European Economic and Social Committee
REX/432
How media is used to
influence social and political
processes in the EU and
Eastern neighbouring
countries
Brussels, 8 May 2015
INFORMATION REPORT
of the
Section for External Relations
on
How media is used to influence social and political processes in the EU and Eastern
neighbouring countries
_____________
Rapporteur: Indrė Vareikytė
_____________
Administrator: Ms Ernšteina
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Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 99 — 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel — BELGIQUE/BELGIË
Tel. +32 25469011 — Fax +32 25134893 — Internet: http://www.eesc.europa.eu
EN
On 11 December 2014, the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 31 of its
Rules of Procedure, decided to instruct its Section for External Relations to draw up an information
report on
How media is used to influence social and political processes in the EU and Eastern
neighbouring countries.
The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the
subject, adopted its information report on 28 April 2015.
*
*
*
1.
Conclusions and recommendations
1.1
The freedom of information and expression are inviolable in the EU, yet this freedom can also
be used to overturn its principles in order to make debate and critical thinking impossible and
not as a tool to inform or persuade, but as a weapon. Propaganda is an extreme form of abuse
of media which aims to influence social and political processes and is particularly potent
when it is sponsored by governments and used in international relations. A current acute case
is Russian state-sponsored propaganda, which raises great concerns for European and Russian
civil society.
1.2
A variety of tools and methods are currently used to undermine European values and
influence the Eastern Partnership and other external actions of the EU, as well as to develop
and provoke separatist and nationalistic attitudes, manipulate the public and conduct direct
interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries and the EU as a whole. The impact
of such disinformation is often underestimated, even in countries that face it most.
Meanwhile, there is a lack of national and EU level actions to tackle the issue.
1.3
During the economic crisis European media outlets have faced budget cuts, which in turn
lowered media quality standards. Meanwhile, despite its budget cuts elsewhere, Russia is
heavily investing in state-controlled media and intensifying its information influence
campaigns to gain support among internal and external audiences for its political goals and
actions. It is important to note that Russian media outlets are able to provide more popular
and, often, controversial content by not upholding the high standards of media ethics, which
are natural for the European media.
1.4
Propaganda cannot and should not be countered with anti-propaganda. Considering the scale
and amount of resources dedicated to increasing information influence, the EESC encourages
choosing the approach of internal partnerships, publicity, transparency and education instead
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of active counter-propaganda or attempts to engage in an open media warfare, which could
only further destabilize European society.
1.5
Europe should learn the lessons from the most recent war in the European neighbourhood: the
role of propaganda was extremely negative and distracting and the position of independent
journalists was very fragile during the Balkan wars that took place only two decades ago.
1.6
In response to the current situation EU institutions together with the Member States should
develop an action plan on strategic communication, covering these major areas: (a) enhancing
EU communication and media quality; (b) increasing support for existing EU and Eastern
Partnership media outlets on EU reporting; (c) strengthening media cooperation networks; (d)
developing and sustaining platforms for media communication with populations; (e)
involving and trusting local journalists and supporting local initiatives aimed at local agenda,
not only regional or European level; (f) encouraging media engagement of reporting on EU
matters; (g) sharing best practices to educate the general public and raise the level of media
literacy and critical thought; (h) enhancing the level of good governance in media outlets and
ensuring the transparency of ownership and funding; (i) fostering independent academic
research on media; (j) ensuring adequate resources for implementing the necessary measures.
1.7
The Committee therefore recommends taking these necessary actions:
1.7.1
Support an EU level network consisting of representatives from media regulators, journalists,
experts, NGOs and EU institutions to design and implement a media impartiality ratings
system, to draft recommendations on media regulations, safeguard freedom of speech, set the
benchmark of quality journalism, monitor the media situation in the EU and its immediate
neighbourhood, support EU Member States’ governments in their communication with
minorities, etc.
1.7.2
Encourage the European Regulators Group for the Audiovisual Media Services to evaluate
the implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the speediness of its
complaint procedures and the effectiveness of measures against disinformation and
manipulation of Freedom of Information and Expression.
1.7.3
Increase the proportion of European works in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, and
ensure broader distribution of European works.
1.7.4
Encourage the Council’s Working Party on Information, in cooperation with the European
External Action Service and other relevant institutions, to collect, filter, summarize and share
the information with the High-Representatives of the Member States in order to ensure that all
representatives have the same amount of data on the subjects when decisions are taken.
1.7.5
Establish a position of EU media spokesperson for Russia-related issues, who should be well
prepared to react to propaganda and provide a harmonized EU approach.
