Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire
Review, Umatilla National Forest, U.S.
Forest Service
National Oversight Review
National Incident Management Organization
5/8/2014
Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ 1
Purpose............................................................................................................................................ 2
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Objectives of the Review ................................................................................................................ 6
Fire Chronology .............................................................................................................................. 9
Observations ................................................................................................................................. 11
Discussion by review objective .................................................................................................... 12
Attachments .................................................................................................................................. 22
Key Fire Events............................................................................................................................. 23
WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Validation and Rationale) ........ 25
Vinegar Fire Infrared Map ............................................................................................................ 34
Vinegar IMT (Phone) Interview Schedule .................................................................................... 35
Objective of this Review
The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document
risk management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect
effect on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management
for incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive
analysis of incident documentation.
This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and
facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an
opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the
effectiveness of implementation in the field.
The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning
environment and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Review Objectives:
Objectively look at actions
taken by the Incident
Management Team and the
local Agency Administrator
to meet the direction
provided by the Forest
Service Chief
Asses the consideration and
effectiveness of applying risk
management concepts to
incident cost through the
associated decisions and
expenditures as an outcome
Identify Best Business
Practices Used on Fires This
Past Season
Identify How Social and
Political Issues Factored Into
Our Decision Making
Identify Which Current
Procedures Can Be Enhanced
or Expanded
Identify Improvements That
Can Be Made In Sharing and
Clarifying Expectations
Review Team Members:
Tom Johnston, SOF-NIMO
Tim Sampson, Fire Staff,
Colville National Forest
Joe Krish, Fire Operations
Specialist, Regional Office
Carla Schamber, IBARegional Office
Gabe Dumm, Fire Planner,
Umpqua National Forest
Purpose
In December 2012, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation
Management requested that the National Incident Management
Organization (NIMO) assign Team Leaders for the ten selected fires
within Forest Service Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. The NIMO Executive
Committee assigned James “Tom” Johnston to be the National
Programmatic/Cost Fire Review Team Leader for the Whiskey
Complex (OR-UPF-130132) on the Umpqua National Forest and the
Vinegar Fire (OR-UMF-000845) on the Umatilla National Forest, both
in the Pacific Northwest Region. The review team (team) consisted
of: Tom Johnston (Safety Officer-NIMO); Carla Schamber (IBA-PNW
Region); Gabe Dumm (Fire Planner-Umpqua National Forest); Tim
Sampson (Fire Staff-Colville National Forest); Joe Krish (Fire
Specialist-PNW Region); Kris Eriksen (Public Information OfficerNIMO); Dana Reid (Finance Section Chief-NIMO); and Terri Knauth
(Safety Officer-NIMO).
The team reviewed numerous documents located on the Forest, from
the Incident Management Teams (IMTs), within the Vinegar Fire ftp
site and on InciWeb. Documentation that was reviewed included:
Incident Action Plans (IAPs); Wildland Fire Decision Support System
(WFDSS); Incident Status Summaries (209’s); fire maps; and the Blue
Mountain Interagency Dispatch Center (BMIDC) 2013 Year-end
Summary. Eleven (11) on-site interviews were held in Pendleton,
Baker City and La Grande, Oregon on March 5-6, 2014. Those
interviewed included the: Forest Supervisors of the Umatilla and
Wallowa-Whitman National Forests (NFs); the Deputy Forest
Supervisor on the Wallowa-Whitman NF; Forest Fire Staffs on the
Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs; District FMO; Public Affairs
Officer; the Tri-Forest Aviation Officer, Center Manager and Assistant
Center Manager of Blue Mountain Interagency Dispatch Center
(BMIDC); and the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) District
Forester. Phone interviews were held with the two Incident
Commanders (ICs) of the Type 3 Incident Management Organizations
(IMO) and the ICs and Deputy IC of the Type 2 IMTs from February 32|P a g e
Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Review Team Members
Continued:
Kris Ericksen, PIO-NIMO
Dana Reid, FSC-NIMO
Terri Knauth, SOF-NIMO
18, 2014. The team focused on the objectives of the review and was
cognizant of the need to avoid hindsight bias when reviewing
documents or interviewing people. The team had open discussions
with personnel regarding the incident, their interactions, and what
they thought was important to share as lessons learned.
Mike Ferris, PIO, NIMO
The team found that there were many factors that influenced the
complexity of the Vinegar Fire: difficult terrain, adjacent to two NFs
(Wallowa-Whitman and Malheur NF’s), involving two counties (Grant
and Baker), with mixed conifer fuel type; the fires close proximity to
two rural communities, scattered residences with very poor access,
and active mining claims; and the fires location within the North Fork
of the John Day Wilderness (NFJDW). Severe weather and fuel conditions, as well as other
wildfires burning in the immediate area, within the Region and on the adjoining Region,
also contributed to the complexity.
Background
The 2013 Programmatic/Cost Fire Review(s) are grounded in the objectives of the Chief’s
Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season. The reviews provide an opportunity to evaluate
how clearly Leader’s Intent was communicated and the effectiveness of implementation in
the field. The results of the reviews provide information critical to the well-established
learning environment and continual improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest
Service (FS).
The Chief’s stated vision for success continues to be defined as safely achieving reasonable
objectives with the least firefighter exposure necessary, while enhancing stakeholder
support for our management.
Building on lessons learned in 2012, utilization of all aspects of risk management continues
to provide the best framework to successfully achieve this vision. Sound decision-making
relies on identifying reasonable objectives for protection of critical values at risk (VAR),
while considering the amount and quality of firefighter exposure and probability of
success. The format/protocol is broken down into three sections: Pre-Season (engaging
the fire before it starts); During Incident (managing incident uncertainty and inherent
risk); and After Incident (learning and improving).
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U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Pre-Season preparedness is critical to success when a fire starts. In addition to pre-season
preparedness (annual fire refresher, work capacity test) we need to build decision-maker
and key stakeholder capacity to manage the uncertainties and inherent risks associated
with fires. Specifically, we need to increase understanding of risk management with key
stakeholders and partners, cooperators and collaborators. We have to increase Line Officer
Agency Administrators (AAs) capacity as risk managers and improve Incident Management
Team (IMT) skills in operational risk management. In addition, the Agency units need to
establish landscape level risk assessments, compare them to the goals and objectives in the
Land Resource Management Plan (LRMP) and identify a common understanding of values
to be protected by answering four questions:




