“Nervous of the ‘Cinema as an Art Medium’”: governmental film
propaganda in the Free State.
Kevin Hora
School of Media DIT
PhD Candidate, TCD
Free State Politicians viewed the cinema with distrust. Though adept propagandists, they
were wary of cinema, seeing it as fodder for uneducated minds, and a communications
channel that needed to be controlled by the state. Consequently, Free State politicians
failed to fully explore the potential of cinema for domestic and foreign propaganda and
implemented harsh censorship. This paper looks at attitudes and opinions towards film
propaganda, and establishes that two arguments inhibited its development: finance and
lack of understanding of the medium. It traces efforts to produce a state-sponsored film,
Ireland, and assesses the use of feature films and newsreels. The paper suggests that Free
State politicians, while adept propagandists, were unable to fully realise the potential of
cinema, and were content to avail of it when opportunity was presented, but had no
strategic vision for successfully developing film propaganda.
Why the state was slow to use film propaganda may be explained by its inability to fully
grasp what it entailed. Self-imposed isolation from European organisations scarcely helped.
An invitation forwarded by the Dominions Office to attend the 1926 International
Cinematograph Congress, organised by the French National Committee of Intellectual
Cooperation, was declined.1 In 1927 the state declined to participate in a Swiss conference
on educational film when the Department of Education confessed that it had “no experience
of the use of films of this kind”.2 The International Institute of Education Cinematography, a
League of Nations funded Italian organisation, also met with apathy. The Italian
ambassador to Britain sought support for it, citing “the great importance attaching to
cinematography as a practical method of instruction and as an instrument of culture,
1
2
NAI, D/Taoiseach: S5121
NAI/D Taoiseach: S5326.
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
1
education and healthy propaganda.3 His communication was passed to Education which,
though again narrowly interpreting educational film, was influenced by more than its own
aversion as the Dominions Office had already expressed Britain’s position:
the cinematograph is still in an early stage and … educational authorities hold
divergent views as to the value … and the practicality of its employment….
Moreover, having regard to the varying conditions of the cinematograph in different
parts of the world, it seems doubtful whether the establishment of an Institute …
would … serve any very useful purpose….4
It fell to the Department of External Affairs to communicate the state’s position.5 Oddly,
External Affairs had received the 1926 Imperial Conference report on empire-produced
films, which contradicted the Dominion’s Office:
The importance and far-reaching influence of the Cinema are now generally
recognised. The Cinema is … a powerful instrument of education in the widest sense
… and even where it is not used avowedly for purposes of instruction, advertisement
or propaganda, it exercises indirectly a great influence in shaping the ideals of the
very large numbers to whom it appeals. Its potentialities in this respect are almost
unlimited.6
Isolation did not mean that film companies ignored the state. Newsreel companies
submitted frequent requests for political interviews. The style of filming in the silent era
was to record politicians at events, or posing self-consciously. With the advent of sound
films, the “piece to camera” became more popular. While a good relationship evolved
between the state and film companies, including Pathé, British Movietone News, Paramount
News and International Newsreel Corporation, the transition from silent to spoken film
proved occasionally problematic. Agreeing to participate in a spoken film for the first time,
Cosgrave clumsily essayed humour:
3
NAI/D Taoiseach: S5514. 7 September, 1927.
NAI/D Taoiseach: S5514. 21 September, 1927.
5
NAI/D Taoiseach: S5514. 29 February, 1928.
6
NAI/D Taoiseach: S5403. 18 November 1926
4
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
2
The apparatus though the medium of which I am now speaking for the first time
possesses at least one stimulating property – while recording every word and motion
of the speaker it gives no opportunity to the opponent. Oppositions tend to
pessimism and I welcome their absence on this occasion as it enables me to present,
uninterrupted, a cheerful view of our position in Ireland.
