The Non-Identity Problem, lecture 4, Mich2012 Claire Benn cmab3@cam.ac.uk The Non-Identity Problem – Alternative Solutions Recap The Significant Moral Difference View: 1) The Time Dependence Claim 2) The No Worse Off Argument 3) The Person-Affecting Principle a. An action is wrong only if it harms b. An action harms only if it brings about a state of affairs that makes someone worse off Parfit’s strategy: Reject the Person-Affecting Principle; adopt Principle Q and try and find Theory X Diffuse the Non-Identity Problem Strategy 1: Heyd Bites the Bullet There is a conflict of intuitions: the person-affecting intuition and the no significant moral difference intuition. Parfit asks us to prefer the latter. Heyd says we should prefer the former. Thus, according to Heyd, future people, whose existence depends on a given act has “no moral status of any kind, not even a weak one” relative to that act. We cannot genuinely harm people who depend on our choices for their very existence. PROBLEM: why accept the person-affecting intuition? As Roberts puts it “it seems implausible that whatever we do is automatically made morally permissible so long as more benign alternatives very probably would have led to variations in the timing and manner of conception and thus have changed the identities of future persons.”1 Strategy 2: Benatar Rejects the No Worse Off Argument The No Worse Off Argument is based on the premise that ‘if being brought into existence is either a benefit or neither a benefit nor a harm, then someone is not made worse off by being brought into existence when the alternative is never to have been born at all’. Benatar accepts this but rejects the antecedent of this conditional. His anti-natalism position is follows from the following observations: The presence of pain is bad The presence of pleasure is good The absence of pain is good The absence of pleasure is not bad2 Existers experience pleasure but only existers suffer (and all existers suffer some time). Thus, there is a negative aspect to existing. On the other hand, non-existence entails the absence of pleasure, which is not bad, and the absence of pain, which is good. Thus non-existence is overall a good thing whereas existence involves a bad thing: pain and suffering. 1 2 Roberts. ‘The Non-Identity Problem’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Benatar, Better Never to Have Been, p30 1. The Non-Identity Problem, lecture 4, Mich2012 Claire Benn cmab3@cam.ac.uk Conclusion: we always harm someone by bringing them into existence. PROBLEM: this means that it is always impermissible to have children. Separating Wronging and Harming Attack the Person-Affecting Principle premise (a) and distinguish wronging from harming. Strategy 3: Kumar and Mutual Respect “The kinds of considerations that are relevant for determining whether or not a person has been harmed have primarily to do with the state of the person who claims to have been harmed. Whether or not another has wronged one, on the other hand, has primarily to do with facts concerning the character of the wrongdoer’s regulation of her conduct with respect to how she has related to the wronged.”3 Consequentialism: does not explain how anyone in particular is a victim of wrongdoing. The Person-Affecting Principle is part of the ‘outcome approach’ to understanding wrongdoing: still, mistakenly, thinks that outcomes determine whether wrongdoing has occurred. The Drunk Driver. “Consider, for example, the case of a drunk driver who comes swerving along the street where you happen to be taking a late evening stroll, thereby momentarily imperiling your life. Luckily, nothing happens to you; the whole incident takes place so quickly, you don’t even have time to be frightened. You are not, therefore, in any way worseoff as a result of your life having been put at risk. As the risk did not in fact blossom into an actual harm, or end up setting back one’s interests in any way, any talk of one having been left worse-off as a result of the drunk driver’s conduct would be, in this case, misplaced.”4 The Non-Consequentialist Conviction. “that what one does has an intrinsic significance in moral reasoning that is independent of what happens as a result of what one does.”5 The Legitimate Expectations Account of Wrongdoing.6 “One person wronging another, then, requires that the wrongdoer has, without adequate excuse or justification, violated certain legitimate expectations with which the wronged party was entitled, in virtue of her value as a person, to have expected her to comply.”7 Failing to comply with certain legitimate expectations is, as Kumar says, “not just a matter of having failed to conduct oneself in a certain way. It can also be understood as a failure to have been responsive to certain considerations that it was legitimate to expect one to have 3 Kumar, 'Who Can be Wronged', p100 Kumar, 'Who Can be Wronged', p103 5 Kumar, 'Who Can be Wronged', p105 6 This is my name for this position. 