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1.7.6
Support the establishment and functioning of Europe-wide monitoring initiatives to
systematically track false and/or misleading information originating from foreign media
outlets. Monitoring reports should be made publically available.
1.7.7
Create and constantly update the EU list of media channels and their representatives, who
have been accused and sanctioned with dissemination of false and/or misleading information
in at least one Member State.
1.7.8
Encourage Member States and their regulators, as well as related media and civil society
organizations to more actively analyse and raise awareness on cases of disinformation,
propaganda, attempts to manipulate, deceive, incite hatred and propagate war and other
methods of information influence by exposing and publicizing disinformation attempts. The
EU should collect and share the best practices from the Member States.
1.7.9
Increase support for the exchange of European-made media content, especially in the light of
widening access via translation processes, in order to promote European works and provide
competitive alternatives to the Russian production on the EU TV market.
1.7.10 Establish a co-funding scheme for reporters from broadcasters in the EU Eastern border
countries, Eastern Partnership states and Member States that do not have sufficient resources
to report on EU news from Brussels.
1.7.11 Engage and strengthen independent Russian language media outlets by encouraging
cooperation with national and EU-wide broadcasters for sharing content and reporting.
1.7.12 Encourage the Eurobarometer and national polls to analyse the impact of disinformation and
information manipulation on the public and use the data for the development of quality EU
and National communication strategies and policies.
1.7.13 Invite the Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) to collect existing
UNESCO, Council of Europe and Member States examples on media education and
information literacy training, and prepare a list of recommended practices to the Member
States.
1.7.14 Strengthen the promotion of European identity and core values – human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights – through the European
support instruments implemented both in the Member States and countries eligible for such
support.
1.7.15 Enhance transparency and integrity in the lobbyist, think tank and NGO sectors at both EU
and national levels by implementing strict registration and declaration rules for lobbyists, as
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well as requiring think tanks and NGOs to disclose their funding sources and declare possible
links between their funders and research outcomes.
2.
Introduction and overview of the situation in the EU and Eastern Partnership countries
2.1
At international level Russian media messages are a lot subtler than those it employs with its
domestic audience. It reaches broader audiences by operating in foreign languages and these
messages are crafted to influence and change opinions. Its influence consists of the following
main objectives: increasing its influence among populations within Europe, ending its western
isolation and sanctions, discrediting the EU and other western countries, eroding support for
legitimate governments, demoralising local populations, disorienting western policymakers
and undermining the concept of free, independent and pluralistic media1.
2.2
Russian content is often aimed at European values and the EU’s foreign policies. As a result,
the picture of the world is simplified and painted in black and white, where the “decadent”
West is black and Russia is white2 – thus destabilising and provoking confrontations among
the societies of the EU, as well as hindering the cooperation between the EU and Eastern
Partnership states3.
2.3
The Russian government attempts to exert its influence on the strategic choices of Eastern
Partnership countries by using mass media, as well as economic and political means. Its
attitude towards its neighbours includes efforts to interfere in their attempts to shape their
national identity by claiming that these countries and their people should be linked more
closely to Russia, not Europe.
2.4
In its public diplomacy, the Russian government seeks to develop its own effective means of
information influence on public opinion abroad and its state-controlled media outlets are
playing an important role in forming public opinion by spreading key narratives, thematic
frames and messages outlined in the strategic policy documents of the Russian Federation4.
2.5
The global news network RT is the main Russian international media outlet used in the
government’s information campaign. It has 22 satellites and over 230 broadcast operators,
attracts over 700 million viewers in more than 100 countries and is available in almost 3
million hotel rooms throughout the world. State-funded with a budget of $400 million in
2015, it broadcasts in English, Arabic, Spanish, German, French and Russian and is the most
watched news channel on the internet in the world5. For comparison, the BBC World Service
1
2
3
4
5
EU Strategic communication responding to propaganda, non-paper, 8 January 2015
The anatomy of Russian information warfare, Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2014
The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, Institute of Modern Russia, 2014
Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 303-18-02-2013, 12 February 2013
RT has the most YouTube videos of any news agency on the planet and 1,466 million YouTube subscribers. For comparison,
BBC News – 0,377 million subscribers
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Group, the biggest broadcast newsgathering operation in the world, had a budget of $376
million for 2014-2015.
2.6
To further increase the global reach and broadcast in different media, a new state-funded
international multimedia structure – Sputnik – was launched. It includes a website, newswire
and social media presence, as well as "news hubs" operating in 30 languages, present in
34 countries and 130 cities around the globe. Sputnik broadcasts over 800 hours of radio
programming a day.