What is important?
Why is it important?
How important is it? and
How much risk are you willing to take to protect it?
Lastly, complete a risk analysis with partners to identify VAR and pre-determine strategies
for protecting them, while balancing risks across all categories and in time and space.
The During Incident phase tests our pre-season work and our ability to apply risk
management principles. As acknowledged by the National Cohesive Strategy for Wildland
Fire Management: “Safe aggressive initial attack is often the best suppression strategy to
keep unwanted wildfires small and costs down.”
This strategy will be applied to initial attack (IA) where the pre-identified values to be
protected are at the greatest risk. Decisions will be based on firefighter/aviator/public
safety, VAR and the probability of success. We will implement sound financial management
and believe costs are an output of the best risk informed decisions. To be successful in this
phase, we (IMTs and units) should follow the objectives listed below in the Standards for
Managing Incident Risk:
Seven Standards for Managing Incident Risk
1. Complete an Incident Risk Assessment
 What is at risk, probabilities of harm, and possible mitigations?
2. Complete a Risk Analysis
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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
 Consider alternatives (objectives, strategies and tactics) against desired
outcomes, respondent exposure, probability of success and values to be
protected.
3. Complete Two-way Risk Communication
 Engage community leaders, local government officials, partners and other key
stakeholders associated with the incident to share the risk picture and solicit
input.
4. Conduct Risk Sharing Dialogue (“Red Book”, Chapter 05.11, framework 10
questions)
 Engage senior line officers (AAs) and political appointee (as appropriate) in
dialogue aimed at understanding, acceptance, and support for the alternatives
and likely decision(s).
5. Make the Risk Informed Decision
 Develop a time frame to revisit the decision.
6. Document the Risk
 Document the assessment, analysis, communication(s) sharing, and decision in
WFDSS.
7. Continue Monitoring and Adjusting
 Monitor and adjust as necessary or as conditions change. Monitor incident;
revise the risk process as conditions change and re-engage stakeholders and
senior officials as appropriate. Significant changes will likely require updates to
the WFDSS (published decision and risk support work).
In areas identified pre-season as having low threats to values to be protected, an
engagement strategy designed to minimize firefighter exposure and/or meet restoration
objectives may be considered. Line Officers using fire for multiple objectives must follow
the Seven Standards for Managing Incident Risk to the highest level of performance and
accountability.
To be clear, Standards 1-4 need to be completed pre-season; all standards apply during the
incident.
Lastly, the effective interaction between AAs and Incident Commanders (ICs) is essential
for safe, efficient, and effective management of incidents, utilizing the Five Rights (the
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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Right Plan, in the Right Place, at the Right Time, with the Right Assets [(personnel and
equipment) for the Right Duration]. Careful attention to these five “Rights” will limit
unnecessary exposure to firefighters and expenditure.
The third phase, After Incident, is the time when we as a learning organization should
strive to improve how we do business and seek to learn from each incident. It is important
to engage key stakeholders in an After Action Review (AAR), noting what was planned,
what worked and how we can improve. It may also be useful to engage in a peer review
process with other units that have experienced similar incidents to learn strategies for
improvement and identify personnel that will ensure improvement plans and lessons
learned are implemented.
Objectives of the Review
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Identify Best Business Practices used on fires this past season.
Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making.
Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded.
Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations.
Identify actions taken by the IMT and Forest to meet the intent/direction of the
Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol.
6. Identify practical application of risk management concepts that generate positive
outcomes (Public Safety, Firefighter and Cost).
Fire Environment
Blue Mountain Interagency Dispatch Center (BMIDC) was relatively busy during the week
previous to the Vinegar Fire with thirty (30) initial attacks (IAs). The BMIDC set up an
expanded dispatch for the Vinegar Fire. The Vinegar Fire was started by lightning on
August 12, 2013 from a passing weather system that moved through Oregon, southern
Washington and Idaho. The District at the time of the Vinegar Fire’s start had an additional
six IA fires that they were managing at the same time. It had been a busy summer and
many of the fires had gone into extended attack before being suppressed.
At the time of the Vinegar Fire, the Pacific Northwest (PNW) Region and State of Oregon
had several large project fires (Big Windy, Whiskey Complex, Douglas Complex, etc.) and
critical resources (Type1 (T1)/Type 2 (T2) air tankers, T1 helicopters, Interagency Hotshot
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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Crews) were becoming scarce. At the time the fire started, the PNW Region was at
Preparedness Level (PL) 4 and the national PL was 3.
The Vinegar Fire was detected on Vinegar Hill (Appendix- Area Closure map) in the
southeast part of the NFJDW. There were numerous hazards and conditions (inaccessible,
steep terrain, active fire behavior and mine adits (mine entrances) that Dispatch and the
duty officer had to consider in managing the fire. The decision was made to order the
Redmond Smokejumpers and requested that one of the jumpers be qualified as a T3 IC.
The intent, at that time was to place resources within the NFJDW and use a direct strategy
(containment lines with one foot in the black). After careful consideration by fire managers