7 Kumar, 'Who Can be Wronged', p107 4 2. The Non-Identity Problem, lecture 4, Mich2012 Claire Benn cmab3@cam.ac.uk been response, or to have taken into account considerations that it was reasonable to have expected one to have disregarded as irrelevant for one's deliberations at that time.”8 Significance of Types rather than Tokens. “For the purposes of thinking about what one is entitled to expect of another, however, knowledge of the particular identity of the other is not essential. What is essential is that one has reason to take the other to be of a certain type.”9 PROBLEM: Parfit considers this solution. Before birth “we can use the phrase ‘her child’ and the pronoun ‘he’ to cover any child that she might have. These words need not refer to one particular child. We can truly claim: ‘If this girl does not have her child now, but waits and has him later, he will not be the same particular child. If she has him later, he will be a different child.’ By using these words in this way, we can explain why it would be better if this girl waits. We can claim: The objection to this girl’s decision is that it will probably be worse for her child. If she waited, she would probably give him a better start in life.”10 However, after the girl has her child then the phrase ‘her child’ now naturally refers to this particular child. And this girl’s decision is not worse for this child. So, the child is a particular person who should be thought of as an individual rather than just an interchangeable token of a type. Strategy 4: Woodward and Specific Interests and Rights Specific Interests. People have “relatively specific interests (e.g., in having promises kept, in avoiding bodily injury, in getting their fair share) that are not simply reducible to some general interest in maintaining a high overall level of well-being and that many moral requirements function so as to protect against violations of such specific interests.”11 Promise Making and Promise Keeping. I am contemplating promising you that I will do something. What I am contemplating promising is helping you study for a test and returning your books to the library. If I don’t promise then I know I won’t do either of these things which would be helpful to you. However, I also know that if I do promise then I will take your books back to the library but that by taking them back I won’t be able to help you study for the test. Now taking the library books back and not helping you study leaves you better off than if I don’t take the library books back and still don’t help you study.12 The Racist Ticket Seller. “Suppose that Smith, who is black, attempts to buy a ticket on a certain airline flight and that the airline refuses to sell it to him because it discriminates racially. Shortly after, that very flight crashes, killing all aboard. There is a clear sense in 8 Kumar, 'Who Can be Wronged', p107 Kumar, ‘Who Can be Wronged’, p112 10 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p359 11 Woodward, ‘The Non-Identity Problem’, p809 12 Adapted from Woodward, ‘The Non-Identity Problem’, p810 9 3. The Non-Identity Problem, lecture 4, Mich2012 Claire Benn cmab3@cam.ac.uk which the airline’s action has the result that Smith is better off than he otherwise would be, and if selling or not selling Smith the ticket are the only relevant actions which the airline can perform, not selling leaves him better off than any other possible action the airline might have performed.”13 Personal, not Impersonal, Complaint. “Presumably what the nuclear people will complain about is the fact that many of their number have been killed, injured, poisoned, and so forth. Presumably they will not say, ‘We recognize that nothing wrong has been done to us. What awakens our indignation is rather that even better off people would have been produced if the alternative energy policy had been chosen.’”14 PROBLEM: Parfit also considers this strategy and rejects it. Newspaper Protester. A man writes to a newspaper to protest about a politician who welcomed a decrease in teenage pregnancies. The man says that his mother was only 14 when she had him and that because of her youth his early years were hard on both of them. However, the man argues that his life is now well worth living. He argued that it was outrageous to suppose that it would have been better if he had never been born. He argues that he is glad that he was brought into existence and that he does not regret the choice his mother made. Parfit argues that in the Non-Identity Cases, when people realise that the alternative is not to have been born at all, as long as their lives are worth living, they will be glad that we chose as we did. Their lack of regret over our choices is an implicit waiving of their rights. Thus there is no rights based objection to be had. 13 14 Woodward, ‘The Non-Identity Problem’, p810 Woodward, ‘The Non-Identity Problem’, p817 4.