Echeñique, Javier. Aristotle's Ethics and moral responsibility. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012. viii, 209 p. $95.00. ISBN 9781107021587.
Michael Pakaluk, Ave Maria University, mpakaluk@gmail.com
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This is a book mainly about praise and blame, what these are, and what their function is. It is
incidentally a book on Aristotle’s views on moral responsibility.
Echeñique advances what he calls an “ascriptive” theory of praise and blame, according to which to
praise someone for an action is to ascribe that action to some virtue, which that action either expresses
or will lead to in the agent; similarly, to blame someone for an action is to ascribe that action to some
vice, which that action either expresses or will lead to in the agent. This ascriptive theory, as Echeñique
explains, is the same as the “attributional” theory of praise and blame put forward by Gary Watson [[1]]
and Joel Feinberg [[2]], with some slight changes: basically, on the attributional theory, insofar as we
praise or blame someone we are not expecting that he act toward us in certain ways, or holding him
accountable for doing so or not doing so, whereas on the ascriptive theory, praise and blame may, and
often do, involve this added component, even if holding someone accountable is not at the core of, or
essential to, what praise and blame are.
Echeñique favors this ascriptive theory over a competing theory, which is an adaptation of the position
taken by P.F. Strawson in a well-known article [[3]] and which Echeñique therefore refers to as the
“Strawsonian” theory. The Strawsonian theory holds that praise and blame are reactive, emotion-like
attitudes, which members of a moral community reciprocally feel toward one another, insofar as they
either do, or fail to do, actions that are expected of them: they are “held accountable” for such actions;
and actions like these therefore deserve to be praised or blamed.
In the main part of his book, Echeñique aims to refute the Strawsonian theory, relying on the following
considerations. As explained, the Strawsonian theory holds that praise and blame are (1) reactive, (2)
emotion-like attitudes, (3) felt reciprocally by members of the same moral community, and (4) for
actions which deserve praise and blame. Against (1), Echeñique says that praise and blame have a
prospective dimension (yet without being inherently manipulative), especially when parents, teachers,
or legislators praise or blame those under their care with a view to fostering virtue and discouraging
vice. Against (2), he says that praise and blame are statements in the indicative mood, not attitudes or
emotions, merely. Against (3), he says that we praise and blame children, and yet children are not
reciprocating members of the same moral community, because they do not in turn praise and blame the
adults who care for them. Against (4), he says that we praise athletes for their talents and artisans for
their skill, and yet it is clearly inappropriate to hold that these talents or athletes “deserve” praise, in
any non-metaphorical use of that term. The ascriptive view, in contrast, seems open to none of these
objections but rather helps to explain the relevant phenomena.
In the book, Echeñique refers to Aristotle in relation to each of these objections. For instance,
Echeñique points out that Aristotle says that we praise athletes and artisans (51-54, see <i>Nic. Eth.</i>
1101b12-18); that Aristotle says that praise and blame take the form of statements (43-47,
see<i>Rhet.</i> 1367b36-1368a9); that, although Aristotle does not explicitly say that children are
suitable objects of praise and blame, nonetheless, in a passage in which we might have expected to
excluded children, if that were his view, he noticeably failed to do so (34-38, see <i>Nic. Eth.</i>
1149b31-1150a1). But obviously these references to Aristotle are all incidental, as the objections stand
on their own. Moreover, it is too much to impute an ascriptive “theory” to Aristotle simply on the
grounds that what he says (or fails to say, in the mentioned <i> argumentum ex silentio</i>) is more
consistent with that theory than with the Strawsonian theory: it seems better to hold that when
referring to practices of praise and blame, Aristotle says what most of us would say, or what his
contemporaries would say, and that the ascriptive view at least initially matches this non-theoretical or
pre-theoretical view better.
So much for the main part of the book: as I said, it is the presentation of a series of objections to the
Strawsonian theory in the guise of interpreting Aristotle and replying to those interpreters of Aristotle
(T. Irwin [[4]] and S. Sauvé Meyer [[5]]) who seem to impute something like a Strawsonian account to
Aristotle, followed by the development of the alternative ascriptive view. To my mind, this part of the
book raises an interesting question about what is the proper method of ancient philosophy. It seems
desirable that scholarship in ancient philosophy and the interpretation of classical texts be brought into
relation with current debates about philosophical topics among philosophers who do not see
themselves as engaged in the history of philosophy. And yet if—to take an extreme case-- one merely
uses an ancient philosopher or classical texts as instruments for carrying out a debate that in principle
stands on its own, then no original contribution is allowed to the ancient philosopher or text, while one
risks obscuring the arguments and evidence that are most relevant to the current debate, making the
fair assessment of that debate only more difficult. Moreover, one might think that ancient texts will not
make their own contribution unless they are examined through a rather detailed exegesis of the sort
which, I find, Echeñique typically does not undertake.
The second half of book is something like an appendix, consisting of chapters each devoted to a
condition which can render an action not voluntary (which Echeñique calls a “defeater”), such as nonculpable ignorance of particulars, extreme psychological compulsion, violent interference, and coercion.