2.7
Social media has become a tool for information collection for intelligence purposes,
disinformation, deception, as well as recruitment and fundraising for particular activities.
Through various forms, e.g. fake social network accounts and profiles, it is also a convenient
tool for the rapid distribution of interlinked texts and images supporting a certain narrative,
and their easy, cost-free multiplication.
2.8
An information campaign to shape international opinion has extended to recruiting and
training online bloggers and trolls who spread the Kremlin’s messages in the comments
sections of top news websites and in social networks. Over 400 employees work 12-hour
shifts and are split into three departments – writing up themes, commenting, and creating
graphics and content for social media6. On an average working day, the trolls are expected to
post 50 times on news articles. Each blogger is to maintain 6 Facebook accounts publishing at
least 3 posts a day and discussing the news in groups at least twice a day. Each month, they
are expected to attract 500 subscribers and get at least 5 posts on each item a day. On Twitter,
the bloggers are expected to manage 10 accounts with up to 2 000 followers and tweet
50 times a day7.
2.9
With their large Russian-speaking populations, the Baltic States are among the EU countries
that are highly vulnerable to Russian disinformation and influence. The biggest First Baltic
Channel (PBK) rebroadcasts programming and news from the Russian state-owned Channel
One and attracts over 4 million viewers or 2/3 of the total population in the Baltic region.
Often Russian media content is provided for Baltic broadcasters for free or a symbolic fee in
exchange for long-term partnership contracts, as well as for an obligation not to rebroadcast
independent Russian media outlets8.
2.10
Russian state-controlled media often discredits the EU based on the opinions of individuals
who have no credibility in the EU. Such experts often have backgrounds in extremist groups
6
7
8
The Trolls Who Came In From The Cold, Radio Svoboda, http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/26899521.html
Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America, Max Seddon, BuzzFeed, 2 June 2014
Humanitarian Dimensions of Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. Centre for East
European Policy Studies, 2010
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that would make them ineligible for western media channels9. Russian state media validates
this approach with the idea that there is no such thing as objective truth – this concept is used
to argue that any opinion, however bizarre or ridiculous, has the same weight as all others.
2.11
However, media is not the only source of Russian information influence – it also functions
through various Public Relations agencies, lobbyists, think tanks, non-governmental
organisations, elite influencers, party politics, expert community, cultural activities and
European far-right and far-left movements which in return receive payment through various
"independent" public trusts, off-shore accounts and/or exposure in Russian state media10.
3.
Overview of media situation in the Russian Federation
3.1
The goals of Russian domestic state-media and information campaigns differ from those of
the international level – the domestic population needs to be reassured that defence and media
spending is necessary, while at the same time conditioned to accept cuts to civil sector
programmes and to maintain support for Russian leaders (prior to the start of the conflict in
Ukraine 53% of Russians said they would vote for a different candidate during the next
election. After the annexation of Crimea, 86% said they would re-elect Vladimir Putin as the
president11).
3.2
The lack of media freedom in Russia works as a supporting factor for these goals. The
government of Russia controls around 95% of media and over 90%12 of Russians get their
information directly from state media. Total state spending on the media was set to be around
$2.94 billion in September 2014.
3.3
Russian media ownership consists of 4 main groups: (a) the State – VGTRG (the State’s
major media holding: includes 4 main national TV and over 80 regional TV channels,
5 national radio stations and a 17% stake in Euronews), Channel One (250 million viewers
around the world), RT, ITAR-TASS, etc.; (b) Gazprom-Media Holding – NTV, Rutube, etc.;
(c) Bank Rossiya – REN TV, Channel 5, etc.; (d) Alisher Usmanov – Mail.ru, VKontake and
Odnoklassniki (most popular social networks), etc13.
3.4
In September 2014, the Russian Duma passed a law restricting foreign ownership of media
companies to 20%, which forces foreign owners to relinquish control over independent
outlets, further consolidating the government’s control over the media and eradicating the
possibilities for foreign media outlets to broadcast in the country.
9
Example, RT experts: Holocaust denier Ryan Dawson as a “Human Rights activist”, and neo-Nazi Manuel Ochsenreiter as a
"Middle East analyst"
10
11
Spin doctors to the autocrats: how European PR firms whitewash repressive regimes, Corporate Europe Observatory, 2015
Levada analytical centre survey, 2014
12
Media Guide – Russia, BBC Monitoring, September 2014
13
Media Guide – Russia, BBC Monitoring, September 2014
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3.5
While most Russians rely on TV for their news, younger Russians also rely on the internet. In
response, Russia characterised the internet as a "CIA project" and enacted a "bloggers law"
which forces bloggers with more than 3 000 followers to register with the government and
imposes onerous requirements for social media sites and search engines. In June 2014 the
Russian Duma introduced a law according to which a person who "likes" or "shares"
disapproval of Russian actions or policies can be charged with "extremism" and be
prosecuted. The government has also been given powers to block opposition websites without
explanation.