and line officers of the values at risk and the firefighter’s exposure to uncommon hazards
(i.e. mine adits, potential for unexploded ordinance), difficult and inaccessible terrain, and
expected fire behavior, a decision was made to employ an indirect strategy focused on
point protection and containment of some portions of the fire, while putting other portions
of the fire in monitor status. This strategy balanced the need to protect critical values at
risk, such as the nearby communities, with firefighter exposure.
Fire behavior on the Vinegar Fire from the day of IA on August 12-22, 2013 was influenced
by heavy fuel loadings, remote access, warm temperatures in the 80-88 degree range, low
relative humidity, gusty winds from the northeast up to about 25 m.p.h. and unstable
atmospheric conditions as reflected in a Haines Index of 1-4 and multiple Red Flag days
(lightning). These conditions produced a high intensity fire with torching, crowning, and
spotting from ¼ to ½ mile. Initially the fire grew toward the north, which is normal for this
time of year. The fire spread 50-100 acres quickly during the first day, established on a
ridge and started backing downhill, though spotting. This was a fire with the potential of
being large and complex. From August 16-21, 2013 the fire experienced changes in wind
direction and grew to the south and southeast threatening the communities of Greenhorn
(adjacent to the NFJDW Boundary) and Granite, and burning toward adjacent jurisdictions
including the Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman National Forests, two counties and two ODF
Districts (Appendix –Operational Map). Local firefighters and AAs with past fire experience
in this area reported that they expected the fire to continue spreading to the north and not
swing to the south, southeast.
The alignment of the terrain, fuel conditions (low dead and live fuel moisture), in addition
to the change in wind direction caused the fire to grow approximately 1,000 acres.
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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
From August 19-22, 2013 the fire received some sporadic, light precipitation. After August
26, 2013 the fire experienced little growth due to more seasonal weather conditions with
cooler temperatures and higher relative humidity. It was contained and turned back to the
District on September 5, 2013.
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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Fire Chronology
Date
8/12
8/14
%
0
0
Command
Initial Attack
T3 B. Coville
Acres
100
150
+
Comments
8/16
0
T2 B. Watts
310
160
8/17
0
T2 B. Watts
858
548
8/18
0
T2 B. Watts
858
0
8/19
0
T2 B. Watts
913
55
8/20
0
T2 B. Watts
964
51
8/21
0
T2 B. Watts
1,059
95
8/22
0
T2 B. Watts
1,161
102
8/23
5
T2 B. Fillis
1,161
0
8/24
10
T2 B. Fillis
1,161
0
50
Fire will spread on all
perimeters, sustained
crown runs. IMT 2 Watts
will shadow tomorrow,
take fire 8/15.
VAR-Greenhorn, Historical
structures (cabins) and
affects the Natural
Resources in North Fork
John Day Wilderness.
Remote location, access,
limited resource
availability (IHC,
Aviation), continued dry
and windy, hazards
associated with historic
and active mines.
IHC and engines needed
for Greenhorn Community
burn-out and protection.
Level 2 evacuation
recommended Alamo- an
area north of Greenhorn.
Level 1 evacuation for
Greenhorn, primary and
secondary lines
construction (N & E).
Road closures, active fire
behavior, Level II
recommended for Alamo,
line completed on E.
Alamo reduced to Level I,
weather dry and windy.
Active fire behaviortorching and spotting,
Alamo and Level I.,
continue point protection.
Oregon Team 2 (Fillis)
shadows today, area and
road closures in affect.
Level I in place, continue
line construction, assist IA
with WWF and UMF. Mopup SE/E and NE Divisions.
Level I in place, continue
line construction, assist IA
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Person
Cost
50
20,000
283
300,000
339
873,000
419
1.1 mil
517
1.5 mil
561
2.1 mil
547
2.8 mil
534
3.4 mil
535
4.2 mil
537
4.7 mil
Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
8/25
20
T2 B. Fillis
1,220
59
8/26
45
T2 B. Fillis
1,220
0
8/27
45
T3 S. Severs
1,220
0
8/28
45
T3 S. Severs
1,233
13
8/29
45
T3 S. Severs
1,291
58
8/30
45
T3 S. Severs
1,316
55
8/31
45
T3 S. Severs
1,323
7
9/1
45
T3 S. Severs
1,333
10
9/2
45
T3 S. Severs
1,350
17
9/3
9/4
45
53
T3 S. Severs
T3 S. Severs
1,350
1,351
0
1
9/5
53
T4 District
1,351
53
4 IMT’s
25
days
1,351 Total Ac.
with WWF and UMF. Mopup SE/E and NE Divisions.
SAT visit yesterday,
continue contingency line
preparation.
Point Protection and mop
up. TOC planned 8/27.
Concerns- remote location,
weather (dry, windy),
creeping and smoldering.
Point protection and mopup on E.
Interior- creeping and
smoldering, increase due
to more accurate mapping.
Mop-up in all divisions.
Interior creeping isolated
torching and short range
spotting, SW corner
perimeter. Mop-up Divs.
Growth in Salmon Creek
and East Fork Clear Creek
drainages. Mop-up in Divs.
Growth in SW isolated
torching and short range
spotting.
Mop-up all divisions,
interior still active.
Growth in SW corner,
Mop-up continues in all
Divisions.
Continue mop-up.
Continue mop-up,
transition to T4 tomorrow.
Patrol and Mop-up.
No reportable accidents,
86,850 personnel hours
489
5.5 mil
330
5.8 mil
115
6.1 mil
115
6.4 mil
115
6.5 mil
99
6.7 mil
91
6.8 mil
89
7.1 mil
80
7.2 mil
32
28
7.3 mil
7.3 mil
5,790
Persons
$7,380,000
Critical Values at Risk (VAR)
VAR in the fire area as identified by the FS, cooperators/partners, and key stakeholders
included: firefighters, public and responders; the communities of Greenhorn and Granite;
scattered structures within and outside the NFJDW; the social/political relationship of
private citizens and the ODF. Resource and wilderness values, such as wildlife habitat,
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Vinegar Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
watershed values, aesthetics, etc. were identified by agency personnel. No homes or
businesses were destroyed or damaged, but the community of Greenhorn was threatened
and required the construction of a shaded fuel break.
Observations
The following are observations the team made in the report:

