas Olson (2011a) uses the same claim to defend the epistemic error
theory.
5 Cf. Olson (2011a).
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2
Hence, assuming that preserving true normative epistemic claims is an
important theoretical desideratum, there is strong motivation for defending
an account of epistemic normativity that makes epistemic norms immanent
rather than transcendent. In what follows, I examine and reject one popular
account that meets this criterion, namely epistemic instrumentalism.
Nevertheless, I show that the failure of instrumentalism does not necessarily
entail that epistemic norms are transcendent. There is an alternative account
of epistemic normativity, epistemic constitutivism, which also makes
epistemic norms immanent. I outline that account and argue that it promises
to deliver the advantages of epistemic instrumentalism without its problems.
2. Epistemic instrumentalism
According to epistemic instrumentalists 6 , epistemic norms are a
particular kind of instrumental norms. In general, an instrumental norm N is
a norm whose normative force is conditional on agents having some end that
would be promoted by conforming to N. In other words, such a norm only has
normative force for S if conforming to it is a means to an end that S has. Thus,
instrumental oughts and reasons to  (the oughts and reasons provided by
instrumental norms) are ones that S has just in case -ing would be a means
to S’s ends.
So understood, instrumental norms, oughts, and reasons are
ubiquitous in the practical domain. It is only true, for example, that I ought to
purchase hockey equipment if I have the end of doing something that requires
hockey equipment, e.g., playing hockey, or giving a gift to a friend who wants
to play hockey. Only if I have such an end is the fact that hockey equipment is
needed to play hockey a reason for me to purchase hockey equipment. If I
have no such end, then I have no such reason and it is not the case that I
ought to purchase hockey equipment. This is because doing so is not a means
to any of my ends.
Epistemic instrumentalism construes epistemic norms as nothing more
than a particular species of instrumental norms. What distinguishes them
from other instrumental norms – i.e., what makes them distinctly epistemic –
is simply the particular kind of end that gives them their reason-giving force.
When that end is epistemic, then so is the norm. Although characterisations of
the primary epistemic end differ, most of them are a variation on the theme of
believing the true and avoid believing the false. Call this the truth-end. So in
sum, epistemic instrumentalism claims the following:
(EI)
Epistemic norms are instrumental epistemic norms, i.e., norms
that (i) describe means to the truth-end, and (ii) have normative
force for S just in case S has the truth-end.
Quine (1986), Foley (1987), Laudan (1990), (1991), Maffie (1990), Kornblith (1993), Nozick
(1993), Papineau (1999), Leite (2007). See also Kelly (2003) and Lockard (2013) for a clear
presentation of epistemic instrumentalism.
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3
Since their normative authority is entirely dependent on our ends,
instrumental norms are a type of immanent norms. Hence, accepting (EI)
provides a straightforward way of avoiding the epistemic error theory.
Is (EI) plausible? The answer depends, I will take it, on whether (EI)
can do justice to our intuitive concept of an epistemic norm. To put it another
way, (EI) is only true if it can account for what I will call the ‘non-negotiable’
features of epistemic norms. By non-negotiable features, I mean features that
are such that norms that would lack them would not count as genuine
epistemic norms. But as I will argue, epistemic norms as construed by (EI) –
i.e., instrumental epistemic norms – lack some of these features.
First, the normative force of epistemic norms is compatible with the
goal of avoiding believing the truth. What this means is that epistemic norms
can apply to us and have normative force even when our goal is to avoid
finding out the truth about a certain question. In other words, it can still be
the case that we epistemically ought to believe that P in situations where what
we most want is to avoid believing the truth about whether P. Consider the
following example
Spoiler alert Max missed the finale of his favourite television series,
which aired last night and revealed the answer to the main question of
the series, namely whether the main character ends up dying or
surviving. Given his passion for the show, he really wants to avoid
learning the answer to that question before he watches the rerun
tonight after work. But to his dismay, one of his colleagues – who, let us
stipulate, is convinced that Max watched the show last night – comes
up to him in the morning shouting: “I knew it! I told you they would
make character X die!”