He spoiled the effect by continuing: “The world today is full of anxiety, political and
economic.”7 As politicians became more accustomed to film, fears of the medium were
lessened by exercising editorial control. A British Movietone News film for American
audiences was deemed unsuitable at a private pre-screening, and Fox, the parent company,
was given detailed editing instructions before presidential consent was forthcoming.8
Co-ordinating filming schedules was a more subtle form of control. Sean Lester introduced
Alfred Brick of Fox Films to a number of state departments, and the Director of Army
Intelligence, who indicated that a programme of “suitable items of Army doings” was in
hand.9 Evidently Brick’s trip was successful. Having attended a private screening of the film,
an impressed TW Smiddy, the state’s representative in the USA, apprised External Affairs of
its content and suggested it would have a strong impact on American audiences.10 Fox
returned in 1929, with an itinerary that included prominent political buildings, Cosgrave at
home, the Lusitania memorial, the Gardaí and Air Corps.11
As newsreels became familiar to politicians, the state’s overseas representatives, exposed to
cinema propaganda in their postings, began to advocate a state film. From Paris, Count
O’Kelly suggested a film about the Wild Geese, for its romantic story and distance from
politics.12 In 1926, he extolled the Belgian government’s film propaganda, particularly, a
film promoting industry and tourism which was “precisely the type of publicity” the Free
7
NAI/D Taoiseach: S2365. 18 November 1930.
NAI/D Taoiseach: S2366. 30 April, 1930
9
NAI/DFA: GR837-3. 31 July, 1925.
10
NAI/DFA: GR837-3. 15 December, 1925.
11
NAI/DFA: GR837-3. 30 October, 1929.
12
NAI/DFA/P/1/VII. 22 November, 1924.
8
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
3
State needed.13 His letter aroused interest in External Affairs, which admitted that the
prospects of a film were remote, but asked him to ascertain the cost of production and
methods of exhibition.14 O’Kelly’s reply suggested that he viewed the film as useful for
special screenings to select audiences, but not for general release.15 As the matter failed to
interest other departments, it was not pursued.
Nonetheless, a state propaganda film, Ireland, was eventually produced, though it was a
protracted process hindered by misunderstandings, inter-departmental spats and typical
Department of Finance miserliness. In 1925, a request by Smiddy for state films to lodge
with the philanthropic United States Bureau of Commercial Economics, caused chaos.16
External Affairs asked Industry and Commerce and Agriculture for films.17 Agriculture
directed External Affairs to Industry and Commerce,18 who for their part referred to
interdepartmental communication on railway films.19 Meanwhile, Smiddy, labouring under
the misapprehension that films existed, again asked External Affairs to request films from
Industry and Commerce.20 The department did.21 However, in copying Finance, Fisheries,
Lands and Agriculture, and Justice, External Affairs seemed to imply that the department
was obstructing it. Industry and Commerce chastened External Affairs, and placed the
blame on Finance, which had already rejected several proposals. Clearly piqued, the
correspondence suggested that if External Affairs felt so strongly about propaganda film,
that department should bring proposals before the Executive Council.22
External Affairs replied in a conciliatory tone, enclosing a copy of a memo from TJ Kiernan,
secretary to the London delegation. Kiernan recommended producing propaganda films to
13
NAI/DFA: GR837-2.
NAI/DFA: GR837-2.
15
NAI/DFA: GR837-2.
16
NAI/DFA: GR837-4.
17
NAI/DFA: GR837-4.
18
NAI/DFA: GR837-4.
19
NAI/DFA: GR837-4.
20
NAI/DFA: GR837-4.
21
NAI/DFA: GR837-4.
22
NAI/DFA: GR837-4.
14
23 February, 1926.
4 March, 1926.
11 March, 1926.
11 July, 1925.
1 August, 1925.
31 August, 1925.
4 September, 1925.
29 April, 1926.
17 May, 1926.
25 May, 1926.
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
4
disseminate through the Imperial Institute and Empire Marketing Board.23 The new spirit of
détente bore fruit as External Affairs assured Industry and Commerce that it would support
proposals before the Executive Council.24 The new proposal outlined the overseas
representatives’ clamour for a film that would allow them to compete with countries
displaying a greater proclivity towards publicity. It observed that film propaganda in the
state was haphazard, orchestrated by private interests, or subject to budgetary constraints.
It suggested that a good deal of propaganda work was already under way, and referred to
films, shot or planned by Fordsons and the Lee Boot Factory in Cork, the Shannon Works
and the Irish Cattle Traders, as well as noting the success of Irish Destiny. Wisely
anticipating Department of Finance objections, the proposal argued that the cost was
negated by the necessity for a film, and by the trade, tourism and tax revenues that would
accrue. The carrot to Agriculture, Industry and Fishing, and the defence forces that they
would be part of the film was as much a sop for support as a propaganda necessity.25 The
proposal was successful; however, sanction was delayed while Finance displayed its
customary reluctance to open the public purse, and it was a further two years before a
contract was signed with McConnell-Hartley Ltd to produce the film.26
Alongside official propaganda, independent film-makers sought inspiration in the state.