On the first day of the Vinegar Fire, a key decision was made by local fire managers.
The decision was to disengage from direct attack and initiate actions to protect VAR
(point protection). The early recognition of the need to change strategy increased
the probability of success and decreased firefighter (smokejumpers) exposure to
hazards.

The lend-lease (aviation) agreement between the Pacific Northwest and the
Intermountain Region (specifically the Payette, Nez-Perce and Wallowa-Whitman,
Umatilla and Malheur NFs) provided for outstanding cooperation, efficiencies, and
working relationships for the Forests that border these two Regions.

The agreement(s) (formal and informal) between the Pacific Northwest Region and
the ODF provides many types of organizational strengths. The sharing, training,
collaboration and cooperation of resources (personnel and equipment) pre-season,
during and post season provides for support during critical times. This is an
exceptional example of a strong partnership/relationship that needs to be
considered as an example to other regions.

The Umatilla NF maintains an active relationship with the local publics and the ODF.
Numerous meetings and scenario based workshops are attended regularly by FS
(Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) and State of Oregon personnel. The
relationship(s) developed in the course of pre-season planning/training was
consistently brought up as a critical element in the success of the incident.
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U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014

Throughout the duration of the fire, a number of Forest Managers were assigned as
“shadows”1 to the Umatilla Forest Supervisor. The Forest and Region are actively
trying to increase the “capacity” and “capability” of qualified Fire Managers.
The team made other observations and developed lessons learned based on personal and
phone interviews and written documentation. The team is available for future discussions
as needed regarding the materials included in this review.
Discussion by review objective
The following observations, recommendations and Lessons Learned (positive and negative)
are organized by the six objectives of the review. There are subjects, topics and situations that
can be shared locally, geographically (Pacific Northwest Region), nationally, within all three
areas and with all Incident Management Teams (Type 1 and Type 2) and Incident
Management Organizations (Type 3 IMO).
Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires this Past Season
The Vinegar Fire burned a relatively small (1,351 acres) geographical area all within the
NFJDW.

One of the lessons learned was the value of involving stakeholders (especially the
ODF) early to establish dialogue on VAR, firefighter exposure, risk verses gain to
inform and support decisions about fire strategies.

Even with the burning conditions and rapid large fire growth, Incident Management
Team (IMT) were able to keep up with local contacts and notifications through
aggressive outreach and communications plans. Communicating with the public
and partners and gathering local input was essential to success. Utilizing the
landowners, Oregon District Forester (John Buckman) and especially the knowledge
and expertise of local FS personnel knowledge aided in the development of
strategies, tactics, VAR, and community interactions that were both effective and
well supported.
1
Shadowing; having visiting Line Officers mentored by an experienced and qualified Fire Manager; learning about
fire; increasing their skill, knowledge and experience on large complex fires.
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U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014

Pre-season planning and implementation is an important practice. Annually, the
Forest conducted workshops, simulations and training, tests and exercises,
cooperator/partner response, defined the roles and responsibilities of fire managers
and line officers. Workshops also ensured that firefighters understood fire behavior
(intensity and spotting), fuel characteristics, predicted weather patterns and rates of
spread so they could be prepared for the fire season.

Open communication between the three NFs (Umatilla, Wallowa-Whitman and
Malheur) as well as the ODF was displayed on the Vinegar Fire. The Forest
Supervisor and fire staff from the Umatilla NF made contact with their neighboring
forests well before the Vinegar Fire even started. They had a fairly busy season to
date and requested additional resources for fire management activities and
leadership. Effective pre-season communication about risk, VAR, and firefighter
exposure with communities, stakeholders, partners and adjacent units (Nez PerceClearwater and Payette NFs, and Region 4) was critical to success during the
incident. The public, communities, cooperators and partners basically understood
fire suppression activities and a have a good relationship with the FS.

Due to appropriate pre-season planning, Region 4 typically loans aircraft to their
neighbors to the west whenever possible.

Dutch Creek protocols and procedures, [approved by National Wildfire Coordinating
Group (NWCG)] have been in place for several years. Information such as point of
contact, patient assessment, stabilization and transportation (ground and/or air)
within the proper time frame (situation dependent) is vital. Assigning ground
ambulances, EMTs and paramedics to specific locations of high risk operations is
common place within the Forest’s fire organization. Remote locations and smoky
conditions with poor visibility often cause fire personnel to rely on ground support
rather than air-ambulances or designated team aviation assets.

The development of the Strategic Risk Assessment for the incoming IMT assisted in
VAR identification, identifying responder exposure and defining long-term strategy
(tactical, resource needs, etc.). Utilizing technical specialists, such as a Fire Behavior
Analyst at public meetings to explain topography and fuel characteristics, influence
of fire behavior, etc. helped to demonstrate professionalism and encourage
cooperation between the public and Umatilla NF.
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U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014

Clarity of the mission is paramount to a successful outcome. Every firefighter must
understand the purpose and importance of their actions to provide an
understanding of expectations and risk vs. gain.

Brian Watts’ Type 2 IMT has developed a Liaison Officer guidebook (guide) for
helping personnel work with the public, cooperators and partners. The guide is an
excellent example of who to talk to, why and what to say to interested persons about
the fire.

The forests (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) are excellent examples of a
willingness to take the extra step to build AA fire management capacity. They had
numerous line officers and other staff come to the Forest to shadow, train and be
mentored in a highly complex fire unit.

The forest Public Affairs Officer updates and prepares a communication briefing
package prior to the fire season. The package consists of current contact
information (phone and email) of community leaders, political appointees, land
owners, cooperators and partners that can be given to incoming IMTs during the fire
season.
Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored into Our Decision Making

The social and political issues on the fire could have been controversial for the
Forest and the IMTs if the fire had come out of the NFJDW and impacted the
community of Greenhorn and/or the ODF Districts. The Forest was well aware of
this risk and took proactive steps to minimize the sociopolitical impacts by
communicating early and frequently with partners and cooperators, initiating
aggressive public relations and communicating the plan and including key
stakeholders in the decision making process and rationale.

Protection of private property and structures were clearly identified as a priority in
the objectives for the incident. Most of the employees expressed an understanding
of the VAR for the different stakeholders. Values such as communities, structures
and infrastructure were easily identified and those stakeholders were included in
the process.
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U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region
Umatilla National Forest, March 2014

The direction of the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the fire season was a catalyst for
additional risk management discussions with the public, partners and local
communities. They are extremely familiar with historic strategies and tactics within
this remote, wilderness rich area. Fire personnel knowing that direct attack in this
type of fuel and terrain can be difficult at best, spent days visiting with people in the
potentially threatened community of Greenhorn managing expectations about best
fire management practices and keeping them informed of current strategies and
expected fire behavior.

The ODF utilized full suppression, with numerous resources (personnel, equipment
and aviation) to keep fires small and protect the public and private property. Their
preferred method of fire suppression is single command with strong agency
representation. They do not manage wildfires for multiple objectives and avoid
managing long duration incidents. These suppression philosophies are not well
aligned with current Federal management policies. The Forests (Umatilla and
Wallowa-Whitman NFs) are working hard with the ODF (workshops, meetings and
training) on developing a mutual understanding of risk management and risk
analysis principles. Because of these efforts, partner relationships with the Forest
Service are excellent.