It seems clear that, unfortunately for Max, he ends up with conclusive
epistemic reasons to believe that the character ends up dying, namely that his
colleague told it to him while thinking he had already seen the finale. Despite
his goal of avoiding learning the truth about that question, it is hard to deny
that he epistemically ought to believe that the character does not survive. In
such a situation, it would clearly be epistemically unreasonable for him not to
believe his colleague. It would most likely qualify as a case of wishful thinking.
What this example shows, then, is that there are cases where the normativity
of epistemic norms can coexist with the goal of avoiding true beliefs. Call this
first non-negotiable feature of epistemic norms truth-avoidance
compatibility.
The problem for (EI) is that instrumental epistemic norms (the norms
that (EI) identifies as epistemic norms) cannot have this feature. These norms
are such that their normativity is contingent upon having the goal of believing
the truth and avoiding believing the false. But since this goal is incompatible
with wanting to avoid true beliefs, the normativity of instrumental epistemic
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norms is not compatible with the goal of truth-avoidance. Hence, (EI) cannot
accommodate this first non-negotiable feature of epistemic norms.
A second non-negotiable feature of epistemic norms is that they can
provide us with epistemic reasons to believe that P even in cases where we are
utterly indifferent about whether P. Their normative force, in other words, is
compatible with indifference about the relevant matter. Consider the
following example:
Delaware Like most people, Nancy has absolutely no desire in
knowing what the official beverage of Delaware is. Unbeknownst to her
however, her friend Brett, whom she knows to be very intelligent and
reliable, has recently developed a deep obsession for Delaware. One day
he comes up to her, grabs her by the shoulders and says: “Listen to me,
Nancy. I’ve got to tell you something. Look at me! Are you listening? I
just found out that the state beverage of Delaware is milk! Isn’t that
great?”
Despite her sheer indifference about what Delaware’s state beverage is, it does
seem that she ends up having excellent reasons to believe that that beverage is
milk. It would clearly be epistemically unreasonable for her not to believe it.
Cases like this therefore shows that epistemic norms can have reason-giving
force for one even when one is utterly indifferent about the relevant matter.
Call this second non-negotiable feature indifference compatibility.
The problem is that instrumental epistemic norms (epistemic norms as
construed by (EI)) cannot have that feature. When I am epistemically
indifferent, I do not have the truth-end. But since the normative force of
instrumental epistemic norms is contingent upon having that end, there can
be no cases where (i) I am completely indifferent about whether P, and (ii) I
have an instrumental epistemic reason to believe that P. Thus (EI) cannot
generate epistemic norms that have the non-negotiable feature of indifference
compatibility.
Instrumentalists might reply as follows. If Nancy really ought to believe
that Delaware’s beverage is milk, then it follows that refraining from forming
any doxastic attitude regarding this question would be epistemically
unreasonable.7 But that seems to imply that people ought to make up their
minds about every question upon which their evidence bears. In other words,
it seems to imply that as soon as S is in possession of evidence bearing on
whether P, she is epistemically unreasonable unless she forms a doxastic
attitude about whether P. But this is implausible. We are constantly
bombarded with evidence that bears on countless questions, many of which
we do not bother considering given our interests and our limited cognitive
By forming a ‘doxastic attitude’ about whether P, I mean either believing that P, disbelieving
that P, or withholding belief about whether P. To be clear, not forming any doxastic attitude
about whether P is distinct from withholding belief. While the latter is an attitude (which is
sometimes the appropriate one to hold given the available evidence), the former is the
absence of attitude.
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resources. Yet we are clearly not violating any epistemic norm in so behaving.
Since indifference compatibility implies that implausible idea, it is not a nonnegotiable feature of epistemic norms.
While I do want to claim that it would be epistemically unreasonable
for Nancy not to believe that Delaware’s beverage is milk, that claim does not
entail the implausible idea that we ought to make up our mind about
everything our evidence bears on. This is because of a peculiarity of the case
‘Delaware’. It involves an agent being forced to form a doxastic attitude about
a question. Despite Nancy’s indifference, Brett draws all of her attention to the
question ‘what is Delaware’s state beverage?’ and forces her to actively
consider it. She is thus put in a situation where she does not have the option of
not forming any doxastic attitude about the question. Her only options are to
believe that it is milk, disbelieve it, or withhold belief about the question. But
once we admit that, the attitude of belief is clearly, among the three, the one
that Nancy epistemically ought to form since she is given conclusive evidence
that the answer is ‘milk’.