George Dewhurst, Denis Johnston, and Tom Cooper used local knowledge or political
contacts to make Irish Destiny, Guests of the Nation and The Dawn respectively. State
assistance was readily available, and the state provided information on the American and
French markets for Irish films to Daniel Coholan, an aspiring Athlone-based
cinematographer,27 and to J Eppel on Belgian film manufacturers.28 However, assistance did
not suggest capital. CS Clancy, an Irish-American producer who had filmed Will Rogers in
Ireland, proposed producing ten single-reel travel comedies, and series of five-reel romantic
dramas, modern comedy dramas, one or two-reel legends, one-reel illustrated songs and
poems, and epic historical dramas. He anticipated vast audiences and revenues:
23
NAI/DFA: GR837-4. 15 June, 1926.
NAI/DFA: GR837-4. 16 June, 1926.
25
NAI/DFA: S5105. 28 July, 1926.
26
NAI/DFA: S5105. 10 July, 1929.
27
NAI/DFA: GR837-12. 20 June and 7 August, 1930
28
NAI/DFA: GR837-6. 7 January, 1926.
24
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
5
the Keith Vaudeville Circuit … will … book the series “solid” … $7.70 per reel per day.
… this means a booking of 3000 days per reel. Therefore ENCHANTING ERIN… could
gross $225,000….
In addition these ten reels should play in at least 6000 … theatres in America at a
minimum average of $4.00 per reel per day.29
Profit was one thing, production costs another, and his figures must have confounded the
impoverished state. They ranged from $3,500 for a single reel film, to $500,000 for an epic,
and Clancy merely required a five-year contract, with a profit-share and salary. His pitch for
public or private funds would have met with official resistance, no matter that he offered an
annual return of up to 100%.30
While Clancy’s proposal was the most professional, several amateurs made such dubious
entreaties that the state could be forgiven for assuming a fearful attitude towards cinema.
Most were politely rejected and promptly forgotten. O’Kelly was horrified at a glib rewriting
of history proposed by a Monsieur Chauvelot, who, he reported, was:
anxious to produce an Irish propaganda film…. When I asked … he said that the plot
was based upon the flight … of Irish Nationalists implicated in an uprising against
England, and the return of their children who now find Ireland free…. M. Chauvelot
… explained that he was going to begin with … the Phoenix Park murders of 1882.
Two of the assassins were to have fled to Australia, and it was their children who
were returning to Ireland….
When I had recovered my breath I suggested … he was about to write a most
excellent British propaganda film against Ireland. He seemed quite undismayed and
said he was prepared to change the plot to please me – or … anyone else.... I am
using all my best efforts to make him forego it, as I shudder to think what he would
produce if given the slightest encouragement.31
29
NAI/DFA: GR837-5: 12 August, 1926.
NAI/DFA: GR837-5: 12 August, 1926.
31
NAI/DFA: GR837-18a: 10 February, 1932
30
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
6
Fortunately the state did not need to discourage film-makers, when the blunt instrument of
censorship was available. The Censorship of Films Act, 1923 signalled the state’s moral
intent, requiring the censor to decide whether a film was “indecent, obscene or
blasphemous” or “subversive of public morality.”32 The censor, James Montgomery,
demonstrated a devotion to duty that was more than the prudishness of the religious
fundamentalist, or the superciliousness that regarded cinema as dangerous fodder for
working-class minds: he was an officer of the state, appointed by the Minister for Justice.
Consequently, some decisions were motivated by nationalism rather than morality.