There was a considerable amount of time and energy spent between the Forest, ODF
and IMTs concerning the indirect line – shaded fuel break placed between the fire
and the community of Greenhorn. Although it remained untested by the fire, the
shaded fuel break (250’ wide, 1 mile long) gave the community of Greenhorn a
measure of protection from not only the Vinegar Fire but future fires as well. The
project was stopped when the weather and fire behavior moderated and the threat
to the community of Greenhorn diminished. In addition, IMTs had over 80 portable
pumps, porta-tanks and miles of hose laid out for the protection of VAR. What type
of tactics and strategy can or should be used for the protection (shaded fuel break,
sprinklers, gel, wrapping, retardant, etc.) of VAR? At what point are efforts such as
this beyond the scope of responding to the immediate threat of the current and
expected wildfire (no longer an emergency action) and would therefore require
NEPA documentation? This is not a local or even a regional issue, but national in
scope and should be discussed before the next fire season.
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Umatilla National Forest, March 2014

In the initial stages of the fire, extreme fire behavior, inaccessible terrain caused the
Duty Officer and IA resources to rely on Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATS) to slow
down the fire growth. It is fairly common for the public to think that if fire
managers are not utilizing aviation “they are not fighting the fire.” The decision to
stop flying was ultimately tied to excessive risk to the pilots and the low probability
of success. Some aviation cost could have been reduced with less SEAT use.
Identify Which Current Procedures can be Enhanced or Expanded

The WFDSS process was considered cumbersome with questionable value for the
firefighting or decision making effort. Some felt it was a valuable tool in the
beginning, but lost value as the incident increased in size, intensity and complexity.
In some instances, IMTs and units find themselves behind and playing catch-up on
highly complex fires documenting strategy in WFDSS. Password expiration dates
can be untimely.
Some personnel felt WFDSS was eventually used for
documentation and not for making informed decisions and alternative development.
Another perspective gleaned from interviews was that WFDSS is simply a web site
that houses fire behavior and analysis tools and the major output of any
consequence or timeliness is the strategic risk analysis. It would be useful for
additional clarity at a national level to define what WFDSS should be. If the intent is
that WFDSS is a documentation tool, then being a day or two behind on publishing a
decision may not matter. If it is intended to serve as a decision aid- in that a
decision is only made after the WFDSS is largely complete- then it may be necessary
to streamline the process so that decisions may be published in real time.

The Forest did present Brian Watts’ T2 IMT with the Strategic Risk Assessment
(SRA) and a set of broad strategies and asked them to develop specific
strategy/tactics and bring them back the next day to the Forest for review. An IMT
doesn’t often have the time to be able to develop specific strategies over a 24 hour
period. However, the low intensity fire behavior allowed this transition to occur.
The development of strategy, tactics and objectives over a longer than normal time
period assured both the Forest Supervisor and the Incident Commander that they
were on the same end-state page for the fire.
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Umatilla National Forest, March 2014

Programmatic fire reviews in the present context of “Lessons Learned” for AAs,
IMTs and Fire Managers was viewed as a good tool. This effort is aimed at providing
an atmosphere of learning in a very dynamic environment.

Communication between the incoming IMT and Expanded Dispatch has to be
developed as soon as possible by phone. If the area doesn’t have hard line capability
and/or cell phone coverage, it is strongly recommended that the IMT order a cellon-wheels (COW) immediately. The facilitation of orders (supplies, equipment and
personnel) is vital to successful fire management.

It is also important that IMTs assess their resource needs with the host unit before
ordering equipment that is not initially needed (for example Engine Strike Teams in
a Wilderness). A “standard” pre-order of equipment, personnel and supplies are not
needed on every fire and/or situation. The time and expense for expanded dispatch
to un-order/cancel the resource order(s) is unnecessary.

There were minimal accident/injuries on the fire line; and no reportable illnesses or
injuries on the fire. The IMTs used the standard ICS-206 Medical Plan with an
attached 9 line. None of the Teams are accurately following the NWCG Dutch Creek
protocols on the ICS-206. All of the ICs asked for the protocol information and they
agreed to apply it to their medical plans for the next fire/fire season.

All of the IMTs involved with the Vinegar Fire appropriately utilized the
Hazard/Risk Modified 215A which identifies hazards, probability of exposure,
consequences, risk level and mitigations.

The Redmond Smokejumpers/T3 IMO was assigned to reconnaissance of the fire
(after the transition with Watts T2 IMT) but more importantly were delegated to go
to the communities of Granite and Greenhorn to visit with the local residents to
make the fire efforts and resources visible to the public. The relationship between
the forest fire management organization and public was enhanced greatly by their
interaction.

Transitions between like teams (i.e. T2 IMT to T2 IMT) were identified as normally
being a smooth transition. Transitions from a T2 IMT to a T3 IMO is usually more
challenging and requires additional time, focused efforts, and often requires some
members of the outgoing team to remain with the new IMO for a period of time. The
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Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
transition between Brett Fillis’ T2 IMT and the incoming Shane Severs’ T3 IMO
presented challenges and it would have been beneficial to have an extra day built
into the transition plan. The information exchanged was too little and the time too
short and it took the T3 personnel two days longer to get a handle on porta-pump
locations, understand shaded fuel break direction and get a full accounting of
personnel allocation (numbers and positions). It is vital for incoming IMT/IMO to
completely understand and agree with conditions, personnel numbers and
expectations regarding successful incident management.

Type 3 IMOs are configured two different ways: a standing established Command
and General (C&G) Staff and/or picking personnel from a pool (ad-hoc) and making
up the team. Established teams have team cohesion and know each other’s skills,
knowledge and abilities. While pick-up teams have to develop that information
about each other in a very short period of time while still managing the incident.
There are times, when just identifying and selecting personnel is a challenge. In
addition, T3 ad-hoc organizations do not have a Liaison Officer (vitally needed on
the Vinegar Fire), and at times have minimal logistics and finance skills and
experience. As mentioned in earlier fire reviews, T3 position identification and
training is wanted and needed for T3 organizations. The only two positions that
have Incident Qualification and Certification System (IQCS) identifiers are the T3 IC
and the Line Safety Officer. Other C&G staff positions on the ad-hoc team (logistics,
public information, planning) have no formal training requirements.