Moreover, a slightly different consideration supports indifference
compatibility without being vulnerable to that instrumentalist reply. Suppose
that despite her indifference, Nancy forms an opinion about the identity of
Delaware’s beverage and believes what Brett tells her. Intuitively, Nancy is
epistemically reasonable in so believing. She believes as she should. If this is
true, then epistemic norms do have normative force in that situation since
they are the ones on the basis of which Nancy is positively appraised. It is thus
a case of indifference compatibility. But this is something (EI) cannot
accommodate. Instrumentalists have to deny that she really counts as
epistemically reasonable (or unreasonable) since they have to deny that
epistemic norms apply at all in that situation (given that she lacks the truthend). So indifference compatibility really is a non-negotiable feature of
epistemic norms, and (EI) does not seem to be able to accommodate it.
It is possible, however, to interpret (EI) in a way that allows it to
account for both truth-avoidance and indifference compatibility. One thing to
note is that there is an ambiguity in the truth-end. The goal of believing the
true and not the false can be interpreted either in a particular or a general
way. The particular truth-end is the goal of believing the true and not the false
about the particular matter at hand. The general truth-end, on the other
hand, is the goal of believing the true and not the false in general. It is, in
other words, the end of generally having true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs.
If the truth-end is the particular one, then (EI) claims that epistemic norms
only have normative force for S if S has the goal of believing the truth about
the particular matter at hand. If the truth-end is the general one, then (EI)
claims that epistemic norms only have normative force for S if S has the goal
of generally having true belief and avoiding false beliefs. ‘Spoiler alert’ and
‘Delaware’ are only problematic for the former version of (EI). While these
examples do exclude that I have the goal of believing the truth about the
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matter at hand (I seek to know neither the fate of the character nor the
identity of Delaware’s beverage), they are compatible with my having the
general truth-end. Instrumentalists could therefore respond that the second
interpretation of (EI) is the correct one, and that (EI) so understood can
account for the two non-negotiable features above because it does allow
epistemic norms to have normative force in cases like ‘Spoiler alert’ and
‘Delaware’.
The problem is that there is a third non-negotiable feature of epistemic
norms, which is in conflict with both versions of (EI). Epistemic norms, I will
argue, can have normative force even in cases where S lacks both the
particular and the general truth-end. Call this feature no-truth-end
compatibility. Consider the following example.
Falsity-end Mary does not want to know the truth about anything.
This is because her primary end in life is what she calls the ‘falsity-end’:
the goal of maximising her false beliefs and minimising her true beliefs.
It is the only thing that matters for her. She is aware that the pursuit of
that goal might cause her to get hurt or even perish. After all, her goal
will likely lead her to lack beliefs that are essential for her survival. But
she is fine with that. She is willing to die for the cause if that is what it
takes.
Given that it is incompatible with her end of maximising false beliefs and
minimising true ones, Mary lacks the general truth-end. Because of that, (EI)
entails that epistemic norms have no normative force for Mary. She has no
epistemic reasons to believe anything; she is not appropriately deemed
epistemically reasonable or unreasonable.
But that seems wrong. It would be conducive to Mary’s general end to,
e.g., believe that she does not exist, that she knows everything, or that she is a
grapefruit. Yet, it seems undeniable that she would be epistemically
unreasonable in so believing. Despite her peculiar goal, she would still
epistemically ought not to believe that she does not exist, that she knows
everything, or that she is a grapefruit.
So in sum, (EI) is false, and it is false even if we interpret it in the
generalist way. This reason is that the norms it generates lack the feature of
no-truth-end compatibility, which, I argued, is a non-negotiable feature of
epistemic norms.
3. An alternative option: epistemic constitutivism
A natural reaction to the failure of (EI) is to infer that epistemic norms
are not immanent, but transcendent. This reaction is misguided however. (EI)
and transcendence are not the only options. There is an alternative account of
epistemic normativity, epistemic constitutivism, which also makes epistemic
norms immanent. Moreover, as I will argue, that account promises to deliver
the advantages of (EI) without its problems. Unlike instrumentalism,
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constitutivism has all the resources to do justice to our concept of an
epistemic norm.