Ourselves Alone, Beloved Enemy and two versions of The Informer rankled for their
depictions of Ireland. Ford’s Informer was eviscerated:
A sordid & brutal travesty of the Black & Tan period. The prostitute and brothel tone
… is very clever and artistic but it is unfit for exhibition in this country. The issue of a
cert by this Censorship might be taken as the states [sic] approval of a gross libel.33
He dismissed Beloved Enemy as the “most extraordinary romanticising of Michael Collins”34
and perceived an anti-Irish bias in Ourselves Alone:
it seems ‘fairly fair’ to the British but not to us - ie that is the hero is a Bayard of the
RIC. The leader of the gangster IRA is an Oxford man from the big house. I’d reject it
if I could. It is likely to lead to protests.35
His prescience was well-founded: a week later, he noted “Old IRA sent me a protest which I
sent to the Ministry.”36
Irish-made films fared better. The Dawn was: “A good attempt from our side. A good
contrast to ‘Ourselves Alone’.”37 The censor’s imprimatur was essential, as was the approval
of Frank Aiken, Minister for Defence. Tom Cooper successfully used the precedent set by
Aiken’s granting of army equipment to the makers of Guests of the Nation to request similar
support. Domestic features were more polemic than Hollywood’s efforts. British soldiers
32
No. 23/1923: Censorship of Films Act, 1923: 7.2
NAI/D Justice - Film Censor’s Office. 28 June 1935
34
NAI/D Justice - Film Censor’s Office. 29 April 1937
35
NAI/D Justice - Film Censor’s Office. 5 May 1936
36
NAI/D Justice - Film Censor’s Office. 12 May, 1936
37
NAI/D Justice - Film Censor’s Office. 23 May 1936
33
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
7
were brutish in The Dawn, but the RIC were Irish, which mattered more than the uniform.
Although more policemen than soldiers perished in the conflict, the propaganda implication
was that the disestablished force would be portrayed as never having been the real enemy.
Moreover, the IRA displayed courage and respect for law and order. In Irish Destiny, the
villain, Gilbert Beecher, produces illicit poitín, the scourge of the country, and kidnaps the
hero’s sweetheart, before natural justice is meted out at the hands of the IRA and he
perishes in a conflagration at his still. Furthermore, the old woman’s reaction to the
execution of two English soldiers in Guests of the Nation, and the emotions it evokes in their
executioners, establishes the compassion of the Irish, even to their enemy. Such portrayals
may suggest that where the state had the opportunity to influence productions it did so
discreetly, but effectively.
Hollywood smut damaged the state’s morals, but seditious films struck at democracy. In
1930, the Dublin Film Society asked TM Healy for patronage.38 Healy’s staff received advice
from Cosgrave’s office that the society’s promoters included a group:
who regard themselves as ‘intellectuals’…. Paul Farrell is a re-instated Civil Servant
with artistic leanings. Miss Manning… is a journalist in the Film and Fashion domain.
The others … are interested in Art and Drama. With the possible exception of Mr.
Farrell none of the promoters has been prominent in contemporary troubles.
Nevertheless their programme is disturbing. The film ‘Potemkin’ is largely Bolshevist
propaganda, - so also is ‘Mother’; ‘Storm Over Asia’ is … an anti-British film and a
gross libel on the British Army, - and while I have not particulars of the other films
they seem to be … ‘of unusual interest’.
We have some reason to fear … that Bolshevist propaganda agents look to this
Society as a medium for the dissemination of films which would otherwise fail to
secure publicity here. Apart from this I am somewhat nervous of the ‘Cinema as an
Art Medium’ in the hands of a Society such as the present.39
38
39
NAI/D Taoiseach, S6002. 11 February, 1930
NAI/D Taoiseach, S6002. 19 February, 1930
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
8
Watching such films was sufficient to mark a citizen as dangerous, though the notion that
the society’s members were dupes of dastardly Bolsheviks supported the view of cinema as
a moulder of malleable minds. Indeed, the group was already under Garda surveillance, and
a file identified committee members.40 Aside from O’Farrell and Manning, Lillian Dalton,
daughter of a senior civil servant, worked in the Belgian Consulate, and was described as “a
supporter of the present government”; George E Cowell was a Trinity College student; and
Harold Douglas was the son of Senator Douglas. Respectability was no defence against a
state determined to control its citizens’ cinematic preferences.
Control over film was achieved through extraordinarily severe censorship. It may not be
unfair to suggest that, under Cumann na nGaedheal, this was a direct consequence of a
moral imperative and religious influence, while under Fianna Fáil it was a continuation of
this, with the added element of a carefully constructed notion of a self-contained Irish
identity that came from the depths of the party’s own ideology. High-brow preoccupations
within the administration saw little cultural value in film, and this resulted in a failure to
adequately explore its potential. Film required a concentration on the visual element until
sound films became a possibility, and words and image could be married to create a more
potent message. That propaganda films could have been used more frequently or expertly
is undeniable, but early wariness, antipathy, and financial considerations, were forceful
issues that first had to be overcome.
40
NAI/D Taoiseach, S6002. 3 March, 1930.
Kevin Hora, School of Media, DIT
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