Logistical challenges can cost a lot of time and effort and can be a distraction to an
IMT/IMO. The Vinegar Fire presented such a challenge with an issue regarding the
caterer. Initially, a local caterer was ordered for the Vinegar Fire because a national
caterer was not available. As soon as a national caterer became available, the IMT
was ordered to replace the local caterer with the available national caterer. This
process was very time consuming and frustrating to the IMO. The IMO felt it made
little sense to replace what was working as well as incur in and out set-up and
demobilization costs to make this swap. National/Regional Contracting Officers
should be able to evaluate the situation and make a decision dependent on cost,
suitability, and customer service.
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Identify Improvements that can be made in Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

It is the expectation of the Deputy Chief of State and Private (S&PF) and the
Washington Office Director of Fire and Aviation Management (FAM) that we
emphasize the importance of communicating our intent to all of our partners,
including AAs and ICs. They expect each region and forest to become actively
engaged with their stakeholders and prepare them to participate in risk-informed
decision making meetings to prepare them for the upcoming fire season. The
Leader’s Intent from the Forest Supervisor was stressed very often on the Vinegar
Fire. Firefighter, aviation and public safety was the primary objective.

The forests (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) conducted pre-season planning
to ensure that cooperators understood their roles and responsibilities for
evacuations and fire management activities. The unit provided clear direction and
understanding of their expectations for the fire season.
Early on, they
communicated and worked with local law enforcement, landowners, permittees,
partners and cooperators with developing an understanding of the “what ifs” of
wildland fire.

The continued partnership development with the local volunteer fire departments
and cooperators included sand table scenarios, simulations and joint exercises.
Strong relationships have been built with an understanding of capabilities and
establishing priorities relating to VAR.

Communication of leader’s intent, expectations, management and resource
objectives and definition(s) e.g. point protection, at the forest level is essential.
Leader’s intent was transferred from the AA through the IMTs and IMOs to every
firefighter, cooperator and partner on the incident.
Identify Actions Taken by the IMT and Forest to Meet the Intent/Direction of the
Chief’s 2013 Wildland Fire Response Protocol.

The Forests (Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs) met regularly pre-season and
during the season to discuss fire management activities. They hosted pre-season
workshops and scenarios with personnel from the ODF, Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and other cooperators/partners (rural fire departments).
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Forest personnel also attend the Regional Aviation and Fire Management, Fire and
Leadership Team (FALT) and the Oregon Eastside pre-season meeting prior to the
fire season. The meetings and workshops ensured that equipment and cost-share
agreements are in place and that risk analysis; firefighter exposure and VAR
principles are understood. The Umatilla NF had the National Incident Management
Organization (NIMO) come to the forest and facilitate risk based scenarios and sandtable exercises. It is apparent that these meetings have contributed to an excellent
working relationship and understanding between fire managers from the different
entities.

Fire personnel as well as forest personnel have After Action Reviews (AAR) after
each incident and at the end of the fire season. The intent is to discuss what
happened on the incident and how they can improve the next time. In most cases,
cooperators (rural fire departments) and partners (BLM and ODF) are invited to
participate.

IMT/IMOs habitually conduct AAR within their functional area sections (Logistics,
Operations, Command, etc.) and with the C&G Team Leaders to discuss lessons
learned and how to improve.
The Region, Forest and District(s) have been cooperative, open and frank in their
discussions with the Programmatic/Cost Review team, to discuss ways to improve fire
management activities and review lessons learned on the Vinegar Fire. Their commitment
to a learning culture is commendable.
Identify Practical Application of Risk Management Concepts that Generate Positive
Outcomes (Public Safety, Firefighter and Cost).

The Umatilla NF, in conjunction with the Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman NFs
prepared for the fire season all year long. During pre-season, they historically have
an eastside Oregon meeting with key stakeholders, partners and cooperators.

On the Vinegar Fire, the Umatilla NF demonstrated several applications of risk
management including:
o Worked with the Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman NFs to prepare Leader’s
Intent and fire objectives: firefighter exposure and public safety were the
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number one priority; private structures; property and Forest
infrastructure/resources were second; and natural landscape values were
third. The Five Rights were discussed and reiterated daily: Right Plan; Right
Place; Right Time; and Right Assets for the Right Duration.
o The Umatilla and Wallowa-Whitman NFs personnel prepared a Strategic Risk
Assessment (SRA) during the IA phase of the Vinegar Fire. The VAR, (What is
important? Why is it Important? and How Important is it?); firefighter
exposure; probability of success; and the fire’s objectives were an integral
part of the SRA.
o Changing the strategy from direct attack to indirect attack, (point protection)
as soon as they discovered that direct attack was unsafe for firefighters.
They shared the risk discussion with the ODF, the public, Malheur and
Wallowa-Whitman NFs and cooperators.
o Initiated and stayed in two way risk communication with the IMTs, the
communities of Greenhorn and Granite, landowners, two County Sheriffs
(Grant and Baker Counties), Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman NFs,
Cooperators (rural fire departments), and partners (BLM and ODF).

The AA of the Umatilla NF had five “shadow” Line Officers (mentees) with him
during the month of the Vinegar Fire. He truly believes in increasing the capacity
and capability of fire management decision makers locally and nationally.

The IMTs and T3 organizations utilized the modified Risk/Hazard 215A that
identifies hazards, exposure frequency, consequences, initial risk level, mitigations
and the residual risk level. The risks from the hazards and mitigations were
discussed daily with responders and the Umatilla NF. The results were: 25+ fire
days, 1,351 acres burned, four (4) IMTs and IMOs assigned, 5,790 persons were on
the fire with 86,850 personnel hours worked with no reportable accidents. This is a
commendable safety record that can be directly attributed to the leadership and
personnel on the Vinegar Fire.