Just like epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic constitutivism is the
application of a more general account of normativity to the epistemic
normativity. The general constitutivist idea is that we can derive norms,
reasons, and oughts related to an activity A from the constitutive aim of A
(assuming that A does have a constitutive aim). The constitutivist ‘schema’ is
the following:
(Step 1) A has the constitutive aim B.
To say that B is A’s constitutive aim is to say that it is constitutive of that
activity being an instance of A that it be directed towards attaining B. Aiming
at attaining B is part of what it is to be an A. An activity that lacks that aim
would not count as an A.
(Step 2) A’s constitutive aim generates a standard of success for A.
If A has B as its aim, then a successful instance of A is one that attains B.
(Step 3) The standard of success for A generates A-related norms.
If one is engaged in A-ing, which is only successful if it attains B, then one is
subject to norms that describe means to attain B. In other words, insofar as I
am engaged in A-ing, I have a reason to do what will be conducive of attaining
B.8
An example of an activity to which the constitutivist schema can be
applied is the game of Sudoku.9 It seems fairly clear that the activity of doing a
Sudoku puzzle has a constitutive aim, namely to fill out every square with a
number from 1 to 9 without repeating the same number in the same row,
column, or square. An activity that would lack that aim would not count as
doing a Sudoku puzzle. If this is right, then a successful instance of playing
Sudoku is one in which you fill out every square in the appropriate way.
Consequently, insofar as I am engaged in playing a game of Sudoku, I have a
reason to do what will allow me to fill out every square in the appropriate way.
In other words, insofar as I am playing Sudoku, norms describing ways to
satisfy the standard of success for Sudoku will have normative force for me.
For example, the norm ‘note the remaining possible candidates for a square’
will have normative force for me since it helps reaching the aim of filling out
the squares appropriately. However, if I am not doing a Sudoku puzzle, then I
have no reason to conform to that norm.
What about epistemic norms? Recall that for epistemic
instrumentalists, distinctly epistemic norms are those that arise (are
immanent) from the distinctly epistemic end, namely the truth-end. In
parallel, epistemic constitutivists view distinctly epistemic norms as those that
arise (are immanent) from the distinctly epistemic activity, namely the
8 Cf. Katsafanas (forthcoming).
9 I borrow this example from McHugh (2012).
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formation and regulation of belief (belief for short). 10 Thus, epistemic
constitutivism is essentially the application of the constitutivist recipe to
belief: 11
(Step 1) Belief has a constitutive aim.
The idea belief has a constitutive aim is a common one. 12 It means that, as
Conor McHugh puts it:
[…] the regulation of states of believing is directed towards this aim, and it is by virtue
of this aim that the states so regulated count as beliefs. […] When a proposition is
taken up for consideration in order to form an attitude to it, or to regulate an existing
attitude to it, it is part of what it is for the attitude so formed or regulated to count as
belief that the regulating processes have this aim or function. (McHugh 2012, 425)
Different proponents of that view hold different views of what that aim is. One
popular candidate is truth (e.g., to believe that P only if P is true).13 Others
think it is knowledge (e.g., that you believe that P if and only if you know that
P).14 I shall remain neutral about that question since I only want to defend
epistemic constitutivism, which only needs the claim that the activity of
forming and regulating belief has a constitutive aim (whatever that aim is).
(Step 2) The constitutive aim of belief generates a standard of success
for belief.
If belief has a constitutive aim B, a successful instance of belief is one that
attains B. What that standard of success is will of course depend on what we
identify as belief’s constitutive aim. The truth aim, for example, entails that a
successful belief is a true belief and the knowledge aim entails that a
successful belief is one that constitutes knowledge. Since I remain neutral
about what belief’s aim is, I also remain neutral about what its standard of
success is.
(Step 3) The standard of success for belief generates epistemic norms.