Why are these chapters added to a book mainly about praise and blame? According to Echeñique, to
show that Aristotle “has an original, appealing and very complete account of each and every one of the
defeaters” (83), which is internally consistent and moreover compatible with an ascriptive account of
praise and blame; and, furthermore, to show that when some defeater is discussed by both the
<i>Eudemian</i> and the <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>, then the latter may be understood as resolving
problems inherent in the former.
Here I find that the general absence of detailed exegesis serves as an obstacle to Echeñique’s purposes.
I shall briefly advert to one example to illustrate this point. In chapter 3 on the defeater, violence,
Echeñique states four different definitions of violence or forcible interference with one’s actions which
seem offered by or implicit in the <i>Eudemian Ethics</i> account: violence is what is against natural
inclination (88); what originates outside the agent’s whole motivation set, besides being against natural
inclination (94); what originates outside the agent’s whole motivation set, besides being against the
agent’s “rational impulse” (100); and what simply originates outside the agent’s whole motivational set
(which Echeñique wishes to say is the “core” notion of violence, 103). Now Echeñique concedes that
these four accounts hardly constitute an “appealing and complete” account, and they hardly seem
internally consistent; rather, they seem heterogeneous and motivated by disparate considerations—
thus his discussion of the defeater, violence, hardly corresponds to Echeñique’s purpose in including a
chapter on this topic at all. Moreover, Echeñique’s does not include a separate or full consideration of
the Nicomachean account but only refers to it in a footnote (104-5n30), in much too brief a manner to
allow the reader to consider how this account might have evolved out of tensions in the four Eudemian
accounts.
However, the <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> gives a distinct definitionof violence, different from any
Eudemian definition, as that which someone does or suffers, the origin of which is outside the agent, to
which the agent contributes nothing (1110a1-3). Moreover, although Echeñique thinks that Aristotle
says nothing to explain or develop this definition in III.1, it is interesting that the definition gets stated
and then reiterated, with δή, later in the chapter, which is a characteristic way in Aristotle of marking off
material which deals with the reiterated point:
τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἁπλῶς μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ ὁ πράττων
μηδὲν συμβάλληται; (1110b1-3)
ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.
(b15-17). [[5]]
That intervening material (b9-15) is indeed translated and briefly discussed by Echeñique (108), yet not
as relevant to the definition of violence, but rather understood as a dialectical reply to the view of
Gorgias in the <i>Encomium of Helen</i> (107-8).[[6]]
Suppose, then, we attempt to construe b9-15 as relevant to the definition of violence. Then it can be
construed as an argument that the “origin of which is outside the agent” clause needs to be
supplemented by the “agent contributing nothing” clause, as in the <i>Nic. Eth.</i> definition. We can
gloss the argument as follows: “Suppose one were to say that it is enough, for something to be counted
as a violent cause, that it is external (b9-10); but objects of perception and thought are like that; and
when we act in response to such objects in a way which is voluntary, we do so with pleasure (b12); and
so [δή] it is ridiculous to count as the cause of the action only that which is outside (b13), and not the
agent for being such as to be influenced by those things: and so one has to add, when the influence is
violent, that the agent contributes nothing (b15-17).”
My point is not that Echeñique should have considered and evaluated this particular interpretation of
the passage, as giving an argument for the <i>Nic. Eth.</i> definition, but rather that, in my view, he in
general does not deal with the text in sufficient enough detail as potentially to reveal considerations of
this sort.
Notwithstanding the difficulties I have raised, Echeñique’s book is exceedingly thoughtful, precise in
expression throughout, consistently rich in insights, and enjoyable to study. It furthermore seems to be
generally correct. Although, as a work of skill, on its own terms it does not deserve any praise,
nonetheless, when I adopt the stance of the “apt observer” (73), as I must as a reviewer, I find it
appropriate to express a judgment ascribing perspicacity, understanding of Aristotle, and intellectual
integrity to its author.
[[1]] “Free agency,” in Watson, G. (ed.) Free Will, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
[[2]] <i>Doing and Deserving</i>, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
[[3]] “Freedom and Resentment,” <i>Proceedings of the British Academy</i>, 48: 187-211, 1962.
[[4]] “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle,” in A.O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, Berkeley,
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 117-56.
[[5]] In Aristotelica Richards argues, rightly I think, that the neuter article be athetized.
[[5]] <i>Aristotle on Moral Responsibility: Character and Cause.</i> Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993.
[[6]] Aristotle’s use of a future less vivid conditional to introduce the view he is considering (εἰ δέ τις τὰ
ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι … πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια, 1110b9-10) makes less likely, I believe,
that he is responding to a view stated by a preceding thinker; rather, he seems to be developing a new
objection, presumably presupposing his own view, that objects of sense perception, thought, and desire
are “outside us” (ἔξω) and motivate us from without (see for example <i>De Anima</i> 417a4, b20).