The Dutch Creek Protocols: mission locations; medical support and assessment; and
distance and time for medical extraction (ground and aerial) were discussed, and
the Region 6 Nine Line was attached to the ICS-206 Medical Plan. Though especially
not bulleted within Block 8 (Special Instructions) of the Medical Plan for this fire, all
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Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
fire personnel understood the process in case of serious accident/injury. The IMTs
will modify their Medical Plans prior to the 2014 Fire Season.
Attachments








Vinegar Fire History – Key Fire Events (see page 23).
WFDSS Information - August 18, 2013 (see page 25).
Medical 9 Line Information (see page 30)
Transportation Map - August 27, 2013 (see page 31).
Public Information Map - August 27, 2013 (See page 32).
Vinegar Fire Area Closure Map (see page 33).
Infrared Map - August 19, 2013 (see page 34).
Personnel Interview List (Phone and Forest) (see page 35).
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Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
Key Fire Events
The Vinegar Fire (OR-UMF-000845) was ignited by lightning on Sunday, August 11, 2013,
and was declared 100% contained on September 5, 2013, after burning 1,351 acres in
Oregon within the North Fork John Day Wilderness on the Umatilla National Forest.
The fire was detected and put under an initial attack strategy on August 12, 2013 along
with seven other lightning caused fires within the area. The rapid growth of the Vinegar
Fire in acres, situation and complexity led to multiple transitions of Incident Management
Teams (IMT). The fire strategy was initially to go direct (fighting the fire close to the fires
edge) and then changed to an indirect strategy/point protection strategy (backing off from
the fires edge) because of the hazards and risk exposure to firefighters. The fire was initial
attacked by a Type 3 Incident Management Organization (IMO) (Brandon Coville T3 IC and
Jason Barber T3 IC trainee) but rapidly progressed in complexity to a Type 2 IMT (Brian
Watts IC-Oregon Team 4). An opportunity that provided a quick transition was that Brian
Watts Type 2 team was closing out a fire (GC Complex) in John Day, Oregon, just an hour
away from the Vinegar Fire, and had 7 days left on their fourteen day tour.
The Management Objectives on the Vinegar Fire were:
 Implement good risk management practices in order to provide for firefighter,
other responder and public safety. Use good risk analysis processes, principles of
the 10 Standards Fire Orders, LCES and the 18 Watch-Out situations as the
foundation for risk decisions at all levels.
 Use aggressive outreach to ensure timely and accurate dissemination of
information regarding fire related activities is provided to the public, landowners,
cooperators, elected officials and other stakeholders.
 Utilize efficient and effective business practices to manage the fire cost, which
should be in alignment with the identified values to be protected.
 Ensure that relationships are maintained or enhanced with local cooperators,
landowners, the general public and other key stakeholders. Seek input from
landowners and cooperators in development of strategies.
The understood values at risk (VAR) were firefighters, aviators, the public, the
communities of Greenhorn and Granite, mining claims, miscellaneous structures in and
outside the North Fork John Day Wilderness, the Olive Lake wooden pipeline, and other
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values spread across two National Forests (Malheur and Wallowa-Whitman), two counties
(Grant and Baker) and two Oregon Department of Forestry Districts.
The strategy chosen was to manage the Vinegar Fire as a full suppression incident
(although in-direct), basing priorities on the VAR. Firefighters, the public and other
incident responders were identified as the highest value. Protection of structures,
community assets and private property were the second highest priority and natural
resource values were the last priority. The message was clear: keep the fire within the
North Fork John Day Wilderness if possible.
Oregon Team 4 timed out and Bret Fillis (Oregon T2 Team 2) who had been staged at La
Grande, OR for a fire that did not materialize (District caught it) was reassigned to the
Vinegar Fire from August 23-26, 2013. The Vinegar Fire had gotten some precipitation and
fire growth was mainly interior with little perimeter growth.
Oregon Team 2 timed out and was replaced by Shane Severs local T3 Incident Management
Organization from August 27, 2013 until it was turned back to the District/Forest on
September 5, 2013.
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WFDSS SUMMARY (Weather, Objectives, Course of Action, Validation and Rationale)
August 18, 2013 - Day 7 of Fire, Watts’ T2 IMT in place
Weather
 Dry, Rh 19-27%, breezy, 3-7 day, mostly clear, normal temps (47-52, 81-88)
degrees.
Objectives
 Base all actions on sound risk management principles with the highest priority on
firefighter and public safety (following standard firefighter safety protocols and
provision for firefighter and public safety is the highest priority).
 Keep fire costs commensurate with the values at risk.
 Ensure positive communications with affected partners, agencies and communities.
 Protect private inholdings, structures and improvements.
 Keep fire east of Olive Lake, south of the 10 road, west of 1310 road, north of
Malheur National Forest boundary.
Course of Action
 Confine and contain fire while protecting the highest values at risk as described in
the strategic Risk Assessment (SRA).
Validation
 Relative Risk Notes - There is a high hazard to firefighter safety and a low
probability of success with a direct attack. Currently there is an imminent threat to
the high value private structures and communities.
 Hazards Notes - The fuel type is timber with significant amounts of standing dead
trees and down fuels, most closely represented by fire behavior fuel model 10. The
upper elevations are lodge pole pine with a mixture of sub-alpine fir. The fuels in
the Vinegar Hill Scenic Area tend to a fuel model 2 with lighter fuels. Limited
existing safety zones are available for a direct attack.
 Value Notes - The most significant values at risk are adjacent private structures
related to mining claims and the communities of Greenhorn and Granite.
Secondarily, the Olive Lake Campground and the Fremont Powerhouse (and
associated wooden pipeline) are recreational assets that should be protected where
possible.
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
Probability Notes - Due to heavy fuel and fire on mid slopes there is a low
probability of success with direct attack and due to the overhead hazards and lack of
safety zones high exposure to fire fighters.
Risk Assessment
Intent
 This assessment was prepared on behalf of the Agency Administrators of the
Umatilla National Forest involved in Vinegar Fire and is intended to serve as Agency
Administrator fundamental Incident Guidance with respect to strategic direction.
The assessment provides a relative comparison of alternative strategic directions
based on the values at risk, protection objectives and exposure of incident
responders to the risks of wildland fire. The assessment reflects Agency
Administrators’ careful consideration of management strategies and was completed
with their full engagement and direction.
Current Incident Summary