If one is engaged in the activity of belief, which is only successful if it attains B,
then one is subject to norms that describe means to attain B. In other words,
insofar as I am forming and regulating belief, I have a reason to do what will
be conducive of attaining B. The content of these norms will depend on what
belief’s aim and success standard are. They will describe means to attain true
belief if belief aims at truth. Alternatively they will describe means to attain
knowledge if belief aims at knowledge. Once again, I remain neutral about
that question since I leave it open what the aim and standard of success of
belief are. All that epistemic constitutivism claims is the following:
Note that to call the formation and regulation of belief is an ‘activity’ is not to say that it is
intentional or voluntary.
11 Railton (1997) discusses a version of this strategy. See also Tubert (2010).
12 Velleman (2000), Owens (2000), Steglich-Petersen (2006), (2009), Bird (2007), McHugh
(2011), (2012).
13 Velleman (2000), Steglich-Petersen (2006), (2009).
14 Owens (2000), Bird (2007), McHugh (2011).
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(EC) Epistemic norms are constitutivist epistemic norms, i.e., norms
that (i) describe means to achieving the constitutive aim of the
activity of forming and regulating belief, and (ii) have normative
force for S just in case S is engaged in the activity of forming and
regulating beliefs.
Epistemic constitutivist norms are thus a kind of immanent norms
since their authority is not mind-independent. More precisely, they are
immanent because whether they have normative force for S depends on
whether S is engaged in the activity of forming and regulating belief.
Therefore, just like (EI), (EC) provides a straightforward way of avoiding the
epistemic error theory.
However, unlike (EI), (EC) has what it takes do justice to our concept of
an epistemic norm. More precisely, contrary to epistemic instrumentalism,
epistemic constitutivism, if it is sound, is able to accommodate all of the nonnegotiable features of epistemic norms. In particular, constitutivist epistemic
norms (epistemic norms as construed by (EC)) have the three features listed
above. They are ‘truth-avoidance compatible’, ‘indifference compatible’, and
‘no-truth-end compatible’. The reason is that (EC) gives the right verdict in
the cases presented above: it entails that epistemic norms do have normative
force for the agent in all three examples. This is because these are all cases
where the agent is effectively engaged in the activity of forming and regulating
belief, which is all that (EC) needs in order to generate epistemic normativity.
This is true of Max and Nancy in ‘Spoiler alert’ and ‘Delaware’. Their attention
is drawn to a particular question, and they are forced to form a judgement
about that question. It is also true of Mary in ‘Falsity-end’ since part of her
primary goal is precisely to form (false) beliefs.
What about an agent whose primary end was to believe nothing at all?
According to (EC), such an agent would be subject to the authority of
epistemic norms so long as she fails to achieve her goal, i.e., so long as she was
forming and regulating beliefs. But what if she were to succeed? A first thing
to note is that this is extremely hard to imagine. We constantly form countless
beliefs. We cannot help it. Right now I cannot help but believing that I am
thinking, that I am looking at my computer screen, that I am sat down, that I
am typing these words, that I have two eyes, that it is sunny outside, that I
exist, and so on. Perhaps one way for our agent to achieve her goal would be to
be put in a coma. In that situation, (EC) would entail that epistemic norms
have no normative force for her. But this is the right result. It would be absurd
to say of comatose people that they ought to believe things or that they are
being epistemically reasonable or unreasonable. It is no feature of epistemic
norms that they have authority on comatose people. Maybe we can imagine
our agent taking a pill that erases her current beliefs and makes it impossible
for her to believe anything. (EC) would entail that epistemic norms have no
normative force for such an agent. But again, this is the right result. It would
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be absurd to say of people who cannot believe anything that they ought to
believe things. It would be like saying to my mother that she ought to jump
from London to Paris. Epistemic norms, it seems, only have normative force
for believers. It is no feature of epistemic norms, in other words, that they
have authority on beings that are unable to form beliefs. So the conceivability
of an agent seeking to believe nothing at all is no problem for (EC).
More generally, unlike instrumental epistemic norms, constitutivist
epistemic norms have all it takes to qualify as genuine epistemic norms. I
therefore conclude that unlike epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic
constitutivism provides a promising way of avoiding the epistemic error
theory and, more generally, of securing the place of epistemic normativity in a
plausible naturalistic ontology.
11
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