3.6
In 2014, World Press Freedom Index and Press Freedom Survey ranked Russia as
“Worsening” and "Not Free," describing the media environment as "characterised by the use
of a pliant judiciary to prosecute independent journalists, impunity for the physical
harassment and murder of journalists, and continued state control or influence over almost all
traditional media outlets"14. Due to the deterioration of press freedom independent media
outlets and journalists are forced to stop their broadcasting or even leave the country.
3.7
As a result, 49% of all Russians believe that information on the Internet needs to be censored;
42% believe foreign countries are using the Internet against Russia and its interests; 24%
think the Internet threatens political stability; and 39% believe personal blogs should be
regulated the same as mass media websites15.
3.8
Propaganda and conspiracy theories spreads confusion domestically, so that truth becomes
overshadowed with the flow of false messaging. The claims that create the picture of an
enemy are not necessarily fully believed, but do serve to create confusion so that the picture
becomes murky. The Russian population is left confused and passive – propaganda became a
tool, which induces paranoia, fear, a sense of insecurity, nostalgia for the Soviet Union and
nationalism. Data shows, that 68% – a 17% increase in 201416 – of Russians believe, that they
are under the threat of being attacked by another country.
3.9
Therefore, it is important to continue engaging with the people of Russia especially with the
young generation in order to support and maintain the contact with Russian society, and to
preserve the European perspective. Building mutual trust and ensuring that Russian and EU
civil society can interact freely and providing as much support as possible to Russian
independent civil society organisations have never been more important17.
14
15
16
17
World Press Freedom Index 2014, Reporters Without Borders; Freedom House, Press Freedom Survey, 2014
Benchmarking Public demand, Erik Nisbet/Center of Global Communication Studies/Russian Public Opinion Research Center
Levada analytical centre survey, 2015
REX400, Civil society in Russia, 10 December 2014, Rapporteur Ms Mall Hellam, EESC
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4.
Current EU and national level actions
4.1
The necessity to prepare a communication strategy countering the Russian disinformation
campaign directed towards the EU, its eastern neighbours and Russia itself is already tasked
by the European Parliament18, the Council19 and four Member States’ informal paper20.
4.2
The European Council Conclusions on external relations of 19 March 2015 stress the need to
challenge Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns and invite the High Representative, in
cooperation with Member States and EU institutions, to prepare an action plan on strategic
communication by June.
4.3
The British regulator Ofcom put TV Novosti (the Licensee of RT in the UK) on notice that
any future breaches of impartiality rules may result in further regulatory action, including
considering a statutory sanction21.
4.4
The Lithuanian court upheld a move by a media watchdog to suspend the Gazprom-owned
NTV Mir after it broadcasted a movie in which it lied about events in 1991, when the Soviet
army tried to remove Lithuania’s pro-independence government22.
4.5
The Latvian regulator restricted the rebroadcasting of the television channel Rossiya RTR on
the territory of Latvia for a period of three months after strongly condemning Russian actions
in Ukraine and claiming that Rossiya RTR, along with other state-controlled television
channels, is disseminating tendentious information that has a negative influence on Latvia’s
national security interests23.
4.6
Nevertheless, the actions of Member States’ regulators against biased content and
disinformation are limited by the level of implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services
Directive in other Member States. The above-mentioned examples from the authorities in the
Baltic States could not reach a tangible effect, as some broadcasters are registered in and
broadcast the signal from another Member State, which has not fully implemented the
Directive.
18
19
20
21
22
23
European Parliament resolution on the situation in Ukraine, 15/01/2015 (2014/2965(RSP))
Council conclusions on Ukraine, 29/01/2015
EU Strategic communication responding to propaganda, non-paper, 8 January 2015
Ofcom Broadcast Bulletin, Issue number 266, 10 November 2014, p. 5-44
Vilnius Regional Administrative Court ruling on Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania’s request to halt the
broadcasting of the Russian TV channel NTV Mir Lithuania, 21 March 2014
Decision No 95 On restricting the rebroadcasting of Rossiya RTR in Latvia, National Electronic Mass Media Council, 3 April
2014
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Brussels, 28 April 2015
The President
of the
Section for External Relations
José María Zufiaur Narvaiza
_____________
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