The Vinegar Fire is currently 300 acres and is located in the Greenhorn Unit of the
North Fork John Day Wilderness, Umatilla National Forest, near the community of
Greenhorn. The fire initiated in the Vinegar Hill Scenic Area, but was pushed by
winds from the southwest downhill to the northeast and ended up above Dry Creek
within one mile of the Wilderness and Wallowa-Whitman National Forest
boundaries. The fuel type is timber with significant amounts of standing dead-trees
and down fuels, most closely represented by fuel model 10. The upper elevations
are lodge pole pine with a mixture of sub-alpine fir. There are numerous
interspersed areas of rock scree and alpine meadows that break up the fuel
continuity. The fuels in the Vinegar Hill Scenic Area tend to a fuel model 2 with
lighter fuels.
Key Incident Objectives


Provide for firefighter and public safety
Utilize risk management to provide for the safety of incident personnel and the
public while implementing reasonable objectives commensurate with the values at
risk and probability of success.
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Umatilla National Forest, March 2014






Protect private inholdings, structures and improvements.
Protect the structures and assets related to the Olive Lake Campground and
Fremont Powerhouse.
Protect Wilderness values and natural and cultural resources by utilizing MIST
tactics and existing trails and natural barriers.
Maintain suppression costs commensurate with values at risk.
Maintain and enhance relationships with agency partners, cooperators, and
community leaders by providing timely and accurate information.
Utilize resources from local communities wherever possible.
What are the critical values at risk?
The most significant values at risk are adjacent private structures related to mining claims
and the communities of Greenhorn and Granite. Secondarily, the Olive Lake Campground
and the Fremont Powerhouse (and associated wooden pipeline) are recreational assets
that should be protected where possible.
Risk Analysis:
By implementing a confine and contain strategy in the wilderness, firefighter safety
and costs should be minimized.
Options Considered:
Option 1 - Perimeter Control, Contingency Checking and Monitoring. Option 1 uses
a combination of perimeter control, contingency lines, and monitoring to provide
protection of critical values at risk. Fireline is used to provide protection of
identified values (described in table above).
Option 2 - Full Perimeter Control. Option 2 uses a full perimeter control strategy to
fully contain the fire as small as possible.
Option Comparison:
This assessment develops the person-hours of exposure of incident personnel for
the total option and estimates the cost of the option. The assessment assumes that
each person is exposed for 14-hours per option-day for hand crews and equipment
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Umatilla National Forest, March 2014
crew (e.g., engines, water tenders). For aviation resources, exposure is based on 6hours per option-day.
Option #1
Perimeter Control, Contingency Checking and Monitoring
Estimated Incident Responder Exposure (person hours)
1300 Firefighter-days (70% probability of success)
Estimated Cost: $1,300,000
Option #2
Full Perimeter Control
2100 Firefighter-days (30% probability of success)
Estimated Cost $2,100,000
Risk Communication:
The Umatilla NF, Wallowa-Whitman NF, Oregon Department of Forestry (NE Oregon
and Central Oregon Districts), and Grant County and Baker County Commissioners
and Sheriff’s Offices will continue to be involved in management of this incident to
its conclusion. Press releases are being sent to concerned members of the public,
interest groups, neighboring agencies, partners, and media. These groups will
continue to receive relevant information and public comment will be considered in
the management of the incident.
Risk Sharing:
The District Ranger is working closely with the Forest Supervisor in the
management of this incident. The Forest Supervisor has been in contact with
regional staff and has briefed the Regional Forester and Regional Fire Director. The
importance of working together is to provide clarity to the IMT for the course of
action selection and leader’s intent direction was stressed.
Risk Decision:
Based on the findings outlined below, my decision is to implement Option # 1Perimeter Control, Contingency Checking and Monitoring.
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Findings:
The selected course of action is the least exposure prospect that meets the incident
objectives, is worth exposing incident responders to the inherent hazards of the
wildland fire environment, and has a reasonable probability of success. The
selected option is reasonably safe for firefighters to implement.
Risk Monitoring:
As this incident develops, I will monitor the effectiveness of the course of action
with the IMT. If conditions warrant, the risk assessment, analysis and risk decision
will be revised as needed.
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Transportation Map
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Vinegar Fire Public Information Map
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Vinegar Fire Infrared Map
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Vinegar IMT (Phone) Interview Schedule
OR- UMF-000845
Assigned
Type
Name
Position
Date and Time
8/14
T3
Brandon Coville
IC –T3
Tuesday Feb 18 @ 0900 PT
8/16
T2
Brian Watts
Nick Lunde (AD)
IC (Team 4)
DIC
Tuesday Feb 4 @ 0800 PT
Tuesday Feb 4 @ 0800 PT
8/23
T2
Bret Fillis
Eric Knerr
IC (Team 2)
DIC
Tuesday Feb 4 @ 1300 PT
Tuesday Feb 4 @ 1300 PT
8/27
T3
Shane Severs
IC
Monday Feb 3 @ 0900 PT
Umatilla National Forest Interview Schedule
2517 SW Hailey Ave, Pendleton, OR 97801
March 5, 2014
1000 Kevin Martin
1100 Brian Goff
1100 Kelly Hedgepeth
1200 Joani Bosworth
1200 John Buckman
Forest Supervisor
Forest Fire Staff
District FMO
Public Affairs
ODF District Forester
541-278-3752
541-278-3748
541-427-5357
541-278-3722
541-963-3168
Tamarack
Tamarack
Potamus
Potamus
Tamarack
Wallowa-Whitman National Forest Interview Schedule
1550 Dewey Ave, Baker City OR
1500
1530
1600
John Laurence
Tom Montoya
Bret Ruby
Forest Supervisor
Deputy Forest Supervisor
Fire Staff
541-523-1202
541-523-1203
541-523-1207
541-519-8280
For. Sup. Office
Grande Ronde
Phone
Zone Position/Blue Mtn. Dispatch Center (BMIDC) Interview Schedule
59973 Downs Rd, La Grande OR
March 6, 2014 @ 0900
0900
1000
1100
Renae Crippen
Billie Hopkins
Miles Hancock
BMIDC Center Manager
Exp. Dispatch Coordinator
Unit Aviation Officer
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541-975-5402
541-975-5403
541-975-5418
BMIDC
BMIDC
BMIDC